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**РЕАЛИЗАЦИЯ ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ СОЕДИНЕНИЯ ГАЗОПРОВОДА И
ЖЕЛЕЗНОДОРОЖНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ МЕЖДУ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИЕЙ И
РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ КОРЕЯ ПОСРЕДСТВОМ ПОЛИТИКИ РОССИИ ‘ПОВОРОТ
НА ВОСТОК’ И СТРАТЕГИИ ЮЖНОЙ КОРЕИ ‘ДЕВЯТЬ-МОСТОВ’**

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CONNECTING GAS PIPELINE
AND RAILROAD SYSTEM BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA THROUGH RUSSIA’S ‘TURN TO THE EAST’ POLICY
AND SOUTH-KOREA’S ‘NINE BRIDGE’ STRATEGY**

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Abstract

This research focuses on strategic importance of Russian 'Turn to the East' policy and South-Korean 'Nine-Bridge' strategy, particularly, paying attention to the political significance of two projects; connecting gas pipeline and linking railroad system through North-Korea, which can bring North-Korea into participation and establish peace regime on Korean peninsula.

This study examines practical action plan and special roles for multilateral cooperation within searching the common interest of 'Turn to the East' policy and 'Nine-Bridge' strategy based on the historical development. Empirical figures are presented to verify the necessary cooperation including business feasibility on the projects. However, there are several realistic hurdles, especially, relevant to North-Korea which is not supposed to be overcome by simple solution and short range plan. So this research carefully approach to this subject with long term perspective and introduce practical channel for completing cooperation.

Keywords: Turn to the East, Nine-Bridge, Gas pipeline, Railroad, International Business, Trilateral cooperation, Multilateral cooperation, Russia, South-Korea, North-Korea

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Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to research the importance of Russian ‘Turn to the East’ policy and South-Korean ‘Nine-Bridge’ strategy and how they will cooperate to complete two projects; connecting gas pipeline and linking railroad system through North-Korea. In this study, there is an additional research about practical roles for implementing these two projects and making North-Korea participate into them.

In recent years, Far East of Russian Federation is attracting a lot of attention from the international community. South-Korean government is thinking this region, albeit relatively underdeveloped compare to the West part of Russia, as not only a big business market but also an important strategic bridge to connect with North-Korea and, ultimately, Europe. Russia also pays attention to this region in order to suppress emerging Chinese power and block U.S. influence by hand Russian energy power with geographical merit.

Russia has been ready to make a good partnership with nations around the Far East, where is strategically important region to extend Russian power up to Pacific. South-Korea also sets to understand this dynamics and prepares to shake hands with Russia. Especially, Seoul interests in connecting gas pipeline from Far East to South-Korea and linking TKR to TSR. There are, however, several formidable hurdles to jump. First, North-Korean involvement is imperative but nothing can guarantee this. Second, Russia and North-Korea is under sanction by U.S. Third, Kremlin is usually non-cooperative against energy exploring alien power. In fact, all these obstacles are likely to take a long time to overcome since these are too huge to work out by simple solutions in short term. Therefore, this research attempts to present more realistic solutions with comprehensive and broad approach rather than hurry to show instant solution to come true trilateral cooperation.

This is a study about researching the practicality of some international businesses which were announced within the national strategic long-term project. Measuring on realistic possibility of international businesses which are still in its infancy isn’t easy due to insufficient research data. Moreover, several conceptual different interpretations about the multilateral cooperation formulated by different socio-political system can make serious misunderstandings among nations. Therefore, in this study, multi-method approach was used to make up for this, mainly, in focusing on published discourses and content analysis including several economic figures which are presenting empirical data related to business profitability.

Significance of the Study

First: Though a number of academic studies on Russian ‘Turn to the East’ policy and South-Korean ‘Nine-Bridge’ strategy have been made most of those studies have mainly reflected just one way comprehension without interactive understanding between countries so academic works to find out common interest between relevant countries are still on demand. In general, the state-led multilateral projects used to stimulate our curiosity in various perspective. For example, which options may be chosen to maximize economical effects? And what is the best political decisions under the condition to minimize international conflict? In this regard, two projects mentioned above assign unprecedented mission to Russia and South-Korea because they did not have close relationship on political and economical sphere till now. Therefore, as a basic step to improve mutual understanding between them for the projects this dissertation reveals what implication lies beneath on ‘Turn to the East’ and ‘Nine-Bridge’.

Second: South-Korean government shows big interest in connecting gas pipeline and railroad system to Russia. Similar projects were proposed by some former South-Korean governments including Park’s administration within the ‘Eurasia initiative’, which was assessed as a failed initiative by many academic studies. It has been presented that one of the main reasons about the unfruitful outcome was a lack of strong confidence for developing projects. In contrast to the the previous authorities, however, recent Moon’s administration has a strong conviction on completing the projects with comprehensive understanding on the regional political dynamics and economic situation.

Third: The results of the study on connecting gas pipeline and railroad system may support comprehending inevitability of cooperation between Russia and South-Korea, and even North-Korea. In the long run, the reflections and conclusions of this research intend to cover not only regional state-level business cooperation, but also effects on entire diplomatic mechanism of Northeast Asia.

In addition, this dissertation shares new approach to attract North-Korea into global market and for this, in this research, practical roles of three countries were presented considering on respective political and economical situation.

Research questions

There are four research questions. First, what is the historical background of Russian ‘Turn to the East’ policy and South-Korean ‘Nine-Bridge’ strategy? And how has been this ground developed to reflect common interest of each country? Second, basically, is this project ‘connecting gas pipeline and railroad system through North-Korea’ a feasible one? And if yes, which benefit will be in each nation? Third, how makes North-Korea participate into trilateral cooperation? Lastly, could the projects contribute to formulate peace circumstance on Korean peninsula? And what is the role of relevant countries to support this process?

Methodology

There are three methodological components. The first one is a content analysis on policy which was officially announced in public. The second component is based on several economical figures in order to estimate the profitability of the business. The third one is narrative approach to explain each country’s socio-political character and propose solution based on the situation. Moreover, in chapter, several figures and tables were collected to show historical development of the theme and analyze feasibility of multilateral cooperation.

Literature review

There are many internationally well-known studies about the Russian ‘Turn to the East’ but compare to this, the South-Korean ‘Nine-Bridge’ was less studied. It is probably because the latter was recently released, i.e, in 2017. Therefore, even though two states several times tried to start gas pipeline and railroad project, at that time, there wasn’t any academic contemplation for completing the project but was just busy to launch the business without long-term program. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Moscow has paid attention to the Russian east for quite some time¹ and this has been introduced on several academic literatures.² The studies are presenting

¹ Макаров И. А., Макарова Е. А., Бордачев Т. В., Канаев Е. А., Литвинова Ю. О., Лихачева А. Б., Пестич А. С., Пятчкова А. С., Соколова А. К., Степанов И. А., Щербакова А. В., Караганов С. А., 2016, Поворот На Восток. Развитие Сибири И Дальнего Востока В Условиях Усиления Азиатского Вектора Внешней Политики России, М.: Международные отношения, and Mikhail Nosov, 2019, Поворот На Восток: Итоги Пяти Лет, Научно-аналитический вестник ИЕ РАН.

² Especially, two books are well describing about this in detail; ‘The Political Economy of Pacific Russia Regional Developments in East Asia (Springer International Publishing, 2017) and ‘Russia’s Turn to the East: Domestic Policymaking and Regional Cooperation’ (Cham Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 2017)

why Russia ‘ought to’ be oriented towards the east in order to get into the new international order. Considering contemporary international relation, it is hard to say that Russian academic literatures are more accessible than western sources and thus Russian foreign diplomacies are frequently described by western scholars who are in western ways of thinking.³ Russian ‘Turn to the East’ is also in such case albeit it is very popular concept in academic sphere. Many relevant sources are likely to reflect western standpoint and it disturbs penetrating into the real Russian perspective. Furthermore, It is subject to distort reality thus may be far from reaching ideal conclusion. In this regard, on the other hand, the books mentioned above (Footnote 2) appear to strike balance between outside voice by West and Russian domestic voice communicating with various discourses. Especially, the books pay attention to the cultural factors articulated by Russian author in order to prevent mis-conceptualising vis-a-vis Russian east and it gives a chance to understand real Russian mentality stayed in ‘Turn to the East’.

Compare to flooding research sources about Russian east, ‘Nine-Bridge’ is now on a basic stage so just a few researches are existing. Most of them end up simply introducing a concept on ‘Nine-Bridge’ by handling, notably, just South-Korean stance. Moreover, many data relevant to the project on connecting gas pipeline and railroad are pretty out-of-date, and, most of all, scholars studied this subject are generally pessimistic on the projects per se due to the complex political relations among states.⁴ Therefore, not surprisingly, major articles drawn in this point came to an end with negative perspective about the implementation of the projects. Nevertheless, some books are presenting practical prospect to make it the strategy including problematic factors.⁵ Even though these literatures are written in Korean thus limited to access, its’ wide spectrum to display the vision over the South-Korean future tactic⁶ deserves to refer.

³ Charles E. Ziegler, *Russian Diplomacy: Challenging the West*, 18.10.2018, *Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* Seton Hall University.

⁴ 장덕준 (국민대학교), 2017, 북방정책 재고: ‘유라시아 이니셔티브’의 재검토 및 새로운 대륙지향 정책을 위한 원형 모색, *한국 슬라브-유라시아학회 슬라브학보* 제32권 제1호, P.277-317, (Translated in English), Jang Deok-Jun (Kookmin University), 2017, ‘The Nordpolitik’ Revisited : In Search of a Prototype for Overhauling ‘The Eurasia Initiative’ and After, *Korean Slavic-Eurasian Association Slavic Journal*, Vol. 32, No.1, P.277-317.

⁵ 신북방경제협력 추진전략 및 기본계획 수립, 2018, 북방경제협력위원회, 책임 연구원: 이연호, 연구원: 이상준, 강문성, 강명구, 이성우, 윤대엽, 제성훈, (Translated in English), *New Northern Economic Cooperation Promotion Strategy and Basic Plan*, Senior Researcher: Lee Yeon-ho, Researcher: Lee Sang-jun, Kang Moon-seong, Kang Myeong-gu, Lee Sung-woo, Yoon Dae-yeop, Je Seong-hoon, 2018, Northern Economic Cooperation Committee.

⁶ 한반도 르네상스 구현을 위한 VIP 리포트: 신북방정책 추진의 기회와 위협요인, 2017, 현대경제연구원, 17-28 (통권 701호), (Translated in English), *VIP report to realize the Renaissance of the Korean Peninsula, Opportunities and Threats to Promote New Northern Policy*, 2017, Hyundai Economic Research Institute, 17-28 (No. 701) and 강명구, 2019, 신북방정책과 신동방정책을 통한 한·러 협력 연구, *KDB산업은행 미래전략연구소 미래전략개발부, 산은조사월보*, 2019.8, 제765호, (Translated in English), Kang Myung-koo,

In fact, this (Footnote 5) is a handout book introducing overall foreign policy of Seoul not only northward strategy including Russia but also southward policy covering adjacent Asian countries, e.g., Southeast Asia. However, supposedly, South-Korea has to consider multi-dimension variables to deal with external policy within middle power state position⁷ and this perception exerts a strong pressure on designing foreign policy to be interconnected. Therefore, making sense of comprehensive South-Korean foreign diplomacy is imperative to research 'Nine-Bridge' strategy as a part within full context.

The conceptual framework: International cooperation

This study defines international cooperation to form a concept of multilateral cooperation at an academic level based on Robert Keohane's 'After Hegemony'. The notion of international cooperation has usually been used in the literature on international relation that has debated how cooperation emerges in an international system. A standard definition is that cooperation occurs when "actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others."⁸ Therefore, cooperation is described as an interaction to achieve common goals when actors' preferences are met. This is a basic concept in classical term on international cooperation thus this study follows the same perspective to research the subject, especially cooperations between actors in different systems, and in various scales including bilateral and multilateral.

Keohane used theories of hegemonic stability as a theoretical baseline to push forward an original argument about conditions under which international regimes can promote cooperation among states with pre-existing complementary interests.⁹ Key factor of Keohane's theoretical construct is the conceptual distinction between cooperation and harmony.¹⁰ While he defines harmony as any situation in which one actor's policies automatically facilitate the attainment of others' goals, he thinks that the cooperation as one of expression on separate individuals or

2019, Korea-Russia Cooperation Research Through New Northern Policy And New Eastern Policy, Future Strategy Development Department, KDB Industrial Bank Future Strategy Research Institute, KDB Survey Monthly Report, 2019.8, No.765.

⁷ 김우상 (연세대학교), 2013, 대한민국의 중견국 공공외교, 한국 정치정보학회 정치정보연구 제16권 제1호 2013.06, P.331-350, (Translated in English), Kim U-Sang (Yonsei University), 2013, Korea's Middle Power Public Diplomacy, Political Information Research Society of Korea Vol.16 No.1, P.331-350.

⁸ Axelrod, R., Keohane, R. O., 1985, Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions, in *World Politics* 38, P.226-254.

⁹ Herbert A. L., 1996, Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas, and Franck, in *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, P.222-238.

¹⁰ Keohane, R. O., 1984, *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, P.51.

organizations is caused by conforming to each another through a negotiation and coordination. Cooperation therefore should not be understood as the absence of conflict but as a successful effort to overcome conflict. This concept about harmony and cooperation which is emphasizing intentional effort among actors on global business market is pretty persuasive and still working in modern international trading system. With such a clear conceptualizing, Keohane aimed “not to relegate cooperation in the mythological world of relations among equals” and hoped “to convince readers of a realist orientation to take cooperation in world politics seriously, rather than to dismiss it out of hand.”¹¹ That is, For Keohane cooperation was not to be seen as a function of the mere existence of common interests but as a goal that state can pursue.¹²

Moreover, Keohane identifies international regimes as the main instruments through which states can use to pursue a goal, and explains why cooperation can persist all the way even in chaotic situation by regime’s order. He argued that these regimes facilitate states’ ability to enter into mutually beneficial processes of cooperation in the absence of a hegemon. As Keohane argues, “international regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international order beyond the nation-state. They should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest: as components of systems in which sovereignty remains a constitutive principle far from being contradicted by the view that international behavior is shaped largely by power and interests, the concept of international regime is consistent both with the importance of differential power and with a sophisticated view of self-interest.”¹³ This explains why recent international cooperations are more paying attention on affordable self-interest rather than complicate political relations and how international regimes affect sustaining economic blocks between different ideological states.

