

АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ВНЕШНЕЙ И ВНУТРЕННЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ ФРАНЦИИ

UDC 327

France's security strategy for the 21st century

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After the end of the Cold War, France issued the first document defining its national security strategy only in 1994. In the following years, despite its involvement in NATO and European Union enlargement, France did not publish any documents defining its security strategy. Only when Europe and the world found themselves in the process of reconfiguration of the international order at the end of the first decade of the 21st century did France begin to issue extensive documents defining its defense and national security strategy. As international terrorism became the greatest threat to France, the first document published in 2006 dealt with its position regarding this global phenomenon. Subsequently, White Papers on Defense and National Security were published in 2008 and 2013, followed by the Strategic Review of Defense and National Security in 2017. These documents define threats and challenges to the security of France, as well as its goals, and means and methods for strengthening it. They make up a broad understanding of the security of the state, society and the individuals, and international security. They show the programming of France as a European and world power. The author draws attention to some similarities and differences with the national security strategy of the Russian Federation. The analysis is conducted using the neorealist approach.

Keywords: France, strategy, national security, defense, international cooperation.

The aim of this text is to analyze the programming documents presenting the security strategy (concept) of France in the 21st century. Knowledge of the strategy, i.e. the planned goals and the way of their implementation, is needed to show the international role of France, which is the intention of this volume. Thus, the strategy is an important element of the implemented national and international security policy. In this analysis, I am going to verify the hypothesis that France has its own independent security strategy which expresses its superpower interests and ambitions to be the leader of the European Union.

It assumes the protection and promotion of the needs and interests of the state, society and individuals. Thus, it is a broad vision of the security of these entities, which are to be provided by various means and methods, civil and military. France promotes a policy of multilateralism in the international stage. There are some similarities between the French security strategy and Russia's security strategy.

The basic research method is the content analysis of documents and a critical analysis of the literature on the subject. In part, a comparative method will also be useful.

This analysis is conducted from a neorealist perspective. Especially useful are the indications of Kenneth Waltz [1, p. 30] and John Mearsheimer [2] about the ongoing re-configuration of the international order, which means the redistribution of power in the international system. This consists the erosion of the West's hegemonic position and the emergence of a new concert of the powers. The international position of France also is changing, what constitutes an objective condition for its security. Paris sees new challenges and threats and tries to find a way to deal with and counteract them. This is reflected in the changing security strategy, enshrined in subsequent programming documents. Thanks to the adopted neorealist research approach, it will be possible to show how the security strategy of France has changed in line with the evolution of the international situation, the pulsation of new challenges and threats, and the changing global balance of power.

Antecedents

Since 1972 no French programming documents containing the concept of security has been published. Only 22 years later, in March 1994 France published *Livre Blanc sur la Défense*. No less essential were more detailed, repeatedly issued military planning laws called *Loi de Programmation Militaire*. Since year 1990, these laws were issued every few years.

In the first years after the end of the Cold War, when debates were held on the future design of the European security system, for France, the key problem was deepening European integration and taking a position on the eastern extension of the European Union expected by the new democracies from Central Europe. In Paris, the awareness of the inevitability of this process was realized, but to slow it down Eduard Balladur, French Prime Minister came up with the idea of a Stability Pact for Europe. It was taken over by the EU on December 12, 1993. It was clear that the one, who mostly benefited from the implementation of the Stability Pact was integrated Western Europe. It could use the Pact as a preventive diplomacy tool in a way to clear the ground for the EU's enlargement, blocking the possibility for candidates to bring to Western structures the luggage of issues not settled in their mutual relations. As part of the Union's initiative, two conferences took place in Paris: the first on March 26–27, 1994, and the second on March 20–21, 1995, when the Stability Pact was signed [3–5]. The pact includes a political declaration and, as annexes, some bilateral agreements endorsed by Central and Eastern European countries¹. The OSCE, being an all-European organization, was made responsible to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Pact, while the European Union undertook an obligation to financially uphold its implementation (through the PHARE program).

¹ Text of the Pact with appendixes see in: [6, p. 287–291].

While evaluating the position of the French diplomacy on the EU's enlargement to the east, one should agree with Christian Lequesne's opinion, who points out that from the very beginning France highlighted threats rather than opportunities, hoping to protect the achievements of European integration [7, p. 39 ff].

