Expert examination as an epistemological phenomenon

Abstract

The article examines the epistemological parameters of the phenomenon of expert examination as well as the social and cognitive features of using scientific knowledge to substantiate the objectivity of expert evaluations. Today, the scope of expert activities has significantly expanded. Accordingly, the number of studies, including philosophical ones, considering this phenomenon, in particular, has increased primarily in connection with the growth of its role in assessing the social-humanitarian risks associated with the introduction of scientific-technical advances. At the same time, attention is directed to the fact that it is precisely due to the significant expansion of the scope of expert activity that the nature of the expert examination itself is distorted — its dependence on social contexts is increasing, but its objectivity is lost. The article aims to clarify the reasons for the growth of this dependence in connection with the specificity of the epistemological parameters of knowledge, which is used as a scientific basis for expert evaluations. This aspect of expert examination, as a rule, falls out of sight of both its researchers and the experts themselves. Modern philosophers and methodologists of science state the direct dependence of expert examination on applied (i. e., limited to practical requests) developments, while, in the author’s opinion, the condition for the objectivity of expert opinions is the obligatory appeal of experts to fundamental science, motivated by the commitment to expand the sphere of holistic knowledge concerning the world. This condition is highlighted due to the epistemological perspective of comprehending expert evaluations, which makes it possible to include additional criteria for their objectivity in the sphere of the expert’s self-awareness. The actualization of such criteria, according to the author, is now becoming a prerequisite for an effective expert examination that maintains a high social status.