Protection of creditors and directors liability effectiveness in corporate insolvency proceedings. Missed opportunities in the framework of the Rordorf reform

Abstract

The paper criticizes the fact that the last of several Italian insolvency law reforms exhibits an utter lack of demonstrated interest — a principle feature of any legislation that deals with the business crisis. The directors’ liability of insolvent companies has historically been one of the weakest points of Italian regulation for its very low enforceability. On the contrary, other EU jurisdictions (France and Spain) pay much attention to the efficacy of directors’ misconduct not only through specific forms of liabilities which make simpler the recovery of the damages caused to the company, but also through different and effective solutions (i. e., Disqualification) which impede wrongdoers from engaging in reckless behavior and wrongful conduct in future (UK, Ireland, Norway). The primacy of self-regulation in insolvency matters and the lack of adequate regulatory responses may go on to stimulate the efficiency and the integrity of Italian Insolvency system. Refs 8.