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The structure of an individual soul and the problem of “two minds” in the theology of Philo of Alexandria*

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The teaching of Philo the Alexandrian is a system of the regular intersection of theological and psychological lines of reasoning. The crucial point for the Judaic thinker was the rational explanation of religious doctrine. Philo manages to do this using the Stoics' concept of soul and its action in the light of allegoric interpretations of the central points of Genesis, such as the creation of man and the first-fall of the Progenitors. Philo's elaboration on the Stoics' doctrine of the soul reveals the conceptual model of relationship between God and man based on the communication between the mind and the senses within a human soul. Philo finds the universal aspect of the action of an individual mind, whose disposition towards the senses either links it to the universe and God or closes it within itself and becomes a cause of vice. Philo uses the Stoics' distinguishing of an individual mind (*hegemonikon*) and the universal *logos* to state the transitional function of the human mind regarding God and the universe. In terms of the Stoics' concept of the rational nature of impulse, Philo explains man's responsibility for the appearance of evil as well as the reason for seeking the cause of the universe and its place there. Thus, Philo shows the action of an individual soul both in the context of the living processes of the whole universe and in relation to God.

Keywords: mind, reason, soul, sense, individuality, *logos*, Stoicism, governing principle, *hegemonikon*, universe, rational soul, irrational soul.

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Introduction

The crucial point of Philo's theology is a combination of the transcendent character of God, which is immanent to the life of the world. Along with the complete transcendence of God, Philo asserts that in God is found the ontological basis for all creation. To explain this point, Philo interprets the biblical texts using the relevant doctrines of Greek Philosophy. One of these is the Stoic doctrine on the soul, which Philo uses in his model of the relationship between the mind and emotions in the human soul, taken in its attitude towards the Mind of God.

The theme of the soul in Philo's theology is problematic because Philo presents several concepts of soul from Greek Philosophy and it is not easy to understand their precise role in Philo's system. The point is that Philo simultaneously stresses, on the one hand, the opposition of the intelligible and sensual realms and, on the other, their close connection. Regarding Philo's closeness to the vocabulary of Plato, some scholars tend to emphasize in Philo the rational-sensual opposition, concerning the rational and irrational parts of the soul in particular. But, as a result of this, the meaning that Philo gives to the irrational soul becomes incomprehensible. So, Pohlenz finds the discrepancy between Philo's interpretation of Adam and Eve as the mind and sense on the one hand, and the sevenfold division of the soul on the other¹. Wolfson, despite his perfect acquaintance with Philo's legacy, says that he has not clearly understood in Philo what the irrational soul is². Interest in Philo's doctrine on the relationship between the mind and sense has risen amongst more modern scholars, notably D. Winston, D. Robertson, J. Dillon, D. Runia, A. Kamesar and others³. Nevertheless, Philo's model of the soul's action in the context of the transcendent-immanent relationship has not clearly been revealed yet. We find this model in Philo's elaboration of Stoic doctrine on the soul, which he provides through the allegorical interpretation of the texts of the Book of Genesis. We give consideration to Philo's projection of the interaction between the rational and sensual components of a soul, where the Judaic thinker's philosophy closely follows the Stoics' doctrine of the soul, its structure and its action.

¹ Pohlenz M. Die Begründung der abendlandischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa. Hildesheim: Kleine Schriften, 1965. S. 805.

² Wolfson H. A. Philo foundations of religious philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: in 2 vols. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962. P. 387.

³ Winston D. Logos and mystical theology in Philo of Alexandria. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985; Robertson D. Word and meaning in Ancient Alexandria theories of language from Philo to Plotinus. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008; Dillon J. M. The middle Platonists 80 B. C. to A. D. 220. Ithaca; New York: Cornell University Press, 1996; Runia D. T. God and man in Philo of Alexandria // Journal of Theological Studies. 1988. Vol. 39. P. 48–75; Kamesar A. The Logos Endiathetos and the Logos Prophorikos in allegorical interpretation: Philo and the D-Scholion to the Iliad // Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies. 2004. Vol. 44. P. 163–181.

