Static Game Theoretic Models of Coordination of Private and Public Interests in Economic Systems

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2017

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Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

A problem of inefficiency of equilibria (system compatibility) in static game theoretic models of resource allocation is investigated. It is shown that the system compatibility in such models is possible if and only if all agents are individualists or collectivists. Administrative and economic control mechanisms providing the system compatibility are analyzed.

Description

Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2017. – 404 p.

Keywords

coordination of interests, hierarchical games, public goods economy, resource allocation

Citation

Gorbaneva, O. I., & Ougolnitsky, G. A. (2017). Static game theoretic models of coordination of private and public interests in economic systems. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 10(0), 79-93.

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http://hdl.handle.net/11701/10453

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