The identiy of concepts “cognition” and “criminal procedure proving”

Abstract

Examining theses about the nature of the concepts “cognition” and “proof of criminal procedure”, the author refutes the understanding of the latter as a species of cognition which has remained since Soviet times. The author believes this detail sets a strong cornerstone for adopting epistemological theses into the proof of criminal procedure. If this step is absent, it shall be impossible to think of forming rules of making the cognitive and prognostic criminal procedure decisions as pre-developed by K. V. Skoblik. The criminal procedure form does not have a specific character in order to create proofs of criminal procedure as the species of cognition. This statement is also argued in the article. The subordination between these concepts is based on nonessential features. If we use essential features, these concepts will be identical. Consequently, the criminal procedural form must not ignore objective laws of cognition so we must construct it using these laws. Thereupon, the discrepancies of Russian CrPC towards understanding proving as cognition are shown in the academic paper. The historical method, methods of definitional concepts and division of concepts were applied by K. V. Skoblik in the current research. Refs 26.