“The Wissenschaftslehre 1804 (2)” of J. G. Fichte in the context of the history of philosophy

Abstract

The article highlights the content, structure and terminology of one of the central works of the classic of German idealism J. G. Fichte — “The second course of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre of 1804” (“The Wissenschaftslehre of 1804 (2)”). Despite such a high significance of this work, it has almost never been the subject of detailed consideration in the domestic research tradition. The reason for this state of affairs is the interweaving of its problems in the context of disputes of the late 18th — early 19th centuries on methodological and substantive principles of philosophy as a science. The complex structure of “The Wissenschaftslehre 1804 (2)” and its unique terminology cannot be deciphered without reference to the specified context. As a result of a comparative analysis of the works of the main opponents of science teaching at that time — F. W. J. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel — preceding its appearance with the texts of Fichte, the article establishes that the main problems aimed at solving the text of the second course of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre in 1804 are the problems of introducing absolute philosophy into the point of view and demonstrating the principle of Wissenschaftslehre as free from the opposition of subject and object, thinking and being. Fichte does not recognize the validity of the accusation of his philosophy in subjectivism and himself, in turn, reveals the one-sided objectivism of the “philosophy of identity” of Schelling and Hegel. In this regard, the article manages to establish that the structure of “The Wissenschaftslehre 1804 (2)” includes 4 parts: from 1 to 14 lectures (rise to the point of view of science), 15 lecture (presentation of the principle of science), from 16 to 27 lecture (establishing the beginning of the difference in absolute unity) and 28 lecture (doctrine of the phenomenon of absolute). At the same time, it is proved that the “The Wissenschaftslehre 1804 (2)” has not undergone fundamental changes in comparison with its first expositions, and the changes that take place concern only the way of presenting the Wissenschaftslehre to readers and listeners, as well as its secondary part (“the doctrine of the phenomenon”).