In Central Europe, including the post-Soviet Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, where the EU and NATO membership was perceived as vital interest that was evidently declared on the verge of transition, the European confederation project was seen as delaying the decision to invite these states to start negotiations on accession to the European Union. Meanwhile, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance were not prepared to welcome new Eastern European members. Central European countries, being afraid of Russia coming back to the restoration of its sphere of influence in Central Europe, aimed to join NATO, while France, similarly to other allies from southern Europe, first paid attention to the challenges and threats that were coming from North Africa and the Middle East, and thus did not perceive NATO expansion to the East as an interesting thing. This shows that at the beginning of the 1990s, the strategic security interests of France and Central European states were defined differently because of different perceptions of threats. What is more, in the times of the first years after the breakthrough of 1989, the liberal Western countries supposed that the era of political and military blocs was coming to the end and that only through establishing collective security institutions should the security be intensified, just as it was done after the both world wars. Another thing worth keeping in mind is the fact that France still acknowledged itself to be a great power with world interests (fr. *mondialisme*) [8; 9], not just European ones. Therefore, not formulating a clear security strategy in the process of rapidly occurring geopolitical changes in Europe seemed a rather cautious attitude, or at least a non-risky one.

Although there was a reference to defense in its title, the White Paper implied a wider approach to the French security that went far beyond the classical understanding of defense. It spoke about the changed strategic situation after the Cold War, noting that new centers of power had appeared, such as Europe, the USA, Japan, China and Germany. Interestingly, Russia was not mentioned as one of them. The reasons of crises in Europe were identified as following: the emergence of new states, the unstable situation in Russia as well potential turbulence in the post-Soviet space and the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, such threats as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the raising vulnerability of countries to terrorism, religious and nationalist extremism and drug smuggling were listed. All abovementioned was supposed to lead to a globalization of security and communication strategies [10, p. 4–20].

As crucial to the French security interests, the White Paper named Europe (which should be read as the European Union) at the top of the list, whose goal is to establish an integrated federal-type military organization and to rebuild the transatlantic link — to assure the United States contribution to the European security and stability. In conclusion it was stated that under no circumstances may the antagonistic military blocs be renewed, hence, Russia should be engaged in security-related efforts, while the European Union should be unhurriedly enlarged and the role of the United Nations should be advanced in maintaining international peace and security, above all in matters of global crisis management. Another thing considered essential were bilateral agreements, in particular with African and Central and Eastern European states. The necessity to control arms, disarmament, arms flow as well as proliferation based on the assumptions of transparency and

verify contractual obligations in these points was also accentuated [10, p. 27–44]. The document's authors stressed that France had no explicit enemies. The nature of the defense strategy was indeed defensive, while its goal was just deterrence [10, p. 45–55].

The 1994 White Paper became the only strategic document France adopted in the first post-Cold War decade. However, the military planning laws and other documents did not introduce any changes to the earlier summarized priorities of French security policy. Only the new doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which was announced in June 2001, implied some novelty as according to it, France was allowed to use nuclear weapons against the aggressor. One more change to this doctrine in January 2006 indicated the possibility of a nuclear warning strike against the state sponsoring terrorism [11].

For several years after 1994, when it was decided to expand NATO and the European Union to include Central European countries, France did not issue any program documents defining its security policy strategy. Nevertheless, its security strategy can be reconstructed on the basis of the observation of the implemented policy on the enlargement of both multilateral structures.

When Central European states involved in the process of the systemic transformation that just began in 1989, declared their aspiration to become part of the European Communities, on December 31, 1989, French President François Mitterrand came up with the proposal of the alternative idea of a European confederation that estimated loose relations between all European countries, along with the USSR. The concept was promoted by French diplomacy only till mid-1991, as it faced very limited interest in the states that were supposed to be involved in it [12]. France upheld the intentions of the new Central European democratic countries to become members of the EU, at the same time presuming that this would be a long-term perspective while the process itself would take decades. France was initially focused on slowing down the pace of the European integration process. However, it underlined that Central European countries must satisfy the high criteria for membership in the EU. Aspiring to postpone the opening of the Union to new members from the Eastern Europe, in spring 1993 France introduced the Stability and Growth Pact for Europe. It was an instrument for the political preparation of the candidate states, while it did not boost the economic standards entitling to the membership.

