THE RECEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN ARGENTINA
BY EUGENIO PUCCIARELLI: HIS IDEAL OF A MILITANT AND
HUMANIST PHILOSOPHY UNDERPINNED
BY A PLURALISTIC CONCEPTION OF REASON AND TIME*

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This paper focuses on the Argentine philosopher Eugenio Pucciarelli (1907–1995) and his critical reception of phenomenology. It introduces to his contribution to phenomenology in the context of its early reception in Argentina and addresses the following issues: 1) the mission of philosophy, the various ways of accessing its essence, in particular those of Scheler, Dilthey and Husserl, 2) his reception of Husserl as far as the ideals of science and reason are concerned, 3) the crisis of reason 4) his pluralistic conception of reason and time, and finally, to 5) his humanistic stance. I argue that his conception of philosophy, which emphasizes the personal dimension and the social commitment of philosophical practice as well as the relentless search for unshakeable foundations of knowledge as carried out by Husserl, is underpinned by a pluralistic conception of reason, time and culture that confers Pucciarelli's philosophizing a humanistic bias. Phenomenology as conceived by Pucciarelli becomes thus an active force by embracing multiple perspectives, such that its methodology can be applied to varying contexts and circumstances. Pucciarelli's commitment to social justice and Latin American culture responds

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to the attempt to rescue the virtues and freedom of the individual, which ground human dignity. In short, Pucciarelli’s stance reveals a profound pluralistic humanism that does not neglect its militant and critical function, thus evidencing its relevance to the current sociopolitical situation in Latin America.

Keywords: Argentina, culture, humanism, Latin America, phenomenology, pluralism, reason, time.

RECEPCIÓN FENOMENOLOGÍA EN ARGENTINA: IDEAL DE LUZ EN LA FILOSOFÍA HUMANISTA PLURALISTA CON OPORON EN LA CIENCIA Y TIEMPO EN LUCAS PUCCHARIELLI*

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This article is focused on the Argentine philosopher Ezechiel Pucharelli (1907–1995) and his critical reception of phenomenology. It serves as an introduction to his contributions to phenomenology in the context of its primary reception in Argentina and is structured around the following themes:

1) the mission of philosophy, different ways of understanding its essence, especially that of Scheler, Dilthey and Husserl; 2) his reception of Husserl with the ideal of science and reason; 3) the crisis of reason; 4) his pluralistic concept of reason and time; and, finally, 5) his humanistic direction. The article claims that his concept of philosophy, in which the personal aspect and social relevance of philosophical practice, as well as the constant search for immutable foundations of knowledge, is similar to Husserl’s, is based on a pluralistic concept of reason, time and culture, which gives Pucharelli’s philosophical practice a humanistic inclination. Because phenomenology, in the form in which it develops Pucharelli, becomes an active force, encompassing multiple perspectives, its methodology can be applied to different contexts and circumstances. Pucharelli’s commitment to social justice and Latin American culture is a response to the attempt to rescue the virtues and freedom of the individual, which ground human dignity. In other words, Pucharelli’s position demonstrates a profound pluralistic humanism,

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1. INTRODUCTION. THE EARLY RECEPTION OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN ARGENTINA

The occasion to review and do justice to the early reception of phenomenology in Latin America is propitious to refer to its early reception in Argentina, especially by Eugenio Pucciarelli, who undoubtedly should be placed among the greatest contributions made by Argentine philosophy throughout the twentieth century. In this context, the work and trajectory of emeritus Professor Dr. Roberto J. Walton, disciple and successor of Pucciarelli in the chair of Gnoseology and Metaphysics at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, retired Senior Researcher at the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de Argentina (CONICET) (National Council for Scientific Research), and emeritus Director of the Centro de Estudios Filosóficos (Center for Philosophical Studies), which bears Pucciarelli’s name, of the Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires (National Academy of Sciences of Buenos Aires) is well known internationally. The same does not apply to Pucciarelli’s work, whose repercussion and reception was centered in Latin America, unlike that of both his teachers Alejandro Korn (1860–1936) and Francisco Romero (1891–1962) and his colleagues

1 Besides his numerous articles, Walton is author of Mundo, conciencia, temporalidad (World, Consciousness, Temporality) (Walton, 1993a), El fenómeno y sus configuraciones (The Phenomenon and Its Configurations) (Walton, 1993b), with Angela Ales Bello, Introducción al pensamiento fenomenológico (Introduction to Phenomenological Thought) (Ales Bello & Walton, 2013), Intencionalidad y horizonicidad (Intentionality and Horizonticity) (Walton, 2015), Horizonicidad e historicidad (Horizonticity and Historicity) (Walton, 2019) and Historicidad y metahistoria (Historicity and Metahistory) (Walton, 2020). See the “Lista seguida de obras de Roberto Walton” (“List of Works by Roberto Walton”) prepared by Javier San Martín in Horizonte y mundanidad. Homenaje a Roberto Walton (Horizon and Mundanity. Homage to Roberto Walton) (Rabanaque & Zirión Quijano, 2016), and, on the dominant issues of his thought (Rabanaque & Walton, 2022, 64 ff.).

Coriolano Alberini (1886–1960), Carlos Astrada (1894–1970) and Luis Juan Guerrero (1899–1957), who held closer ties to Germany.

Let us recall that the introduction and development of phenomenology in Argentina are closely related to three key facts. Firstly, Argentina’s intellectual background at the beginning of the twentieth century was characterized by the need to overcome positivism. Secondly, the influence of José Ortega y Gasset, who paid three visits to the country in 1916, 1928, and 1939, founded the *Revista de Occidente* in 1924 and edited a collection of books under the title of *Biblioteca de ideas del siglo XX*, which contributed to the reception and translation of German philosophy. However, already before his first visit, Alberini mentions in his *Escritos de filosofía de la educación y pedagogía* of 1973 that phenomenological notions were circulating in the *Universidad de Buenos Aires* well before Ortega’s first visit. Thirdly, thanks to the early translation into Spanish of the *Logical Investigations* (1929) by José Gaos and Manuel García-Morente, Husserl’s phenomenology was widely read and discussed. This early period in the development of phenomenological thinking in Argentina is marked by the reception of Husserl, Heidegger and Scheler by mainly Alberini, Astrada, Cossio, Guerrero and Romero, while the reception of Kant was mainly due to the pioneering work of Korn.

All these philosophers laid the foundations of the influence of German philosophy in Argentina and, in contrast to Pucciarelli, held personal contact to German philosophers, as the following short introduction to their work shows. We may start by Astrada, who studied in Cologne, Bonn and Freiburg, and met not only Husserl and ideology; (Perez de Watt, 1988)—contributors: B. Portela, M. Sacerdote, A. Montenegro, F. J. Olivieri, E. Pucciarelli, C. Fernández—; (Walton, 2004); (Walton, 2008).

3 See the pioneering work of Javier San Martín, who edited an anthology of the writings of Ortega y Gasset in German (Ortega y Gasset, 1988). On the phenomenology of Ortega y Gasset see: (San Martín, 2012). On the influence of Husserl’s on Ortega y Gasset see: (Díaz Álvarez, 2013, 3–8) and on Ortega y Gasset’s visits to Argentina see: (Ruvituso, 2015, 57–63, 74–83).

4 On this subject see: (Walton, 1997, 675; Rabanaque & Walton, 2022, 54).

5 This early knowledge was presumably due to teaching activities of the German professor Felix Krüger, who taught in Argentina from 1906 to 1909, as remarked in: (Ferrer, Schmich & Pérez-Gatica, 2022, 103, fn. 165).

6 On this subject see: (Walton, 1997, 675; Rabanaque & Walton, 2022, 54).

and Heidegger, but also Scheler, Hartman, Oskar Becker and Ernst Cassirer. Astrada’s interests in phenomenology are prevalent in his early books, for instance in both El juego existencial (The Existential Play) of 1933 and El juego metafísico (The Metaphysical Play) of 1942, where he emphasizes, under the influence of Heidegger and Scheler, the notions of existential and metaphysical play, while in both his Idealismo fenomenológico y metafísica existencial (Phenomenological Idealism and Existential Metaphysics) of 1936 and Fenomenología y praxis (Phenomenology and Praxis) of 1967 he interprets Husserl’s philosophical position as a “transcendental idealism” (Astrada, 1967, 42–48) that accepts the Cartesian ontological postulates. Astrada was the personal student of Risieri Frondizi (1910–1983), who thanks to a scholarship studied in Harvard, where he met Wolfgang Köhler. Under the influence of Köhler’s Gestalt theory and that of Husserlian thought, he published his main work ¿Qué son los valores? (What are values?) in 1958, where he conceives of philosophy as a theory that concerns the totality of experience. He develops a theory of values, which, while emphasizing objectivity, also involves individual and social considerations (Frondizi, 1958, 114 ff.). He founded the Department of Philosophy of the Universidad de Tucumán in 1937 and taught in Yale during Perón’s dictatorship, returning after his destitution in 1955, when he assumed as Dean and Rector of the Universidad de Buenos Aires. Alberini taught at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, where he was its Dean from 1923 to 1927, and edited the influential Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires since 1912. He travelled to Germany in 1930 and gave conferences about the influence of German philosophy in Argentina in Berlin, Leipzig and Hamburg. In Berlin, he was invited to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft, where

8 Astrada, as the only non-European author, contributed with his article titled „Über die Möglichkeit einer existenzial-geschichtlichen Praxis“, to the book Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften, aus Anlass seines sechzigsten Geburtstages verfasst (Astrada, 1949), which included contributions by Ludwig Binswanger, Wilhelm Szilasi and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, among others (Walton, 2017, 14).

