

## Foucault's biopolitics as neoliberalism and the twenty-first century

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In this article, the author articulates Foucault's theory of biopolitics as neoliberalism and argues that it is simultaneously the most comprehensive theory of biopolitics and the most instructive theory for political philosophy in the twenty-first century. More precisely, the analysis of *biopolitical governmentality* in Foucault's different works reveals the continuation between the archeology of knowledge and genealogy of power, bringing forth the issue of political subjectivity and politics *per se*. It is argued that Foucault's project presents an unfinished project of Modernity and that, as such, it opens the possibility of a different rationality with the affirmation of the idea of legitimacy. The movement from sovereignty to biopolitics for Foucault is relevant as the destruction of the legal system and the distancing from philosophy. Furthermore, these are key characteristics of the new Western discourse which at the same time is structured on the system of binary oppositions and discloses itself as a counter-history. In Foucault's project by contrast, the potentiality for a new political subjectivity arises from the interrelations between scientific knowledge and knowledge of the people (local memories). Political realism is the result of his elaboration of utilitarian vs revolutionary course. Finally, contemporary phenomena of biopolitics are presented, most notably Western 'humanitarian interventions', political trials, the control and regulation of population in the Coronavirus crisis, bioterror, and the artificial difference between democracy and authoritarianism.

*Keywords:* biopolitics, neoliberalism, governmentality, political subjectivity, discourse of the West.

### Biopolitics as neoliberal governmentality and post-politics

First and foremost, it should be emphasized that contemporary debates about biopolitics — in their multiplicities and variations — often appear different from Foucault's concept of *biopolitics as neoliberalism*<sup>1</sup> in spite of the fact that Foucault first articulated the subject of biopolitics and, moreover, provided the most comprehensive theory which in many respects arises as a paradigm

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<sup>1</sup> The issue how different authors from Agamben to Hardt and Negri significantly depart from Foucault's project has been articulated in [1].

*par excellence* for the political philosophy of the twenty-first century. More accurately, *biopolitics as a philosophical concept* was first elaborated in Foucault's 1978–1979 lectures delivered at the Collège de France, later published as *The Birth of Biopolitics (Naissance de la biopolitique)*. However, according to Foucault, the concept of biopolitics equally relates to his previous analyses in works like *Society Must Be Defended (Il faut défendre la société)*, *Discipline and Punish (Surveiller et punir)*, *The History of Sexuality (L'Histoire de la sexualité)*, and *Security, Territory, Population (Sécurité, territoire, population)*.

Therefore, the discourse of biopolitics is structurally positioned throughout Foucault's work as a leading trace referring to a spectrum of issues, ranging from the market and economy to techniques of governing, law, sexuality and then to life and death. In this way, biopolitics emerges as a thread of what Foucault calls a *practice of truth* or *regime of truth* permanently manifested throughout different phenomena. Following a chronological line, in *The History of Sexuality* Foucault introduces the concept of biopower to emphasize both power over individuals and over people as members of a certain population and then articulates both *biopolitics and biopower*<sup>2</sup> in his 1978 lectures, linking it to the concept of *governmentality*. Moreover, precisely this structure, *biopolitics-biopower-governmentality*, appears as the basis for Foucault's elaboration of how contemporary biopolitics conditions a particular form of *counter-politics*, i. e., of *post-politics* and *anti-politics*, which therefore arises as a philosophical challenge *par excellence*.

This is how Foucault's political philosophy — most notably the issue of *political subjectivity* — refers to a series of practices and equally why it must begin as a *critique of biopolitics*, i. e., of all the ways in which power is exercised. Strictly speaking, Foucault's political philosophy was articulated mostly in his later work on governmentality, population, and biopolitics, especially in *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*. However, rethinking politics as the relation between knowledge and power is presented in Foucault's entire *oeuvre* and therefore the continuity between the *archeology of knowledge* and the *genealogy of power* is situated in an *expansion of the structural knowledge-power relation* as it is constitutive for articulating the *political per se*.

