

Saint Petersburg State University

BERTUZZI Virginia

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The Problem of Threat perceptions within the European Union: the case of the CSDP

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Academic Supervisor:

Professor Tatiana Romanova

Reviewer:

PhD Ageeva Vera D.

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“La souffrance est une école de sagesse. Si à une certaine étape de la vie tu penses désister, regarde en arrière et les étapes traversées te remonteront sûrement le morale. La vie est un combat. Qu’est-ce qu’il puisse arriver dans notre vie, il ne faut jamais baisser les bras”¹.

¹ Translation: “If at a point in life you think of giving up, looking back at the way already taken will restore your morale. Life is a struggle. Whatever happens to us in our life, we should never give up.” This text was written by a prisoner in a center of detention in Mauritania where people are suspected of being irregular immigrants.

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Introduction:

In the recent years, new security threats and challenges arise within the European Union.² Many European countries have faced new security challenges and have felt somehow threatened by the events that occurred, like terrorism, immigration, organized crime, cyber-attacks. After the end of World War II, Europe tried to find a way for a lasting peace between countries. On March 25, 1957, the six founding countries signed the Treaty of Rome, one of the main milestones for the foundation of the European Union. However, it was only with the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, that the EU acquired modern institutions and new methods. The Treaty of Lisbon, introduced specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy, introducing the notion of European Capabilities and armament policy, but mostly introducing the Common Security and Defence policy with the actual provisions.³

After many centuries of periodic wars between the European countries, Europe knew peace and collaboration between countries that have always been enemies throughout history. For many years, wars were in distant countries and it seemed like nothing could shake that perfect harmony that the founders of the EU created. Due to the prosperity of peace and the presence of NATO, the European member state started to invest less and less of their GDP in the security and defense field. This resulted in lack of instruments and investments for their national security, and thus also for counter new security threats and challenges that arise in the early 2000s. The 9/11 attack represents one of the main chapters that changed forever the concepts of security and defense. This terror attacks had an impact also on the European Foreign and Security policy⁴ and it also showed the differences between the European countries strategic cultures. It quickly became evident that new threats and new challenges came out, and that the EU single countries as well as the EU couldn't avoid it. Although, the European Parliament had the task to enforce and develop a stronger CSDP, it is known that defense was neglected for quite a long period of time. In fact, during the Cold War European's security was

² Susi Dennisson, Ulrike Esther Franke and Paweł Zerka. 2018. "The nightmare of the dark: the security fears that keep Europeans awake at night", European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR)

³ European Union, 'the Lisbon Treaty', 2009 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:TOC>

⁴ Bono, Giovanna. "The Impact of 11 September 2001 and the "War on Terror" on European Foreign and Security Policy: Key Issues and Debates." *Studia Diplomatica* 59, no. 1 (2006): 7-26

mainly granted by NATO and the United States played a crucial role in the European integration and security.⁵

However, the CSDP has represented a tool for some countries to pursue national interests outside Europe. If this is true at a national level, it is also true at a European level. The efforts for the development of a much stronger CSDP have been futile. Over the past ten years the notion of European defense cooperation has been misused as a political device, but the European Council started to have a frank debate on defense issues only in 2013. In this sense, something has changed in the last few years and the state of emergency has been slowly recognized but in some ways it's already too late to fix the problem of lack of investments, and even the former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized the European countries for their lack of investments in the field of security and defense.⁶

In a nutshell, the EU has neglected defense for quite a long time and now this comes back again, in fact security threats after going further away geographically for 20-30 years, they are now coming closer to the EU borders and are becoming bigger in size as well, an example of that are the civil war in Syria or the war in Libya. This made institutions and countries realize that they lack the toolkits to deal with these new threats. The EU has a specific way to address challenges and threats, which are usually official written in their defence policies and official strategies, however it is also true that the EU doesn't own an army. For all of these reasons, some scholars believe that the EU cannot even be considered a security actor, in fact it spends less than the US for military research, innovation and new equipment.

On the other hand, the new security challenges in Africa pushed the EU member states to invest money for the deployment of some mission and in some cases never stopped to finance them. In fact, the EU started to deploy CSDP missions since 2003 and even though some argue that the results have been mediocre, some other argued that the CSDP moved forward, increasing its professionalism.⁷ An example was when Catherine Ashton used to be the EU High Representative and the situation in the Sahel region was already alarming. In fact, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was already controlling some parts of the regions,

⁵ Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world", Brussels, 8 December 2003
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>

⁶ Howorth J. 'Security and Defence Policy in the European Union' (2nd ed.). Basingstoke, U. K. : Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. (The European Union Series).

⁷ T. Tardy, "CSDP in action, what contribution to international security?", EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Chaillot Paper n.134, May 2015

especially in Mali, where the government was weak and couldn't counter terrorism. As a consequence, some issues arose like organized crime networks and weak security capabilities of the State. In this regard, Ashton argued that "threats to security transgress national borders and the only possible and effective response is a regional and a comprehensive one. We need to make the ongoing European engagement in the Sahel more coherent, coordinated and more effective".⁸ Furthermore, in 2004, Joe Borg during the European Policy Summit on EU Enlargement described as common challenges for Europe "illegal immigration and the threat of terrorism".⁹

However one could ask to what extent the CSDP has evolved throughout the years. First, it should be mentioned that CSDP actual provisions emerged only in 2009 with the Treaty of Lisbon, that established reforms aimed to strength the policy. Therefore this policy is relatively young and the EU is also a relatively young international security actor, if compared with international superpowers like the United States and Russia. Nowadays, scholars focus their studies on the so called "second wave of CSDP theorizing",¹⁰ however many other think over how and if CSDP has created a path-dependency constraining the behavior of Member States.¹¹

The goal of this research is to find if and how threat perceptions within the EU change or influence the path of CSDP. The importance of this research is due to some factors. First, threats in the last at least twenty years changed a lot, and the problem with nowadays threats is that they are interlinked with each other, posing an additional issue. For instance, migration is closely interrelated with smuggling and illegal trafficking, hence with forms of organized crime.¹² Second, also the European security environment has changed a lot in the recent past¹³ and it is curious to see how the discourse changed quickly throughout the years, how institutions within the EU started to speak again about defense and security. But it also to observe how some Member States have started to be vocal about a stronger European defence, this is the

⁸ European Parliament, Catherine Ashton speech "The Sahel Region", Speech/11/33, Strasbourg, 19 January 2011 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_11_33

⁹ European Union, "Speech by Joe Borg: Enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy", Brussels, 13 May 2004 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_04_247

¹⁰ Kurowska, X and Breuer, F. (eds), "Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy", Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan (2012)

¹¹ Giovanni Faleg, "The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: learning Communities in International Organizations", Springer, (2016)

¹² L-E. Lundin, "The EU and security, a handbook for practitioners", Snterus, 2015

¹³ Ian Anthony, "Reducing Military Risk in Europe", Sipri policy paper no. 51, 2019

case of France.¹⁴ Finally, the CSDP has gained new strategic importance, being not only useful for crisis management but it also became a tool that European states and EU itself used to pursue its own interests and priorities in the continent. In particular, the research doesn't look at structural changes in the CSDP, rather it focuses on which are the concrete results of threat perceptions. CSDP has always been considered weak but in reality many operations were established, and some missions even evolved as threats changed. In this sense, threat perceptions result also in this policy, and in EU policies that establish operations under the CSDP.

In order to reach the goal, the research will be divided into three main chapters, and a collective conclusion that will answer the research question. The first chapter provides a theoretical framework, two main theories will be used: social constructivism and new institutionalism, with a particular analysis on how these theories bring novelty in the study of the CSDP. The second chapter, analyzes the threats that have been mostly cited by the EU official security strategies since 2003, searching for definitions and reasons why they are perceived in that way. Finally, the third chapter looks for results of these threats using the case of the CSDP, describing results and missions. In particular, three CSDP missions are taken into account: EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali with a brief reference to Sahel EUTM Mali.

The threats that will be analyzed are related both with internal security issues and external security issues but somehow they all connect with CSDP. It would be impossible to mention all the security threats since 2003, the one that used to be more discussed by governments and EU documents were: immigration, terrorism and cyber security threats¹⁵. First of all, immigration is a potential security issue, not only for the internal security of receiving EU member states but also because of the problems connected with that, and it can be seen as a chain. In fact, immigration is linked with smuggling, smuggling is connected with international organized crime, and a confirm to that comes also from the United Nation stated that "Transnational organized criminal groups are generally involved in the smuggling of

¹⁴ Ministère de L'Europe et des affaires étrangères official website, "European Defence", <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/europe/european-defence/>

¹⁵ The word 'migrants' appears 8 times in the Eu Security Agenda of 2015, while 'terrorist' 'terrorism' 'terrorists' are cited 68 times. In the same document, words like 'cybercrime', 'cyber', 'cybersecurity', 'cybercriminals', 'cyberterrorism' are cited in total 36 times.

migrants from West Africa to Europe.”¹⁶ Moreover, terrorism is related with CSDP operations, in fact article 43 of TEU states that “All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”¹⁷ Finally, cyber security was described as a challenge in 2003 in the European Security Strategy, but it slowly became perceived as a threats in surveys. Also, the EU developed its own cyber defence policy and capabilities related with the CSDP. The choice of these three specific threats comes from a conscious decision, the EU has been through different security challenges for instance the Ukrainian crisis and the Baltics have long felt threatened by Russia. However, these three threats have been concretely taken into account by the EU for a long period of time, but mostly

In order to come to some conclusion and give an answer to the research question, it is important to study which is the perception of the threat, therefore presuming even that some threats may not be real threats. Raymond Cohen, who studied the threat perception during International Crises argues that when a threat is not perceived, even if it is evident or clear, there may be no mobilization of defensive resources or response whatsoever.¹⁸ Having this concept in mind, it is easier to come to a conclusion and to find out if the EU is dealing with some threats and giving an institutional response, with the tools of the CSDP. Some of the research papers analyzed in this thesis were made in collaboration between departments of International Relations, Political Science and Psychology. The latter is useful in fact to have a sociological and psychological explanation of the “perception”.

This research is focused mainly on primary sources, as speeches and official policies and strategies were essential to understand which words were used and which were and are the official positions of the EU and its policymakers and politicians. In this sense a discourse analysis was also needed, and the threat cited in the research have a background in past speeches and EU strategies. First things first, European Security Strategy of 2003 “*A Secure Europe in a Better World*” directly addressed some of these threats: terrorism and organized crime. In fact, it was stated that terrorism “poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe” while “Europe is a prime target for organized crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and

¹⁶ United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, “The role of organized crime: in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to the European Union”, United Nation, 2011

¹⁷ The Treaty on European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

¹⁸ Raymond Cohen, threat perception in International Crisis

weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.”¹⁹

The European Agenda on Security of 2015 shed a light on the security concerns of the EU by giving a EU official standpoint on many challenges and threats. In particular, it analyzes the evolution of threats, defining them “cross-border threats”.²⁰ Also, it provides a list of recommendations and set the future framework for official security measures, it advances proposals for dialogues on security aimed to discuss priorities “against transnational organized crime and terrorism, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings”²¹. Moreover, the Cybersecurity Strategy of the EU “*An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace*” described the context of cybersecurity, analyzing the problem that cyberspace poses and impact our society. In particular, it establishes the principles for cybersecurity, addressing the agencies that have the responsibility in order to achieve cyber resilience and the development of capabilities related with the CSDP.²² As for the, European Agenda of Migration of 2015, it describes the phenomena of migrations, establishing the path for the immediate actions, including the possibility for CSDP operations as a tool for shattering smuggling.²³ Furthermore, the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework adopted in 2018, which is an evolution of the cybersecurity strategy of 2013. The scope of the policy was to further develop and update the existing cyber defence policy, in particular it clarified the priorities and the role of European actors. Specifically, it stated that “Cyber security is a priority within the Global Strategy on the EU Foreign and Security Policy and within the EU Level of Ambition.”²⁴ Finally, the EU Counter-terrorism strategy adopted in 2005, declared that terrorism posed a threat to all Member States and to the European society, but it mainly established the four pillars of the EU’ counter-terrorism strategy.²⁵

¹⁹ Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy”, Brussels, 8 December 2003

²⁰ European Commission, “The European Agenda on Security”, 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf

²¹ Ibid p. 4

²² European Commission, “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”, Brussels, 2013 http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf

²³ European Commission, “A European Agenda on Migration”, 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

²⁴ Council of the European Union, “EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (2018 update)”, Brussels, 19 November 2018 <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14413-2018-INIT/en/pdf>

²⁵ Council of the European Union, “The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, Brussels, 30 November 2005 <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204>

The research is based on statistical analysis of data made by the Eurobarometer, a series of surveys commissioned by the EU Parliament that keeps monitoring the public opinion of EU member states. Its database is one of the biggest worldwide, and due to the fact that the results are published by the European Commission and/or European Parliament, the data was taken into consideration. In particular, the Special Eurobarometer 371 “*Internal Security*” of 2011 analyzes the perception of five challenges: terrorism, organized crime, natural and non-made disasters, cybercrime and security of EU borders.²⁶ For instance, it is interesting for the research because it shows as irregular immigration is perceived as a threat only by 13% but eastern Mediterranean, due to the geographical perspective, perceived it much more like a threat with data of 55% for Cyprus and 38% for Malta. Furthermore, the Special Eurobarometer 432 “*Europeans attitude towards security*” of 2015 analyzes the perceived threats and challenges, in particular the perceived sources of threats. Unsurprisingly terrorism remained a threat perceived by the EU public opinion and people assumed that the threat of terrorism was likely to increase.²⁷ The Special Eurobarometer 464b of 2017 is also about the Europeans attitudes towards security, and it takes into account always five challenges, however it put emphasis on the perception of national law enforcement authorities action in fighting specific threats. The report finds out that terrorism in 2017 was the major threat perceived by Member States.²⁸ Finally, the Special Eurobarometer 479 called “*Future of Europe*” of 2018, takes into account a multitude of themes, between those they asked Europeans what are the threats for the EU in the upcoming years. The results put terrorist attacks in the first position.²⁹ Moreover, it was also take into account the data presented by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which specifically analyzed only security threats.³⁰

²⁶ Special Eurobarometer 371, “*Internal Security*”, European Commission, 2011

https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S998_75_4_EBS371

²⁷ Special Eurobarometer 432, “*Europeans attitude towards security*”, European Commission, 2015

https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S2085_83_2_432_ENG

²⁸ Special Eurobarometer 464b, “*Europeans attitude towards security*”, European Commission, 2017

https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S1569_87_4_464B_ENG

²⁹ Special Eurobarometer 479, “*Future of Europe*”, European Commission, October-November 2018

https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2217_90_2_479_ENG

³⁰ S. Dennison, U. E. Franke, & P. Zerka, “*The Nightmare of the Dark: the security fears that keep europeans awake at night*”, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2018

CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: How Constructivism and New Institutionalism explain security and threat perception.

This research will be analyzed through two main theories: constructivism and new institutionalism. On one hand, constructivism “sees the world as a project under construction”³¹ while new institutionalism brings the State back in the discussion, stating the importance of institutions once again, in fact “Institutions shape actions”³². These theories have been chosen for the novelty that bring into the context of threat perception and CSDP. In fact, Both the neorealists and the neoliberals have failed in explaining why the bipolar system-in which the US and the USSR were balancing each other- during the Cold War collapsed. However, social constructivism helped to better understand security studies and in particular studies on the European security Integration. Neorealists failed in formulating an explanation of why Member States tried to deepen the European integration process. Their rhetoric of “relative or absolute-gain”³³ failed, while Constructivists tried to explain it with different key points.

When the European Union was established through the Maastricht treaty in 1993, a new official asset was created, making the EU a supranational entity. It’s important to know, that the European Union can be conceptualized in different ways, with different approaches and theories. To a certain extent, the creation and the ‘*mise en force*’ of the institutional system that is characteristic of the EU is a social construct, indeed different identities and interests share common visions and path. On the other hand, in Europe the state was never been eliminated and the EU is an institution related to other institutions, and New Institutionalism is useful because it argues that without a clear analysis and understanding of institutions, one cannot understand the choices made by individuals with institutions.

³¹ Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and BethA. Simmons. “Handbook of International Relations”, London: SAGE Publications, 2002.

³² André Lecours, “New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis”, University of Toronto Press, 2005.