1. The structure of a soul

Philo notices several concepts of the soul. Following Plato, he speaks of the tripartite soul: the rational (λογιστικόν), the irascible (θυμοκόν) and the concupiscent (ἐπιθυμητικόν), assuming their spatial location in man's body⁴. But, drawing also upon other conventional classifications of the faculties of the soul which were common in his time, like Aristotle, he divides this irrational soul into the nutritive (θρεπτικόν) or vital (ζωτικόν) faculty and the sensitive (αἰσθητικόν) faculty⁵. The third is like the Stoics' concept of soul, consisting of the "governing principle" and its seven faculties, namely the five senses, speech, and generation⁶. The third concept differs from the first two by stating the crucial role of the mind in unitary personality in moral and other action. As we will see, it is within the framework of Stoic psychology that Philo's concept of soul can be largely described.

1.1. Two men and two minds

What is the essence of man? On this question, Philo has an answer — a man in the true and full sense is the mind (νοῦς) (Heres. 231)⁷. We will keep our attention on this term. There are places in Philo's works where the term *soul* is applied to man, and it is also an essential characteristic⁸. But, as we will see, for Philo, the term *mind* is more appropriate to man than the term *soul*. That this is so becomes clear by a comparison of the meaning of the notion of *soul* in Plato and Philo.

1.1.1. The irrational and the rational souls

Like Plato, Philo applies the term *soul* to both rational and irrational creatures. The soul, which all animals have is called "irrational" (ἄλογος). It consists of sensation, imagination, and impulse (Immut. 9, 41)⁹. As it has been said, following Plato, Philo divides this irrational soul into two parts, the irascible

⁴ Philo. Leg. All. III, 38, 114; Spec. I, 29, 146–148; Spec. IV, 15, 93. Cf. Plato. Timaeus 69 e — 70 e. — Greek text of Philo's works and English translation is quoted from: Philo: in 8 vols / ed. by G. P. Goold, transl. by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929–1939.

⁵ Wolfson H. A. Philo foundations... Vol. 1. P. 388.

⁶ Opif. 40, 117; Leg. All. I, 4, 11; Deter. 46, 168; Agr. 7, 30; Heres. 48, 232. In Abr. 5, 29. Cf. SVE, II, 823–833.

⁷ Cf. "Man is the most proper title of a mind endowed with reason and articulate utterance (ἄνθρωπος, ἡρθρωμένης καὶ λογικῆς διανοίας οἰκειοτάτη πρόσρησις.)" (Det. 22–23).

⁸ See Immut. 7, 35–9, 45.

⁹ Philo suggests the essence of the irrational soul to be in blood (Deter. 22, 80; Heres. 11, 55; Spec. IV, 23, 123) or breath (πνεῦμα) or the seed (σπέρμα) (Opif. 22, 67). Like the Stoics, he also speaks of it as fire. (Cf. Decal. 25, 134; Wolfson H. A. Philo foundations... Vol. 1. P. 203–204; SVE, II, 77.)

(θυμικόν) and the concupiscent (ἐπιθυμητικόν). The former is located in the chest and the latter in the abdomen¹⁰.

According to both Plato and Philo, along with the irrational part, man's soul also includes the rational part¹¹. Plato suggested its location in the head¹², though it might also be, according to Philo, the heart¹³. However, the spatial location for the rational soul to Philo is arbitrary because, "our mind is indivisible in its nature" (Heres. 48, 232). Plato also describes the rational part of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν)¹⁴ by the term *Logos* (Timaeus 46) or by such equivalent terms as "the immortal soul" (Ibid. 69 d–e) or "the supreme form of soul within us" (Ibid. 90 a). Philo names the rational part of the soul using the term *mind* (νοῦς) (Heres. 55; 231) and by other relevant terms (λόγος, διανοία, ἡγεμονικόν)¹⁵. Both Plato and Philo offer an opposition between the rational and irrational parts of the soul¹⁶ since it belongs to different realms, the intelligible and the sensible. This opposition is described by Philo according to Plato's explanation of the creation of two parts of the soul in *Timaeus*. Like Plato in *Timaeus*, he holds that the rational soul was created by God himself¹⁷. Also following Plato's *Timaeus*, Philo treats the irrational soul together with the body as created not by God himself but rather by His powers. The latter did it by "imitating" (μιμουμέναις) the skill shown by God in forming the rational soul¹⁸. Philo explains this by the fact that God is not responsible for the evil that emerges through sensual nature.