But which components guide regimes to run for cooperation in success between states which are fully loaded by self-interest? Reiteration, reciprocity, and reputation are major three mechanisms which institutions can induce states to cooperate for mutual gain.¹⁴ Keohane more develops about this by drawing a similarity between the market and the uncoordinated actions of states. The basic premise of Keohane’s line of argumentation is that “like imperfect markets, world politics is characterized by institutional deficiencies that inhibit mutually advantageous

¹¹ *Ibidem*, P.55.

¹² Herbert A. L., 1996, *Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas, and Franck*, in *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, P.6.

¹³ Keohane, R. O., 1984, *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, P.63.

¹⁴ Axelrod, R., Keohane, R. O., 1985, *Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions*, in *World Politics*.

cooperation.”¹⁵ Under the imperfect market, Keohane argues, “world government does not exist, making property rights and rules of legal liability fragile; information is extremely costly and often held unequally by different actors; transaction costs, including costs of organization, and side-payments, are often very high.”¹⁶ To make up for this weakness, Keohane thinks of international regimes performing three major functions mentioned above and it helps states overcoming the deficiencies of self-interest-based international system. In this way, various types of international regime sharing similar interest sustain cooperation even while structural conditions are changed. These three components as a strong instrument help to fight against the market failures which were caused by an anarchical system inhabited in rational but egoistic states. This study therefore keeps in mind reiteration, reciprocity, and reputation as a key factor to implement multilateral cooperation among states in different ideology.

In conclusion, as Keohane summarizes, “international regimes are useful to governments, far from being threats to government. They permit governments to attain objectives that would otherwise be unattainable. They thrive in situations where states have common as well as conflicting interests on multiple, overlapping issues and where externalities are difficult but not impossible to deal with through bargaining”.¹⁷ In this way some international regimes including intangible one could work to facilitate international cooperation around the Far East region between Russia, North-Korea, and South-Korea to attain ultimate goal, sharing the notion; reiteration, reciprocity and reputation.

¹⁵ Keohane, R. O., 1984, *After hegemony*, P.85.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, P.87.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, P.97.

Chapter 1 'Turn to the East' of Russia and 'Nine-Bridge' of South-Korea

1.1 'Turn to the East' policy of Russia

This section reviews how Russian 'Turn to the East' policy and South-Korean 'Nine-Bridge' strategy were developed and what the aim is. To clarify vision of each policy this research is examining discourses declared by policymakers and chronical background of each policy. Russia's 'Turn to the East' policy began more than a decade ago. The subject of the region's possible secession from Russia was brought up soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the first half of the 1990s, the experts started talking about the harmful consequences of the region's economic weakness and its infrastructural remoteness from West Russia, which poses a threat not only to the region itself but also to the rest of the country. By the end of the decade "it became clear that Siberia and the Far East are not merely synonymous with 'might' but represent Russia's future." "The country's domestic, foreign, economic, and military policies will be increasingly determined by the direction of the regions' development and its outcomes". The appreciation of the Russian Far East's geopolitical significance and the understanding that it may be lost have slowly begun to enter the minds of the Russia's politician.¹⁸

In 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke of the threat to the "existence of the region as an inseparable part of Russia."¹⁹ In 2002, he commented about the region's "enormous strategic importance for the entire country, which may have become essential to the future succession".²⁰ In November of the same year, the Security Council of the Russian Federation was discussing questions of guaranteeing national security in the Far Eastern Federal District. Addressing the Council, the president pointed out the reasons behind such close attention to the region, stating that its "serious demographic, infrastructural, migration, and environmental problems, economic imbalances, and social tension limit Russia's potential for successful integration into the Asia-Pacific Region."²¹

¹⁸ 'Russia's Strategy: The New Exploration of Siberia and the Far East' (Moscow: The Council for Foreign and Military Policy, 2001), P.16, http://www.svop.ru/public/docs_2001_9_17_1351070795.pdf

¹⁹ Vladimir Putin, Introductory Remarks at a Meeting on the Prospects of the Development of the Far East and the Trans-Baikal Region, Blagoveshchensk, July 21, 2000, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2000/07/21/0000_ty-pe82912type82913_127800.shtml

²⁰ The transcript of the conference on the problems of socioeconomic development of the Far Eastern Federal District, http://archive.kremlin.ru/ap-pears/2002/08/23/1620_type63378type63381_29304.shtml

²¹ Vladimir Putin, Opening Remarks at a Meeting of the Security Council on National Security in the Far East, Nov, 27, 2002, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2002/11/27/0003_type82912type82913_151801.shtml

Figure 1 Russia's great Eurasian corridor scenario



Source: Russia, Greater Eurasian scenario (2016)

Thus, the East Russia's integration issue rather than the Kremlin's concerns about the state's territorial integrity or the life of the region's residents became the driving force for the Kremlin's decisions on the development of its Far East Region. The authority merely used the talk of security threats and losing the Far East as an argument to divert the state's attention to the region. Evidently, the Russian government, the business community, and the public were not ready to immerse themselves in the problems of the remote East at the expense of the close and familiar West. So the Kremlin's goal for developing the eastern regions of the country for Russia's integration into the Asia-Pacific, for a long time, no concrete steps were taken to attain the goal. But the slowly growing confidence of the ruling elites which was absent in the first decade after the Soviet collapse strengthened their resolution to act. The elites have also realized the importance of the rise of Asia and the consequence of the growing gap between the pace of development in Russia and China. Finally, they have come to regard Russia as an "energy power that is indispensable to the global economy and capable of being effective on the Asian markets."²²

All this concept over the Russia's national security by the underdeveloped East part of Russia was officially invoked at the Security Council meeting of December 2006. The Security Council of the Russian Federation resolved to accelerate the development of the Russian Far

²² D. Trenin, 'Russia's Asia Policy under Vladimir Putin, 2000-2005' in *Russian Strategic Thought Toward Asia*, ed. G. Rozman, K. Togo, and J.P. Ferguson (N.Y.: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2006), P.127-129.

East. Vladimir Putin stated that the “decline in the population and deep imbalances in the district's structure of production and foreign economic contacts” and the ineffective use of the region's natural competitive advantages “pose a grave threat to our political and economic positions in Asia and the Pacific, and to the national security of Russia as a whole.”²³ The situation in the region was described as critical and harmful to national interests. At this meeting, Putin invoked Russia's repeated fear of losing its Asian periphery, stressing that the underdevelopment of the sparsely populated but resource rich the Russian Far East.

In 2007, the Russian government approved the new version of the program entitled ‘The Development of the Far East and Baikal Regions Until 2013.’ A year later, the program was supplemented by an addendum entitled ‘The Development of Vladivostok as a Center for International Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.’²⁴ In 2009, the government approved ‘The Strategy of Socioeconomic Development of the Far East and the Baikal Regions Until 2025,’ which start to “counteract the potential threat to national security in the Far East and Baikal.”²⁵

Although President Medvedev was far more interested in western countries including Europe and U.S. during his presidency, a series of economic crisis in Europe, escalated tensions between East Asian countries, North-Korean nuclear weapon issue and American’s returning to the Asia-Pacific all served to hesitate the talk of the threats to Russia in the Pacific. And those global circumstances practically strengthened the Russian authority to continue driving for ‘Turn to the East’. Adding to this, global financial crisis happened in 2008 also helped to determin the Kremlin that the center of economic power was moving to Asia and this made Russia's eastern reorientation policy even more clearly proceeded. Then the Ukraine crisis of 2014, secluded Russia from western countries, dramatically gave the chance for Moscow in Asia as the main alternative to Western markets.

At the meeting of the State Council Presidium in 2012, Vladimir Putin again formulated the economic approach to obtain the region’s security, speaking of the need for its accelerated sustained development of the Russian East “so that these territories develop efficiently and become the key contributors to Russia’s prosperity and power.”²⁶ Addressing the Federal Assembly in 2012, he repeated that Russia’s 21th century vector of development points to the

²³ Vladimir Putin, Opening remarks at the Security Council meeting, December 20, 2006, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/12/20/1910_type82912type82913_115717.shtml

²⁴ Directive № 1128-r of the Government of the Russian Federation, August 6, 2008, <http://www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/rfgovernmentdecisions/archive/2008/08/06/3507349.htm>


²⁵ ‘The Strategy for the Socioeconomic Development of the Far East and the Baikal Region Until 2005’, P.3, <http://government.ru/gov/results/9049>

²⁶ The State Council Presidium meeting, November 29, 2012, <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/16990>

east, and tapping into the enormous potential of Siberia and the Far East provides Russia with an opportunity to take its rightful place in the Asia-Pacific.²⁷

From this time Russia’s east policy starts to show more detailed several objectives. First, ‘civilizational objective’ to clarify that Russia rejects the universal values of the West but accept its own distinctive civilization. Second, ‘geo-political objective’ to make a multilateral security framework, which confronts to the US-centered world system. Third, ‘geo-economical objective’ to change economic dynamics to Aisa by making an integrated hub, to develop the Russian Far East as a manufacturing basement, to improve its transportation system and also to supply several natural resources priorly to Asia rather than to Europe. In fact, the gateway to Asia for all these objectives is China but not Korean peninsula, with which relations, geographically, must cover the Asia-Pacific and the Central Asia region including South and Southwest Asia. Even Putin announced during his pre-election articles in 2012 that cooperation with China was an opportunity for Russia to “catch the Chinese winds in the sails of our economy”.²⁸

Figure 2 Dynamics of foreign direct investment inflow into the Russian economy (In general and the Far East) (mln USD)




Source: Central Bank of Russia (2018)

²⁷ The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly, December 12, 2012, <http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/17118>

²⁸ <http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20120227171547818/>

But the Russian Far East, anyway, has not made satisfactory outcome to attract foreign business (Figure 2) and still remains heavily dependent on capital infusions from the Moscow and state affiliated companies. After 2014, Russia lifted informal and tactical restrictions on investments from China into the Russian Far East, in the hope of attracting Chinese money for the region's development. However, Chinese money is not rushing to the Russian Far East partly because Russia is not a developing country, like African countries, where Chinese companies can exploit natural resources with relatively little oversight and few regulations. Another factor discouraging Chinese investment into Far East, is Moscow's reluctance to cede control to foreign investment for business on energy industry which is regarded as a strategic instrument for Russia's development. The Chinese know that even big investments into Russia will not give them any significant leverage over Moscow's foreign policy because Russia has a strong great principle that values more political sovereignty than economic profit. This mainly differentiates Russia from other countries and those differences are often willing to force changing foreign policies to satisfy Beijing's wishes for the sake of Chinese money.

Figure 3 China's investment into Russia (FDI into Russia, mln USD)



Source: FDI markets (2018)

Furthermore, the early promise of cooperation between Russia and China “highlighted by a 400 billion-dollar deal with Gazprom, a 24.5 billion dollar currency swap agreement and an infrastructure technology agreement to allow China to build new stations on the Moscow’s

subway and allowing Huawei to install Chinese equipment in the Sberbank system” were not followed by more significant economic integration.²⁹ (Figure 3) And the Kremlin disappointed about the China’s actions over the Crimea annexation in 2014 because the majority of Chinese banks had complied with Western sanctions against Russia.³⁰ The Chinese were always being pragmatic and followed economic logic in dealing with Russia. This kind of discrepancy has pushed Russia’s policymakers to expand its Asian policy to other countries in the region.

Due to this gap between Russia and China, some in Russia argue that the Korean Peninsula is a major alternative target over Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’ policy. Rather than emphasizing relation with South-Korea, with which Russia has already substantial economic ties, Moscow give priority to relation with North-Korea, with explanation that the result will be triangular economic cooperation, drawing on South-Korea’s financial strength. In order to explain this Russian diplomat Georgy Toloraya³¹ pointed out an upsurge in contacts with North-Korea in 2014, beginning with Kim Yong-nam, the nominal head of North-Korea, attending the Sochi Olympics, at which South-Korean president Park Geun-hye was absent. The high point came in October when the North-Korean foreign minister Ri su-yong visited Russia for 11 days, including travel to four regions in the Russian Far East. When Foreign Minister met with officials in Russia, he stressed projects aimed at increased production around this region. Following forgiveness of the North-Korea’s USD 11 billion debt which North-korea borrowed during Soviet period from Russia, Russia has insisted that the North-Korea, instead, must pay for this with such items as coal, rare earth elements, and other minerals in North-Korea. This can give chance for Russia to make business in assisting for modernization of the North-Korea’s mineral industry, while playing an important role in building new roads and up-to-date railroad line and investing in special economic zones. If Russia’s plans exceed its financial resources, hope turns to South-Korean investors.³²

Given these circumstances, there are two main causes of Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’ policy, On the one hand, the government continuously tried to maintain and strengthen Russia’s position in the Pacific, as well as ensure its security and territorial integrity. On the other hand, they feared losing the East territories, mainly, caused by China. It is obviously contradictory

²⁹ <http://carnegie.ru/2015/02/10/soft-alliance-russia-china>

³⁰ <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/04/22/pivot-to-nowhere>

³¹ Georgy Toloraya (April 3, 1956) - Russian diplomat, Director of department at ‘Russkiy Mir’ Presidential foundation, Executive Director of Russian National Committee on BRICS research, the East Asia section Director at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Visiting professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).