France, as the main spokesman for erecting a robust European Union, considered that the Union should be supplied with a strong security and defense component. However, its Atlantic-oriented partners, such as Great Britain, Denmark, Portugal and to some extent the Netherlands were against it, in the 1990s Paris was forced to concentrate mostly on consultations with Central European states under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Secondly, France placed value on the maintenance and revitalization of the Western European Union (WEU). At the end of that decade, the European Security and Defense Policy was announced, which due to the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 became the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and a year later, the decision was made to abrogate the WEU. Paris, striving to establish ESDP, had to agree to a partnership and later association of Central European democracies (having association agreements with the EU) with the WEU. In 1992 they got the status of associated partners of the WEU, and associate members (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) after becoming part of NATO in 1999. It was of particular interest for France to bind such states as Poland with the WEU, because then France did not take part (since 1966) in the NATO's integrated military structure.

Paris was in favor of NATO's enlargement to the east, highlighting the necessity for Central European countries to meet the criteria of being democracies. Its tentative posture was associated with aiming Russia to approbate for such a historic decision. Not accidentally NATO-Russian Federation summit took place in Paris, where the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed on May 27, 1997. The idea itself to make an agreement between NATO and Russia before deciding on the enlargement of the Alliance was blamed by politicians from Poland and Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). In their opinion, this solution was quite similar in the spirit to the Yalta Agreement of 1945. Still nowadays, leading Polish and other Central European politicians make attempts to impugn included in the Founding Act political commitment of the Alliance not to deploy additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in the newly admitted states [13].

Furthermore, France was concerned with the fact that the admission of countries from Central Europe to NATO would enhance the pro-American wing of the Alliance. This would present a challenge for French attempts to Europeanize NATO through building the so-called European Security and Defense Identity [14–16]. French experts supposed that due to decision at the Madrid summit in July 1997 to invite Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to accession talks, the US would additionally get a large market for its military equipment, as these states would have to rearm after becoming the part of the Alliance their armies and would mainly acquire American armaments [17, p.90–91]. For Paris NATO enlargement the United States appeared to be a benefit for the United States. For that reason, at the Madrid Summit French President Jacques Chirac said that France would not grant a centime to financing the expenses of the Alliance's enlargement (Rzeczpospolita, July, 9, 1999). Primarily, France at the time of presidency of Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) earnestly promoted the concepts of multipolarity and multilateralism, and thus objected the consolidation of US hegemony in the world [18–20].

France, having considerable ambitions as a co-leader (together with Germany) of the EU, was further doubtful and hesitant to bulk Poland's pro-American posture. When in December 1999 the concept of ESDP was particularized at the meeting of the European Council, Poland formerly disapproved the ESDP, raising concerns that this would decrease NATO's cohesion and adversely influence the continuity of the US military presence in Europe. Actually, the hesitancy showed earlier by Madeleine Albright echoed in Poland's posture. From that moment on, in French diplomacy the pejorative term 'the US Trojan Horse in a uniting Europe' was used while talking about Poland. Later, when Poland, as a part of NATO, actualized the bandwagoning strategy towards the United States, these terms were rehashed, being, unfortunately, true. As year 2003 started, Franco-Polish relations were disturbed by Poland's back for the US military intervention in Iraq. Nevertheless, regular visits of top politicians from both parties rapidly improved this relationship. The pro-American attitude prompted several Central European allies of the US to break international law. An example of this was the CIA prisons in Poland and Romania, where Americans held al-Qaeda fighters and used torture against them for the purpose of extracting confessions. The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in July 2014 echoed the world, as it found Poland complicit in "CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on its territory", and that it had exposed the plaintiffs to serious risk of torture by enabling the CIA to detain them. In conclusion, the court found that Poland had violated the Convention

for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, and Protocol No. 6 to the Convention of 1983 [21].

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, when the geopolitical landscape began to change profoundly, the West, including France, found itself on the defensive. The financial crisis of 2008 and the recession that happened afterwards brought about a sufficient rise in the role of the so-called new emerging powers, led by China, and consequently the gather of contenders for choosing the destiny of the world has extended beyond the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) with new, ambitious regional powers like Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Nigeria. The liberal West started losing its past capacity to impact world affairs, at the same time conservative and nationalist regimes begun obtaining it [22, p. 58–66]. Illiberalism found a cozy hideout in Western states, especially in the USA during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017–2021), in Hungary and Poland, and enhanced on the political scene of other Western democracies, such as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Austria. All these changes had to be referred to in program documents and a new security policy strategy had to be presented.

Being one of the leading Western states, France has published three fundamental documents rethinking its security and defense strategy. They were the following: the White Paper on Defense and National Security of July 2008, another White Paper of April 2013, and Strategic Review of Defense and National Security of October 2017.

