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Поле DC | Значение | Язык |
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dc.contributor.author | MAROSAN, BENCE PETER | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-06-27T18:10:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-06-27T18:10:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2024-03 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | MAROSAN B. P. HOW COULD HUSSERL’S THEORY OF THE BODILY SELF-CONSTITUTION OF THE EGO HELP BRIDGE THE EXPLANATORY GAP?. Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, 2024, vol. 13 issue 1, pp. 57–94. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.other | https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2024-13-1-57-94 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11701/45626 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The explanatory gap—the apparently ineliminable chasm between physical, bodily processes and states on the one hand, and subjective, lived experience on the other—belongs among the greatest problems of contemporary philosophy of mind and empirical research concerning consciousness. According to some scholars—such as eliminativist philosophers like Paul and Patricia Churchland—it is a pseudo- question. However, in our interpretation, an accurate phenomenological reflection on one’s own consciousness convinces the attentive and careful philosopher that it is very much a real question—and in fact a crucial one. The present paper endeavours to show how Husserl’s theory of the bodily self-constitution of the ego could help us, not to close the explanatory gap in a reductionist manner, but rather to bridge this gap by rendering apparent the necessary connection between the subjective, phenomenal side of experience and its bodily basis. In this interpretation, Husserl’s conception of embodiment could even provide a more rigorous and firmer theoretical foundation than any which currently undergirds empirically related research regarding the origins of consciousness in the natural world. In the first half of the study, I outline Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt’s attempt to bridge and, in a further step, to eliminate the explanatory gap, in which they proceed from the external world to the interiority of mind. The second part of the paper presents a phenomenological analysis that aims to demonstrate that a Husserlian attempt would follow the opposite direction: from the inside proceeding outwards towards the external, physical reality. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | This study was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (project: BO/00143/23/2) and by the No. 138745 project of Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | St Petersburg State University | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology;Volume 13; Issue 1 | - |
dc.subject | explanatory gap | en_GB |
dc.subject | embodiment | en_GB |
dc.subject | philosophy of mind | en_GB |
dc.subject | Edmund Husserl | en_GB |
dc.subject | self-constitution | en_GB |
dc.subject | transcendental and empirical ego | en_GB |
dc.subject | hard problem of consciousness | en_GB |
dc.title | HOW COULD HUSSERL’S THEORY OF THE BODILY SELF-CONSTITUTION OF THE EGO HELP BRIDGE THE EXPLANATORY GAP? | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
Располагается в коллекциях: | Issue 1 |
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04_Marosan-57-94.pdf | 817,07 kB | Adobe PDF | Просмотреть/Открыть |
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