

“Honeymoon” of the Russian Empire and the United States during WWI*

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The article focuses on the debatable issues of Russian-American relations from 1914 until the fall of Tsarism, such as the degree of the two countries’ rapprochement, ethnic questions, the positive dynamics of mutual images and the intensified process of Russians and Americans studying each other. Based on primary and secondary sources, this work intends to emphasize that the conflict element in bilateral relations did not hamper cooperation between the two states. The author’s multipronged and interdisciplinary approach allowed her to conclude that the United States was ready to engage in wide-ranging interaction with the Russian Empire regardless of their ideological differences. From the author’s point of view, it was the pragmatic agenda that aided the states’ mutual interest in destroying the stereotypes of their counterpart and stimulated Russian Studies in the US and American Studies in Russia. Therefore, the “honeymoon” between the two states had started long before the 1917 February Revolution. However, Wilson strove to turn Russia not so much into an object of US’ “dollar diplomacy”, but into a destination of its “crusade” for democracy. The collapse of the monarchy provided an additional impetus for liberal internationalism by integrating the Russian “Other” into US foreign policy. Ultimately, an ideological (value-based) approach emerged as a stable trend in structuring America’s attitude toward Russia (be it the Soviet Union or post-Soviet Russia).

Keywords: the Russian Empire — US relations, WWI, Russian-American rapprochement, mutual images.

Introduction

The history of relations between the Russian Empire and the United States during World War I has usually been researched in conjunction with the February Revolution since the ascendant cooperation peaked in spring of 1917.

Benson Grayson’s book [1] remains the only specialized study of Russia — US relations in the years of the US’ neutrality; he confines himself to diplomatic relations and bases his exploration on the well-known State Department records and ambassadorial memoirs. This monograph contributed little to understanding the logic and dynamics of bilateral relations as they have been represented in the books of William Williams and John Gaddis. Williams, a New Left historian, was a proponent of economic determinism in his *American-Russian Relations 1784–1947* [2], although his book *The Tragedy of*

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American Diplomacy emphasized the important of a Weltanschauung that included cultural and religious dimensions and could not be reduced to economic ambitions [3]. In his turn, Gaddis, who was close to realism in the 1970s, placed particular emphasis on inter-governmental interactions viewed through the prism of interests and ideologies in the foreign policy of both states [4]¹. Additionally, books by Soviet historians Rafail Ganelin and Vyacheslav Lebedev offer higher-quality analyses and a wider source base, although Grayson's book is less tendentious. In the meantime, Soviet historiography stressed trade and economic relations as well as conflict areas in Russia — US relations [5; 6].

At the turn of the 21st century, studies of Russia — US relations were given a new impetus largely by Norman Saul's fundamental monograph. Using Russian and American primary sources, the book's first two chapters present an original and multi-faceted analysis of interactions between the Russian Empire and the US [7, p. 1–102]. The same descriptions cannot be applied to Vyacheslav Shatsillo's work that substantially bases on well-known primary and secondary sources and combines old interpretational patterns with the contemporary propaganda discourse [8]. The most recent books also include Dale Rielage's study where he demonstrates that late Imperial Russia failed to make full use of the American market for its military needs. Rielage fits the issue of military supplies from overseas producers into a larger context of interactions between the Tsarist bureaucracy and civil society to confirm the argument that "neither group could effectively guide Russia through the challenges of the new century" [9, p. 4].

Even though new studies continue to appear, debatable issues remain, including the degree of the two countries' rapprochement in 1914 — early 1917²; the special significance of ethnic questions that cannot be reduced to the "Jewish" question alone; the positive dynamics of images, and the intensified process of Russians and Americans studying each other. This article will focus on these aspects as it intends to emphasize that the conflict element in Russian-American relations did not hamper the two states' rapprochement that started two years before the February Revolution.

Conflict context of bilateral relations

World War I (1914–1918) was caused by clashing geopolitical and economic interests, unresolved colonial disputes, and nationalistic ambitions. The emergence of two military political blocs, the Entente and the Central Powers, as well as the arms race speeded up the start of the global conflict, although historians continue to debate the proportion of regularities and incidents in the process.

Despite its dynastic and economic ties with Germany, the Russian Empire found itself in the same camp as liberal western states, Great Britain and France. This development was owing to contradictions with the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans, allied relations with France, and settlement of colonial disputes with Great Britain, while the latter two states viewed the German Empire as their principal adversary³.

¹ The first edition of his book *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States* was published in 1978. After the 1970s Gaddis became "post-revisionist".

² The post-Soviet historiography continued to insist that conflict areas were dominant and the negative dynamics of images subsisted. See, for example [10, p. 140–144].

³ Among the most recent important works see: [11].

On the eve of the war, President Woodrow Wilson's views of Russia centered on the tension between humanitarian ideals and economic interests and in 1911, he contributed to the campaign for abrogation of the Russian-American commercial treaty of 1832, defending American ideas of religious freedom and civil equality [12, p. 26–29; 13, p. 879–912].

After Wilson was elected US President in 1912, it became clear that Russia was not among foreign political priorities of the Wilson Administration whose first steps concerning Russia were its protracted attempts to appoint a new US ambassador to Russia. It took 16 months, to the displeasure of the government of Nicholas II⁴. In May 1914, citing family reasons, Russophile Charles Crane declined Wilson's offer of the post [14, p. 106–110]. The next attempt failed as well, so the new ambassador was appointed only in May. It was George Marye, a businessman from San Francisco, who arrived in Russia only in October 1914, when World War I was already underway.

Wilson's liberal idealism and the amateurish nature of the US foreign policy regularly prompted caustic remarks from George Bakhmetev, Russia's Ambassador to the US. However, with his typical pragmatism, he wrote to Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "these are only secondary phenomena and despite these developments, the US with its tremendous and steadily increasing natural wealth... will remain a major factor that is but a short distance away from us in the east and with whom we can at any time develop common and important interests" [15, p. 397].

Following the outbreak of military hostilities in Europe, the US proclaimed its neutrality and initially interacted with both blocs. Wilson, who took control of America's foreign policy, and Edward House, his personal advisor and political consultant usually called Colonel House (even though he did not hold the military rank), were wary both of Germany emerging victorious and of Russia establishing its hegemony in Europe should the Entente win. Later, there were concerns about the possibility of a separate Russian-German peace treaty and of an anti-democratic Germany-Russia-Japan alliance emerging [16, p. 432, 316, 459, 184; 4, p. 54; 17, 133–154].