Terrorism as a Main Threat

Already since 1970s, French state has been jeopardized by terrorist attacks. A significant growth in terrorist attacks there occurred in the second decade of the 21st century. It is undoubtedly for this cause that terrorism is considered in France to be the major threat to security. The French government even released the White Book on Terrorism in 2006. This document orders for the creation of a new doctrine of actions against terrorism that is described as a strategic threat to French interests in the world [23, p. 5–6]. The White Book on National Defense and Security that appeared two years later (2008) asserts that the most threatening sequence of events for France is a simultaneous terrorist attack on national territory using ABC weapons and an attack on a strategic location beyond the state's borders. In addition, it mentioned the assumed existence of strategic uncertainty as one of the fundamentals for French defense and security policy and stated that policy's most essential targets were the anticipation of threats and the protection of people. The predominant tools of this policy are to be the EU as a global actor as well as global management that should be effective and have international legitimacy [23, p. 39]. The White Book on National Defense and Security from 2013 consecutively does not mention terrorism in first place on the catalog of threats. It indicates the persistent threat of terrorism and its geographical expansion, made easier due to globalization, notably on the territories of weak states, which are destabilized by local conflicts. Such places as the region of the Sahel and Sahara, northern Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and the Afghan-Pakistani border areas are named in this context [24, p. 44]. The Strategic Review of Defense and National Security 2017 declared by President Emmanuel Macron identifies terrorism, above all Jihadist terrorism, as the most pressing threat. This threat will assumably reconstruct itself, expanding into new regions and will go on striking against French and European societies [25, p. 21].

Changing Perceptions of Challenges and Threats

In the White Books on national defense and security of 2008 and 2013 the importance of globalization as a process designing a new environment for international security was stressed. The document from 2013 mentions the following strategic changes influencing the international system:

- the financial and economic crisis that diminished the international position of Europe and of the USA, and didn't prevent the increasing power of China, India or Brazil;
- events in the Arab countries, the so-called Arab Spring, the pending Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- the strategic switch of the Washington in the direction of Asia and the Pacific region (the so-called Asia pivot), which lead to a change in US geopolitical priorities;
- the multi-level European Union crisis, which impedes the EU's assumption of more considerable responsibility not only for its own security, but also for that of the whole world, something the USA anticipates of it [25, p. 27–33].

The White Book of 2013 separates the typical threats to international security into the following categories:

- A. Threats associated with the use of force. It indicates that the radicalization of national sentiment could convert itself into dangerous nationalism and this could result in the outbreak of wars. In addition, the White Book calls attention to the accelerating armament of Asian states and Russia, which applies energy matters for its foreign policy, to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East (Iran) and the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, it reminds of the threat of chemical and biological weapons.
- B. The risk of weakness. Weak countries comprise an origin of threats, as they may be used by criminals or terrorists as a safe shelter where to plan and stage attack on other states from. In this context, the White Book refers to such countries as Sahel, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- C. Threats, which are becoming greater because of globalization (terrorism, cyber threats, natural, sanitary and technological catastrophes, and climate change inducing the melting of Arctic ice cover) [25, p. 33–46].

One more, updated vision of threats for French and international security is included in the Strategic Review of Defense and National Security 2017. This document states that France and Europe operate in a doubtful strategic environment, the prevailing characteristics of which are instability and unpredictability. As the major challenges and threats it highlights the undermining of the existing international order, including the annexation of Crimea by Russia (in 2014) and tensions within the European Union; the destabilization of the Middle East, including the war in Syria; constant vulnerabilities in the Sahel region; the great power ambitions of China and Iran; the French territory's exposure to terrorist attacks; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; demographic and migration pressures; energy rivalry, the consequences of climate change, pandemic risks, trafficking, organized crime and the increase of threats in cyber-

space. As places where there are risks to the security of France, the document points out the Mediterranean Sea, including its southern coast, the Balkans, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia [26, p. 17–50]. While as weaknesses, intensifying aspects of crises the Strategic Review indicates the following phenomena: demographic and migratory pressures, climatic disturbances, sanitary risks, energy rivalries and organized crime [26, p. 30–33].

Security Policy Aims, Means, and Methods

In the White Book on Defense and National Security of June 2008, France demonstrated its European and international ambitions. While getting ready to embrace the leadership of the European Council, it set forward a wide program to make the European Union a comprehensive security actor able of playing a global role. It came up with the proposal of drafting a white book on EU defense and security. It promoted the recharging of transatlantic relations, France coming back to the integrated military structure of the Alliance, a more considerable role in the Alliance for France and integrated Europe, and assuring the complementarity of NATO and the EU in the security field. What is more, it suggested the creation of an effective collective security system within the UN framework, with the principle of multilateralism as a basis.