9 On Astrada see: (Ferrer, Schmich & Pérez-Gatica, 2022, 106–110).

10 Astrada writes in El juego existencial that, the farther he advanced in his reflections on the “extatic core of existing,” the clearer he perceived that “the totality of the existential structures in which we moved was submitted to a transcendent process, whose undulating metaphysical line was that of the play itself” (Astrada, 1933, 10). On play itself, Astrada argues that “the play that the transcendence of existence plays, as such, is called world” (Astrada, 1933, 24). In El juego metafísico Astrada writes: “Metaphysics is a play”, that of a “fundamental questioning.” “In the metaphysical play human existence, under the impulse that projects it towards transcendence, strives for the search of being” (Astrada, 1942, 7). On this subject see: (Walton, 2017, 14 ff.; Rabanaque & Walton, 2022, 54 ff.).

11 On this subject see: (Zirión Quijano, 2022, 145).

12 On Frondisi see: (Vázquez, 1965, 368–378).
he met Albert Einstein, Wolfgang Köhler and Max Planck, while in Freiburg he met Heidegger, Husserl, and in Munich, Oswald Spengler. Central to academical networking was the publication of his book *Die deutsche Philosophie in Argentinien* in Berlin in 1930\(^\text{13}\). In 1949 he opened the so-called *Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía*, occasion on which German and North American delegations met for the first time in Argentina\(^\text{14}\). Guerrero graduated in Zürich in 1925 with a thesis on general axiology, which was published in Marburg in 1927. Back in Argentina he taught aesthetics and published his main work *Estética operacional en sus tres direcciones* (*Operational Aesthetics in its Three Directions*) (1956–1967)\(^\text{15}\) in three volumes, where, under the influence of Husserl and Heidegger, he recurs to the notion of transcendental horizon to analyze artworks and elaborates an operative aesthetics encompassing the processes of manifestation, production and promotion of artworks\(^\text{16}\). Carlos Cossio (1903–1987), whose activities, like Pucciarelli’s, were also centered in Argentina, also applied Husserlian phenomenology, in his case to law: He developed an egologic theory of law, consisting in an analysis of legal norms and systems (logic of parts and wholes) and a transcendental theory of legal knowledge. Cossio draws on Husserl to introduce values and valuation in the theory of law under consideration of intersubjective behavior\(^\text{17}\). He also published in Austria (Cossio, 1953)\(^\text{18}\).

Regarding Pucciarelli’s teachers, Korn and Romero, what characterizes their philosophy is its humanistic stance. Korn taught at the *Universidad de Buenos Aires* from 1906 to 1930 and was its dean between 1918 and 1921. He was co-founder of key institutions such as the *Sociedad Kantiana* in Buenos Aires in 1929, integrated by almost all professors holding a chair at the *Universidad de Buenos Aires* and at the *Universidad de La Plata* from 1928 till its dissolution around 1933/34 (Romero, 1952, 54)\(^\text{19}\). In his *La libertad creadora* (*The creative freedom*) of 1930, he emphasizes the

\(^{13}\) On this subject see: (Ruvituso, 2015, 79, 310).

\(^{14}\) The German delegation was integrated by Eugen Fink, Wilhelm Szilasi, Hans-Georg-Gadamer, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Ludwig Landgrebe, Ernesto Grassi, Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Walter Bröcker und Thure von Uexküll, while the exiled Karl Löwith and Helmut Kuhn joined the North American delegation. On this subject see: (Ruvituso, 2015, 155–211).

\(^{15}\) Guerrero explains that the term ‘operational’ as applied to his “transcendental” aesthetics involves not only a “seeing, but rather seeing in a particular way” (Guerrero, 1956, 15).

\(^{16}\) On Guerrero see: (Walton, 2017, 21–24; Walton, 2022, 55 ff.).

\(^{17}\) On Cossio see: (Walton, 1997, 677; Walton, 2022, 56).

\(^{18}\) On the controversy between Cossio and Hans Kelsen about the normative (Kelsen) or transcendental (Cossio) function of norms see: (Caminada, 2023, 304 ff.)

\(^{19}\) The titles of the conferences and seminars held by Romero, Korn and Astrada, among others, at the *Sociedad Kantiana* have been published in *Kant-Studien* Vol. XXXV (1930, 581), XXXVI (1931,
concepts of both freedom, which is not absolute, and will, which teleologically strives for the realization of higher spiritual values. Hence, he does not conceive of an “ethics without duty, without responsibility, without sanctions, and above all else, without freedom,” which, by liberating us from “mechanical automatism,” grants us “the dignity of our conscious personality, free and owner of its destiny” (Korn, 1948, 46). As Pucciarelli puts it in his foreword to the 1948 edition, “habit repeats and freedom creates” (Pucciarelli, 1948, 7), words which convey Korn’s essential message: “If we want a better world, we will create it,” by overcoming resistance and obstacles (Korn, 1948, 46). His fellow colleague Romero taught at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and Universidad de La Plata, was director of the prestigious Biblioteca Filosófica of the Losada publishing house, where he sponsored translations of Scheler among others, as well as consulting foreign editor for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research from its foundation, thanks to which a book on his philosophy was published in New York already in 196020. He was the co-founder of the Sociedad Kantiana, together with Korn, and of the Colegio Libre de Estudios Superiores, spaces which were key for the development of philosophy in Buenos Aires and the establishment of intellectual networks with philosophers abroad21. In 1962 he travelled to Germany and stayed in Stuttgart, Tübingen and Munich. Under the influence of Husserl, Scheler and Hartmann, he developed a “theory of man,” published as Teoría del Hombre in 1952 (3rd ed. 1965) and translated into English in 1964 as Theory of Man. The main thesis of Romero’s philosophy is that experience confronts us with a movement of “transcendence,” which, as a “drive or impulse” stemming from a “will of consciousness” (Romero, 1965, 46), runs through reality. This movement increases and encompasses manifold modes of irradiation, gradually advancing from inorganic reality through life, pre-intentional psychism and intentional psychism to the realm of spirit22. In agreement with Korn,
he asserts the “parallelism between freedom and transcendence,” insofar the “absolute transcendence” of spiritual and cultural acts is correlative to the “suppression of coercion.” In short, Romero develops a general theory of reality and sketches a “metaphysics of transcendence” as the framework for the examination of reality and values, following “the philosophical requisite by which no particular problem can be isolated from conceptions concerning totality” (Romero, 1964, 163 ff.).

Despite these early contacts, studies on circulation of knowledge between Europe and Latin America, while emphasizing the center-periphery relationship that in this early period mainly involved transfers from Europe to Latin America, also make clear that these transfers were not passive. In this connection, as early as 1952 Romero argued in his Sobre la filosofía en América (On Philosophy in America) that the “Latin American mind” was characterized on the one hand, by the “predilection for issues concerning spirit, values and freedom,” the tendency to unify them under the “assertion of spirit as the essence of the culmination of reality” and the assertion of “spirituality as the free realization of value” (Romero, 1952, 17). On the other hand, as he observed later in 1960 in Ortega y Gasset y el problema de la jefatura spiritual y otros ensayos (Ortega y Gasset and the Problem of the Spiritual Leadership and Other Essays), a salient trait was the consideration of a multiplicity of perspectives—for which he coined the term “occidentalidad más espacio libre”—all which features testified the “fundamental unity” and the originality of Latin American culture (Romero, 1960a, 114, 115). Romero emphasized particularly the “feeling of freedom” that underlies Korn’s theory of values, which “humanistic roots” express “human personality” and thus incarnate “the fight against coercion, the aspiration to freedom” (Romero, 1952, 67).

These humanistic concerns are shared by Pucciarelli. What distinguishes him from his predecessors is his pluralistic conception of reason and time, by which he develops an original theory that can be viewed as an instantiation of Romero’s assertion about the plurality of perspectives characterizing Latin American thinking, which underpins the role of philosophy as an active force that promotes and induces social transformations, without engaging in partisanship. Accordingly, he particularly stresses the relevance of the philosopher’s social commitment for overcoming the crisis caused by the dominance of technology and ideology over society—a commitment that neither neglects the personal dimension of philosophizing nor its social function as a militant and critical humanism.