However, there are the differences between Plato's and Philo's concepts of creation of the soul. Wolfson points out one of the important details that marks it:

According to Plato, there was no idea of mind nor any idea of soul; but instead there was a universal mind existing probably from eternity, and a universal soul which was created by God prior to the creation of the world out of three ingredients — the same stuff as the ideas, the stuff of matter, and a mixture of the stuff of ideas and the stuff of matter (Timaeus 34). According to Philo, there are ideas of mind and soul, both of them created by God when he formed the intelligible world on what the Pentateuch calls the first day of creation (Opif. 7, 2)¹⁹.

Taking into account this difference noted by Wolfson, we can appreciate Philo's original view on the nature of the soul. For Plato, an individual soul (both the rational and the irrational) is a part of the universal world-soul, confining

¹⁰ Leg. All. III, 38, 114; Spec. I, 29, 146–148; Spec. IV, 15, 93. Cf. Timaeus 69 e — 70 e.

¹¹ Heres. 55; Leg. All. II, 2; 95; Agr. 7, 30–31; Spec. I, 37, 201.

¹² Spec. IV, 15, 92; cf. Timaeus 69 e; 90.

¹³ Deter. 24, 90; Somn. I, 6, 32. The heart is the place where the Stoics locate the entire soul with all its faculties, for to them, the rational faculties of the soul do not differ in their origin from the irrational faculties.

¹⁴ Republic IV, 439 d.

¹⁵ Philo denotes *mind* by the terms of νοῦς (Heres. 11, 55), λόγος (Det. 83), διανοία (Heres. 231), πνεῦμα (Ibid.). Relating to man's mind only, Philo applies the Stoic term ἡγεμονικόν.

¹⁶ Spec. IV, 15, 92; Virt. 3, 13; cf. Leg. All. I, 22, 70 (λογικόν); III, 38, 115 (λογιστικόν).

¹⁷ Conf. 35, 179; Fug. 13, 69. Cf. Timaeus 69 c.

¹⁸ Fug. 13, 69; cf. Opif. 24, 74–75; Conf. 35, 179. Cf. Timaeus 69 c.

¹⁹ Wolfson H. A. Philo foundations... Vol. 1. P. 390.

within its nature. In contrast, Philo's assertion that there are the ideas of the soul and the mind, tends to separate the mind from the mixed nature of the soul and set it into direct relation with God's Mind or the Logos of God.

This tendency we also find in Philo's further elaboration of the relationship of the Demiurge and the world-soul of *Timaeus*. Plato holds that the Demiurge constructed mind within world-soul and soul within body of the cosmos (Timaeus 30 b). Philo removes this hierarchy to the individual-psychological level: God installs the sovereign Mind in the princely part of man's being and endows the body with a soul (Opif. 48, 139). We see here the conception of man as the microcosm. J. Danielou explains it this way:

In its totality the universe constitutes the Great Cosmos, whose high priest is the Logos. Moreover, a man forms a microcosm whose structure is parallel to that of the universe and whose head is the νοῦς. Man is not a part of the Cosmos. He is the image of the Logos as the Cosmos is the image of the Logos²⁰.

Thus, Plato's doctrine on the world-soul suggests rigid natural frameworks for an individual soul, which implies a significant degree of suppression of the soul's individuality by the universal world-soul. In contrast, Philo stresses the personal communication between an individual mind and God's Logos. He shifts the focus from the ontology of the universe into the psychology of the individual. Because of this, man for Philo is essentially the rational consciousness, the mind.

1.1.2. *The pre-corporeal stage of the creation of man*

Specifics of Philo's approach to man's essence is shown from the further interpretation of the creation of man in the Book of Genesis:

26 And God said, Let us make man after to our image and likeness (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν), and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the flying creatures of heaven, and over the cattle and all the earth, and over all the reptiles that creep on the earth.