Foucault's originality here is in the articulation of a particular “*regime of truth*”, i. e., of *liberalism as biopolitics* referring to a *series of historical practices and techniques of governing*. Furthermore, the outstanding task of genealogy is precisely the examination of appearances of biopower within one “*regime of truth*” and, in such a way, to make visible the multiplicity of forms of the

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<sup>2</sup> Despite the difference between *biopower* and *biopolitics* as found in contemporary theories, such as in works of M. Lazzareto, it is not of particular significance in Foucault's analysis. See: [2].

*politicization of life*. Therefore, genealogy for Foucault is always a *genealogy of power* and the genealogy of power as an analysis of biopower exemplified in particular cases sheds light on the *phenomena of biopolitics*. In this way, Foucault argues how a dominant form of power in Western societies appeared, i. e., how *biopolitics appeared as the new discourse of the West*.

Foucault, however, contrary to Habermas's claim [3], has no intention of entirely dismissing Modernity and emphasizes that critique is always a profoundly contextualized act as a critique of the particular discourses and practices that it enabled. Or, more accurately, Foucault neither projects the end of Modernity nor does he conclude that, because of the dominance of power relations, *a rationalized discourse is not possible*<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, Foucault's genealogical project in and of itself appears as an *unfinished project of Modernity*, its critical response to itself, a possibility of a different possibility which *affirms the idea of legitimacy*. Therefore, it seems that most interpretations of Foucault's concept of power have not considered how the genealogy of power refers above all to the transition *from sovereignty to biopolitics as the new discourse of the West*. Furthermore, this consideration is precisely what is missing in post-Foucauldian approaches to biopolitics: the rethinking of all the implications that *biopolitics as a strategic relation appears as a process of fragmentation and dissolution of political sovereignty*. For Foucault, therefore, reason — as well as power — is always present and the real issue is *what forms knowledge-power relations take*. In the case of biopolitics, the dominant form is that *instrumentalized reason and its "regime of truth" is liberalism*. Moreover, if for Foucault biopolitics as such appears as the destruction of sovereignty then it can be further argued that perhaps it is not a matter of chance that neoliberalism in contemporary forms of biopolitics continues and radicalizes this de(con)struction.

Foucault's analysis of the *microphysics of power*, i. e., of "capillary power", emphasizes how "the condition of possibility of power is not ... in sovereignty" because "*power is the name for a complex strategic situation in a certain society*" [5, p. 106]. Indisputably, "the object" of such power can be the individual, group, class, people, nation, and all of this at once. Therefore, the transformation in Western thinking and practices of politics refers to a completely *new form of power* which develops around the concept of *governmentality (gouvernementalité)*, realized through techniques of domination *in the entire social field*. Consequently, biopolitics arises as a form of power which extends *beyond politics* precisely because it *politicizes the life* of individuals and populations. Dreyfus and Rabinow rightly emphasize that,

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<sup>3</sup> A paradigmatic example in this sense is that, referring to Deleuze, Foucault writes that it is most unusual that someone like him "took Nietzsche seriously which indeed he did" [4, p. 122].

in this new economy of governing — in micro-power as the new dominant form of power — *time appears in a new way* and such that *control must now be permanent* [6, p. 154]. This *total control* enables the *control of time and explicitly of events, singularities, and discontinuities* which no longer appear in and of themselves. Still, Habermas misses the point in claiming how power for Foucault is the decisive characteristic of politics and that, in essence, his approach is a nihilistic one without the possibility of a rational outcome<sup>4</sup>. Perhaps this would have been the case had Foucault not introduced an unexpected element in this discourse: *law*. Foucault insists that *new forms of governing “colonize legal procedures and destruct the juridical system of sovereignty”* [7, p. 55].

The power of biopolitics as the exemplary case of domination which *destroys the legal system* appears most notably in *relations of force* and *relations of war*. This way Foucault aims to emphasize that the inversion of Clausewitz's formula, i. e., *politics as war continued by other means*, signifies precisely the *transformation in the field of governing where war becomes a code for peace*. In this way, *Society Must Be Defended* aims to explain the differences between the *theory of domination* and the *theory of sovereignty* and, through them, the *rise of biopolitics* such that war continued by other means is the representative case of a new type of governing.