³³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe." *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (1999): 83-114

1.1 Constructivism

What is Social Constructivism?

Constructivism steps away from the rationalist theories, and comes in the IR panorama in the 80ies, describing a different reality that we could call a social reality³⁴, trying to explain the social world differently than what was done before. Onuf was the first that introduced the term 'Constructivism'. The precedent theories -the traditional ones- supposed and almost took for granted the similarity and uniformity of States during history and have sought for regularities and generalizations. However, the end of the Cold War brought a huge change in the history of the International Relations, that were described by the rationalists; this change was represented by the fact that the time of war was replaced with cooperation, simply put 'from war to peace, from conflict to cooperation'.

These theories have partially failed in describing this alteration, and it was in the 1900s in which social constructivism tries to give a new explanation. This new theory puts emphasis on new aspects like the importance of social norms and rules, and so new democratic values – or how constructivists will call them 'social accepted norms'- brought skepticism about the validity of the past theories, in particular the realists view of the world, that cares only about the material interest of the States and its power. Constructivism argues that realists have failed during the post-Cold war 'era' to describe what happened, in particular they have failed in giving a reasonable explanation of the new issues of the Era. For these reasons, Constructivism tries to put out a new vision and a new explanation that was not just based on material factors, in fact constructivists took into account the changes and the new reality and understood the importance of also ideational factors.

Here's stands another issue that Constructivists took into account: the structure-agent issue; while the rationalists theories focused more on the structure, constructivists deviates their rhetoric and started to introduce the agency and the interactions between actors. Interactions between States and international actors become a central key in the constructivist discourse. If before they reacted to situations trying to maximize their benefits as rational individuals, now in the interaction with other actors they can make choices and new realities are brought in these interactions. That's why, constructivists will further say that interactions and more generally International relations are a social construct. However, it's right to mention that Constructivism

³⁴ Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons p. 114

has evolved and muted and that nowadays there are some consistent varieties within it. The main currents are: Conventional and Critical constructivism. The former asks questions like – *what* causes a State to act in a certain way. Conventional constructivism seek the relations between actors, social norms, interests and identities, and it's more focused understanding the causal explanation to something. Hence, they are interested in which are the factors that causes something. The latter focuses its attention on *how* – how States believe in a certain way, how their identity is formed. They don't bring their attention on the causal effect, so they don't think in causal terms. As an alternative, they are interested in the process of constructing an identity, how an identity is formed, which are its components and how an identity is made. The came up with the idea that an identity is formed through language and communication, interactions between actors or individuals. Language and communication (both spoken and written) play a key role for Critical constructivists, which analyzed how these two elements can change (or not) the reality in which individuals live and how language can also shape and construct that reality.

One could ask which are the main elements of separation between the previous theories and Constructivism. The way that Constructivism and Rationalists (as well as neorealists and neoliberals) see the social being is quite different. For neorealists, such as Waltz, at the center of everything there are the States who try to maximize their profits (and power), they consider States just like individuals who try to survive in an anarchic environment. That environment is highly competitive and each State tries to maximize its power at the expense of another State, hence a fundamental element is that each State is selfish and think about its own reward and self-interest.

Here stands a big deviation, the world of neorealists, centered on States and in the distribution of power does not take into account that social environment and the trace of “socialization”. On the other hand, neoliberals focus their attention on how ideas can be a key player in International Relations, e.g. how ideas can motivate an army to fight a war for democratic and liberal values. However, constructivists like Ruggie argued that “the individuals featured in story are not born into any system of social relationship that helps shape who they become”³⁵ What is clear is that the social context is extremely important for Constructivism,

³⁵ Ruggie, J. G. (1998), 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', *International Organization*, 52/4: p. 866

therefore individuals cannot be separated from that social context in which they live and grow, that context shape their identity and the choices available for them. As Onuf would say “constructivism applies to all fields of social inquiry”³⁶

Alexander Wendt can be considered one of the main scholars of this theory, called Constructivism. Wendt put emphasis on how identities and interests of States are ‘social constructs’ and how world politics is socially constructed. In particular, constructivism argues that social interactions and social relations construct individuals and make us who we are. When individuals interact with each other, it’s like they “construct” the world they live in. Though they argue that States are independent and self-sufficient, it’s just partially true; this because States have interaction in the international system and this is what creates International Relations. For all the reasons precedingly mentioned, the society is a fundamental environment for individuals, the society influences individuals and make them who they are but it’s also true the contrary: individuals create the society in which they live. States have different interests, these interests assume a distinct form through the interaction with other International actors. However, Wendt take a stand against the idea of “national interest”, in fact he argues that interests take into account not just the mere desire of actors but also their beliefs based on careful consideration. In his words, “only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material [...] the rest is ideational: schemas and deliberations that are in turn constituted by shared ideas or culture.”³⁷ All in all, the desire is different than belief, because “we want what we want because of how we think about it”.³⁸

The impact of *norms* on international security is what concerns constructivists, social norms are crucial to Constructivism.³⁹ Ideas and Norms constitute the political arena. Moreover, norms restrict behaviors and therefore they are the reason for the identity of individuals/actors. There are some norms, actions and behaviors that are socially accepted more than others. During history, Diplomacy played a key role in creating and reproducing international beliefs that the International players eventually started taking for granted. Alexander Wendt, explains how the British arsenal will be less threatening to the US than the North Korean’s one. That’s because of the meaning that they give to the material structure.

³⁶ Peceny, Mark. “International Relations in a Constructed World. Edited by Vendulka Kubáľková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. P. 58

³⁷ Wendt, Alexander. “Social Theory of International Politics”, Cambridge University Press, 1999

³⁸ Ibid p. 119

³⁹ Katzenstein defined norms as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”

According to Wendt, it is true that the distribution of material and military capabilities matters, however it's also true that "the meaning of power depends on the underlying structure of shared knowledge".⁴⁰ This example means that by themselves nuclear weapons don't have any meaning; it's not these weapons per se that are important, nuclear weapons becomes important when we understand the meaning that the society and states give to them, when we understand the social context in which they are put. Constructivists overcome that material reality, which was true for realists and neoliberalists.⁴¹ However, it's necessary to say that Constructivists do not completely refuse materialism, they don't reject a material reality, however this reality can mute depending on what actors make of it.⁴²

At the end, Wendt argues that "anarchy is what states make of it"⁴³. This doesn't mean that constructivists do not value anarchy nor that they overcome it, it simply means that anarchy can be seen in different ways depending on the meaning that the International players give to it. As circumstances change, even international relations change and so anarchy change its meaning, in particular relations between Countries can change in a positive way (or negative). In particular, Wendt argues that States will have different behaviors and relations towards other States, depending if these other States are enemies or friends, in fact "U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba"⁴⁴.

Another central point in the constructivist rhetoric is the concept of *identity*: constructivists think that States have many different identities that are socially constructed. According to Wendt, on a theoretical level, it is possible to compare States with individuals. Not only individuals act toward objects on the basis of the meanings that the object have for them⁴⁵ but also individuals have many identities that they show in everyday life according to what they have to do or according to the role they have to play, for instance a mother, a teacher, a police officer, a citizen and so on.⁴⁶ In the same way, a State will have many identities as well;

⁴⁰ Wendt, Alexander. 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security* 20 (1): 70-81. 1995

⁴¹ In fact, according to Realism and Neoliberalism the world is embodied by rational actors, which are selfish and self-interested States; the relations between these States are strictly arranged by the balance of material power. Hence, due to this reason, States cannot overcome anarchy and cooperate, because they are driven by different and selfish interests.

⁴² Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations : the Politics of Reality* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002),4

⁴³ Wendt, 1992

⁴⁴ Wendt, p.397

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 396-397

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 398

It's like States interact in the same way individuals do. Moreover, there's a relationship between interest and identities. A small State will have a different identity from a bigger one, the small State will have as main interest its survival, while the bigger one will seek advantages in the international arena, trying to dominate it. According to this narrative, the actions and the choices of States are strictly related to their identities, therefore "Identities are the basis of interests"⁴⁷. Therefore, It is the social context in which individuals live that change their interests and identities, both are socially constructed.⁴⁸ The identities and interest are not permanent, in fact they may change throughout time and they can mute due to social interactions. In a nutshell, when new situations happen, we mute also our interests depending on the meaning that we give to it.

Threats are another key point that constructivism has studied and conceptualized differently. In fact in a self-help world of sovereign States threats arise naturally.⁴⁹ A very important factor is that constructivists think that threats are made by different factors that can be history, communications and so on. According to Hopf, constructivism gives a useful alternative to the liberal theory of democratic peace, balance of threat, cooperation under anarchy and security dilemmas.⁵⁰ However, constructivists differ a lot from mainstream theories because they don't take the world as an objective thing, it's not something static. Balance of threat is not embodied in the constructivist theory; for instance, they argue that Soviet Union and the West perceived each other as a threat not just because their behaviors but also because they had different identities and cultures, and for this reason they understood each other differently perceiving the other like a threat; thus, this explanation is not just objective like neorealist argue. In a nutshell, constructivism tries to give an explanation to why threats are perceived and arise asking "How" instead of "why";

Agent-Structure Dilemma

Rules bring here another information, in fact they tell who are the agents – the active participants that compose a society. According to Constructivists, the agency and the structure are also socially and mutually constituted which means that each constitute the other;

⁴⁷ Ibid, 398

⁴⁸ According to constructivism, the identity of actors is formed by the structure.

⁴⁹ Ulusoy, Hasan "Revising security communities after the cold war: the constructivist perspective", Center for Strategic Studies, 2003

⁵⁰ Hopf, Ted p. 186

constructivists focused their attention on who shapes who, in particular the question was: how are structure and agent related?

First of all, the agent is usually the individual or the State, while the structure is represented by the structural context. The structure can be described as that international system composed by material and ideational elements; this structural context may both influence the environment or being influenced by the environment. For instance, the structure may be composed by factors like ideas of how a society should be. In this sense, these ideas shape the way individuals behave in that society, ideas tell people what's an appropriate behavior is; also, structural factors have a huge influence on the identity of individuals. To simplify, Constructivists argue that the identity and the choices available of the agent are shaped by that structure.⁵¹ Agents perform into the social structure.

As Onuf says “agents make the material world a social reality for themselves as human beings”.⁵² As an agent, you have goals and limited choices available for you; therefore, the agent will act according to its purposes using any means possible. However, in any society there are rules, some explicit and some implicit, that human being follow for being good citizens. It is the society that sets the rules and decides if the behaviors of its citizens is good or bad. It's not the agent who sets the rules, it's the society as a whole that dictate which are the right rules to follow; because of this, the agent is not totally free, because rules limits its acts.

For these reasons, agents are limited, some limits are not materials, as Onuf suggests a human being needs air to breathe and cannot fly because humans don't have wings, and although human being can create airplanes, still they have limited resources available.⁵³ To better understand the relation between the agent and the structure, Wendt suggests that just like capitalists are an effect of that capitalistic structure and mode on production in which they live, thus “state agents are effects of the structure of the world system”⁵⁴

To recapitulate, Constructivism takes into account identities and interests; as Ruggie suggests “Social constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human

⁵¹ Larivé, Maxime H. A. 2014. *Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity*. Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series. Farnham, Surrey, England: Routledge

⁵² Kubalkova, Vendulka, Onuf, Nicholas, Kowert, Paul “International Relations in a Constructed World.” New York: Routledge, 1998

⁵³ Ibid, p.64

⁵⁴ Wendt, p. 346 (1987)

action”⁵⁵ and again “constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life”⁵⁶. He argues that material structures exist, however these are invested with powerful social meanings.⁵⁷ The difference with the previous theories is that, while neorealism argued that States are more or less the same and so there are no possible mutation in the structure, constructivism thinks that agency and structure “grounds its view that social change is both possible and difficult”⁵⁸

Institutions

Moreover, there’s the question of institutions; rationalists stated that institutions are just a platform for international players to choose and adopt their strategies based on their preferences, however constructivists think that institutions incorporate informal norms and formal rules.⁵⁹ In some way, rules are also related to each other, agents can recognize this and it can be said that rules come in families.⁶⁰ Institutions and identities of actors/agents are related to each other, in fact the actor’s identity and interests are shaped by the institutional structures.⁶¹ Scholars of International Relations used to call these families of rules “regimes”, however recently they have started to call them “institutions”. These two terms became almost identical, and by regime scholars mean an international regime made of rules, principles, norms and procedures.⁶²

According to Onuf, norms and rules can be distinguished by how formal they are, some norms are so informal that one cannot be sure that there are rules, until they observe how agents respond to them. For the same reason, institutions are made in the same way. The rules that make institutions can differ a lot. On the same way, Wendt follows Onuf’s thoughts, he suggests that “an institution is a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests”;⁶³ as Onuf he shares the idea that institutions contain within themselves rules and norms, that have power

⁵⁵ Ruggie, J.G. “Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization” (New York: Routledge), 1998

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.856

⁵⁷ *Ibid*

⁵⁸ Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171-200

⁵⁹ Leviré, Maxime H. A., p. 37

⁶⁰ Onuf, p.69

⁶¹ Tonra, B. (2003), Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41: 731-756

⁶² *Ibid*, p.70

⁶³ Wendt, p. 399 (1992)

in how the collectivity acts, socializes and behaves. Thus, institutions represent the social structure and “are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors ideas about how the world works”⁶⁴

Constructivism and the Integration of the CSDP

To recapitulate, the dominant theory in security studies remains the rational choice approaches that argues that States are rational and seek to maximize their benefits. However, constructivists have tried to explain the emergence of an European security and defense policy in a different way, stepping back from the ‘state-centric’ rational vision. The difference with the classic schools of thought of IR is that Constructivism sees the EU as a security actor in the international order. While the EU is recognized as an economic actor by most of theories, it cannot be said the same regarding its military credibility. In part due to the fact that it doesn’t have a common army, but also because of the credibility of the CSDP.

Pernille Rieker explained the Constructivist perspective over the EU security policy in three components; first, according to Social Constructivists the EU has already some levels of autonomy⁶⁵, although the EU cannot be considered a unitary actor, it has a certain degree of influence over Member States. Moreover, in order to adapt with their environment States may try to influence the security discourse and policies at a European level. On the other hand, some studies of EPC argued that the European states would seek for consensus with the other members.⁶⁶ Taking into account the constructivist paradigm that identities can develop or change, according to Tonra, when there’s a foreign policy initiative States will reflect on “ ‘what will the European partners think’ rather than ‘what is our position on this’”.⁶⁷ After 9/11, the EU took some initiatives in order to enforce its security within its borders, allowing police to operate in other member states’s territories (domestic police cooperation), for this reason as Rieker suggests sovereignty has been transformed. Moreover, the EU delineated the ‘High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy’ that exercise its influence over the national foreign policy of each country, most of the times affecting member states policies. Second, the EU has a security policy that stretches beyond military means.⁶⁸ Following this

⁶⁴ Idib, p. 399

⁶⁵ Pernille Rieker, “EU Security Policy: Contrasting Rationalism and Social Constructivism”, NUPI, 2004

⁶⁶ Simon J. Nuttall, “European Political Co-Operation”, Oxford University, 1992

⁶⁷ Ben Tonra. “ The Europeanisation of the National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union”. London: Routledge, 2001

⁶⁸ Rieker, p. 10

idea, Social Constructivism argues that the EU has military capability as well, in fact the EU should not be compared with the US and Russia but it should be analyzed what it is able to do and achieve. Finally, the EU security policy is likely to be developed⁶⁹ and there's already proof of this. Rieker brings several examples, like the establishment of the EU operational headquarters, the set-up of a European armament agency, the adoption of a security strategy that recognizes the main threats and the proposal for assistance and solidarity between states in case of a terrorist attack. To conclude, Constructivists are aware that States have different positions regarding international politics and different priorities, however they also believe that they would come together for important issues especially when it comes to implement security policies.