27 And God made man, after to the image of God he made him, male and female he made them (Gen. 1:26–27).

Philo finds here the double creation of man. The expression "God made man" (Gen. 1:27) is referred by Philo to "the real man, who is absolutely pure Mind" (πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπου, ὃ δὴ νοῦς ἐστὶ καθαρῶτατος). God is the only Maker of this Man. The words "let us make man..." (Gen. 1:26) Philo treats as a creation of "so-called man" in whom the mind is mixed with sensible nature, "an irrational and rational nature are woven together" (De fuga 69–72). In this "so-called" man, the rational nature (the mind) is made by God, but an irrational

²⁰ *Daniélou J.* Philo of Alexandria. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2014. P. 134. — In the concept of man as the microcosm, Philo's symbolism and allegorism are rooted. As R. V. Svetlov points out, "universe for Philo is not only our dwelling created by God. It is also the totality of signs that require correct reading" (*Svetlov R. V.* Rational theology: The case of Philo of Alexandria // *Issues of Theology*. 2020. Vol. 2, no. 1. P. 70).

nature (or irrational soul) is fashioned by the forces of God. This is explained from the point of theodicy, but also, as we will see, it refers also to the problem of personality. Both these cases, Philo understands as a pre-corporeal stage of the creation of man. The first man is created as a genus in which both male and female are simultaneously present, and individual members are distinguishable only in potency (Opif. 76). The “so-called” man is also created out of corporeality, his mixed nature deals still only with the principles of reason and sensation. Above all, this “man” concludes the principle of individuality.

The “double” creation of man is further explained by Philo in the treatise “Allegorical Interpretation”. The first man is found in the creation of man “after the image of God”, Philo calls him “the heavenly man”, who “was stamped with the image of God”. The second is named the “earthly man”, who is “a moulded work of the Artificer but not His offspring”²¹. Both “men” are actually “minds”. The first one being an “offspring of God”, does not have any “part or lot in corruptible and terrestrial substance”; the second, “was compacted out of the matter scattered here and there, which Moses calls ‘clay’”, or it is mingled with terrestrial substance (Leg. All. I, 31–32, 35). The *earthly mind* is an essential part of an individual human soul, whereas the *heavenly mind* is not included in its structure, but it connects with the *earthly mind*, if a soul is appropriately settled. It is shown in the next Philo’s discourse on the creation of the corporal men.

1.1.3. *The creation of the corporeal man*

These two minds Philo perceives in the structure of the real empirical man whose creation, according to his view, we are told in the second chapter of the Book of Genesis. Consequently, this is the “third” creation of man. It is the “earthly mind”, that becomes “a living soul” (Gen. 2:7). In the biblical words “breathed into his face a breath of life” (Gen. 2:7), Philo finds the “face” as “the dominant element (ἡγεμονικόν) in the body” like “the mind [is] the dominant element (ἡγεμονικόν) of the soul” (Leg. All. I 39). So, the *hegemonikon* remains separate from the other parts of the body, either senses or organs of utterance and of reproduction, but it “inspires” these parts of the soul, being itself “inspired” by God (Ibid. 40). Because of this, the mind-hegemonikon is called “the god of the unreasoning part”. This governing function of the *earthly mind* (reasonable power) over irrational parts of the soul is distinguished from the *heavenly mind* which is independent of the changeable world.

We note the stable Stoics’ terminology in Philo and his accent on the demiurgic function of the lower mind, *hegemonikon*. It forms a real kind of soul, where the roots of good and evil within the soul are found. Philo obviously holds man’s mind (earthly mind) to be “the dwelling-place of vice and virtue” (Opif. 73). Such a mind is endowed with all the characteristics which can be called personality. It is a “personal mind”, that is responsible for virtue and vice. *Personality*

²¹ See also Conf. 35, 179.

is the closest notion in which Stoic *hegemonikon* can be understood²². In Philo, it is a personalization of the mind in the empirical corporeal man.

Now we should consider the theology of Philo as the relationship of two minds in which irrational nature becomes the field of realization of the forces of an individual mind.

