Demarcation between evidence and construct as a basis for answering the question of being and truth in philosopy

Abstract

The paper attempts to reveal and identify a prerequisite for answering the two fundamental questions of philosophy: that of being and that of truth. This precondition is viewed as a problem of demarcation between evidence and construct, which is achieved in the process of doubting the being of an existent or in intuitive experiencing the former. This brings about evident (truthful) statements about this being and this existent, on the basis of which there are constructed (hypostatized) other forms of the existent. Despite the fact that construct and evidence cannot be separated and do form a specific antinomy in themselves, there is a way of building a scale for founding the distinction modification, whose ends shall be occupied by ideal types, while the centre is given to the actual status quo. This status quo is represented by four synthetic types of being. Our understanding of being as a relation between the subject and the object, each and every agent of which can be experienced with enough evidence and be constructed at the same time, leads us to shaping a regional ontology that encompasses both subjective forms (evidence of man and a construct of the society) and objective forms (evidence of nature and a construct of the culture) of being. Directness and certainty are the two key properties of evidence, whereas a breakup with them is the characteristic of a construct whose goal it is to achieve practical solution of theoretical problems. Constructs are the essential historical forms of culture such as reflection on being in the form of values, theories and imagery; and also its transformation in the course of practical activity. A special place in this praxis is given to a synthesis of reflection and transformation; i.e. performance that claims to be able to create a simulated being that is more real than reality. Human history is the story of how we rejected evidence in favour of constructs. This rejection, however, is at the same time rejection of genuine human properties in favour of ephemeral ones. The goal of modern philosophy is interpreted as that of freeing or clearing evidence from construct. Refs 12.