The Teleological Thinking in Nicolai Hartmann. A Conversation between Hartmann’s Theory of the Final Causality of Nature and Kant’s Views on Teleology

Abstract

The work aims at presenting an interpretation of Nicolai Hartmann’s investigation of teleology, which would make possible a confrontation with Kant’s critical philosophy and teleological thought. Kant’s influence on the theoretical position assumed by Hartmann regarding the problem of finality is elucidated in the article. Kant’s influence on Hartmann will be explained in two steps: by considering the definition of purposiveness as a heuristic principle and by analyzing Hartmann’s approach to the problem of human freedom. Then Hartmann’s analysis of the categories is addressed, the philosopher’s exposition of the origin of the final nexus in the structure of consciousness being fundamental for his entire interpretation of the problem of teleology. By means of that, the faculty of consciousness to set for itself a purpose and its temporality as the origin of this faculty are analyzed. Hence, the question about the categorical claim of finality turns into the problem concerning its position with respect to the level of Being as exposed by Hartmann. Following that, the case of the organic is investigated, where the question of teleology is crucially at stake. Even though finality and purposiveness are necessarily given as related to a consciousness, this latter cannot represent something dominating the world and the organic. That excludes the possibility of finality in the organic—at least in this form. Considering Kant’s influence on defining the heuristic principle and causality of human freedom, monism in the determinations of reality is excluded in principle, while the position and possibility of finality in nature are newly defined.