

TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION STRATEGIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC RISK MANAGEMENT*

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The article problematizes a range of issues related to the transformation of coordination relations in the structure of public administration when making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The main substantive objective of the study is to analyze the conceptual model of strategies and political-administrative coordination mechanisms of interaction in risk situations, the features of management influences that ensure enhanced functionality of prevention and distribution of threats, especially in the context of digitalization. The research methodology is based on classical and modern concepts of public management, risk and its perception, and theories of political coordination of various forms of algorithmic threat management. The article argues that coordination in the structure of public administration is a political form of coordination and correction of political interests, rules of interaction between producers and consumers of risks, their beneficiaries and those most exposed to risks. The article proves that political and administrative coordination in the field of risk management is aimed at minimizing the results of conflicts of interest, deformation of the perception of threats and dangers into riskophobia or riskophilia. The authors argue that government monopolization of the right to information about risks reduces the possibilities for joint coordination and the effectiveness of political strategies to address threats. The analysis made it possible to come to the conclusion that the discoordination of functions, tasks and risk management processes does not allow the preferences and perceptions of risk of social actors to be aggregated into the overall interest of preventing and

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forecasting threats, and forms points of blockade of the structural-organizational and institutional-regulatory mechanism for controlling hazards in the social system. The study identifies and describes dysfunctions in the field of public administration associated with discoordination of political risk management, highlights institutional, distributional, behavioral and paternalistic management failures in situations of uncertainty, threats and dangers, identifies and describes mechanisms of political-administrative coordination risk management.

Keywords: transformation of public governance, political and administrative coordination, risk, risk reflection, political risk management, managerial failures.

The coordination theory is an analysis instrument underused in the arsenal of modern sociology and political science of risk. It attracts attention in emergency circumstances.

Simultaneously, the global pandemic, which has significantly complicated the configuration of administrative and political methods for regulating public relations, has made it evident that the needs for rational and effective coordination urge the renewal of the heuristic tools for the analysis of this activity both at the level of academic relevance and at the level of developing technological mechanisms and methods for solving issues of risk and threat management. The pandemic, forcing people to adjust the practices of political risk management and decision-making in the context of uncertainty, has created the urge to analyze the issue at a new level. It involves evaluating new technologies and their effectiveness, re-evaluating the existing administrative and political coordination mechanisms in the risk identification and assessment system, and leveling these risks off.

The research relevance of studying the place and role of coordination relations in decision-making in the context of uncertainty is due to the growing fragmentation of the functional purpose of the political and administrative levels of maintaining the rules of behavior in the conditions of “a reproducible algorithm for successful extreme behavior without rules, in which the government easily provokes repeated risks, relying on its lack of responsibility to the population” [Pavlovsky, 2019, p. 92].

A particularly challenging issue is distributional equity of risks and determining who should bear the burden of the corresponding costs. As one addresses the issue of coordination mechanisms of interaction in the “risk subspace”, which, using P. Bourdieu’s methodology, one considers to be an asymmetric structure that produces, reproduces, ranks, and distributes threats and risks, functioning “simultaneously as tools and goals of the struggle in various fields” [Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40], makes it possible to grasp the features of managerial influences that ensure the reinforcement of the functionality of prevention and distribution of threats.

One of the key research issues is that most works on this subject dramatically ignore the understanding of the correlation of risk and its perception with the role of coordinational management mechanisms in forming both adequate and inadequate responses to contemporary threats. The consequences are the unwillingness to institutionalize norm and value regulators that work with risk exposure of modern society, lack of situation and information assessment depth and various types of managerial deviations in the practice of political strategy implementation. In different methodological approaches, the opportunity to influence risk production and spreading is

related to one of the most profound characteristics of the crucial governmental governance that ensures steady development.

Classical concepts relating to modern risk study and perception by U. Beck [Beck, 2000], Z. Baumann [Baumann, 2017], A. Giddens [Giddens, 1996], N. Luhmann [Luhmann, 1993], as well as keystone concepts by A. Wildavsky, K. Dake and M. Douglas [Douglas, 1982; Wildavsky, 1994] have laid the foundation for this research that focuses on peculiarities of risk acceptance in different social groups caused by inherent socio-cultural values.

N. Luhmann has stated that the fact that many sciences have turned to risk analysis never leads to a universal concept of risk. The research is unique in the way it combines theories of political coordination of various forms of algorithmic threat management that establish and change the rules of the game, disciplining sanctions in a risk-based society, and studies of the institutional design of modern risks and dangers, various strategies in the context of uncertainty. It is important to propose a conceptualization of bureaucratic practices within the typology of risk response strategies, the specifics of risk reflection, and the calculation of costs, benefits, and utility in various organizational coordination models.

