

## МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ, ПОЛИТИКА И ЭКОНОМИКА СТРАН АЗИИ И АФРИКИ

UDC 94

### Turkish-American Relations during the National Struggle and the Government of Ankara: 1919–1923

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During the National Struggle led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Ankara government formed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Turkey's most important goal in foreign policy was to establish an independent and national state. Meanwhile, the United States closely watched the struggle and tried to keep relations with Turkey under control. The reason for this was the steps taken by the United States to get to know the National Struggle Movement and the agenda of the issue of us mandate in Turkey. At the Paris conference, the United Kingdom offered the United States a mandate over Turkey, and in a week later on Istanbul and The Straits, as well as New Armenia, which would be established on the territory of Turkey. However, although the United States was initially interested in this mandate, it did not accept it in the end according to public opinion. As a result, at the Lausanne conference, the tendency of rapprochement has increased between Turkey and the United States. On August 6, 1923, a new agreement was signed between Turkey and the United States. The agreement signed between US Ambassador to Switzerland Joseph Clark Kru and Ismet Inonu regulated political and commercial relations. Despite the agreement, Turkish-American official relations still did not start immediately. However, as a result of the policy put forward by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, these relations began to develop year by year. The development of these relations showed that the events that took place against the backdrop of Turkish-American relations and the accumulated experience are always very interesting and important from the point of view of the international community and history. In this article, the relations between Turkey and the United States during the National Struggle period have been studied.

*Keywords:* Ataturk, Ottoman, Turkey, Ankara government, USA, National Struggle.

## Introduction

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Republic of Turkey was forced to pursue many negative foreign policies due to many issues inherited from the Ottoman Empire and foreign policy. This comes from the fact that the foreign policy was not followed completely independently. As a result, this situation had a great influence on the formation of the foreign policy of Turkey. In order to understand the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey, it is necessary to know the political events of the last period of the Ottoman Empire, the National Struggle led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the foreign policy pursued by the Ankara government during that period.

It should be noted that the principle of the founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk “Peace in the country, peace in the world” was the most important principle of Turkish foreign policy. This principle remains to this day. However, the location of Turkey in an important geopolitical and geostrategic center of the world, has always placed it in an important place in world history, so this state is always obliged to carry out foreign policy in accordance with the period.

Looking at the National Struggle led by Mustafa Kemal and the foreign policy of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, we see that the most important goal was to build an independent and national state. At the same time, in order to achieve this goal, it was always sought for a support and an ally. At first, this ally, the USSR, was later seen as the United States. The reason for choosing the United States as a partner was seen as a force that would act together against Britain.

Turkey's relations with the United States are based on the Ottoman Empire, the successor of Turkey. These relations were created on the basis of the US economic and trade aspirations. Also, the weak and willing side of this interest was the US, and the strong side was the Ottoman state. This relationship was interrupted when the United States declared war on Germany at the beginning of the World War I. Germany began to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire to declare war on the United States. Unable to withstand the pressure of Germany, the Ottoman Empire severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 20, 1917. But he did not declare war on the United States. Despite the severance of diplomatic relations, the United States continued its activities in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, the US gained great privileges and carried out cultural occupation in the Ottoman lands. Within the US missionary activity, many schools were opened in the Ottoman lands and a strong network with missionary centers was established. In addition to missionary activity, the United States has gained important economic interests in these lands. As a result, proposals on the establishment of an Armenian state and its granting to the American mandate began to increase in eastern Anatolia.

Although the United States did not declare war on the Ottoman Empire during World War I, the long-running Ottoman-Turkish opposition began in US public opinion. This situation had a very negative impact on diplomatic relations during and after the World War I [1, p. 125]. With the end of the war, the activities of the Armenian lobby in the United States necessitated the return of the United States to the region. Also at the Paris Peace Conference, Britain offered the United States a mandate over all of Turkey, and a week later over Istanbul, the Straits and Armenia. The Greek occupation of Izmir provoked outrage in Anatolia, and reactionary rallies against the occupiers and the Istanbul government began in many cities, especially Istanbul. On May 19, 1919, Mustafa Kemal

Pasha came to Samsun. Together with the people against these invasions, the National Struggle began to be organized. A wide national struggle against all these invasions began. This struggle caused a wide resonance in the world. On June 10, 1919, United States Commissioner Ravndal sent a telegram to the US State Department informing him that the movement, which had begun in Samsun, was of concern to Britain and that British spies were sending troops to the region [2, p. 25].

### **Purpose, tasks and methodological basis of the research**

The purpose of our research is to briefly touch on the Turkish-American relations during the Ottoman Empire, and to study the relations during the National Struggle and the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Further, it was intended to study the foreign policy pursued during the “National Struggle” and the impact of the United States “mandate” during the discussion, as well as to study the bilateral meetings held during the diplomatic relations established by Ataturk with the United States.

