

The first-person perspective description error in naturalism*

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In this article, it is shown that in some theories defending the non-reductive nature of the first-person perspective it is possible to find a very inconsistent attitude. Such theories are associated by the author to a so-called moderate naturalism. The article demonstrates the difference between moderate and radical naturalism. Radical naturalism completely abandons the idea of subjectivity as unobservable from a third-person perspective. On the contrary, moderate naturalism defends the irreducibility of subjectivity, but believes subjectivity to be a part of the nature. As a case of moderate naturalism, the article considers the approaches of Lynne Baker and Thomas Metzinger. Exemplifying these approaches to the first-person perspective, it is shown that in the case of certain work strategies focused on the first-person perspective, it is possible that a so-called description error may appear, by which a description error of subjectivity — when it is placed in the world as a part of nature, existing according to its laws — is understood. The logic of this error points to one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's statements about the incorrect placement of the eye in the perspective of the eye view itself. If the first-person perspective is introduced as a point of view (or a point of observation), then its subsequent shift to the observation result area leads to description error. If there is no observation, as well as no viewpoint, we lose the very idea of first-person perspective and actually take the position of radical naturalism.

Keywords: first-person perspective, subjectivity, Lynne Baker, Thomas Metzinger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, naturalism, moderate naturalism, radical naturalism.

Introduction

The problems of a scientific explanation for the whole complex of subject-related ideas are well-known. Qualitative facts cannot be identified as physical facts, but only physical facts are observable and measurable. At the same time, some philosophers of consciousness believe that there are no special problems in the synthesis of the idea of subjectivity with naturalism. Such a position is held by Ned Block, according to whom “phenomenal consciousness is not a secret for science” [1, p. 230]. David Chalmers also noted this at the beginning of his philosophical journey: “Consciousness does not imply deep metaphysical riddles” [2, p. 24]. Interestingly, this position, at least in the case of Chalmers, does not im-

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ply any reductionism in relation to consciousness, but rather the opposite: consciousness should be recognized as something real, while reductionism unnecessarily simplifies the picture of the world. The point is, however, to preserve scientific thinking without denying the existence of consciousness. Thus, despite the fact that modern anti-reductionism has gained a foothold in the analytical philosophy of consciousness, the idea of the compatibility between science and the reality of consciousness is still rarely questioned.

However, a number of thinkers, in particular Lynne Baker and Thomas Metzinger, tend to believe that the problem of the first-person perspective poses a serious challenge to scientific naturalism [3–5]. In this case, however, we are referring to radical (or “hard”, as the authors themselves write) naturalism. Such naturalism is aimed at a comprehensive reduction, namely, an explanation of the diversity of phenomena in terms of natural sciences. Baker and Metzinger themselves do not accept such naturalism, considering it insufficient for the phenomenon of subjectivity explanation. Both of these authors have invested a great deal of effort in preserving and defending the idea of subjectivity. They are not alone in this tradition. It has been discussed the last 30 years in the works of various authors [6–9]. Despite the criticism of reductionism, first-person approach has very good positions and even an extended application [10]. Recently, the problem of self-consciousness has accompanied most of the research on consciousness in general [11].

At the same time, as I will try to show, Baker and Metzinger themselves are not ready to abandon naturalism completely when analyzing subjectivity and adhere to the position, which I will call moderate naturalism, for the sake of convenience. According to the approach that is close to them, the first-person perspective is something irreducible and real, but at the same time it is part of the natural world. Even if qualitative and phenomenal states are unobservable from the third-person perspective, there are no grounds for them to fall into unjustified mysticism and consider them to be manifestations of “immortal souls” [3]. But this also does not make it impossible to place these properties of subjectivity (I-properties) into a single evolutionary development system of all living organisms, and to suppose subjectivity as a graduated property of all living things. A full-fledged transition to the phenomenological rails and the rejection of the naturalistic approach in attempts to preserve the self still remains a problem [12]. The confirmation of this can be found in many sources [13–15].

