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http://hdl.handle.net/11701/44956
Полная запись метаданных
Поле DC | Значение | Язык |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Shimai, Su | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-02-26T18:11:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-02-26T18:11:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.other | https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2023.14 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11701/44956 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A comprehensive comparison between supply chain cost-revenue sharing contract and trade-off mechanism is considered. Either of the two main members – manufacturer and retailers in the supply chain acts as the bellwether to initiate the green transition program through a cost-revenue sharing contract. While the trade-off mechanism which is applied in the pollution control problem is inspired by the sharing setting behind the contract, i.e., the player transfers part of her profit to another player in trade for her limited responsibility in reducing pollution. However, the power structure is not included in the trade-off mechanism where a third party should be designated to implement the details. The conclusion is given in the end. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, grant No. 22-11-00051, https://rscf.ru/en/project/22-11-00051/ | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | St Petersburg State University | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 16 | - |
dc.subject | supply chain | en_GB |
dc.subject | trade-off mechanism | en_GB |
dc.subject | pollution control | en_GB |
dc.subject | differential game | en_GB |
dc.title | Learning of Supply Chain Cost-Revenue Sharing Contract in the Form of Trade-off Mechanism in Pollution Control Problem | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
Располагается в коллекциях: | 2023 |
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Файл | Описание | Размер | Формат | |
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229-236.pdf | 489,23 kB | Adobe PDF | Просмотреть/Открыть |
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