Interdependence can push States to cooperate and eventually develop a “collective identity”, however in these situations there's always the risk that someone will take advantages from that; because of this, when there's a certain grade of interdependence, it is necessary that there's also auto-limitation. If there's a common threat, this can push the building of new alliances. However, the participation in a community can bring the fear that other actors are going to take some better benefits or take advantages of the others; that's why, it's important that the behaviors of States follow rules of auto-limitation; homogeneity can keep in the conflict among actors and help the development of a collective identity. Tonra believes that in the construction of a CFSP some elements are crucial for explaining and understanding that policy such as roles, rules, identity and ideas.⁷⁰ Starting from the point that States are role players, they will be aware of the context in which they are and about the decision-making situations and as a result they will take decisions according to that.⁷¹ Following this vision, the CSFP evolves and states mute their interests and identities when they are called for the development of the security policy. It has been already stressed that for constructivism the change in world politics is possible and difficult.⁷² This is also true when States negotiate some policies, the change that constructivist speak about, it is possible whether if we talk about identities or world politics, because nothing is static.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p.11

⁷⁰ Tonra, B. (2003) p. 739

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 739

⁷² Hopf, Ted, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No.1, 1998

In the context of the ESDP, member states are role players and its role it is not simply shaped by the logic of gains.⁷³ In fact, it is more correct to say that it is shaped by the so called 'logic of appropriateness', "a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior [...] Rules are followed because they are seen as natural"⁷⁴ therefore States keep in mind the expectations of other States in the decision-making process.

In conclusion, the whole research indirectly assumes that the EU acts as a security global actor, there's a question that we should ask – Is the EU making any difference in the world politics? And What role does the EU play in terms of security and defence? These questions are formulated not only in the context of international relations, but more specifically in the security and defence context. As already said, constructivism sheds a light on these issues, and can be useful in explaining the European case; we should always remember that constructivists argue that the international structure is shaped by ideas and norms; in turn, these ideas and norms shape interests, identities, behaviors. Constructivism is useful in the study of the EU foreign affairs and security and defence policy, because it gives importance to what previous theories didn't conceptualize; it gives importance to social interactions, that influence member States, also it combines material structure with sociological factors. For example, constructivism argues that the European strategic culture may be shaped by "shared experiences of military missions, similar risk assessment and socialization of elites within common institutions".⁷⁵ However, constructivism is just one of the main theories with which one can analyze EU policies and it's not empirical, nor establishes to be like that. After the end of the Cold War, the EU had much more opportunities to become central in world politics and influential, hence its role became more crucial in International relations. It's also true that the process of integration within the EU and among member state has given the EU more power and the ability to become a global actor capable to influence the space outside its "borders". It should be taken into consideration that the EU has made huge progress and has acquired more ability in acting collectively in the geopolitics context.⁷⁶

⁷³ N. Karacasulu & E. Uzgören, "Explaining social constructivist contributions to security studies", METU conference on International Relations, June 14-15, 2006, Ankara

⁷⁴ J. G. March & J. P. Olsen. "The logic of appropriateness", Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2004

⁷⁵ Czaputowicz J., "European Cooperation in the Field of Security and Defence. International Relation Theories Perspective", University of Warsaw, *Securitologia* nr 1/2014

⁷⁶ Laffan, B., O' Donnell, R., Smith, M. (1999). *Europe's Experimental Union*. London: Routledge: 214

In conclusions, the points that were made were several:

Constructivism:

- It is an approach to understand social phenomena, rather than a formal theory.
- Actors are role players.
- States/Agents examine the context and the expectations of the decision-making
- Identity and cultures matter, in fact identity doesn't determine the foreign policy but it explains the national interest. Also, Identities can mute over time.
- According to Ruggie, material structures do exist and are invested with a social meaning. This means that actors acquire a certain behavior when they enter in relation with other actors.
- It seeks to find which impact norms have on the identities, behaviors and roles of actors.
- It understand the security problem as a social phenomenon.⁷⁷
- According to Wendt, ideas have a role in social interactions, cultures have a deep impact as well in international relations and the structure is important because it can shape identities, ideas and interests of individuals.
- Threats are constructed by social processes that are a result of cultural, ideological and historical factors.

1.2 New Institutionalism

New institutionalism theory is based on the idea that organizations are planted in a sociological and political environment. It tries to explain why institutions matter in the political life and how these institutions can change or influence the behavior of States/actors. Institutions can be defined by the sets of rules and codes that shape the behaviors of actors. The genesis of new institutionalism arise from the field of political science, that have been mostly focused on the study of institutions and power. Institutionalism obtained much more attention during the last decades, it shares some assumption with the liberal tradition, in particular with neoclassical economics; due to this, new institutionalism is based on methodological individualism.⁷⁸ Individuals create different institutions that eventually will be useful to reach their interests and goals, hence institutions are directly influenced by the behaviors of individuals.

⁷⁷ Ole Weaver, "Securitization and Desecuritization", Ronnie Lieschutz, On Security, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 46-86

⁷⁸ Palan, R. (Ed.). (2013). Global Political Economy. London: Routledge

However, new institutionalism is different from previous economic theories and it appeared as a “reaction to the dominance of realist thinking which assumes that conflict between states is inherent in an international system characterized by anarchy”.⁷⁹ Neo-institutionalism takes also inspiration from the sociological world, in particular toward the ideas of Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Marx. For instance, from Weber they have taken the idea of conflict within and between institutions, while from Marx they have taken the idea of power structures and macro-historical processes in which institutions are implanted.⁸⁰ According to Smith, institutions can help to facilitate many processes, in particular they provide technical expertise, wisdom and knowledge, moreover they can create new norms and ideas that can influence States.⁸¹ Basically, what institutions do is facilitate the conversation among States so that they can reach common agreements, for this reason institutions are also important because they influence the result of the decisions. Moreover, historical and organizational institutionalism were created by sociologists, that aimed to bring back institutions and political organization in the social analysis.⁸²

New Institutionalism is not unified and has within itself a different set of approaches, and all of them have different focuses and have their roots in different disciplines such as sociology, economy, history; the most important analytical approaches inside new institutionalism are: Rational choice institutionalism, Historical institutionalism and the Sociological institutionalism. One may think that these approaches have much in common, however they give different explanations about the political world; though it can be said that they seek to identify which role institutions play in the determination of social and political results. The main questions scholars ask are: institutions versus individual behavior, and how institutions originate and evolve. Although, they have quite similar interests, they are independent from each other,⁸³ and they look at institutions differently.

⁷⁹ White, Brian (2001) *Understanding European Foreign Policy*, London, Palgrave

⁸⁰ Jenson, Jane, Mérand, Frédéric (2010). *Sociology, Institutionalism and the European Union. Comparative European Politics*. Vol. 8, 1, 74-92. Macmillan Publishers

⁸¹ Smith, Michael E. (2004) *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge University Steven et al (2004), “A European Way of War”, London, Centro for European Reform.

⁸² Jenson, J. and Merand, F.. “Sociology, institutionalism and the European Union,” *Comparative European Politics*, 2010

⁸³ Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” *Political Studies* 44, no. 5 (December 1996): 936-57.

Historical Institutionalism (HI) developed its core concepts during the 1960s and 1970s; it has been inspired by structural-functionalism and theories of politics, however it developed its own concepts and rejected some functionalist explanations. It stresses that institutional resolutions approved in the past can hang on and constrain actors for several time later on the choices are made. The question is why and how institutions matter? On the contrary of structural-functionalism, HI doesn't agree with the thinking that social, psychological and cultural traits of actors drive the system's operation. In fact, they argue that it's the principal factor that shape and structures individual behavior is the political economy.⁸⁴ Moreover, according to HI institutions are difficult to change; this resilience is connected both with the uncertainty of institutional infrastructure and both because of the high costs and stakes related with national constitutions and international treaties, that are not easy to reform.⁸⁵ Hence, institutions are seen as "formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity"⁸⁶ and HI conceive them as organizations and the conventions emanated within them. Individuals are seen as entities living in a world organized by institutions, in which routines have already been formed; also, institutions can shape the identity of individuals and can influence their preferences. Institutions can also affect the behaviors of individuals/actors by giving them a certain degree of certainty about the future behavior of other actors.

Taking into consideration what just mentioned, we can argue that HI is based on several assumption. First, institutions give incentives to stick with them and not leave them due to the high costs of abandoning a pre-existing system. This could be summarized with the concept of "*path dependence*", once a member state deliberately made some decisions and accepted some institutional rules, it is difficult to revoke previous decisions and therefore member states are encouraged to "perpetuate institutional and policy choices inherited from the past, even when the resulting outcomes are manifestly inefficient".⁸⁷ In a nutshell, the costs would be higher than the benefits. For this reason, scholars argue that HI is not distant from the rational choice theory. There could be two kind of explanations using both the economic and cultural approach; from the first point of view, institutions continue to exist due to a Nash equilibrium so actors

⁸⁴ Hall and Taylor p. 6

⁸⁵ Mark A. Pollack. "Institutionalism and European Integration," in Antje Wiener, Tanja Börzel, and Thomas Risse, *European Integration Theory*, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, February 2019 Forthcoming).

⁸⁶ Hall and Taylor p. 6

⁸⁷ Mark A. Pollack p. 3

don't deviate because deviation will be not optimal. While, culturally some institutions are ordinary and already accepted and they cannot be easily changed by individuals. Moreover, HI argues that institutions distribute power unequally among social groups, hence there's a "disproportionate access to the decision-making process" that eventually creates losers and winners.⁸⁸ However, from the HI narrative it is not clear how paths are being formed; some scholars argue that there are 'policy legacies', though others argue that new paths can be taken and that institutional changes may occur. According to HI this can happen when there are economic crises, shocks or military conflicts.

Rational choice institutionalism is another branch of NI and just like other schools it has different variables. It originated in contemporary with HI and started to analyze the American congressional behavior and the effects of US Congressional institutions in general. Scholars noted that there was a paradox; taking into account the rational choice theory, in a majoritarian decision-making system like the US, it should be difficult to secure a majority for legislation in the Congress. In fact, policy choices should be unstable and cycling due to the multiple preference-orderings of legislators,⁸⁹ so there should not be a lasting majority among legislators.⁹⁰ However, they ended up noting that despite what just mentioned, there was a stability of policies within the Congress. Of course, this raised questions and in the late 1970s, rational choice scholars started to ask how and why that stability was reached. Contrarily to HI, Rational Choice Institutionalism adopts a deductive methodology, which means that explanations to phenomena are deduced from abstract assumptions. RCI argues that actors are rational, they have preferences, beliefs and their behavior is a sum of the intelligent choices and calculation. Also, actors are selfish and they make choices in order to maximize their benefits. Individual's preferences are shaped by the institutional context. The institutional context is a place in which behaviors are encouraged or discouraged. Some scholars also argue that institutions have been created in order to minimize transaction costs. To summarize, although inside RCI there are some variations we can argue that there are common features. First, individuals have a fixed set of preferences and behave in a way that maximize their preferences. Second, according to Hall and Taylor, RCI sees politics as a series of collective action dilemmas.⁹¹ Third, individual's behavior is driven by a scrupulous calculus strictly related by

⁸⁸ Hall and Taylor p. 9

⁸⁹ Hall, Taylor: The Three New Institutionalisms p.10

⁹⁰ Mark A. Pollack p.2

⁹¹ Hall, Taylor p. 12

what actors expect the others are going to do. Finally, in order to explain how institutions origin, they argue that actors develop and create institutions because of the gains originated from the cooperation.

Sociological institutionalism arose from organizational theory in late 1970s. It has been developed in sociology and it's not homogenous within itself. SI is probably the one from the three theories that differs more in thought. It argues that institutions constitute actors, shaping their ideas and beliefs. The core of SI is that there are sociological qualities like ideas, share values and norms that are of vital importance inside institutions because they can shape policies. Therefore, SI is close to Constructivism, arguing that values and ideas influence the practices within institutions. It also tries to explain why institutions throughout the world are similar regardless of local differences.⁹² Institutions don't affect only actor's choices and behavior but also their preferences and identity, identities are constituted from the institutional forms.

New Institutionalism has been employed also for studying the EU integrations. One of the main argument of this thesis is the CSDP, and according to Article 36 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the EU has the right to scrutinize the policy and take initiative of addressing the VP/HP.⁹³ The EP has also the right to hold debates for speaking about the implementation of CFSP and CSDP. Over the past two decades, NI (RCI) has studied the legislative organization of the EP and the voting behavior of its members.⁹⁴ Scholars adapted this new study on the already existing model derived from the study of the US Congress. The EP is composed by different parties, and the result of the study was that MEP voting behavior is not due to their nationality but instead it is mostly related with the MEP's party group. Due to these practices, these studies showed that the EP can be studied like a normal Parliament, just like the American Congress, in which members vote accordingly to their party in a cohesive way. NI also investigate why and under which conditions member states delegate their power to other entities, like the Commission. And what happens if the agent to which you have delegated your power behaves in a way different from national preferences of MS? This is explained by arguing that the principles are usually established before the agency starts working, thus principles are established before the scope of agency activities.⁹⁵ NI analyzed

⁹² Hall, Taylor p. 14

⁹³ Fact Sheets on the European Union -2020 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.1.2.pdf

⁹⁴ Mark A. Pollack p. 5

⁹⁵ *ibid* p.8

also the aspects of European Integration; Fritz Scharpf, in his book talked about the ‘joint-decision trap’ which means that when government decisions, institutions or policies when are taken they tend to be rigid and to stay put.⁹⁶

In conclusion, there’s also an old institutionalism and a new one. The new institutionalism, in fact, takes some aspects of the old one and goes further, while the old one is still stuck between the interwar idealism and international organization studies. Hence, new institutionalism cannot be unified into a one identical body because it consists in more analytical approaches.⁹⁷ New Institutionalism takes into account many things, in particular the process of institutional change, and the relationship between institutions and other analytical variables and concepts.⁹⁸ Similarity can be found with neo-realist theory, in fact both neorealists and neo-institutionalist agree on the fact that the international system is anarchic and that States are still the key actors in the international system. However, new-institutionalists think that States have interests in cooperating, in fact “external forces or pressures such as anarchy, the distribution of power, or hegemonic leadership do not dictate state behavior”.⁹⁹

In conclusion, the point that were made were several:

New Institutionalism:

- Institutions are important and do matter in the political context; they shape and influence actors behaviors, which are influenced and conditioned by the institutional context. It focus its attention on how institutions shape ideas, rather than the contrary.¹⁰⁰
- Historical Institutionalism has two key concepts: “path dependence” and “unintended consequences”, institutions are a constant in history. It argues that history matter but it goes beyond trying to explain how historical events change or influence future political choices and results.
- Rational choice institutionalism argues that actors have a fixed set of preferences, therefore in order to achieve their goals they behave instrumentally in order to maximize their goals, strategically calculating every move. Just like economic theories, they think

⁹⁶ Scharpf, Fritz W., “The Joint-Decision Trap. Lessons From German Federalism and European Integration” Public Administration, Vol. 66, No. 2. Pp. 239-78 (1988)

⁹⁷ Hall, Peter A. and Taylor, Rosemary C.R. (1996) *Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism*, MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/6

⁹⁸ *New Institutionalism : Theory and Analysis*. 2005. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

⁹⁹ Smith, Michael E. (2004) p. 20

¹⁰⁰ W. Salet, “The Routledge Handbook of Institutions and Planning in Action”, Routledge, 2018

that institutions originates in order to give the ability to actors to maximize their value, hence actors are utility maximizing individuals. Also, institutions provide actors useful information that reduce uncertainty about other actors behaviors, potentially allowing better outcomes.

- Sociological institutionalism argues that institutions are helpful in order to explain the ‘world’ and the organizations in which individuals and States participate. Therefore, sociological institutionalism focuses its attention to the role of institutions and how they can shape identities, behaviors and preferences of States.

1.3 Threat Perception seen by Constructivism and New Institutionalism

In the international relations theory, a threat perception is described as a situation in which a group or an agent has the capacity or intention to threaten another group or agent with harmful actions. However, threats are not certain and there’s always a probability they will not be carried out. Security Studies scholars emphasize the importance of analyzing if the threats that we are facing are real or if there are some individuals or groups that have benefits from certain security threats.

Threats can be divided into two groups: threats toward a community (a collective of individuals) and threats against an individual. International relations theories focus on threat that are against a collection of individuals, however different theories have different approaches to define threats. There can be different types of threats against a collectivity of individuals, the most common are: military threats, economic threats and cultural threats.