1.2. *The relationship between two minds in man*

From the previous reasoning, it can be seen that the two minds are divided by Philo, but this is not a division of two similar substances. Moreover, this is not division as such, but the relationship between two minds in man. Philo clearly speaks about this in his treatise *Who is the Heir* (Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres). Commenting on the verse of Gen. 15:10 “the birds He did not divide”, Philo takes into account two *logoi* or two minds (δύο λόγους). The principle that Philo provides here is a correlation of two *logoi*. Firstly, it is explained in terms of image and similarity: one *logos* is “the archetypal reason above us,” (ἀρχέτυπον <τὸν> ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς) the other, the copy of it which we possess (μίμημα τὸν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχοντα) (Heres. 231). The first one is the “image of God” (εἰκόνα θεοῦ), the second — the cast of that image (τῆς εἰκόνοσ ἐκμαγεῖον) (Ibid.). And thus:

the mind in each of us (καθ’ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν νοῦν), which in the true and full sense is the ‘man,’ is an expression at third hand (τρίτον εἶναι τύπον) from the Maker, while between them is the Reason which serves as model (παράδειγμα) for our reason, but itself is the effigies or presentment (ἀπεικόνισμα) of God²³.

This reasoning of Philo we must strongly distinguish from Platonic speculations. As Wolfson rightly points out, Philo revises the meaning of the Platonic term *image* (εἶκον).

Whereas in Plato the term *image* is used exclusively with reference to things in the visible world; ideas are not *images*, they are *patterns* (paradeigmata). In Philo, indeed, the term *image* is still applied to things in the visible world and ideas as well as the *Logos* are still described by the term *pattern* as well as by the term *archetype* (archetypos), but, unlike Plato, Philo describes the ideas as well as the *Logos* also by the term *image*. God alone, according to him, is to be described only by the terms *pattern* and *archetype* and never by the term *image*. The ideas as well as the *Logos* are indeed *patterns* or *archetypes* with reference to things in the visible world which are modeled after them, but they are only *images* with reference to God who has created them. This is the double aspect of ideas and *Logos*²⁴.

Regarding Wolfson’s explanation, we can clearly see in the quoted passage of *Who is the Heir* a certain hierarchy: God — God’s Mind — the human mind.

²² Rist J. M. Stoic philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. P.25.

²³ Philo. Heres. 231.

²⁴ Wolfson H. A. Philo foundations... Vol. 1. P.238.

The first is the παράδειγμα only, the second — the εἶκον and παράδειγμα, the third — the εἶκον, but not εἶκον only. The latter is shown from the next reasoning:

Our mind (ὁ ἡμέτερος γέγονε νοῦς) is indivisible (ἄτμητος) in its nature. For the irrational part of the soul received a sixfold division from its Maker who thus formed seven parts, sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, voice and reproductive faculty²⁵. But the rational part, which was named mind (νοῦς), He left undivided (ἄσχιστος). In this he followed the analogy of the heaven taken as a whole. For we are told that there the outermost sphere of the fixed stars is kept unsevered, while the inner sphere by a sixfold division produces the seven circles of what we call the wandering stars²⁶. In fact I regard the soul as being in man what the heaven is in the universe (ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ψυχῇ, τοῦτο οὐρανὸς ἐν κόσμῳ). So then the two reasoning and intellectual natures, one in man and the other in the all, prove to be integral and undivided (τὰς νοεράς καὶ λογικάς δύο φύσεις, τὴν τε ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ παντί, συμβέβηκεν ὀλοκλήρους καὶ ἀδιαρέτους εἶναι) and that is why we read “He did not divide the birds”²⁷.

In the quoted passage, Philo’s elaboration on the Stoic’s concept of the soul needs to be noted. It is more usually stated in the form that the soul has eight parts, the hegemonikon being reckoned as one²⁸, but really all irrational parts meant the faculties of forces which are encompassed by *hegemonikon*. Furthermore, Philo utilizes the Stoics’ comparison of the structure of man’s soul with the structure of the world as microcosm and macrocosm, and by this analogy, Philo sets a principle of relationship between two minds or logoi: the Mind of God in the universe and the individual minds of men. Philo makes this distinction in the treatise *De Vita Mosis*, when he speaks of two logoi: *logos ediatheos* and *logos proforikos* and the transcendent-immanent transitional role of God’s Logos and human word (Mos. 2.127). Here Philo compares two relationships: between the divine Logos and the universe and between man’s inner logos (*logos endiatheos*) and spoken logos (*logos proforikos*)²⁹; in the quoted passage, we see a similar model. The presence of God’s Mind in the universe is given as the paradigm of action of the individual mind in a soul. As in *De Vita Mosis* 1.127, man’s inner logos operates with its articular faculty or spoken logos, so in Heres. 232–233 man’s mind deals with the irrational faculties of the soul. And, as the logic of the noted passages says, only the right attitude of man’s logos/mind to its lower faculties makes this individual logos/mind congenial to God’s Mind. Therefore, God’s Mind, taken as the image of God and the Paradigm of man’s mind, does not belong to man, but it is the necessary Link between God and created nature, which was mostly embodied in human beings. The human mind, in turn, is also the link between the uncreated and created natures, but only in its

²⁵ Cf. *De Opif.* 117.

