Category of nothing in the philosophy of Plato

Abstract

The article analyses the interpretation of the relationship between being and nothing provided by Plato. Plato does not question Parmenides’ thesis “being is, but nothing is not,” but he believes that if philosophers do not look beyond that thesis, there will be stagnation. There is no absolute nothing, but according to Plato, nothing is somehow and in some other forms still interacts with being. In the dialogues “Parmenides” and “Sophist,” Plato illustrates how nothing penetrates being, deprives it of oneness and integrity and thus transforms it into the set of particles where each particle appears to be itself, but unlike the others. By “others” Plato means nothing, which is not the absolute nothing, but only the relative nothing — the nothing of something or other. In the dialogues the interaction of being and nothing is analysed in respect to the Realm of Ideas — to the domain of types and varieties, and their universal qualities. In his “Timaeus,” alongside types and properties, Plato introduces individuals with their individual qualities. The nothing of something or other is also in the realm of individuals, but here it manifests yet another aspect of itself. Here we see the nothing that creates and destroys things, which is not the case in the Realm of Ideas. It is true that every individual and every individual quality emerges from nothing and immerses in it, while no such thing happens with types, varieties, and their universal qualities. From the viewpoint of Plato, individuals emerge because of some force that influences types, varieties, and their universal qualities. The same force brings into the realm of individuals nothing that creates and destroys. Again this force is the basis for the four elements of which every natural object is composed: fire, air, water and earth. Here both Aristotle and Plato are in agreement. Aristotelian prior matter has shared features with the force of Plato: it brings into existence the realm of individuals and serves as the basis for the same four elements. The author argues that the bringing into existence of individuals is the primary function of Aristotelian prior matter and of Plato’s force, while serving as the basis for the four elements is secondary and optional. Indeed Empedocles believes the four elements are autonomous and has no common background.