Genealogical analysis constitutes itself as a response to the insight that *biopolitics — as a new form of governing — rests on a binary structure* and Foucault emphasizes that “such discourse in the West is perhaps *the first historical-philosophical discourse opposed to philosophical-legal discourse*. It is a discourse in which *truth* clearly functions *as a tool for certain victory*. It is an unclear critical discourse, but a strongly mythical discourse. In its substantial elements, it is *foreign to the great tradition of philosophical-legal discourse*. To philosophers and law scholars it is unusual and foreign” [7, p. 75].

Therefore, biopolitics as liberalism appears as only one possibility of Modernity and is further continued in neoliberalism and realized in contemporary practices. Furthermore, biopolitics in this way dissolves philosophy itself, precisely because it appears as a de(con)struction of sovereignty and subjectivity, and a “colonization of legal procedures”. Philosophy, rationality, and law are in and of themselves opposed to every concept of the *instrumentalization of truth* and the *instrumentalization of knowledge through the politics of power*. To illustrate how philosophy has nothing to do with a binary system of thinking, Foucault emphasizes that the new

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<sup>4</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow, on the other hand, articulate how “Foucault does not attack reason but rather shows the functioning of a historical model of rationality. Foucault is eminently reasonable which is why he focuses on political production of truth in modern power regimes” [6, p. 133].

historical-philosophical discourse of the West is structurally linked to war or, more precisely, that such discourse divides society in *a binary war as a war of races*. Therefore, the inclination to this *racial war* rises from a *historical-political matter*, one *dramatically opposed to the philosophical and legal discourse*, and such a task is realized by setting up *binary oppositions which are immanent to biopolitics*. The concept of a war of races means that biopolitical discourse as the new discourse of the West can appear either in the form of Western-centric discourse or in multiple forms of Eurocentrism [7, p. 78–81]. Moreover, Foucault reintroduces the concept of *counter-history* to articulate how *the discourse of war itself functions as counter-history*, i. e., as both a *post-history* and an *anti-history*. In contrast to a real historical struggle, counter-history relates to the biological struggle for life and then to the differentiation between races, the selection of the stronger and affirmation of “*the best race*” becoming the paradigm of *contemporary biopolitics*.

The new historical discourse of the West is, therefore, *both counter-historical and counter-political*. It instrumentalizes both *history* and *politics* in the same way in which it instrumentalizes *truth* — for the purpose of *power* and *war* — using historical knowledge and dissolving philosophical and legal knowledge so that the biological “struggle for life” can appear in different forms. Foucault writes that “*racism is literary revolutionary discourse turned upside down*” and concludes that the issue of governing can no longer be separated from the question of *slavery and freedom*. Moreover, for him, *the issue of freedom is the first question of politics* and the implicit aim of his critical project.

The movement from sovereignty to biopolitics Foucault articulates as the transition from *the body to population* in the sense in which the processes of birth, death, and life — which enables racism — together with the problem of the city signify the transformation toward *regulating power*. However, Foucault insists that most of contemporary forms of power — from Nazism on — simultaneously appear as *power of control and biological regulation*. In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, he writes *the history of liberalism as the history of biopolitics* to articulate contemporary neoliberalism, i. e., the *contemporary history of biopolitics*. This means that every genealogy is a *genealogy of the present* and as such, as articulated in *Society Must Be Defended*, has the task of determining the relation between *scientific knowledge* and *knowledge of the people* or between *scientific knowledge* and *local memories* [7, p. 105]. Furthermore, it is precisely this interrelation that enables *a new rethinking of subjectivity and politics* as situated between the general and the local, and therefore as structurally opposed to biopolitics. Thus, the fact that the genealogical analysis in *The Birth of Biopolitics* develops with a focus on *reason in politics*, i. e., with an emphasis on how different forms of knowledge are *constitutive for the political*

should be comprehended exactly in light of the articulation of the *possibility of new politics*.