²⁶ Cf. *Timaeus* 36 D and *De Cher.* 22 f.

²⁷ Philo. *Heres.* 232–233.

²⁸ *SVF* II, 827.

²⁹ *Prikhodko M.* Language and laughter in the treatise of Philo of Alexandria “The worse Attacks the Better” // *Schole. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition.* 2021. Vol. 15, no. 2. P. 611–624.

highest state, which it has to reach. This is one of the important problems which Philo investigates in his theology.

We have seen that for Philo, the essence of man is his mind, and the similarity between that mind and the Logos of God, and its link to God as a whole, depends on the attitude of that mind to its irrational soul. Thus, the object of our study should be the relationship between mind and sense within the human soul.

2. The concept of the initial act of soul: impulse and reason

2.1. The Stoic's background

As we have already seen, Philo's doctrine of the soul closely resembles the Stoic's concept of soul. Although Philo uses various relevant concepts of Greek philosophy in his doctrine of the soul, we are convinced that it is the Stoics' doctrine of the soul that shapes Philo's thoughts on this subject. Above all, Philo's and the Stoics' views on the mind as the centre of the human being and on the rational nature of the soul's action are closely intertwined.

We note again, that Stoics spoke of the "governing-principle" (*hegemonikon*), "the most authoritative part of the soul"³⁰, whose parts, qualities or faculties include: the five senses, the faculties of reproduction, and that of speech (SVF II, 827). One of the functions of the "governing principle" the Stoics called "impulse" (*ὀρμή*), "a movement of the soul towards or away from something" (SVF III, 377). Impulse is a movement which the soul may initiate on receipt of some "impression" (*phantasia*). Together, impression and impulse provide a causal explanation of goal-directed animal movements. Stoics argued that every animal is determined by nature to show just those preferences and aversions which are appropriate to its natural constitution (SVF III, 178–188). It is called "well-disposition towards itself" (*oikeiosis*)³¹. This position of the animal being determines its relationship to the environment³². Stoics also described the impulse of the governing-principle as an act of "assent". To assent to a sense-impression is to take note of a message and to identify its source. Hence assent is a necessary condition of impulse (SVF III, 171). So we are not impelled or repelled by things which we fail to recognize as sources of advantage or harm.

In Stoic doctrine, it is important to distinguish the "governing-principle" *hegemonikon* and reason (*logos*). As Rist points out, the *ἡγεμονικόν* in the orthodox Stoicism is something of what we might call the "true self" or personality of each individual human being, or "the root of the personality"³³. But "rationality" is only characteristic of the governing-principle in mature men. Governing-principle initially governs human beings by impulse, that is the principle of self-preservation, but, gradually, as a child becomes adult, the governing-prin-

³⁰ Diogenes Laertius. VII, 159.

³¹ Cicero. *De Finibus* IV, 45. — We use the English translation: *Cicero. On Moral Ends* / transl. by J. Annas, ed. by R. Woolf. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

³² Diogenes Laertius. VII, 85.

³³ *Rist J. M. Stoic philosophy*. P. 25.

ciple is modified fundamentally by the accretion of reason, logos³⁴. In the words of Chrysippus, “reason supervenes as the craftsman (τεχνίτης) of impulse”³⁵. Reason, in the Stoic view, does not destroy those faculties that precede its emergence, but it shapes them and starts to govern the structure of the human soul (nature), having impulse as its faculty. That is why, as Rist notes, the Stoics’ ideal of *apatheia* does not mean a rejection of feelings, but a consolidation of the senses with the *hegemonikon*, which, in turn, unites with the world’s logos³⁶. In reality, the perfect correlation between the *hegemonikon* and its faculties does not exist in a man. Therefore, uncontrolled impulses or passions appear in a soul. That leads to wrongful human acts or to vice.