St. Petersburg, renamed Petrograd in August 1914 owing to the anti-German campaign, viewed the US neutrality as Germanophilism and as a desire to profit from the war. Additionally, Washington agreed to represent German and Austro-Hungarian interests in the Russian Empire and to handle the issue of their prisoners-of-war, thereby bolstering Russia's perception of America's German sympathies. The timing of the new ambassador's arrival also appeared suspicious as he was installed in the office two years after the resignation of the former one and exactly at the time when Germany and Austro-Hungary asked that the US represent their interests [18, p. 17–18]. On August 3, 1914, Washington instructed the US Embassy in the Russian Empire to act on behalf of the Central Powers, although Chargé d'Affaires Charles Wilson advised the Department of State against this course of action [19, p. 26–27].

The wave of anti-German sentiments resulted in persecution and public ostracism of the Singer Sewing Machine Company; it was accused of espionage since it was associated with Germany and employed many Germans. Its offices and shops were attacked and shut down, and the government temporarily took control of its factory in Podolsk due to the charges of harboring German spies. The company suffered serious losses and, in order

⁴ Novoe Vremya, (1914), January 14/27.

to improve the corporate image, some of its facilities switched to military production [7, p. 12–14].

The Imperial Court and the government were particularly displeased with Wilson's mediation policy which he had been viewing as special mission of the US since the start of the war. The first attempts at mediation undertaken by the Department of State on direct instructions from the President in September 1914 prompted both confusion and annoyance in the capitals of the warring states. Colonel House's European tours of 1915–1916 produced no results, yet they helped monitor the proposals of Europe's most astute politicians that Wilson took into account in his project for a new system of international relations. Incidentally, House never got as far as the Russian Empire, and not only due to his state of health, but because neither the president, nor his advisor viewed Russia as a partner in the talks on the outline of the new world order. Moreover, House found it difficult to shed his view of Germany as a buffer protecting Europe from the Russian threat [17, p. 155–182].

By 1916, Wilson had fully developed the notion that international relations had to be restructured to be based on a “new diplomacy” that would be open and respectful of sovereign rights of all nations. Hence his note sent to the warring states on December 18, 1916 suggesting that they proclaim their goals in the war; and hence his address to the US Congress on January 22, 1917 suggesting “peace without victory.” Wilson thereby transitioned from secret mediation to public diplomacy.

George Bakhmetev, who called Wilson the “Self-Proclaimed President of the Universe” and a “new Don Quixote” meddling in others' affairs, nonetheless called Petrograd to give a sympathetic response since Russia was interested in American loans and military supplies⁵ [15, p. 645]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Imperial Court, and the government press viewed Wilson's messianic peacemaking as an insult and as Germanophilism, because his initiatives supposed that both warring blocs had identical interests [20, p. 84–87].

Even the liberal Russian press condemned Wilson's attempts to stop the war without the Entente's victory. Pavel Milyukov, the leader of the the *Kadets* (the Constitutional Democratic party), stressed that while the principles laid down by the US President could serve as a foundation for future peace negotiations, “peace without victory” was out of the question. In his turn, the progressive nationalist Vasily Shulgin welcomed the US desire for democratic peace without annexations and contributions, yet said that talks “can only begin after the Allies' decisive victory”⁶. The *Kadets* did not criticize Wilson for the neutral US stance, although they were interested in seeing Americans on the side of the Entente⁷, while progressivists explained the US policy as a desire to profit as much as possible through military supplies and to weaken both Germany and Great Britain as America's principal economic competitors⁸.

Conflict in Russia — US relations stemmed from three ethnic questions: the “*Slavic*,” the “*Polish*,” and the “*Jewish*” ones. The first two proved to be directly related to Wilson's

⁵ Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoy Imperii (AVPRI), Fond (F). 133. Kantselyariia MID, Opis' (Op), 470, Delo (D). 62, List (L). 2.

⁶ Utro Rossii, (1917), January 11.

⁷ Rech', (1914), November 6/19; (1915) January 9/22, March 15; (1916), November 1; Russkaya Mysl', (1916), No. 9.

⁸ Vestnik Evropy, (1915), No. 7–8, p. 273, 30; Utro Rossii, (1915), August 22, October 11; (1916), May 24; (1917), January 25.

vision of the post-war world order that, in his opinion, would be impossible without putting into practice the “national self-determination” principle and the latter was linked to a long-standing ideological conflict⁹.

Starting with the first years of the war, the Tsarist government following its Pan-Slavic program strove to counteract German and Austro-Hungarian propaganda among the Slavic population in the US. The stance of America’s Czechs, Slovaks, and Southern Slavs was important for the Russian Empire, since Washington conducted a two-edged policy. On the one hand, the US attempted to drive a wedge between Austro-Hungary and its German ally; on the other hand, to stimulate democratic reforms in Austro-Hungary itself giving account to every people’s right to choose the form of sovereignty best suited for it. This policy brought Wilson the votes of the immigrant community in the US at the 1912 and 1916 elections. His stance on the issue of Austrian Slavs’ future, first, created a precedent of interfering into domestic ethnic policies, and second, it delivered a blow to the Slavic geopolitical programs of both the Tsarist and the Provisional Governments geared toward preserving the territorial integrity of multi-ethnic Russia as a guarantee of its political power [22, p. 41, 49, 84; 23, p. 12–17; 24, p. 56–114].

Anthony Volf, the Russian consul in Chicago, played an exceptionally important role in collecting and collating information on the Slavic movement in America since his place of service was the largest center of Slavic immigration and home to the majority of their leading organizations. Volf was supported by the military agent Colonel Nikolay Goleevsky and advocated establishing a pro-Russian Slavic Alliance in the US; Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported Volf over the opposition of Ambassador George Bakhmetev who deemed support for Slavs a useless and risky venture¹⁰ [15, p. 319–321, 324–328, 330, 338–340]. In his turn, N. N. Kratirov, an Embassy staffer and author of the “Slavs in America” analytical memo, stressed Slavs’ real contribution to unmasking the actions of Austria’s Ambassador Konstantin Theodor von Dumba and Germany’s Ambassador Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff¹¹. On the whole, Russia missed an opportunity to put Czechoslovak organizations across the Atlantic under her control.

The war advanced the internalization of the “*Polish question*.” This process had several principal stages: Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich’s manifesto of August 2/15, 1915 whereby creating a united, free, autonomous Poland was proclaimed to be one of the goals of the war; the Central Powers’ Manifesto of November 5, 1916 proclaiming the establishment of an independent Poland in Russian lands occupied by Austro-Hungary and Germany; the Provisional Government recognizing the independence of Poland as a state in a “free military alliance with Russia”; western allies’ statements of a united and independent Poland. Of special significance here were Wilson’s address to the Senate of January 22, 1917 calling for “peace without victory” and his subsequent Fourteen Points speech, since both of them moved the “Polish question” to the level of high diplomacy [25, p. 105–130].

