Values as Norms — How to defend an Intricate Concept of Nicolai Hartmann

Abstract

In Nicolai Hartmanns view, values are objective ideal beings and objective norms (Wo = No – thesis). So, his value-theory seems synthetic, complex, and highly defeasible. Being valuable doesn’t imply obligation. In my investigations, I will show one of the ways in which the how the Wo = No – thesis can be grounded. I will start from Hartmann’s level-ontology and argue that at the psychological level values (as types of being valuable) are determined with prima-facie-necessity, while at the level of spirit — within its constitutive interdependencies of personnel spirit, objective spirit, and objectivated spirit — they don’t. At the level of spirit (as normative sphere), values appear as super-formed to norms. The possibility of normative relevant decision is grounded in the relative autonomy of the level of spirit in relation to the psychological level and in dependencies between persons and institutions. For defeating strong cultural relativist implications of this approach, I will argue on the ground of a counterfactually modelled response-theory of obligation. A source of obligation are valuable goods, we receive since our birth and which determine that we owe a worthy response to the givers. An idealized-generalized obligation under response-theoretical conditions as the content of the normative expectation of an ideal expectator could concern the realization of values, how it is claimed by value-ethics. I will conclude, that in respect to different features of normativity, such conception cannot ground normativity in the strong sense of factual ought, but normativity in a weaker sense of counterfactual ought. It seems plausible, that what is good, should — under certain conditions — be realized, if possible.