Characterizing the general picture of Turkish-US relations during the National Struggle and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, it was planned to study the significance of its relations in the world system, its place in socio-political processes and the position of Turkey in the world from a methodological point of view. At this time, a critical approach from simple to complex, synchronous and complex tracking of the history of the period, analysis and comparison of facts, interpretation and generalization methods were used.

### **Turkish-American relations, which began with the end of the World War I**

The United States, which was on the side of the occupying States during the war of independence, supported the occupation with its fleet. Although it was said that it played a largely neutral role during the invasion, coastal cities such as Samsun were bombed by ships belonging to this fleet. As a result, Izmir was occupied by the Greeks on May 15, 1919, under the control of Allied ships, including the United States. In the United States, the USS Arizona, USS Dyer, USS Gregory, USS Luce, USS Manley were involved in this occupation [3, p. 26]. At the same time, the US President officially accepted the occupation of Izmir [4 p. 153]. The occupation of Izmir strengthened the belief of the United States that Britain would succeed in Anatolia. For this reason, the occupation was very well received by the US public [5, pp. 2–6]. This situation would have opened the way for the US to crash further eastward. In fact, the United States had previously located in the Ottoman Empire as a missionary. In this regard, he was ahead of England.

With the onset of the occupation, there were calls for the United States to settle in the territory of the present-day Republic of Turkey as soon as possible. These calls were mainly from the Armenian people and the Armenian lobby in America. Lewis Hack, appointed the first US representative to the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul Government) and carrying the title “Commissioner” was at the forefront of the calls. Lewis Huck reported that not enough information was received from Anatolia, and therefore consulates in Izmir, Sivas, Adana and Aleppo should be opened as soon as possible [6, p. 125]. Instead of taking a step towards the calls of the US Lewis Hekin, the United States appointed Rear Admiral

Mark Lambert Bristol, commander of the US Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, to Istanbul as “High Commissioner”. Bristol, who had an extremely important place in the relations between the two countries, worked as an ambassador in Istanbul and closely followed the processes in Anatolia as the representatives of other countries. However, the US State Department failed to change its attitude towards diplomatic relations with the Ankara government [7, pp. 278–279]. The US administration responded negatively to calls for post-war diplomatic relations [1, p. 125]. In short, he tried to maintain a waiting position.

In general, the economic and social situation of the Ottoman state and people at that time was very difficult. The situation was tense even among the leaders of the state. Some of them supported the patronage of England, some supported the American mandate, and some supported the formation of a new independent state. At the same time, the allies pursued a policy of dividing the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the situation in the country, especially in large cities, was very difficult. At the same time, the National Struggle started by Mustafa Kemal Pasha worried the allied countries. For this reason, Mustafa Kemal Pasha saw the situation in Samsun as dangerous and moved to the Basin. Then, on May 28, 1919, the calls to the Basin and on June 22, 1919, to Amasya were published. These calls included calls for resistance to the occupation.

### **Turkish-American relations during the National Struggle**

The process of political and military organization of the National Struggle — the War of Independence, which began in Anatolia, had begun. Mustafa Kemal Pasha began to gather under one roof the local resistance movements against the occupation in many parts of Anatolia during the National Struggle. Mustafa Kemal Pasha called for “the establishment of an unconditional, independent new Turkish state based on national sovereignty!”, set a goal to implement the idea [8, p. 80].

Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s appearance on the agenda at the Paris conference caused him to find a place in US public opinion. There were reports that the National Struggle was intensifying day by day and that a 300,000-strong nationalist army led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha had ruled the region from Konya to Erzurum. Mustafa Kemal Pasha formed a new government in Ankara and it was emphasized that this government had a great influence on the Istanbul Government. It was reported that the intensification of the National Struggle with each passing day had upset the calculations in Anatolia [1, p. 125]. Of course, this situation could not help but frighten the allies, especially Britain and the United States.

The news of how the Ottoman Empire would disintegrate and the fact that events did not take place in accordance with the American plan caused serious discussions in the American public. Because according to the occupation of Izmir, the Turks will be expelled from Thrace, Istanbul and the Bosphorus, the new capital will be moved to Bursa or Konya. Part of Thrace would be given to Greece and the rest, including the United States, under the mandate of the Istanbul League of Nations. In addition, under a US mandate, Armenia would be established in six provinces in Eastern Anatolia. The government was warned after examining what happened to the public. It was noted that if the United States assumes responsibility for Armenia, it will enter a real war with the Bolsheviks and the above-mentioned National Struggle soldiers. [5, pp. 3–4].

Finally, between July 23 and August 7, 1919, the National Struggle was further expanded under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, chairman of the Committee of Rep-

representatives, which was established after the Erzurum Congress and was the executive body of the Society for the Defense of Rights. It has matured in the National Pact, formed and legitimized as a fully independent, national Turkish state. The growing and growing national movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal had embarked on the path to becoming a state with the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly [9, pp. 116–117].