While the government of Nicholas II conceived of this question as part of the ethnic and religious problem of Russia’s political development, for Wilson, this question became a way of implementing the idea that the US had a special mission to protect smaller European nations’ rights to national self-determination [26, p. 367, 404–406, 414, 421–422, 29–30, 72,

⁹ See about it in details: [21, p. 215–243].

¹⁰ AVPRI, F. 170. Posol’stvo v Vashingtone, Op. 512/I, D. 393, L. 12, 51; D. 401, L. 2–7; D. 417, L. 2–9; F. 135. Osobyi politotdel, Op. 474, D. 352, L. 53, 57; D. 343, L. 34–38, 59 ob.–64.

¹¹ AVPRI, F. 135, Osobyi politotdel, Op. 474, D. 364, L. 1–84.

79–81, 106, 368–371, 396–397, 432–433]. In a memo written in early 1917, Ivan Korostovets, a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Council and an experienced diplomat who had accompanied Sergei Witte to Portsmouth in 1905, pointed out that the differences between Petrograd and Washington in interpreting the "Polish question" constituted one of the principal obstacles in the way of the mutual rapprochement [15, p. 648]. In their turn, leaders of the Polish community in the US had real influence on Wilson and House's stance in the "Polish question" [24, p. 122–130]. The four million people in the Polish diaspora itself were split into pro-German and pro-Russian camps and contributed to shaping the public opinion in the US, thus boosting America's role as a defender of Polish interests.

The US policy in the "Polish," "South Slavic," and "Czechoslovakian" questions was transformed into a mechanism for implementing the principles of the Wilsonian diplomacy and resulted in a clash between two messianisms, the Russian one based on ethnic and religious principles and the ideas of pan-Slavism, and the American one geared toward disseminating democratic ideals. This clash did nothing to improve the bilateral relations. At the same time, the sentiments among Slavic communities in the United States were a fairly stark illustration of the Russian Empire's declining influence among Slavs.

The "*Jewish question*" remained a stumbling block, although the war made adjustments to it as well, shifting emphases and adding important nuances. German propaganda in the US used the stories of the "horrors of Jewish pogroms and rioting" in the war-ravaged Poland as its trump card. The tone was set by *The Day*, a newspaper published in New York and edited by Herman Bernstein, an Austrian Jew and a former secretary of the American Jewish Committee. He acted in close contact with Germany's Ambassador von Bernstorff and expressed the interests of German Americans, particularly Jews [15, p. 307–308]. In January-February, the media disseminated von Bernstorff's letter to Bernstein. The letter reported major pogroms in 215 towns and cities of Russian Poland and outrages perpetrated by Russian soldiers. This information was accompanied by letters from victims of violence in Warsaw, Kibarty (in today's Lithuania), and Brody (in today's Ukraine) [26].

At the start of the war, there were, indeed, anti-Jewish riots in Poland, and anti-Semitic sentiments among Russians were on the rise as well, although information about large-scale pogroms was an open provocation. The Jewish population was forcibly evacuated from war-struck areas, which resulted in their mass arrival into Warsaw and other Polish cities. These developments, in turn, prompted resentment of Russians and Poles that translated into violence. The overcrowded Jewish ghetto in Warsaw also became a temporary refuge for those American Jews who had traveled to Russia in summer to visit their relatives. Later, they were allowed to return home [7, p. 10–11, 38–39].

The "Jewish question" was now spurred on by refugees' stories and continued to negatively affect the bilateral relations and the perception of Russia in the United States. M. V. Rutkovsky, an agent of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, stressed that practically minded Americans considered it abnormal to prohibit freedom of movement beyond the pale of settlement¹² [15, p. 308–310].

The persistent difference in stances made it impossible to conclude a new Russian-American commercial treaty to replace the denounced one even though both parties wanted to do it and deliveries of American goods were increasing. Both George Marey and David Francis failed in this task, even though both viewed concluding the agreement

¹² AVPRI, F. 134, Arkhiv "Voyna", Op. 473, D. 42, L. 234–236.

as their principal objective¹³ [18, p. 40; 27, p. 13–16, 18–19, 28–30, 49–50]. On the one hand, the Russian government held fast to its position in the “passport conflict.” Without being able to protect the passports of Jewish American citizens, the Department of State, accordingly, rather quickly abandoned its attempts to negotiate a commercial treaty being justifiably concerned about the prospects of having this treaty ratified by the Senate. On the other hand, this issue was no longer quite as urgent with the military hostilities going on, since Russia — US economic and trade relations were developing successfully without a treaty. Russia’s exports into the US fell, while imports from the US were exclusively within the purview of governmental agencies. *Modi vivendi* and short-term agreements served as alternatives to a new treaty [5, p. 27–28; 7, p. 17, 64, 73; 1, p. 48, 53–54, 78; 28, p. 22–27].

During World War I, Jewish activists and like-minded non-Jews in the US succeeded in retaining certain influence over public opinion. However, given the two states’ rapprochement and the re-structuring of mutual perceptions, a real opposition emerged in the US to the American-Jewish lobby. Additionally, there were still hopes of Russia’s discriminatory policies being liberalized, inspired by Russian symbolic gestures: Nicholas II accorded a Jewish delegation a favorable reception; the most egregious trials against Jews doing business beyond the pale of settlement were aborted; Russian generals visited synagogues; and Jews were now being given state awards. However, the hopes for more substantial changes were never fulfilled.

Despite tensions over the treatment of ethnic minorities and geopolitical and ideological issues, Russia and the United States developed unprecedented interaction in trade and economy as well as in the humanitarian area.

The wartime cooperation between the Russian Empire and the US

Initially, the outbreak of military hostilities in Europe resulted in a drop in American imports to Russia, since over half of exported goods was delivered via Germany and then re-exported to the Russian Empire. However, the war opened up an opportunity for a large-scale expansion of direct Russia — US trade and financial contacts.

In the Russian Empire, these developments were supported by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Sazonov; in 1914, he pointed out to Chargé d’Affaires Charles Wilson that the US could take Germany’s place on the Russian market. Another supporter was Finance Minister Petr Bark, who started looking for US loans in the very first months of the war. Already in October 1914, acting on Bark’s instructions, Witte visited the US Embassy in Petrograd where he said “in strictest confidence” that the Russian government was interested in his travelling to the US to negotiate a large loan for Russia. Although Washington saw it as an opening for concluding a new commercial treaty, Robert Lansing (at that time still a counselor to the Department of State) stressed that given the US neutrality it could not issue loans to parties at war. Witte soon passed away, and Bark continued, throughout 1915 and 1916, to actively negotiate loans with J.P.Morgan’s Guaranty Trust and the National City Bank in New York. Their representatives traveled to Petrograd and fought each other for control of the “Russian business” [5, p. 10–15, 34–44, 50–80].

