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dc.contributor.authorShimai, Su-
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-26T18:11:27Z-
dc.date.available2024-02-26T18:11:27Z-
dc.date.issued2023-
dc.identifier.otherhttps://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2023.14-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11701/44956-
dc.description.abstractA comprehensive comparison between supply chain cost-revenue sharing contract and trade-off mechanism is considered. Either of the two main members – manufacturer and retailers in the supply chain acts as the bellwether to initiate the green transition program through a cost-revenue sharing contract. While the trade-off mechanism which is applied in the pollution control problem is inspired by the sharing setting behind the contract, i.e., the player transfers part of her profit to another player in trade for her limited responsibility in reducing pollution. However, the power structure is not included in the trade-off mechanism where a third party should be designated to implement the details. The conclusion is given in the end.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, grant No. 22-11-00051, https://rscf.ru/en/project/22-11-00051/en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSt Petersburg State Universityen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesContributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 16-
dc.subjectsupply chainen_GB
dc.subjecttrade-off mechanismen_GB
dc.subjectpollution controlen_GB
dc.subjectdifferential gameen_GB
dc.titleLearning of Supply Chain Cost-Revenue Sharing Contract in the Form of Trade-off Mechanism in Pollution Control Problemen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
Располагается в коллекциях:2023

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