Baker’s and (partly) Metzinger’s position on the first-person perspective can be used as an example, according to which subjectivity is declared to be irreducible to physical facts but is later placed in the field of natural facts, as a product of evolution and a property of living bodies. Despite the large number of authors whose theories we could use to illustrate the idea of a real essay, I decided to focus mainly on the two well-known names as a working manifestation of my thoughts. Their approaches, in my opinion, seem to be illustrations of moderate naturalism even though, of course, their theories do not limit the approach of moderate naturalism. In the same vein, it was possible to consider in detail the works of David Chalmers, Ned Block, Barry Smith, Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher and others [1; 16–19]. Using only two chosen curious examples of moderate naturalistic theories, I would like to show where they can hide possible epistemological and logical problems. In particular, through the famous Wittgenstein discourse on the “metaphysical subject”, which cannot be placed in the world of facts and explained by them, I will try to show the complexity of the natural interpretation of a first-person perspective [20]. Relying on his philosophical logic, I will pay attention to the fact that the subjectivity that

follows from the order of natural phenomena becomes a very contradictory construction. It will be shown that in some strategies for the preservation of the subject under moderate naturalism, the same mistake is often made, which was pointed out by Wittgenstein, when justifying the impossibility of describing the subject as a part of the world observed.

Naturalism: radical and moderate

First, it is necessary to make a distinction between moderate naturalism and radical naturalism.

Radical naturalism is true if and only if reality is completely devoid of the first-person perspective. This means that reality can be described entirely without using any terms referring to the first-person. If radical naturalism insists on a total absence of the first-person perspective, then how does it do so? The key arguments of radical naturalism are that what is real is either directly observable or indirectly measurable. In addition, what can be given as an object is also real. These three characteristics if combined allow us to create a capacious definition of what is real for a radical naturalist. That is the third-person perspective: what may be observed by different observers and in respect to which there can be an agreement. For example, two observers may agree on what they see is the moon if they point to the same “same” object in the sky¹. If different observers agree on the observation, then the observed is a real object, and the observation itself is made from the third-person perspective.

Within the framework of radical naturalism, only what is observed from the third-person perspective exists. This position is criticized for the fact that there is also an individual experience of the mental state (qualia), which cannot be observed externally by different observers. For example, if someone smells citrus, then his or her experience itself, i. e., how he or she feels, cannot become the experience of another observer. It is possible to study in detail in what condition the human brain is when it experiences the smell of citrus, but his inner experience, accompanying this condition is not identical to the brain states.

The logical argument in favor of the impossibility of addressing private qualitative states directly is the following: if we assume that the condition of a certain recipient experiencing something particular becomes available to the researcher not in the form of brain neural activity data, but in the form of his or her own experience, it will be necessary to admit that this condition has become a private one for the researcher himself, rather than an object open for a comprehensive observation. According to this position, the phenomena of consciousness, such as pain or pleasure, has a “subjective way of being” and “exists only as experienced by the conscious subject” [21, p. 94]. Environmental entities such as stars and trees have an “objective way of being” [22, p. 92]: their presence in the world is presumed to be independent of the presence or absence of any observer endowed with an inner conscious life. Thus, privacy by its very nature cannot be turned into an object, which makes it possible to introduce the so-called unrealizable first-person perspective, the presence of which is reason to challenge the appropriateness of radical naturalism.

In turn, the recognition of the reality of the first-person perspective makes it possible either to choose a philosophical strategy alternative to naturalism, or to take the position

¹ The way in which it may well not be one and the same for different observers is a separate philosophical difficulty.

of so-called *moderate naturalism*. By moderate naturalism, I understand such naturalism, which believes that the first-person perspective is an irreducible property and is absolutely real, but at the same time, it is itself a part of the natural world and is described in terms of biological explanations — evolution, graded presence of different living beings depending on the complexity of their organisms, etc. It is in such naturalism that, in my opinion, the preservation of subjectivity and its placement in the world will be accompanied by a description error.

Subjectivity and the first-person perspective

The idea of “*ontological significance of subjectivity*” [3] is one of the initial steps towards the formation of an error in the subject’s description within the framework of moderate naturalism.

According to this idea, ontological subjectivity refers to subjective phenomena that are ontologically significant. Ontological significance suggests that phenomena should be in ontology “in the full list of what exists” [3, p. 340]. To include a subject in the list of what exists in fact means that the subject is included in the list of objects, because we think of “the list of what exists” as a list of objects. Consequently, consciousness is somehow objectified, bringing us back to the starting point, from which we wanted to discard. The subjective dimension cannot be an object, as it presupposes a comprehensive observation, i. e., a third-person perspective, which is impossible. How is this contradiction eliminated?