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23 On these ‘transfers’ see: (Dotti, 1992; Dotti, 2000; Ruvituso, 2015; Ruvituso, 2017; Sarlo, 1988).
24 On this subject see: (Ruvituso, 2017).
Eugenio Pucciarelli was born in La Plata, Argentina, in 1907, and graduated as a medical doctor at the University of Buenos Aires—a profession he did not practice—and as a professor in philosophy at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata (National University of La Plata). At this university, where he was disciple not only of Korn and Romero, as stated above, but also of Pedro Henríquez Ureña (1884–1946), he obtained his doctorate in philosophy in 1937 with a thesis titled “La Psicología de Dilthey” (“The Psychology of Dilthey”) (Pucciarelli, 1938), under the tutelage of Romero. A year later he began his teaching career at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, where he was Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters from 1940 to 1944. After this period, he pursued his teaching at the Universities of Buenos Aires (1960–1983) and La Plata (1944–1957). He was the Director of the collection La vida del espíritu of the publishing house Nova, Buenos Aires, which, with the publication of works by Dilthey, Scheler and Husserl, among others, made it possible to disseminate valuable works of classical and contemporary philosophy in Latin America. He was a full member of the Academia Nacional de Ciencias Morales y Políticas (National Academy of Moral and Political Sciences), where he was President, and in 1974 he founded and directed the Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, which today bears his name, and four years later the journal Escritos de Filosofía, currently directed by Dr. Roberto J. Walton and Dr. Luis R. Rabanaque. Pucciarelli died in 1995.

Pucciarelli carried out his academic activities almost exclusively in Latin America. Besides those in Argentina, he taught at both the Universidad Nacional de Caracas (1945–1946) and the Universidad de Piedras in Puerto Rico (1960–1961). According to his biographical notes (undated), he also held conferences as invited speaker in Germany (1963), in Mainz and Heidelberg, Colombia (1964), Peru (1943, 1951), Guatemala (1961) and held seminars in Mexico (1961, 1964), Brazil (1948, 1949, 1959) Chile (1959) and Bolivia (1943). Apart from his numerous publications in the Latin American countries he visited, there are only a few contributions in translation. Among them, one in particular deserves mentioning, namely, “El hombre y el tiempo” (“Man and Time”), which was published in Spanish in both Escritos de Filosofía in 1983 (Pucciarelli, 1983a) and a compilation titled La evolución, el hombre y el Humano (Evolution, Man and the Human) in Tübingen in 1986 (Sevilla, 1986), on the occasion of two associated con-

25 For an introduction to Pucciarelli, see: (Rabanaque & Walton, 2022, 56–58) and for an extensive analysis see: (Walton, 2004; Walton, 2007; Walton, 2008; Walton, 2017).

26 See: “Conflict between technological and humanistic values” (Pucciarelli, 1987a), “Angel Vasallo, Elogio de la Vigilia” (Pucciarelli, 1945a), and “Philosophie et culture: perspectives d’avenir” (Pucciarelli, 1983c).
gresses. The first event, the “Primer Simposio Internacional de Antropología Filosófica” (“First International Symposium on Philosophical Anthropology”), took place in 1983 at the Academia Nacional de Ciencias in Buenos Aires under Pucciarelli’s direction, while the second one, the “II Simposio Europeo-Latinoamericano de Antropología Filosófica” (“II European-Latin American Symposium on Philosophical Anthropology”), was held in 1984 in Tübingen. They both dealt with a common topic, namely, “El hombre en la crisis de nuestro tiempo” (“Man in the Crisis of Our Time”).

Given the magnitude of his work, which encompasses some 1.200 writings, the least part published, I will limit myself here to highlighting his reflections on phenomenology and his ideal of humanism. As a brief introduction to these issues, it is important to stress that Pucciarelli was characterized by the breadth of his concerns, which led him to venture into art, literature, politics, social issues, science and technology from a philosophical position that opened up the horizons of the most diverse human endeavors and achievements. Testimony to this is his legacy, of which only three thematic compilations have been published to date: Los rostros del humanismo (The Faces of Humanism) (Pucciarelli, 1987b), El enigma del tiempo (The Enigma of Time) (Pucciarelli, 2013), Razón Técnica, Ideología (Reason, Technics, Ideology) (Breuer & Walton, 2020). As for his philosophical references, Pucciarelli points first to vitalism, indicating that his interests were closer to Dilthey than to Bergson. In an article titled “Autopresentación” (“Self-presentation”) he also underlines the “spell” of Simmel ideas:

> Duration, historicity, horizontal and vertical transcendence of life depending on whether one looks at the thought of Bergson, Dilthey or Simmel have been for me nothing but different expressions of becoming, different ways of visualizing it and making it manifest. Hence my initial sympathy for these thinkers, to whom I was never a prisoner. (Pucciarelli, 2007, 304)

Later came the influence of phenomenology (Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann), as he makes clear in the self-presentation titled “Última lección de filosofía” (“Last Lesson in Philosophy”) (Pucciarelli, 1988). In Husserl he emphasizes the problems of

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27 The first congress counted with the participation of Gerhard Funke, Hans Albert, José Ferrater Mora, Antonio Pintor Ramos, Danilo Cruz Vélez, André Jacob, Marcos M. Olivetti, Pietro Prini, Georges Gusdorf, Pierre-François Moreau and Edgar Morin. The Tübingen publication contains contributions of Manuel Granel, Julián Marías, José Ferrater Mora, Antonio Pintor Ramos, Danilo Cruz Vélez, André Jacob, Marcos M. Olivetti, Pietro Prini, Jorge J.E. Gracia, Valerio Rohden, Gerhard Funke, Georges Gusdorf, Hans Albert, Pierre-François Moreaux, Edgar Morin and Murielle Gagnebin. The majority of these philosophers participated in the congress, according to the foreword written by Rafael Sevilla (Sevilla, 1986, 9–13).

28 Inventoried and digitally archived by the author in the framework of the grant awarded by the DAAD.
consciousness and time, the wresting of logic from subordination to psychology, thus securing its autonomy, and the discovery that consciousness has a constant structure, which he highlights as a significant achievement particularly in connection with the enquiry into the nature of time (Pucciarelli, 1988, 33). He was acquainted not only with his original contribution to the gnoseological problematic in the Logical Investigations, the three volumes of Ideas and “Philosophy as a Strict Science,” but also with the question of time in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Later on, already in the 1960s, he devoted himself to texts such as Experience and Judgment and The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, which had been published a few years earlier (Iribarne, 2007).

The problems “that have become flesh” in his consciousness have been “reason, time, technology and ideology” (Pucciarelli, 2007, 292). This primacy does not preclude that his theoretical interests be extended to other fields such as the nature of philosophy and humanism. In addition, he has devoted himself to the history of Argentinean philosophy and literature, subjects which are underpinned by the question of the conditio humana (Walton, 2007). Faced with this plurality of themes, Pucciarelli emphasizes in “Última lección de filosofía” on the occasion of the event held in homage to him by the Bank of Boston Foundation to present his book Los rostros del humanismo in 1987, that it is necessary to engage in a dialogue on the problems, distinguishing between the particular situation of the problems, which is affected by the passage of time, and their content, which is not affected by history. In this respect, he recalled a phrase by Nicolai Hartmann, also echoed by Romero,

> which led to an emphasis on the problem, considered as the most vivid part of philosophy, and to use the answers, especially when they came from dissimilar orientations, to make the perception of the problem more evident. And I have always tried not to forget the ethical implications of teaching philosophy, a teaching directed not to the intelligence but to the whole man as a member of a society. (Pucciarelli, 1988, 42)

These expressions reveal his strong ethical vocation, which defines the mission of philosophy and the core of the humanist ideal he represented.

3. MISSION OF PHILOSOPHY, THE HUMAN TYPE OF THE PHILOSOPHER

Pucciarelli embodied the humanist ideal, which he defined, in the wake of Korn and Romero⁹, as “that philosophical position which, by emphasizing the value of man and exalting the feeling of his dignity, stresses the importance of free activity

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⁹ Pucciarelli devoted many articles and conferences to his teachers. On Korn see: (Pucciarelli, 19370; Pucciarelli, 1948; Pucciarelli, 1959; Pucciarelli, 1960), and on Romero see: (Pucciarelli, 1972b; Pucciarelli, 1975a).
and stimulates his original creations” (Pucciarelli, 1987b, 32). Since the human being is “the architect of his world and of himself,” constructing a world of meanings and making decisions on the basis of which he shapes his own personality, the notion of humanism is linked to the freedom of the human being. It is free insofar as it emancipates itself from all external subjection, recognizing, however, the validity of the prevailing values in the various historical contexts in which it is inserted. Pucciarelli does not hide his fear of the crisis that the humanities are going through, triggered on the one hand by the sciences, which have forged an image of the world opposed to that forged by classical culture, and by politics which, claiming a break with the orders of the past, conceives of the humanities as “ideological masks” designed to conceal social justices (Pucciarelli, 1987b, 35). Pucciarelli asks whether, in the face of the urgent demands of the present, humanism is a valid orientation for today’s world. For Pucciarelli, humanism continues to be present, although it presents itself in modern forms. It is dominated by the critical attitude, the practice of which characterizes the philosophers’ mission. Without it, the sense of freedom in the human world would disappear.