2.2. *Oikeiosis and the first-fall of the mind*

We have seen that the Stoics put at the core of the impulse of the *hegemonikon* well-disposition towards itself or *oikeiosis*. Within this principle, the dialectical relationship between the particular and universal value is concluded. Realization of the rationality of the Universe or the Logos of the Universe leads to the understanding of the good of the whole as the particular good. It is that which finds in itself the principle of the Universe, or the Logos. Philo uses this concept to reveal the universal meaning of the biblical story of the first-fall of the Progenitors from chapter 3 of the Book of Genesis. In the treatise *On the Cherubim*, Philo interprets this story as the result of the joining of the Mind in us (ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς), which he calls Adam with outward Sense (αἴσθησις), which he calls Eve, “the source of life of all living bodies (Gen. 3:20)” (Cher. 57). Eve-Sense opens to Adam-Mind the vision of the environment or the world. Receiving Sense, the Mind “to some it was attracted, because they work pleasure, from others it was averse because they cause pain” (Cher. 62). Philo emphasizes that sense is a constituent part of a perfect soul and that the Mind without Sense was absolutely blind, incapable and truly powerless (Cher. 58–59). It is God, Who provides the Mind with the perception of material as well as immaterial things (Cher. 60). This sense-perception Philo describes as the “enlightenment of the mind by the flash of the sun’s beam”, or “a blind man suddenly receiving the gift of sight”, who “found thronging on it all things which come into being, heaven, earth, air, water, the vegetable and animal world, their phases, qualities, faculties...” (Cher. 62). That is to say, Philo means sense-perception for the mind to be the highest good and joy.

Nevertheless, the Mind-Adam, enjoying the opportunity to perceive the outer world, decided that all objects which he could perceive by Sense-Eve were “his own possessions” and “all his own invention and handiwork (πάντων ὑπέλαβεν εὔρετην καὶ τεχνίτην³⁷ ἑαυτόν)” (Cher. 57). To Philo, the result of this

³⁴ Long A. A. *Hellenistic philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. P.173.

³⁵ Diogenes Laertius. VII, 86.

³⁶ Rist J. M. *Stoic philosophy*. P.25–26.

³⁷ Cf. Chrysippus: “reason supervenes as the craftsman (τεχνίτης) of impulse” (Diogenes Laertius. VII, 86).

pride of mind is the birth of Cain, whose name means “possession”. So, the fullness of sensual impressions turns out to be “vanity of thought” for the proud mind, which becomes the main evil for a soul (Cher. 57). Thus, Philo finds that the cause of the evil of a soul lies in the position of the human mind, which has received sense-perception, rejected the Mind of the Universe (God’s Mind) and put itself as the cause of all visible and comprehended things.

It is evident that Philo’s description of the first-fall of the Progenitors is written in the Stoic’s vein. On the one hand, it deals with the conceptual frameworks in Philo’s allegoric interpretation of the story of Adam and Eve. He presents the mind and sense as two constituent parts of the human soul, where sense can be regarded as a faculty of the mind. The mind is considered in two manners: as a potentiality that has found its natural realization and as a definite personal rational attitude. The first one corresponds to the Stoics’ *oikeiosis* of the governing-principle: through sense-perception, it receives and rejects impressions according to the principle of well-disposition to itself (Cher. 62), or it acts with impulse. The second case reflects the mature mind, which takes a decision according to free choice.

In this way, Philo uses the Stoics’ model of the soul’s action to demonstrate the wrong acts of men’s minds. Philo expresses the joining of the mind with sense in very similar terms to the Stoics’ development of the “governing principle” from the desire for self-preservation to the rational impulse to be in accordance with the universal nature. Between these two kinds of the “governing principle” of a soul, Philo sets the problem both of the relationship between the divine and humane minds and the fall of the latter. In the words of Chrysippus about the mind as a “craftsman (τεχνίτης) of impulse”, Philo expresses the hubris of the human mind, imagining itself as the cause of all things, claiming all to be “his own invention and handiwork” (εὐρετήν καὶ τεχνίτην) (Cher. 57). So Philo develops the Stoic principle of *oikeiosis*: seeking virtue as something which “belongs to a man” (Cic. Fin. III, 2) in the perspective of seeking God’s Logos by the human mind. As it is shown in the case of the first-fall of the Progenitors, the human mind, assuming sense-perception, was prompted to find its *place* regarding the Creator and creation. This place of the human mind is the understanding of God as the *cause* of all things in the Universe.