Different from works like *The History of Sexuality*, *The History of Madness*, and *Discipline and Punish*, in *The Birth of Biopolitics* Foucault presents techniques of governing not only over individuals but over *entire populations* which are, simultaneously, being *regulated*. At the same time, the idea is equally about *total control over economic processes* with the accent that the final task of *contemporary political economy* is *regulation of the population, its economic power, growth, migration, health and likewise*. Therefore, contemporary biopolitics does not primarily govern citizens as legal subjects but rather *citizens as a part of the biomass called the population*. It deals with the *potential of economic production and the growth of both human capital (the politics of education) and health factors (social politics)*. Moreover, it is in this way opposed to the legal order of things because it is established as *the idea of regulating life itself* and in such way is the *governmentality par excellence*. This transformation of political rationality, which happened with political economy, illustrates for Foucault an immanent relation between the *new form of governing and utilitarian philosophy*. Furthermore, the very possibility of biopolitics as the politicization of life is conditioned by this crypto-metaphysical turn, i. e., *as the appearance of utilitarianism from a certain dispositive of knowledge and power*<sup>5</sup>. This is how liberalism as biopolitics historically appeared along with the market as the space of production of truth *par excellence*. Continuing, Foucault emphasizes how truth is produced through power and that power cannot be exercised differently than through the *production of truth*, concluding that “this is the case in all societies, but I believe that in our (Western) society the relation between power, law and truth is organized in a specific way” [8, p. 31].

### The revolutionary course vs the utilitarian course

Here the difference between what Foucault calls a *revolutionary course*, which begins with Rousseau, and a *utilitarian course* as two distinct possibilities of Modernity [9, p. 58–70] needs to be emphasized. While the first course moves from the idea of human rights to the idea of sovereignty — and through such a movement legitimizes the idea of the state — *the utilitarian course is not founded on law but on practices*, i. e., on usefulness as the final criterion, and, instead of legitimization appears as “*the issue of British radicalism*”. Indisputably, these differences simultaneously relate to both politics and philosophy disclosing the relation of *philosophy towards politics*. This disclosure reveals

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<sup>5</sup> For the concept of *dispositif* in Foucault, see: [10].

how *techniques of governing* appear in the first place, i. e., how a particular discourse appeared as foundational for biopolitics. Or, more precisely, while law in the case of the “revolutionary course” arises as an expression of the collective will and is articulated in the idea of *the social contract*, in the case of utilitarianism it emerges because of transactions which divide the sphere of power intervention and the sphere of the individual. Consequently, freedom in the first sense is *legal freedom* while in utilitarianism it is not linked to legality but only to the independence of those who are governed in relation to the structure of power.

The realization of the utilitarian course in concrete political practices in time begins to correspond to scientific categories such as *species* and *population* which, in final instance, *became more relevant than legal categories*. Therefore, *the new political rationality of biopolitics* appears precisely as structurally linked to the development of the empirical sciences and develops beyond both law and political theory. Simultaneously, Foucault emphasizes the ambivalence of power, stating that power relations are at the same time *deliberate and non-subjective*<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, power can be realized in two entirely different ways, as a *possibility of subjectivity* and as a *possibility of techniques of governing in biopolitics*. The philosophy of power can in this way become the philosophy of freedom and the duplicity in Foucault’s concept of *assujettissement* reveals precisely the potentiality of both subjectification and *homo politicus*.

Therefore, in spite of the fact that power for Foucault in and by itself always remains a constitutive element of politics — which is why his position is one of a *political realism* that avoids the trap of utopia — it is at the same time the case that his analysis counts on the Hegelian position of *self-reflection* in relevant ways. Moreover, even Foucault’s critique of rationalization and an articulation of a specific reason opposed to it resembles the Hegelian relation between reason and understanding, where reason is now positioned in a special field of strategy, genealogy, and exploration, *as a logic of strategy which is permanently created by genealogy itself*. Furthermore, when this is considered with the fact that knowledge as an element of power rises in real social struggles, as the path for appearance of political subjectivity, Foucault’s stance on rethinking the political becomes clearer.

