Stereotypical Images of the Great Patriotic War: Repressed Commanders of the Red Army

Abstract

The article is devoted to the analysis of the problem of readiness of the Red Army for war from the point of view of personnel of the command staff. The problem of contemporary perception of images of the Great Patriotic War has many facets and unconditional relevance, both for public thought and for science. One of the main stereotypes about the Great Patriotic War, launched in the mid-1950s and which is perhaps the most tenacious and influential both on public thought and on scientific searches and reasoning, was the idea of the problems of the Red Army in the early years of the war in connection with the destroyed command staff of the army. The problem of the quality of command personnel as of June 22, 1941 is linked to the repressions in the Red Army of 1937–39, which destroyed the color of the army, the low level of the grown command staff and the small experience of this new command staff. These problems and their possible impact on the combat capability of the Red Army are analyzed in this article. The author considers the figures of repression in the Red Army 1937–39, losses among the command staff of the Red Army in the first months of the war, German losses, the reality of the correlation of losses and capabilities of the Red Army, analyzes historical sources and criticizes one-sided selection in support of ready-made opinion, the most popular in public consciousness. In favor of such conclusions are the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the first six months of the war, the level of generals of the Red Army and data on the grassroots and medium command personnel.