How to study ICT-security policy: Opportunities and challenges for critical discourse-analysis

Abstract

The article examines the method of critical discourse-analysis (CDA) on the example of the relations between the United States and Russia in the field of ICT security, as well as in the context of negotiations at the UN level in the same area, where both countries have a significant influence on the processes. CDA can be used to study ICT security policy in order to understand how different actors use language to discuss problems: what terms and concepts are used, as well as how they can influence public perception of the problem. CDA can also be used to study the dynamics of interaction between different actors: what interests they pursue and what compromises they are willing to make to achieve common goals. The method is connected with the theoretical framework of A. Holzscheiter, which identifies the levels of analysis (micro-agents and macro-structures), as well as the types of power/influence realization in discourse (deliberative and productive). As a demonstration of the method, the author has made a brief analysis of the discourses of ICT threats to the United States and Russia based on strategic documents of the states. It is inscribed in the structures of bilateral relations and international negotiations, presented in the form of events on a timeline. Depending on the level of analysis or the starting point of the study — agents or structures — we get completely different explanations of the causal relationships of possible explanations for policy change through discourse (productive or deliberative). The study of ICT security is further complicated by the fact that we must keep both the bilateral and international levels of interaction in focus, since these processes are closely interrelated. In conclusion, the article describes important limitations of the method, including the weak explanatory potential of the reasons for the change in ICT security policy.