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in addition to his efforts to organize the National Struggle in Anatolia, also attached importance to diplomatic activities [10, p. 102]. At the organizational stage of the National Struggle, the idea of creating a single country, which emerged during the congresses, also determined the main directions of foreign policy to be implemented at this stage. The growing weight of the idea led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha also determined the foreign policy axis of the National Struggle for the establishment of a national, independent Turkish state [11, p. 56]. It should also be noted that foreign policy was formed during the congresses. In this context, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States was considered one of the main goals. Thus, Mustafa Kemal Pasha tried to gain international recognition and diplomatic power against Britain [12, pp. 112–114]. However, at that time the issue of the American mandate left its mark on Turkish-American relations. The idea of an American mandate, which was also supported by some intellectuals, was widely discussed during congresses. The mandate issue was not widely discussed in the Sivas Congress. However, it was decided to send a delegation from the United States to Anatolia to observe by sending a telegram to the United States Congress [13, p. 62].

The contacts were influenced by the steps taken by the United States to get to know the National Struggle Movement better and the issue of the United States mandate. As Mustafa Kemal Pasha noted in his Nutuk, there was a large section that supported the American mandate. Although Article 7 of the declaration, published after the Erzurum Congress, explicitly stated that “the mandate and the protectorate are unacceptable”, the issue was raised again in the Sivas Congress [14, pp. 83–92]. As a result, it was not accepted as mentioned above.

The first contact of the United States with the National Struggle was in the Sivas Congress. In this context, Mustafa Kemal Pasha met with American journalist Louis Edgar Brown, who came to Sivas and followed the Sivas Congress [15, pp. 83–92]. However, this meeting was not an official one. The arrival of American journalist Louis Edgar Brown in Sivas provided an opportunity for the National Struggle to be recognized by the US public. Such contacts were extremely important in the face of black propaganda by the West. Thus, the purpose of the National Struggle could be explained first-hand. Therefore, Brown's visit to Sivas was welcomed with great pleasure [1, p. 129]. Brown met with leading figures in Congress, including Mustafa Kemal Pasha [16, p. 452]. Fearing a backlash from the US public, he stated that his visit was unofficial at all of his. Despite the expectations of the mandate supporters, Louis Edgar Brown was unable to influence the Sivas Congress. Brown's position disappointed supporters of the mantle. Meeting with Mustafa Kemal Pasha Brown, Mustafa Kemal Pasha said he did not know anything about the mandate [17, pp. 239–243]. There was a fact that Louis Edgar Brown was not an official representative of the United States, nor was he interested in the interests of the United States. Mustafa Kemal Pasha knew this well. Therefore, the talks were full of information about the National Struggle Movement.

At the Paris conference, the United Kingdom offered the United States a mandate over all of Turkey, and a week later over Istanbul, the Straits and Armenia. Britain's proposal was supported by other countries participating in the conference. This issue changed the agenda even more. Seeing this, US President Wilson commissioned Herbert Hoover, Director of the American Aid Society in the Middle East, to investigate the proposal. Hoover suggested that General James G. Harbord be appointed to investigate the situation in Anatolia [18, p. 89].

The American Aid Society in the Middle East was an organization created by the US government to help peoples affected by military operations in World War I. It was established in September 1915. In the Middle East, as well as in the Caucasus — Baku, Shusha, Tbilisi, Yerevan. Branches were organized in cities such as Batumi. In addition to providing financial assistance to those in need, these departments also collected information on the situation in the regions [19, p. 439]. The American Relief Society's activities in the Middle East, mainly because they were addressed to the Armenian population and sent to the US government, also reflected the interests and views of Armenians as a rule.

It should also be noted that Article 12 of the Principles proclaimed by US President Wilson in the US Congress at that time was about the Ottoman Empire. This article stated, "The sovereignty of the Turks must be ensured in areas where the majority of the Ottoman population is Turkic. The security and autonomous development of other peoples must be ensured within the borders of the state. The Dardanelles must be open to all ships and trade under international guarantees" [20, pp. 21–22]. Although these principles, expressed by US President Wilson, provided the legal basis for the establishment of a new Turkish state, they also brought controversy and confusion in the Ottoman geography dominated by a multinational structure. Another issue that was discussed as much as the Wilson Principles was the "mandate issue". This issue was on the agenda until it was rejected by the Sivas Congress [1, p. 123].

