

ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННАЯ ИСТОРИЯ

Freedom and Unfreedom in the Russian Empire in the Debate between Chicherin and Rennenkampf at the End of the Nineteenth Century

G. M. Hamburg

For citation: Hamburg G. M. Freedom and Unfreedom in the Russian Empire in the Debate between Chicherin and Rennenkampf at the End of the Nineteenth Century. *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History*, 2024, vol. 69, issue 2, pp. 291–306. <https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu02.2024.203>

This article treats the polemic between the conservative-liberal Boris Chicherin and Nikolai Rennenkampf on the Polish and Jewish questions. Some portions of the exchange appeared in legal, and others in clandestine editions. The initial critical encounter between them in the early 1880s was an abstract debate about the metaphysical grounding of rights. But already at that time, the two opponents raised the fundamental question as to whether Russia's political future would focus on individual liberty or on the will of state officials and that of the majority in society. The polemic continued in the mid-1890s with Chicherin's publication of *Kurs gosudarstvennoi nauki*, in which the conservative-liberal criticized the Church and the national policy of the Empire. The more conservative Rennenkampf answered with two open letters, in which he castigated Poles for threatening the social equilibrium in the Western provinces of the Empire. Rennenkampf also viewed the Jewish question as "incomparably more complex" than the Polish question. Chicherin responded to Rennenkampf in a short book published abroad. He did not agree with Rennenkampf's assertion that the Jewish problem was "more complex" than the Polish question; indeed, Chicherin thought it "much simpler". By the 1890s, Chicherin had changed his ideas about the Polish question but also about Russia's readiness for constitutional government. Indeed, he had reached the conclusion that Russia itself was ready for a representative assembly. He was troubled by the Petersburg government's promotion of Orthodoxy and of Russian language on the Empire's western periphery. For Chicherin, the encounter with Rennenkampf had the highest possible stakes — the choice between freedom

Gary Hamburg — PhD (History), Professor, Claremont McKenna College, 888, Columbia Avenue, Claremont, California, 91711, USA; gary.hamburg@cmc.edu

Гарри Гамбург — д-р ист. наук, проф., Клермонтский колледж МакКенна, США, 91711, Калифорния, Клермонт, Коламбия авеню, 888; gary.hamburg@cmc.edu

© St. Petersburg State University, 2024

and unfreedom inside Russia itself. Rennenkampf called for unrelenting pressure on Russia's "enemies".

Keywords: B.N.Chicherin and N.K.Rennenkampf, the polemic, the Polish and Jewish questions.

Свобода и несвобода в Российской империи в полемике между Чичериным и Ренненкампом в конце девятнадцатого века

Г. М. Гамбург

Для цитирования: *Hamburg G. M. Freedom and Unfreedom in the Russian Empire in the Debate between Chicherin and Rennenkampf at the End of the Nineteenth Century // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. История. 2024. Т. 69. Вып. 2. С. 291–306.*
<https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu02.2024.203>

Пolemika 1880–1890-х гг. по польскому и еврейскому вопросам между двумя крупными акторами российской общественной жизни и известными учеными Б. Н. Чичериным и Н. К. Ренненкампом рассматривается в рамках внутривосточного российского контекста. Начавшись с абстрактного обсуждения правовых основ, дискуссия шла и в подцензурной, и в вольной прессе. Но уже тогда обозначилось одно из основных противоречий — личной свободы и воли государства. Polemika продолжилась после выхода в свет фундаментального «Курса государственной науки», в котором «консервативный либерал» Б. Н. Чичерин критиковал и церковную, и национальную политику Российской империи. «Нелиберальный консерватор» Н. К. Ренненкампов ответил своими открытыми письмами, в которых, признавая ошибки и российской власти, традиционно обвинял поляков, считая при этом еврейский вопрос еще более сложным, чем польский. Чичерин дал ответ в виде книги, изданной в Берлине, в которой изложил прежние воззрения, а еврейский вопрос трактовал как более легкий для разрешения. Вся эта polemika в целом была вторым обращением Б. Н. Чичерина к польскому и еврейскому вопросам — первый состоялся в 1860-х гг. Теперь его взгляды в значительной степени изменились — он считал, что Россия уже готова к представительной демократии, а имперская религиозно-национальная политика могла представлять для нее серьезную опасность. Это опасение и лежало в основе развернувшейся дискуссии. Позиция «консервативного либерала» была типичной для тех, кто был не готов принести такого рода мечты в жертву некоему унитарному государству, которое царизм хотел распространить и на западные окраины. Для Б. Н. Чичерина вопрос стоял ребром: свобода или несвобода в империи, в Польше и в самой России. Он готов был призвать правительство освободить «проблемную» Польшу. Н. К. Ренненкампов, естественно, придерживался другого взгляда.

Ключевые слова: Б. Н. Чичерин, Н. К. Ренненкампов, polemika, польский и еврейский вопросы.

The conservative-liberal Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin considered the Polish question at two junctures in his life. The first was in the 1860s, in response to the Polish insurrection of 1863–1864 and in connection with Nikolai Andreevich Miliutin's reformist ideas on the Polish peasantry. On March 19, 1863, Chicherin wrote his brother Vasilii Nikolaevich predicting that the patriotic spirit of Russian society would support suppression of the Polish uprising, but expressing the fear that the government might prove too weak

to carry it out¹. Later, in mid-October of that year, he advocated a Carthaginian peace in Poland, such that the Poles “for the next ten years shall live under terror, so that they may be convinced they are completely in our hands”. In the same letter to Vasiliĭ Nikolaevich, Chicherin rejected the imposition in Poland of a constitution: “One cannot grant Poland rights unless one grants them to Russia as well, and in Russia this would mean chaos. The more insignificant such constitutional rights may be, the worse [the situation]...”² In late 1863, Chicherin met with Miliutin, and the two reached “complete agreement” on Poland. Miliutin asked Chicherin to write a pamphlet justifying the impending land reforms in Poland³.

The second juncture when Chicherin pondered Poland occurred from the mid- to late 1890s, as he reconsidered Russian imperial politics. By then, he was troubled by the Petersburg government’s promotion of Orthodoxy and of Russian language on the Empire’s western periphery. And by then, he had reached the conclusion that Russia itself was ready for a representative assembly — a reform he had rejected as premature in the 1860s. In his opinion, imperial religious and nationality policies and the prospect of representative rule had to be considered together, as parts of a larger whole.