In 1915, the *Kadets* in the 4th State Duma, joined by Octobrists from the right wing of Russian liberalism and centrist Progressives, formed the Progressive Bloc. Its members

¹³ New York Time, (1914), July 3.

advocated forming a responsible government that would be able to extricate Russia from a series of military failures, welcomed American investments and railroad construction and banked on an alliance with the US and on its aid. The proponents of an active Russia — US rapprochement in trade and in modernization of Russian economy included the *Octobrist* Alexander Guchkov, the Chairperson of the Central War Industry Committee, the *Kadets* Pavel Milykov and Andrey Shingariev, the progressive Maksim Kovalevsky¹⁴, as well as such statesmen and entrepreneurs as Vladimir Kovalevsky, Deputy Minister of Finance in Witte's cabinet, and Vasily Timiryazev, the Minister of Trade and Industry in 1905–1906 and 1909.

American consuls and journalists called upon their fellow citizens to step up the expansion of goods and capitals across the Atlantic, since, following Germany's withdrawal from the Russian market, it could be taken over not only for the duration of the war, but for good, they hoped¹⁵ [7, p. 14–15]. US entrepreneurs enthusiastically engaged in talks with the emissaries of the Tsarist government discussing possible sales of train cars, weapons, gun powder, military uniforms, sugar, and medical products.

In the first months of the war, various ministries started sending their agents to the US to sign contracts. That is why a Commission was formed at the Embassy in the spring of 1915 with a view to coordinating their activities. As the volume of orders from various ministries increased, the Commission expanded its membership. It acted as an intermediary for placing orders worth 450 million dollars that Russia was paying for without recourse to loans [6, p. 14–24].

In October, the Russian Procurement Committee led by Major General Alexey Sapozhnikov was finally established in New York to make direct purchases in the US. The Committee included emissaries of ministries and *Zemstvos*. Initially, its activities were sharply criticized on both sides of the Atlantic, since military procurement essentially broke down due both to objective reasons, such as the absence of a developed military industry in the US and financial problems, and to subjective matters. The inexperienced Sapozhnikov established ties with American suppliers of dubious reputation who later proved to be swindlers and profiteers; he spent much time socializing, and some members of the Committee used the situation for their own profit [29, p. 29–36].

In July 1916, Sapozhnikov was replaced with Lieutenant General Anatoly Zaliubovsky, who uncovered the principal reasons that impeded the procurement. He believed that the problem on the Russian side was the membership of the Committee that did not have experienced engineers and firearms experts, lawyers to be in charge of the legal aspect of the contracts, and entrepreneurs with a good knowledge of the American market. Additionally, there was a shortage of available ships, and most importantly, regular shipping of orders to Russia had not been set up. The obstacles on the American side consisted in most American factories being technologically unprepared to execute complex and large military orders and in the fact that competing British and French orders were given priority over Russian ones. Zaliubovsky poured significant effort into reorganizing the activities of the Russian Procurement Committee [6, p. 205–209; 15, p. 743–746; 30, p. 8–16, 24–27, 121–127].

¹⁴ *Birzhevye vedomosti*, (1915), December 5/18; *Utro Rossii*, (1915), August 30, November 2, December 2; (1916), May 14, 30; *Golos Moskvy*, (1915), May 23.

¹⁵ *Washington Post*, (1915), March 15; *The Boston Transcript*, (1915), March 1915; *Journal of Commerce*, (1915), March 20.

Financing Russian orders placed in the US and paying for them became a serious problem. In January 1915, the Tsarist government received a loan of 25 million rubles from an American bank group; this loan, however, was not enough to meet Russia's needs. Since September, following the signing of a contract in London, Russian military orders placed in the US were financed with British loans, which made Russia financially dependent on Great Britain and on J. P. Morgan's Guaranty Trust representing Great Britain's interests. In 1915–1917, deliveries for contracts concluded by Morgan in the capacity of the British commercial agent accounted for 44% of all American exports. From November 1916, the Russian Procurement Committee was granted the right to place orders directly, without Morgan's intermediary services [5, p. 19–21, 148].

Intensified Russia — US relations during the war required that the staff of the US Embassy in Russia be renewed and expanded. In January 1916, the decision was made to replace Ambassador George Marye. He was well-liked at the Imperial Court, but Wilson thought him to be too pro-Entente. His replacement had to be a more energetic person capable of taking the Russia — US relations to a new level [31, p. 67, 442, 511]. The President chose the 65-year-old David Francis, a St. Louis newspaper publisher, former mayor of the city, governor of Missouri, and former United States Secretary of the Interior, who was equally unfamiliar with the art of diplomacy and with Russia. However, Wilson liked his extensive experience in both politics and life, his energy, and business acumen and, most importantly, his firm conviction that the US had a special mission in the world. In their turn, American Russophiles in the US and in Petrograd clued him into the state of affairs in Russia. In January-June 1916, new valuable Embassy staffers arrived in Petrograd, such as William Huntington as a commercial attaché, a career foreign service officer Joshua Butler Wright as counselor, and Livingston Phelps as first secretary [7, p. 62–71].

In the spring of 1916, Ambassador Francis, having rightly concluded that J. P. Morgan's Guaranty Trust served the interests of Great Britain, encouraged Samuel McRoberts, the vice president of the National City Bank of New York, to come to Russia. The latter arrived together with the bank's second vice president to agree on a loan and on opening the bank's branch in Russia. In Russia, this plan was promoted by Ivan Korostovets, who was certain that only the American capital was capable of relieving Russia's financial wartime burden and acting as a counterbalance to its financial and economic dependence on Russia's allies [15, p. 218].

Following the talks, the syndicate of New York banks extended to the Tsarist government a credit of 50 million dollars against 150 million rubles deposited in the Imperial Russian Bank. At the same time, an arrangement was finally achieved on opening in January 1917 in Petrograd a branch of the National City Bank with a capital of 50 million dollars. In November 1916, the syndicate sold on the American market Russian state treasury obligations up to the amount of 25 million dollars [5, p. 99–106, 115–116, 127]. In their publications and public speeches, McRoberts and commercial attaché William Huntington stressed that exports of American goods would go hand in hand with building factories and investing in various economic sectors. Following his return to the US, McRoberts launched a media campaign for a “commercial crusade” to the Russian Empire¹⁶ [32, p. 18–81].

