The fixed point non-classical theory of truth value gaps by S. Kripke

Abstract

The article is about one of the vital problem for analytic philosophy which is how to define truth value for sentences which include their own truth predicate. The aim of the article is to determine Saul Kripke’s approach to widen epistemological truth to create a systemic model of truth. Despite a lot of work on the subject, the theme of truth is no less relevant to modern philosophy. With the help of S. Kripke’s article “Outline of the Theory of Truth” and R. L. Kirkham’s work “Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction” the author tried to represent a non-classical approach which is now known as Saul Kripke’s truth value gaps theory. Considering his solving of the Liar Paradox, as well as the Strenghened Liar, it is obvious that there could be the circumstances (or facts) that make sentences have no truth value. In that case the solving of the paradox attracts Kleene’s non-classical three-valued logic which contains the third way and the solution falls into the gap between truth and falsity. Hence there are no relevant and full satisfactory ways to solve the Liar’s Paradox by the language-levels approach. The task consists in an extension of the approach to natural languages and elimination of an ad hoc element as well. Besides that, the language-levels approach refers to the speaker that means that only the last one is allowed to define the hierarchy of the levels and truth value of sentence, but often he does not know what level he is speaking of. As Kripke stated, contingent facts can lead to a paradox which isn’t allowed for a logical point of view. However usage of mathematical apparatus allows the theory in question to be universalized and moreover paves the way to futher epistemological development of the problem in question. As Kripke’s theory is formalized and presented as a functional series, it gives access to a system model of truth whose elements would be epistemological theories (concepts) of truth. Such a model, for instance, confirms the validity of the deflationary concept of truth. Refs 7.