Transformation of the subject in bioethics: From an autonomous person to cosmopolitan

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity in bioethics, starting from the level assumed by the prevailing model of personal autonomy up to the cosmopolitan dimension innate to the global model proposed by Van Rensselaer Potter. In the article, autonomy is considered in the more general context of the individualization of Western societies. It is revealed that autonomy is inherently dependent on the idea of human well-being and the values of individualism and therefore it can be reduced to individual decisions. This devaluation of personal autonomy finds justifiable criticism among bioethicists. The concept of the subject is restored in the frame of the substantive model of autonomy indicating the inextricable connection of a choice and a common personal perspective. Such an individualistic approach to the subject is initially limited. Being concentrated on the behavior of a rational individual, the approach localizes all relevant ethical cases. In the modern world, global problem intersect with each other they cease to be noticed and moreover become intimatized due to their individualistic description. This approach to the subject is thus inadequate and needs to be replaced. For this purpose, the difference between the two traditions within bioethics must be overcome: an autonomous person and cosmopolitan remain the two significant models of subjectivity, and the bridge between them has never been built. The article explores the possibility of such a transition to a cosmopolitan position on the classic example from The Phenomenology of Spirit. It can be concluded that the current position of the theory of the subject is tenuous on both flanks of bioethics. When it loses the message of subjectivity and becomes a servant of the technological approach, we get just another version of medical ethics and lose the long-term perspective appropriate for the cosmopolitan world.