Some scholars argue that risks and threats have always been selected and considered by elites, in addition to that they argue that the way people view risks and threats reflects people’s values, choices, beliefs and perceptions.¹⁰¹ In addition, some studies focused their attention on the perceptions of the public opinion, arguing that public perceptions and constructions of threat differ depending on identity, ethnicity, religion, gender, location.¹⁰² The post-Cold War era really challenged Realists assumptions on security, and the result was that new approaches gained more success for explaining security in a new light. When, different theories were taking

¹⁰¹ Stevens, Daniel, and Nick Vaughan-Williams. “Citizens and Security Threats: Issues, Perceptions and Consequences Beyond the National Frame.” *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 46, no. 1, 2016, pp. 149–175., doi:10.1017/S0007123414000143

¹⁰² Jarvis and Lister, 2013: 162

into account economic, environmental and social threats, Realists strongly criticized the broadening of the concept of security.¹⁰³ In fact, Walt argued that the broadening of security was making it difficult to establish the limits.¹⁰⁴

On the other hand, Constructivism argues that threats are not objectives, but instead are constructed. As a consequence, constructivists agree that security is a political construction, for this reason threats cannot be objectives and fixed like Realists argue. Hence, threats perceptions are not immutable and States can change their perceptions over security risks and threats, according to the evolutions of facts.

During the Cold War, when the world was bipolar, the threats were influenced by the East/West competition and a nuclear war was the main threat perceived. But threats changed and so public opinion and scholars started to focus their attention in another way. 9/11 represented a new pillar for security studies, it still represents a singular episode that changed the concepts of security and defense. As a consequence, new threat perceptions on terrorism (and other issues) changed the way governments implemented security policies.

Threat perceptions are easily interpretable and psychology is related to the concept of perception and misperception. As Janice Gross Stein argues, “leaders deliberately minimize or exaggerate the threat an adversary poses, they do not unconsciously misperceive but deliberately distort”¹⁰⁵, according to Gross Stein, policymaking is directly influenced by misperceptions and perceptions. Moreover, Gross Stein argues that there are two kind of threats in international relations. One is conditional and the other is called “situational threat”. The former is when an individual or a leader threatens another one with harmful consequences if this one doesn’t comply with the request; in a nutshell, when a leader uses deterrence, therefore it is not important the threat in itself, rather the perception of the threat.¹⁰⁶ The latter refers to the case in which leaders don’t perceive the threats that are communicated or formally said by another but also threats that lie in the environment; however, these so called “situational threats” are difficult to detect both for policymakers and for scholars. This happens because every individual perceive a situation in its personal way, that might be different from one another;

¹⁰³ Pernille Rieker, “EU Security Policy: Contrasting Rationalism and Social Constructivism”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper 659, 2004, p. 7

¹⁰⁴ Walt, Stephen M. “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211-39

¹⁰⁵ Janice Gross Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: the Misperception of Threat”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 245-271

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*

hence, it is difficult to discuss about how the threat is accurate and even for scholars is arduous to analyze the scope of the threat.

Another important contribution to the study of threat perceptions has been made by Christoph Meyer and Alister Miskimmon, who explains how “social and political dynamic shape the process of threat construction”;¹⁰⁷ the core of this thought is that “social and political threats are influenced by judgements within epistemic communities”.¹⁰⁸ What can be extrapolated from this study is that scholars, intelligence, policymakers and so on, have different ways to analyze threat perceptions. In addition to that, politicians and political parties may have an interest in using threats for political purposes, for instance for gaining votes, enhance their reputation or concentrate the attention of public opinion on specific threats instead of materialized ones. However, a society is a melting pot of different actors and besides politicians and experts, a huge part of the information is in control of news media, which in turn use these perception for gaining attention. Then, it’s the turn of citizens who collect the information and interpret the events. Eventually, this would create in them threat perceptions and the result of that would be feelings and emotions like fear and anger, that would facilitate political strategies.¹⁰⁹

Conclusions:

To conclude, this first chapter has addressed Social constructivism and New Institutionalism as the theories useful for studying threat perceptions and the common security and defense policy of the EU. In Security Studies, Constructivism is an approach that gives new explanations and take the research into another level. For this reason, it brings novelty in the thesis, explaining threats with a different light. Also, in the context of the EU, a reality of different countries with different identities, costumes and languages, it can explain why different States have different fears or perceive risks in a different way. It can also shed a light on why at an Institutional level, member States fear common threats and agree to tackle them with specific policies or conversely to not implement a security policy. In fact, social constructivists (Hopf and Wendt) argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce the perception

¹⁰⁷ Christoph O Meyer & Alister Miskimmon, “Perceptions and responses to threats: introduction, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22:4, 625-628, 2009;

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

of threat. Constructivism helps to better understand anarchy, interests and identities because it analyses how they change overtime, and it not just assumes that these are static.

The defense and security policy of the EU is based on cooperation, and the EU's civil and military missions are also based on the cooperation and willingness to participate of member states; hence constructivism is one of the main theories that helps to understand how interactions may lead to a cooperative anarchy.¹¹⁰ Nowadays, governments can change and be unstable, politics may change as well in a relatively short period of time; threat perceptions may change quickly as well, that's why constructivism is an useful approach for this purpose, because its concept of security is flexible and adapts to changes in the world politics.¹¹¹

On the other hand, New Institutionalism is helpful for this thesis because it takes into account the centrality of institutions. The European Union is without any doubt the "most densely institutionalized international organization in the world"¹¹² and therefore institutions within the EU are important in the political arena. Decisions and debated are held within institutions, hence institutions matter because policies and resources are created and mobilized within them. Also, institutions shape the behaviors of states, influencing their decisions and perceptions. It would be misleading to interpret institutions just like material things, in fact they work as processes. Taking this into account, new institutionalism is helpful in the context of the EU because it may explains why behaviors of member states gradually mute or persist. Institutionalists generally argue that preferences of who governs within the EU institutions may change over time and this is due to the institutional turnover. All the three approaches of NI can bring different explanations useful to understand why some policies are either implemented or not, thus it can explain under which conditions there's a path-dependent behavior.

Lastly, whether if we study the organization, the governance or anything related to the EU, we should not forget that it is not just a usual institution. In fact, the EU is deeply characterized by certain beliefs, cultures, human rights and a welfare states. That's why social

¹¹⁰ Georg Sorenson, "An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for conflict and cooperation", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, 1997, p.253-269.

¹¹¹Rieker, Pernille. "EU Security Policy: Contrasting Rationalism and Social Constructivism", NUPI, 2004

¹¹² Mark A. Pollack. "The New Institutionalisms and European Integration," in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds., *European Integration Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 137-56.

constructivism and NI complete each other in this thesis, because of the dense system of beliefs and agencies that always characterized the EU. Finally, the goal of this chapter was to provide a methodology in order to explain threat perceptions within the EU and whether there can be cooperation between Member States in terms of security and defence.

CHAPTER 2. Which Threats?

According to the European Agenda on Security of 2015 argued that “new and complex threats have emerged [...] Many of today's security concerns originate from instability in the EU's immediate neighborhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becoming more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature.”¹¹³ As the EU was stating, nowadays, threats change quickly. The geopolitical world order is not stable, in fact it can change periodically. As new security threats arise, the geopolitical order is also influenced by them and the response sometimes can lead to a new world order, or more likely to new policies in order to face threats. Since 2003, when the first European Security Strategy was published, threats have changed and a series of European policies have been made in order to address new challenges and threats.

In particular, the threats addressed in this chapter are important because they resulted more often in the European policies and defence strategies. Terrorism, Irregular immigration, cyber-attacks resulted to be among the threats most present in the policies and document cited but also they resulted to be among the security threats that Europeans perceived. Some perceptions are old and already well discussed, and some are considered new and unexpected.¹¹⁴ They have in common the fact that both of them shaped the CSDP, although one could consider them internal threats, they can all be considered threats coming from outside the European borders. Immigration, Terrorism and Cyber-attacks are threats coming from the outside, although one could argue that terrorist attacks are merely internal security threats, the EU acts against terrorism, and against the possibility of terrorist to arrive in the EU, with operations *in loco*. The fact that in the aftermath of 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the former French president Hollande decided to bomb Isis in Syria tells a lot about the EU perception of terrorism as an external threat. Moreover, terrorist groups have only networks in Europe but their bases are outside European borders.

2.1 The threat perception of immigration

The phenomena of migration is old as the humanity itself and always existed, people always used to migrate from one place to another throughout history, due to geographical and climatological factors. However, in the last decade this phenomena started to worry, slowly

¹¹³ European Commission, “The European Agenda on Security”, Strasbourg, 2015

¹¹⁴ Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, A., Michalski, A., Nilsson, N.; Oxelheim, “The EU and the growing number of complex security threats. In The European Union: Facing the Challenge of Multiple Security Threats”. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. L. (2018).

becoming an uncontrolled issue for First World countries, that tried to restrict migratory movements and the number of migrants allowed to enter in these countries. Migrations have shown to be much more complex phenomena to analyze, due to the fact that the reasons behind migration flows have always been different and the impact on societies have cause different responses.

As for the European Union, 2015 marks the year of the worst migration crisis of contemporary history, with a massive pick of arrivals of unprecedented in scale. However, irregular migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea started years before 2015 and it started to be evident the complexity behind migration flows. It also quickly became evident that “first arrival” nations of migrants were not ready alone to respond to these huge flows of people and that “the response was immediate but insufficient”¹¹⁵. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that only in 2014, 219,000 migrants crossed the Mediterranean arriving to European shores¹¹⁶. The main routes of arrivals in Europe were two: one passing through the Mediterranean Sea and one through the Aegean Sea from Turkey.

Talking about security, immigration represented a security threat for the stability of some member states in particular, but in general for the EU, in fact it has been in the European agenda for quite some time¹¹⁷. Moreover, there were other issues connected to the migration crisis like organized crime, some scholars also suggested that listing together immigration with terrorism and organized crime make sense and that we must take them into consideration¹¹⁸. According to the European Union, “emergency measures have been necessary because the collective European policy on the matter has fallen short”,¹¹⁹ however the EU and also countries by themselves have tried to respond by cooperating with external countries, for instance Turkey. From a security point of view, what was evident from the migrant crisis was also the crisis of

¹¹⁵ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions. A European Agenda on Migration”, Brussels, 2015, COM (2015) 240 final

¹¹⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Calls for Urgent Action as Hundreds Feared Lost in Mediterranean Boat Sinking,” News Stories, April 20, 2015, <http://www.unhcr.org/5534dd539.html>.

¹¹⁷ Michela Ceccorulli, “Migration as a security threat: internal and external dynamic in the European Union”, GARNET Working Paper No: 65/09, (2009)

¹¹⁸ Furuseth Rita, “Creating Security Through Immigration Control: An Analysis of European Immigration Discourse and the Development Towards a Common EU Asylum and Immigration Policy”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2003

¹¹⁹ *ibid*

border management of EU member states and the humanitarian disaster.¹²⁰ There has been also a lot of attention from politics, governments and media that put lots of pressure on the EU showing that it was a challenge. However, many still argue that the EU didn't take immediate response and action in order to help first-aid MS, lacking a comprehensive approach that the EU professed to have taken.¹²¹

Despite the EU institutional action and the calls for common response and funds, the southern countries were more affected by the migrant crisis and they had to bear the burden on their own. The increase of the numbers of asylum seekers and economic migrant created a general dissatisfaction among southern frontline countries, that showed to be more vulnerable to this issue. Moreover, most of irregular migrants didn't want to stay in the European countries in which they first arrived like Italy, Greece and Malta. Indeed, they just wanted to transit in these countries in order to finally reach northern European countries, which are perceived as countries with better economic and life conditions.¹²² However, the Dublin regulation didn't and doesn't allow many migrants to reach the aspired destinations, in fact it establishes that countries in which migrants first arrived and entered the EU are entirely responsible for the migrant's asylum application. If migrants reach another EU country but get caught, or they are illegally trying to reach another country, the Dublin regulations stipulate that the migrants must be sent back to the country in which they first arrived.¹²³ For this reason, the Dublin regulations created discontent and frustration among Southern Europe countries that had to face "a disproportionate share of responsibility for regulating borders on behalf of Europe as a whole".¹²⁴

As a result, there was a rise of attention to the refugee crisis by the media and governments. On August 16 of 2015, Angela Merkel during an interview stated that "the issue of asylum could be the next major European project [...] preoccupy Europe much more than the issue of Greece and the stability of the euro".¹²⁵ According to the UNHCR's report, the role of mass media in influencing public and elite political attitudes towards migration has been

¹²⁰ Steven Blockmans. "New Thrust for the CSDP from the refugee and migrant crisis", CEPS special report, No. 142/ July 2016

¹²¹ Ibid. p.1

¹²² Timothy G. Hammond, "The Mediterranean Migration Crisis", Foreign Policy Journal, May 19, 2015

¹²³ European Council on Refugees and Exiles, "Dublin Regulation, accessed May, 2015

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Interview of August 16, 2015 to the German ZDF

huge and it's impossible to ignore this fact. Indeed, media are daily consulted by citizens that use them to understand what happens in the world.¹²⁶ At this point, there are questions that are spontaneous – which perceptions and behavior have citizens of receiving countries towards immigration? Which is the significant expression of the feeling of threat? And which are the factors that build the image of immigration as a threat? These are all lawful questions and there can be made several hypothesis about it, using different dimensions like economic, cultural/symbolic, and security.

The role of the Media

As mentioned, during 2014 and 2015 immigration highly covered the media that gave lots of attention to the fact. Usually, in the media and in institutional thinking immigration is seen in its economic and security dimensions. The perception and the feeling is that migrants who seek for better living conditions are more a burden, thus they are seen like a threat to the economic well-being of a country and a security threats for citizens.¹²⁷ Vela, Pereira and Ramos analyzed immigration as a threat perceived through different dimensions, taking into account the experience of Portugal. They argue that media most of the time associate immigration with employment, the level of incomes and access to public services. According to this narrative, migrants impoverish the already scarce resources, and are seen essentially like a burden for the whole society.

Moreover, media contributed also to foment the perception of the immigrant as a social cost by not informing that immigrants do not compete in the same work area with citizens of the receiving countries, and by not informing citizens about their contribution to the growth of GDP.¹²⁸ In the case of Portugal, the critic is that the media didn't inform enough citizens about the positive impact of immigration for the country's economy. Furthermore, other studies that analyzed the attitudes and perceptions towards irregular migration have mentioned that media have affects public attitudes to it. In fact, there's an evidence that shows how negative stories

¹²⁶ "Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries" Report prepared for the UNHCR

¹²⁷ Vala, Jorge and Pereira, Cicerto Roberto and Ramos, Alice. "Racial prejudice, threat perception and opposition to immigrants: A comparative analysis", Portuguese Journal of Social Science Volume 5 No. 2, 10.1386/pjss.5.2.119/140, (2006)

¹²⁸ Ibid p. 121

provoke a perception of threat to one's group, on the contrary stories that emphasize humanitarian plight can increase the support over services designated to immigrants.¹²⁹

A study that compared the press coverage of the Migrant Crisis in the EU, analyzed the differences in the media of five different countries: Italy, Spain, Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden. The research combed thousands of articles written during 2014 and 2015, also it analyzed the sources that journalists used. The choice of analyzing the media of these countries has been justified on the basis that all of them were 'key entry points' for migrants and refugees during the crisis. In particular, Italy played a key role in the search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean,¹³⁰ rescuing the majority of refugees and migrants coming with boats and most of them had to transit and pass through its territory. Moreover, Germany and Sweden took a large number of refugees and migrants in the EU, especially refugees coming from Syria, last but not least UK was the major voice in EU on the matter of immigration.