³² Georgy Toloraya, ‘Russia-North Korea Economic Ties Gain Traction.’ 38 North, November 7, 2014.

that China have been serving indispensable component for this region economically and geopolitically. Because of this, Russia have been obliged to take advantage of Chinese money but faces uncertainty of China's investment, thus, this may be give a chance for Russia to rely on Korean Peninsula for the development of Russian Far East instead of China.

1.2 'Nine-Bridge' strategy of South-Korea

Since China announced 'Belt and Road' Initiative in 2013, South-Korea also has pursued several international initiatives which are independent of China's ambition. In particular, two national vision of the Moon's administration: the New Northern policy and the New Southern Policy, offers vision about how middle power in Asia can survive against growing geopolitical uncertainty in the region. About the former, Cooperation with Russia is the core element which president Moon speched first time at the 2017 Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. The 'Nine-Bridge' Strategy giving shape to the New Northern policy suggests expanding South-Korea and Russia's multicooperation, including ports, railroad, natural gas pipelines, electrical grids, and Arctic shipping lanes etc. It is also targeting of enlargement of the two countries' joint business on shipbuilding, agriculture, fisheries, and industrial complexes.

The New Northern policy, alike 'Turn to the East', has the history. In 1987 South-Korean President Roh Tae-woo proclaimed 'Northern Policy' to promote exchanges with socialist's countries. After Soviet Union team participated in the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul Moscow took steps into establish official contacts with South-Korea. In 1989, trade offices were opened in Moscow and Seoul, direct sea and air routes established between them, human interactions of businessmen and officials are increased.

At that time South-Korea's interest over Russia was just focused on rich mineral resources. Russia, by the way, urgently needed to attract investment and spur economic development of the country, especially the backward regions of the Far East.³³ South-Korea in the early 1990s was regarded as a source of investment in the manufacturing sector as well as the supplier of high-quality consumer goods for the Russian market. Given all that, trading of both countries mainly was South-Korean exports of electric home appliances, textiles, foot wear, furniture and South-Korean imports of raw materials from Russia. Since Russia had just begun opening its market, it permitted easy entry of South-Korean consumer goods but due to the low


³³ K.Korenevsky, Russia-Korea trade and investment cooperation: current tendencies and perspectives, 2004, <http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/confer/seoul04/papers/korenevskiy.pdf>

purchasing power in Russia South-Korean export didn't grow fast. On the other hand, abundant and cheap Russian natural resources and raw materials had found South-Korean sales networks rapidly.³⁴ (Figure 5)

Figure 4 Nine-Bridge strategy



Figure 5 Russia-South Korea trade in 1992-2016



Source: Cooperation between North and South Korea-Russia (Marina Kykla, 2018)

³⁴ Ibidem

In the period 1992-1996, a rapid growth in trade was recorded, the turnover increased almost 20 times in a four year. At the same time, South-Korean imports grew faster, which led to a significant increase in the South-Korean trade balance deficit. In 1990s bilateral trade grew steadily but the period of rapid growth was interrupted in 1998 by the consequences of the financial crisis in South-Korea and Russia. Turnover fell by 36% in 1998, and entered a new phase of stable growth only in 2001.³⁵ (Table 1)

Table 1 South Korea-Russia trade in 1992-2004 (mln USD)

	1992	1994	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Korea's Export to Russia	118	961	1967	1114	640	788	940	1066	1660	2339
Korea's Import from Russia	75	1229	1810	999	1590	2058	1930	2217	2522	3671
Turnover	193	2191	3777	2113	2227	2846	2870	3283	4180	6010
Korea trade balance with Russia	43	-267	157	115	-953	-1270	-990	-1151	-862	-1332

Source: <http://stat.kita.net/>, <http://www.customs.ru/>

Table 2 South Korea-Russia trade in 2006-2017 (bln USD)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Turnover	9,75	15,07	18,09	9,98	17,66	21,15	22,45	25,18	27,29	18,06	15,14	19,28
Korea's exports to Russia	5,18	8,09	9,75	4,19	7,76	10,30	11,10	10,30	9,01	4,56	5,11	6,9
Korea's Imports from Russia	4,57	6,98	8,34	5,79	9,90	10,85	11,35	14,86	18,28	13,50	10,03	12,35
Trade balance (as for Korea)	0,61	1,11	1,41	-1,6	-2,14	-0,55	-0,25	-4,56	-9,27	-8,94	-4,92	5,4

Source: <http://stat.kita.net/>, <http://www.customs.ru/>

³⁵ Marina Kukla, 'Cooperation Between North And South Korea-Russia', Far Eastern Federal University, Pohang, 2018, P.4.

When economic relations between the two countries entered a full-blown growth phase, as Russia's economic situation took a favorable turn. In the period from 2001 to 2014, the turnover and exports and imports, with a few exceptions, grew steadily. The trade turnover increased almost 10 times.³⁶ (Table 2)

The Northern policy of South-Korea dates back to President Park Chung-hee and made significant progress during the Roh Tae-woo administration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It has had at least two core objectives: to enhance peace and security between South and North-Korea, and to step into the Eurasian continent for taking economic benefit. The Park Chung-hee government was the first to initiate Northern policy in 1973 that clarified Seoul's position to open doors based on reciprocity to all the communist countries³⁷. The Roh Tae-woo administration took a big positive turnover about the Northern policy. With seizing the opportunity by detente, it built up diplomatic relationships with most of the Soviet countries as well as China from 1989 to 1992. Roh's Northern policy also included active support for North-Korea. However, unfortunately, the first North-Korean nuclear crisis resulted in Northern policy to stop. The succeeding Kim Young-sam administration, however, was not able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War since the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s imposed a confrontational perception and imminent policy towards the North-Korea.

Under the 'Peace and Prosperity' in Northeast Asia, President Roh Mu-Hyun projected a vision that South-Korea become a hub state of Asia, bridging the Eurasian continent and the seas, beyond stable management of inter-Korean relations.³⁸ He remarkably enhanced economic relations with Russia as well as Central Asia based on the 'Master Plan for South-Korea's Advance to Central Asia'.³⁹ The Northern policy of the two liberal administrations (with former president Kim Dae-jung) was intended to lead changes in North-Korea from reconciliation between South and North. But Lee Myung-bak administration had totally different view on this. It emphasized on the South Korea-US alliance and triangular cooperation between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington instead of inter-Korean relations. Therefore, although its northern economic policy, 'New Asia Initiative',⁴⁰ advanced economic relations with Russia

³⁶ *Ibidem*, P.5.

³⁷ Kim Tae-hwan, *Open Forum, Beyond Geopolitics: South Korea's Eurasia Initiative As A New Nordpolitik*, Korea National Diplomatic Academy, 2015.

³⁸ The ROK Ministry of Unification, *Peace and Prosperity Policy of the Roh Mu-hyun Participatory Government* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2003).

³⁹ Kim Tae-hwan, 'Beyond Geopolitics: South Korea's Eurasia Initiative as a New Nordpolitik', Korea National Diplomatic Academy, 2015.

⁴⁰ https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/12/275_46016.html

and Central Asian countries, in the aspect of peace and security his Northern policy restrained positive inter-Korean relation.

Next, Park Geun-hye administration proposed ‘Eurasia Initiative’ in 2013, which was regarded as an ambitious plan to shape the fundamental of the global economy, diplomacy and the geography of national security. In Park Geun-hye’s idea, ‘Eurasia Initiative’ is promoting the concept of one continent, creative continent and peaceful continent.⁴¹ That emphasizes the idea of the creation and development of South-Korea with Eurasian countries by a single and unified system of transport, energy, trade networks, along with the implementation of economic cooperation and exchanges within the sphere of science, technology, and culture, including at the level of interpersonal relationships, and thus improving inter-Korean relations based on trust.⁴² Accordingly, in order to realize the ideals of ‘Eurasia Initiative’, lots of organization and research institutions of the South-Korean government have to find out ways and divide the research scope into five areas, which includes transportation and logistics, energy and resources, agriculture and fishery, commerce and industries, development finance, to figure out detailed plan and identify core projects.⁴³ In addition, Park Geun-hye proposed to build the ‘Silk Road Express’ which will run from Busan all the way to Europe via North-Korea, Russia, China and Central Asia.⁴⁴ This initiative regards the Russian Far East, Central Asia, and Mongolia as key hubs of the new networks to connect Eurasia.⁴⁵ Although this has gained the supports from many Eurasian countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Mongolia it was not proceeded by elaboration of specific strategies, practical content and implementation methods. This was just seen as a mere piece of a conceptual project serving only a secondary role to specific polices and economic project.⁴⁶ More important thing is that South-Korea fails to attract North-Korea to become a part of the project so despite of their best efforts, the initiative has not been implemented in a systematic way.

⁴¹ MOFA of ROK, ‘Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia’, <http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=14195&seqno=312966>

⁴² Konstantin Asmolov, ‘The Eurasia Initiative by the President of South Korea’, <http://journal neo.org/2014/08/28/rusevrazijskaya-initsiativa-prezidenta-rk/>

⁴³ JY.Lee, ‘Korea’s Eurasia Initiative and the Development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia’, J.Huang, A. Korolev, ‘The Political Economy of Pacific Russia’, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, P.103-125.

⁴⁴ KORAIL, ‘Takes First Steps on Eurasian Continental Railroad’, Business Korea, 2014, <http://www.Businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/politics/3784-silk-road-express-korail-takes-first-step-%E2%80%99Ceurasian-continental-railroad%E2%80%9D>

⁴⁵ MOFA of ROK, ‘Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia’.

⁴⁶ JY.Lee, ‘Korea’s Eurasia Initiative and the Development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia’, J.Huang, A. Korolev, ‘The Political Economy of Pacific Russia’, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, P.103-125.

On the basis of all these predecessor's experiences to bring sustainable peace to the Korean Peninsula, to improve South-Korea's economic prospects, and to shape regional geopolitics 'Nine-Bridge' strategy is designed. This strategy seeks to connect South-Korea to Russia and China through North-Korea, even Central Asia and Europe, respectively. By diversifying its export routes, finally, South-Korea would become less dependent on the maritime route and sharpen middle power position in East Asia by becoming an active player in regional affairs.

1.3 The Russian Far East: hub for the prosperity

The Russian Far Eastern Federal District consists of eleven federal subjects, with a vast land equivalent to 41% of Russia's overall territory and wealth of abundant natural resources. Nevertheless, the investment climates is not attractive and even not considered as a favorable investment magnet. Total population of this district amounted to only 8.2 million in 2019 (this is about 5.6% of the total population of Russia) and the size of the consumer market is very small. In addition, the unfavourable geographical location, severe climatic conditions, high degree of dependence on raw material production and low level of industrialization and deteriorated infrastructure are the major socioeconomic characteristics of the Russian Far East.⁴⁷


For South-Korea's national interests, Russia is a very important trading partner and also a source of several raw materials which is crucial to advance for state. In addition, Russia is a country that sustains up-to-date science and technologies that can help South-Korea's future industry to develop. For Russia, South-Korea is an industrial powerstate that possesses accumulated know-how through dramatic industrial development. South-Korean industrial competitiveness can help facilitating Russia's economic modernization and accelerate industrial growth potential. Probably, the most important thing is that South-Korea is one of the major countries to realize Russia's vision for the Far East development.

In particular, the Russian Far East is a conceptual contact zone between the South-Korea's 'Nine-Bridge', the Russia's 'Turn to the East', and the North-Korea's peace. Therefore, implementation of cooperation in Russian Far East would mean not only strengthening economic cooperation but also making the groundwork of peace in Korean peninsula. South-Korea is possible to usher new era in its relations with Russia by seeking ways to participate in

⁴⁷ Lee Jae-Young, 'Russian Far East Development from The Korean Perspective', Valdai papers, 2019.

Far East development projects with the ‘Nine-Bridge’ Strategy. At the same time, when the denuclearization process of North-Korea is realized in the future, it will be more feasible to promote a triangular cooperation among Russia, South-Korea, and North-Korea. In addition, the Russian Far East is only gateway to connect with Eurasian continent so various type of cooperation with Russia in the Far East region would provide opportunities for South-Korea to participate in integration around the region. Moreover, various economic cooperation processes are being proceed to put this region into one unity, such as EAEU, SCO, and China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. For this reason, South-Korea needs to seek ways to participate in international cooperation frameworks, based on open economy, in Russian Far east. This effort contribute to the economic growth of South-Korea and broden South-Korea’s influence to Eurasia and even Europe. Therefore, Seoul should accelerate effort for cooperation between Russia and South-Korea by utilizing its geoeconomic and geopolitical status. In the meantime, Russia needs to diversify its cooperation with Northeast Asian countries to reduce its strong dependence on China. In particular, a variety of economic cooperation around the Russian Far East with South-Korea will contribute to regional peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia including North-Korea.

Table 3 Shares of South-Korea, China, and Japan in Russian Far East’s trade



Source: Far Eastern Customs Administration of Russia

Traditionally, South-Korea, China, and Japan are the most important trading partners to the Russian Far East, accounting for 78% of the region's trade as a whole in 2017. (Table 3) Although the absolute amount of trade between South-Korea and the Russian Far East is relatively small, it is hardly an insignificant amount considering the trade volume between South-Korea and Russia (\$19.28 bln of the total Russia and South-Korea trade in 2017). Therefore, in order to expand trade between the two countries, it is crucial to intensify trading between South-Korea and the Russian Far East.⁴⁸

It is necessary South-Korean companies's investment to promote economic cooperation around the Russian Far East. South-Korean money in the Far East, however, still remains at a negligible level. Over 70% of South-Korean investment has been concentrated in the western part of Russia and in the Far East has been sluggish. But fortunately in recent years, South-Korean companies are investing in the 'Advanced Special Economic Zones (ASEZs)'⁴⁹ and the 'Free port of Vladivostok'⁵⁰ which the Russian government is actively promoting for industrialization and internationalization of the Far East.⁵¹

In a geographical perspective the Russian Far East is directly exposed to the Korean issue and a strategic area to promote multilateral cooperation including North-Korea. At the same time, the Far East is a key hub which strategic interests of Russia, China, and Mongolia all coincide. Furthermore, Seoul is really ready to continue cooperation with countries that improve the quality of people's life around the Far East. So since 2017, the South-Korean government has focused on the 'Nine-Bridge' strategy as a national strategic direction and this has been major national mission of Seoul which is reflecting the president's perception of international situation and national administration. The vision for the partnership with Russia which the Moon Jae-in administration seeks with the 'Nine-Bridge' strategy is to promote sustainable development with stable cooperation for Russia and this will facilitate peaceful settlement of North-Korean risk through the close communication and tight cooperation based on mutual confidence.