Chicherin’s *volte-face* on the Polish question in the 1890s was the result of a remarkable intellectual journey that has not been well understood. The present essay will focus on Chicherin’s ideas about Poland and Empire in the 1890s, a subject that has sometimes been approached through his polemic with Nikolai Karlovich Rennenkampf on the Polish and Jewish questions⁴. Strangely, the polemic with Rennenkampf has never been treated in its full context. Providing that context is this essay’s second purpose.

N. K. Rennenkampf had a distinguished career as an intellectual and political figure, a career that in certain respects mirrored that of Chicherin⁵.

Rennenkampf was a hereditary noble of Baltic German ancestry: his father Karl-Friedrich was a lieutenant general and an aide to the commander of the Imperial War Academy; his brother Konstantin Karlovich, also a trained lawyer, was a state-secretary to Aleksandr II from 1873, and from 1889 — director of His Majesty’s Imperial Chancellery. His mother, Serafima Petrovna Nemchinova, was also from the hereditary nobility and, as her last name suggested, probably of German lineage, although it is possible she was from Russianized gentry. Rennenkampf was born in 1832 in Chernigov province. He enrolled in 1843 at the Chernigov gimnaziia, where he was influenced by Ianuarii Mikhailovich

¹ Rukopisnyi otdel Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi biblioteki (RO RGB). F.334. K.3. Ed. khr. 1. Il. 1–2, second numeration.

² *Ibid.* Il. 5–6.

³ The pamphlet was apparently never published, but the manuscript, entitled *Krest’ianskoe delo v Pol’she*, can be found in RO RGB. F.334. K.20. Ed. khr. 10. I have dealt in greater length with Chicherin’s attitude toward Poland in: *Hamburg G. M. Boris Chicherin & Early Russian Liberalism. 1828–1866*. Stanford, 1992. P.261–265. For a review of the enormous literature on the Polish uprising and the attitude of Russian society toward it, see: *Airapetov O. R. Tsarstvo Pol’skoe v politike Imperii v 1863–1864 gg.* // *Russkii sbornik. Issledovaniia po istorii Rossii*. Vol. XV. Moscow, 2013. P.7–138.

⁴ See: *Rennenkampf N. K. Pol’skii i evreiskii voprosy* // *Otkrytye pis’ma B. N. Chicherinu*. Kiev, 1898. Ottysk iz No. 158, 159, 160, 162, 164, i 165 “Kievliana” za 1898; *Chicherin B. N. Pol’skii i evreiskii voprosy: ovet na otkrytye pis’ma N. K. Rennenkampfa*. Berlin, 1899. For a recent discussion of this polemic, see: *Timiriaev D. O. Razdely Rechi Pospolitoi i situatsiia v zapadnom krae v politicheskoj polemike B. N. Chicherina i N. K. Rennenkampfa* // *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriiia 8. Istoriia*. 2018. No. 6. P.3–17.

⁵ See: *Rennenkampf Nikolai Karlovich* // *Biograficheskii slovar’ professorov i prepodavatelei Imperatorskago universiteta Sv. Vladimira (1834–1884)* / ed. by V. I. Ikonnikov. Kiev, 1884. P.561–565.

Neverov and Ippolit Iakovlevich Stsislavskii (Scislavski): both acquainted him with liberal historiography of Russia. On graduating in 1849, Rennenkampf entered the lycée of Aleksandr Andreevich Bezborodko, where he studied law. The lycée's program concentrated on study of the Russian *Code of Laws*, on the training of future governmental officials, and on general understanding of legal theory — the subject called “encyclopedia of right”, which would later be one of Rennenkampf's specialties.

The lycée' curriculum was apparently a hybrid of cautious liberalism and assertive conservatism. On the one hand, Rennenkampf read the liberal historians Sergei Mikhailovich Solov'ev and Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin on Old Russian laws; the enlighteners Montesquieu and Adam Smith; and the French liberal historians François Guizot and Augustine Thierry. He wrote his first-year essay on Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois*⁶. The young Nikolai Khristianovich Bunge, who taught finance and financial law based largely on Smith's economic doctrines, exerted significant influence on Rennenkampf. It may be important that, while teaching at the lycée, Bunge prepared his book *Theory of Credit* for publication⁷. In 1851, Rennenkampf followed Bunge to Kiev's University of St. Vladimir.

On the other hand, the Bezborodko lycée was by formation and inclination a conservative institution. It was named after Prince Aleksandr Andreevich Bezborodko, an advocate of the partitions of Poland and a state-chancellor under Pavel I. Its director in the 1840s was Khristian Adol'fovich Ekeblad, who was “a profound enemy of atheism, cosmopolitanism, and liberalism”⁸. It is conceivable that the lycée's conservatism helped shape Rennenkampf's diploma essay “O pravakh i obiazannostiakh osedlykh inorodtsev i v osobennosti evreev v Rossii” (“On the rights and duties of Jews in Russia”) at St. Vladimir University in 1859⁹.

In 1858, Rennenkampf joined the law faculty at St. Vladimir University, where at first he taught comparative legal systems [*entsiklopediia zakonovedeniia*]. From 1871, he taught legal theory [*entsiklopediia iuridicheskaiia*], and in 1880 — political science. He acquired a large reputation inside the university, where he served as rector from 1883 to 1887 — the period in which Aleksandr III's university counter-reform was imposed. Rennenkampf also played a prominent role in Kiev's city administration: from 1875 to 1879 he was the city's elected mayor [*gorodskoi golova*].

In his legal education, professorial role, and service to a large city, Rennenkampf's life loosely resembled Chicherin's. Boris Nikolaevich taught in Moscow University's faculty of jurisprudence from 1861 to 1868, and served as the city of Moscow's elected mayor from 1881 to 1883. However, unlike Rennenkampf, who retained the Petersburg administration's trust, Chicherin clashed with minister of education (later, minister of internal affairs) Dmitrii Andreevich Tolstoi. Chicherin therefore in 1867 resigned from the university faculty in protest of Tolstoi's intervention in its affairs, and, in 1883, was forced by him to step down as mayor of Moscow.

Rennenkampf first debated Chicherin in 1883, in a long review of the latter's two-volume work, *Property and the State*¹⁰. Rennenkampf gave Chicherin credit for exposing the

⁶ Rennenkampf Nikolai Karlovich. P. 563.

⁷ Bunge N. K. Teoriia kredita. Kiev, 1852.

⁸ Rennenkampf Nikolai Karlovich. P. 562.

⁹ Ibid. P. 564.

