Setting constitutional boundaries on institutional reforms in China

Abstract

China has experienced dramatic social transformation over the past 40 years of reform and opening up. While achieving tremendous economic achievements, China is also facing a series of challenges due to the complexity of social governance. Advancement among state institutions reform of China since 2014 is part of the aforementioned social transformation process. The institutional reform involves changes in the powers of the legislature, executive and judicial organs, which promotes the formation of a new state organ system and directly leads to the 2018 constitutional amendment. The issue of constitutional limits for the reform of state institutions has aroused widespread concern in academia. The Constitution contains various regulatory bases for institutional reforms. Some of the reforms are clearly bound by the Constitution, some are restricted by its general provisions, and some transcend the framework of power distribution defined in the Constitution. In practice, institutional reforms involve three strategies in response to the Constitution. First, compliance with the Constitution. Second, deviation from the Constitution and promotion of constitutional amendments. Third, deviation from the Constitution with avoidance of constitutional adjustment. This article holds the view that over the course of social transformation, reforms have to remain current while improving the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Constitution that provides the authoritative structure and stable expectation for the state and its citizens shall not be neglected. Any major systemic reform with regard to the Constitution must adhere to formal constitutionality as the primary foundation.