Aspects of naming and names of aspects

Abstract

The paper undertakes an analysis of the discussion about the presence and varieties of the de dicto / de re ambiguity for names. I will argue that we are dealing with several phenomena here, which are relatively easy to confuse: first, usual de re; second, a name being normally used as opposed to being used as in a diverging or underdeveloped dialect; third, the reinterpetation of a name as denoting a (temporal, cognitive, etc.) aspect of an individual. The second and the third phenomenon can combine with usual de re. After surveying the examples, I first filter out those in which deviant dialects are manifest. This issue is resolved via a diagonalisation operation across the special dimension called “dubbing-in-force”, which is essentially the part of the naming conventions salient in the discourse situation. Then the cases of semantic reinterpretation are considered, where I stipulate the existence, on a par with the usual domain of individuals, of a dedicated domain of aspect-type entities to which a name can refer in some cases. This stipulation does not by itself destroy rigid designation, as names continue to denote rigidly, even if what they denote is aspects of individuals rather than complete individuals. Finally, I turn to customary de re readings for singular terms, where the difference between the aspect/individual contrast and the de re / de dicto ambiguity is emphasised; I provide a Quinean “double vision” scenario which, unlike the original version, involves aspects of individuals. Thus the possibility of superposition is demonstrated for the phenomena studied in the paper. Refs 25.