Philosophy is, thus, that wisdom which springs from the exercise of freedom and criticism, and which has as its mission the integration of culture and the historical action of humanity. For this reason, Pucciarelli frames humanism within the encompassing and integrative framework offered by philosophy as the wisdom that guides the human spirit in its virtue-oriented education. The theory of philosophy, that is, the question of philosophy as a “problem for itself” (Pucciarelli, 2007, 297), is an issue to which he has devoted himself without pause. To this subject he wrote extensively, dealing with the questions of the internal structure of philosophy, with the relations of philosophy to human life and its historicity, with the unity of philosophy in the midst of plurality and with the expressions and conceptions of individual philosophers.

This critical attitude of the philosopher entails “the need to reform the concept of truth”, as he argues in “La filosofía como expresión del tipo humano” (“Philosophy as an expression of a human type”) (Pucciarelli, 1987c). It must consist in a congruence between “the world view, expressed in each philosophical system and the corresponding human type” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 118) Philosophy, as an expression of a human type, is less a doctrine than “a way of access to reality” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 91), but it cannot be characterized simply as an epochal consciousness. To consider it as an “ideology detached from reality,” as “an expression of the alienation of man” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 93) implies renouncing to correct its inadequacies and limiting oneself to the mere contemplation of the world. This is why Pucciarelli rejects the human type that limits itself to contemplation in a merely receptive attitude and accordingly
stresses the importance of a “thought that imbues action in order to transform the world,” insisting on the “militant” function of philosophy (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 94). It is not enough, then, to “discourse about freedom” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 93), but one must actively contribute to its exercise by creating the necessary conditions that make it possible. Hence, Pucciarelli advocates a “militant philosophy,” and an exercise of philosophy that is world-transforming (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 94).

From these considerations, Pucciarelli develops a pluralist conception of both philosophy and human types, which advocates a personal and militant dimension of philosophical activity in order to transform reality, such that philosophy can face the challenges posed by the present unstable political situation in Latin America30.

4. PATHS OF ACCESS TO PHILOSOPHY: SCHELER, DILTHEY, HUSSERL

One of the ways of addressing philosophy itself consists, as mentioned above, in starting from the human type of the philosopher, since

without philosophy—without clear and well-founded ideas about the human being and history, about the world and the ends that stimulate the moral action of individuals—

neither a harmonious culture nor a fully human life is possible. (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 84)

The philosopher must therefore examine “his way of seeing the world and feeling life” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 84). Thus, in “Max Scheler y su idea de filosofía” (“Max Scheler and his Idea of Philosophy”) (Pucciarelli, 1969c), he emphasizes Scheler’s attempt to determine the essence of philosophy on the basis of the “spiritual attitude” of the person and the “human type” (Pucciarelli, 1969c, 218). Scheler asserted the existence of a correlation between the spiritual attitude of the philosopher and the realm of entities under study, accessible only thanks to a “moral act of the whole person” determined by love, as he points out in “El acceso a la esencia de la filosofía” (“Access to the Essence of Philosophy”) (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 25). Access to the essence of philosophy in Scheler occurs through the heuristic method (Pucciarelli, 1969c, 218), which starts from the consideration of the human type of the philosopher, whose achievements constitute partial contributions to the vision of totality. Pucciarelli points out in his critique that, in his interest to grasp reality intellectually, the philosopher’s task is torn between the aspiration for totality and its conceptual expression, that is, between the claim to universal validity and the contingent and ephemeral character of human experience. This is why “only a fragment” of knowledge is grasped, in each case, by the

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30 On the challenges posed by the present unstable political situation in Latin America see: (Rizo-Patrón Lerner, 2021).
philosopher. The first factor that introduces a personal dimension into philosophizing is thus the “fragmentation of knowledge,” as Walton (2007, 316) remarks.

The way of access to philosophy is for Dilthey history, which reveals the one-sidedness and heterogeneity of systems. Pucciarelli raises a serious objection to this position, on the grounds that it has alienated philosophy from history. Dilthey’s historicist position has the character of a petitio principii, since it demands to know beforehand the boundaries between philosophy, art, religion and science, a knowledge of which already presupposes a knowledge of essences that allows orientation, incurring thus in a hermeneutical circle. Moreover, Pucciarelli reproves the fact that the result arrived at by the historical method cannot transcend its grounding in already given systems, and in particular, the fact that under these conditions it would be difficult to foresee the emergence of unprecedent forms of interpretation of reality (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 26 ff.). From these considerations we can deduce the “inevitably personal character” (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 28) of the philosophical task and the “pluralistic consideration of the history of philosophy” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 118), which favors tolerance and reflection, promoting dialogue and the renewal of thought.

Thus, a second factor that introduces a personal dimension to philosophizing concerns is the “diversity of human types” (Walton, 2007, 316). Hence, Pucciarelli’s interest in Dilthey’s analysis of worldviews, which, while providing a ground for philosophies, arise in turn from lived experience and “vary according to the constitution of each human type” (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 18). The resulting heterogeneity is not radical, for it presupposes a common ground of problems that is constant throughout history. This is why Pucciarelli refers to the differentiation postulated by Nicolai Hartmann between the “situation” of problems, which is modified over time, and the “content” of problems, which is not affected by history, as he states in “La metafísica en la situación actual” (“Metaphysics in the Present Situation”) (Pucciarelli, 1968, 7). The treatment of the content of the problem faces different situations which vary according to historical circumstances.

The development of philosophy leads to the separation or even opposition between the scientific spirit and the ethical-religious vocation. As a theory, philosophy is love of knowledge, culminating in the ideal of science. It corresponds to the human type in which not only the thirst for knowledge predominates, but also the hope of satisfying it within an impersonal scientific framework. As a practice, philosophy is love of wisdom, and this implies a concrete way of manifesting itself that reveals “the existence of an order embodied in conduct,” as he states in “Ciencia y Sabiduría” (“Science and Wisdom”) (Pucciarelli, 1965, 367). Neither pole excludes the other. This implies, in turn, that the personal dimension of existence cannot be hidden under a set
of impersonal concepts. The ideal of science advocated by Husserl must be properly interpreted, that is, not as a philosophical norm, but as a pole on which the efforts of researchers converge and which motivates them to reach higher levels of universal validity. In the name of this claim, Husserl elaborated the idea of philosophy as a strict science. Pucciarelli characterizes this science as

The demand for substantiation, linked to the notion of evidence conceived of as the immediate awareness of truth, and the demand for systematization, destined to be realized in the total unity of knowledge, achieved by making explicit the necessary connection between all its parts. (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 20)

The satisfaction of both requirements made it possible to elaborate the basis for an “ultimate and absolute foundation of the other sciences”, which became subordinate to philosophy understood as a “strict science” (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 20). Pucciarelli argues that with the interpretation of philosophy as a genre of knowledge that “cannot but be reduced” to a correlation between consciousness and object, “being is reduced to object” and counterposed to the unobjectifiable being, which is excluded from the totality of being. He also points out that the decision to subject philosophy to the norm of science is not grounded in Husserl's work but seems to have arisen “from the author's personal experiences, perplexed by ideological divergences and aware of the impossibility of resolving them by a critique inspired by objective guidelines” (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 20 ff.).

This last aspect is re-evaluated in the article “Husserl y la actitud científica en filosofía” (“Husserl and the Scientific Attitude in Philosophy”) (Pucciarelli, 1962), where he points out that Husserl's philosophy, which requires the realization of the ideal of a philosophy as a strict science, arises from the reflection on the two meanings of the word philosophy: love of knowledge and love of wisdom. Husserl calls for a philosophy as science, starting from the ‘idea’ of science and from the demands of foundation and systematization contained in it. The unity of knowledge calls for a double movement: objective, turned towards things, and reflective, directed towards the subjective activity of cognition. As for the method, which requires the prior elimination of all assumptions—the principle of “going to the things themselves”—it is intuition. Phenomenology is a philosophical science which embraces in hierarchical order the eidetic sciences—at its apex, phenomenology—, the ontologies and the ‘empirical sciences.’ It is an eidetic-material science of a descriptive nature. Its field is constituted by the essences of the experiences of pure consciousness. As these essences are morphological, the science that deals with them cannot be exact, but it can be rigorous, based on an intuition that guarantees the evident apprehension of its objects,
which does not exclude intersubjective confirmation. Research finds its principle in transcendental subjectivity as the source of all objectivity, without losing contact with the “lifeworld.” Both the elevation of the sciences to the dignity of philosophy and the transformation of philosophy into science presuppose for Husserl the establishment of knowledge on absolute and self-evident foundations.