General James G. Harbord came to Sivas to investigate the situation in Anatolia. Arriving in Sivas on September 13, 1919, General Harbord was greeted with a ceremony and met with the Governor of Sivas. General James G. Harbord, who arrived in Sivas with a large delegation, was placed in Sivas American College. General Harbord says he wants to meet with Governor Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his friends. After that, there is a meeting between the two [21, pp. 262–263]. General Harbord and Mustafa Kemal Pasha met on September 20, 1919, in the principal's office of the Sivas Sultanate (Lyceum) where the Sivas Congress was held. Rauf Orbay also attended the meeting. During the meeting, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had the opportunity to express his views on the American mandate and the goals of the National Struggle at General Harbord [22, pp. 204–206]. One thing to note is that, unlike those who met before, general Harbord had the authority at least. He would pass on the information from those meetings to the US government.

In a meeting with US General Harbord, Mustafa Kemal Pasha tried to gain US support and soften the anti-Turkish atmosphere in the United States under the influence of Armenians [22, pp. 3–5]. Mustafa Kemal Pasha issued a 10-point memorandum at Harbord [23, p. 260]. The memorandum highlighted the violation of the ceasefire by the allies as one of the main factors in the start of the National Struggle and noted that the ultimate goal of the national movement is to establish a fully independent state within national borders. Referring to the historical rights of the Turkish nation in this region, the principles of the strategy to be pursued to achieve this goal are outlined [24, pp. 662–667].



This memorandum was important in terms of reflecting Turkey's foreign policy principles during and after the National Struggle. In this memorandum, Mustafa Kemal supported the American direction as a tactical measure in order to gain time to organize the resistance against the British and the Greeks. Over time, as the National Struggle intensified, he abandoned this idea. It is clear from the subsequent actions that this was indeed a tactic against the behavior of the allies. Mustafa Kemal never considered accepting the protection and mandate of any state over Turkey [25, pp. 13–14]. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, seeking the support of the US public against Britain, emphasized the importance of General Harbord's visit to Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal Pasha once again tried to draw the United States to his side against Britain. That is why the memorandum emphasized confidence in the United States [1, p. 131].

After the meeting, General James G. Harbord visited Erzurum to hold another critical meeting. This visit was also very important. Seeing the purpose of the National Struggle in Sivas, General Harbord witnessed how baseless the propaganda of the Armenian lobby in the United States in Erzurum was [26, p. 98].

However, it should be noted that in the meantime, US missionary organizations have established a strong network of communications in Anatolia. For this reason, the events in Anatolia were reported to the United States. The United States called Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his entourage "rebels". At the same time, Pan-Turanism in the National Struggle [1, p. 123].

On October 25, 1919, General James G. Harbord presented a report by Frank L. Polka, chairman of the American Peace Mission in Paris. After investigation, Polka wrote a letter to the US State Department on October 31, 1919, informing about the report. Although Polka's report was considered extremely successful, the US public was not satisfied with this information. In his report, Harbord stressed that the economic dimension of the mandate would be very heavy [1, p. 133]. Because the economic situation in Anatolia was very difficult and deplorable. There was arbitrariness in the political administration. In general, the social class did not know by whom and how it was governed.

Against this rapprochement, Britain continued to urge the United States to establish and control an Armenian mandate so that the United States could take responsibility for the region. America investigated this issue for a while and is considering accepting this responsibility [26, p. 121]. In fact, Britain wanted to divide Turkish lands at the hands of the United States, to own the oil-rich lands it needed, such as Mosul and Kirkuk again he succeeded.

When General Harbord and his delegation arrived in the United States on November 11, 1919, a meeting with President Wilson to present the report failed. President Wilson was partially paralyzed on September 29 due to illness. Therefore, the report could not be investigated by Wilson. The report was sent to the US Senate on April 3, 1920. The weather in the United States soon changed after the discussion of this issue in the Senate [1, p. 133]. On June 1, 1920, Senator Lodge proposed to the US Senate that the Armenian mandate be rejected. The mandate ended when the proposal was adopted by 52 votes in favor, 23 against and 21 abstentions. On June 1, 1920, the US Senate rejected the request of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Lloyd George to accept the mandate of Turkey, Istanbul and Armenia [27, p. 361]. This situation also signaled a change in US foreign policy. The United States, which was a party to the processes taking place in Europe after the World War I, finally decided to withdraw to its continent [28, pp. 127–136] decides.

The main reason for this was the foreign policy pursued by the ruling Democratic Party in the American public. Also, the death of over 100,000 American soldiers in World War I was one of the reasons for the growing discontent.

In the November 1920 elections, the Democrats in the United States, with a difference of 10 million, took power from the Republicans. Wilson's presidency ended. G. Warren, who was elected president after Woodrow Wilson, who was closely interested in European issues. Harding Wilson instead preferred to stay away from European issues. In the US, the atmosphere completely changed. With his return to the US isolation policy, his relations with Turkey were interrupted until the Lausanne Treaty.