¹⁰ Chicherin B. N. Sobstvennost' i gosudarstvo. Chast' 1. Moscow, 1882; Chast' 2. Moscow, 1883; *Rennenkampf N. K. Retenziia na B. N. Chicherin. Sobstvennost' i gosudarstvo // Zhurnal grazhdanskago i ugovnogo prava*. 1883. Book 6. P. 127–174.

sophistries of German socialists¹¹, but he doubted Chicherin's premise that metaphysics is the sole key to higher truth in scholarly questions, and that philosophy alone can disclose ultimate knowledge¹². Nor did Rennenkampf agree with Chicherin that the metaphysical freedom of human beings accounts for the appearance in history of free institutions. Indeed, Rennenkampf wondered whether study of history, art, physiology, and the social science might not reveal the roots of human unfreedom¹³.

Rennenkampf rejected Chicherin's distinction between external liberty and liberty in the public sphere. He asked whether any sort of external freedom for individuals is possible outside of society¹⁴. He accused Chicherin of incoherence in trying to identify the theoretical limits of liberty. If the freedom of personhood was to expand to its full potential, how could Chicherin defend public laws that curtailed individual liberty? Rennenkampf contended that this apparent contradiction in Chicherin's system stemmed from "postulating liberty as the sole base of [political] theory"¹⁵. Rather, Rennenkampf held, social life is based on the necessary tension between individual rights and society's demands: "Chicherin's main mistake is that he has taken liberty alone as fundamental: whereas just as important a principle to human nature is the desire to live in society, so is the imperative to live in society subject to its laws and conditions"¹⁶.

Rennenkampf did not countenance Chicherin's idea that rights in the philosophical sense can be distinct from statutory rights. In Rennenkampf's opinion, individual rights are always mixed with material interests and have a social-use component¹⁷. Meanwhile, Rennenkampf treated society's welfare and the prerogatives of government as "sacred"¹⁸. At bottom, Chicherin wanted to expand individual liberty by diminishing the state's and society's control over individuals. Rennenkampf wanted to restrain individual liberty in the name of the state and social interests. No wonder Rennenkampf criticized Chicherin for basing his book on "the shaky, vague and old-fashioned ground of metaphysics"¹⁹.

The initial critical encounter between Rennenkampf and Chicherin was therefore an abstract debate about the metaphysical grounding of rights. In veiled form, however, the debate raised the essential question as to whether Russia's political future would focus on individual liberty or on the will of state officials and the majority in society.

From 1894 to 1898 Chicherin published his three-volume *Course on Political Science*²⁰. He based the first volume on revised lectures he had delivered in the 1860s to students at Moscow University and to Grand Duke Nikolai Aleksandrovich²¹. The second and third volumes originated in notes to undelivered lectures. Because Chicherin had not given them to students, they had to be rewritten from scratch and polished. Chicherin updated all three volumes with contemporary examples. Since the first two tomes dealt with the nature of the state, public law, and the science of society, Rennenkampf probably read

¹¹ *Rennenkampf* N. K. Retsenziia na B. N. Chicherin. Sobstvennost' i gosudarstvo. P. 162.

¹² *Ibid.* P. 163–164.

¹³ *Ibid.* P. 166.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* P. 166–167.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 167–168, here 168.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 170.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* P. 172.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* P. 173.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* P. 174.

²⁰ *Chicherin B. N. Kurs gosudarstvennoi nauki. Chast' I. Obshchee gosudarstvennoe pravo.* Moscow, 1894; *Chast' II. Sotsiologiya.* Moscow, 1896; *Chast' III. Politika.* Moscow, 1898.

²¹ *Ibid.* Chast' I. P. III–IV.

them as restatements of positions that Chicherin had staked out in *Property and the State*. He might have been tempted to respond to Chicherin by resuming his earlier polemic.

In the event, the trigger for the polemic's renewal was the third volume, on politics. In it, Chicherin stressed that the classical conception of politics and the Russian term for "political activity", *politika*, were too narrow to encompass the book's broad theme. He invoked the German term *Staatswissenschaft* [science of the state] to capture his real subject — that is, moving beyond domestic political considerations to international relations. Strangely, he did not analyze international law as a component of politics, even though it fitted under the rubric of *Staatswissenschaft*. In spite of this omission, he proudly claimed the book was "the first attempt in the Russian language to present the subject in its entirety"²².

Chicherin divided his tome on politics into six books, each touching on matters sensitive in the Empire. The portions that provoked Rennenkampf directly to respond were Book 2, on the creation of the state, and Book 5, on the politics of administration.

The controversial remarks in Book 2 had to do with conquest and incorporation of conquered territories — a subject familiar since Titus Livius' *The History of Rome* and Tacitus's *Annals*, and forcefully analyzed in chapters 3–5 of Machiavelli's *The Prince*. In general, Chicherin remarked, the larger the conquered territory and the more diverse its population, the more difficult it is for the conquering power to hold it. Controlling such territories was not possible by force alone, but could only be achieved via a "firm legal order" [*tverdyi zakonnyi poriadok*]²³. Furthermore, conquests based on religion could not be lasting, because well-ordered states require secular government²⁴. He thought the Western Church's independence from the state had facilitated the appearance of secularity in Europe, whereas the Eastern Church had made a pact with the state that discouraged secularity²⁵. Absolutism had caused the Russian people "to forfeit a sense of right and liberty, without which neither true human dignity nor a life worthy of human beings is possible"²⁶. Thus, Russia's national character was not favorable to the peaceful absorption of large, diverse conquered territories. This abstract proposition had an obvious application to the Russian occupation of Poland.

Chicherin turned to two elements of the state: territory and national identity. He wrote that Poland lacked protective mountain borders and a river defense system. These geographical disadvantages proved fatal in combination with Poland's political culture. In contrast to Russia, where the Empire's great power status had been "purchased at the cost of colossal sacrifices, both in personnel and material", Poland had been "condemned to impotence," because its aristocracy "sought unhindered liberty without assuming liberty's burdens"²⁷.

According to Chicherin, Poland's erasure from the map of Central Europe was nevertheless "a misfortune not only for it but for the European balance of power [*raznovesie*]". A buffer-state like Poland was needed between Germany and Russia. A Polish buffer was

²² Chicherin B. N. Kurs gosudarstvennoi nauki. Chast' I. P. V.

²³ Ibid. Chast' III. P. 43.

²⁴ Ibid. P. 44.

²⁵ Ibid. P. 50.

²⁶ Ibid. P. 52–53.

²⁷ Ibid. P. 65.

“in Russia’s interest, for Russia had nothing to fear from a weak neighbor, especially one hostile to the populous Empire on its other flank”²⁸.