Within the research framework, there is no need to provide a detailed analysis of publications on the methodological aspects of this issue. A detailed overview of the research and development corpus is presented in the analytical review by Kevin Crowston et al. [Crowston, Rubleske, Howison, 2006]. The authors believe that it is essential to understand coordination not as a finite or equilibrium state but as a continuous open process in the system as a whole to ensure its stability by reinforcing the integration of its parts and elements [Chavance, 2003].

Other approaches that are crucial in connection with the issues examined in the paper include the social risk amplification concept [Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, 1988], which considers the mechanisms of coordination of initial individual signals concerning threats with the current political agenda, the political goal setting of the state, the political intentions of the ruling minority, and public political discourse [Solovyov, 2019], which can weaken or strengthen the perceived risks.

This type of methodological narrative provides a chance to identify the risks and dangers and show how political actors legitimize their decisions.

Public power is not unified (except for a monopoly on violence). It is a multi-level hierarchical structure of fragmented echelons whose actions and interests are uncoordinated and sometimes conflicting with each other, forming their strategies for self-preservation and generating additional costs in connection with risks.

Noting in this regard the tremendous increase in the complexity of transactions between participants in the social game, the need for intervention to ensure equal access to it and its conditions, Michel Crozier believes that it is necessary first to understand the reasons for the behaviors that are considered undesirable, and then try to influence the conditions that generate them and to anticipate possible errors. However, the issue is not limited to that as “the dispute is not about the need for regulation, but about the type of power that should develop it, about the type of power that should apply it, on the one hand, and about the limits of this power and the abuse of power that it commits, on the other” [Crozier, 2011, p. 196]. It is essential to take into considera-

tion the ability of political and administrative institutions to abuse power and violence, create, use the term suggested by M. Foucault, various forms of “administrative inquisition”, their use of a sophisticated arsenal of practical tools, checks and balances, formal and informal restrictions that are intended to compensate for the sinking trust through organized distrust [Rosanvallon, 2008]. As Gleb Pavlovsky emphasizes, the government is splitting into a supplier of dangers and a seller of means of protection. Not managing the dangers turns out to be a winning strategy for political institutions. The government, instead of coordinating risk and managing threats, tends to regard human behavior as harmful for humans themselves (although it seems reasonable to those who engage in it), creates challenges, generates demand for their creation, and spreads anxiety from which citizens are “saved” on behalf of the same government. The authorities detest conflicts, but suppression or “prevention” of conflict is extremely advantageous for them. A business area emerges that manipulates by using threats and creating false agendas [Pavlovsky, 2012].

Explanatory models of the perception of risk tolerance and its acceptability base on assessments of the political/emotional perception of the evaluation of the “honesty” of their distribution or on the analysis of coordinating political/administrative decisions based on certain regulatory principles and methods of justifying assessments of threats and dangers.

Additionally, the theoretical premise of M. Crozier is seen as fundamental in this regard. He characterized modern society as the “realm of negotiation, and believed that the power of the government depends on the scope of control over the source of uncertainty” [Crozier, 2017].

In this context, it seems one-dimensional to describe coordination relations solely as the coordination of “the actions of public authorities, reconciliation of goals, resources, forms, and methods of activity in order to achieve common goals” [Buchakova, 2014]. The approach used in this paper to examine the coordination relationships in risk management is fundamentally different.

To overcome these shortcomings in understanding coordination relationships in risk management, the authors propose to shift the epistemological attitude. Instead of reducing the practice of political coordination design to a normative and legal description of coordination by the government authorities, it is necessary to identify the semantic dimension of the interests, motives, and actions of political actors in the coordination process that use threats and dangers as a resource. Corey Robin emphasizes that fear is political. It originates in society, has far-reaching consequences, can dictate politics, brings new groups to power, keeps others out, and creates and cancels laws [Robin, 2004].

In particular, the research expands the range of the analysis to include the impact of coordination on the responses of risk consumers to the dysfunctions of risk producers. Awareness of the cleavage between them in differentiated societies is one of the most important human attitudes [Shils, 1961]. Simultaneously, the primary risk for risk producers is often “the risk of a Russian roulette player — an unrecoverable final loss” [Pavlovsky, 2019, p. 66–67].

They often develop and apply “a sophisticated arsenal of practical tools, checks and balances, formal and informal restrictions that are intended to compensate for the sinking trust through organized distrust”.