## **Foreign policy pursued during the Ankara Government and the United States**

On April 23, 1920, the Turkish Grand National Assembly convened in Ankara. First, on April 25, a government was formed under the chairmanship of the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, as the Interim Executive Committee. Thus, the Ankara Government was formed separately from the Ottoman Government in Istanbul. Also, by the Law of the Commander-in-Chief, which came into force on August 5, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was allowed to increase the material and moral strength of the army, to use his powers in the field of management and administration [9, pp. 116–117]. This actually meant the establishment of a new independent Turkish state. Mustafa Kemal Pasha gained new powers to take big steps in this direction.

The Ankara government quickly established an organizational and management structure and began to succeed. Military success soon manifested itself in governance and diplomacy, and important steps were taken. With the election of Bekir Sami Bey as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, the foreign policy of the national Turkish state began to be implemented at the institutional level [9, pp. 116–117].

The United States did not establish any contact with the Ankara Government in the first six months of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (April — November 1920) Although there were no official initiatives in Turkish-American relations at first, the interest of the US business community in Anatolia and the Ankara Government began to grow. In particular, Samsun was the station of Americans who want to establish relations with the Ankara Government. Admiral Bristol also came to Samsun several times. He met with local leaders to establish new and better relations [6, p. 329]. The establishment of these relations did not rise to the state level in order to be formal.

In November 1920, Ismail Bey, a representative of the Ankara government in Samsun, sent a telegram to Ankara stating that there was an American representative in his region who had been appointed by the United States. As Admiral Bristol did not report the matter to Ankara, the Ankara government refused to recognize the US representative [7, p. 280].

It should be noted that although he refused to recognize his representative, Ankara treated all the support staff and American citizens very well. Knowing the importance of establishing trade relations with America, he raised this issue again. Admiral Bristol notified American officials that Europeans are approaching to connect with Ankara, adding that the United States also needs to do something to establish relations with the Ankara government [7, p. 285].



During this intermediate period, Ankara's government began to fill the governing gap in the country, as well as restore its relations in the international arena. 1921 is considered a year when political relations were established with Western countries during the National Struggle. In this context, the first attempt was to establish political relations with the United States on the condition of the unconditional abolition of capitulations, which is one of the basic principles for the realization of full independence. The Ankara government did not lose hope in the United States, and in early 1921 gave full authority to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish diplomatic relations with the United States Government [29, p. 86].

Despite the atmosphere against the Ankara government in the United States, the events in Anatolia began to occupy a wide place in US public opinion. The achievements of the National Struggle and the newly established Ankara government were contained in public opinion against the news published under the influence of lobbies. The US journalists who came to Ankara witnessed the events and contributed to the correct understanding of the fight against their writings. In addition, they met with the authorities and called for the start of diplomatic relations with the Ankara government. During this period, some American media began to publish articles about the future of the New Turkey. Events in Anatolia began to occupy a large place in US public opinion.

At that time, the most interesting topic in the American press was the policy of the new Turkish state against the United States and its attitude. During this period, the interview of the Philadelphia Public Ledger correspondent Clarence K. Streit with the Speaker of the Parliament Mustafa Kemal was very interesting. He asked him 19 questions related to the political events of the Mustafa Kemal period in Turkey. Many of those questions were about US-Turkish relations. [30, p. 257] In response to the first question, Mustafa Kemal stated that they wanted to take advantage of America's friendship. He said they did not see themselves at war with the American people. He said he wondered why the American nation had not yet established diplomatic relations with Turkey. In response to the second question, the Turkish Nation expressed its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with the United States within the Misaki National. He said they had informed the US government of the situation and stressed the importance of American assistance in activating its natural resources for all humanity and the nation [30, pp. 257–277].

American journalist Clarence K. Streit visited Ankara in early 1921 and stated that the foundations of the new Turkish state were laid in his meetings with United States officials after his visit. The US representative in Istanbul, High Commissioner Admiral Bristol, said the Ankara government should be recognized as "de facto". The United States Department of State's High Commissioner Admiral Bristol's efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the Ankara government were unanswered. Despite the United States administration's strategy to ignore the Ankara Government, High Commissioner Admiral Bristol and the US public could not remain unresponsive to the successes achieved. Although it did not meet the expectations of the Ankara government, informal contacts were established [1, p. 123].

The success of the Ankara government prompted Admiral Bristol to take action. Annie T. Allen, well known by Ankara government officials, were appointed a representative to Ankara. In June 1921, R. McDowell, an officer of the American Middle East Relief Organization, came to Ankara and held a series of meetings. In a report sent to Admiral

Bristol after leaving Ankara, McDowell said the Ankara government was ready to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. On top of that, Admiral Bristol asked the Ankara government for permission to appoint a semi-official representative to Samsun to represent the United States. The Ankara government has said it wants to establish official relations with Washington in exchange for the permission. The United States has said it will not accept such an offer [6, pp. 329–330].