Pucciarelli concludes in “El acceso a la esencia de la filosofía” (“Access to the Essence of Philosophy”) (Pucciarelli, 1969a), that both Husserl and Dilthey alienate philosophy by subjecting it, the former to science and the latter to history. He acknowledges, however, the merit of the scientistic position for having distinguished between the existing sciences and the very idea of science as the ideal term for the convergence of the particular sciences: However, he criticizes the fact that the very idea of science is also conceived of as a historical fact, changing through the ages on the one hand, and on the other, that even the most rigorous sciences are not in a position to satisfy the demands of an ideal science (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 27). In short, “autonomy of philosophy, exemption from assumptions, concern for totality, rigorous knowledge” are the common features that make up the essence of philosophy and its three ways of access: the historicist (Dilthey), the scientific (Husserl) and the one that considers spiritual activity (Simmel and Scheler) (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 16). The motivation behind Pucciarelli’s criticism is, in his own words, his own struggle against the pretensions of neo-positivism which denies philosophy the consideration of traditional problems—being, truth, value—and reduces its problematic to linguistics and its function to that of a mere auxiliary of science (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 28).

To Pucciarelli’s remarks on Husserl I may object that Husserl’s main aim in the Crisis involves no subordination of philosophy to science. Quite on the contrary, he endeavors to enquire into the philosophical foundations of the universal validity claim posited by science. Accordingly, he exposes the process of idealization of the sciences by which they ‘forget’ their grounding in the “ontology of the lifeworld” as the origin of the constitution of meaning and lived experience, studies which were deepened in the manuscripts assembled in the complementary volume to the Crisis (Husserl, 1993, 140–160)\textsuperscript{31}. Moreover, the fact that the critique may start form ‘personal experience’ does not imply that it lacks objectivity. In this connection, it must be emphasized that Husserl grew up in an age where the sciences had achieved their own development through technical efficiency, fueling thus an unbroken faith in progress and in the continuous improvement of human existence. When Husserl denounces

the crisis of sciences in the 1930s, he is “invoking the spirit of his time” (Heffernan, 2015, 55 ff.). This motif of a crisis with grave consequences for the meaning of human life was neither new to the Geistes- or Naturwissenschaften, nor in Husserl’s thought. In face of this “tragedy of modern scientific culture” (Husserl, 1969, 3), what was required was the questioning of both the very foundations on reason and the pretension of truthfulness of sciences. To disclose these foundations required, more precisely, a clarification of the sense of the validity of applied reason as it concerns mathematics and formal logic, the exactness of which science relied upon. Hence, it involved the interrogation of the operation of reason in the constitution of a particular historical moment, that is, the constitution of science itself (Ströker, 2019, 296).

This enquiry demanded a philosophical “reflection” (Besinnung) and a “critique” of both the sense of human existence and the significance that science carries for life (Husserl, 1970, 5 ff.). Critique is thus a “reflection in which something is given as what it genuinely, essentially ‘is,’” where this givenness is understood as a determination of sense. Hence, the sense of the validity of science involves a claim about its meaning, which must be rational in order to signify and have a weight or value, or what Husserl calls ‘evidence,’ which in turn only manifests itself in reflection (Dodd, 2004, 4 ff.). Moreover, this endeavor to search for the foundations of validity, which concerns in the first place a reflection on the horizons in which the “claims of reason” and validity are constituted (Dodd, 2004, 7), requires we reflect on the original modes of encounter between subject and world, that is, it requires a reflection on the way we relate to the world and endow it with sense. Hence, intentionality is neither an “objectivation” nor an “exclusion” of the subjective or objective poles of this relation, as Pucciarelli argues, but a way of relating them through the constitution of meaning and sense. Husserl’s commitment to this reflection on the meaning of science must not be confused with what has been termed an “uncritical worship of science” so common in positivism or in “naturalistic philosophers” (Spiegelberg, 1969, 77).

5. HUSSERL: THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE AND THE HORIZON OF REASON

Pucciarelli considers, both in the afore mentioned “El acceso a la esencia de la filosofía” (Pucciarelli, 1969a) and in “La idea de filosofía en Husserl” (“The Idea of Philosophy in Husserl”) (Pucciarelli, 1969b), that in Husserl’s thought there are tacit

32 George Heffernan retrieves this thought already in Husserl’s “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” of the first decade of the century (Heffernan, 2015, 55 ff.; Husserl, 1987, 60).
33 On the notion of evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology of existence, mainly based on Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie (Husserl, 2014), see: (Heffernan, 2021).
assertions that act as unproven assumptions, thus rendering his attempt to lay the foundations of an absolute science invalid. Even if one disregards his “gnoseological idealism” and his “spiritualistic metaphysics,” as well as the hypothesis of pre-established harmony to overcome solipsism and his claim to universality of phenomena by not taking a position on transcendence, the statement that “science is the highest aspiration of the human spirit, which leads it to place the theoretical ideal above the practical ideal, truth above the good” cannot be concealed in Husserl’s thought. Furthermore, Pucciarelli argues that the application of the ideal of science to philosophy obeys the assumption that being is object, and thus opposed to the subject, which presupposes, in Husserl’s view, the possibility of objectively valid knowledge, derived from the inference of absolute science from positive science (Pucciarelli, 1969b, 34). In doing so, science

ignores the singular intimacy of each subject, removes from knowledge the personal aspects of human experience, reduces them to subjective dispositions, and excludes from knowledge all that is irreducible to the categories of reason. It reduces all being to an object. (Pucciarelli, 1969b, 35)

Pucciarelli enunciates here not only a very definite objection to Husserl’s idea of philosophy but also his own humanist position: “The primacy of reason, which Husserl affirms, threatens the fullness of human experience, which has access to spheres of being that cannot be fixed in logical schemes obligatory for all; there are evidences different from those that reason provides” (Pucciarelli, 1969b, 35). To sustain this claim, he quotes Husserl’s well-known passage of an appendix to Husserl’s Crisis to assert that Husserl himself had given up the dream of a philosophy as rigorous science (Pucciarelli, 1969b, 35). Husserl’s well-known proclamation preceding the quoted passage, which has sparked a long debate in academic circles, seems to confirm it. There, Husserl states: “Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, apodictically rigorous science—the dream is over” (Husserl, 1954, 508; 1970, 389). Stephan Strasser (1959, 132)35

The full passage reads as follows: “To be sure, the man who has once tasted of the fruits of philosophy, has become acquainted with its systems, and has then unhesitatingly admired these as among the highest goods of culture can no longer let philosophy and philosophizing alone. Some regard the philosophies as art works of great artistic spirits and consider philosophy ‘as such’ to have the unity of an art. Others oppose philosophy to the sciences in another way, such that it stands on a plane with religion, into which we have grown historically” (Husserl, 1954, 508; 1970, 389).

Strasser writes: „Es ist den meisten Husserl-Forschern bisher entgangen, daß dieses Werk in vieler Hinsicht einen Wendepunkt in Husserls Denken bedeutet. Wir finden darin eine deutliche Absage an das den formal-apriorischen Wissenschaften entlehnte Erkenntnisideal (der Titel des Werkes ist bezeichnend hierfür). […] Vor allem aber wird hier zum ersten Mal […] die historische Dimension in die phänomenologische Problematik einbezogen […]. Der Wunschtraum einer Philosophie
and Ludwig Landgrebe (1967, 187)\textsuperscript{36} were the first philosophers to interpret these lines as Husserl's renouncement to that ideal\textsuperscript{37}, as the title of Husserl's text (“Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection”) seem to imply. However, Hans Spiegelberg (1969, fn. 2)\textsuperscript{38} and in his wake Hans-Georg Gadamer (1963, 25)\textsuperscript{39} made clear that

\begin{footnote}
36 Landgrebe agrees with Strasser: “Es zeigt sich hier, wie die Verabschiedung der Leitidee der apodiktischen Wissenschaft Hand in Hand geht mit der entschiedenen Zuwendung zur geschichtlichen und geschichtsphilosophischen Begründung des Weges der Besinnung. Sie ist kein Bruch mit Husserls früheren Ansätzen, sondern die Konsequenz aus dem Programm einer letzten Begründung philosophischer Wahrheit auf ‘absolute Erfahrung’.” Landgrebe further explains that the subversion of all common beliefs also required the questioning of the ego's evidence. However, this could not be carried out in view of Husserl's positing of the subject of absolute experience as the grounds on which any justification relies. Hence, Husserl had to recur to a “reflection” (Rückbesinnung) on the history of this requirement as it had been made by European science and philosophy. In my view, these reflections on the impossibility of an “apodictical critique” (Landgrebe, 1967, 187) and consequently, on the necessity of a historical investigation, make clear why Strasser and Landgrebe interpreted Husserl's phrase as implying that an apodictical science, that is, a science built on irrefutable and absolute grounds, was no longer possible. However, Landgrebe seems here to conflate two problems, namely, the apodictical evidence of the Ego with the deployment of historical horizons, and views them as contradictory, as Ignacio Quepons argues in connection with Landgrebe's analysis of the Cartesian Meditations. Scientific predicative judgments and their evidence are connected to lived experiences and presuppose pre-predicative judgments having their own mode of evidence, which involves potentialities of meaning that in turn build up the potential horizon of all predicative evidence (Quepons, 2023). Hence, the progressive deployment of evidence as a striving for the confirmation of apodictic judgments implies both the analysis of the historical horizon in which the idea of science has been constituted and the reflection on the pre-predicative judgments which the former ones presuppose. Thus, the questioning of the Ego's evidence implies both a reflection on the lived experience on which it grounds and the analysis of historical horizons, where these evidences find concretion, such that the apodicticity of the Ego results from this deployment of evidences, implying therefore no contradiction.