⁴⁸ Lee Jae-Young, 'Russian Far East Development From The Korean Perspective', 2019.

⁴⁹ 'Advanced Special Economic Zones' (ASEZs), introduced in March 2015 (Officially these zones are designated as a 'Territories of Advanced Social and Economic Development': TADs are the economic zones created in accordance with the Federal Law of December 29, 2014. TADs can only be created in the Far East), the ASEZs are based on deregulation and tax breaks working as incentives for attracting private investment.

⁵⁰ 'Free Port of Vladivostok', which was signed into law in 2015, turning 15 municipalities in the southern part of Primorskii Krai into a special economic zone. The Free Port regime encompasses 28,400 km and 1.4 million people. Like the ASEZs, it involves tax and customs benefits and simplified regulations.

⁵¹ On May 16, 2018, the 12th Korea-Russia Far East and Siberia Subcommittee's meeting was held in Moscow to discuss ways to promote cooperation for the 'Nine-Bridge' Strategy and to support South-Korean companies' entry into the region.

In terms of economic prosperity, Seoul and Moscow can pursue mutual benefits through various economic collaborations alongside South-Korea's unique strengths, especially, on quick industrial development know-how and innovative IT technologies, and Russia's demand for economic growth, especially, on economic modernization and decentralised market based on new economic growth engines and institutions.

Ultimately, in order to realize the vision of cooperation, it will be essential to find out common interest between 'Nine-Bridge' and 'Turn to the East' with keeping in mind that the Far East region is a hub over Pacificward expansion for Russia and northward expansion for South-Korea alongside North-Korea. Given the common interest, in the short and mid-term, the focus should be laid on establishing partnership of trust and cooperation through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and economic relations with relevant countries in the region. In the mid-long term, it will be necessary to push forward various projects between Russia, South, North-Korea, and to resume business projects based on the premise that progress is heading for the peace of North-Korea and better inter-Korean relations. In any way, Promoting cooperation in the Russian Far East will contribute to peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula as well as development of Russo-Korean relation.

Chapter 2 Connecting gas pipeline and railroad

2.1 The necessity of gas pipeline and railroad project

In previous chapter we reviewed the importance of both countries new grand scheme and strategic masterplan on the eastward of Russia and on the northward of South-Korea. This chapter will specify how to achieve two major projects presented in ‘Nine-Bridge’ strategy: connecting gas pipeline and linking railroad. The first section analyzes the necessity of two projects and the second section provides an analytical framework and discusses on business profitability. The third section presents the effort for the cooperation of. In particular, this chapter reviews various pragmatic data to justify viability of projects.

South-Korean President Moon Jae-in began to carry out energy transition policy aimed at promoting safer and cleaner energy since his inauguration in May 2017. Two factors largely explain this energy transition policy. First, the 2016 earthquake in Gyeongju where raised public concern about nuclear safety. Second, the problem of fine dust, which became a huge social issue, necessitated a need for more environmental friendly energy. Naturally, a critical element of the transition policy was to decrease the use of nuclear energy and coal while increasing the use of natural gas and renewable energy.⁵²

Figure 6 Russia-South Korea connecting gas pipeline route scenario



Source: Northern Energy Cooperation: The Background and Future Tasks (Chung woo-jin)

⁵² Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, *energis*, 2019, P.1.

The 8th Basic Plan for Long-Term Electricity Demand and Supply (BPLE)⁵³, approved around seven months after Moon’s inauguration, excellently demonstrates this change. According to this plan, the share of nuclear energy in electricity production will decrease from 30.3% in 2017 to 23.9% in 2030, and the share of coal-fired power will decrease from 45.4% to 36.1% during the same period. In contrast, the share of natural gas and renewables will increase during the same period. The former will increase from 16.9% to 18.8% and the latter will increase from 6.2% to 20%.⁵⁴ (Table 4)

Table 4 South-Korea’s electricity generation mix to 2030

Year	Nuclear	Coal	Gas	Renewables	Others
2017	30.3%	45.4%	16.9%	6.2%	1.3%
2030	23.9%	36.1%	18.8%	20.0%	1.1%

Source: Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy of South-Korea

To be sure, the increase of 1.9% in the share of natural gas is smaller than expected, especially given that Moon Jae-in as a presidential candidate pledged to increase its share by approximately 20% by 2030⁵⁵. However, the volume of future natural gas demand is likely to increase more than the mere increase of 1.9% suggests, largely because the total electricity consumption is expected to increase by around 14.3% from 2017 to 2030.⁵⁶

The increase in the volume of future natural gas demand becomes clearer when we compare the 13th Long-Term Natural Gas Demand and Supply Plan (NGP)⁵⁷ with the 12th NGP. One of the biggest differences between these two plans is that the former reflects the 8th BPLE. Comparing the two plans is not easy because they differ in terms of the base year and end year. However, we can roughly compare future gas demand under the two different plans. Gas demand in 2029 under the 12th NGP is 34.65 million tons (47.12 bcm)⁵⁸, whereas gas

⁵³ The BPLE was established in South-Korea pursuant to Article 25 of the Electricity Utility Act and Article 15 of the Electricity Utility Decree biennially for mid to long-term forecast of electric power demand and the corresponding installation of more electric facilities. The 1st BPLE was established in 2002.

⁵⁴ Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, *energis*, 2019, P.1-17.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, P.1.

⁵⁶ Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy of South-Korea. 8th Basic Plan for Long-Term Electricity Demand and Supply, http://www.motie.go.kr/motie/ne/presse/press2/bbs/bbsView.do?bbs_seq_n=160040&bbs_cd_n=81

⁵⁷ Town gas business law in South-Korea provides that the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy shall make a long-term natural gas supply and demand plan, which covers more than 10 years from the year when the plan is made, and publish its major contents every two years.

⁵⁸ Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy of South-Korea. 12th Long-Term Natural Gas Demand and Supply Plan, https://www.kdi.re.kr/policy/topic_view.jsp?idx=149814

demand in 2031 under the 13th NGP is 40.49 million tons (55.07 bcm).⁵⁹ Even if we take into account a two-year difference in terms of the end year between the two plans, future gas demand under the 13th NGP is much larger than that of the 12th NGP.⁶⁰ (Table 5)

Table 5 Gas demand projections under the 12th Long-Term Natural Gas Demand and Supply Plan (NGP) and the 13th NGP (mln tons)

Year	12th NGP (December 2015)	13th NGP (April 2018)
2015	33.70	-
2018	-	36.46
2029	34.65	-
2031	-	40.49

Source: Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy of South-Korea

It was in this context that the Moon’s administration sought to revive the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project that had been discussed on and off since the late 1980s. South-Korean President expressed on numerous occasions his interest in building the gas pipeline. For example, in his telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin shortly after the inauguration, President Moon indicated that he would attempt to implement the pipeline project. This interest was expressed again when Moon gave a speech at the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok in 2017.⁶¹ Noting that South-Korea’s ‘Nine-Bridge’ and Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’ are connected, he proposed that the two countries lay bridges for the pursuit of cooperative projects including the gas pipeline and railroad project.⁶²

Regarding the transportation routes all logistics have to focus on being handled safely and efficiently through land and sea. This multi-functionality enables the realization of ceaseless logistics. In particular, South and North-Korean railroad and Russian railroad cooperation can be part of an extremely important strategy to strengthen economic and social connections in this region with which the Korean Peninsula connects the ocean and continent, and performs the role of a bridge between the Pacific Ocean and the Russian Far East. This aims to overcome the physical barriers by connecting logistics networks that have been disconnected within East part of Russia with constructing a complex logistics networks connecting the railroad and other

⁵⁹ Ibidem.

⁶⁰ Ibidem.

⁶¹ Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, *energis*, 2019, P.2.

⁶² Ibidem.

types of transportation systems and ultimately connect them to Europe. This Plan also seeks to realize a multi-direction connecting starting from Busan in South-Korea and passing through North-Korea, Russia, China, Central Asia, and Europe. (Figure 7) This transportation and logistics network will both contribute to reducing logistics costs and revitalizing trade, and will act as a driving force to create a new business model, To realize this Seoul have to actively promote trilateral relationship between South Korea, North Korea, and Russia.


Figure 7 Linking railroad Korean peninsula-Russia-China-Mongolia-Europe



Source: International trade Association of South-Korea

In terms of the logistics network's effectiveness connecting railroad around the Russian Far east will bring out conceptual change for open space from the simply physical area. Russia's Far East and the Korean Peninsula are a gateway for entry not only to South and North-Korea, but also to Northeastern China and Russia's Pacific region. Therefore, the Russian Far East and the Korean Peninsula have a geopolitical advantage as a hub state for the Northeast Asia cargo handling and for transit trade in the Northeast Asia. If South-Korea and Northeast Asia are to form an integrated economic zone in the future the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) will revitalize personal and physical exchanges in whole Northeast Asia, strengthening connectivity within Northeast Asian economic zone. Furthermore, concerning on a trans-continental railway system, linking the TKR and the Trans-Siberia Railway (TSR) lines are of great significance not only for the Korean Peninsula but also for Northeast Asia and Europe. This railway project will help accelerate the building of an inter-Korean consensus and a trans-continental railway can be used as a trunk corridor for Korean peninsula as like 'Belt and Road' initiative of China.

Table 6 Real GDP levels of Northeast Asia (bln USD)




Source: Global Insight (2013)

* CAGR: compound annual growth rate

The compound annual GDP growth rate of five Northeast Asia nations (Russia, South-Korea, China, Japan, and Mongolia) between 2000 and 2012 was 4.1% which is 1.5 times higher than that of the world (2.6%). (Table 6) There has been a steady increase in the share of the five nations in terms of GDP; they took 17.5% of the global GDP in 2000, 18.2% in 2004, 19.4% in 2008, and 21% in 2012.

Table 7 Trade amount of Northeast Asia (bln USD)




Source: Global Insight (2013)

* CAGR: compound annual growth rate

The overall trade volume of the five Northeast Asia nations showed robust growth rate of 12.7% on average between 2000 and 2012. (Table 7) There has also been a firm increase in the five nations' share in terms of global trade volume; they took 13.8% of the global trade volume in 2000, 15.8% in 2004, 17.8% in 2008, and 20.5% in 2012.⁶³

The Northeast Asia is expected to show continuous growth in interregional trade, increasing interdependence, and the expanded volume in the logistics market, which shows great potential for developing when the logistics networks are established. Northeast Asia including Russia and Korean peninsula is one of the world's three trade zones (with EU, NAFTA). The increasing rate of freight volume is exceeding that of the EU and NAFTA. A report from the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) predicts that the world's high value-added container freight volume will more than double in around ten years.⁶⁴ As the logistics networks grow and rapidly change in the Russian Far East and the Korean Peninsula, it is important to build the necessary transportation and logistics infrastructure to allow further integration into Northeast Asia.

Figure 8 Cargo delivered through TSR (thou FEU)



Source: CJ logistics

⁶³ Lee, S-W., Kim, G-S., and Kim, E-W., 'Evaluation Study on the Sea-Land Routes in Northeast Asia', Greater Tumen Initiative, Korea Maritime Institute, <http://www.tumenprogramme.org/UploadFiles/2014-07/Evaluation%20Study%20on%20Sea-land%20Routes%20in%20NEA.pdf>, P.5.

⁶⁴ 'Regional Shipping and Port Development: Container Traffic Forecast (2007 Update)', United Nation Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, New York, 2007, http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/pub_2484_fulltext.pdf

As mentioned above the world's high value-added container freight volume will probably more than double in around ten years. International container traffic volume increased nine times from 70,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) in 1999 to 620,000 in 2007. The total quantity of containers increased approximately four times during the same period. It is forecasted that the percentage of freight volume in Asia will increase by more than 10% annually.⁶⁵ In particular, the TSR freight volume is continuously increasing. (Figure 8) The increase in TSR freight volume exceeds freight volume in the Asia region, which highlights the business potential of connecting TKR and TSR in the future, this is considered as a 'geography extension project' by the Coordinating Council on Trans-Siberian Transportation (CCTT).⁶⁶ Connecting TKR and TSR will enhance economic collaboration between Russia, South-Korea, and North-Korea because of reductions in costs and transportation times, and will thereby contribute to economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. Moreover, China opened the Harbin-Changchun-Shenyang Expressway, passing through the provincial capitals of the three Northeastern provinces in 2012. It is highly likely that the existing railroad will be incorporated into the logistics network and Russia is promoting the ground-breaking 'TSR seven-day project' to reduce TSR transportation time from two weeks to one.⁶⁷ These projects all together can help to increase value-added business for the Far East and Korean Peninsula as they bolster the logistics network throughout the wider region.

2.2 Business feasibility

Making profits are most important motive to sustain business not only in private level but also international level. Even the international cooperation which was employed for the political purpose rather than commercial benefits, relevant states may try to maximize monetary profits. Anyway, for the development of business, firstly, contract parties will try to analyse business feasibility in various aspects and, next, make phased implementation plan based on this analysis. By this sense, this section discusses business feasibility based on various factors to consider that may affect to decision of three states (South-Korea, Russia, North-Korea) on connecting piped natural gas (PNG) and linking railroad project.