The result of this huge research were several. First of all, there's a great difference in the terms used by the media, for instance in Germany (91%) and Sweden (75.3%) there were two terms mostly used 'refugee' (flüchtling(e)/ flykting) and 'asylum seeker' while in Italy (35.8%) and UK (54.2%) the media used the term 'migrant'. Spain's (67.1%) press preferred the word 'immigrant'. All of these terms had an influence and impact inside each of these countries, especially on debates on this issue, most likely creating a perception.¹³¹ Furthermore, themes were also different, for example humanitarian themes were mostly discussed in Italy (50.6%) and Sweden (47.1%) than in Spain (32.5%). What was most significant was the difference in the theme of threat. Refugees and Migrants were addicted as a threat for national security mostly in articles in Italy (10.1%), followed by Spain (9.2%), U.K (8.5%), Germany (4.8%) and Sweden (2.3%). Conversely, cultural threat or threat to community cohesion was more discussed in the British press (10.8%). Also, threats to welfare/health systems in the UK press (18.3%) were higher than other countries. From this data, it can be argued that there has been a variation on how asylum and immigration has been reported, and according to this study

¹²⁹ DENNISON, James, , DRAŽANOVÁ, Lenka, "Public attitudes on migration : rethinking how people perceive migration : an analysis of existing opinion polls in the Euro-Mediterranean region", ICMPD, Migration Policy Centre, OPAM, 2018

¹³⁰ Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries" Report prepared for the UNHCR

¹³¹ Ibid

Sweden was the country in which the press was more positive toward migrants and refugees.¹³² In fact, there were very few articles that spoke about migrants and refugees as a threat. On the other hand, the press in the U.K. was the most negative. Finally, the study argues that the negative press coverage influenced the perception of the public. On the contrary, the reverse trend can create a positive attitude towards migrants and refugees, not fueling threat perception.

How migrants and refugees are represented and described matters because it can contribute to construct a perception or an understanding. For instance, also the language used to describe migrants matters because it can prevent them from receiving support in receiving countries, so it directly influence public perception.¹³³ Thus, media has a roll in influencing public attitudes towards immigration.

The Symbolic threat

If it's true that the media have a role in constructing a certain stereotype of migrants and refugees and so creating a perception, it's also true that cultural differences may play a role in emphasizing a perception. In particular, social psychology focused its attention on symbolic threat since the 1980s. Symbolic threat means that a specific group represents a danger for the culture and core values of our group. In a nutshell, it represents the idea that immigrants can be a threat to the core values of the society of the receiving country.¹³⁴ Vala, Pereira and Ramos showed how after the terroristic events on 9/11, immigrants belonging to the Islamic religion have been represented as a threat to the values and identity of western civilization. Hence, this threat was not only a security threat but it represented a threat directly to the identity.¹³⁵ Again, the media throughout the past years have been represented immigration as a cultural threat.

The Security threat

To recapitulate, It is important to specify that public perception of migration is not the same in all EU Member States and polls showed great difference.¹³⁶ Despite that, public perception towards migration has increased a lot during the years of crisis everywhere in

¹³² P.10 ibid

¹³³ Newton, L. (2008) *Illegal, alien, or immigrant: The politics of immigration reform*. New York & London: New York University Press.

¹³⁴ Vala, Jorge and Pereira, Cicerto Roberto and Ramos, Alice p.122

¹³⁵ Vela, Jorge and Pereira spoke also about the cover of the magazine *Time* of 28 February 2005 with the reproduction of Monalisa wearing a veil, a specific Muslim symbol; the cover was realized for a dossier dedicated to the identity crisis of Europe.

¹³⁶ Marcel Canoy, "Migration and public perception", BEPA, European Commission, 2006

Europe, though southern European countries remained more concerned about the issue. the migrant crisis of 2015 showed how member states had different opinions and views on security. Their emotions and perceptions differed a lot, perception is strictly related also to emotions, in fact emotions influence the way individuals perceive threats,¹³⁷ therefore it was normal that some states feared immigration relatively more.

As already mentioned, irregular migration is related with other security issue, this is the case of terrorism. In fact, some argued that among refugees and migrants there are also individuals that are driven by political goals or jihad ideas, hence they can represent a threat to security.¹³⁸ Media and politicians often relate these two issues, thus “the public presentation of immigrants and migratory phenomena by the media and by politicians is often biased or negative, linking them often almost exclusively to security issues”.¹³⁹ Public perception is an important factor because it has implications for the EU’s ability to promote and attract support for its migration policies.¹⁴⁰ Thus, threat perception over migrants and irregular immigration directly fuels European policies on that matter.

EU Member States addressed the immigration security issue differently, however the general trend was to strengthen borders control. During the Cold War the concept of security was linked with military force, however after that the perception of security was not only associated with ‘military’.¹⁴¹ This is exactly what happened in the EU during the migration crisis, in fact the survival of States wasn’t threaten but it was threaten the strategic stability, the identity security, the economic security and so on. For this reason, security is not directly associated with survival but with the possibility to protect national interests and manage different risks coming from a multitude of directions.¹⁴² Indeed, ‘uncontrolled’ flows of migrants and refugees represented both a challenge and a threat for Member States, especially for southern frontline states that had to cope with the emergency for years, shouldering the

¹³⁷ Cengiz Erisen, Sofia Vasilopoulou & Cigdem Kentmen-Cin (2019): Emotional reactions to immigration and support for EU cooperation on immigration and terrorism, *Journal of European Public Policy* CHECK THIS

¹³⁸ Kuvekalović, G. Stojanović, M. Filipović, “Security Implications of the migrant crisis in Europe in 2015-16”, *Conference Paper*, 2016

¹³⁹ Marcel Canoy, “Migration and public perception”, BEPA, European Commission, 2006

¹⁴⁰ Ricklef Beutin, Marcel Canoy, Anna Horvath, Agnes Hubert, Frédéric Lerais, Peter Smith, Myriam Sochacki. “Migration and public perception”, Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) European Commission, 2006

¹⁴¹ Michela Ceccorulli p.3

¹⁴² Ibid p.3

burden almost by themselves.¹⁴³ However, according to Jef Huysmans, migration is one of the factors weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity, thus it represents both an internal and external threat for the survival of the national community.¹⁴⁴

All in all, Member States perception of migrations has been quite different throughout the years. For instance, only for some Finns immigrants were seen as a security threat, but at the same time the Finnish Security Intelligence Service review stated that refugees could be a possible security threat.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, Mediterranean nations like Greece and Italy have different perceptions. Greeks have almost a positive perception compared to Italians, in fact “36 per cent of Italians describe refugees as similar to themselves compared to 43 per cent of Greeks”.¹⁴⁶ Again, different was the approach of the Baltic countries to the Migrant and Refugees crisis of 2015. In fact, the Baltics are known for being among the other things NATO members, and they considered both the EU and NATO partnership as a possible guarantee against threats from Russia, which has always been perceived as a threat by the Baltics. In 2015, Estonia strongly opposed to share the burden of refugee crisis¹⁴⁷, in particular the ministry of Interior at that time, Toomas Viks, argued that the resettlement of refugees was only one among the possible solutions and that relocations and resettlement should be only voluntary for member states.¹⁴⁸ At that time, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland had similar point of views on the issue.¹⁴⁹

Italy has been one of the most vocal MS during the migrant crisis and one of the immediate action and response to it was the operation ‘Mare Nostrum’ with the aim of saving lives at sea. Moreover, the EU raised the budget for the Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon. The fact that migration has been treated like a security threat can be also found in the practices of prevention of entry and expulsions. The national responses to the migrant and

¹⁴³ Steven Blockmans, “New thrust for the CSDP from the refugee and migrant crisis”

¹⁴⁴ J. Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 751-77, December 2020.

¹⁴⁵ Finnish National Contact Point of the European Migrant Network (EMN), “Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Programmes in Europe: what works? -National report of Finland”, European Migration Network, 2016

¹⁴⁶ Dixon T., Hawkins S., Juan-Torres M., Kimaram A., “Attitudes Towards National Identity, Immigration, and Refugees in Greece”, *More in Common*, May 2019

¹⁴⁷ Veebel V., Markus R., “Europe’s Refugee Crisis in 2015 and Security Threats from the Baltic perspective”, *Canadian Center of Science and Education, Journal of Politics and Law*; Vol. 8, No. 4; 2015

¹⁴⁸ The Baltic Course. “Latvia and Estonia to oppose EU refugee quota system”. (2015, May 12). Retrieved from <http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=106034>

¹⁴⁹ Veebel V. Markus R. p. 257

refugee crisis was to develop policies focused on restricting ‘social security rights and enabling access to the labour market’¹⁵⁰ Moreover, there was a discussion among MS on sharing the burden, distributing a certain number of asylum seekers equally among states, establishing quotas. However, Austria at that time decided to implement the quota to limit the flow of migrants and refugees, accepting only few of them. All in all, even between institutional figures there has been a standpoints, for instance the former president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, stressed: ‘Do not come to Europe. Do not believe the smugglers. Do not risk your lives and your money. It is all for nothing’.¹⁵¹

2.2 The threat perception of terrorism

Among the threats that shaped the European policies and external actions there is also terrorism. The discussion over terrorism is not new and throughout the past twenty years has been quite influential in the way states have conducted their security operations. As stated, the terrorist attack on 9/11 represented a breach, showing the weakness of the security system. However, there has been an evolution and the terrorist attacks (jihadist and not) have showed that there has been an evolution. In the European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, which was published in 2009, terrorism and organized crime are stated as top threats in the European environment.¹⁵² In particular it was stated that ‘terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe.’¹⁵³ The ESS referred to the kind of terrorism related to ‘violent religious extremism’; also, what was interesting to note is that terrorism and organized crime were linked in the ESS of 2003.

The security environment within the EU has surely changed and it is now more dynamic; many were the reasons, for instance the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism created big challenges. Moreover in the ‘90s new democracies were born and new challenges and risks came with it, creating a lack of security.¹⁵⁴ In the first ESS of 2003, one of the key-threat was

¹⁵⁰ A. Hassel, B. Wagner, “The EU’s ‘migration crisis’: challenge, threat or opportunity?”, Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2016

¹⁵¹ Tweet of 3 March 2016, contained also in ‘The European Council: may 2016 to June 2018’ volume 2. July 2018

¹⁵² Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy: a secure Europe in a better world”, European Communities, 2009

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ G. Chirlesan, “European security and the terrorist threat: evolutions and current ways of managing it”, International conference Knowledge-based organization, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 2015

terrorism and in the European reports that were published years later, terrorism still occupied a place in the key-threats and challenges among WMD proliferation, organized crime, cyber security and energy security.¹⁵⁵

9/11 terrorist attacks shocked indirectly the EU, that created internal cooperation among MS in order to strengthen cooperation to counter the threats of terrorism. However, there were many cases of terrorist attacks, for instance in 2004 the train bombing in Madrid, a year later the terrorist bombing in London's subway and shooting in Paris in 2015, the terrorist attacks in Brussels, Nice, Germany and again London, Stockholm, Paris and Manchester.

In particular, 2015 represented a break for Europe's history of terrorism. On 13 November 2015, gunmen linked to the Islamic State (known as ISIS or ISIL) in Iraq and Syria opened the fire and shot indiscriminately people at four different locations in Paris killing in total 130 people. As a consequence, the former President François Hollande declared the state of emergency and ordered a series of strikes in Syria at ISIS bases, that were supported by the UK. Moreover, he asked for the solidarity of other MS by invoking the EU's mutual-defense clause,¹⁵⁶ all of the EU member states responded supporting and giving aid to France, however some of them questioned the military actions against ISIS. Talking about terrorism, Hollande specified that: "the enemy is not just France's enemy, it is Europe's enemy. Europe cannot live in the belief that the crisis around it have no effect on it".¹⁵⁷ As a result, in the media and political discourse, the argument was discussed on daily basis, creating fear, collective psychosis and anxiety.¹⁵⁸

How to define terrorism

Before analyzing the threat perception of terrorism and counterterrorism measures, it is useful to understand what is terrorism and eventually which kind of terrorism has affected the European Union lately. The European Parliament argues that the International community is divided on the definition of terrorism, however every country agree on the fact that terrorism

¹⁵⁵ Referred to the "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy" and to the "Internal security strategy for the European Union" in which terrorism is denounced and it's argued to be one of the main threats for the European's security.

¹⁵⁶ Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union

¹⁵⁷ Hollande, F., 'Speech by the President of the Republic before a joint session of Parliament', France Diplomatie, 16 November 2015

¹⁵⁸ T. Renard "Fear not: A critical perspective on the Terrorist threat in Europe", Egmont Institute (2016)

poses a huge threat that needs to be addressed. Both individual countries and international organizations have adopted different positions and approaches, this due to their different visions and perceptions on what constitutes terrorism.¹⁵⁹ As stated by the United Nations (UN) a universal, common and consensual definition of terrorism would help countries to fight against it in a better and more effective way. UN Resolution 1566 of 2004 stated that all acts 'which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature'. Despite some progresses, the UN pushed States for a common definition, but the difficulties for the consensus arose also from some organizations, for instance the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) specifically asked a differentiation between terrorism and 'the legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation and colonial or alien domination in the exercise of their right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law'. *** For all of these reasons it has been difficult to come up with an agreement and it has been difficult to understand what constitute a 'legitimate struggle'. Regardless, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No 196) adopted in 2005 didn't provide a definition of terrorism, however it criminalized any terrorist offence, and the recruitment and training for terrorist purposes. Finally, the directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and the Council on combatting terrorism defines 'terrorist group' as a 'structured group [...] acting in concert to commit terrorist offences'¹⁶⁰, however in the definition provided there's any reference to a belief or ideology, since terrorism has become associated with religious extremism.¹⁶¹

According to Haitham Abdelsamad, it is difficult to define what terrorism is because it is used frequently and it is often associated with 'individual perceptions rooted in emotion rather than objectivity'.¹⁶² Generally speaking, in most definitions of terrorism there are some words that are often use, like 'violence', 'fear', 'loss of civilian life'. Englund and Stohl tried to analyze the construction of terrorism in deep, they argue that 'terrorism is 'violence that evokes a

¹⁵⁹ European Parliamen, 'Understanding definitions of terrorism', November 2015

¹⁶⁰ Council of the European Union and European Parliament, 'Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism', 2017

¹⁶¹ H. Abdelsamad, 'Special report: Terrorism and counterterrorism in the EU', Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, 2018

¹⁶² Ibid

visceral, psychological response in order to coerce compliance'¹⁶³, the logic behind a terrorist attack is that the pain and suffering inflicted to the victims have some kind of end. Usually, victims are innocents and cannot avoid violence. Moreover, they also describe it as 'organized behavior with a rational objective'¹⁶⁴

Which terrorism?

The term 'terrorism' is a very broad term itself; in particular language is important, in fact the term 'extremism' is linked predominately to Islamic actors.¹⁶⁵ The terrorism that emerged in the last twenty years within the EU has been different in many ways, and most of the attacks were operated by jihadists belonging to the Islamic State, Al Qaeda or different groups. Terrorism is not an easy phenomenon to explain, indeed it's very complex and it does change.¹⁶⁶ Jihadi terrorism has been one the most threatening for the western countries, in particular for their values and societies. According to Bakker, the jihadi terrorism is the result of a combination of Islamist ideology and the idea of the jihad.¹⁶⁷ Who commits to the jihadi terrorism is called a jihadi terrorist, and they believe that violent acts are a goal of Islam. Their goals include the establishment of a (pan-)Islamic theocracy and the restoration of the caliphate and specifically 'the ideology holds that Islam is not only a religion but also a social and political system that governs the legal, economic and social imperatives of the state according to its interpretation of the Islamic law'.¹⁶⁸

In addition to that, Jihadi terrorism is tricky to explain because there are significant differences in the size and shape between different regions, for instance jihadi terrorism in Afghanistan is different than in Indonesia, Spain, Kenya and so on. Bakker also argues that the characteristics of the jihadi terrorism are always changing, especially the modus operandi behind it, not also the structures and networks but also individuals. Moreover, the jihadi terrorists changes also from time of time and are never the same, what stays the same is the constant seriousness of the threat posed by them and the atrocities committed. Europe started to know what Jihadi

¹⁶³ Englund, Scott, and Michael Stohl. "Constructions of Terrorism." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 3 (2016): 33-39.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid* p. 33

¹⁶⁵ Recep Onursal & Daniel Kirkpatrick, 'Is Extremism the 'New' Terrorism? the Convergence of 'Extremism' and 'Terrorism' in British Parliamentary Discourse, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2019

¹⁶⁶ E. Bakker, "Jihadi terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study", *Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael*, December 2006

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid* p.2

terrorism was only back in the 1990s, before that time it existed nationalist terrorists (IRA, ETA, RAF, Red Brigade). Due to this, Bekker says that the threat posed by jihadi terrorism was underestimated and misunderstood,¹⁶⁹ in fact, when the bombings in Madrid happened in 2004, no one expected it to happen, thus it had a deep impact on threat perceptions of the society.