A noteworthy step was taken by the United States after the successes of the Ankara government and the meetings of US representatives in Istanbul. The United States sent a delegation to Ankara. The main purpose of this delegation was to liaise with the Ankara government, to recognize Mustafa Kemal Pasha and to determine the situation of Americans in Anatolia. This meeting, which is extremely important in terms of economic, political and missionary activity, is also the result of the Ankara government's diplomatic achievements. The delegation, led by Lieutenant Robert S. Dunn, included Heck and translator Annie T. Allen. The meeting took place on July 1, 1921 at 16:00 at Ankara Station, which the Americans called the "Winter Palace". Prior to the delegation's meeting, Hek and Mustafa Kemal Pasha had a bilateral meeting at the same place in the morning. At this time, the questions to be asked at the afternoon meeting were identified. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was extremely cold at the meeting. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's choice to speak Turkish was a sign of this. This attitude of Mustafa Kemal Pasha disappointed the delegation [31, p. 56].

Thus, the United States did not want to establish official relations with the Ankara government until the end of 1921. But then, thinking about his own interests, at the end of 1921, informally appointed Julian E. Gillespie representative in Ankara. US representative Julian E. Gillespie returned to Istanbul again in February 1922. In June 1922, Robert V. Imbrie was appointed to Ankara as an unofficial representative. US Representative Imbrie left Ankara after the Great Taarruz victory [1, p.136]

Although efforts were made to establish relations with the United States, the main goal of the Ankara government during the National War — liberation war in its foreign policy was to promote the newly established Turkish state in the international arena. As a result, Turkey's gaining legitimacy as a nation of the international recognition was realized at the Lausanne Conference [25, p. 55].

In 1922 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the National Struggle for National Sovereignty and Independence was won against both internal and external enemies. During the talks in Mudanya on October 3–11, 1922, the Parliament and the Ankara Government proposed to the Western countries to hold a peace conference in Izmir on October 20. However, it was decided to convene a peace conference on November 13, 1922 in Lausanne [32, pp. 5–10].

## **Turkey-US relations at the Lausanne conference**

After the signing of the Mudanya Armistice and the victory of the The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Ankara Government) against the Greek forces, the allies invited the Parliamentary Government to a peace conference to be held in Lausanne on October 28, 1922 [33, p. 359]. Rauf Orbay first wanted to attend a conference to discuss the terms of the peace. However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk considered the participation of Ismet Pasha appropriate. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who attended Mudanya meetings, considered it

expedient to send Ismet Pasha to Lausanne as a general representative. Ismet Pasha was brought to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and work was accelerated [11, pp. 287–289]. The allies also called on the Istanbul government to put pressure on the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Ankara Government, in Lausanne. Reacting to this situation, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, on November 1, 1922, the Istanbul Government announced that the Ottoman government had in fact been abolished.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly met in Lausanne not only with the Greeks who invaded Anatolia and defeated the Ottoman Empire, but also with other allies who defeated the Ottoman Empire in the World War I. He faced the abolition of the Ottoman Empire. On November 20, 1922, negotiations began in Lausanne. Ottoman debt, the Turkish-Greek border, the Straits, Mosul, minorities and surrender were discussed at length. However, no agreement was reached on the withdrawal of capitulations and the evacuation of Istanbul and Mosul. Because this was the red line of the Turks [34, pp. 292–306].

On November 14, 1922, the United States announced to England, France and Italy that it wanted to participate in the conference as an observer rather than as a party country. Although, The United States did not fight with Turkey, participated as an observer at the conference in Lausanne [35, pp. 1–10]. Contrary to the expectations of the Turkish side, Anglo-American rapprochement was observed in the first part of the Lausanne talks. The British envoy, Lord Kurzon, said he respected America's "open door" principles to prevent them from acting with the United States and Turkey. Then the issue of minorities was raised. Thus, they were able to express their views on Armenians, to whom America is sensitive. The reaction of the Turkish delegation to the Armenian issue was widely covered in the Turkish and American media. These relations resulted in Ankara suspending the Chester Project talks [36, p. 224].

Richard Chaild, who was present as an American representative, took the floor at a meeting on November 21. He said he would be closely monitored even if they did not take part in the conference vote. He said they had the right to appeal if decisions would be contrary to the interests of the United States. The American observers at the conference called on the government to act in accordance with special instructions, to continue the capitulations signed during the Ottoman period and to protect religious, humanitarian and educational institutions.

Although the United States participated in the conference as an observer, it was asked to provide all possible assistance to the peace and compensation for the losses suffered by American citizens [37, p. 24]. He performed some duties to protect his interests in the East [29, pp. 1–10]. Towards the end of the conference, they expressed their support for the freedom of the Turkish Straits. In the end, it was seen in Turkey that the US government did not want to take an active role in the Armenian issue, in accordance with the instructions given. The Armenian issue was connected with the protection of the rights of minorities. Although it was decided to move forward with the allies in the negotiations, confidence in the allies was shaken and a problem arose [32, pp. 5–10].