According to Chicherin, Russian occupation of Poland was “not difficult, given the complete dissipation of its [Poland’s] political unity, but [Poland’s] former independence and the homogeneity of its Polish elements have constituted an insuperable obstacle to any further ties”²⁹. Fusion of Poland and Russia “could occur on paper, but Poland is alien to Russia in actuality”³⁰.

Chicherin classified the Poles as an ethnos or nationality [*narodnost’*], “which had declined due to an utter lack of political sense”³¹. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Polish aristocracy’s “solitary objective was, it seems, to weaken the state.” The elites refused support to the army out of fear of the king. They exploited peasants and engaged in “senseless political quarrels”. And they did this at a moment when rival states were growing in power. After the first partition of Poland, its elites mistakenly “placed their hopes on Prussia”, which was “Poland’s chief enemy”, as subsequent partitions demonstrated. Then, after the Napoleonic wars, the Poles forfeited the Russian crown’s friendship by participating in the “insane revolution of 1830”³². They repeated the blunder of rebellion in 1863–1864³³.

Chicherin purported to sympathize with the Poles and “to desire their resurrection,” but he believed that would only be possible if the Polish elites came to understand that “independence requires more than burning ambition”³⁴. He discounted the prospects of Polish independence being achieved via a pan-Slavic federation, even though the Austrian Empire had shown some interest in accommodating its Slavs³⁵. Russia remained “indifferent to Poland’s lot”, or was even hostile to any change in it, because “the Poles had twice raised arms against Russian dominion”³⁶. Chicherin thought the resolution of the Slavic question would happen “only in the distant future”³⁷. He hoped for a new tsar, one “like Aleksandr I, who, animated by exalted feelings of justice and humaneness, would restore the homeland of a downtrodden tribe and bind the wounds inflicted by civil strife”³⁸.

Thus, Chicherin repeated his earlier condemnation of Polish uprisings against Russia but added three points. First, he suggested, Russia would be wise to disentangle itself from governing Poland: the occupation was partly responsible for the lack of dignity of Russia’s own people. Second, it was in Russia’s geopolitical interest to have Poland as an independent buffer-state between the Russian and German Empires. Third, the Russian crown *might* act as a benefactor to the Poles as part of a future resolution of the Slavic question, even though that resolution was a distant prospect. Chicherin moved beyond his position on Poland in the 1860s, because he saw that Russia’s occupation of that state was injurious to the Russian character, to Russian diplomatic interests, and to the hopes of a Slavic confederation.

²⁸ Ibid. P. 68–69.

²⁹ Ibid. P. 71.

³⁰ Ibid. P. 72.

³¹ Ibid. P. 87.

³² Ibid. P. 87–88.

³³ Ibid. P. 89.

³⁴ Ibid. P. 89.

³⁵ Ibid. P. 99–101.

³⁶ Ibid. P. 101.

³⁷ Ibid. P. 102.

³⁸ Ibid. P. 103.

In Book 5 of *Course on Political Science*, Chicherin analyzed “spiritual interests” in the politics of administration — that is, the range of relationships between state and Church. We have already noted the relevance of religion to the conquest of large, diverse territories: Chicherin claimed any such conquest based on religion could not endure. In this new discussion, he argued that the established Churches are counterproductive, because disfavored confessions “see themselves as outcasts of the realm”, as “humiliated for the sake of everything they consider dear and sacred”³⁹. Living under a persecuting Church “spreads hatred and hostility in the hearts of the persecuted”, and also turns members of the established Church who abhor violence against the Church, as the European Enlightenment had demonstrated. Moreover, religious privilege “weakens [‘the Church’s] inner forces”⁴⁰.

At the same time, as he cautioned Churchmen not to cling to political authority, Chicherin warned the government against making war on the Church, as the French revolutionaries had done and as Bismarck had done during the *Kulturkampf*⁴¹. He preferred separation between Church and state, under Cavour’s formula: “A free Church in a free state”⁴².

Chicherin criticized the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and Poland for wanting to subordinate national identity to itself⁴³. In Chicherin’s view, “a conquered people, so long as it has life, will never reconcile itself to its oppressed status”. It is therefore much better for the state to introduce religious toleration and to avoid intruding into matters of conscience⁴⁴. In Chicherin’s view, persecution of the Jews was a “sad tale”, a policy “linked to the lowest human impulses”⁴⁵. He called anti-Semites “by and large the worst deviants in the human race,” “narrow fanatics or vulgar demagogues”. Sadly, he noted, Russia had long maintained “medieval restrictions on Jews’ civil rights” and more recently had mobilized nationalist sentiments to tighten those constraints⁴⁶. The restrictions against Jews were against Russia’s own financial and material interests⁴⁷. They also contributed to the reactionary political climate in the Empire as a whole⁴⁸.

Chicherin’s analysis of Church-state relations amounted to a broad criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church’s role in imperial politics, especially its hostility toward Catholics in Poland. It also rejected the state’s persecution of religious minorities, particularly the Jews. Chicherin named few actual policies of the administration. He only alluded to the imposition of the Pale of Settlement under Catherine II, and to anti-Jewish legislation under Aleksandr III. He did criticize the 1891–1892 expulsion of Jewish artisans from Moscow and mentioned the involvement of the common people (he called them “*temnyi massy*”) in pogroms⁴⁹. His view was that, in religious matters, the Russian Empire was badly governed. The state had damaged itself by persecuting religious minorities and had exposed itself to danger in occupied Poland. He implied that Russians should leave Poland

³⁹ Chicherin B. N. Kurs gosudarstvennoi nauki. Chast’ III. P. 454.

⁴⁰ Ibid. P. 455–456.

⁴¹ Ibid. P. 460–461.

⁴² Ibid. P. 462.

⁴³ Ibid. P. 463.

⁴⁴ Ibid. P. 463–465.

⁴⁵ Ibid. P. 466.

⁴⁶ Ibid. P. 467.

⁴⁷ Ibid. P. 468.

⁴⁸ Ibid. P. 472–479.

⁴⁹ Ibid. P. 467.

as soon as possible. He also hinted that reconsideration of the government's religious policies, and of the Orthodox Church's posture in imperial affairs, should occur before, and along with, that exit.

In 1898, in two open letters in the newspaper *Kievljanin*, Rennenkampf accused Chicherin of misunderstanding the partitions of Poland and of misinterpreting Poland's international role. In Rennenkampf's opinion, 18th-century Poland was so weak as to constitute a source of international instability: "Poland at that time did not bring peace but rather constant anxiety, a kind of political anarchy, which kept all its neighbors on guard, at arms. Each new [Polish] king forced neighboring countries to exert their utmost strength to keep other countries from seizing advantage at Poland's expense". Therefore, Rennenkampf argued, the partitions of Poland in which Russia participated occurred "in self-defense"⁵⁰.