⁶⁵ Lee, S-W., Kim, G-S., and Kim, E-W., 'Evaluation Study on the Sea-Land Routes in Northeast Asia', P.12-14.

⁶⁶ 'Geography Extension of Trans-Siberian Transportation', Coordinating Council on Trans-Siberian Transportation, 2013, <http://en.icctt.com/geography-expansion>

⁶⁷ 'Trans-Siberian in 7 Days Project', Russian Railroad, http://eng.rzd.ru/statice/public/en?STRUCTURE_ID=4317

First of all this two projects are bound to fail unless it secures political support due to the North-Korean variables. The importance of political support was best evidenced in the TAPI gas pipeline project traversing Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, regarding this region as a ‘powder keg’ in South Asia.⁶⁸ After numerous negotiations with the backing of the U.S., the four concerned states made substantial progress in securing political support for the TAPI pipeline project. This was most clearly epitomized in December 2010 when the four states signed an intergovernmental agreement to build the TAPI pipeline. The signing of this intergovernmental agreement paved the way for the signing of a gas sales and purchase agreement in May 2012. In this way, the TAPI project moved from the stage of political discussion to the stage of commercial discussion.⁶⁹ It must be stressed that this move does not necessarily guarantee its successful implementation. However, without it, the project has no chance of being implemented.⁷⁰

This explains why several cross-border projects in politically sensitive areas have not been implemented. The Kazakhstan-Iran oil pipeline project passing through Turkmenistan is a case in this point. In the 1990s, Kazakhstan and Iran began to seek to build this pipeline because it was the shortest and cheapest route to the world market. However, the U.S. sanctions on Iran have prevented them from securing political support for the pipeline project, and thus it still only remains on paper.⁷¹ This discussion implies that unless the gas pipeline and railroad project first secures political support, it cannot proceed to the next stage of commercial discussion and thus have any chance of being implemented.⁷² (This study discusses some resolutions about this in Chapter III so here just remarks on the importance of political support for cross-border projects)

For South-Korea this PNG project certainly entails several risks. For example, its implementation can be stopped in the middle of construction if inter-Korean relations suddenly deteriorate. These risks, however, have not prevented South-Korea from pursuing the gas pipeline project. South-Korea has sought to secure political support for the project as long as

⁶⁸ Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Pakistan: A Powder Keg in South Asia’, 2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/03/02/pakistan_a_powder_keg_in_south_asia_110891.html

⁶⁹ Lee, Y., ‘Opportunities and risks in Turkmenistan’s quest for diversification of its gas export routes’. *Energy Policy* 2014, P.330–339.

⁷⁰ Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, *energis*, 2019, P.3.

⁷¹ Bahgat, G., ‘Pipeline diplomacy: The geopolitics of the Caspian Sea region’, *Int. Stud. Perspect.* 2002, 3, P.310–327.

⁷² Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, *energis*, 2019, P.1-17.

there were no political barriers such as UN sanctions after North-Korea’s nuclear test. Three main factors explain this position. First, South-Korea can gain economic benefits by building this gas pipeline. In particular, it can lessen its gas import bill because PNG is expected to be 25%~30% cheaper than liquefied natural gas (LNG).⁷³ Thus, if South-Korea can import 7.5 million tons (10.2 bcm) of Russian PNG, it can save approximately \$780 million~\$936 million per year based on the average LNG import price of \$416 per ton in 2017. Importing PNG also helps South-Korea enhance its bargaining position against LNG exporters.⁷⁴

Second, Seoul can ponder ways to diversify of gas supply markets by connecting PNG. South-Korea imported 51.3 bcm of gas in 2017. The country imported 42.1% and 23.39% from the Middle East (Qatar and Oman) and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei), respectively. Therefore, if South-Korea imports 10.2 bcm of gas from Russia, this will relevantly reduce its huge dependence on the Middle East and Southeast Asia.⁷⁵ (Table 8)

Table 8 South-Korea’s gas imports by country in 2017

Country	Volume (bcm)	Share (%)
Qatar	15.9	30.99
Oman	5.7	11.11
Malaysia	5.1	9.94
Indonesia	4.9	9.55
Brunei	2.0	3.90
Australia	9.6	18.71
Russia	2.6	5.07
Others	5.5	10.73
Total	51.3	100

Source: BP. Statistical Review of World Energy (BP: London, UK, 2018)

Third, South-Korean government perceives that this gas pipeline project will play an important role in facilitating the energy transition policy. Seoul seeks to decrease its dependence on coal-fired power to tackle the problem of fine dust. Therefore, the government needs to find a source of alternative energy and this project will help to solve the problem.⁷⁶

⁷³ Koo, K., ‘The RNS Gas Pipeline Project Can Be Realized Within Three Years after Its Commencement of Construction’, The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2018, <https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/view/2017/05/335425/>

⁷⁴ Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, *energis*, 2019, P.1-17.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁶ Kang, K., Oh, S., President Moon’s Special Order, ‘Open North Korea through the RNS Pipeline’. Mael Kyungje Shinmun, 19 May 2017, <https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/view/2017/05/335425/>

This PNG project entails risks for Russia as well. Russia, like South-Korea, cannot rule out the possibility that its implementation can be stopped in the middle of construction. Moreover, Russia also faces the risk that North-Korea could disrupt its gas exports to South-Korea and if this occurs, Russia will lose its gas revenue. Russia is well aware of this risk because its gas exports to Europe had been disrupted on numerous occasions largely due to its dispute with the transit state of Ukraine albeit these risks have not deterred Russia from pursuing this PNG project.⁷⁷ Therefore, the country has sought to secure political support for the project as long as its gas consumer South-Korea has done the same. There are three factors on this. First, Russia can diversify its gas exports by implementing the pipeline project. Its gas exports are concentrated in Europe, constituting 82.02 % of the total gas exports. In contrast, the share of its gas exports to the Asia-Pacific only amounts to 6.64 %. (Table 9) To be sure, it will increase by ‘Power of Siberia’ gas pipeline connecting Russia and China. Nevertheless, Russia has determined that it needs to greatly increase the share of its gas exports to the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s Energy Strategy for the period up to 2030, approved in December 2009, best reflects this manner of thinking.⁷⁸ The strategy specified that Russia would seek to increase its share of gas exports from 0% to 19~20% by 2030⁷⁹. The draft of Russia’s Energy Strategy for the period up to 2035, first released in January 2014, raised the target. According to the draft strategy, the share will increase to 43% by 2035.⁸⁰

Table 9 Russia’s gas exports by region in 2017

Region	Volume (bcm)	Share (%)
Europe	189.4	82.2
CIS	26.2	11.34
Asia-Pacific	15.4	6.64
Total	231.0	100

Source: BP. Statistical Review of World Energy (BP: London, UK, 2018)

Accomplishing this target, however, will not be easy, primarily because competition over

⁷⁷ Lee, Y., ‘Interdependence, issue importance, and the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute’, Energy Policy 2017, 102, P.199-209.

⁷⁸ Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, energis, 2019, P.1-17.

⁷⁹ Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period Up to 2030, Institute of Energy: Moscow, Russia, 2010, P.23.

⁸⁰ Shadrina, E., ‘Can Russia succeed in energy pivoting to Asia?’, EPPEN, January 2016, http://www.eppen.org/resim/haber_resim/EPPEN16.Elena.Shadrina.pdf

the Asia-Pacific gas market is likely to greatly intensify by Qatar and Australia. (Table 10) Moreover, The U.S. intends to join this fierce competition. Thanks to its shale revolution, the country significantly increased its gas production and became a net gas exporter in 2017. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. was capable of exporting around 50.64 bcm of LNG annually by the end of 2018, and this capacity is projected to reach around 91.99 bcm annually by the end of 2019. This means that the volume of the U.S. LNG exports will almost double in one year. As a result, the U.S. is expected to become the third largest LNG exporter after Australia and Qatar in 2019.⁸¹ In these conditions, Russia has a strong incentive to build this PNG. By constructing the pipeline, it can achieve two goals of preempting the both Korean gas market and increasing its gas exports to the Asia-Pacific.⁸²

Table 10 Qatar and Australia’s gas exports to the Asia-Pacific in 2011~2017

Year	Qatar (bcm)	Australia (bcm)	Total (bcm)
2011	48.6	25.6	74.2
2012	66.5	28.0	94.5
2013	75.0	30.1	105.1
2014	74.4	31.6	106.0
2015	69.5	38.9	108.4
2016	68.0	55.1	123.1
2017	69.6	75.9	145.5

Source: BP. Statistical Review of World Energy (BP: London, UK, 2018)

Second, Russia can reduce its dependence on China by building the PNG. Currently, Russia exports only a small volume of gas to China. However, by the completion of ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline, it will allow Russia to export 38 bcm of gas per year to China. Russia’s dependence on China will then significantly increase.⁸³ This is likely to decrease Moscow’s negotiating power against Beijing in the Asia-Pacific gas market largely because Beijing tends to believe that gas in Russia’s eastern Siberian fields has no market to sell except for China.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Zaretskaya, V., Skarzynski, N., ‘U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Export Capacity to More Than Double by The End of 2019’, In Today in Energy, 10 December 2018, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37732>

⁸² Lee Yu-sin, ‘Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.’, *energis*, 2019, P.1-17.

⁸³ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁴ Henderson, J., Mitrova, T., ‘Energy Relations between Russia and China: Playing Chess with the Dragon’, OIES, Oxford UK, 2016, P.84.

Third, Russia can increase its sphere of influence in the Korean peninsula by constructing the PNG. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its influence substantially decreased. Thus, Moscow has attempted to regain it.⁸⁵ The Russian parliament's ratification of the 2012 agreement to forgive 90% of North-Korea's \$10.9 billion debt in 2014 is a case in this point. Around this time some observers noted that this move is partially related to the country's effort to build the trilateral gas pipeline via North-Korea.⁸⁶

For North-Korea, this PNG project entails little risk, primarily because it is unlikely to bear any financial burden for constructing the pipeline. In contrast, the country can gain two important benefits by allowing the construction of the gas pipeline. Above all, it can earn a transit fee when the pipeline becomes operational. Korea (South) gas corporation (KOGAS) revealed its estimate of this fee in 2018 based on Gazprom's comparable contracts with transit countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Slovakia. It noted that North-Korea can earn around \$175.9 million annually.⁸⁷ This sum is substantial especially given that the North-Korean total exports in 2017 only amounted to \$1.74 billion.⁸⁸ Moreover, North-Korea can lower its substantial dependence on China. More than 90% of North-Korea's foreign trade takes place with China. Due to this heavy dependence, Pyeongyang finds it is difficult to stay out of China's power. In this context, this PNG project between Russia and South-Korea via North-Korea will allow for Russia to play a more important role over North-Korea. This also provides Pyeongyang with more room to maneuver in carrying out its foreign policy.⁸⁹

Another cross-border project of this study is about railroad project linking South-Korea to Russia through North-Korea. This project is more sensitive on North-Korean variables than PNG project do because there is no substitutional route if the North-Korea does not permit their territory for the railway. Nevertheless, given that the cost effectiveness of maintenance and the continuity of track after construction in comparison with the initial investment cost this project is enough worth of being progressed.

⁸⁵ Lee Yu-sin, 'Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.', *energis*, 2019, P.1-17.

⁸⁶ Soldatkin, V., 'Russia Writes off 90% of North Korea Debt, Eyes Gas Pipeline.', *Reuters*, 19 April 2014, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/russia-northkorea-debt/russia-writes-off-90-percent-of-north-koreadebt-eyes-gas-line-idUKL6N0NB04L20140419>

⁸⁷ Yonhap, 'Transit Fees for Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Estimated at over W200b', *Kogas. The Korea Herald*, 23 October 2018, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20181023000842>

⁸⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity Website, <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/#Exports>

⁸⁹ Lee Yu-sin, 'Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.', *energis*, 2019, P.6.

One of the main importance of this project is railroad per se, as the most optimal and money saving means of transportation. The cost of transportation and logistics is an important factor to gain price competitiveness in international markets. With mass dislocation of cargoes from Asia to Europe and vice versa, railroads possess indispensable advantages compared to maritime routes. For example, there is a much smaller dependence on climatic conditions, a higher level of ecological security, a more dramatic reduction of time and expenditures owing to fewer additional loading-discharging operations, a greater degree of safety for cargo as well as the possibility to monitor throughout its transit, and finally a larger share of usable cargo than intermodal transportation (up to 60% as compared to ocean freight which is around 30%).⁹⁰

The most general logistics transportation path between Northeast Asia and Europe is the marine transportation path. More than 98% of container liners that currently connect major ports between Far Eastern Asia and Europe use the Suez Canal to transport freight.⁹¹ The path through the Suez Canal is the most common transportation route, reaching about 21,978km and most shipping companies in the Far East who participate in trade with Europe stop at Busan port of South-Korea. It takes an average of 28-35 days to transport containers to the major ports of Europe using the Suez Canal.⁹² The marine transportation route operating from Busan to Finland takes an average of 30~35 days. Compare with this, the line connecting Finland through Far East ports and the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) takes about 25 days, reducing the transportation period.⁹³

More in detail, the analysis to classify the competitiveness of TKR-TSR transport route compare to five other South-Korea and Europe transport routes with considering quantitative factors (transport distance, transport time, and transport cost) (Table 11) and the qualitative factors (transport service, safety, and awareness) is showing that TKR-TSR transport route is most competitive one.

The priority in the routes from Busan to Berlin:

Route 1 > Route 6 > Route 4 > Route 2 > Route 3 > Route 5 in order.⁹⁴ (Figure 9)

⁹⁰ Eds. I.D.Ivanov, M.I.Titarenko, 'Russia in APEC and in the APR', M., 2001, P.148.

⁹¹ Hyun-gin Jin, 'Plan to build an international combined transportation network through the TAR application', Korea Maritime Institute, 1998.

