THE SHADOW TO THE END OF EPOCHE

Abstract

The postulate of Husserlian phenomenology, according to which evidence is the giving of thought to the thing, also contemplates the possibility that certain ways of givenness may be achieved by transgressing the dynamics proper to intellectual intuition. Thus, the primacy of direct perception would be replaced by a system of relations between thought and thing in respect of which there would be no single evidence. This outcome, rather than the finiteness of human subjectivity, should bring one back to the very essence of the object. Evidence would therefore know a conversion that would make it coincide with the ultimate degree of visibility, corresponding to the invariant element of the object. But the attestation, in Husserl’s reflection, of an a priori rooted in the factual or in a “definitively true world” would imply in turn the assumption of a perspective inclined to a form of realism sustained by a “minimum of reality.” This would entail a phenomenology in which the manifestation of entities is no longer linked to the subjective sphere but to a dimension of self-evidence within which the phenomenon coincides with its own evidence. In this sense Husserl seems to reach the acquiescentia in re ipso of the phenomenon: a dwelling of it in its own essence; a dwelling in which the phenomenon would not reveal itself through any grammar of the visible.