37 As Karl-Heinz Lembeck points out, this interpretation was shared by Wilhelm Szilasi and Hubert Hohl. See: (Lembeck, 1988, 54, fn. 18; Szilasi, 1965, 87, 101; Hohl, 1962, 78). Hohl views this renunciation of „wissenschaftlicher Strenge” as the emergence of a „neuer, phänomenologischer Wissensschaftsbegriff” that involves a return towards the “living world (Lebenswelt)” and towards “transcendental subjectivity” (Hohl, 1962, 79 ff.). Szilasi views this as Husserl’s “resignation” and adds that since Husserl had lost the „Ariadnefäden”, what was needed was a return to “first principles” (Szilasi, 1965, 101).

38 Spiegelberg writes: “In the few places where in 1935 Husserl seems to be saying that philosophy as a rigorous science is a dream now ended (for instance, in Husserliana VI, 508) the context makes it plain that he was speaking in bitter irony about the times, not about himself” (Spiegelberg, 1969, 77, fn. 2).

39 Gadamer quotes Spiegelberg and observes: „Man mißversteht diese Husserlschen Worte, wenn man sie als seine eigene Meinung auffäßt. In Wahrheit schildern sie eine von ihm nicht geteilte, ja
Husserl was simply referring to a common opinion of some of his colleagues, who had been “seduced by historicism and an irrational philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie)” (Moran, 2002, 4) and/or by an anthropology à la Heidegger. Indeed, a few lines further in the text, Husserl writes: “A powerful and constantly growing current of philosophy which renounces scientific discipline, like the current of religious disbelief, is inundating European humanity” (Husserl, 1954, 508; 1970, 390). It is precisely this fact that not only confirms that Husserl had not given up his ideals, but actually lead him to a reflection on the history of philosophy, as Paul Jannsen (1970, 142, fn. 8) has explained in detail. Husserl remained optimistic despite this “tragedy of modern culture” (Husserl, 1974, 7; 1969, 3), as a manuscript (Husserl, 1989a, 238) and a letter to Roman Ingarden, both of 1935, testify.

This “primacy of reason” is a recurring subject in Pucciarelli’s later writings. In “La razón en crisis” (“Reason in Crisis”) (Pucciarelli, 1968), he observes that Husserl, following Descartes in the importance he assigns to intuition and evidence, conceives of reason as a “cognitive activity, of a synthetic nature, which operates as the essential structure of transcendental subjectivity” (Pucciarelli, 1968, 245), in close relation to

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40 For this reference to Heidegger see also: (Gadamer, 1963, 25; Pöggeler, 1996, 23).


42 In a letter to Ingarden, dated 10.VII.1935, Husserl writes: „Philosophie „als str[enge] Wiss[enschaft]“ gehört zur erledigten Vergangenheit, so gut wie die Scholastik des 13. Jahrh. Auch im übrigen Europa greift die irrationalistische Skepsis um sich, das Bollwerk des mathematicistischen Positivism wird nicht lange helfen, da man schließlich entdecken wird, daß es eine Attrappe von Philosophie u. nicht eine wirkl. Philosophie ist. Ich bin sicher: nur die tr[anscendentale] Phän[omenologic] schafft letzte Klarheit u. den einzig möglichen Weg in notwendig verwandelter Gestalt, die Idee einer Phil[osophie] als universale Wissenschaft zu verwirklichen“ (Husserl, 1968, 92 ff.) In the explanatory notes Ingarden says that, although he thinks he had been told by Fink about Husserl’s renouncement and had himself repeated this comment in his „Gedenkrede“ of 1959, he now realizes that Husserl spoke about the European situation at that time. This means “no renunciation to his own program of a philosophy as a rigorous science,” as Husserl’s letter proves (Husserl, 1968, 181). This letter is mentioned in (Orth, 1976, 217, fn. 10) and quoted in (Jannsen, 1970, 142, fn. 8).
logic. He recognizes in Husserl’s late period, however, a “turn” towards history, thanks to which reason contributes to the autonomy of personal life and to the progress and meaning of history. To its function of knowledge is added, as a principal aspect, the “practical function that it exercises as an ideal that stimulates the progressive march of humanity”. Pucciarelli glimpses in these considerations a widening of the problematic horizon of reason and an increase of the intellectual means to grasp reality (Pucciarelli, 1968, 246).

No longer in the sphere of history, but in those of practical and axiological reason, Pucciarelli observes in “Los avatares de la razón” (“The Vicissitudes of Reason”) (Pucciarelli, 1980), a broadening of the areas in which reason intervenes. In this respect, he points out that the richest meaning of the word logos is reason, more specifically, the reason that is at the service of science. He stresses that, although Husserl insists that reason is always cognitive and implies a critical reflection on the true and the false, it is not limited to the realm of logics, but also includes an awareness of the good, the bad and the just, which “opens the doors of action” (Pucciarelli, 1980, 8).

Regarding Pucciarelli’s critique, it is important to notice that Husserl's manuscripts on these relevant issues, especially those on ethics, limit the scope of phenomenology and the structure of consciousness, were published in the *Husserliana* only after Pucciarelli’s had written his own articles on the subject.

In keeping with his inclination towards a militant and critical humanism, Pucciarelli stresses in his reading of the *Crisis* that “reason, which constitutes humanity in the human being, is that which allows him to attain, with freedom and autonomy, personality.” Hence, although reason initially withdraws into itself, thanks to self-reflection it attains the rank of reason that is self-understanding and self-regulating, thus allowing humanity to understand itself on the basis of philosophy understood as a rigorous science, which, in turn, characterizes its practical life (Pucciarelli, 1980, 8 ff.).

### 6. THE CRISIS OF REASON

This idea of reason is going through a crisis today, triggered by the expansion of barbarism and the irruption of irrationality and vitalist hedonism, an observation that in our age of “alternative facts” and fake news is still valid. This crisis, analyzed in his afore mentioned paper “La razón en crisis” (Pucciarelli, 1968), brings with it

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43 See: Hua XXV (Husserl, 1987); Hua XXVIII (Husserl, 1988); Hua XXVII (Husserl, 1989a); Hua XXXVII (Husserl, 2004); Hua XLII (Husserl, 2014); Hua XLIII (Husserl, 2020). On ethics and affectivity see: (Breuer, 2019; Breuer, 2020b; Breuer, 2022; Hart, 1992; Melle, 1991; Melle, 2002; Melle, 2007; Peucker, 2008).
the awareness of new limitations and the loss of confidence in its unlimited capacity. Pucciarelli analyses the various crises through which reason has gone through: the limitation of its universal validity, the discovery of the falsity of propositions whose truth is based on intuitive evidence, the replacement of the criterion of evidence by that of logical coherence, the multiplicity of types of evidence and their relative truth, the controversies about the number and hierarchical relation of principles and about the analytical character of their statements and their evidence, the presence of the irrational in all domains of being and knowledge. He particularly addresses the lack of universal validity or “autonomy” of reason, by emphasizing that “the ideas of reason are not independent of the content and orientation of their respective systems” (Pucciarelli, 1968, 210). As examples, Pucciarelli mentions Dilthey’s historical reason, Bergson’s “abandonment of life” to intuition and instincts, whereas reason was brought closer to matter, Ortega y Gasset’s endeavor to conciliate reason with life by his notion of a “vital reason,” Husserl’s assertion of perception as the ground for the legitimacy of knowledge, Jaspers’ exposure of the limits of rational thinking in face of the difficulties posed by metaphysical knowledge, Whitehead’s distinction between utilitarian and disinterested reason, Santayana’s exploration of the vicissitudes of reason within the realm of common sense, society, religion, art and science (Pucciarelli, 1968, 210 ff.). To these attitudes Pucciarelli contrasts the struggle of the “champion of the theoretical spirit of our time, Edmund Husserl,” to establish philosophy as a science and to find unshakeable foundations on which to base other forms of knowledge, as opposed to the recognition of the close association of the crisis of reason with the crisis of Western civilization (Pucciarelli, 1968, 214).