The threat perception

Terrorism, of every kind, is always a threat that destabilize the countries attacked by it and can damage not only the society but also the economy of a State. Also, it destabilize the security and the stability of a State, but mostly it destroys human lives and leaves psychological effects on the society. Hence, terrorism has multiple consequences also on the well-being of survivors, on the health and can create post-traumatic disorders.¹⁷⁰ As if this isn't traumatic enough, the threat perception of terrorism can affect a society even when it doesn't happen, still provoking consequences.

Just like it was for immigration, the media have a role in creating a threat perception towards terrorism, in fact according to Vergani, they shape the relationship between terrorism and political attitudes. This means that the threat of terrorism can eventually change people's political attitudes. According to Vergani's vision, the media try to catch the attention of people by presenting sensationalized news stories that provoke a sort of emotion on the readers, mostly negative emotions that lead to hate against the 'Others' or the out-groups. Indeed, he believes that 'terrorism is a powerful identity threat because it can make identities salient and trigger in-group and out-group categorization'¹⁷¹ Moreover, there would be a sort of difference between the traditional media and the online ones; in fact he observes that even though individuals are exposed to the Internet (hence to online media and terrorism news) for most of their time, individuals feel less threatened and concerned about. On the other hand, when same news on Terrorism are discussed in a traditional media and the individual is exposed to those information, there's much more concerns and threat perception. Previously, it has been mentioned how immigration is somehow related with terrorism, anyway according to this observation, a higher exposure to traditional media can provoke a negative attitudes also

¹⁶⁹ Ibid p. 4

¹⁷⁰ Vergani, Matteo. *How Is Terrorism Changing Us?: Threat Perception and Political Attitudes In the Age of Terror*. 1st ed. 2018.

¹⁷¹ Ibid p.30

towards immigration; conversely, individuals would approve and support counterterrorism measures.

On the other hand, some scholars like Daniel Byman argued that terrorism may be a threat also to democracy. In specific, he argues that terrorism undermines liberal democracies even in mature societies. Thus, the fear of terrorism is crucial because it can benefit and empower political extremes and polarize societies.¹⁷² In the fight against terrorism multiple actors can mitigate its devastating effects, for example international organizations, agencies, governments. Regardless, terrorism plays a role in the debate of other factors, like migrations, the fears of immigrants and Muslims refugees/migrants.¹⁷³

Conversely, Abdelsamad argues that there is an overestimation of the threat of terrorism, he observes how not only this is dangerous but also potentially harmful for counter terrorism measures. He argues that terrorism have different intentions than those they proclaim.¹⁷⁴ The goal of terrorist groups is when people watch what they do, this because the effects of terrorism are wanted to be mainly psychological; in fact terror creates anxiety in people that tend to exaggerate the threat that terrorists pose. The consequences of the atrocities committed by terrorists against civilians have also implications on the EU's fight against terrorism, thus even 'insignificant levels of terrorism can induce high levels of terror'.¹⁷⁵ In a nutshell, fear has always an impact, therefore terrorism should be discussed in a proper way, especially the threat that provokes, because 'terrorism is violent, but it is also a means of communication, namely of propaganda'.¹⁷⁶ In conclusion, Abdelsamad stresses that it's society's responsibility not to accentuate the 'publicity', revenge or retaliation, because it can have disastrous effects and it may not diminish terrorism but rather fool an entire society.

European MS threat perceptions

The most emblematic recent case of terrorist attack has been surely the shooting in Paris of 2015. After, the terrorist attacks the European MS met and elaborated a sort of statement in which they all showed unity and solidarity to the terrorist attacks in Paris. In particular, the attacks 'targeted the fundamental values and human rights that are the heart of the European

¹⁷² D. Byman, "Terrorism and the threat to democracy", Foreign policy at Brookings, FINISH

¹⁷³ Ibid p. 4

¹⁷⁴ Abdelsamad p. 4

¹⁷⁵ Ibid p.5

¹⁷⁶ Ibid

Union – solidarity, freedom, including freedom of expression, pluralism, democracy, tolerance and human dignity’.¹⁷⁷

From these words, it is understandable that one of the main threat perceived at that time was the threat towards the fundamental values that constitute the symbol of the EU. Moreover, European MS agreed on: ensuring the security of citizens, preventing radicalization and safeguarding values, and finally cooperating with their international partners. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks were taken seriously also on the European Agenda on Security as soon as the first attacks happened. In the European official document it was stressed that new threats were emerged and that cooperation among MS at all levels was needed.¹⁷⁸ The result was that in the security agenda count terrorism resulted as a high priority.

Furthermore, a special commission on Terrorism met also in 2018, and even during this occasion the terrorist threat was reaffirmed. Member States also reaffirmed that ‘the cross-border nature of terrorism requires a strong and coordinated response and cooperation within and between Member States’.¹⁷⁹ In the document, terrorism remains a ‘threat’ and it is emphasized again after several year from the 2015 attacks, the need of ‘transparency and a common understanding of threat levels’.¹⁸⁰ Besides that, it is reaffirmed also the need of prevention of radicalization that so often leads to violent extremism. At the end of 2018, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism.¹⁸¹ With this resolution is confirmed again that the threat of terrorism requires a holistic approach that connecting internal and external security; the Parliament specifies that even though there were made several progresses in counter terrorism threat, these were primarily reached due to misfortune of events rather than pro-active measures.

In conclusion, the terrorist attacks of recent years made by extremists groups created a sense of anxiety but also had an impact on EU policy towards the refugee crisis. Defining what is terrorism is crucial, because without a clear and agreed understanding of it, it is difficult to

¹⁷⁷ Council of the EU, ‘Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 – Statement by the members of the European Council’, Statements and Remarks, 12/02/2015

¹⁷⁸ European Commission, The European Security Agenda ‘Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions’, COM(2015) 185 final

¹⁷⁹ 2018/2044(INI) – 21/11/2018 Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading

¹⁸⁰ *ibid*

¹⁸¹ 2018/2044 (INI) – 12/12/2018 Text adopted by Parliament, single reading

establish which approach is appropriate for counterterrorism. This thesis takes into account in specific of terrorist attacks happened with the EU's borders, however worldwide, before '9/11' the jihadi terrorism targeted mostly Muslims and countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. It's probably due to this reason that only after '9/11' and other attacks happened in other countries of the world considered 'western' countries, that jihadi terrorism is perceived as a global threat and phenomenon.

2.3 The threat perception of cyber-attacks (Cyber security)

The 21st century is probably the one characterized by the rise of technology, that brought a major use of it in most aspect of people's daily lives, for instance for business and services. However, with the developments in terms of technology and people's dependence of it, risks rises as well. The discussions on cyberspace or cybersecurity emerged due to this, and despite the positive application in different fields, it affected the perception of security in the EU. In a nutshell, the technological progresses and innovations have created a new set of possibilities but on the other hand have inserted cyber threats and challenges¹⁸². For instance, when people put their personal data online, they are likely to become victims of a cyberattack/cybercrime.¹⁸³ Moreover, as the security environments changes, what also changes is the threat scenario, nowadays it's more likely to be victims of virtual attacks¹⁸⁴. Indeed, it has become a challenge to protect personal data, governmental institutions, and the threat of virtual attacks seems to be much more real these days. In the last few years, the EU understood that large-scale cyber-attacks have become more frequent and stressed the need to invest more in cybersecurity.¹⁸⁵ In the European Security Strategy of 2009, cybersecurity was englobed in one of the global challenges and key threats, and already in 2006 in the EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society addressed internet-based crime.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Giantas D., Liaropoloulos A., 'Cybersecurity in the EU: threats, frameworks and future perspectives', University of Piraeus, 2019

¹⁸³ European Court of Auditors, 'Challenges to effective EU cybersecurity policy', briefing paper, 2019

¹⁸⁴ A. Bendiek, 'European Cyber Security Policy', SWP Research Paper 13/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2012), at 5.

¹⁸⁵ European Union, factsheet "Security Union – A Europe that protects", 30/10/2019

¹⁸⁶ See European Security Strategy 'A secure Europe in a better world'

What is cybersecurity?

Cybersecurity (or cyberspace) remains in many aspects new and not fully explored, hence it is difficult to provide a universally accepted definition. Also, cybersecurity enfolds a lot of different terms and it covers a broad spectrum of things (and different terms), therefore choosing a definition that fits in the context should be the priority.¹⁸⁷ Even so, in dictionary and in the literature there are several definitions of it and broadly it refers to ‘all the safeguards and measures adopted to defend information systems and their users against unauthorized access’.¹⁸⁸ In the Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union of 2013, the definition is broad: “Cyber-security commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cyber-security strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein.”¹⁸⁹

This definition has a broad scope and some scholars think that it cannot even be considered as a definition. However, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) tried to define cybersecurity as ‘the protection of information, information system, infrastructure and the applications that run on top of it from those threats that are associated with a globally connected environment’.¹⁹⁰ In addition, it also tried to find how different stakeholders define cybersecurity and it concludes that cybersecurity consists of two main elements: information security and Network and Information security. However, ENISA’s understanding a definition of cybersecurity is not official nor totally accepted within the EU. On the other hand, according to the European Court of Auditors cybersecurity is not limited to network and information security, it also covers cybercrimes like ‘launching computer virus attacks and non-cash payment fraud, and it can straddle the divide between systems and content, as with the dissemination of online child sexual abuse material. It can also cover disinformation campaigns to influence online debate and suspected electoral

¹⁸⁷ Enisa, ‘definition of cybersecurity: gaps and overlaps in standardization’, 2015,

¹⁸⁸ Ibid

¹⁸⁹ Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’, 7 February 2013 (‘EUCSS’)

¹⁹⁰ U. Helmbrecht, S. Purser, and M. Ritter Klejnstrup, *Cyber Security: Future Challenges and Opportunities* (ENISA 2012); ENISA is the EU’s cybersecurity agency, an advisory board that helps to develop policies in this regard, also it raise awareness.

interference'.¹⁹¹ According to ECA, cybersecurity threats can also be classified according to what they do to data: disclosure, modification of information, destruction, denial of service, and it depends on which information security principles they violate.

All these definitions can create confusion and what constitutes a problem is that within the EU, many member states have used their own definitions and give different meaning to cybersecurity. For instance, according to Germany: 'cyber space includes all information infrastructures accessible via the Internet [...] the availability of cyberspace and the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of data in cyberspace have become vital questions of the 21st century'.¹⁹² As for the other member states, some of them don't have yet developed a clear definition or they have started to develop their definition during the last years. For this reason, there is a significant gap between EU member states as they struggle to find a common standardization and terminology for cybersecurity.¹⁹³

Moreover, most of the time in policies there are other terms like 'cybercrime', 'cyber espionage', 'cyber defense', it is difficult to distinguish all of them but mostly the notion of cybersecurity contains other terms that are then included into policies and need to be explained. According to the cybersecurity strategy of the European Union of 2013: "Cybercrime commonly refers to a broad range of different criminal activities where computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool or as a primary target. Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (e.g. fraud, forgery, and identity theft), content-related offences (e.g. on-line distribution of child pornography or incitement to racial hatred) and offences unique to computers and information systems (e.g. attacks against information systems, denial of service and malware)."¹⁹⁴ Thus, the cybersecurity strategy went further and it included also information security, cybercrime and cyberdefence; basically, cybercrime refers so criminal activities, for instance phishing, while cyber espionage consists in breaches in databases of a State or a non-state enterprises.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ European Court of Auditors, p. 6: It also makes reference to Europol, that sees a coverage between cybercrime and terrorism.

¹⁹² Federal Ministry of the Interior, 'Cyber Security Strategy for Germany', 2011

¹⁹³ D. Giantas, A. Liaropoulos p. 9

¹⁹⁴ European Commission, "Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union: an Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace", 2013

¹⁹⁵ Elena Conde, Zhaklin Yaneva, Marzia Scopelliti (eds), *Routledge Handbook of EU Security Law and Policy*, Routledge, 2019, pp. 283-300

Cyber-attacks in Europe

Within the EU there have been several cyberattacks, one of this occurred in 2007 and it was against the Estonian public and private infrastructure. As a consequence, it created fear and harm among people and it created a new dimension in the use of IT assets.¹⁹⁶ Due to this event, further discussions were held at the European level. In particular, in Estonia the Presidency, Parliament, government, media, banks and communication infrastructures became the victims of a cyberattack and the suspect was attributed to the neighbor Russia. However, in 2007 Estonia (a tech-savvy nation) was already advanced in the field of technology and was developing ‘e-government’ services. In particular, the use of the Internet was already become established, yet a national cybersecurity strategy wasn’t been developed in order to protect the cyberspace.¹⁹⁷ These attacks against the Estonian’s digital infrastructures signed a turning point and this episode has been named the world’s first cyber war (or Cyber War I), because according to Ruus ‘it was the first time that a sustained, wholesale and politically motivated e-assault was launched to wreak havoc on a country’s entire digital infrastructure’.¹⁹⁸

What happened in Estonia is important because before that time, the term ‘cyber security’ only interested small practices, like hacking intrusions, for instance disrupting a communication system, or hacking a bank system, individual computer systems in order to steal money. However, that time it was different because the cyber-attack blocked an entire system, the whole civil and economic infrastructure, creating a wave of fear and a threat to national security and sovereignty. Hence, States had to face new threats coming from the cyber space.¹⁹⁹ Due to this, Estonia tried to raise awareness about the significant threat of cyber-attacks, however it did not result in a common Cyber Security Strategy at the EU level, there was just a brief reference to cyber security in the European Security Strategy of 2009, which however was not enough to cover the issue. On the other hand, Estonia influenced in a positive way the other EU member that started to have national discussion on this regard.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ P. Trimintzios, G. Chatzichristos, S. Portesi, P. Drogkaris, L. Palkmets, D. Liveri and A. Dufkova. “Cybersecurity in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, Challenges and risks for the EU”, European Union, 2017

¹⁹⁷ Pernik and E. Tuohy, ‘Cyberspace in Estonia: Greater Security, greater challenges’, Tallin, International Centre for Defence Studies, 2013

¹⁹⁸ Ruus, K. (2008). Cyber War I: Estonia Attacked from Russia. European Affairs: Volume number 9, Issue number 1-2. 2008

¹⁹⁹ D. Giantas, A. Liaropoulos p. 11

²⁰⁰ Ibid

Other episodes of cyber conflicts (attacks during Kosovo war, Russia-Georgia conflict) demonstrated that the threat was real and could happen anywhere in the world, and it resulted with the consciousness that strategies and policies on cybersecurity were needed to enforce national security against cyber threats and wars. As a consequence, in the years afterwards the Estonian attacks, other EU member states started to develop their own cyber security strategies. Germany was a precursor, and started to develop its first cyber security strategy already in 2005.²⁰¹ Then, countries like Sweden, Finland, Slovakia followed closely behind while some others only started to develop a discussion about it and strategies in 2013, for instance Poland, Italy, Hungary developed their strategies that year. At the end, European member states understood that cyber-attacks were not only likely to happen but also they were new international threats coming from the cyberspace, able to shake the national security.

Yet, even cyber-attacks were changing and were emerging new cyber actors-threats capable of create vulnerability and attack IT infrastructure. This was understood also by the EU that developed a Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013, in which it was stated the impact of cyberspace on the society. However, in the strategy the responsibility was given to the governments and private sectors, since the latter own a significant part of cyberspace.²⁰² Moreover, the EU understood how cybersecurity incidents were changing and they could perhaps ‘disrupt the supply of essential services we take for granted such as water, healthcare, electricity’.²⁰³ Thus, the Commission decided to develop a policy on Network and Information Security (NIS). However, cyber-attacks didn’t stop and in 2015 Ukraine’s power grid was the victim of a powerful attack against the energy sector. All of these accident around the world put to a test the EU, that concerned about cyber security inside its borders and tried to seek for a major cooperation between its members.²⁰⁴ Despite the concern at the EU level and the raising numbers of cyber incidents all around the world, there has been lack of cooperation and different points of view on cyber security.

²⁰¹ The so-called ‘National Plan for Information Infrastructure Protection (NPSI)

²⁰² European Commission, ‘Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union: an Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’, 2013

²⁰³ Ibid p.3

²⁰⁴ In particular, Giantas and Liaropoulos wrote that cyber incidents like data breaches (they are much more frequent nowadays), DoS attacks to Twitter, Facebook, cyber-attacks on the German Government, suspicions of Russian involvement in elections, cyber espionage, all of these incidents raised concern at the EU level.