¹⁶ Vestnik Russko-Amerikanskoi Torgovoi Palaty (1916), No. 12; No. 8, p. 342, 221.

Despite all the obstacles and Russia's financial dependence on Great Britain, the US succeeded in setting up deliveries of supplies to Russia, including war materials, railroad equipment, medicines, machine tools, and metals. And even though this success took definite efforts and costs. And even though the Tsarist government ultimately failed to make full use of the opportunities afforded by the overseas market, American firms became the principal suppliers of rifles and machine guns, ammunition, powder and explosives, cars and motor bikes for the Tsarist army. Trucks, tanker trucks, and buses were exported solely from the US. After it received additional equipment and materials from overseas, the Singer Sewing Machine Company made an important contribution, too, organizing large-scale production of uniforms and shells at its Podolsk factory. Several production facilities at the International Harvester plant in Liubertsy were also converted for military needs manufacturing grenades [6, p. 164–167, 174–202, 233–237; 7, p. 20–26, 66, 74–75; 8, p. 148–163; 30, p. 28–120].

Between August 1914 and March 1917, the Russian Empire received 233 million dollars in direct American financial aid; additionally, J. P. Morgan's Guaranty Trust extended 1,480 million dollars in loans. Seventy percent of the loans extended to Great Britain and France was used to provide for Russian war supplies [4, p. 52]. Between 1914 and 1916, American exports increased from 27 million dollars to the unprecedented 500 million dollars. Absolute figures show that while lagging behind Great Britain and France in the volume of its trade with the US, Russia was certainly a leader in growth pace. Compared to the pre-war figures, the Russia — US trade grew by 1,157% and it continued to grow after the February Revolution [5, p. 21–22].

The activities of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce established in Moscow back in 1913 made an important contribution to developing trade and economic relations and deepening mutual understanding between the two states [33, p. 233–236]. During the war, the Chamber opened its offices in Petrograd, Kiev, and Tashkent, operated with support from the Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and advocated for a Russia — US business partnership. Since January 1915, it launched its *Bulletin* that often published articles by a Deputy Chairperson of the Chamber, Ivan Ozerov, an economist and a staunch promoter of American capitalist development experience and Russia — US economic rapprochement¹⁷.

In August 1915, Alexander Behr, another Deputy Chairperson of the Chamber, arrived in the US. He held talks on opening a counterpart chamber in the US and on establishing a Russian-American bank. Speaking in New York at the International Trade Conference and calling for the development of relations based on mutual benefit, and not on politics, Behr said, "Russia stands before you not as a petitioner, but as a welcoming hostess opening a door to her innumerable riches" [34, p. 87, 90, 96–97]. Upon his return, he reported American industrialists, merchants, and financiers' tremendous interest in a trade partnership with Russia. And although the bank was never opened, Behr's visit certainly furthered Russia-US trade and economic rapprochement.

The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce under the leadership of Charles Boynton was opened in February 1916 in New York. Boynton was married to a Russian and maintained close ties with the Russophile Melville Stone, the director of Associated Press. The Chamber's membership comprised representatives of the largest US banks, in-

¹⁷ Vestnik Russko-Amerikanskoi Torgovoi Palaty (1915), no. 1, p. 3–5; Russkoe Slovo, (1916), May 25/June 7.

dustrial, and trade corporations; Konstantin Medzykhovskii, the agent of Russia's Ministry of Trade and Industry, became its honorary member. Both chambers were in close contact, although they obeyed the laws of different states, and regularly published articles and reference materials on Russia's and the US' economic development [34, p. 124–134, 142–145, 150–159].

The Society for Promoting Mutual Friendly Relations between Russia and America was founded in Petrograd in 1915 [34, p. 81–85]. The Society was led by Roman Rosen, Russia's former ambassador to the US. Its establishment was spearheaded by its subsequent vice chairperson Nikolay Borodin, a statistician, economist, ichthyologist, and a *Kadet* in his political views. He first visited the US during the 1893 World Fair in Chicago and since then, he became an active proponent of using the American experience in Russia. Between December 1915 and February 1918, the Society, whose founders included many well-known Russian left-wing and centrist liberals, published five issues of *Izvestiia (News-Bulletin)* on the prospects of Russian-American cooperation. For example, in the 1916 September issue, Borodin emphasized “the colossal Russia-America trade turnover which led to increased steamer traffic in the Atlantic” and unprecedented scale of lecture courses and well-informed articles about each other¹⁸.

Bilateral relations were intensifying. Both Washington and Petrograd realized that many problems could be solved only by developing direct business contacts. These contacts were given a new impetus after the February Revolution and the US joining the war in April 1917, when the renewed Russia and the North American republic seemed to find themselves on the same side of the military fight for advancing democracy.

World War I expanded the agenda of the Russia — US interaction by adding *humanitarian issues* [15, p. 790–800; 19, p. 1013, 1019–1023; 28, p. 55–56; 7, p. 36–47; 35, p. 113–118].

Americans participated in philanthropic fundraising for Russian refugees fleeing the near-front areas and for Russian prisoners-of-war in Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey. The money collected through Orthodox Church organizations and at various events, as well as the goods purchased were sent to the Russian Empire, to charities working under the patronage of Empress Dowager Maria Fedorovna and to the Russian Red Cross. The American Red Cross played an important part in raising funds and organizing medical aid; it sent to Russia groups of doctors, nurses, and caregivers supplied with required medical products and hospital equipment. Members of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) acting in close collaboration with the evangelical youth organization Mayak (lighthouse) also aided the wounded.

Mayak was established in Petrograd before the war and led by Franklin Gaylord. John Mott, a proponent of a rapprochement between Russian and American branches of Christianity, also had ideological and organizational influence on the development of the evangelical youth movement in Russia [35, p. 20–21, 43–47].

In winter of 1915–1916, the US started aiding German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war in Russian camps located around Kiev and to the east of Moscow, along the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This matter was agreed on in the personal correspondence between Wilson and Nicholas II. Russia insisted on “full reciprocity.” Therefore the US made an arrangement with Spain that represented the interests of Russian prisoners-of-war in

¹⁸ The News-Bulletin of the Society for Promoting Mutual Friendly Relations between Russia and America, (1916), No. 3, September, p. 2.

Germany and Austro-Hungary for American organizations to provide those POWs with aid identical to that provided to the Central Powers' POWs in Russia.