The White Book recognizes that globalization has profoundly altered the foundations of the international system by reshuffling power to the advantage of Asia and creating competitors in the form of new powers. Therefore, the typology of threats and risk needs a redefinition of national and international security, at the same time taking into consideration the alternated role of military tools and the complexity and uncertainty of the strategic environment [23, p. 13]. Subsequently, France ought to take anticipatory steps. The following catalog of five activities hence becomes essential: reconnaissance and anticipation; prevention; nuclear deterrence; defense; intervention using France's entire national potential, in cooperation with other European and international players.

Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency was marked by significant evolution in France's security concept toward closer transatlantic cooperation within the NATO framework. In April 2009, NATO welcomed France back to its military structure (for more see: [27, p. 107–128; 28, pp. 11–13]). A broad legitimization and elaboration of moving France's security approach in the Atlantic direction was included in a report by a former minister of foreign affairs, Hubert Védrine; it was introduced to the president of the Republic in November 2012. This document underlines the significance of the Europeanization of NATO and of the French idea of l'Europe de la défense. In conclusion, the report outlines the French perception of security as follows:

“In all events, France must maintain its own capacity for analyzing, forecasting, proposing and contributing to planning, which inspires its action and its policies within the European Union, within the Alliance and with the other Europeans. Changes in American foreign and defense policies, along with uncertain events in a shifting multi-polar world, make it more necessary and less impossible for Europeans to play a greater role in their own defense, with the expectation that one day they will assume most of the responsibility for it, while remaining allied with the United States. This policy needs to be implemented simultaneously within the European Union, within NATO and within ad hoc groups, using suitable tactics for each case and each organization and with an eye to anticipating events. It is a bold and forthright policy to achieve greater influence within the Alliance, which will facilitate France's European efforts. Naturally, it is critical to maintain a certain level of capability for this policy to succeed” [29, p. 23].

The following official phase in the evolution of the French security vision was France's White Book of Defense and Security of 2013. It mentions five strategic priorities:

- protecting the territory and population of France and assuring the functioning of crucial state functions;
- together ensuring the security of Europe and the North Atlantic area;
- collectively stabilizing the European neighborhood (Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Sahel, Mauretania, the Horn of Africa, and part of Sub-Saharan Africa);
- taking part in stabilizing the Middle East and the countries of the Persian Gulf;
- contributing to world peace.

A particular section of the White Book was dedicated to France's involvement in NATO and the EU. Attention was also drawn to the necessity to make clear the law on self-defense encompassed in art. 51 of the United Nations Charter in regard to cyber attacks or terrorist activities committed by non-state entities from the territory of countries that are too powerless to be able to control such territory [25, p. 32, 47–68].

The Strategic Review 2017 highlighted strategic autonomy as the most crucial target of France's defense policy. This is in line with the opinion of President Macron, who once quoted General de Gaulle saying that "if France goes to war, it has to be its own war" [30]. The document is imbued with a spirit of independence, which is justified as follows: "In an international system where instability and uncertainty prevail, France must preserve its capability to decide and act alone to defend its interests" [26, p. 56]. The Strategic Review declared that France will endeavor to strengthen international security by cooperating with its allies and partners, and will first and foremost engage itself in fortifying European defense within the framework of the EU by extending the CSDP (including both permanent structured cooperation and the European Defence Fund). In addition, as was mentioned in President Macron's speech at the Sorbonne on September 26, 2017 France plans to launch new projects, such as the European Intervention Initiative, with partners that have the needed military capacities as well as political will. This idea integrates close cooperation on the bilateral (mostly with Germany and with the United Kingdom) and the trans-Atlantic (as part of NATO) levels. The North Atlantic Treaty is defined there as an "élément clé de la sécurité européenne"; France proved its support for the Alliance's decisions, taken during the summits in Newport (2014) and in Warsaw (2016), about reinforcing the Alliance's eastern flank and enlarging defense spending to the recommended 2 % of GDP by the end of 2024. The document summons for the support in Europe, within and out of the EU and NATO frameworks, of all encouraging initiatives that would "strengthen strategic convergence among European nations regarding their shared security" [26, p. 56]. Therefore, France aspires to work towards the "increase Europe's strategic autonomy, which requires the development of a common strategic culture" [26, p. 56].

