J. Butler and P. Strawson on resentment

Abstract

Resentment is one of the most important morally significant phenomena. It is therefore not surprising that it has attracted much attention from moral philosophers. This paper explores two approaches to the philosophical conception of resentment. The first was developed in Early Modern by Joseph Butler. The second was proposed in the mid-twentieth century by P. Strawson. Butler offered his ideas about the nature of resentment within the framework of preaching, which, however, does not mean that the theological context of his argumentation subordinates its philosophical content. Butler’s theory is closely related to his ideas about human nature as something holistic: we need resentment to balance another moral emotion, compassion. Butler also distinguished two kinds of resentment: sudden and deliberate. Strawson, for his part, presented his views on the nature of resentment in an academic lecture, which was then published as an article. His reasoning concerns the relation between freedom, moral reactions, and determinism. Strawson attempts to show that our conception of freedom is closely tied to practices of moral responsibility, the existence of which has nothing to do with determinism. A key point of his argument is the claim that we should stop over-intellectualizing moral experience. If we abandon the intellectualist illusion, we will see in the factuality of moral practices something more than mere factuality. Everything that is necessary for morality is already there, in moral practice itself: desert, resentment, justice, etc. If one realizes this fact, the problem of free will is solved. I conclude this paper by comparing Butler’s and Strawson’s approaches.