The threat perception

As mentioned during the last years, cyber threats started to become perceived differently; as new activities were found out, both public opinion and EU members started to feel threatened about it. Then, it's not a case that the European Council on Foreign Relations found that in 2018 cyber was the area in which EU countries feel most vulnerable.²⁰⁵ In particular, the outcome of ECFR's research was that cyber-attacks were the first out of five top perceived threats, and 16 countries felt vulnerable while 11 said to feel resilient to cyber-attacks. ECFR's survey shows the difference in perceptions among the EU countries and it argues how this may be an issue in the future, saying that 'this determines the urgency with which EU countries wish to counter threats, as well as their views on who should counter them and how they should do so'.²⁰⁶ Moreover, it shows that Denmark, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the UK appear to be most concerned about cyber-attacks, these countries are also the largest and wealthiest.²⁰⁷

The Eurobarometer report on internal security of 2011 analyzed also the perceptions on cybercrime and it resulted that eight out of ten (81%) of Europeans considered cybercrime as an important challenge for the EU security.²⁰⁸ Nine years after that report, at the beginning of 2020 the Eurobarometer found that according to its survey, cybercrime awareness was rising, in fact "52% of respondents are stating they are fairly well or very well informed about cybercrime, compared to 46% in 2017", however what's even more important is that Europeans feel less protected against cybercrime.²⁰⁹

In 2018, during the debates for adopting cyber defense measures many parliamentarians agreed that cyber threats were becoming more and more real and that EU cooperation was needed. In particular, the Estonian EU member, Urmas Paet started his report arguing that "cybersecurity threats are real, they can be very damaging and may bring about lethal consequences".²¹⁰ Moreover, Julian King (member of the Commission) said that to cybersecurity has changed quickly and that a strategic approach was needed in order to counter

²⁰⁵ S. Dennison, U. E. Frankle, & P. Zerka. "The nightmare of the dark: the security that keep Europeans awake at night", European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2018

²⁰⁶ Ibid p. 5

²⁰⁷ Ibid

²⁰⁸ Eurobarometer, "internal security report", Special Eurobarometer 371, 2011

²⁰⁹ European Commission "Europeans attitudes towards cyber security" 2020

²¹⁰ Bebate: PV 12/06/2018 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2018-06-12-ITM-018_EN.html

new threats and challenges. Almost every politician during the debated agreed not only on the threat but also on the complexity of cyber-threats, for instance Anna E. Fotyga (ECR Group) spoke also about hybrid threats explaining how blurred the line can be.²¹¹ Furthermore, what is to take into account is that a considerable number of them, highlighted that the EU should cooperate with NATO against cybersecurity threats. Finally, what is definitely most important is that all of them referred to cyber-attacks and cyber-security with the word ‘threat’.²¹² What’s interesting is the different meaning that parliamentarians gave to cyber security threats, Paet made examples of cyber-attacks on nuclear plant, on an air traffic control facility or on a hospital but also attacks on critical infrastructures, cyber espionage and disinformation campaigns. On this last point, the other members mainly concentrated their speeches, making examples of disinformation campaigns happened both outside and inside the EU borders.

The former High Representatives of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, Federica Mogherini, during a speech at the European Union Institute for security studies (ISS) talked about hybrid threats and hybrid attacks. In the spectrum of hybrid threats, Mogherini talked about cyber-attacks saying how they cause huge economic loss and disruptions affecting people’s daily lives.

Conclusions

In conclusion, migration has been defined by the EU more as a challenge than a threat, however from surveys single European country perceive that uncontrolled migration is a threat, even though there were significant differences between some countries, probably due to geographical reasons. About migration, it is not itself a threat but it starts to be perceived as a threat when is related to organization crime and terrorism. During the plenary session at the European Parliament, migration was not defined as a threat however in the official security strategies it has been related as a threat. Also, who perceived that it was a threat was the public opinion that it was influenced by the media. Even at the European Parliament, parliamentary seemed to have contrasting ideas on how terrorism is influenced by migration. Regarding the terrorist threat, we have seen that, from a security perspective, a shared understanding of its nature and a common threat perception can help developing and designing a coherent security policy, however this argument is true for every issue.

²¹² The word used were: amenazas (Spanish), zagrożenie (polish), hrozba (chzech), minacce (italian).

Moreover, cyber security attacks are now central in people's daily lives, IT infrastructures affect our lives in many ways, that's why the EU decided to develop a Cyber Defence strategy. However, the definition of what is cyber security and how cyber security threats differ from hybrid threats is very vague among parliamentarians, that seem to don't have a clear understanding. This can also affect the structure of policies. Although, the EU has different agencies for specific purposes, able to implement policies or give suggestions to policies, the parliamentarians during speeches tend to confound and overlap cybersecurity threats with hybrid threats. However, this could be due to the fact that the discussion was never meant to be separated. The former High Representative, Mogherini, also held a speech talking both about hybrid threats and cyber threats. However, discussing two specific topic together can create enormous confusion both to public opinion and both to parliamentarians that have to suggest defense policies. Ultimately, this can result in weak security and defense policies, without a coherent purpose.

In this chapter, it is highlighted that in order to develop and build a strong policy that concerns any threat, first of all it is needed a common understanding on the matter and a common perception. If these two factors are missing, developing a policy and putting it together results almost like a failure.

CHAPTER 3. the case of CSDP: the results of changing threats.

As mentioned the EU is not provided with its own military capabilities and it acts through the Common and Security Policy, essentially established for responding to international crisis. Thus, the CSDP is a tool for managing crises, have a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and strengthening of the international security.²¹³ In particular, the CSDP is able to launch military operations and civilian missions in response to international crisis working alongside with international partners, with the consent of a host nation or with the United Nations mandate.²¹⁴ Only in 2017, more than 5,200 people were deployed in different regions of the world under the CSDP, both in military operation and in civilian missions and more than 30 missions.

In the context of the CSDP, Member States are important because they play a key role in investing national finances, experts and capabilities for the deployment of missions. Also, another key role is represented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy that guides and control the policy. Moreover, the High Representative is supported by other European bodies, like the council of the EU, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. Last but not least, the CSDP is supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA), Satellite Centre (SatCen), Security and Defence College (ESDC) and Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).²¹⁵

This chapter attempt to analyze the results the complexity of the Common Security and Defense policy, how is structured and how operations works, however the main attempt is to analyze if there were concrete results in the CSDP, after the emergence of new challenges and threats. In specific, if threats created the path for civil or military operations and which role have current CSDP missions. In order to do so, the thesis will seek to analyze the impact of migration, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity upon CSDP.

3.1 CSDP overview

The foundations of the CSDP are laid in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) that was the pillar for the creation of the EU. In 1948, UK, France and Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels

²¹³ EEAS website https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5393/csdp-capabilities_en

²¹⁴ European Union Institute for Security Studies, "European Security and Defence, the basics" 2017

²¹⁵ *ibid*

that contained the idea of a common defence policy for Europe. The dream of the founding fathers back in the 1950s was a European Union of security and defense, however it did not end as they hoped and their attempt to achieve military integration failed in 1954.²¹⁶ During the Cold War the European security was guaranteed by the United States through the Atlantic organization (NATO) and the EU strictly remained related to the political and economic integration. However, the EU struggled in the 1990s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and to the conflicts in the Balkans. This instability pushed the Western European Union (WEU)²¹⁷ to adapt the Petersberg Tasks in 1992 in order to respond to international crises. Thus, the EU was assuming responsibilities in terms of crisis management and conflict prevention, and the Petersberg Tasks were also defining the type of military actions and functions the EU could have taken. Basically, the ministers of the WEU agreed on the need to take part in peace-keeping, humanitarian, rescue and peace-making missions. At that time, cooperation between WEU and NATO strengthened and this resulted in the creation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in 1996, an attempt to coordinate security and defense with the cooperation of NATO. The Petersberg tasks were then incorporated into the Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The Amsterdam Treaty was another pillar, in fact it established the position of High Representative for the CFSP, however what was significant was the meeting in 1998 at Saint Malo between Jacques Chirac (president of France) and Tony Blair (UK's prime minister). The scope was to find an agreement in order to develop autonomous military capabilities, so that the EU would have be able to respond even without the help of the US. The meeting resulted in the Saint Malo declaration, stating that: "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."²¹⁸ It followed that in 1999, the European Council of Cologne expressed the idea of a EU able to have an autonomous military capacity. In particular, the Council affirmed the willingness in framing a common defense policy, consequently they appointed Javier Solana as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to develop the CFSP. In particular, it outlined the institutional

²¹⁶ Graf von Kielmansegg, Sebastian, 'The meaning of Petersberg: some consideration on the Legal Scope of ESDP Operations', 2007, 44CMLRev 629

²¹⁷ The Western European Union was founded in 1954 and was an international organization and military alliance (of 10 countries), with the aim to enforce and coordinate matters of European security and defense. It also acted as a mediator and it contributed to the creation of the North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO).

²¹⁸ European Council, 'Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo 3-4 December 1998'. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable_en.pdf

framework of the policy, that included: the High Representative, a Political and Security Committee (PSC), a European Military Committee (EUMC) and a European Military Staff (EUMS).²¹⁹ However, the main result was the decision of the EU Member States to build a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) that promoted credible military forces and decision-making structures. During the same year, the European Council met again and developed the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) that designed military capabilities that were allowing the EU to get involved in peace enforcement, humanitarian, crisis management missions. In specific, the purpose was: “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.”²²⁰ And in order to do so it was specified that it didn’t imply the creation of a European army.

Furthermore, in 2003 the first ESDP mission was launched (EUPM BiH, in Bosnia and Herzegovina) but it also marks a turning point as it was when the European Council adopted the first European Security Strategy (‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’), a document that was establishing a set of strategic priorities for the EU and agreed on a joint threat assessment.²²¹ In 2004, it was set-up the European Defence Agency (EDA) in order to support the development of defense capabilities and military operations among the EU Member States, and enhancing the industrial cooperation.²²² However, what signs a cornerstone in the development of the CSDP was the Treaty of Lisbon, in fact ESDP was renamed as CSDP. In particular, Lisbon treaty introduced defense-relevant clauses, like the mutual assistance clause in Article 42 (7) TEU and the ‘solidarity clause’ in Article 222 TFEU ²²³. Moreover, it established the European External Action Service (EEAS) with the scope of supporting the High Representative and the Vice-President of the European Commission (HR-VP). In a nutshell, the Lisbon Treaty clarifies the the institutional aspects and strengthen the role for the European Parliament.²²⁴ Finally, there were still some developments, like the European Defence Package in 2009 and the Ghent Initiative in 2010, the former was meant in order to

²¹⁹ Larivé, M. H. A., *Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity*, Farnham, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Company, pp. 209, 2014

²²⁰ Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm#b

²²¹ European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’ (12 December 2003)

²²² European Union

²²³ After the terrorist attacks in Paris, in 2015, the former President Hollande, activated the mutual assistance clause.

²²⁴ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.1.2.pdf

support the European Defence market, while the latter launched an initiative in order to improve the availability of defense capabilities.²²⁵

Legal Provisions

To summarize, concerning the legal provisions, the CSDP is framed by the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The CSDP belongs into the CFSP, in fact it's an integral part of it, while the CFSP contains the foreign policies of the EU.²²⁶ The article 41 establishes the funding of CFSP and CSDP, while Article 42 to 46 in section 2 describe the policy. According to Article 42, the European Council and the Council of the EU take decisions for the CSDP usually by unanimity but there are some exceptions, in particular related to the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). The High Representative (that acts also as the VP/HP) is responsible for the proposals for decisions.

CSDP Capabilities

The EU is aware of the great challenges of contemporary world, especially of the higher complexities and uncertainties. Uncertainties reflect also in the security environment, that quickly changes and therefore needs specific and ad hoc strategies. For this reason, there are expectations on the EU to become more capable to deal with threats and challenges, but mostly to become a global actor. In turn, the EU argues to dispose a unique array of instruments that allow to promote peace and security around the world.²²⁷ In order to promote peace and security, the CSDP disposes of a comprehensive approach divided into civilian capabilities and military capabilities. However, as the Council of the EU says, the CSDP must have also a political, diplomatic, legal, development, trade and economic instruments.

- *Civilian Capabilities*: are at the base of every mission. In order to respond successfully to an assigned task in the field, they need to be adequate and appropriate. They are of vital importance for the EU, that considers the process of generating the needed capabilities for civilian CSDP missions a strategic priority. The European Council stressed many times the need for further developments of civilian capabilities. The ambition towards civilian crisis management has always been high, accordingly the EU

²²⁵ ISS "European Security and Defense"

²²⁶ Common Security and Defence Policy EEAS website
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.1.2.pdf

²²⁷ Homepage of European External Action Service. Page CSDP capabilities.

provided process of recruitment, training and deployment of civilian personnel. Despite the encouraging results, there are still important gaps.²²⁸ In order to resolve these problems, in 2012 it was created the multiannual Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP). The goal was to help the Member States to resolve the inadequacies with concrete actions. Through the CCDP, more Member States were able to reach some achievements like establishing a national budget for civilian crisis management. Moreover, the CCDP constitute a lasting framework for CSDP civilian capability development, but as the EU ambitions and the political context change throughout time, also the CCDP may contemplate periodic modifications. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is the principal body responsible for the sustainability of civilian CSDP capabilities. In 2018, the EU established a new civilian CSDP compact, that consists of 10 strategic guidelines and 22 political commitments with the goal to strengthen civilian CSDP missions.²²⁹

- *Military capabilities*: in 2007 the EU approved the Progress Catalogue, which identifies quantitative and qualitative military capability shortfalls; the result of the Progress Catalogue is that the EU is able to conduct a full spectrum of military CSDP operations within the framework of CSDP and the parameters of the Strategic Planning Assumptions, with different operational risk coming from different shortfalls.²³⁰ CSDP military operations are able to be legally launched both through the EU Council decision or either an invitation by the host country, or a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²³¹

To summarize, according to Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, not only the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP, but also it can carry military and civilian missions in order to support peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security. CSDP missions are mainly a Member States policy tool and besides the EU Council, other EU institutions have a limited engagement and role in it.²³² The budget for military missions is directly financed by the EU Member States, while the EU Parliament doesn't have much control and cannot really

²²⁸ Ibid

²²⁹ T. Smit, 'Towards a more capable European union civilian CSDP', SIPRI, November 2019

²³⁰ Homepage of European External Action Service. Page CSDP capabilities.

²³¹ Thierry Tardy p.3

²³² European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 'Migration Mission Creep? Ecre's assessment of the emerging role of CSDP missions in forced displacement and migration', (2019)

scrutiny CSDP missions. Moreover, the host country can request the mission to the EU, but it is always the host government that consent the EU deployment.

3.2 Migration and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy

Since 2015, the EU has taken seriously not only migration but everything related to that, due to the complexity of the phenomena. Migration was not only perceived as a threat by the public opinion of the EU member states but was also perceived as a great challenge for the EU institutions and EU governments that tried to push the EU for concrete action and solidarity. Though, migration persisted for many years before 2015, the EU moved its first steps only after 2015, providing support and making concrete steps to prevent further loss life. Though EU stated that the response was insufficient, the EU also stated the ‘need to use the EU’s global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of migration’²³³ as their priority has always been to save lives, preventing human tragedies and avoid the criminal phenomena of human smugglers. Thus, the EU called for immediate actions and some of them were supported by the CSDP, these immediate actions related with the CSDP were:

Saving lives at sea: the first action that was taken due to the emergency was the former Italian ‘Mare Nostrum’ operation. However, the EU intervened by tripling the budget for the **Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon**. Frontex is an agency related to the CSDP, and the goal of these operations was to save lives at sea by enhancing the EU maritime presence. Specifically, the *Operation Poseidon* provided Greece with technical assistance, helping with border surveillance and rescue operations. Also, Frontex helped Greece in carrying out returns and readmissions. In total, the people rescued between January and August 2016 were 37,479.²³⁴ While, *Operation Triton* was held in Italy, helping with border control, surveillance, and search and rescue operations. In total, between January and August 2016 circa 38,750 people were rescued with the help of the operation.