⁹² Seung-woo Ko, 'Study on the effect that TKR and TSR connection gives the international transportation logistics market of Korea', Korea Maritime University, 2005.

⁹³ Ji-Young Song, Hee-Seung Na, 'A Study On The Intercontinental Transportation Competitiveness Enhancement Plan Between Northeast Asia And Europe Using The Trans-Siberian Railway', International Journal Of Engineering And Technology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012.


⁹⁴ Dae-seop Moon, Dong-jin Kim, Eun-kyung Lee. 'A Study on Competitiveness of Sea Transport by Comparing

Table 11 Quantitative data of criteria

Transportation routes		Total transport distance (km)	Total transport time (days)	Total transport cost (USD/20ft)
Route 1	TKR - TSR	12,481	26	4,200
Route 2	Busan - Vostochny- TSR	12,002	46.5	5,016
Route 3	Busan - Vladivostok - Vostochny - TSR	12,004	47.5	5,016
Route 4	Busan - Vanino - TSR	11,981	33	5,416
Route 5	Busan - Suez - Europe - Berlin	20,945	35	5,665
Route 6	Busan - Arctic Ocean - Europe - Berlin	12,645	20	5,995

Source: The Asian Journal of shipping and Logistics (Mar. 2015)

Figure 9 International transport routes between Busan and Berlin



Source: The Asian Journal of shipping and Logistics (2015)

That is, the trans-continent railroad transport using TKR-TSR shows the highest competitiveness, while the most frequently used Sea transport passing through the Suez Canal shows the lowest competitiveness. Regardless of practical restraints in realizing the routes,

International Transport Routes between Korea and EU', The Asian Journal of shipping and Logistics, 2015.

Route 1 (TSR-TKR) and 6 (Busan-Arctic Ocean) showed the highest competitiveness among other existing route (Route 2, 3, 4, and 5).⁹⁵ In addition, TKR as a startingline of the high competitiveness railroad transportation route is possible to link major trans-continental railroad lines, including TSR, between Northeast Asia and Europe with trans-China railroad (TCR), trans-Mongolian railroad (TMR) and trans-Manchurian railroad (TMGR). (Table 12)

Table 12 Major trans-continental railroad line specification

Classifi- cation	Section	Dista-Double nce track	Rail- road Electri- fication	Track gauge	Remarks
Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR)	Vladivostok~Khabarovsk~Chita~Ulan - Ude~ Irkutsk~Omsk~Novosibirsk~Yekadelinburg~ Moscow	9,880 9,880	9,880	Russia broad gauge (1,520mm)	• Transport capacity: 140,000TEU/year • Freight system: MTT
Trans-China Railway (TCR)	Lianyung port~Jeongju~LanZhou~Urumqi~ Arasanku (Cn)~Druzhba (Ka)~Presgonorkovka (Ka)~Zaulalie St. (Ru) connecting to TSR	8,613 7,127	5,001	China standard gauge (1,435mm)/ Kazakhstan broad gauge (1,520mm)	• Freight system: ETT
Trans-Manchuria Railway (TMR)	Domun~Manchuri (Cn)~Zabaykalsk (Ru)~ Kalimskaya St. (Ru) connecting to TSR	7,721 7,367	6,067	China standard gauge (1,435mm)	
Trans-Mogolian Railway (TMGR)	Tienjin (Cn)~Beijing~*Eren Hot (Cn) - Zamiin Uud (Mo) - Ulaanbaatar~Suhbator (Mo) - Nauski (Ru)~Ulan Ude St. (Ru) connecting to TSR	7,753 6,296	5,777	Mongolia broad gauge (1,520mm)	Single track railway for the whole section of Mongolia

Source: Korea Railroad Research Institute

However, there are some technical problems to take into account for proceeding this project. First, about 80% out of the whole route is electrified except for the routes of North-Korea and Mongolia. Furthermore, North- Korea use 3000 voltage of direct current (DC) and Russia, China use 25000 voltage of alternating current (AC). In order to transport cargo from Busan to the final destination in Europe, it is essential to introduce some kind of method so that the cargo can be transported directly from Busan to the final destination regardless of electrified railroad and non-electrified railroad sections.⁹⁶ Second, two different types of gauge are used for railroad in the region. Russia, Central Asia, Mongolia use broad gauge (1,520mm) rails, while China, Korean peninsula and Europe use standard gauge (1,435mm). Therefore, transshipment occurs at the border between China and Russia, China and Kazakhstan, and North-Korea and Russia. But all those technical obstacles might overcome by mutual efforts and financial investments, for example, through which had done as for ‘GTI project’.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Ibidem

⁹⁶ Won-Hee Yoo, Dong-hee Ku, Jung-won Suh, ‘An Efficient Connection Technology of TKR and TSR’, Journal of Korea Railroad, Vol.4, No.1, 2001, P.16-23.

⁹⁷ A.Barannikova, ‘GTI projects: Trans-Siberian and Trans-Korean Railroad Connection, Tumen River Forum, 2014.

2.3 The Effort for cooperation

In order to achieve great goals of ‘Turn to the East’ Russian government established ‘The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East’ in 2012. (This Ministry was renamed in March 2019 as ‘The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic’ to increase the effectiveness of governmental administration on the development of the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone) In terms of its constitution of organization this ministry have multiple functions, which have offices not only at the federal level but also at the regional level, to take Moscow’s order on policy vertically and to manage regional problems directly as well. The establishment of this Ministry has significant implication as for which there is regional representation to facilitate the flow of information and decisions between the Moscow and the federal subjects. Therefore, even though PNG and Railroad project are state level project so more relevant to state-owned corporate, for example Gazprom and Russian Railways, involvement of this Ministry in every phase for development is absolute because they can coordinate disagreement in the course of working-level negotiation as a hybrid representative department of the Moscow and the Far East. As Putin expressed that “the tasks to be solved are unprecedented in scale, and therefore also our steps must be non-standard”.⁹⁸ To realize its ambitious plans, Moscow came up with an institutional innovation: a new ministry, operating partly in Moscow as a regular part of the federal government, partly as a decentralized structure based in the Far Eastern federal okrug.

In general, Russian politics is informed by a long tradition of implementing top-down development models. This plan manifests itself in the belief that the state can organize itself out of problems through strategic planning, bureaucratic reorganization and targeted state programmes.⁹⁹ Unsurprisingly, the policymaking behind the ‘Turn to the East’ also exhibits a strong continued commitment to strategic planning.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, this top-down approach coexists with a direct controlling. The authorities frequently have to resort to this style due to the failure of the bureaucracy to implement plans or to tackle inter-ministerial rivalries.¹⁰¹ Thus, the leadership and top officials are required to become involved in regional,

⁹⁸ Putin, Vladimir, ‘The President’s address to the Federal Assembly’, Kremlin.ru, 12 December 2013, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19825>

⁹⁹ Cooper, Julian, ‘Reviewing Russian strategic planning: the emergence of Strategy 2020’, NATO Defense College, 2012.

¹⁰⁰ Fortescue, Stephen, ‘Russia’s “turn to the east”: a study in policy-making’, *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32(5), 2016, P.423-54.

¹⁰¹ Monaghan, Andrew, ‘Putin’s Russia: shaping a “grand strategy”?’ *International Affairs*, 2013, P.1221-36.

even local issues, micro-managing, rather than focusing on strategic matters.¹⁰² To achieve this grand scheme, the hybrid solution presented by the introduction of ‘The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East’ reflects an attempt to combine Moscow’s traditionally centralized approach to policy formulation with bold acknowledgement of the difficulties of ‘micro-managing policy’¹⁰³ implementation in a region extraordinarily distant both in time and space.

Table 13 Russian ministries which are responsible for regional policy

<i>Name</i>	<i>Years in operation</i>
State Committee on Federal Affairs and Nationalities	1993–1994
Ministry on Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy	1994–1996
Ministry on Nationality Affairs and Federal Relations	1996–1998
Ministry on Regional and Nationalities Policy	1998
Ministry on Regional Policy (nationality policy as separate ministry)	1998–1999
Ministry on Federal Affairs and Nationalities	1999–2000
Ministry on Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy (Goskomsever and migration service added)	2000–2001
No separate ministry (portfolio divided between Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Economic Development)	2001–2004
Ministry of Regional Development	2004–2014
No separate ministry, but ministries for the Far East (2012–), North Caucasus (2014–) and Crimea (2014–2015)	2014–

Source: RIA Novosti (2016)

Moscow’s rationale for creating a Ministry dedicated specifically to developing Russia’s eastern region was because the Kremlin wanted to give specific priority to Russian Far East development as well as facilitate cooperation with external partners. Originally, this Ministry functioned alongside ‘The Ministry of Regional Development’, which was abolished in 2014.¹⁰⁴ (Table 13) ‘The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East’ operates partially in Moscow and partially in the Russian Far East itself, so as to make a balance between

¹⁰² Ibidem, P.1235.

¹⁰³ Micromanagement is a management style whereby a manager closely observes and/or controls and/or reminds the work of his/her subordinates or employees. This is generally considered to have a negative connotation, mainly because it shows a lack of freedom in the workplace.

¹⁰⁴ Blakkisrud, H., ‘Russia’s turn to the East: The ministry for the development of the Far East & the domestic dimension’, NUPI policy brief, 2017, https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi_xmllui/bitstream/handle/11250/2449476/NUPI_Policy_Brief_8_17_Blakkisrud.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

the center of Russian power and the periphery. The Far East development ministry has offices in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. These regional offices of the Ministry operate with a degree of authority that is more or less equal to Moscow.

The very strong point of this new ministry was its hybrid structure. The ministry was intentionally established in Moscow which means central power and Khabarovsk which means regional power. So the minister divide his schedule to cover two branches simultaneously. There is clear rationale: the Russian Far East is located very far from the central power to control directly, therefore with setting up a decentralized structure which is positioning in the field intended to completely secure regional challenges and troubles so as to effectively reflect state's control. This new system has successfully been settled down over the past few years with suggesting development model for the Russian Far East. The ministry still tries to present a set of new mechanisms aiming at improvement of the local investment circumstance and giving a chance to the regional economy as a gateway to the Asia-Pacific.

To drive 'Nine-Bridge' strategy South-Korea launched 'The Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation' in June 2017. (Basically PNG and Railroad project are under this committee's control). This committee was born not to repeat mistakes previous 'Eurasian Initiative' did as below:

- *No existence of separate organizational framework to promote*
- *Various organizational systems without a unified system and strategy*
- *The main committee has a limited role to share business plans and collect results*
- *A control tower and relevant budget were needed, but the suggestion was ignored*

This Presidential Committee is the policy control center and communication channel of the 'Nine-Bridge' Strategy. It consists of five governmental members (the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Economic Advisor to the President) and 23 civilian members (related experts from academia, research institutes, public institutions, companies, legal circles, etc.)¹⁰⁵ The first meeting of the committee in 2017 set a goal to establish a blueprint for implementing mutually beneficial economic projects with Russia and develop necessary practical measures. From this time the presidential committee has tried to maintain active contact between the Blue

¹⁰⁵ 'Organization', Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation, http://www.bukbang.go.kr/bukbang_en/about_pr/organization/

House and ‘The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East’. This means that new mechanisms were established to facilitate business and interregional cooperation. Many practical progresses are actively ongoing in hand with two state-led organizations.

For the regional cooperation including PNG and Railroad project, in November 2017, the Korea (South) Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) opened the Korean Investor Support Centre in Vladivostok for investors to call and obtain advice on how to implement their projects in Russian Far East and Gazprom has resumed talks with South-Korean counter-partner KOGAS to build a gas pipeline from Russian Far East to South-Korea via North-Korea in June 2018. Gazprom mentioned, “The political situation has been somewhat different, and the South-Korean side has asked Gazprom to resume the project, and a series of talks has been held on this issue, and these talks are continuing” and added “Should the security situation on the Korean Peninsula improve, we will be able to review the PNG business involving the two Koreas and Russia”.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the first Russia-Korea Interregional Forum was held in Pohang, South-Korea, in November 2018. Representatives of nine Far Eastern Federal District regions, 17 regional governments from South-Korea, and over 200 business people, took part. This forum was conceived as a platform for personal contact between local governments and businesses to increase mutual awareness of local conditions and opportunities as well as to provide a place where regional investment projects could be discussed. The Second Russia-Korea Interregional Forum was held in Vladivostok, in September 2019. Furthermore, in November 2019 North-Korean and Russian representatives signed a new protocol on cross-border rail and transport system during the ‘9th meeting of the Subcommittee on transport’ under the ‘Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economics, Science and Technology’. It added that the protocol sets out the main activities in those areas of transport, while two deputy discussed starting container shipments from South-Korea to Russia through North-Korean territory.

Uncertainty remains, however, as to whether the institutional model devised by both countries will prove capable of dealing with the fundamental problems in multilateral political issues. Especially, in case of ‘The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East’, the system is still characterized by Moscow’s strong preference for top-down development models albeit all things considered it might not be fair to make conclusions at this stage. Nevertheless, the main mechanisms of the new development model have been in place just for a short period

¹⁰⁶ <https://neftegaz.ru/en/news/Transportation-and-storage/407391-gazprom-and-south-korea-revive-talks-to-build-gas-pipeline-via-north-korea/>

in overcoming many difficulties like an economic sanctions and North-korean turbulences. So all these experiences will teach both tracks important lesson that on the internal and the external dimension will need rather long-term commitment and cautious approach than short-term glory if they want to yield positive results.

Chapter 3 Roles for the trilateral cooperation

3.1 Russia as a mediator

This paper analyze the implementation of possibility on PNG and Railroad project between South-Korea, North-Korea, and Russia. However, these regional economic cooperations have been less satisfactory than expectation so far. This is due to a number of factors. Objectively, the regional investment environment is still behind in trend; the small market size and out-dated infrastructure, as well as the severe weather and lack of a labor force. While the Russian government itself has initiated development plans in the Far East region several times, they were unsuccessful because of insufficient capital. And in case of South-Korea, both the lack of funding for large infrastructure development with resource exploitation and unstable Korean peninsula's factors have prevented South-Korea from actively promoting cooperative projects with Russia and North-Korea.

