Limits of tolerance

Abstract

The article considers one of the most important aspects of the problem of tolerance connected with determining its borders. To the extent that the idea of a tolerant state is the center of the liberal concept of tolerance, the practice of tolerance is connected with the passive adoption of norms and values of another. Tolerance understood in such a way contradicts the self-identification of individuals and social groups. The liberal concept of tolerance is draws criticism as not corresponding to the pluralism of values and to the realities of multiculturalism. There is a danger of such a distribution of the principle of tolerance when society is paralyzed by the aspiration, no matter what it takes, not to violate the norms and the principles of other subjects even at the expense of one’s own identity. “The tolerance paradox” (Slavoj Žižek) becomes apparent in that in a tolerant society priority is given to values and ideals of the subject, which openly breaks the principle of tolerance. It follows that this principle cannot be understood as maintaining the balance between respect for others and the need for one’s own freedom. Such a balance will always develop not in favor of the tolerant individual if the category of recognition in its contents comes down to passive recognition of the rights and beliefs of others. It is shown that the concept of “fight for recognition” exposed by Hegel in his dialectics of the Master and the Slave can be adopted by modern critics of the liberal concept of tolerance. It is possible to call the Hegelian approach to tolerance as transgressive since the attitude towards another subject appears as result and as a prerequisite of the fight for recognition.