Whatever the Poles' weakness in the 18th century, Rennenkampf noted, the Polish government had occupied Russian territories earlier. He described the Polish Catholic clergy as eager for spiritual dominion over Russia and Ukraine. He considered the successes of Polish Jesuits in spreading the Catholic faith in Ukraine and among aristocrats in Russia proper as proof of Polish aggression. Rennenkampf offered statistics on Roman Catholic and Orthodox believers in nine western provinces of the Russian Empire between 1870 and 1890. He contended that the percentage of Catholics had increased since the Polish partitions because of "Polish proselytism"⁵¹. By his lights, the Russian partitions of Poland constituted an attempt, only partially successful, to return control of the local peasantry to Russian Orthodoxy and to Russia, and thus to break Poland's economic, political and spiritual stranglehold over ethnic Russians⁵². Surprisingly, however, he insisted that the partitions of Poland could not be fully explained in terms of Russian needs. In his view, the Poles themselves had precipitated the partitions "by misunderstanding their own situation, by egoism and pettiness"⁵³.

Unlike Chicherin, Rennenkampf doubted that the Poles would learn good political sense. In the Austrian-occupied zone of Poland, Poles had persecuted local Orthodox peasants⁵⁴. They had driven many peasants from their lands and had meanwhile built monuments to Polish heroes⁵⁵. In short, Austrian Poles were waging an economic and cultural war against innocent peasants. Rennenkampf admitted that authorities in Russian-occupied Poland had made many errors. In 1830–1831 and 1863–1864, they had acted "with excessive severity" [*izlishnye surovosti*] against the Poles. Yet, he thought, the Poles "to a certain extent were guilty" of provoking these severe measures. In his opinion, in 1863, the Poles had risen against Russia in the expectation of foreign intervention supporting their struggle; furthermore, Polish insurrectionary acts constituted "terror" against the Russian presence⁵⁶. In spite of Polish blunders in 1863, Rennenkampf contended, the Russian government had not tried to russify Polish regions of the Empire⁵⁷. Rennenkampf knew his assessment was not credible: he immediately declared his support

⁵⁰ *Rennenkampf N. K. Pol'skii i evreiskii voprosy*. P. 13–15.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* P. 17–18.

⁵² *Ibid.* P. 19.

⁵³ *Ibid.* P. 20.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* P. 21–22.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* P. 22–23.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* P. 26.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* P. 27–28.

of the central government's effort to introduce Russian-language school instruction in the western periphery. He also supported the central government's closure of Catholic monasteries in areas where Poles had allegedly dominated Russian peasants. In such regions, he wrote, "the government's measures guarded and defended the uneducated, impoverished Russian peasantry against the numerically small but wealthy and educated [Polish] nobility and clergy." He described Catholic institutions as "forward bastions of propaganda," as "supporting points for agitation and for inimical enterprises"⁵⁸. The choice of military metaphors underlined Rennenkampf's conviction that the western provinces were sites of an on-going Polish-Russian cultural war.

Rennenkampf claimed that, in theory, better relations between Russians and Poles were possible⁵⁹. He mentioned as evidence the sympathy between the poets Pushkin and Mickiewicz as one example of such harmony. Rennenkampf also quoted Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin's 1862 letter calling on Poles and Russians "to put aside anger, hostility and mistrust"⁶⁰. Rennenkampf claimed personally to have witnessed trust-building efforts between Poles and Russians in the 1840s. He cited his old professor N. Kh. Bunge as one advocate of harmony between the two peoples⁶¹. He added that, before 1863, links between Polish and Russian intellectuals were an "accomplished fact", even though Russians wanted to see peasants on the western periphery freed from Polish landlords.

Yet, Rennenkampf asserted, the 1863–1864 Polish uprising "revealed the true attitude of Polish society"⁶². By this, he meant that Polish educated circles "showed their Catholic fanaticism, nationalist hatred, their lust for domination and for expropriation of the Russian peasantry"⁶³. He could not forgive Polish nobles for failing to tell rebellious local peasants that promises of their freedom made in "golden decrees" were false. He praised professors of St. Vladimir University for writing an 1863 exposé of the Poles' "narrow nationalist ambitions"⁶⁴. Any reader of Rennenkampf's first open letter to Chicherin must have suspected that, in his youth, Rennenkampf had hoped for a *modus vivendi* between Polish elites and Russians in the western provinces, and that he had seen his optimism dashed in 1863.

Rennenkampf concluded the first letter to Chicherin by declaring that no solution to Polish-Russian tensions was possible unless the Poles renounced "their former domination... of millions of Russians"⁶⁵. Rennenkampf's approach to the Polish question therefore originated in his resentment of Polish condescension, religious proselytism, and political Machiavellism.

Rennenkampf viewed the Jewish question as "incomparably more complex" than the Polish question⁶⁶. He dismissed Chicherin's approach to it as virtually identical to that of Western European publicists in France and England. He cited Anatole Leroi-Beaulieu's *Israel chez les nations* (1893) as an example of a text prophesying Jewish assimilation into

⁵⁸ *Rennenkampf* N. K. Pol'skii i evreiskii voprosy. P. 29.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* P. 30–31.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* P. 32.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* P. 33–34.

⁶² *Ibid.* P. 35.

⁶³ *Ibid.* P. 36.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* P. 30.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* P. 43.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* P. 44.

Christian society⁶⁷. Rennenkampf argued against the likelihood of such assimilation in Russia, because the Jews had always distinguished themselves “by their exclusivity and their alienation from other tribes”⁶⁸, but also because the Russian people had a long history fearing the Jews⁶⁹. Rennenkampf pretended to dislike the Pale of Settlement, but he also seemed to view it as an unfortunate historical necessity⁷⁰.

Rennenkampf’s program to deal with the Jewish problem consisted of several points:

1. Preventing energetic and more cultured Jews from exploiting the “scattered, weak and ill-educated peasantry, on which Russia’s power and stability depend”⁷¹.
2. Preventing Jews from buying or renting peasants lands⁷².
3. Blocking Jews from taking a disproportionate number of seats in schools⁷³.
4. Preventing Jews from participating in vodka sales⁷⁴.
5. Abolishing laws that support Jewish exclusivism by eliminating Jewish schools and societies⁷⁵, while also protecting Russian peasants against deleterious Jewish influences⁷⁶.
6. Counteracting Jewish family culture that discourages women from working outside the home⁷⁷.

