Consciousness of Others in phenomenology and postanalytical philosophy

Abstract

The article discusses the problem of perceiving the internal experience of other people. Language as a system of social codes is not suitable to describe individual experiences. Therefore, phenomenology and hermeneutics rely on empathy. However, it is incomprehensible in this way to apply one’s experience to another’s. In addition to its ineffability, the inner experience of another confronts analysts with other problems. Interest in the inner experience in philosophy was raised by the search for that which has the property of truth. Reliance on direct knowledge turns out to be common to many different epistemological programmes and, in particular, the meeting point of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. R. Carnap considered peculiar “epistemological atoms”, from which a system of knowledge should be logically constructed. M. Schlick considered verification as a criterion of the significance of theoretical statements— through this, statements are derived or confined to the immediate data. According to Husserl, comprehension of truth is associated with its obviousness. Intellectual intuition understands the subject as it presents itself. A thorough systematic comparison of phenomenological and analytic philosophy of consciousness is difficult to accomplish, most likely because the two philosophies use different languages that cannot be applied to each other. Therefore, phenomenology and hermeneutics have claimed status as a methodology and philosophy of humanities, while analytic philosophy is focused on scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, they have common ground in the study of consciousness characteristics such as self-evidence, nonpositionality and intentionality. Contrary to popular perception of the opposition of phenomenological and empiric programmes to justify knowledge, techniques of phenomenological analysis of consciousness are being assimilated in postanalytical philosophy. Social attitudes and cultural backgrounds form the external context in which acts of consciousness take place. Thanks to common standards and rules for ensuring social order, communication of “I” and “Other” is possible.