According to the US Foreign Ministry, after the signing of the peace treaty between the allies and Turkey, the US representatives entered into the overthrow and began Special negotiations with Turkey. The draft treaty developed by the allies was examined by American representatives on January 29, 1923. It was accepted in accordance with American interests. On January 31, they also asked Turkey to study the draft agreement. The final

answer was asked on February 4. No capitulation or financial issues were agreed upon in the negotiations. Although the American delegation mediated the signing of an agreement between Lord Kurzon and Ismet Pasha, it did not succeed. Other delegations, led by Lord Kurzon, left Lausanne one by one, and negotiations were interrupted. The United States supported the allies' project during the talks [37, pp. 24–25].

During these negotiations, US plenipotentiary representative Chayld worked on the issues of rapprochement with Armenians, Mosul, Straits and capitulations. Grev, on the rapprochement between the Turkish delegation and the American delegation, Admiral Bristol, fought for the protection of missionary organizations and schools. During the negotiations, certain conditions were created for the development of trade between America and Turkey. One of the important works done in this regard was the Izmir economy Congress held on February 17 — March 04, 1923. Mustafa Kemal opened the congress and used a soft language about foreign capital in his speech. This positive approach was interesting to Americans. Turkey's non-opposition to foreign investment and to take a soft position began to yield its results.

## Chester Project

During this period, the most important agreement signed between the United States and Turkey was the Chester Project of April 9, 1923. This project, signed between the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Ottoman-American Development Company, i. e. the agreement on the construction of the Eastern Anatolian Railways, was approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on April 9, 1923 [32, p. 29].

It should be noted that the United States is still interested in Middle Eastern oil. The rapid depletion of oil in his country has fueled this interest. As is well known, after the World War I, there were growing concerns about the depletion of American oil reserves. For this reason, the Chester Project was of even greater interest to American companies with an eye in the oil region under these conditions [38, pp. 267–270].

With the Chester Project, Turkey showed to Europe and America that it was not hostile to foreign capital. Following this policy, also adopted a policy of interstate balance. The Chester Project was planned to extend the railways to Mosul. It should be noted that Mosul oil in particular is the most important cornerstone of planning. Britain and Germany reacted strongly to the project. Similarly, as the Lausanne Conference continued, the approval of the Chester Project by the Parliament further alarmed Britain and France. However, Turkey's attempt to open up to foreign capital did not work. The main reasons for the failure of the Chester Project were the lack of interest of American capital and American official channels in the project. Because the main interest of the United States was the oil of Mosul and Kirkuk. The Chester Project lost its significance when it was known that these territories wouldn't be given to Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty [39, p. 109]. Another reason was disagreement between the partners of the Chester Project. Disputes between American and Canadian partners and Chester's withdrawal from the company partnership negatively affected the implementation of the project. Clayton-Kennedy, a Canadian partner, did not start the project on time because he could not find enough capital during this period. For these reasons, Turkey terminated the contract with the Ottoman-American Development Company in December 1923 [38, p. 301].

## The second round of negotiations in Lausanne

The second round of negotiations in Lausanne began on April 23, 1923. The United States again joined the second stage of negotiations as an observer. Although political issues were solved more easily, tough discussions were held on economic issues. Until January, there were many disagreements between the parties on many issues. Faced with the stubborn attitude of the Turkish delegation on the basis of independence and sovereignty, the economic and political interests of the allies in the Middle East, difficult disputes arose. The American representatives made a great effort to create a common ground between the Turkish and allied representatives. However, all these mediation attempts were fruitless as they stood between the initiatives of the Turkish delegation and the instructions they received from Ankara.

With the last-minute talks between Ismet Inonu, Bompard and Montagna and the American representative Chayld, the allies stated that they would make sacrifices on economic issues. The Turks would have agreed to have foreign legal advisers not only in Izmir and Istanbul, but also in the courts of Samsun and Adana. This result, which was won by the American representative Chaid with a hard effort, could not be reached by the kurzo train, which was supposed to be delayed in the departure time, which could not prevent the conference interruption [40, p. 69].

As the Lausanne peace talks drew to end, negotiations between the United States and Turkey began in May 1923. The most important reason for the talks was that more important steps had been taken on the road to peace between Turkey and its allies. The Turkish and American representatives, Josef Grev and Ismet Inonu, signed the "General Agreement and the Extradition Treaty" signed on August 6, 1923 in Lausanne [41, p. 288].

