THOMAS HOBBES ON BETRAYAL OF THE FATHERLAND (IN WAR)

Abstract

My intention is to demonstrate how Hobbes’ attempts to adapt two ancient institutions from Roman Law to his own time and knowledge of theology and philosophy. Treason (and the figure of the traitor) could be quite significant within the context of Hobbes’ (but not only his) understanding of the figure of the sovereign and sovereignty. The central part of the text is an endeavor to ascertain the source and unconditional condition for treason as such, within the framework of Hobbes’ theory of representation (representatio) which he writes about in Chapter 16 of the Leviathan. The act or performance in which we could perhaps recognize a traitorous gesture (or the dynamic of treason) could be found in the so-called paradox of representation. The “traitor” breaks the chain of the transfer of power and empowerment, thus stops representation, and puts an end to speaking in the name of the other. If it is possible to discover whether this is possible and whether speaking and acting in one’s own name always carries elements of treason, then we can conclude that differing forms of “direct” speech and action (“in one’s own name”) are “acts of treason.” In that case, what interests me is whether “treason” is found within the heart of representative democracy, and thus if it is de facto an integral part of a democratic order and society.