Americans inspected camps and supplied prisoners with money, medications, and other aid paid for primarily by their own governments. In spring of 1916, the Second Division of the Embassy was formed to distribute aid among German and Austrian prisoners of war. The division was housed in the building of the former Austrian embassy in Petrograd. Initially, it was headed by Edward Devine, a Columbia University professor of social welfare and a philanthropy expert. In the fall, he was replaced by Basil Miles who had formerly been on the Embassy staff during the Russo-Japanese war and consequently had valuable expertise.

The American Red Cross and YMCA actively assisted in handling the humanitarian issues. Since the Second Division's jurisdiction was limited to European Russia and Western Siberia, a special American Red Cross Unit assisted by the YMCA provided medications and clothes to camps in Central and Eastern Siberia. These camps left over since the Russo-Japanese war were notorious for their particularly harsh conditions. The YMCA also aided in distributing governmental charity sent from the US, while the YMCA's War Prisoners' Aid section regularly provided organizational and informational assistance to the Second Division.

Aiding Austrian and German prisoners-of-war was a complicated and delicate activity, especially since many German-speaking social workers made local authorities suspect them of being spies. Americans were helped by the fact that since 1915 they had been providing similar aid to Russian prisoners of war in Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire. The Tsarist government, though, allocated incomparably smaller funds for supporting POWs, which resulted in higher mortality rates. Finally, the US played the key role in selecting among "Austrian" prisoners those Slavs (Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs) who were willing to fight on the side of Russia or their own nations. Thus the war added the humanitarian dimension to the Russia — US cooperation.

Dynamics of mutual representations

During World War I, the interstate agenda featured the question of destroying mutual stereotypes and myths as well as of disseminating knowledge about each other. The Russia — US rapprochement created favorable conditions for the intended developments as it was conducive to expanding *the range of mutual images*. The "Russian message" received a powerful response in the US, as did the "American message" in Russia.

The American journalists and columnists repeatedly said that the US did not know the true Russia. In 1916, Richard Child, a military correspondent, lawyer, and subsequently a diplomat, wrote:

We know so little about Russia and that little we know is so distorted! We know about spies, and secret police, ballets, massacres, exile to Siberia, the Jewish question, bureaucratic graft, and much of what we know is not so. We know a Yellow Russia. Most of our immigrants from Russia are not representative of Russia. They are not even Slavs... More than that, most of the Americans who go to Russia and come back to report are not representative of the United States; they are adventurous journalists seeking to find the sensational mysterious Russia of the moving picture scenario, and adventurous commercial agents who cannot speak the Russian language [36, p. 186–187].

Child called upon his fellow citizens to be more tolerant of the peculiar features of the Russian Empire's development and of such "sore points" as the Jewish question, especially since Americans were interested in taking cooperation with Russia further. Child called upon Russians to abandon their simplified notions of the US as a country of smokestacks and of Americans as a people obsessed with money-making.

Back in June 1915, Alexander Kokhanovsky, the management officer of the Russian consulate in San Francisco, bemoaned the fact that the US had long gotten used to "saying negative things" about Russia [15, p. 613]. However, already by 1916, Joseph Loris-Melikov, the First Secretary of Russia's Embassy in the US, after his travel around the country drew the opposite conclusion. In his substantial memorandum "On a Russia — US Rapprochement" he wrote that Americans had previously affected by stories of cruel Jewish pogroms, about the horrors of exiles to Siberia and of persecutions of Finns, "now are willing to listen to real-life descriptions of Russian valor, our Motherland's spiritual and economic power" [15, p. 620]. Agreeing with Loris-Melikov, Bakhmeteff stated in July 1916 that Russians "have become the focus of Americans' admiration and hopes" [15, p. 632].

Russophiles with ties to the Crane circle were expanding their ranks and were very active in constructing positive perceptions of Russia. They included Samuel Harper who regularly traveled to Russia and studied it with the financial support from Crane; Isabel Hapgood, a renowned translator and popularizer of the Russian culture; Norman Hapgood, an adherent of Wilsonian internationalism, the editor of Collier's and Harper's Weekly (which Crane owned since May 1913); Elizabeth Reynolds, the first Russian instructor at Columbia University, where she worked since 1915. Later she married Norman Hapgood and founded the Russian department in Dartmouth in 1918. There were also many others. For example, Wharton Barker, a businessman from Philadelphia and an old friend of Russia, who continued to publish articles in support of Russia in the local and central press, highlighting contribution to the fight against the German militarism. Barker suggested to Nicholas II and Sergei Sazonov that they use his connections and resources for the good of Russia, and from time to time he acted as an intermediary between various American firms wishing to receive contracts to supply goods and weapons to Russia and the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.¹⁹

These people had different personalities, views, and talents, but they were united in their belief in the great future of the Russian people, in their desire to introduce Americans to the culture and history of Russia, and in their negative attitude to the anti-Russia propaganda of the American-Jewish community. They published many articles in newspapers and magazines, and gave public lectures in universities and clubs. Some, like the liberals Harper and Crane, welcomed the Russian Empire's participation in World War I while believing in the renewed "Milyukov's Russia." Others, like the conservative Isabel Hapgood, "distanced herself from Slavophile critics of westernization and welcomed the anticipated adoption of the Gregorian calendar, which she asserted Americans had hastened" [37, p. 49].

Crane was the most influential among them. He did not seek an official position on the Wilson Administration, but he knew both the President and Colonel House well. Additionally, Crane's son Richard was appointed personal secretary to Robert Lansing. Crane had the key role in Wilson's decision to replace George Marye with David Francis.

¹⁹ Letters of Wharton Barker to Nicolas II and Sergei Sazonov see in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The Wharton Barker Papers, Box 12.

The latter went to Russia in April 1916 accompanied by Harper. Crane covered his travel expenses and had convinced the President that Harper was best suited for the mission since he knew Russia well and had connections in governmental, liberal and revolutionary circles. In Petrograd, Harper introduced Francis to his Russophile friend Frederick Corse, the head of the New York Life Insurance Company in Russia and President of the American club of the city, who was very active in the American colony's charitable work in Petrograd. Francis himself was a member of the board of directors of New York Life where his son was a regional manager. Corse became one of the new ambassador's key advisors [14, p. 128–135].

On the whole, the emphases in the American perceptions of Russian were clearly shifting in 1914–1916 for several reasons [13, p. 998, 1001–1002, 1007–1011; 37, p. 47–50; 7, p. 27–31].