The agreement signed between the Turkish Representative in Lausanne Ismet Pasha and the American Representative J. Grev caused great protests in the United States, as it covered the Armenian issue and the lifting of capitulations. There were fundamental issues that laid the foundation for this agreement. These included the most concessional country, citizenship, legal counsel, American cultural and religious organizations, and the guarantee of rights and compensation [42]. Grev, who signed the agreement, wrote in a report to the Foreign Ministry that the agreement was not perfect. He even said that there was an agreement that the Turkish side wanted under the conditions. He also said that the best result he could achieve could be this. Grev wrote that they did not succeed in the matter of citizenship, the judiciary and minorities. He accepted that sacrifices fell especially on America. He noted that America's most important achievement was gaining the status of "the most concessional country" [6, p. 416].

Although the rapprochement between the Turkish and American delegations in Lausanne resulted in an agreement, it failed to establish a strong Turkish-American relationship. The agreement was violated by anti-Turkish Americans. However, the Turkish Grand National Assembly accepted the agreement a few days after it was signed in Lausanne [43, p. 43]. Although the treaty had to be approved by the US Senate as soon as possible, Prime Minister Calvin Kulich sent the treaty to the Senate only on May 3, 1924. The Senate postponed the discussion of the agreement. The Turkish-American Treaty of Friendship and Trade, signed in Lausanne on August 6, 1923, was not ratified by the US Congress on January 18, 1927. Thus, Turkish-American relations were severed. Only 6 votes were not enough for the number of votes required for approval [43, p. 43].

## Conclusion

Turkey's relations with the United States were based on the Ottoman Empire, the successor of Turkey. These relations were created on the basis of the US economic and trade aspirations. Under the conditions of that period, the weak and willing side of the US was formed and the strong side was the Ottoman state. But after the World War I the Ottoman Empire became a defeated state and its territory was occupied by the states of the Entente. This situation had a negative impact on Turkish-US diplomatic relations during the World War I and after it. With the beginning of the occupation, calls began to be made for the US to settle in the territory of the current Republic of Turkey more quickly.

When we look at the National Struggle led by Mustafa Kemal and the foreign policy of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, we see that the most important goal was to build an independent and national state. With the outbreak of the National Struggle in 1919, the United States began to closely monitor the events in Turkey. Because at that time, the issue of US mandate in Turkey was raised. However, the United States later rejected the mandate.

The United States did not participate in the Lausanne Conference, which began after the successful completion of the National Struggle. The reason for this was that during the World War I, the two countries did not declare war on each other. However, the United States sent observers to the conference. There were disputes in Lausanne over the Armenian issue and capitulations. The biggest loss for the United States in signing the Lausanne Peace Agreement was the removal of capitulations. According to the agreement, it was important for merchant ships to pass freely through the Turkish Straits in times of war and peace. The administration of the straits was entrusted to a commission, including an American member, under the responsibility of the League of Nations. Equality of American religious, educational and charitable institutions with Turkish institutions was accepted on the borders of Turkey. The rights of minorities were equated with those of Muslims, and freedom of life, property and religion were guaranteed.

We can say that Turkish-American relations were formed in a low profile, but in a radically positive direction. The reasons for the low level of relations were the conditions of the period between the two countries and the "isolation" policy pursued by the United States during this period.

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## Турецко-американские отношения во время национальной борьбы и правительство Анкары: 1919–1923 гг.

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Во время национальной борьбы под руководством Мустафы Кемалья Паши и правительства Анкары, сформированного Великой национальной ассамблеей Турции, важнейшей целью Турции во внешней политике было создание независимого и национального государства. Между тем США внимательно следили за борьбой и старались держать отношения с Турцией под контролем. Причиной этого было желание США лучше изучить Движение национальной борьбы. Также на повестке дня стоял вопрос о мандате США в Турции. На Парижской конференции Великобритания предложила Соединенным Штатам мандат на Турцию, через неделю на Стамбул и Проливы, а также созданную на территории Турции Новую Армению. Несмотря на то что Соединенные Штаты изначально были заинтересованы в этом мандате, в конце концов, согласно общественному мнению, они его не приняли. В результате на Лозаннской конференции усилилась тенденция к сближению между Турцией и США. 6 августа 1923 г. между Турцией и США было подписано новое соглашение послем США в Швейцарии Джозефом Кларком Кру и Исметом Инону, которое регулировало политические и коммерческие отношения. Несмотря на договор, турецко-американские официальные отношения завязались не сразу. Однако в результате политики, проводимой властями, с каждым годом все больше развивались. Развитие этих отношений показало, что события, которые происходили в контексте турецко-американских отношений, и накопленный ими опыт всегда были очень интересны и важны для международного сообщества и истории. В данной статье изучены отношения между Турцией и США в период национальной борьбы 1919–1923 гг.

**Ключевые слова:** Ататюрк, Османская империя, Турция, правительство Анкары, США, национальная борьба 1919–1923 гг.

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