However, most of all, North-Korean issue is most biggest obstacles against implementing the projects because the gas pipeline and railroad must pass through the North-Korean territory. In fact, each project was feasible before the North-Korea's fourth nuclear test in January 2016 (Table 14) and improvement in inter-Korean relations alone could facilitate the political viability of PNG project. After the test, however, entire regional dynamics was changed and U.S. became the most decisive element in the political viability of the project.

Table 14 Timeline of North-Korean nuclear tests and UN Security Council resolutions

No. of Test	Date	UNSC Resolution
1st test	9 October 2006	1718
2nd test	25 May 2009	1874
3rd test	12 February 2013	2094
4th test	6 January 2016	2270
5th test	9 September 2016	2321
6th test	3 September 2017	2375

Source: Arms Control Association Website

To be more precise, if the U.S. not imposed its own sanctions against North-Korea and Russia, beside UN sanctions against North-Korea, Seoul and Moscow could have more seriously tried to make some connection to secure political support for the project. This also

can be interpreted that there is too much uncertainty regarding the business feasibility on these projects because it is hard to predict how political situations such as the Seoul-Pyeongyang relation and the U.S.-Russia will be developed. Therefore, each government involved in these projects should rather not keep just on own's way than try to make a long-term strategy with considering on multi-faceted perspective.

'Nine-Bridge' is the most important external policy of South-Korea for the next 20 to 30 years, as like Russia's 'Turn to the East' do, which will be modified and enhanced with domestic and global changes. When the PNG and railroad passing through North-Korea is constructed, it will obviously contribute to the peace and stability in Korean peninsula and will realize economic cooperation among South-Korea, North-Korea, and Russia. Even more, it will present a suitable opportunity for rapid progress of three countries through reciprocal interaction and mutual cooperation in politics. In this regard, it is expected that cooperation between South-Korea and the Russian Far East will be strengthened and strongly driven to complete in the long run. So in this chapter I deal with each country's (Russia, South-Korea, North-Korea) role to come true PNG and Railroad project, mainly, in political aspect.

First, Russia can act as a mediator which have stake in veto power of UN Security Council, even possible to persuade other veto power countries to make much bigger voice. For example, to resolve UN sanctions against North-Korea Russia can push the U.N. Security Council to lift some sanction on behalf of resolving the North's humanitarian absence. Around Korean peninsula is on the frontline of the renewed competition between great powers. As tensions between the U.S. and China grow and become protracted, it is essential for some type of international peace process to stop competition among super power countries aiming for suppressing military confrontation. But Russia's desire to spread regional influence, caused by growing alignment with China and its broken relationship with U.S., will give inconvenience to China and U.S. when it comes to the diplomatic process over North-Korea. In this term, the toolkit Russia has at its disposal are too limited to have an impact on North-Korea and it is true that Russia have didn't play a decisive role on the Korean Peninsula so far. Russia could, however, become an indispensable partner in a broader conversation on security mechanisms in Korean peninsula in regard of historical connections with North-Korea from the soviet period and, most importantly, its permanent membership of the UN Security Council allows it to play its own game.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Alexander Gabuev, 'Bad Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia's Role on the Korean Peninsula, Russia in the Asia-Pacific Korean Knot Asia-Pacific Security', 2019, the Korea Foundation, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78976>

It is obvious that the stated goal of Russian policy and diplomatic efforts on the Korean Peninsula is denuclearization. Indeed, Moscow included the denuclearization of the peninsula in the latest version of its Foreign Policy Concept. It stated that “Russia has always championed a non-nuclear status for the Korean Peninsula and will support its denuclearization in every possible way, believing that this objective can be attained through the Six-Party Talks”.¹⁰⁸ Moscow has signed off on all the UN Security Council resolutions on this issue, and repeats this goal in the statements. Based on this political concept, Russia possesses several sensitive worries. First, Russia is fully aware of the consequences that the example set by North-Korea could have for the global non-proliferation regime, which Moscow would like to keep intact. Second, the Kremlin is concerned about the risk of North-Korean technology falling into the hands of non-state actors and terrorist groups.¹⁰⁹ For example, choked by sanctions, North-Korea could be forced to earn hard cash by selling its technology on the black market, meaning it could ultimately end up in the wrong hands. In addition, Moscow can’t rule out the risk of a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula between North-Korea on one side, and the U.S. and its allies on the other side.¹¹⁰ These concerns form a very clear recognition for Moscow about North-Korean nuclear issue. Russia will not recognize North-Korea as an officially nuclear power state due to all the negative consequences for the global non-proliferation regime. At the same time, Russia is likely to disagree to sanctions that could lead to the collapse of the North-Korean regime which can occur exodus from Pyeongyang to the Russian Far East, especially Primorye krai, where Russian is living around 2 million. From all these fear, Russia can use their veto power of UN Security Council to regulate complex interest preventing unexpected chaos among countries which are directly involved on this issue. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia is indispensable component for any moves about the Korean Peninsula and Russia’s veto power gives it a lot of leverage in closed-door negotiations on UN resolutions.¹¹¹

Second, in the economic perspective, Russia is willing to play a role as a mediator controlling troubles for implementing PNG and Railroad project to overcome economic asymmetry in the Far East region where deeply relies on Chinese power. Even before the war

¹⁰⁸ ‘A key strategic document outlining the Kremlin’s approach to foreign policy and international issues’, signed by Putin on November 30, 2016, P.89.

¹⁰⁹ Alexander Gabuev, ‘Bad Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula, Russia in the Asia-Pacific Korean Knot Asia-Pacific Security’, 2019, the Korea Foundation, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78976>

¹¹⁰ Ibidem

¹¹¹ Alexander Gabuev, ‘Bad Cop, Mediator Or Spoiler: Russia’s Role On The Korean Peninsula Russia In The Asia-Pacific Korean Knot Asia-Pacific Security’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2019.

in Ukraine broken out in 2014, China was already an important partner for Russia. But after the annexation of Crimea and the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions by many Western countries, good relations with China became far more important to Moscow. To cope with the sanctions and its increased isolation, Russia needed a large external partners that could provide natural resource markets, replace lost loans and investments. The Chinese government was ready to take advantage of such an opportunity, although not all of Russia's expectations have been met, and many Russian companies have gained access to Chinese markets since 2014. By this way, complex relations between China and Russia have intensified since 2014, but they are clearly asymmetric, since Moscow needs Beijing far more than Beijing needs Moscow.¹¹²

Table 15 Trade between Primorye Krai and the North-Korea (mln USD)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Exports to DPRK	n/a	n/a	9.9	12.0	21.5	18.3	6.7	3.9	9.24
Imports from DPRK	n/a	n/a	3.0	1.7	1.9	0.1	1.67	3.1	0.01
Total volume	n/a	n/a	12.9	13.7	23.4	18.4	8.37	7	9.43

Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia (2018)

Table 16 Trade between Khabarovsk Krai and the North-Korea (mln USD)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Exports to DPRK	0.0213	0.6399	2.7163	0.6	0.0906	1.126	1.2	1.2	0.16
Imports from DPRK	0.0099	0.0039	0.0	0.1456	0.0025	0.1055	0.3	0.0	0.0
Total	0.0312	0.6436	2.7163	0.7456	0.0931	1.2315	1.5	1.2	0.16

Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia (2018)

So Russia need to change this circumstance fully making use of PNG and Railroad project. Now Russia has very little economic leverage over North-Korea. In 2017, Russia-North Korea trade turnover was \$77.9 million (1.5 percent of North-Korea's trade). Trade turnover fell to \$34 million by the sanction in 2018 (1.2 percent of Pyeongyang's trade)¹¹³. And the trade between Primorye Krai and the North-Korea (Table 15) along with the trade between

¹¹² Mark Galeotti, 'Russia and China's Cosplay Alliance, How long will this awkward friendship last?', on Aug. 22, 2019, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/22/russia-and-chinas-cosplay-alliance-a66973>

¹¹³ Alexander Gabuev, 'Bad Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia's Role on the Korean Peninsula, Russia in the Asia-Pacific Korean Knot Asia-Pacific Security', 2019, the Korea Foundation, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78976>

Khabarovsk Krai and the North-Korea (Table 16) are negligible level. However all this results, paradoxically, reveal that when Moscow handle well over complex situation around the region, which has huge potential to be developed, Russia can dominate the market in advance.

Russia can play a very crucial role and give an influential impact over Korean Peninsula thus have to try contribute as an honest mediator and bring North-Korea to the table. We are at ease, however, that North-Korean issue is one of a few topics that Russia and U.S. still try to discuss at a working level. Even though the Russia's behavior stems from its vision about national interest regarding the Korean Peninsula in line with 'Turn to the East' policy, the international community, anyway, will need Russia's support more and more to resolve North-Korean issue and this necessity give Russia more legitimacy to become a mediator in this region.

3.2 South-Korea as a donor


South-Korea is willing to be a donor for saving North-Korea. The history of South-Korea's foreign policy since the country's establishment following World War II has featured an unwavering focus on national unification as an essential strategic objective, alongside the strong concern on North-Korea's desperate economic situation which is destroying basic life of compatriot. Base on this basic concept, Unification policy is always South-Korea's national identity and is a powerful political instrument for building domestic political support for national leadership which encompasses domestic and foreign policy. Thus, Korean administrations inevitably develop and pursue strategies to achieve national unification as a touchstone for leadership and as an evidence for proving their legitimacy. The formation and pursuit of national unification strategies is driven by domestic political imperatives and is an important factor that consumes significant time and attention in foreign policy of Seoul. This unique political ground in South-Korea can be comprehended by 'Sunshine policy' which was initiated by Kim Dae-Jung.¹¹⁴

The 'Sunshine policy' was South-Korea's official foreign policy towards North-Korea from 1998 to 2007. The policy was aimed at greater engagement with North-Korea through broader economic commitment and the establishment of regular South-North dialogues and

¹¹⁴ Kim Dae-jung (Korean: 김대중, 6 January 1924 - 18 August 2009) was a South Korean politician who served as President of South-Korea from 1998 to 2003. He was a 2000 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, the only Korean Nobel Prize recipient in history. He was sometimes referred to as the 'Nelson Mandela of South Korea'.

summits aimed at the normalization of relationship between Seoul and Pyeongyang. This policy was a framework that Seoul could operate under moving towards the mutually desired goal of a peaceful resolution on the peninsula and eventual reunification. Though officially articulated by Kim Dae-Jung, the ‘Sunshine policy’ came about as a result of earlier lessons learned from the turbulent history of South-North relations. Among those were the convictions that deterrence alone is not enough, that efforts to engage North-Korea should include significant economic and humanitarian components, and that a summit is essential.¹¹⁵ The core value of the ‘Sunshine policy’ separates economics from politics through the humanitarian aid, confidence by the communication, and a sympathy for peace on Korean peninsula. Even though this policy came to an end with the election of new president of South-Korean Lee Myung-bak in 2007 who is hard-liner conservative, the core components of the ‘Sunshine policy’ which had been truly reflecting South-Korean’s strong desire for the unification, have continuously presented in Seoul’s approach to South-North negotiations as a main key factor. While it has been influenced by changing perspective of every South-Korean new administration as well as the changing views of the South-Korean itself, the core of the ‘Sunshine policy’ has endured throughout the North and South’s diplomatic history.

Figure 10 South-Korean perceptions of the North-Korea (Responses to the question ‘What is North-Korea to South-Korea?’ in 2015/2016, n=1,200 South-Korean)




Source: Seoul national University - Institute for Peace and Unification studies (2017)

¹¹⁵ Levin, Norman D., Yong-Sup Han, ‘Sunshine in Korea’. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, P.10-11.


By this basic concept, as a companion not an enemy (Figure 10) the South-Korean government is continuously sending humanitarian aid to North-Korea even though this fluctuated according to the political dynamics. (Figure 11, 12)

Figure 11 South-Korea’s Humanitarian aid to North-Korea (bln WON)



Source: Ministry of Unification of South-Korea (2017)

Figure 12 Total amount of health aid towards North-Korea by the 11 largest donors



Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs financial tracking service (2012) * Private: individual and organizations

This perspective of Seoul towards Pyeongyang formulate a role for donor in PNG and Railroad project. In fact, one of the main purpose of 'New northern policy' is unification of Korean peninsula and to accomplish this grand masterplan Moon's administration made a detailed execution program 'Nine-Bridge' strategy.¹¹⁶ Connecting PNG and linking Railroad through North-Korea to Russia is most directly involved subject for stepping forward to unification and most influential project for the peace talk, which is unwilling to withdraw if once is started construction of infrastructure for the projects. Because the expected transit fee, which South-Korea have to pay to North-Korea around 175.9 million dollar annually,¹¹⁷ will give North-Korea few reason to block their territory as long as North-Korea's desperate economic situation is lasted.

However, some complex calculations are entangled to make it as a pure donor although this project is imperative for the peace process. Most of all, this project arguably must take into account influence of relevant major powers, in particular the China and the United States. This two super powers regard Korean peninsula as a middle zone which has to be balanced between North supported by China and the opposition by U.S. Thus, Korean unification is likely to be feasible with some type of consent between Beijing and Washington, even though they have clearly conflicting interests on this. Therefore, Russia is more being paid attention as a mediator to coordinate two different political view and, in this regard, South-Korea have to make close economic ties with Russia to motivate Moscow with sending a signal that South-Korean political priority has always been unification between South and North.

