GEORGY CHERNAVIN. PHILOSOPHY OF THE TROLL. THE PHENOMENON OF PAID BOTS. Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2021. ISBN 978-5-386-13894-3

Abstract

The review is devoted to Georgy Chernavin’s book Philosophy of the Troll. The Phenomenon of Paid Bots. The central concept of the book–default opinion as an opinion that nobody is behind — is outlined. In the light of the idea of the default opinion Georgy Chernavin seeks to lay bare the anonymous character of the natural attitude and the general positing which belongs to it — “the” world is always there as an actuality. The natural attitude turns out to be the attitude that nobody has ever taken up, since it has always already taken me up and, thus, is taken for granted without my taking part in it. The review analyzes the ambiguity of the troll as interpreted in the book: on the one hand, the troll is the one who expresses someone else’s opinion in the first person, and, in this way, embodies the natural attitude, on the other hand, the troll turns the natural attitude into the professional one, and, therefore, breaks it involuntarily, setting it down as an attitude, that is, moving toward its defamiliarization. Yet the review problematizes the research strategy Georgy Chernavin follows in some respects. In the first instance, this refers to the almost complete reduction of the other to the anonymity, which leaves no room for the meaningful others in the structure of experience. Like Heidegger, Georgy Chernavin relies on the alternative “Me or nobody (das Man)” (despite the problematical character of “me” and “my own” in the book), whereas the other in proper sense and one’s own others remain offscreen. I also try to show the problematical character of the interpretation of the involvement and the noninvolvement, represented in the book. The involvement is treated by Georgy Chernavin only as something that buries philosophical problems in oblivion, and all possibilities of philosophical understanding are attributed to the noninvolvement. I argue that, on the contrary, the involvement in phenomenology is also essential for the non-identity of the self and, thus, is the condition of the possibility of the philosophical problematization, whereas the noninvolvement, as exemplified by the trolls, can turn out to be the source of the default opinions too. In conclusion, I consider the possibility of turning the central argument of the book against the book itself by representatives of other philosophical traditions.