A more productive option is the use of the epistemological arsenal of considering the coordination at the institutional level as a joint activity of the governors and the governed, which implies “recognition of the mutual responsibility of the parties, and, therefore, significantly lower use of deception and dishonest tricks” [Solovyov, 2021, p. 47].

This research issue can be formulated as a matter of the political and administrative dichotomy, the mechanisms, and forms of coordination between those “exposed to risks and those benefiting from them” and between “risk producers and risk consumers” [Beck, 2000, p. 26].

Coordination is a specific authentic political form, a typical model of coordination and correction of political interests, the rules of interaction of authorities at various levels among themselves and with the population, a societal framework that arises from competitive interactions. It concerns the model of the state as a “playmaker” [Rubinshtein, Gorodetsky, 2020, p. 179], a key player in generating, coordinating, making, and executing decisions, which manipulates all threads of coordinating the “game”, from the quality of strategic thinking and strategic decision-making skills, the ability to organize a team game of risk management, which determines the life of the “society of risk”.

Therefore, the special functional burden of political coordination is to maintain (change), based on non-economic criteria, the compatibility of the positions of political actors with the political system and with each other. As the means and prerequisites for this compatibility, the initial organizational forms of coordination are the unity of the order of adoption and the content of the organizational principles of power, the order of decision-making, and functional specialization, the principles of interaction and adjustment of the laws of rational management and models of the political and organizational process [Malone, Crowston, 1994]. Therefore, this understanding of political coordination allows one to observe a different construction of the techniques of ruling to study the art of governing, that is to say, the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing [Foucault, 2010].

Political and administrative coordination in the field of risk management, among other things, aims at minimizing the consequences of conflicts of interest, the results of which may lead to rejection of reasonable decisions and lead to “unrealistic optimism” or “unrealistic pessimism” in the perception of threats and dangers, “riskophobia” or “riskophilia”, social ideas regarding strategies of behavior in the conditions of vulnerability since “the political process has its own logic, which in many cases does not coincide with the usual logic of optimizing economic mechanisms... Moreover, in the process of political maneuvering, participants often deliberately avoid risks associated not only with the protection of strategies that they consider insufficiently popular among voters but also with the search for new opportunities in this area” [Radygin, Entov, 2012, p. 26].

The paradox of poor governance from the standpoint of risk management effectiveness is that the society pays a high price for its failures, and the stabilizing mechanisms are distorted. In this situation, the entire society is at risk since reacting to the perception of risks by the majority, which is directed by political management

to maximize popularity, the society finds itself outside the zone of effective solutions for managing threats [Rubinshtein, Gorodetsky, 2018]. Nevertheless, it is attractive and convenient for politicians [Baland, Moene, Robinson, 2010].

Such political maneuvering in the subspace of risk and the desire to avoid discussing risks, simplified perception of threats due to the focus on purely tactical goals, the monopolization by the authorities of the right to information about risks, narrow the range of possibilities for joint coordination in the context of interdepartmental rivalry, reducing to zero the effectiveness of political measures aimed at threats elimination.

Scholar's attribute this primarily to the vagueness of criteria for assessing the consequences of non-trivial decisions in a situation of uncertainty and threats compared to ordinary activities. In the political coordination projection, a risk situation generates preliminary probing, coordination, and other "safety" procedures that delay decision-making and restrict its effectiveness [Radygin, Entov, 2012].

As U. Beck has pointed out, socially accepted risks include a "political detonator": the aspects that have been considered non-political become politics [Beck, 2000, p. 26].

Therefore, the incoordination of the functions, tasks and processes of risk management does not allow one to aggregate the preferences and perceptions of risk of social actors into a common desire to prevent and predict threats, forms the points of blocking the structural/organizational and institutional regulation mechanisms for controlling hazards in the social system. Earlier in the research, the authors have already mentioned that risk is the result of particular decisions oriented in specific ways which can lead to unexpected, dysfunctional, negative consequences, in which people form preferences and orientation that are beneficial to the authorities in terms of optimizing risk management and achieving maximum effect at minimum cost [Abgadzava, 2020].

Therefore, coordination in risk management means finding ways to aggregate conflicting perceptions of risks, aligning interests between those who produce risks and those who consume them.

It is clear that since these groups can independently form models of their behavior in a threat situation that do not coincide (contradict) with the risk minimization objectives of the political system, it is necessary to reconcile operations, goals, and resources to ensure a holistic risk management process. Considering the aspects mentioned above, the authors believe that political and administrative coordination tasks are to develop ways of controlling risk that minimizes and mitigates the emerging mismatches of private interests.