In this sense, speaking to Western societies, Foucault writes how “the task today is to refuse what we are... We must imagine and built what we could be...in order to free ourselves both from individualization and totalization of modern power structures... *We need to promote new forms of subjectivity*” [11; 12]. This means that the aim of politics is to articulate itself in opposition

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<sup>6</sup> Here Foucault’s “Hegelianism”, especially the dialectical motive of the master-slave struggle for recognition, comes forth in its developed form. For other Hegelian motives in Foucault see: [12].

to liberal and postmodern individualism as well as to be counter-posed to the project of totalization that characterizes biopolitics. Foucault further articulates that such a task is political, ethical, social, and philosophical, therefore implying that what is at stake is *a new birth of philosophy, ethics, and politics* in a specific discourse of *political rationalism* which exemplifies *a new relation towards the individual, state, and its institutions*. This new subjectivity would mean the appearance of *a new power — the power of freedom —* and to be articulated in difference to *biopolitics as the most developed form of the utilitarian course*. It would be related to the *revolutionary course as the still unrealized possibility of Modernity*.

If biopower has therefore been “the necessary element for the development of capitalism” because capitalism needed a power “which would strengthen the capabilities of people but in such a way that governing over them would not become harder” [5, p. 157], then it is exactly the *objectification of life* that strengthened *liberal power structures*. This is *how power becomes power over populations* and techniques of governing through *surveillance and regulation of processes of birth, death, sickness, food, life conditions* emerge and “all this in the context of representing ways in which *life appears as an extraordinary element of power*” [13, p. 362]. In such processes, *life becomes politicized and politics becomes depoliticized* while biopolitics enables an entrance into “the field of pure calculations and from knowledge/power create agents of transformation of human life” [5, p. 166].

This is how *politics appears as permanent war* and Foucault emphasizes that the biopolitical paradigm — beside the fact that it often appears in different forms of violence — can take on a *humanitarian rhetoric* which is a *par excellence* movement of depoliticization because *it is precisely the opening of the humanitarian space that removes the political*. At the same time, biopolitical depoliticization manifests itself in one more relevant framework, i. e., as the *dominance of economism* because the moment that the economy becomes self-sufficient is the moment of the dominance of the market, which further enables the economy to turn against sovereignty. This is precisely why the crux of neoliberalism is society as the space of market relations and the explanation how depoliticization is to a great extent realized as *economization*.

However, Foucault especially underlines the contemporary biopolitical wars, stating that “governing over life and survival many wars have been led and can be led. Today the atomic situation has reached the final point of power and in such a way that an entire nation can be exposed to death so that another nation would survive. The principle to be able to kill because of life has now become the governing principle of international strategy and survival now is not the legal survival of sovereignty but the *biological survival of a certain population*” [7, p. 44].



Indisputably, Foucault was ahead of his time and anticipated the further development of biopolitics precisely in the field of world politics, international relations, contemporary discourses, and techniques of power which continued to develop in the second half of twentieth and then into the twenty-first centuries. If one keeps in mind the justifications for numerous Western-led wars and “humanitarian interventions”, the synthesis here is the struggle for the survival of one population against another, which is why one nation is exposed to death (“the enemy”) while the other has the right to live (“the friend”). Furthermore, *the friend-enemy binary opposition became the leading principle of international strategy, entering the field of international relations and international politics as a constitutive principle from which an entire regime of truth is created from dominant forms of power.* Therefore, the first victims or “collateral damages” of these processes were *law and sovereignty*, and then, further and especially, the concept of *popular sovereignty*.

In this way, Foucault’s critical normativism comes forth from his genealogical project, which appears fully articulated in his outstanding critique of biopolitics. In its final implications, it is precisely this movement that brings forth the potentiality of a different rationalization. Therefore, Foucault implicitly discloses the birth of a distinct ethical, political, and philosophical subjectivity and comes close to a certain unraveled modernism in politics<sup>7</sup>.