Conclusions

Philo follows Stoic psychology and develops its concepts because the models of the soul’s constitution and soul’s action in orthodox Stoicism are most appropriate to his vision of decisive factors of intercommunication between the transcendent and the immanent realms. Philo relates to these factors the rational attitude of personality towards oneself and the environment. This position consists of a definite realization of the mind in its faculties in the sensual sphere. For Philo, this model of the structure and action of soul is similar to the structure of the Universe and the type of God’s presence in the world. That is to say, Philo has found the model of the interrelationship between the individual and the univer-

sal as well as between the created and the divine natures. Such communication concentrates on God's and human minds. Philo's treating of the essence of an individual soul in the stoic term of "governing principle" allows him to find the crucial point of the ascension of created nature to divine status as soon as its degradation. Philo also uses the stoic concept of the soul's impulse to demonstrate the universal meaning of the biblical teaching on the first-fall of Adam and Eve, showing that it is man's mind that is responsible for evil in the world. Thus the problem of the relationship between God and man is twofold: it is a question about the position of man's mind in respect of the Mind of God, and, on the other hand, it is an attitude of man's mind toward the senses.

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Abbreviations

SVF — *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* — The fragments and testimonia of the earlier Stoics by Hans von Arnim

Fin. — *Cicero. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* — Cicero. On the ends of good and evil

Philo's works:

- Agr. — *De Agricultura* — On Husbandry
 Cher. — *De Cherubim* — On the Cherubim
 Congr. — *De congressu eruditionis gratia* — On the Preliminary Studies
 Decal. — *De Decalogo* — On the Decalogue
 De plant. — *De plantatione Noe* — On Noah's Work as a Planter
 De praem. — *De praemiis atque poenis* — On Rewards and Punishments
 Det. — *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* — The Worse attacks the Better
 De fuga. — *De fuga et inventione* — On Flight and Finding
 Heres. — *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* — Who is the Heir
 Immut. — *Quod Deus immutabilis sit* — On the Unchangeableness of God
 Leg. all. — *Legum allegoriae* — Allegorical Interpretation
 Migr. — *De migratione Abrahami* — The Migration of Abraham
 Mos. — *De vita Moysis* — Moses
 Mut. nom. — *De mutatione nominum* — On the Change of Names
 Opif. — *De opificio mundi* — On the Creation
 Somn. — *De somniis* — On Dreams
 Spec. — *De Specialibus Legibus* — On the Special Laws
 Quaest. Ex. — *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Exodum* — Questions and Answers on Exodus
 Virt. — *De Virtutibus* — On the Virtues

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Устройство индивидуальной души и проблема «двух разумов» в теологии Филона Александрийского*

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Учение Филона Александрийского представляет собой систему теологических и психологических линий рассуждений. Решающим моментом для

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иудейского мыслителя становится рациональное объяснение устройства и действия души в свете теологии иудаизма. Филону удается сделать это путем включения психологии стоиков в аллегорическую интерпретацию ключевых событий Книги Бытия, таких как сотворение человека и грехопадение Прародителей. В переработке доктрины стоиков Филон раскрывает концептуальную модель взаимоотношений между Богом и человеком на основе связи разума и чувств, или разумной и неразумной частей человеческой души. Эта модель призвана выявить и объяснить отношение двух разумов: индивидуального ума человека и универсального Логоса Бога, который определенным образом также присутствует в душе индивидуума. Филон выявляет универсальный принцип реализации человеческого разума через чувства, что в конечном счете либо связывает разум со вселенной и с Богом, либо замыкает его в себе и становится причиной порока. В терминах стоической доктрины о рациональной природе импульса Филон объясняет ответственность человека за появление зла, а также перспективу уподобления индивидуального разума его архетипу, Логосу Бога. Таким образом, Филон выстраивает рациональную модель, раскрывающую действие отдельной души как в контексте жизненных процессов универсума, так и в ее собственной сокровенной сфере.

Ключевые слова: разум, чувство, душа, индивидуальность, логос, стоицизм, Филон Александрийский, руководящий принцип, универсум, разумная душа, неразумная душа.

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