First, the public and political discourse was constructing a new demonic “Other,” the German one that came to replace the Russian “Other.” Instead of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, American cartoons now featured Emperor Wilhelm II in the role of a barbaric soldier with a bloodied saber. Anti-German sentiments had been rising among the American public since the war broke out. The exception was the anti-Entente groups of ethnic Germans, Irish, Poles, and Jews. Two factors influenced the spread of Germanophobia: Germany's barbarian warfare methods regularly covered by the press, and Germany's attitude to the seafaring rights of neutral states, which became clear after the *Lusitania* was sunk on May 7, 1915 [38, p. 231–275].

Second, there was a rising number of articles on Russia's fidelity to its allies despite its military defeats in the first year of the war, on its ability to rise from its knees and deliver crushing blows to the enemy as it did in the Brusilov Offensive in June-September 1916²⁰. American war correspondents, including Stanley Washburn, who had ties to the Crane circle, made a major contribution to the shaping of such an assessment. Their articles were accompanied with photographs and illustrations, and they contributed to creating Russia's positive image in the US and to bolstering mutual fellow-feelings. The journalists did it for professional purposes, in order to maintain good relations with the Russian authorities, thereby being able to supply diverse information to their publications, and due to their sincere impulses and belief in the renewal of the Russian Empire [7, p. 42–50].

Third, the American public was increasingly convinced that the war would be the driver of Russia's liberalization contributing to its transformation into a worthy partner of western powers fighting against the “German barbarity.” Since fall of 1914, George Kennan was inspired by the prospects of the Russian Empire's renewal. He believed that the war had consolidated all of Russia's progressive forces. Kennan even abandoned his pessimistic view of peasants and objected against the opinion voiced by New York's Mayor George McClellan Jr. that Russians' “civilizational code” did not allow them to be counted as a European people. Telling Americans about the internal democratism of the Russian peasants with their common sense and self-government ability, Kennan was assuring them that the war would end in a revolution in the Russian Empire. The question was only whether it could possibly be political and non-violent. And although Kennan's enthusiasm had somewhat wilted by fall of 1915 due to the news that the convocation of the Duma had

²⁰ The Literary Digest (1915), August 14, p. 250–251; (1916), June 24, 1833; July 1, 11; Outlook (1915), February 3, p. 263; The North American Review (1916), April, p. 431–436; Review of Reviews (1915), October, p. 437; (1916), July, p. 56–64.

been postponed, he was not prepared to easily abandon his newly revived faith in creating a free Russia²¹ [39, p. 316–348].

In fall of 1916, Nicholas Butler, the Columbia University President, writing under the penname Cosmos, published a series of articles in *The New York Times*. He depicted Russia as a kind of a bridge between the old East and the new West, a country that was steadily traveling the path of westernization [40, p. 48–53; 41, p. 641–680]. Already in 1914, some American observers heard the “murmuring sound of the building of a new democracy”²².

Americans’ belief in Russia’s speediest transformation was further buttressed by Nicholas II’s decree of August 1914 banning sales of alcohol. In America, the decree was perceived as a symbol of Russians’ awakening from “the spell of alcoholism,” since drinking had been seen as one of the main causes of the backwardness of the Russian Empire [42, p. 102–104]. The American press dubbed this decree “a true miracle” and ranked it on par with reforms of Peter I and Alexander II. Isabel Hapgood stressed that this reform was inspired by the US with its temperance movement. Characteristically, in Russia itself, the reform’s supporters among westernizers appealed to the American methods, while its supporters among Slavophiles referred to Russia’s own teetotalist practices citing Old Believers and Muslims [8, p. 67–68; 43, p. 4]. Women participating in the warfare on par with men confirmed the positive shifts in Russia as well.

These inspired contexts stimulated a search for large-scale parallels in the two countries’ development, which evidenced desire of politicians and journalists, public figures and preachers to exaggerate both the scale of Russia’s reforms and the degree of American influence on their making. Additionally, Russians were expected not to radically demolish their past in a revolution, but to gradually refurbish their state²³.

The Tsarist government undertook its own steps to adjust Russia’s image in the US by sending Sergei Syromiatnikov, a well-known conservative writer and public figure, to America in early 1915 [44, p. 143–160]. Being fluent in English, he published a series of articles explaining the stance of the imperial government on the war matters and on Russia’s domestic policies. For that purpose, he also set up a Russian-Slavic Translation Bureau. American press disseminated Syromiatnikov’s appeals to perceive Russia through its history, soul, and thoughts that accorded with the discourse of America’s conservative Russophiles.

In his turn, Iosef Loris-Melikov wrote that it was necessary to educate Americans not only through the printed word and cinema, but also by setting up academic exchanges involving university professors: “Our young people have certainly much to learn from Americans, but the latter would be glad to absorb from Russian academics that elevated and deeply aesthetic spirit that imbues our literature and science. Even now, there are societies and circles cropping up in various places in America that set themselves the goal of studying Russia, its language, the spirit of its people, its learning, and arts” [15, p. 631].

In 1915–1916, the Russian press published increasing numbers of articles calling for creating a diverse image of the United States that would not be confined to stereotypes perpetrated, for instance, by pulp fiction like Nat Pinkerton crime stories. A *Literary Digest* review of the Russian press focused on the many articles that postulated the need to

²¹ Outlook (1914), October, p. 377–380; (1915), March, p. 767–770.

²² Craftsman (1914), November.

²³ New York Times (1917) January 15; The Literary Digest, (1916), November 27, p. 1216; December 6, p. 1528; (1917), February 10, p. 330–331.

expand knowledge of various aspects of American life. For instance, the *Novoe Vremya* newspaper called for establishing closer business ties between the two states and stated that Russians did not have much knowledge of America, while America had even less knowledge of Russia. The *Russkoe Slovo* newspaper, in its turn, stressed that those who cherished Russia's interests and wanted to contribute to the development of its productive forces should spare no efforts to advance closer ties between the Russian Empire and the US based on mutual concessions and understanding²⁴.

In February 1917, Boris Shatsky, an adjunct professor at Petrograd University, was sent to New York to establish a Russian information bureau that would educate Americans about Russia and Russians about America. He arrived already after the February Revolution and, together with Arkady Zak, who worked for the Ministry of Finance, he succeeded in setting up the work entrusted to him, switching gears to protect the interests of the young Russian democracy²⁵ [7, p. 112–115].

The new agenda of bilateral relations gave a new impetus to *the development of Russian studies in the US and of American studies in Russia*. This interest manifested in creating specialized university departments, offering courses, and publishing articles and books [7, p. 52–58; 45, p. 65–72; 46, p. 45–76]. Leo Wiener, one of the pioneers of Russian studies in the US working in Harvard, published a book in 1915 calling for unbiased study of Russia. He suggested that the Russian Empire be perceived through the lens of its fine arts, music, and religion, its public, political, and philosophical thought, poetry, and literature. Wiener also traced the influence of American democratic drives both on sociopolitical ideals and on the music culture, stressing, however, their other manifestations in the Russian cultural milieu [47, p. 10, 14–15, 17, 95, 99].