### **Foucault’s political realism and contemporary biopolitical phenomena**

Furthermore, in the manner of *political realism* Foucault claims that “the problem is not to attempt to dissolve power relations in a utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to provide legal norms, as well as ethics, *ethos*, which would enable these power plays to be realized with a *minimum of domination*” [15]. Differently, therefore, from liberalism, which has not been born from the idea about political society based on a social contract [16], because it has no affinity for either law or political sovereignty but is led by techniques of governing and instrumental reason, the concept of *popular sovereignty arises as a rethinking between economics and politics as well as establishing a new political subjectivity.* If *homo economicus* is the leading figure of counter-politics, relativizing law and using it in a provisional manner, then on the other hand there appears to be a special sort of optimism in Foucault, an *optimism of a rationality which overcomes the utilitarian boundaries of a know-how technique* [16]. In this concept of self-reflective reason, the idea of the social contract would be taken seriously as well as the idea of democracy with

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<sup>7</sup> This motive is elaborated by David Hoy. See: [14].

a new *homo politicus*. Here Foucault's insight from *The Birth of Biopolitics*, "neither democracy nor legal state were necessarily liberal nor was liberalism necessarily democratic or faithful to legal forms" [9, p. 436], needs to be considered with his appeal that what needs to be analyzed is specific techniques of governing and what must be opposed to new power techniques is *new forms of politicization* [17, p. 209].

Therefore, a contemporary critique of biopolitics presents itself as a *contemporary genealogy for rethinking political subjectivities, the relation between politics and ethics*, as well as a rethinking of the *possibilities of democratic practices in difference to biopolitics*. Such a task first and foremost presupposes overcoming the power politics which arises from the quasi-rational dominance of neoliberalism and begins as the analysis of the contemporary phenomena of biopolitics.

Certainly, the structure of contemporary Western wars, most of which are led precisely *in the name of life* and *in the name of peace*, reveals Foucault's concept that what is at stake here is the biological survival of one population against the "population of the enemy" and therefore appears as the example *par excellence* of the biopolitics of the twenty-first century. "Humanitarian interventions" were named *exceptions*, and this is precisely the interrelation between *US exceptionalism* and its *interventionist politics*. Furthermore, Foucault's idea about "a better fitted race" comes forth here as well, based on the totalitarian binarism of "absolute good" and "absolute evil". Second, a part of this process is another phenomenon of contemporary biopolitics, i. e., *political trials* as extensively elaborated in *A History of Political Trials* [18, p. 13–66]. Or, more precisely, they appear as a part of the biopolitical tendency towards military and legal interventionism and therefore as complete control of subjectivities. Laughland equally argues that the doctrine of human rights became the basis for the neoliberal project which destroys the legal system in order to enable governmentality and treats *statesman as criminals*. Reducing state acts to *private crimes* has concealed the aspect of the legality of the rule and produced a new set of rules to replace existing principles. This way the relation between *legal interventionism, military interventionism, and political interventionism* constitutes *the basis of contemporary biopolitics* and presents the neoliberal opposition to popular sovereignty and real democracy. Doubtless, this is most often followed by the *dehumanization of entire nations as selected enemies*. In this way, *interventionism cancels politics and ethics simultaneously*.

Third, according to Foucault the issue of *security* is presented as one of the most useful tools for governing populations and the example of the functioning of the mechanism *security/threat* can also be found in the work of Sarasin, where it is articulated as *bioterror* in the analysis of anthrax as a meta-

phor for an anonymous threat [19, p. 22–37]. In Foucault's terms, this relates to a *dispositive of security*, i. e., reveals the emphasis on a *permanent threat* to the *entire population* and in such way we can say that the imposed measures related to COVID-19 presented a new dimension of *total biopolitics*.

