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http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33701
Полная запись метаданных
Поле DC | Значение | Язык |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kuzyutin, Denis | - |
dc.contributor.author | Skorodumova, Yulia | - |
dc.contributor.author | Smirnova, Nadezhda | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-29T20:25:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-29T20:25:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-10 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Kuzyutin D., Skorodumova Yu., Smirnova N. Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XIV, 257-272. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.other | https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.19 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11701/33701 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A novel approach to sustainable cooperation called subgameperfect core (S-P Core) was introduced by P. Chander and M. Wooders in 2020 for n-person extensive-form games with terminal payoffs. This solution concept incorporates both subgame perfection and cooperation incentives and implies certain distribution of the total players' payoff at the terminal node of the cooperative history. We use in the paper an extension of the S-P Core to the class of extensive games with payoffs defined at all nodes of the game tree that is based on designing an appropriate payoff distribution procedure β and its implementation when a game unfolds along the cooperative history. The difference is that in accordance with this so-called β-subgameperfect core the players can redistribute total current payoff at each node in the cooperative path. Moreover, a payoff distribution procedure from the β-S-P Core satisfies a number of good properties such as subgame efficiency, non-negativity and strict balance condition. In the paper, we examine different properties of the β-S-P Core, introduce several refinements of this cooperative solution and provide examples of its implementation in extensive-form games. Finally, we consider an application of the β-S-P Core to the symmetric discrete-time alternating-move model of fishery management. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Funding: The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 21-011-44058. | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | St Petersburg State University | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Contributions to Game Theory and Management;Volume 14 | - |
dc.subject | extensive game | en_GB |
dc.subject | sustainable cooperation | en_GB |
dc.subject | subgame-perfect equilibrium | en_GB |
dc.subject | core | en_GB |
dc.subject | payoff distribution procedure | en_GB |
dc.subject | renewable resource extraction | en_GB |
dc.title | Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
Располагается в коллекциях: | 2021 |
Файлы этого ресурса:
Файл | Описание | Размер | Формат | |
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257-272.pdf | 493,41 kB | Adobe PDF | Просмотреть/Открыть |
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