Within the framework of this discussion, it remains to identify the following mechanisms of political and administrative coordination of risk management [Aleinikov, Maltseva, 2021, p. 185–187]:

— Coordination unit for forecasting, identification, and assessment of strategic risks, which is used to model the nature and trends of threat development, determine the critical boundary, the red lines of risk tolerance;

— Coordination by quantifying risks and threats (their goals, subjects, actors, resources, stakeholders, etc.);

- Coordination unit of strategic risk limitation, which sets the limits of the freedom of decision-making on risks in the hierarchy of political institutions and eliminates the uncertainty of their actions in a situation of a threat;
- Coordination by identifying the subjects and the actors of risk transfer in the structure of political and administrative institutions;
- Coordination by defining the forms and mechanisms of political hedging and preventive risk reduction;
- Coordination unit of strategic risk diversification based on making political decisions on the distribution of gains/losses and risk management resources among various social actors and institutions in order to minimize threats for the society as a whole;
- Coordination unit of information and methodological support for management actions, rapid response measures, systematization of tools aimed at prevention and dynamic attenuation of risk;
- Coordination by “splitting” the contradictions of the operational generation of possible management reactions to the hazards, regulation of the choice of possible alternatives to the reactions of the solution that is currently the best;
- Coordination by identifying key changeable and persistent variables, “assigning responsibility” for past threats, identifying the primary stakeholders and coalitions interested in the construction of hazards, their roles and risk-generating potential;
- Coordination by establishing the time horizon of the impact of risk factors on the level of uncertainty and their ranking, the opportunities of changing them in the future;
- Coordination unit of scenario planning and integral ranking of scenarios of standard and non-standard situations, in other words, of several significant and mutually influencing trends in the development of risk situations;
- Political and administrative coordination design of alternative options for the impact of threats and coordination of scenarios with the risk management strategy;
- Coordination unit for the formation of a strategic culture regarding risks [Alenikov, Sunami, 2022] and the structure of risk management, the resolution of contradictions, the adjustment of strategic, tactical, and procedural priorities, and the methods of working with threats.

The meaning of such an analytical dimension of political and administrative coordination is to highlight additional characteristics related to the relationship between the theory of risk management and the concepts of formal/informal coordination mechanisms. This approach, which creates a framework for interacting between all players in the “risk field”, activates various tools for addressing threats and creates the basis for institutional and functional adjustments to the mechanisms and procedures used to coordinate the management of hazards and uncertainty. This perspective is a necessary step towards searching for new models for developing policy solutions aimed at preventing and minimizing risks.

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ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ СТРАТЕГИЙ ПОЛИТИКО-АДМИНИСТРАТИВНОЙ КООРДИНАЦИИ В СТРУКТУРЕ ПУБЛИЧНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ РИСКАМИ*

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В статье проблематизируется круг вопросов, связанных с трансформацией координационных отношений в структуре публичного управления при принятии решений в условиях неопределенности. Основную содержательную задачу исследования составляет анализ концептуальной модели стратегий и политико-административных координационных механизмов взаимодействия в ситуациях рисков, особенностей управленческих воздействий, обеспечивающих усиление функциональности превенции и распределения угроз, особенно в условиях цифровизации. Методология исследования базируется на классических и современных концепциях публичного управления, риска и его восприятия и теориях политической координации различных форм алгоритмического управления угрозами. В статье утверждается, что координация в структуре публичного управления — это политическая

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форма согласования и коррекции политических интересов, правил взаимодействия между производителями и потребителями рисков, их бенефициарами и теми, кто наиболее подвержен рискам. Доказывается, что политико-административная координация в сфере управления рисками направлена на минимизацию результатов конфликта интересов, деформации восприятия угроз и опасностей в рискофобию или рискофилию. Авторы приводят аргументы в пользу того, что монополизация властью права на информацию о рисках сужает возможности совместной координации и эффективность политических стратегий по устранению угроз. Проведенный анализ позволил прийти к выводу, что дискоординация функций, задач и процессов управления рисками не позволяет агрегировать предпочтения и представления о риске социальных субъектов в совокупный интерес превенции и прогнозирования угроз, формирует точки блокады структурно-организационного и институционально-регулятивного механизма контроля опасностей в социальной системе. В исследовании определены и описаны дисфункции в сфере государственного управления, связанные с дискоординацией политического риск-менеджмента, выделяются институциональные, распределительные, поведенческие и патерналистские управленческие провалы в ситуациях неопределенности, угроз и опасностей, выявлены и описаны механизмы политико-административного координационного управления рисками.

Ключевые слова: трансформация публичного управления, политическая и административная координация, риск, риск-рефлексия, политический риск-менеджмент, управленческие провалы.

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