Soviet Discursive Power versus War: Agitation and Propaganda in the Blockade of Leningrad

Abstract

In wartime, a crucial state goal is mobilizing civilians to sacrifice for the war effort and to feel a sense of loyalty to state and nation, and by extension to relevant elites. All talk and efforts for creating a loyal subject of a nation (or other political entity) are put to the test in war. One extreme case of the shock and suffering of war was the Blockade of Leningrad, where the 872-day siege led to mass death as well as suffering and created a new world of survival tactics and expedient policies. The research on the agitprop in Leningrad during the Blockade leads to a curious conclusion. Criticizing Stalin and Bolshevism were beyond the pale—but criticizing local structures, procedures, and collective habits could have worked, especially if one avoided criticizing Smolny and did criticized in the spirit of samokritika. Yet the persistence of blaming individual motivations and psychology suggests a real move away from the core logic of Marxism and even Leninism. In this sense, the political culture of Leningrad in the Blockade and the USSR at war might have been closer to the individualism of Anglo-American political culture—closer than either side would want to admit.