In order to realize its European and global ambitions France should contribute money to repair collective order, together with its allies and partners. This engagement goes first, in the sphere of defense, by Europe, European cooperation bilateral and the transatlantic link. All of the bilateral France's partnerships also commit to the guarantee of shared interests. It was declared that France would act for (a) the construction of a European strategic autonomy, (b) the Industrial and Technological Defense Base (BITD), (c) controlled

technological and industrial cooperation, and (d) preparing for the future of integrating innovation and digital [26, p.66–71].

Essentially, the Strategic Review notes that France as a founding member of NATO and the European Union with a full-spectrum forces model, should have two aims: preserving its strategic autonomy and helping to build a stronger Europe to address the increasing number of common challenges.

In order to reach these target France announces reconstructing its capacities that is maintaining a full-spectrum and balanced armed forces model, including nuclear weapon. This is crucial for France's national independence, strategic autonomy and freedom of action. In a more challenging operating environment, this model must absorb all skills and capabilities needed to accomplish desired military results across the full range of potential threats and engagements, along with the most critical ones. More precisely, it should be able to engage in high-intensity operations on land, at sea, in the air, and to operate in the cyberspace. In addition, French armed forces should be capable of autonomous action with respect to nuclear deterrence, the protection of its territory and approaches, as well as to intelligence, operations command and control, special operations and cyberspace [26, p.78]. The model of a full-spectrum military operations derives from France's possession of particular key capabilities only shared by few powers.

The Strategic Review validated and combined the five strategic functions of the French armed forces, as declared in the White Paper of 2013. Deterrence, protection, recognition and anticipation, intervention, and prevention are estimated as such functions. The document identifies the role of nuclear deterrence in French security policy. It underlines that nuclear deterrence is rigidly defensive and stays the vital element of France's defense strategy. It guards France from any aggression of other country against its essential interests, wherever and whatever form. The deterrence maintains in all conditions France's freedom of action and decision. The use of nuclear weapons would not be imaginable that in extreme circumstances of self-defense, a right cherished in the Charter of the United Nations. As such, deterrence is the greatest guarantee of the security, protection and independence of the country. It commits, through its existence, to the security of the NATO and to that of Europe [26, p.78].

Instead of Conclusion

France's security strategy is multidimensional and includes all issues of security policy, from defense through economics, communications, ecology, society, human rights, and individual security. Consecutive French strategic documents show the interests of state, society and individuals. Generally, it should be underlined that France's security strategy is very extensive; it encompasses both civilian and military aspects. Analogous approach was in Russian security concept of 1997 [31].

The French security strategy considers terrorism as a major threat to security of all segments of French entity. Similarly, the threat of terrorism is recognized in Russia. In the Russian Federation's concept of foreign policy from July 2008, terrorism is placed in the first position among the challenges and threats facing Russia [32]. On the other hand, in the national security strategy of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015, terrorism is mentioned in second place, after the activities of foreign intelligence services, as one of the primary threats to state security as an institution and to Russian society [33]. The

foreign policy concept of the Russia of November 30, 2016 names the intensification of international terrorism one of the “most dangerous realities in the contemporary world” and highlights that the global threat of terrorism had qualitatively started a new chapter with the emergence of the Islamic State and other similar groups [34].

The France’s concept of security brings a wide range of measures and means to eliminate emerging threats, but in the program documents it underlines the significance of military measures. This is indicated, for instance, in names of such documents that usually contain the elements of “defense” and “national security”, while Russia issues separate documents defining the concepts of foreign policy, national security and military doctrine. Nevertheless, in Russian concept since 2009 the military tools have been given the prominent role in assuring Russia’s national security. Therefore, the military doctrine of 2010 and 2014 have gained a confrontational tone [35] that is to facilitate not only Russia’s fuller insurance of its national security — as Moscow considers — but also realization of its policy of changing the international order into a multi-polar system.

The French security strategy is notably extensive and shows France’s ambitions to conduct global policy (mondialisme). In a similar way, Russia develops a wide security strategy, that demonstrates its global goals. Its national security strategy of 2009 added to Russia’s major national interests “the goal of transforming the Russian Federation into a world power” [36]. Russia is attempting to be back to the club of powers, who decide about world affairs. Thus, Moscow underlines the necessity to transform the international order into a poly-centric and cooperative system. In this one can notice second similarity among French and Russian security strategies in promoting multilateralism and usefulness of international law, particularly United Nations Charter. This is how it appears in the doctrine, but whether it is confirmed in practice is a different issue and requires a separate study.

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