First of all, consciousness is declared to be “not an essence”. This solution was offered by Baker, arguing that the first-person perspective is not an essence, but a property — a “*dispositional property*” with numerous manifestations. In other words, it is something potential and always existing like some manifestations. It cannot be found ready-made as an object among other objects. According to Baker, the first-person perspective has two levels: a *rudimentary* one and a *robust* one. Both are abilities or capacities. The rudimentary stage that connects us to the animal world is the ability to be conscious and intentional; the robust stage, that is unique to us, is the ability to conceive of ourselves as ourselves.

A first-person *rudimentary* perspective connects animals that are human beings with other animals. All animals, as well as humans, have some personal point of view from which they perceive and act in the world. A human baby is a human animal: it is born with minimal consciousness and folded intentionality. A human being, as a consciously and intentionally oriented being, emerges when a human body develops to the point of being able to support a rudimentary perspective, unlike other nonhuman organisms. According to Baker, the rudimentary first-person perspective does not depend on language or conceptual abilities. She claims that this perspective is found in many species, perhaps all mammals, and seems to be subject to gradation. Consciousness and intentionality develop, but at what level does this formation begin? One can only wonder. Baker herself writes that since the formation process is a step-by-step evolutionary one, it moves from simpler organisms to more and more complex ones, yet the beginning of this evolutionary ladder can be identified only arbitrarily [3]. As we move up this evolutionary ladder, the rudimentary first-person perspective becomes more detailed and branched out, running through different animal species.

The same idea of consistent distribution of the first-person perspective in the animal world is supported by an evolutionary Darwinian explanation. In particular, following

that Darwinism believed in the existence of a single global system of coherence among all forms of life, the same principle will apply to the first-person perspective distribution. In terms of a biological basis, there is no qualitative gap between, for instance, chimpanzees and humans. Accordingly, as Baker states, there are no rigid qualitative transitions in the first person's perspective either. The first-person perspective as a quality is only quantitatively distributed in nature. Human babies, as well as dogs, cows, horses and other non-language-using mammals also have rudimentary first-person perspectives. Evolutionism recognizes the continuity between human animals and higher animals. Thus, the biological continuity of the animal world is not interrupted.

At the same time, Baker notes that we have to admit that there is no identity between humans and animals. This in turn is due to the fact that although there is no discontinuity in the animal world, the evolution of human beings still leads to an ontological discontinuity. The ontological gap between humans and animals is that a human baby has a *remote capacity* to form a developed first-person perspective. By remote perspective, Baker implies *the so-called second-order capacity, or in other words, a capacity to develop a capacity*. For example, a human child has a remote capacity for playing the violin². It is a question of potential capacities to master this or that skill, i. e., to actually receive some mental experience. Currently, the child does not have a skill to play the violin, but he or she has an innate capacity to form it. When a young child learns to play the violin, he or she has the in-hand capacity to make music. However, perhaps the child may never learn to play the violin, so the remote capacity will never issue an in-hand one.

Since the first-person perspective also has remote and in-hand perspectives, the remote capacity to develop a first-person perspective may also not actually develop an in-hand one and remain only in its potential form. Baker provides an example of a severe case of autism, in which one can talk about a similar situation.

Baker needs these arguments for justification: since subjectivity or a first-person perspective is of a dispositive nature, the difficulty of declaring this perspective as an object once it is placed in the natural world, as presented above, should be eliminated. If subjectivity is not given as something ready, but something we are prone to, it can no longer be considered an object. However, this provision does not completely resolve the questions. Even if we describe first-person perspectives not in terms of complete entities, but in terms of a certain potentiality, the very logic of describing these potentials is taken from the world of objects — in this case from the natural world. In fact, the first-person perspective is described as any other biological process, which also has the character of transition from a potential state to an actual one (from the remote to the current one). Thus, the first-person perspective is equated with any other natural phenomenon. But the