Pucciarelli locates the beginning of the breakdown of reason towards the end of the 19th century when the rise of science and technology led to a decline in the confidence in reason due to the afore mentioned crises. The discreditation of reason also has its origin in man’s reaction to wars, which makes it surrender to sentiment and instinct:

The loss of faith in reason has coincided in part with the new conditions of life imposed by military conflicts and the existence of dictatorial governments, which in both cases have put a brake on the exercise of reason as a faculty of criticism, by limiting, even abolishing in some cases, the autonomy of personal life, its independence vis-à-vis the public authorities and the unconsidered pressure of political organizations. (Pucciarelli, 1969b, 214)

Pucciarelli presents us with a desolate panorama of the contemporary human being who has renounced the use of reason. This weakening of confidence has stemmed not only from the vital situation of the “common” individual, but also from
the disappointment of those who were its apologists, the scientist, and the philosopher. Both recognize that the crisis alludes to the impossibility of satisfying the demand for absolute self-foundation of reason. To sustain this assertion, Pucciarelli analyses the internal limitations of formal theories that indicate the inadequacy of the means used to meet ideal demands. He highlights the loss of the autonomy of reason in pragmatism and vitalism, philosophies that prioritize emotion or the irrational, as in the case of both Scheler and Heidegger’s theory of moods. Pucciarelli argues that the crisis has enabled us to formulate the following distinctions: Firstly, between the meanings of the word reason, as for instance, faculty or function of knowing, set of ideal demands, system of principles, rules, and categories; secondly, between the areas of application of understanding and reason. However, the crisis does not affect reason as a human activity in the service of knowledge, because its capacity for self-examination enables it to adapt to new situations. The crisis of reason refers to the precarious or historical character of the means invented by reason to achieve the requirement of universal and full intelligibility—an observation that follows from Pucciarelli’s pluralistic and historically attentive approach (Pucciarelli, 1968, 227–253).

7. PLURALISM OF THE IMAGES OF REASON

Pucciarelli proposes a solution to the circle of determining the essence of philosophy from within itself, “the complementarity of points of view or the convergence of methods” (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 28), which consists in contemplating other ways of gaining access to oneself in order to benefit from the experience of others and to promote dialogue, thus proposing a consideration of multiple perspectives. Attentive to this perspectivism, Pucciarelli defends a pluralism of conceptions of both reason and time.44 In an article titled “Razón” (“Reason”) (Pucciarelli, 1976), Pucciarelli distinguishes a plurality of images of reason—passive or active, intuitive and operative, amorphous or structured, closed or open, constant or variable, vital, existential, instrumental, rhetorical, historical, knowledge-oriented or action-oriented, etc. —according to its structure, its type of activity, its uses and its fields of application. Unlike traditional conceptions, which are mutually exclusive, Pucciarelli’s attitude is strongly “inclusive”: He conceives of reason as a genus that encompasses a plurality of species. Pucciarelli illustrates the example of an analytical (or intuitive) reason in Descartes and a logical (or operative) reason in Leibniz. He analyses reason on the level of language (Hobbes) and in the framework of Kantian philosophy, which aspired to be the full realization

44 On this subject see: (Breuer, 2021).
of the activity of reason. Its type (theoretical and practical) is applied to knowledge and to moral action, the fields of its application being the spheres of nature, of art and of freedom, that is, of ethics. In general terms it is understood as human, discursive, finite, ahistorical and pure. Hegel maintains the Kantian distinction between understanding (abstract concept) and reason (reality), the latter being understood as an activity, an inner dynamism that obeys a dialectical rhythm of oppositions, each of whose moments constitutes an overcoming of the previous ones. In contrast hereto, Dilthey conceives of reason as dynamic, open and historical, since its purpose is to grasp the meaning of life.

Reason faces insurmountable limits through the irruption of the irrational in all domains of knowledge, as mentioned above. Two different paths can be distinguished: The accent on intuition (Bergson) and the unthinkable or absolute (Jaspers). As for technical reason, its categories are of a dynamic nature to accompany technical transformations. Pucciarelli addresses the dangers involved by the use of reason whenever it is applied as a mere instrument to ends alien to it, which have been raised by the thinkers of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas). Since reason has been conceived of as subjective and been reduced to a merely logical and calculating faculty, the question arises as to the existence of guiding principles in the fields of ethics and politics. These thinkers dialectically oppose both forms of reason while attempting to integrate them into a social and historical totality. Pucciarelli also points to the conception of a rhetorical reason, as for instance in Perelman, which serves as framework for argumentation.

This multiplicity entails various problems: Pucciarelli wonders whether it breaks the unity of reason, whether they are irreducible types and whether their results are compatible with each other (Pucciarelli, 1976, 616–622). However, the heterogeneity is not radical, since the problematic contains a constant core constituted by the desire to know, the critical attitude and the demand for a methodology adjusted to both this aim and the reflection on its moral destiny: Pucciarelli thus concludes in “El pluralismo en filosofía” (“Pluralism in Philosophy”) (Pucciarelli, 1978): “Pluralism, which is the fruit of free activity, is also the condition of the existence of freedom and its unimpeded exercise” (Pucciarelli, 1978, 22). The contrast between the different types of reason is therefore not radical, but varies according to the exercise of its function, its context, and the organization of the categorial system. In view of the plurality of historical forms of conceptions of reason, it is possible to affirm that the conception of reason as cognitive and applicable to the ethical field can take on a multiplicity of images according to the historical and cultural context of application. Based on this perspectivism, Pucciarelli posits a “gnoseological pluralism,” which respects both the
heterogeneous ways of conceiving of a metaphysical order and the multiplicity of contents and systems that have crystallized historically (Pucciarelli, 1978, 11 ff.).

The existence of a multiplicity of types of reason raises the question of their unity. Pucciarelli rejects those interpretations that are based on a naturalistic anthropology, which reduces reason to a function immanent to life and to the service of biological needs on the one hand, and on the other, those that uphold its autonomy, which reduces its evolution to a necessary unfolding of fixed forms that are subject to an ideal and timeless order. He sustains a conception, inspired by Scheler, which is based on the “recognition of the functionalization of essential intuition,” according to which the contents of knowledge are functionalized, allowing thus the subsequent grasping of those features which were inaccessible from the previous perspective (Pucciarelli, 1968, 248–250). The crisis of reason, Pucciarelli concludes,

is far from affecting reason as a human activity in the service of knowledge: it does not alter its dynamism, inventiveness, and plasticity. […] it is, strictly speaking, the precarious character, in any case historical, of the means invented by reason itself to achieve the requirement of universal and full intelligibility. (Pucciarelli, 1968, 252 ff.)

These expressions testify to Pucciarelli’s confidence in the human capacity and human reason to overcome vicissitudes, which characterizes his philosophical militancy.

8. PLURALITY OF IMAGES OF TIME

Pucciarelli also proposes a plurality of images of time, a subject which represents his central contribution and to which he devoted extensive articles, some of which he selected and were published after his death in the aforementioned El enigma del tiempo. In an article therein, titled “El origen de la noción vulgar del tiempo” (“The Origin of the Vulgar Notion of Time”) (Pucciarelli, 2013a), he proposes a correlation between the plurality of modes of being and the plurality of time and poses the following question: “The plurality of modes of being, which human experience reveals, must it not be attributed, perhaps, to the multiplicity of modes of temporality?” (Pucciarelli, 2013a, 65). Even if he refers here to Heidegger’s statements, this question can be understood as the issue underlying the totality of Pucciarelli’s studies on time. For instance, in “El hombre y el tiempo” (“Man and Time”) (Pucciarelli, 1983b), he not only distinguishes and characterizes diverse species of time in relation to the processes associated with them, but also observes that each temporality is characterized by continuity or discontinuity, acceleration or retardation, natural or conventional periodization and by its relation to the affective states of the subject who experiences them (Pucciarelli, 1983b, 24). This
question raises the problem, already mentioned above, of the unity of time as opposed to the various temporalities. Pucciarelli's approaches this issue from the point of view of the different layers of the person in relation to a temporal structure of superimposed, hierarchically organized levels (Pucciarelli, 1983b, 28).

In this connection, Pucciarelli points out in “El hombre: corporalidad y temporalidad” (“Man: Corporeality and Temporality”) (Pucciarelli, 1984), the following:

We live simultaneously in a plurality of times, yet life, despite changes in thought, affectivity, and action, shows unity and continuity. It seems that life is the content of an imperative of continuity through time, the only way to ensure the unity of the person and, in the moral order, a sense of responsibility. All this suggests that a hierarchical theory of time is an adequate instrument to do justice to the multiplicity of temporalities destined to come together in the unity of that ‘dimensional category of reality’ which we call time. (Pucciarelli, 1984, 174)

For Pucciarelli, time is a “constitutive trait” of the human being and inseparable from it (Pucciarelli, 1983b, 22). To render time intelligible, man has recur to the conceptions of cosmos, life, consciousness, existence and spirit, concepts that concern both processes and experience, as he claims in “El tiempo en la filosofía actual” (“Time in Contemporary Philosophy”) (Pucciarelli, 2013b, 145). This is why one must distinguish firstly, the “experience of time,” which is always subjective, from the “intellectual representation of time,” which registers it; secondly, the “symbolization of time” by language from theories about its nature; and finally, the “species of time”—physical, biological, psychic, social, historical—from its qualitative aspects (Pucciarelli, 1984, 24), expressions which evidence the influence of Bergson’s, Dilthey’s, Simmel’s, Bachelard’s and Minkowski’s research on time and its grasping through the notion of life (Pucciarelli, 2013b, 154–163). Time can also be accessed through the cosmologies of our time, which are strongly influenced by Einstein’s theory of relativity, by emphasizing “the reality of time and its solidarity with space and matter” (Pucciarelli, 2013b, 146). They follow the inspiration of Heraclitus and emphasize becoming and transience, as advocated by Nicolai Hartmann’s, Samuel Alexander’s, Alfred N. Whitehead’s, Hans Reichenbach’s, Rudolph Carnap’s and Bertrand Russell’s respective philosophies.