The *control and regulation of populations* — in this case precisely Western populations — were manifested not only through limiting or canceling freedom in the most literal ways but simultaneously through spreading unconscious messages of insecurity and permanent threat. Or, more precisely, in multiple aspects COVID-19 appeared as a governmentality over populations *in toto* and as a crux of biopolitics, whereas the specific biopolitical trap has been creating the dominance of atmosphere of *fear* and struggle for *bare life* instead of a *dignified life*. In final instance, this appeared precisely as the measure of *dignity, democracy, and civilization* of Western biopolitics and its concept and practices of “absolute closure” as well as imposing mandatory measures. The result has been the creation of an even more atomized individual who lives in permanent fear and as such corresponds to a Hobbesian individual while it dissolves the community. Furthermore, the majority of cities became closed fortresses, resembling both Bentham's *Panopticon* and Foucault's *prisons* while citizens of certain Western states were not even allowed to leave them because they would be treated as *criminals*. This is how the aspect of *criminalization* moved from the individual to *entire populations* and *how the neoliberal West structurally transformed the lives of its own citizens*.

However, a parallel contemporary biopolitical phenomenon needs to be considered as well: the establishment of US-organized *biolaboratories* throughout the world, which presents the further development of *real bioterrorism*. This *turn from biopolitics to the biotechnology of bioterror* represents perhaps the final stage of the *neoliberal war of races*, especially considering that a great deal of experiments in these laboratories target precisely *certain populations*.

Finally, the US-led idea of a “new concert of democracies” and, parallel to that, the promotion of a new binary opposition — between *democracy and authoritarianism* — appears as a biopolitical phenomena *per se* which, as Gelb articulates, is conceptualized “to leave no or little room for relations with Russia and China” [20, p. 26]. However, the global *Realpolitik* in the last decade has revealed the systemic crisis of neoliberal governmentality, and therefore the limits of the political, financial and military power of the West as well as its boundaries in the scientific and technological fields. Certainly, establishing a new practice of truth as the practice of reality appeared as a consensus about *mimesis* of politics *en générale* creating a *political virtuality* in a *hypermediated world of the postmodern production of the real*.

In conclusion, *all contemporary biopolitical phenomena appear in their structural relation to the self-proclaimed exclusivity of the West and its attempt to impose its own laws and declare them as valid for the entire international community*. This is also how biopolitics as neoliberalism became the name for the time that is ours and the explanation why *the birth of the multipolar world and a transition to a new epoch* [21, p. 11–22] opens the possibility for *overcoming the entire spectrum of a regime of truth*, followed by the potentiality of reducing power plays to a minimum of domination *in a new order which would be created*. Needless to say, on a philosophical level this transition would need to take up concepts that oppose every described biopolitical phenomenon, i. e., openness, dialogue, multiplicities, communities, law, democracy, and freedom, as well as an entire normative framework in which *collective subjectivities realizes themselves*. Here the relevance of Foucault's insight that *contemporary philosophy needs to be political and historical* comes forth since it is only from this interrelation that *freedom and democracy* — in opposition to biopolitics — can emerge in the form of a *new realism for the twenty-first century*.

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### Биополитика Фуко как неолиберализм и XXI век

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В статье автор формулирует теорию биополитики Фуко в терминах неолиберализма и утверждает, что она является одновременно наиболее всеобъемлющей теорией биополитики и наиболее поучительной для политической философии в XXI в. Точнее говоря, анализ биополитической управляемости в различных работах Фуко обнаруживает преемственность между археологией знания и генеалогией власти, поднимая проблему политической субъективности и политики как таковой. Утверждается, что проект Фуко представляет собой незавершенный проект Нового времени и как таковой открывает возможность иной рациональности с утверждением идеи легитимности. Движение от суверенитета к биополитике для Фуко актуально как разрушение правовой системы и дистанцирование от философии. Более того, таковы ключевые характеристики нового западного дискурса, который в то же время строится на системе бинарных оппозиций и раскрывает себя как контрстория. Напротив, в проекте Фуко потенциал новой политической субъективности возникает из взаимосвязи между научным знанием и знанием народа (местной памятью). Политический реализм является результатом его разработки утилитарного и революционного курса. Наконец, представлены современные явления биополитики, в первую очередь западные «гуманитарные интервенции», политические процессы, контроль и регулирование численности населения в ус-

ловиях коронавирусного кризиса, биотеррор и искусственное различие между демократией и авторитаризмом.

*Ключевые слова:* биополитика, неолиберализм, управляемость, политическая субъектность, западный дискурс.

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