² According to Baker, the uniqueness of people depends on a developed first-person perspective — that is, “to be able to think of oneself without the use of any name, description, or demonstrative; it is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, from the inside, as it were” [3]. Baker's hypothesis is that this perspective has evolved with the language. Perhaps that's why her examples are mostly concerned with linguistic constructions, such as the first-person proposals like “I understand”, “I know”, “I feel”. The presence of such constructions can be seen as proof of the first-person perspective's existence. The presence of the very ability of consciousness not to process “in the dark” [2] firstly, characterizes the perspective's presence, and, secondly, is reflected in linguistic forms as a rule: any creature that is able to think this way possesses a developed first-person perspective. However, from the point of view of traditional phenomenology, this position can be challenged, since the I-experience does not have to fit into conscious linguistic forms, but it has to be present, as a transcendental synthesis, for example, which may precede the language form as well. At the very least, this question can be characterized as a phenomenologically debatable one.

fact that we can apply the metaphor of transition from the remote to the in-hand state says nothing about the essence of the perspective itself, which remains problematic as it still retains uncertainty for the natural sciences.

Baker has other arguments in favor of linking the first-person perspective to natural science data. In particular, she argues that the first-person perspective is connected to empirical verification, as some characteristics that we attribute to the *self* are derived from experience. For example, my self-identification as a human being, as a woman, as a speaker of a certain language — all this is taken from experience. Cartesian attitudes regarding self-authentication of the self and its transcendental origin are not shared by Baker. In particular, one of her arguments is that the linguistic ability, actually constitutive for the instance of the *self*, is formed within the limits of experience. To clarify this opposing view, it would be worthwhile to draw on Kant's famous thesis that "as far as time is concerned, then, no cognition in us precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins" [23, B1]. Of course, no competence, linguistic or any other kind, is formed in isolation from experience and, unlike the naive excesses of Cartesian-type rationalism, it points to the necessity of experience in order to "launch" structures out of experience. The obvious connection between our skills and experience in no way disproves the existence of pre-experimental structures that form this experience.

Concluding, we can note that in Baker's approach, the first indication of the subject's erroneous description can be seen — it not only belongs to the natural world, but also gains empirical properties.

Let us now turn to Metzinger's reasoning and see how he demonstrates that subjectivity can be represented in the world while not being reduced. It should be noted that Metzinger appears to be more cautious when addressing the idea of representation of consciousness in the world. To eliminate possible misunderstandings, he divides conscious experience into two levels — one of experience and the other of realizing it. The first one is available to empirical observation procedures, while the second one is not. He begins with a "transparent phenomenal self-model", which can belong to an animal or any other pre-linguistic being. Metzinger also uses the idea of a certain transition from potential qualities to actual ones. As a result, he says that "A conscious cognitive subject is generated as soon as a globally available representation of the system currently generating or operating on quasi-linguistic, opaque mental representations is integrated into the already existing transparent self-model" [4, p. 395].

Essentially, the first appearance of the self is a part of the opaque self-model, integrated into the previous transparent self-model. For example, this state is in accordance with my experience of a desire to sleep. The second appearance of the self is my awareness of this experience and it is phenomenologically transparent, while the first appearance of the self is opaque. This means that I do not notice my awareness of my desire to sleep while I notice my desire to sleep. What remains mostly invisible to me is the actual experience of awareness. In Metzinger's case, it seems that the transparent part does not fit into the world, while the opaque part (the very desire to sleep) does. It is that my desire to sleep can be found in the form of some kind of neurophysiological experience (i. e., in the form of a neural state in the brain), but my awareness of this experience cannot be recognized on any device. Therefore, in some sense, it does not "fit into the world". Thus, as Metzinger writes: "It seems that we are subjects of experience in the world. But the experience of being a subject of experience remains phenomenal" [4, p. 395]. In fact, this formulation is

close to what I am willing to say in this article: Metzinger's description is more in line with the way the experience of subjectivity should be treated, namely not to try to describe it in terms of empirical data.

Let us take a look at the difficulties of placing subjectivity in the world according to the rights of the phenomenon of nature.

An error of describing the subject as located in the world. Asymmetry of the observable and the unobservable

By an error of description, I mean such a type of description when the formation condition of some observation is described in the same language in which the content of observation is described. It is a matter of mixing languages and ultimately using an irrelevant language. Below, I explain what is understood here and how this error relates to the above-mentioned moderate naturalism theories.