3.3 North-Korea as a sustainable peace state

North-Korea have to be changed as a sustainable peace state. Nothing can clearly confirm North-Korea's direction of regime but it is obvious that multilateral business is more feasible to complete among countries in peaceful and politically stable regime. The PNG and Railroad project entails little risk for North-Korea, because it is likely to bear very small financial burden for constructing the pipeline and railroad (especially, for gas pipeline all they can do is just permission of their territory). Pyeongyang can gain two major benefits. First, PNG project can


¹¹⁶ The chief of Presidential Committee on Norther Economic Cooperation (Song Young-gil), spoken during an international seminar held in Seoul on March 19, 2018, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180319006600320>

¹¹⁷ KOGAS and Russian gas giant Gazprom have resumed joint studies in 2018. The gas company estimated the annual transit fee for North-Korea at 180.4 billion won under a premise of paying \$2 for pumping 1,000 cubic meters of liquefied natural gas every 100 kilometers. The calculation was based on Gazprom's comparable contracts with Ukraine, Belarus and Slovakia under a volume rated system.

give transit fee when the pipeline becomes operational. Transit fee is substantial especially given that the country's total exports in 2017 only amounted to \$1.74 billion.¹¹⁸ Second, Railroad project give a new modernized railroad system through renovation, thus, this can facilitate economic rehabilitation of North. Most of all, Pyongyang can send a strong signal to the global market that it is already ready to open domestic market to attract foreign direct investment in safe.

In general, dependence on a single ally and trading partner, i.e. China, is deeply vulnerable to outside pressure. However, All these efforts of Pyongyang can lower its huge economic dependence on China (More than 90% of North-Korea's foreign trade takes place with China) (Figure 13) and it will serve as a stimulus to change its economic structure.

Figure 13 North-Korea's total trade (Share of total)



Source: Korea-Pacific Studies at the University of California-San Diego

* UNSCR refers to United Nations Security Council Resolutions

¹¹⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity Website. <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/#Exports>

As North-Korean authority often imply, strong economic dependence on China runs counter to the country’s ideology of ‘Juche’, which is pronounced joo-chay and most often translated into English as ‘self-reliance’, This was first described in 1955 and continues to serve as the official ideology of the North-Korean government. This aims for an independent Korean state that can take its place among the great powers of the world without fear of foreign domination.¹¹⁹ Fortunately, North-Korea has rapidly changed its strategic course since the beginning of 2018 even though most of this not explored yet.¹²⁰ Pyeongyang seeks to make North-Korea more politically, economically, and psychologically independent from China. This by no means indicates that he seeks conflict with China, nor that North-Korea would become an anti-Chinese regime. North-Korea just seeks to reduce its economic dependence on China, fearing that economic colonization could make the North-Korea susceptible to political intervention.¹²¹ Pyeongyang can reduce North-Korean dependence on China by looking at Russia as an alternative partner. Therefore, cooperation with Russia on PNG and Railroad project could be a starting point to escape from China’s power.

Figure 14 The Russian Far East economic zone around North-Korea



Source: Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science and Education (2015)

¹¹⁹ <https://bigthink.com/politics-current-affairs/juche?rebellitem=1#rebellitem1>

¹²⁰ Young-jun Kim, ‘North Korea’s Relations with China and Russia in the Security Realm’, the national bureau of Asian research, 2019, P.13-19.

¹²¹ Young-ho Tae, a former high-ranking North Korean official who defected, reports that all North Korean people from the top to the bottom have a strong antipathy to China and that half of the stories about Kim Il-sung in North Korean history textbooks describe how he fought against China, Joongang Daily, July 27, 2018.

North-Korea's successful bilateral cooperation with foreign state is not unprecedented. At first, the Russian Far East has proceeded a various kinds of cooperation with North-Korea, especially, Primorye Krai is Russia's major checkpoint to link with North-Korea. This means that this district can play a crucial role for multilateral cooperation. (Figure 14) This district is the only place in Russia that shares border with North-Korea. In detail, The Khasan railway station which is locating this area is an important part of the Russia-North Korean logistics business. Besides, there are various types of transportation sources between Primorye Krai and the North-Korea, for example, the air route Vladivostok-Pyeongyang, the passenger railroad route Ussuriysk-Tumangang, and the maritime-routes from the port of Vostochniy located in Nakhodka city to a number of seaports in the North-Korea, in particular Chongjin, Rason, and Wonsan.

Figure 15 Kaesong Industrial Complex



Source: International Crisis Group (2019)

Second, The Kaesong Industrial Complex was a very successful cooperation case between South and North that was established during the 'Sunshine policy' and operated from 2004 to 2016. (Figure 15) For this project North-Korea just provided a land and labour, however, the South-Korea supported every practical service including transportation and banking services, technology, capital, electricity, communication and so on.

Table 17 Number of North-Korean Workers in Kaesong Industrial Complex

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
6,013	11,160	22,538	38,931	42,561	46,284	49,866	53,448	52,389	53,947	54,988

Source: Kaesong Industrial Complex Foundation

Table 18 Average monthly wages of North-Korean workers in the Complex (USD)
(Figures include social insurance of 15%, paid by firms)

2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
68.1	71.0	74.1	80.3	93.7	109.3	134.0	128.5	155.5	187.7

Source: Kaesong Industrial Complex Foundation

The Complex provided a relatively small but meaningful income stream to Pyongyang. While the overall profit of its operations for South-Korea was tiny as negligible level North-Korea got a quite huge benefit even in cash and this money probably went to the Pyongyang. (Table 17, 18) The Complex was a unique standard model on an advanced manufacturing system resulted in a stable cooperation between rich South-Korean firms and poor North-Korean economy.

This two cases are telling that North-Korea can successfully cooperate with foreign state without sacrificing its national security. Now North-Korean regime looks like failed to execute one of the most important functions of a government, i.e. feeding its people, which damages its legitimacy. Although the region around North-Korea is marked by disputes and rivalries, South-Korea and Russia could cooperate to promote North's economy in hand PNG and Railroad project. For Pyongyang this is likely to be nice selection to boot its economy in consideration on several external factors. Implementation of this project would require commitment, planning and cooperation among relevant states by leading gradual and peaceful soft landing of North-Korean regime. When this is well progressed, international community would see this story as a signal for establishment of peace expecting an outcome that will contribute to regional security and prosperity.

Conclusion

The strategic significance of the Russian Far East has determined the essence of Moscow's policies in the region. 'Turn to the East' policy began more than a decade ago to make it viable platform for Russia's economic integration into the Asia-Pacific. In this regard, In 1990s, the experts started talking about the harmful consequences of the region's economic weakness and its infrastructural remoteness from West Russia, on the other hand, they have come to regard that Russia's energy power is indispensable to the global economy and capable of being an effective toolkit especially on the Asian markets. All these concepts about the Far East were officially reflected on the Council meeting of in 2006. The Security Council of the Russian Federation decided to accelerate the development of the Russian Far East in 2012 and Russian president Vladimir Putin declared the economic approach to obtain the region's security. From this time Russian east policy steadily started to show more detailed several objectives; civilizational, geo-political, and geo-economical objective.

Moscow continuously tried to maintain and strengthen Russia's position in the Pacific, as well as ensure its security and territorial integrity. In fact, the gateway towards Asia to achieve all these objectives is China not Korean peninsula. China has been serving indispensable component for this region economically and geopolitically but this made Russia to worry of losing the country's East territory. Moreover, the Chinese were always being pragmatic and followed economic logic in dealing with Russia, and this has not made satisfactory outcome to attract Chinese money in this region. These reasons have pushed Russia to expand its Asia policies towards other countries in the region. Thus, especially, Russia hopes that the Korean Peninsula can contribute to its goals in the development of the Russian Far East. Rather than emphasizing relation with South-Korea which has already substantial economic ties, Moscow give priority to relation with North-Korea, describing that the result will be triangular economic cooperation if can draw South-Korea's financial strength.

South-Korea, also, has actively pursued international initiatives towards the North. Even though these northward policies were fluctuated by external political situation, Seoul has continuously tried to enhance peace on the Korean Peninsula and to advance into the Eurasian continent for economic gains. In 2013, The Park Geun-hye government proposed 'Eurasia Initiative' which aims at expanding nation's horizon. Although this has gained supports from many Eurasian countries, it was not proceeded more by specific strategies and practical contents but just came to end as a conceptual project. In 2017, the South-Korean president

Moon Jae-In announced the 'Nine-Bridge' Strategy, designed based on predecessor's trials and errors, at the 'Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok'. Giving shape to the 'New Northern policy', he proposed expanding joint infrastructure between South-Korea and Russia including ports, railroad, natural gas pipeline, electrical grids, and Arctic shipping lanes. This strategy seeks to connect South-Korea to Russia and China through North-Korea. This strategy finally aims at sharpening South-Korea's middle power position in East Asia, being an active player in regional affairs.

Based on both nation's perspective, the Russian Far East is a contact zone between South-Korean 'Nine-Bridge' and Russian 'Turn to the East', and, thus, is possible to become a hub for the region's prosperity. Furthermore, the Far East is a crossroad for the Russian Pacificward expansion and the South-Korean northward expansion including North-Korea. Therefore, multilateral cooperation around the Far East means not just only strengthening economic relation but also laying the groundwork for peace on Korean peninsula. In the short and mid-term, it should be paid attention on establishing partnership by mutual understanding and confidence building via multilateral diplomacy preparing economic interaction in the region. In the mid-long term, it will be necessary to actively push forward various multilateral projects and resume multifaceted commercial transactions on the basis of the belief that all these processes are destined for establishment of peace on North-Korean regime and reconciliation of inter-Korean relation.

President Moon proposed in 2017 that two countries lay bridges for the pursuit of cooperative projects including the PNG and Railroad project. As long term oriented projects, Seoul has wanted to revive not only the Russia-North Korea-South Korea gas pipeline project but also the linking Railroad project which can be crucial sources to strengthen the economic and social development in the region. For all these ideas, Seoul launched 'The Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation' in June 2017 which is in charge of PNG and Railroad project. On the Russian side, in 2012, 'The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East' was established in order to realize the 'Turn to the East' policy, which was given a specific priority as a partially decentralized department to take Moscow's centralized order and manage politics in a regional part simultaneously. The projects under the auspices of these powerful governmental departments acquired power to drive forward.

Especially, PNG and Railroad project pertains outstanding significance out of other possible businesses which would be supported by them. Regarding this, business feasibilities are described below.

PNG project

For South-Korea is,

- 1. Lessening its gas import bill: it is expected to be 25%~30% cheaper than liquefied natural gas (LNG) based on the average LNG import price in 2017.*
- 2. Diversifying its gas supply sources: it can reduce its heavy dependence on the Middle East and Southeast Asia.*
- 3. Facilitating the energy transition policy: Seoul seeks to decrease its dependence on coal-fired power to solve the fine dust problem.*

For Russia is,

- 1. Diversifying its gas exports: Its gas exports are strongly concentrated in Europe. (Accounting for 82.02 % of the total gas exports in 2017)*
- 2. Reducing its dependence on China: Moscow's negotiating power against Beijing might be decreased in the Asia-Pacific gas market by the completion of 'Power of Siberia' pipeline.*
- 3. Increasing its influence over the Korean peninsula.*

And more about Railroad project (TSR-TKR),

Railroad project (TSR-TKR)

For South-Korea and Russia is,

- 1. Most optimal and money saving means of transportation: smaller dependence on climatic conditions, a higher level of ecological security, a more dramatic reduction of time and expenditure, a greater degree of safety for cargo.*
- 2. Reducing the transportation period.*
- 3. The high competitiveness: compare to the most preferred maritime transportation route 'Suez Canal' including other 5 possible routes.*

However, these projects are bound to fail unless it secures political support due to the North-Korean turbulence. In the case, it cannot be proceeded to the next stage and have no chance to be implemented at all. Each country has few options based on their strategic orientation to resolve this dilemma so this study suggests realistic role of each state.

First, Russia can act as a mediator in advantage of veto power of UNSC which gives a lot of leverage in closed-door negotiations on UN resolution and this role is helpful to escape from the economic asymmetry over China around Russian Far East. Russia is unlikely to agree on sanctions against Pyeongyang that could lead to the collapse of the North-Korean regime because the consequences of that scenario are too risky for the Russian Far East, especially Primorye krai, where Russian are living around 2 million, thus, Moscow can use veto power to prevent unpredictable disaster. Moreover, mediator's role may give chance to overcome strong monetary dependence on China around the region. Their relationship is clearly asymmetric because Moscow needs Beijing far more than Beijing needs Moscow. Therefore, Russia needs to change this dynamics by hand of PNG and Railroad project with both Koreas which are in less relevant than China but strategically important.

Second, Seoul is ready to be a donor for Pyeongyang. The history of South-Korean foreign policy has featured an unwavering focus on national unification as an essential strategic objective including saving North-Korean from the poverty. (The 'Sunshine policy' had well reflected this unique political ground) Unification policy is always South-Korean national identity and is a powerful political instrument to build up domestic political support for national leadership. Even though foreign policy fluctuated by the changing political ideology, the core value of the sunshine policy has endured throughout the diplomatic history between North and South all the time. Therefore this perspective can ask for donor's role to South-Korea in PNG and Railroad project.

Finally, in order to attract foreign investment, North-Korea must send a signal to global market as a sustainable peace state. North-Korean regime looks like failed to execute feeding its people which is one of the most important function of government and this can weaken its legitimacy of regime. However PNG and Railroad project can give Pyeongyang two major benefits which can undermine weak point. One is a substantial transit fee when the pipeline becomes operational and the other is new modernized railroad system which can facilitate North-Korean economic rehabilitation. In addition, it will serve as a momentum to change its economic structure to escape from the huge economic dependence on China. (More than 90% of North-Korean foreign trade takes place with China) North-Korea already have the experience on cooperating with South-Korea and Russia without sacrificing its national security. Therefore, when PNG and Railroad project is progressed, international community will see this as a beginning of peace movement and this can contribute to promote regional prosperity and reconciliation.

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