Rennenkampf cautioned readers that this program was unlikely to succeed in Russia. Revolutionary reforms in France had struck down anti-Jewish legislation, but those reforms had not eliminated French Jews’ religious particularism or undercut the international ties between French Jews and Jews outside France. Nor had the reforms halted French anti-Semitism⁷⁸. Rennenkampf therefore proposed an answer to Russia’s Jewish question that was no solution at all. His plan amounted to a series of new restrictions on the Empire’s Jews, nothing more.

Rennenkampf’s two open letters to Chicherin appeared in *Kievlianin* and later in a separate booklet in Kiev. Chicherin decided he could not respond in Russian newspapers or by a publication with an imprint in Russia, so he answered Rennenkampf in a short book brought out in Berlin⁷⁹.

He announced at the outset that solutions to the Polish and Jewish questions “are at present idle dreams”. Discussion of them was worthwhile merely because it afforded “a certain moral satisfaction.” Like Rennenkampf, Chicherin noted that, before 1863, there had been considerable Russian sympathy for Poles, but he also said that much had changed since 1863. Among these changes was “a diminution of the moral level of patriotic sentiment in educated Russian society”⁸⁰. Instead of the exalted patriotism that seeks to efface a country’s “moral blight” [*nrvstvennoe piatno*], Russians had embraced the patriotism

⁶⁷ Ibid. P. 49–56.

⁶⁸ Ibid. P. 58.

⁶⁹ Ibid. P. 61.

⁷⁰ Ibid. P. 63–64.

⁷¹ Ibid. P. 67.

⁷² Ibid. P. 68–69.

⁷³ Ibid. P. 69–70.

⁷⁴ Ibid. P. 71–72.

⁷⁵ Ibid. P. 74–75.

⁷⁶ Ibid. P. 76.

⁷⁷ Ibid. P. 77–78.

⁷⁸ Ibid. P. 80–82.

⁷⁹ *Chicherin B. N. Pol’skii i evreiskii voprosy*. P. 3.

⁸⁰ Ibid. P. 3–4.

of subjugation — the kind expressed in nationalist newspaper propaganda and by vulgar people⁸¹.

In analyzing the background to the Polish partitions, Chicherin contended that Catherine II had actually encouraged dissent in Poland in order to keep that country divided and weak⁸². Chicherin quoted the Prussian reformer Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein that the partitions of Poland constituted a “repellent political crime”⁸³. Poles had been forced “at bayonet point” to bow to their country’s dismemberment. Aleksandr I’s decision to restore Poland after 1815 was an attempt to “erase [Russia’s] guilt for this crime”⁸⁴. Chicherin regarded the suppression of the 1830 and 1863 uprisings in Poland as positive steps, in so far as he opposed unnecessary revolutions. Yet he thought the Russian authorities had gone too far to impose Russian control over provinces from the Polish Kingdom⁸⁵. In his opinion, complete subordination of Poland to the Russian administration was a political fantasy⁸⁶. He decried as insulting to the Poles Russian educational policies that forced schools in the western periphery to teach in the Russian instead of the Polish language⁸⁷. He criticized Russian religious policies toward Uniates as imposing “forced conversion”. He said the Russian government was holding Poland and the western provinces under martial law [*v osadnom polozhenii*]⁸⁸. He pointed to the hypocrisy of those Russian patriots who excoriated the Austrians for oppressing captive Slavic peoples while “[our newspapers] do not want to see what we are doing in Poland”⁸⁹. The Panslavs’ talk of Slavic brotherhood was “empty comedy”⁹⁰.

Chicherin regarded as ridiculous Rennenkampf’s demand that Polish Catholic clergymen stop propagating the Roman Catholic faith. According to Chicherin, the clergy naturally tried to win souls, and it was not the Russian government’s duty to insert itself into matters of conscience⁹¹. Instead, the Russian government should return to the Poles their liberty: no other solution to the Polish question was feasible⁹². Occupying Poland “was costing Russians more than they received in return... Moreover, this occupation paralyzes our domestic and foreign energies. Nothing harms domestic progress more than the imperative of holding a subordinate population under constant yoke”⁹³.

At the end of his letter to Rennenkampf on Poland, Chicherin pronounced there was nothing more to be said: “Dixi et animan levavi” [I have spoken and saved my soul]⁹⁴.

Chicherin did not agree with Rennenkampf’s assertion that the Jewish problem was “more complex” than the Polish question; indeed, Chicherin thought it “much simpler”. The difficulty lay not at the policy level but rather in “centuries-old prejudices”⁹⁵. Chicher-

⁸¹ Chicherin B. N. *Pol’skii i evreiskii voprosy*. P. 5–6.

⁸² *Ibid.* P. 7–8.

⁸³ *Ibid.* P. 10.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* P. 13–14.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* P. 15–16.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* P. 17.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* P. 18–19.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* P. 20.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* P. 21, 24.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* P. 23.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* P. 27–28.

⁹² *Ibid.* P. 32.

⁹³ *Ibid.* P. 35.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* P. 37.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

in tried to show these prejudices lacked rational foundation. In his opinion, humanity “had received its moral legacy” from the Jews⁹⁶. The Jews had not fundamentally altered their beliefs since Moses⁹⁷. If there were tensions between contemporary Jews and Christians, the tensions stemmed from an unfortunate side of human nature — namely, “the closer peoples are, the crueler are the divisions between them”⁹⁸. On the Russian side, the rift with Jews had taken ugly forms because Christians had forgotten the apostle Paul’s warning in Romans 11:18: “Boast not against the branches. But if thou boast, thou bearest not the root, but the root thee.” In Chicherin’s view, Paul regarded the Jews as “the root of Christianity”⁹⁹. Christians therefore could not logically hate and oppress the Jews “and still consider themselves genuine Christians professing the law of mercy and of love”¹⁰⁰.

According to Chicherin, Jews in Russia “had committed no crime other than professing their faith”¹⁰¹. Russians had incorporated the Jewish community into the Empire during the Polish partitions, and Jews had done nothing to merit confinement in the Pale of Settlement¹⁰². If Jews had shown exceptional energy, if they were useful in Ukraine, as Rennenkampf had suggested, then they should be celebrated instead of treated as harmful. “In a well-governed society”, Chicherin wrote, “the category of harmful people is impermissible. The concept is an outgrowth of revolutionary and of despotic governments”¹⁰³. Chicherin rejected the anti-Semitic trope that Jews, as an exclusive community, were a “state within the state.” No, they were tied together by bonds of faith — that is, by ties that are good for society¹⁰⁴.