Another possibility of access is consciousness, where the sense of experiences related to time are constituted. Here Pucciarelli analyses the approaches that attribute the origin of the representation of time to the contents of consciousness and to acts. He highlights the evolution of Franz Brentano with respect to his conception of time as given to us in a temporalizing perception, an analysis taken up and modified by

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45 On this subject see also: (Pucciarelli, 2013b).
Husserl in his analyses of the internal time consciousness, which denies the similarity between the stream of experiences and objective time. Pucciarelli details the evolution of these studies that culminate in Husserl’s conception of the living present, analyzing, in addition, the correlation between the constitutive levels of time and consciousness. He also reviews Scheler’s distinction between the multiplicity of times and, in connection with his metaphysics of the final period, the hypothesis of a single time conceived of as the unfolding of the totality of the cosmos. Unlike Husserl, Scheler assigns the original experience of time not to consciousness, but to the life of the body as a vital center. Pucciarelli highlights in this context the divergences between Husserl and Scheler, which originate in two different interpretations of the phenomenological reduction: While Husserl inhibits any positing of existence in order to reach the original phenomena that integrate the knowledge of essences, Scheler takes a further step that excludes the acts that constitute the moment of existence. In Scheler’s interpretation, the Husserlian reduction does not give access to essences, for in this sphere there is a confusion between the essential and the accidental. It is only through a radicalization of the reduction that one arrives at the meeting point between consciousness and body, soul life and biological life (Pucciarelli, 2013b, 163–170). This emphasis on the level of experience is then examined according to the contraposition of two types of experience, which can neither be universalized nor communicated, namely the experience involving a contact with the external within the instant and an ontology that discovers in temporality the meaning of the being of existence. The developments of Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Jean Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Pucciarelli, 2013b, 170–177) are related to this scope of issues.

These analyses reveal Pucciarelli’s emphasis on the personal dimension of philosophizing, from which the examination of time cannot be excluded. As he observes in “Dos actitudes frente al tiempo” (“Two Attitudes to Time”) (Pucciarelli, 2013c), these analyses translate two attitudes theoretical and practical as a function, perhaps, of two different human types but capable of devoting themselves with equal passion to philosophical research. Once again, philosophy reveals the personal dimension that runs through its entire systematic construction and also its own repertoire of questions. (Pucciarelli, 2013c, 111)

Temporality is thus an essential feature of the human being because it permeates all theoretical and practical life. We do not have a “more universal experience than that of time”: We cannot ignore

the transformation we perceive in the outside world, the ageing that comes upon us, the nostalgia that invades us when we evoke the past and the impatience that awakens the
future [...] We feel immersed in a current that overflows us and drags us along: powerless to stem its flow, we see it bursting forth from an uncertain future, rushing over us and pursuing its course towards a past that is receding behind us. [...] time harasses us, drags us along, gives us no respite, passes through us, wearies us, dissipates our joys and ends up destroying us [...] It appears to us as the strongest thread that supports the tapestry of our existence and at the same time as the dissolving force that will put an end to it. (Pucciarelli, 2013c, 79)

9. HUMANISM IN PUCCIARELLI

In view of this multiplicity of changing perspectives, Pucciarelli suggest a “dynamic conception” of the human being, whose essence is not given in advance, an assertion that bears a striking similarity to Husserl’s late reflections in §64 of *Ideas II*, where he punts forward the conception of an essence “open” to a multiplicity of qualitative changes according to varying circumstances (Husserl, 1952, 299; 1989b, 313). This conception of a dynamic plurality can only be expressed in action: Hence, wisdom is achieved by a militant agent, who, due to its inherent freedom and critical attitude, does not allow itself to be confused with the cause it serves (Pucciarelli, 1969a, 367). Pucciarelli rejects the human type who is prone to contemplation in a receptive attitude and who rejects transformative activity. Because modes of action must be guided by theoretical analysis, Pucciarelli emphasizes, alongside logical reason, a historical reason, in which he distinguishes two aspects of narrative, namely, one oriented to understanding the course of history, and the other one based on arguments oriented towards persuasion: While the first aspect concerns facts and events already consummated, the second relates to “action in a nascent state,” as he argues in “Dos vertientes de la razón histórica” (“Two Strands of Historical Reason”) (Pucciarelli, 1981, 229). If action is not to be underestimated, philosophy should not be characterized as mere “consciousness of the epoch” since this would imply the renunciation of exercising a transformative action on the epoch, as he points out in “La filosofía en su diálogo con nuestra época” (“Philosophy in its Dialogue with Our Epoch”) (Pucciarelli, 1982, 36). Hence, he emphasizes in “La filosofía como expresión del tipo humano” (“Philosophy as an Expression of a Human Type”): “Philosophy is not a frivolous game for leisure time, but a serious activity that engages the whole human being, and such an escapism is an indication of a deficient mode of human existence” (Pucciarelli, 1972a, 92).

The philosopher must therefore contribute to create the conditions that make possible the exercise of freedom. For this reason, throughout his writings Pucciarell-
li highlights in the philosopher “a nature that shows the active energy of character through a thought that penetrates into action to transform the world” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 94). It is up to the humanities and not only to science to transform the world. When specifying what he understands by humanism, Pucciarelli points out in “La controversia de los humanismos” (“The Controversy of Humanisms”) (Pucciarelli, 1987b), that this concept designates “that philosophical position which, by emphasizing the value of man and exalting the feeling of its dignity, accentuates the importance of free activity and stimulates its original creations” (Pucciarelli, 1987b, 32). This idea of humanism, centered on the exaltation of the human being, is present in different historical contexts, opens a plural panorama, which nevertheless shows a nucleus of coincidences in the enthusiasm for culture and in the importance assigned to the humanities, spheres which Pucciarelli considers to be united. That is why

there is no humanism without differentiation, and any behavior that strives to ignore it automatically places the individual on the margins of the values that nourish the spiritual orientation of humanism, which are summed up in freedom, dignity, and justice. (Pucciarelli, 1987b, 54)

10. CONCLUSION. PUCCIARELLI AND LATIN AMERICA

Both this humanism and the plurality inherent in all forms of human existence and particularly, in the personal dimension of philosophical practice extend to the realm of culture. Pucciarelli advocates a cultural pluralism that is based on the historical development of Latin America and responds to the moral duty to develop our personality. Pucciarelli recognizes in Latin Americans a deep-rooted identity that operates thanks to shared religion, customs, and language. Assuming the condition of Latin American, as the Dominican erudite Pedro Henriquez Ureña did, implies no isolation, but participation in the universality of spirit from the concrete situation one has been thrown in by destiny (Pucciarelli, 1945b, 21). Underlying Pucciarelli’s reflections is the recognition of the crisis that philosophy is going through, which originates in its “loss of social prestige” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 84), and the hope that “what was once an effective force will once again become an energetic stimulus for the spiritual life of man, especially through its influence on the educational formation of the individual” (Pucciarelli, 1987c, 84). In this connection, phenomenology as Pucciarelli conceives it becomes an active force by not only disclosing the crisis which philosophy and society face, but most importantly by widening its horizons in order to embrace multiple perspectives, contributing thus to its diversified application to varying situations and contexts, such as the Latin American. Accordingly, Pucciarelli
stands out, within the early reception of phenomenology in Argentina, due to his pluralistic conception of reason and time that underpins the transformative role of phenomenology on society. What he shares particularly with his teachers, Romero, and Korn, is a profound humanism and the concomitant commitment to social justice and national culture, that does not operate through exclusion, but through a provisional synthesis of own and foreign cultural features that varies according to circumstances. In this way, as he claims in “Problemas del pensamiento argentino” (“Problems of Argentine Thought”), philosophy and phenomenology in particular are closely linked to social reality, being “its expression, its critique and its propulsive energy” (Pucciarelli, 1975b, 23).

In short, Pucciarelli’s humanism goes deep into the problems of his time to rescue the virtues and freedom of the individual that ground human dignity. For this reason and for his critical capacity, it is undeniably relevant today. His ideal of humanism, which emphasizes not only the personal dimension and the social commitment of philosophical practice, but also the relentless search for the unshakeable foundations of knowledge as carried out by Husserl, reveals a profound pluralistic humanism that neglects neither the consideration of the different dimensions of the Latin American lifeworld nor the militant and critical function of the philosopher, evidencing thus the actuality of his message.

REFERENCES


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47 Originally published in: (Pucciarelli, 1972a).