It is easily seen that in their view of the first-person perspective, Baker and Metzinger are trying to combine the traditional naturalism of scientific origin (primarily in the form of Darwin's theory of evolution) with a philosophical understanding of the inner experience of consciousness irreducibility — the so-called first-person perspective. In general, synthetic theories like these two have some naturalistic and non-naturalistic aspects. By their own admission, they are naturalistic because they “do not appeal to intangible souls” [3, p. 329]. However, in my opinion, it is more than that. Such a definition of involvement in naturalism presupposes a kind of new European view of possible dispositions of naturalism and non-naturalism preceding phenomenology and transcendentalism. In my opinion, these theories are naturalistic because the origin of the subject is thought of as a part and a product of nature. According to them, the first-person perspective emerged through the natural selection process, and humanity itself, with its inherent first-person perspective, is as much a part of the natural world as all other animals. Despite the fact that in one of her latest works Baker speaks more clearly about the need for a phenomenological approach to the analysis of the problem of first-person perspective, I will show below the extent to which her approach still retains a naturalistic subtext. As Baker writes: “The first-person perspective may well have evolved through natural selection; we human persons, with our first-person perspectives, are as much a part of the natural world as the dinosaurs. I have no doubt that something is happening in my brain that allows me to have I*thoughts and I have no doubt that our capacity to have I*thoughts is a product of natural selection” [3, p. 339].

As it follows from such formulations, the first-person perspective existence is successfully described in terms and concepts that are relevant to the objects of formalization from the third-person perspective. Natural objects are described by the language of evolution, natural selection, development of biological organisms, etc. However, all these descriptions may not be applicable to the first-person perspective, unless it is really thought as something that is not identical to physical phenomena in the natural world. The simple idea that the very language of nature's description in scientific terms is itself already the result of first-person perspective work, in respect of which it is logically incorrect to take the external position of observation, seems to escape the attention of such theories. It is this systematic and seemingly conscious omission that can be considered a sign of authentic naturalism.

What is wrong with this approach?

Theories protecting the first-person perspective, such as both Metzinger and Baker, seem to begin with a somewhat sensible intuition that the subjective dimension is not reducible to anything physical. However, after this setting, they increasingly shift towards the naturalization of the description, reasoning about consciousness “from the outside”. In particular, it is asserted that animals possess consciousness, it is graded, and it develops in the course of evolution, etc. In Wittgenstein’s terminology, the language of facts is used where it should be meaningless [24]. Most of these statements have no meaning and serve only as a convenient metaphor for some description of consciousness, as long as we need to do it one way or another. But the introduction of consciousness into the world as a part of this world is more like a logical mistake. One of the inherent principles of the first-person perspective is that the description of the world is made from within this perspective, and therefore the subsequent placement of the source of interpretation in the interpretable suffers from some inconsistency.

The first and key argument against such inclusion is that it is impossible to describe what is claimed to be non-physical through the characteristics of the physical. If we recognize that consciousness is irreducible to the physical, then its subsequent description as a product of evolution, as a phenomenon generated by the brain or as a quality inherent in other animals (this can neither be claimed nor denied), is the result of an unjustified application of language taken from the description of other objects. Strictly speaking, we cannot in any way speculate on the nature of consciousness, or on the causes or conditions of its occurrence. The problem of such descriptions is that in their formation we are forced to turn to the language of empirical objects and phenomena, since we have no other concepts and terms at hand. However, as soon as consciousness has been declared a non-empirical object, the applicability of the empirical language of description to it has no sufficient grounds. The application of the empirical language in this case is no more justified than the application of any other metaphysical language, including the spiritualist language that asserts the existence of souls.

The second argument is that if we assume, following Metzinger, that there is a transparent consciousness that can be considered a *conditio sine qua non* of opaque experience, then the transparent, phenomenal consciousness cannot be included in the field of opaque experiences. This phenomenal state will be a condition of the possibility of experience, but in itself it will not be another experience. Equally, it cannot be described as an experience and have the same language applied to it that is applied to experiences.

This principle can be formulated in another way: what is given to us as a result or a consequence of certain conditions of realization cannot include these conditions as a part of data. They cannot be given inside what is given with their help. The experience of consciousness by means of which a certain reality is given is not a part of this reality.

If we now apply this principle even more broadly, namely to the first-person perspective itself, we can say that the first-person experience is an observation condition and does not fall within the range of this observation. It seems that we should keep in mind some epistemic asymmetry of the observable and the unobservable — the first-person perspective cannot be a part of the observed world. Using a metaphor, we may say that the observation forming the picture is not its depicted part.

