Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Agent Transportation Problems on Network

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a network game where players are multi-agent systems (we call them in this paper ′′coalitions′′) under the condition that the trajectories of players (coalitions) should (have no common arcs, or have no common vertices) i. e. must not intersect. In the same time the trajectories of players inside coalition can intersect (have common arcs,or have common vertices). The last condition complicates the problem, since the sets of strategies turn out to be mutually dependent. A family of Nash equilibrium is constructed and it is also shown that the minimum total time (cost) of players is achieved in a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium. A cooperative approach to solving the problem is proposed. Also, another cooperative mini maximal approach to solving the problem is investigated. We also consider the proportional solution and the Shapley value to allocate total minimal costs between players. Two approaches for constructing the characteristic function have been developed.