For Chicherin, the truth was that “politics does not consist in petty restrictions”. Government that bases itself on fear of the other “holds back progress to the great detriment of the [majority] people and of the realm”¹⁰⁵. In his opinion, fear of the other had been the common denominator in the Polish and Jewish questions, and such fear was a disastrous foundation for Russian political life¹⁰⁶.

In Chapter XV of *Hadji Murat*, Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy imagined a conversation in January 1852 between the Prussian ambassador to Russia and Baron Vil’gel’m Karlovich Liven, in which Liven declared: “*La Pologne et le Caucase, ce sont les deux cautères de la Russie*”¹⁰⁷. Looking back to the Congress of Vienna, Lieven complained that leaving Russia to attend to Poland was one of “Metternich’s tricks”. If the (fictional) Liven had looked forward half a century, he would still have found Poland a neuralgic point for Russia, still a “wound”. The Chicherin-Rennenkampf debate is fresh evidence for us that the Polish question, along with the related problem of the Jews from Polish lands, had not gone away. In answering Rennenkampf, Chicherin showed exasperation over the Russian government’s recent lack of action on the Polish question: “Justice is demonstrated not

⁹⁶ Ibid. P. 39.

⁹⁷ Ibid. P. 41.

⁹⁸ Ibid. P. 42.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. P. 44.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. P. 46.

¹⁰² Ibid. P. 47–48.

¹⁰³ Ibid. P. 51.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. P. 52–53.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. P. 54–55.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. P. 56.

¹⁰⁷ *Tolstoy L. N. Khadji Murat // Tolstoy L. N. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii: in 90 vols. Vol. 35. Moscow, 1950. P. 75.*

by words but by deeds. If I have deprived my brother of liberty, then first thing I must do is to remove his fetters and begin treating him as an equal. Since the uprising [of 1863], thirty-five years have passed; it is now time to return to a normal order"¹⁰⁸.

Chicherin was indignant at the Russian government's dilatoriness in dealing with the Polish and Jewish questions more than three decades after the 1863-1864 uprising, but he was also unhappy with Rennenkampf, who had argued with him for nearly twenty years. In the initial stage of their debate, Rennenkampf attacked Chicherin's basic philosophical assumption — liberty's rootedness in the metaphysical nature of human beings. In Chicherin's opinion, denial of that assumption meant that human beings have no intrinsic dignity, that their behavior can be explained by material impulses, that they are playthings of society and of the state. Chicherin saw in Rennenkampf a supposedly learned man who was hostile to individual rights and therefore to the ideal legal order. The debate's subtext in the early 1880s was the Empire's future. That subtext became explicit in the 1898 polemic.

The first stage of the Chicherin-Rennenkampf debate was symmetrical in so far as Chicherin had published his views in two volumes and Rennenkampf had answered in a legal journal. Both *Property and the State* and Rennenkampf's article had been printed without the censor's interference. The debate's second stage was asymmetrical. Chicherin had written at length, if abstractly, in *Course on Political Science*. Rennenkampf had responded in a newspaper with a critique defending governmental policies toward Poles and Jews. This shift to a newspaper put Chicherin at a disadvantage, because censorship of newspapers would not permit him to answer Rennenkampf in kind, in that venue. He therefore responded to Rennenkampf by publishing abroad — that is, via *tamizdat*. The resort to publication abroad was for him a repetition of the situation in the late 1850s, when he had written for Herzen's London anthology *Voices from Russia* [*Golosa iz Rossii*].

Chicherin's position in the debate with Rennenkampf was one example of the moralism affecting discourse concerning Empire in the last two decades of the 19th century. Vladimir Sergeevich Solov'ev's essay on *The National Question in Russia* [*Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii*] depicted Russia as a community duty-bound to model Christian ethics in its relations with non-Russian minorities and with Europe¹⁰⁹. L. N. Tolstoy's "Church and State" [*Tserkov' i gosudarstvo*] (1879)¹¹⁰, "My Faith" [*V chem moia vera?*] (1883)¹¹¹, and *The Kingdom of God Is Within You* [*Tsarstvo Bozhie vnutri vas*] (1894)¹¹² applied his Christian anarchism to Russian conditions. Tolstoy rejected patriotism and government itself as departures from Christ's teaching in the "Sermon on the Mount". Chicherin had known Solov'ev since the late 1870s and Tolstoy since the late 1850s. He had corresponded with both, studied the works of both, and had disagreed with them on most practical questions. Yet he shared aspects of their philosophical Idealism, particularly their commitment to upholding human dignity and their opposition to governmental coercion in matters of religious faith. In 1891, along with Solov'ev and Tolstoy, Chicherin contributed a letter to the book, *Word to the Accused!* [*Slovo podsudimomu!*] — a denunciation of official anti-Sem-

¹⁰⁸ Chicherin B. N. Pol'skii i evreiskii voprosy. P. 31.

¹⁰⁹ Solov'ev V. S. Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii. Vypusk pervyi. 1883–1888. Vypusk vtoroi. 1888–1891 // Solov'ev V. S. Sbranie sochinenii. Vol. V. St. Petersburg, 1911–1914. P. 3–494.

¹¹⁰ Tolstoy L. N. Tserkov' i gosudarstvo // Tolstoy L. N. Polnoe sbranie sochinenii. Vol. 23. Moscow, 1957. P. 475–486.

¹¹¹ Tolstoy L. N. V chem moia vera? // Ibid. P. 304–468.

¹¹² Tolstoy L. N. Tsarstvo Bozhie vnutri vas // Ibid. Vol. 28. Moscow, 1957. P. 1–293.

itism¹¹³. Chicherin's opposition to anti-Semitism was chiefly the result of his postulate of inner freedom, into which the state may not intrude. He was also a Christian modernist, who wanted to escape the common prejudices of religious traditionalists.