The development of Russian Studies in wartime could be seen in the growing numbers of students in Slavistics classes in Berkeley and Harvard and in the establishment of the Slavic Department in Columbia University in 1915 together with a specialized Russian language course being offered there. John Dyneley Prince, Columbia University's Professor of Semitic and Slavic languages, became one of the principal proponents of developing Russian studies. He was close with the Crane circle, gave lectures on Russia, and participated in the fundraising effort for the Russian Red Cross. The number of students in his Slavic history course increased from 6 in 1913–1914 to 39 in 1915. They were also taught the Russian language²⁶. Together with Mihajlo Pupin, a well-known Serbian-American physicist, and Elizabeth Reynolds, Prince enthusiastically supported the idea of establishing a Russian Studies Center at Columbia University; this idea was advocated by Syromiatnikov. The latter called for setting up student exchanges that would allow young people to obtain more valid and diverse knowledge by attending universities of the country they studying²⁷. At the same time, Crane promised financial support to the Russian Studies Center at Columbia and continued to promote Russian studies in Chicago University. He granted Harper a four-year contract for travelling to Russia, teaching Russian, and giving lectures on Russian history and continued to finance guest lecturers and purchasing books for the library [14, p. 128].

²⁴ Literary Digest, (1916), August 5, p.295–296; Henderson, A. (1916), The Russia — US Rapprochement, *Novoe Vremya*, September 24.

²⁵ AVPRI, F.170, Posol'stvo v Vashingtone, Op. 512/I, D.525, L.0033–0036.

²⁶ New York Times, (1915), March 25.

²⁷ New York Tribune, (1915), April 10.

In 1914, the young American Slavist Frank Golder travelled to Russia to work in its archives and then published a unique and still relevant *Guide*, focusing on Moscow's and Petrograd's archives [48]. Golder himself viewed the publication of this edition as the first step in establishing professional ties between Russian and American scholars, as a start of the process of exchanging ideas, materials, and people in Russian Studies in the US and American Studies in Russia [49, p.3–86]. In addition to Berkeley, Harvard, Chicago and Columbia Universities, Russian language, history, and culture were also taught in Michigan and Missouri. In 1916, a Russian Department was opened at Seattle University. Nikolay Bogoyavlensky, the consul for Nome and Seattle, saw it as “Russia’s peaceful victory” that was important for developing of bilateral relations since Seattle was the gateway of the America’s trade with Eastern Siberia²⁸.

The study of the US received a new development impetus in Russia, saving, however, its applied character. The Moscow historian Stepan Fortunatov increased the number of his students by adding those from Moscow Higher Women’s Courses. Addressing them, he stressed that “if we speak of the interests of the masses, and not individual persons, the US has reached the highest level of material wealth, mental development, and happiness that no other nation in Europe has achieved,” although Americans still had to resolve the racial question and overcome the extremes of its capitalist development and wealth inequality [50, p. 44–45, 226].

However, it was Nikolay Borodin who made the most energetic contribution to developing American studies at that time. He incessantly emphasized the importance of Americans’ achievements for developing Russia’s productive forces and for its revival. In particular, he wrote:

It is our profound conviction that we have no other road to travel in our development than the road of North America; we need to study it, use its experience and strive to attract its tremendous capitals and technical means so that Americans would work together with Russians on exploring Russia’s untapped natural resources and on developing Russia’s weak industry on a large scale²⁹.

In 1915, Borodin published two books on the US where he discovered similarities in the two states’ development and concluded that Russia needed to use not only the American socioeconomic experience, but also the lessons of federalism. Although Borodin idealized the US, which was generally typical for Russian liberal westernizers, he criticized its political corruption, its venal press, and mentioned the existence of negative phenomena in economic and social life. Yet these judgments, too, led him to see the American model of development in a positive light due to its reformist characteristic. Borodin believed that constructive reforms were what allowed Americans to regenerate their society. This was something Russians should also learn from them [51; 52].

October 1917 was a turning point in the development of both American studies in Russia and Russian studies in the US. In the former case, progressive development was interrupted, ideological pressure resulted in condemning to oblivion many works of pre-revolutionary scholars and columnists. American studies would come to be conditioned by the radical discourse defined by the Marxist paradigm instead of the previously dominant liberal universalist one. In the US, the heyday of the Russian studies would be linked

²⁸ AVPRI, F. Posol'stvo v Vashingtone, Op. 170, D. 408, L. 3–5 ob., 7–7 ob.

²⁹ The News-Bulletin of the Society for Promoting Mutual Friendly Relations between Russia and America, (1915), No. 1, December p. 2–3.

to the names of Russian émigré historians such as George Vernadsky (Yale University), Mikhail Karpovich (Harvard University), Michael Florinsky (Columbia University), who brought to their classrooms not only knowledge but also a specific message which was both antimonarchic and anti-Bolshevik and tended toward the liberal-universalist socio-political discourse which now also became an academic discourse [53, p. 25, 93–95, 92].

Conclusion

A study of the relations between Tsarist Russia and the US during World War I indicates that the North American republic was ready to engage in wide-ranging cooperation with the Russian Empire regardless of their ideological differences. So the “honeymoon” between the two states had started long before the 1917 February Revolution.

The Russia — US rapprochement was unprecedented in its scale primarily in trade, economy, and finances, and it continued to expand. Russia needed military supplies deliveries from the US as well as American capital and experience to continue the war and modernize its economic system. That was the grounds for the initial rapprochement between the stance of the government and that of the opposition in Russia. In its turn, the US was changing its status in the international table of ranks, was building up its global industrial and financial power, and was interested in a large-scale economic expansion into the Russian market. Thus a pragmatic dimension of the bilateral relations emerged that was also aided by the states’ mutual interest in destroying each other’s stereotypes of their counterpart and in studying each other.

However, Wilson strove to turn Russia not so much into an object of the US’ “dollar diplomacy,” as into a destination of its “crusade” for democracy. The collapse of the monarchy provided an additional impetus for liberal internationalism by integrating the Russian “Other” into the US’ foreign policy. Ultimately, an ideological (value-based) approach emerged as a stable trend in structuring America’s attitude toward Russia (be it the Soviet Union or post-Soviet Russia).

However, that would transpire later. Thus far, Russia was moving toward another revolution and the US, in turn, was moving toward another cycle on hopes concerning the prospects of Russia’s modernization and of disappointment over its results.

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