Austrian metaphilosophy from Bolzano to the Vienna Circle

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to compare and analyze the metaphilosophical ideas of the key Austrian thinkers of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. To achieve this goal, several tasks are solved: first, to identify the main metaphilosophical positions shared by different Austrian philosophers, second, to reconstruct some details of the discussed metaphilosophical approaches, and third, to clarify the context within which the change in metaphilosophical views took place. The author uses the methods of rational reconstruction and historical-philosophical comparisons. The main content of the article is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the metaphilosophy of B. Bolzano: describes the requirements that Bolzano imposed on philosophizing, and shows how he approached the question of defining the concept of philosophy. The second part examines the details of the metaphilosophical position of F. Brentano and such of his disciples as A. Meinong and K. Twardowski. The peculiarities of Brentano’s views concerning the method of philosophizing are examined, and some clarifications are made to avoid incorrect interpretations of this views. The author also shows what supplementations to Brentano’s metaphilosophy were made by Meinong and Twardowski. The third part analyzes the views on the philosophy of such thinkers as E. Mach and L. Boltzmann. The requirements for philosophizing on the part of natural scientists of the beginning of the 20th century are discussed. In addition, the author considers the metaphilosophical ideas of the early M. Schlick, who clarified the nature of the assistance provided to the natural sciences by philosophy in his work “General Theory of Knowledge”. The fourth part reproduces the metaphilosophy of the early L. Wittgenstein and such representatives of the Vienna circle as M. Schlick, R. Carnap and O. Neurath. The peculiarities of the Vienna positivists’ understanding of the activity-based nature of philosophy are clarified, and the differences in the interpretation of the method of philosophizing are shown.