That is why we do not find subjectivity in the world, nor do we find it among empirical objects. With the help of a subjective perspective, we find the world and all objects in

it, but we do not find this perspective as an object. If we talk about the subject itself in the natural world, it is more likely to be a kind of break or blind spot (we see the neural process as a sequential chain of physical events, but qualia is not a part of this process). The first-person perspective (the subject) is represented in the world not only in terms of “the explanatory gap” [25], but also in ontological terms (as a gap in the middle of the objects of observation).

Thus, if we agree that subjective experience will systematically slip away from descriptions seeking to form a homogeneous field of observation, we risk not being able to create even a moderately naturalistic theory of consciousness.

These considerations do not seem to be taken into account in theories, such as the ones we have considered. The position of both approaches is more like an attempt to declare consciousness as another fundamental law of nature. The key to this position is that nature, as something manifested and consisting of objects and relations between them, can and should contain another object, unique and surprising, the object-consciousness. In doing so, both of the approaches considered attempt to preserve a special autonomy of consciousness, which is irreducible to physics. But this very autonomy, according to said approaches, should be placed in the world — the only and final world of nature.

This is exactly the approach we consider as an example of a description error. This position is similar to Wittgenstein’s famous thesis about the nonpresence of the subject of observation in the observed world: “5.633. Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye” [24, p. 75].

The most important thing in this statement is the problematic application of the same descriptive language to the first-person perspective, which we use to describe the objects of nature, namely, evolution, brain-generated, graduality, inherent in living beings, etc. One cannot take an observation position and expect to find it in the observation field concurrently. At the same time, the unobserved makes itself possible to observe, but it must remain structurally unobservable — any attempt to make it observable (objectivized) leads to metalanguage paradoxes. The non-observability arises because this place is occupied by the observer and cannot be “transferred” to the picture.

In fact, this very moment of non-observability can be interpreted as an actual presence of the observer — the subject of observation, since the subject-observer can be found when the picture of the description is incomplete. In this case, we can really witness the I-perspective presence (however always indirectly, namely by the traces of its nonpresence in the picture). The self-perspective is a perspective from which one looks, but which one cannot see. This is the most essential definition of the self-perspective. The subjectivity of the self-perspective lies not only in the privacy and qualitiveness of its states, but also in its very location. It is not important for the observer whether the content of his or her perception is physical or non-physical, but how the observer himself or herself is located in relation to this perception. Equally insignificant is its physical embodiment because even if it is executed, it will not be a part of the observation. To be a subject means not to be placed in the observable.

However, according to the approaches considered, the subject should become a part of the natural world, i. e., become homogeneous to everything observed. The service provided to the subject by projects such as these comes down to the idea of preserving the

subject in the world. The subject cannot be expelled from it, nor can it be declared a ghost or fiction. However, if the subject does not fit into the natural world, this does not mean that it is declared a ghost. Wittgenstein's thesis used above means refraining from any affirmative judgments or descriptions of the subject. The subject is not inside the world, but on its border — it is a condition of the possibility of the world, not its ingredient. Therefore, in fact, the first-person perspective should be transcendental, not belonging to the world of things, nature and any other naturalized objects. This is why we do not find a first-person perspective in the world, among objects. Through this perspective, or “self-consciousness”, we find the world and all objects in it, but we do not find the “self-consciousness” as an object; what allows us to grasp, cannot be grasped itself.

Nevertheless, the idea that “we human persons, with our first-person perspectives, are as much a part of the observable world” [3, p. 338] seems to be “kneaded” with the description error. The world, as a certain way of conceptualization, appears by virtue of our consciousness. To search for the consciousness itself inside the world means to make a trivial logical mistake of substituting the cause with the consequence. The theories discussed above affirm the reality of the first-person perspective, but paradoxically, they do not say anything about who has the perspective, since he, who has it, is not a part of the observed world.

