What and how Markus Gabriel proves in his book “I am Not a Brain”

Abstract

The paper is a discussion of the book by the German philosopher Marcus Gabriel “I am Not a Brain” in the context of the distinction between Analytic and Continental philosophical traditions. Gabriel denies the benefit of such a distinction. However, his book may be a good illustration of the opposite. The paper shows why this is so. The main thing is that when presenting the theoretical positions of certain philosophers, Gabriel is inclined to refer to non-philosophical explanations of their origins. This manner of presentation has nothing to do with the methods of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers evaluate philosophical concepts and arguments based on themselves. In addition to clarifying this issue, the paper examines the main ideas of Gabriel’s book and evaluates some of the ideas proposed by him related to the concepts of consciousness, the human spirit and the problem of free will. In particular, the paper discusses a concept that receives the name “neo-existentialism” from Gabriel. His solution to the problem of free will is also considered, which is one of the varieties of compatibilism, the position according to which free will can coexist with causal determinism, which means a state of affairs in which at any given time the world has only one really possible future. The connection of this decision with Gabriel’s more general metaphysical ideas, expressed in his book about the nonexistence of the world, is shown. Special attention is paid to the features of Gabriel’s criticism of alternative approaches to the interpretation of consciousness and free will. The analysis of Gabriel’s particular concepts confirms the general conclusion of this paper that his book is not related to the analytical philosophical tradition.