Rennenkampf was a cultural conservative, whose fervent support of Russian Orthodoxy and aversion to Roman Catholicism resembled that of Ivan Ignat'evich Malyshevskii, a historian of the Russian Church who taught at the Kievan Spiritual Academy¹¹⁴. Rennenkampf met Malyshevskii in the Kiev city council, where both were voting members. He also knew Malyshevskii from a series of publications. Among them were a book on *Jews in Southern Russia and in Kiev in the 10th–12th Centuries* (1878)¹¹⁵, a monograph on Saints Kirill and Methodius¹¹⁶, and a book on Saint Vladimir written for the nine-hundredth anniversary of the Christianization of Rus'¹¹⁷. Incidentally, Malyshevskii was a fervent proponent of the building of the Cathedral of Saint Vladimir in Kiev, a building erected between 1862 and 1882 — that is, at the height of Rennenkampf's activity in St. Vladimir University and in Kievan city government. Malyshevskii's most important academic publication was his two-volume monograph, *Western Rus' in the Struggle for Faith and Nationality* (1897), which appeared just as Rennenkampf contemplated his response to Chicherin¹¹⁸. In it, Malyshevskii treated proselytizing efforts of Roman Catholics from Poland and Lithuania as acts of aggression against the Russian Orthodox community in Ukraine. Malyshevskii's and Rennenkampf's cultural conservatism led them to support better education in Kiev: both sought private donations to found and equip schools for common people. They also supported the Russian monarchy and better treatment of oppressed Russian peasants in Ukraine and Poland. Their cultural, political, and social program was not untypical of elite attitudes on the western periphery before 1900, when the Russian right developed a harder edge.

In a recent book, the historian John LeDonne argued that, between 1650 and 1850, the Russian government sought to forge a unitary state across Eurasia but did not succeed in integrating Poland and Lithuania into Russia¹¹⁹. The principal obstacles facing Russian centralizers — the wealthy Polish *szlachta*, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Jews — proved impossible to manage without resorting to coercion¹²⁰. According to LeDonne, “by 1850, the expansion of the unitary state had stopped at the boundaries of Poland and Finland,” that is, the Russians had to acknowledge, at least temporarily, local diversity, the need for separate administrative procedures, and even separate religions¹²¹. If LeDonne is right, the Polish uprising of 1863–1864 upset the status quo and drove Petersburg to resume its campaign to absorb former Polish provinces into a unitary state. Chicherin's

¹¹³ See: F. G. [Faivel' Bentselevich Gets]. Slovo podsudimomu!: o evreiskom voprose: s pis'mami grafa L. N. Tolstogo, B. N. Chicherina, Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov'eva i V. G. Korolenko. St. Petersburg, 1891. Solov'ev quoted Chicherin's letter on pp. XX–XXI.

¹¹⁴ For a short biography, see: *Korol'kov I. N.* Ivan Ignat'evich Malyshevskii: zasluzhennyi professor Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii: nekrolog. Kiev, 1897.

¹¹⁵ *Malyshevskii I. I.* Evrei v Iuzhnoi Rossii i v Kieve v X–XII vv. Kiev, 1878.

¹¹⁶ *Malyshevskii I. I.* Sviatye Kirill i Mefodii pervouchiteli slavianskie. Kiev, 1886.

¹¹⁷ *Malyshevskii I. I.* Zhitie sviatoago ravnoapostol'nago kniazia Vladimira. St. Petersburg, 1888.

¹¹⁸ *Malyshevskii I. I.* Zapadnaia Rus' v bor'be za veru i narodnost': v dvukh chastiakh. St. Petersburg, 1897.

¹¹⁹ *LeDonne J. P.* Forging a Unitary State. Russia's Management of the Eurasian Space, 1650–1850. Toronto, 2020.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 85–104

¹²¹ *Ibid.* P. 179–181.

and Rennenkampf's debate was therefore about the wisdom or unwisdom of making a unitary state on the western periphery: Chicherin rejected that path and called for Russia to emancipate unmanageable Poland; Rennenkampf called for unrelenting pressure on Russia's "enemies".

For Chicherin, the encounter with Rennenkampf had incommensurably higher stakes — the choice between freedom and unfreedom inside Russia itself. His unarticulated banner in addressing the Polish problem was "for your liberty, and for ours".

References

- Airapetov O. R. Tsarstvo Pol'skoe v politike Imperii v 1863–1864 gg. *Russkii sbornik. Issledovaniia po istorii Rossii*, vol. XV. Moscow, Modest Kolerov Publ., 2013, pp. 7–138. (In Russian)
- Bunge N. K. *Teoriia kredita*. Kiev, Universitetskaia tip. Publ., 1852, 312 p. (In Russian)
- F. G. [Faivel' Bentslevich Gets]. *Slovo podsudimomu!* St. Petersburg, Tip. gazety "Novosti" Publ., 1891, 165 p. (In Russian)
- Hamburg G. M. *Boris Chicherin & Early Russian Liberalism. 1828–1866*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992, 443 p.
- Korol'kov I. N. *Ivan Ignat'evich Malyshevskii: zaslužhennyi professor Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii: nekrolog*. Kiev, Tip. N. T. Korchak-Novitskago Publ., 1897, 34 p. (In Russian)
- LeDonne J. P. *Forging a Unitary State. Russia's Management of the Eurasian Space, 1650–1850*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2020, 663 p.
- Malyshevskii I. I. *Evrei v Iuzhnoi Rossii i v Kieve v X–XII vv.* Kiev, Tip. V. Davidenko Publ., 1878, 116 p. (In Russian)
- Malyshevskii I. I. *Sviatye Kirill i Mefodii pervouchiteli slavianskie*. Kiev, Tip. G. T. Korchak-Novitskago Publ., 1886, 483 p. (In Russian)
- Malyshevskii I. I. *Zapadnaia Rus' v bor'be za veru i narodnost': v dvukh chastiakh*. St. Petersburg, Synodal'naia tip. Publ., 1897, 402 p. (In Russian)
- Malyshevskii I. I. *Zhitie sviatoago ravnoapostol'nago kniazia Vladimira*. St. Petersburg, St. Peterburgskoe slavianskoe blagotvoritel'noe obshchestvo Publ., 1888, 16 p. (In Russian)
- Rennenkampf Nikolai Karlovich. *Biograficheskii slovar' professorov i prepodavatelei Imperatorskago universiteta Sv. Vladimira (1834–1884)*, ed. by V. I. Ikonnikov. Kiev, Tip. Imperatorskago universiteta sv. Vladimira Publ., 1884, pp. 561–565. (In Russian)
- Solov'ev V. S. *Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii. Vypusk pervyi. 1883–1888; Vypusk vtoroi. 1888–1891. Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. V. St. Petersburg, Prosveshchenie Publ., 1911–1914, pp. 3–494. (In Russian)
- Timiriaev D. O. Razdely Rechi Pospolitoi i situatsiia v zapadnom krae v politicheskoi polemike B. N. Chicherina i N. K. Rennenkampa. *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Serii 8. Istorii*, 2018, no. 6, pp. 3–17. (In Russian)

Received: August 1, 2023

Accepted: January 10, 2024

Статья поступила в редакцию 1 августа 2023 г.

Рекомендована к печати 10 января 2024 г.