In conclusion, let us pose the following question. Does identifying the error of including the subject in the world mean implicit acceptance of idealism? What is the philosophical alternative to this mistake? At the beginning of this article, we stated that Baker explicitly claims to be unready to accept the existence of immaterial substances — souls. If we assert that subjects are not part of the world, does this mean that we automatically accept the substantial existence of souls? Of course, this is not the case. From the classical stance of philosophy, we know that a more mature alternative to naturalism is not idealism in its metaphysical execution, but transcendentalism according to which notions such as the subject should be placed neither inside nor outside the world. In fact, any statements about constructs that participate in the organization of these statements are logically incorrect. Therefore, the alternative to this position is transcendentalism, a kind of which (apart from the classical Kantian one) we adhere to for the approach used in this article, namely the Wittgensteinian approach.

Conclusion

The article has attempted to show that moderate naturalism theories, such as Baker's and Metzinger's, occupy a rather complicated position and they are not devoid of controversies. On the one hand, the theories argue that science (at least as it is today) cannot be the final word about the existent. This kind of naturalism protects the first-person perspective, as a real one. On the other hand, the philosophers of this direction, while rejecting naturalism as an all-encompassing commitment to the methods of natural sciences, try to retain naturalistic theories to justify the presence of subjectivity in the world. In pursuing this goal, they seek to describe subjectivity as something that, despite its extraempirical character, lives by the laws of empiricism. Subjectivity may be a part of evolution, belong to different living beings, and be graduated depending on the complexity of the organism. It can be preserved at the level of the organism in a potential “rudimentary” form and then manifest in the actual “current” form.

The combination of these two provisions results in a contradictory impression. If one thinks about the accuracy of such descriptions, one can spot an error of two levels (or languages) overlapping. There is a description error, which is that the same descriptive language applied to the empirical objects, is also applied to the first-person perspective. However, assuming that the first-person perspective is not identical to these objects, the use of the language appears arbitrary. As I have suggested, if the first-person perspective is an observing condition or an observation point itself (which is how the first-person perspective is usually defined — as a viewpoint), then placing it in the observed will lock inside of itself a hidden inconsistency. In addition, if we assume that the first-person perspective, as in Metzinger's theory, can appear (in Metzinger's theory — at one of the levels) as a condition of certain states (for example, specific experiences), then placing it in the field of action of these experiences themselves is wrong. As I have proposed, if the first-person perspective is an observing condition or an observation point itself (which is how the first-person perspective is usually defined — as a viewpoint), then placing it in the observed will hide an inconsistency inside of itself. This inconsistency will represent an attempt to apply the attributes and properties that we find in the world as the observed, to the condition of observation. In effect, it would mean that the first-person perspective is lost or dissolved in the observed, and in our case, therefore, in the empirical or observable. The latter, in fact, will result in the reduction of subjectivity. From the above it may be concluded that moderate naturalism is extremely difficult to execute, as it seeks to transform into a radical one.

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Ошибка описания перспективы от первого лица в натурализме*

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В статье показано, что некоторые теории, защищающие нередуцируемый характер перспективы от первого лица, далеко не всегда демонстрируют последовательное отношение к этой перспективе. Подобные теории автор связывает с так называемым умеренным натурализмом. В статье демонстрируется разница между умеренным и радикальным натурализмом. Радикальный натурализм полностью отказывается от идеи субъективности как ненаблюдаемой с точки зрения третьего лица. Умеренный натурализм же, напротив, защищает несводимость субъективности и считает субъективность частью природы. В качестве примера умеренного натурализма в статье рассматриваются подходы Линн Бейкер и Томаса Метцингера. Используя их подходы к перспективе от первого лица в качестве примера, показано, что при определенных стратегиях работы, ориентированных на перспективу от первого лица, возможно появление так называемой ошибки описания, под которой понимается ошибка описания субъективности, когда она находится в мире, как часть природы, по законам которой она существует. Логика этой ошибки рассмотрена на основе утверждения Людвига Витгенштейна о не-

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правильном расположении глаза в перспективе самого взгляда. Если перспектива от первого лица вводится в качестве точки зрения (или точки наблюдения), то ее последующий сдвиг в область результатов наблюдения приводит к ошибке описания. Если же никакого наблюдения нет, как нет и самой точки зрения, то мы лишаемся самой идеи перспективы от первого лица и фактически занимаем позицию радикального натурализма. Следовательно, позицию умеренного натурализма крайне сложно реализовать, так как она стремится перейти в радикальную форму.

Ключевые слова: перспектива от первого лица, субъективность, Л. Бейкер, Т. Метцингер, Л. Витгенштейн, натурализм, умеренный натурализм, радикальный натурализм.

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