Targeting criminal smuggling networks: in order to target criminal networks that scammed migrants, the High Representative (HR/VP) opened the possibility for CSDP operations. The CSDP operation that was successfully realized was the ‘**EUNAVFOR Med**’ best known as ‘**Operation Sophia**’. The aim of this operation was boarding and seizing high

²³³ European Union, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’, Brussels, 13.5.2015

²³⁴ European Commission, ‘EU Operations in the Mediterranean Sea’, 2016

seas vessels that were suspected of human smuggling and trafficking.²³⁵ Moreover, the operation put efforts for the return of stability and security in Libya and the Central Mediterranean region.²³⁶ It was the first EU maritime force providing maritime security that operated in the Central Mediterranean, it also had the support of different organizations. In particular, the operation Sophia was established by the EU Council on 18 May 2015 and differed a lot from the FRONTEX operations. In fact, the operation's mandate was the 'disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean', the purposes was to 'identify, capture and dispose of vessels, used or suspected of being used by smugglers'.

The difference with previous operations was that the operation focused on smugglers rather than rescue migrants.²³⁷ Italy was the lead nation for the Operation Sophia and the composition of the mission varied according to the rotation of ships and assets gave by Member States, for instance during the Phase 1 the mission counted on four naval units (provided by Italy, Germany and UK) and five air assets (provided by France, Luxembourg, Italy, UK).²³⁸ In October 2015, the operation entered in its second phase, and contributed to saving more than 14,800 people during the first year and possible smugglers were reported to the Italian authorities, also 127 vessels were confiscated from illegal organizations.²³⁹ On 20th June 2016, the Operation Sophia was extended for another mandate. This time it also had the mandate to support and train the Libyan Coastguard and Navy, through conducting long term monitoring of trainings, it also contributed to the implementation of UN arms embargo on the high seas, conducting surveillance activities.²⁴⁰ Moreover, other supporting tasks were added on 25 July 2017 like: the set-up of a monitoring system for long-term effectiveness of the training of the Libyan Coastguards, surveillance activities and gather information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya,²⁴¹ and creating the possibility for sharing useful information on human trafficking with member states law enforcement agencies, FRONTEX and EUROPOL.²⁴² The

²³⁵ Tardy, Thierry 'Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military means', European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2015

²³⁶ Eunafor Med Operation Sophia, Mission

²³⁷ Ibid

²³⁸ European Union External Action, 'EUNAVFOR MED FORCE fully operational' (28 July 2015):

http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/press-releases/20150728_en.htm

²³⁹ Blockmans S., 'New thrust for the CSDP from the refugee and migrant crisis', CEPS Special Report, No. 142 /July 2016

²⁴⁰ Resolution UNSCR 2296 (2016) and UNSCR 2357 (2017)

²⁴¹ UNSCR 2146 (2014) and 2362 (2017)

²⁴² Factsheet EUNAVFOR MED, operation Sophia

operation used to be composed of four phases that included: 1) the understanding of smuggling activity and methods, gathering of information 2) detect the boarding, search, seizure and diversion of smugglers' vessels on the high seas 3) operational measures against vessels and related assets used or suspected of being used for human smuggling and trafficking. 4) withdrawal of forces and completion of the operation.²⁴³ The operation was able to work properly also thanks to the partnership with other partner countries, NGOs and international agencies. The Contributing member states were in total 26.

Some of the results were that in 2017 the Operation Sophia contributed to the arrest of 117 suspected human traffickers and smugglers, 478 smuggling vessels were disposed of on the high seas off Libya and more than 24,000 civilians and military security forces were trained.²⁴⁴ As already mentioned, operation Sophia was not a Search and Rescue operation (SAR) like Mare Nostrum, despite that its presence in the central Mediterranean helped to rescue circa 50,000 migrants and refugees. All in all, the operation led to positive results, however there are some debatable aspects that should be taken into account. First, the operation was delimited in a specific area, limiting the territorial scope. Moreover, Italy refused to allow ships to disembark migrants in its ports, complicating and jeopardizing the efforts of the mission²⁴⁵. Finally, Member States struggled to find an agreement on sharing responsibility for people rescued, showing lack of solidarity. Although there were disagreements as the mission mandate was extended, the mission continued but without naval assets for other six months.²⁴⁶

The New High Representative, Josep Borrell declared the permanent cease of the operation Sophia activities on the 31 of March 2020. However, it has been replaced by Operation INIRI to enforce Libya arms embargo.²⁴⁷ Borrell argued that this operation will be necessary for promoting peace through a permanent ceasefire. Although the core task of Operation INIRI will be the implementation of the UN arms embargo through the use of aerial, satellite and maritime

²⁴³ *ibid*

²⁴⁴ European Commission, 'On the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration', Brussels, 27.9.2017

²⁴⁵ Mantini argued that there was controversy over cooperation with the Libyan coastguard, especially because it was accused of not respecting human rights, abusing of migrants and refugees. Also, the Operation Sophia has been in the middle of a political debate, in particular Italy (who has commanded the operation) complained for lack of solidarity on the migration issue. See: G. Mantini, "A EU Naval Mission Without a Navy: The Paradox of Operation Sophia", Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2019

²⁴⁶ European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), "Migration Mission Creep?", policy note #20, 2019

²⁴⁷ EUNAVFOR MED operation INIRI website

assents, the operation will have also secondary tasks similar to the operation Sophia. Specifically, the operation will also:

- Monitor and gather information on illicit exports from Libya of petroleum and crude oil
- Continue to train the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea
- Disrupt human smuggling and trafficking networks²⁴⁸

The mandate of the operation will initially last until 31 March 2021 and the operation will be in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016).

Finally, the CSDP worked and still works in cooperation with Europol, that in 2015 realized the operation Joint Operational Team (JOT) Mare, which goal was to tackle the organized criminal groups who illegally facilitate the journeys of migrants by ships across the Mediterranean Sea, so that they can reach the EU.²⁴⁹

Ultimately, on the Agenda of Migration, the EU stated that migration was going to be a specific component of the ongoing CSDP missions already deployed in Niger and Mali. All these missions have in common the aim to promote stability and peace, however the main purpose is to control migration flows and fight against terrorism²⁵⁰. This basically means that the EU and Member States through these missions hope to get results in less migration flows and terrorism to Europe. Therefore it's a strategic choice to keep them alive. These two missions will be deepened in the next subchapter.

3.3 Terrorism and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy

In 2015, the European Union published the European Agenda on Security; The EEAS cites as actual threats foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, Horn of Africa/Yemen and Boko Haram in West Africa (Nigeria especially). Since terrorism has been quite a constant threat, that was highlighted frequently by Member States and the EU, this last one formulated counter-terrorism strategies. For instance, the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was based on prevention,

²⁴⁸ Ibid

²⁴⁹ Europol, website <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/joint-operational-team-launched-to-combat-irregular-migration-in-mediterranean>

²⁵⁰ European Union External Action, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: the EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', April 2016

protection, response and the Terrorism Action Plan provided a wide-range of actions in order to counter-terrorism internally and externally.²⁵¹

During early stages, neither CFSP nor CSDP were conceived as tools to fight terrorism²⁵², in fact counter terrorism is mainly a matter under the competence of EU member states. However, not only 9/11 terrorist attacks changed this attitude but also nowadays there are several EU institutions that are involved in counter-terrorism operations, or that provide useful intelligence information. In particular, the EU political authorities moved together towards an inter-disciplinary approach in order to create a coherent policy. In this regard, in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) it was stated that the EU will ‘invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity’.²⁵³ As a consequence, all of this resulted with the resolution by the European Council that issued the *Declaration on the contribution of CFSP, including ESDP, in the fight against terrorism*.²⁵⁴ Currently, the two missions that are most important for counter-terrorism are the **EUCAP Sahel Niger** and **EUCAP Sahel Mali**.

EUCAP Sahel Niger

Due to the ongoing instability in the Sahel provoked mostly by terrorism, the Sahel region was in the European radar for a potential CSDP operation at least since 2008, if not earlier.²⁵⁵ It resulted that, it was established in 2012 the so called **EUCAP Sahel Niger** civilian mission (CSDP), launched after the request of Niger’s government. In March 2011, due to the threats posed by the transnational nature of the security threats in the Sahel, the EU adopted the ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’. This document analyzed the security context and proposed a strategy aimed to help countries in the Sahel region.²⁵⁶ In particular, it was described how Sahel represented one of the poorest regions of the world and how fragile governance, corruption, the risk of violent extremism and radicalization represented a transnational security threat, especially a terrorist-linked security threat. The issue with that is

²⁵¹ European External Action Service Website, Counter-Terrorism https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/counter-terrorism/411/counter-terrorism_en

²⁵² Bruno Oliveira Martins & Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, ‘Stepping inside? CSDP missions and EU counter-terrorism’, *European Security*, 21:4, 537-556, (2012)

²⁵³ European External Action Service (EEAS), *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*, June 2016, p. 36, <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/node/339>.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*

²⁵⁵ Fiott, Daniel ‘What would a CSDP mission bring to the Sahel?’, *Ideas on Europe*, (2011)

²⁵⁶ European Union External Action Service, “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel”, (2011)

not only about Niger and Mali, but these challenges and threats have an impact also on neighboring countries, like Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, that need to be engaged in order to solve these issues.²⁵⁷ Already ten years ago the situation was fragile, the fragility of governments had consequences on poverty and security threats and allowed terrorist activities to grow uncontrolled. While poverty, the effects of climate change in the region and rapid population growth created an impact on uncontrolled migration flows. Finally, on of the branch of Al-Qaeda, so called Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) founded a sanctuary in Northern Mali, and started to threaten the region by taking money and lives. In particular, its resources and operational capacities grew fast posing a threat on the already weak security conditions of Mali and Niger.

Due to all these issues Niger's government called for help. However, the situation evolved quickly and besides the crisis in Mali, other threats evolved like the instability in Libya and the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. In addition, the country is affected by illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and people. Geographically, Niger possess a vast desert area that it is used by terrorist groups as a trafficking route and safe heaven. For all these reason, it is of vital importance for Niger to have a well-functioning security.²⁵⁸ Thus, it is important to highlight again that the instability of Niger, but mainly the cross-border nature of the security threats alarmed the EU, that understood the problem posed by these threats as the possibility in the near future of more migration flows, organized crime and terrorism also within the European borders.

The mandate of the mission was to develop an 'integrated, coherent, sustainable, and human rights-based approach among the various Nigerian security agencies in the fight against terrorism and organized crime'.²⁵⁹ The mission aimed to strengthen the security capabilities of Niger, by doing so the European security forces started to train, support and advice the Nigerian authorities. In July 2014, after two years of direct experience the mission objectives changed and were adjusted to the experience and necessities. In particular, the mission increased its assistance in the Agedez region, that was facing many security threats (irregular migration, trafficking) and the Diffa region, that posed a new security challenge. It should be highlighted

²⁵⁷ Ibid

²⁵⁸ European Union External Action, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: the EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', 2016

²⁵⁹ Ibid

that this mission works strictly in cooperation with the local authorities, and this can have consequences also on the outcomes of the mission, especially because as mentioned the EU institutions are unable to monitor the programs established in loco.²⁶⁰ Also, UUBAM Sahel Niger works closely with other CSDP missions in the same region like UBAM Libya and especially EUCAP Sahel Mali. The mission objectives are:

- Help Niger's security authorities to develop stronger operating strategies, as well as achieve interoperability.
- Strengthen the security capabilities of Niger to combat terrorism and organized crime.
- Reinforce and support the development of regional and international coordination in the fight against terrorism and organized crime.
- Help the security forces capability to control migration flows and combat irregular immigration related with criminal activities.²⁶¹

In September 2018, the EU Council extended the mandate of the mission until September 2020, with a budget of €63.4 million.²⁶² According to the European Commission, the EU investment in capacity building for the mission in Niger was €18,4 million between 2015 and 2016, while between 2016-2017 it reached a budget of €36.3 million 2018. Talking about numbers, the results of the operation so far were several and it contributed to train around 12,000 member of Niger's internal security forces.

EUCAP Sahel Mali

Mali represents another weak country in the Sahel region, and for all the reasons already described previously, the EU decided to launch a CSDP mission there. EUCAP Sahel Mali is a civilian mission that is still in progress, its aim is improving the governance practices and institutional capacities, in order to enable people of Mali to exercise their rights.²⁶³ For instance, security and Justice are rights included in the scope of the mission. The mission was launched originally on 15 January 2015 but its mandate was extended until 14 January 2021 with a budget of €67 million for the extension of the mandate period. The first mandate was established due

²⁶⁰ Andrew Lebovich, "Halting Ambition: EU Migration and Security Policy in the Sahel", European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), September 2018

²⁶¹ European Union External Action, p. 2 factsheet

²⁶² European Council website, 'EUCAP Sahel Niger: Council extends the mission for two years.'
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/09/18/eucap-sahel-niger-council-extends-the-mission-for-two-years/>

²⁶³ Ibid

to the invitation of the Malian government. In a nutshell, the EUCAP Sahel Mission goal is to help the Malian government with internal reforms of security forces (ISF) and provide security and justice for Malians by reforming and restructuring their defense and security forces. The mission's mandate was:

- Improving Malian operational efficiency
- Re-establish the Malian hierarchical chains
- Reinforce the role of judicial and administrative authorities
- Facilitate the redeployment to the north of the country.²⁶⁴

Furthermore, the new mandate provided a continuation of the previous mandate, providing trainings and strategic advices, besides the EUCAP Sahel Mali mission will be able to deliver specific , target strategic advices and trainings also in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad.²⁶⁵

Besides the civilian mission, the EU also deployed a military mission called **EUTM Mali** in 2013; the objectives of this mission have been very similar with the civilian mission, in fact the mandate of the mission aimed at restoring the Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by the terrorist groups that control parts of the country. In particular, the mission was established in the aftermath of a crisis that needed a reconstruction of the Malian Armed Forces²⁶⁶. The objectives of this mission are followed by providing the same tools as the civilian mission like: trainings of battalions, advices on command, control, logistical chain, training on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights and support for the elaboration of the first Defence programming Law.²⁶⁷

Although, the Malian soldiers have been generally positive about the outcome of the mission, it is also true that due to the geopolitical implications, these improvements have had only some effects on Mali's security situation.²⁶⁸ In particular, the security situation in the central and northern Mali aggravated and in 2018, the UN recorded an increase in attacks (200% more) respect the precedent year. It was then clear that the missions was not enough to prevent

²⁶⁴ Ibid

²⁶⁵ European Council website, EUCAP Sahel Mali <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/21/eucap-sahel-mali-mission-extended-until-14-january-2021-budget-of-67-million-adopted/>

²⁶⁶ European Union, "The european union's partnership with G5 Sahel countries", (2019)

²⁶⁷ European Union External Action, Factsheet EUTM Mali website, <https://eutmmali.eu/factsheet-eutm-mali/>

²⁶⁸ A. Lebovich, p.11

the rise of violence, on the other hand one cannot deny that the EU reacted quickly in difficult situations, like the attacks on their headquarters in Bamako (2016). Both the civilian and military missions have contributed in saving lives.²⁶⁹

Which was then the EU approach to the Sahel and why was it so important for the nowadays threats occurring in the EU? These are all legitimate questions. For instance, Lopez Lucia argued that the EU Strategy for security and development in the Sahel was used as a ‘laboratory of experimentation for the establishment of a comprehensive approach.’²⁷⁰ According to Angel Losada, the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel, Sahel has always been one of the poorest regions of the world with an average salary of 400-500 dollars, but at the same time a growing birth rate. To control nor to establish missions, the problematic within it are increasing and there are old ones like famine, terrorism, human trafficking, organized crime that are stable issues, that are difficult to eradicate. Moreover, many countries of the Sahel region are experiencing the securitization era, after many years of colonization and post-colonialism. The EU support and missions in the Sahel represented a strategy connected with the European foreign policy that externalizes the bloc’s security.²⁷¹ The decision to deploy a CSDP mission in Niger and Mali was taken and promoted by most of the EU member states, especially by the one that usually give more funds than others, like France and Italy, however Germany, Poland and the Nordic countries were negative about it and reluctant to trust the process.²⁷² However, both the EU’s strategy to establish cooperation with western Central African countries (Rabat Process, 2006) and countries in the Horn of Africa (Khartoum Process, 2014) and both the CSDP missions, had just one goal: reducing irregular migration and make terrorist attacks less likely to happen.²⁷³

3.4 Cybersecurity and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy

As mentioned in chapter II, cyber-attacks represented a huge and growing threat not only for the EU member states but for most countries worldwide. For this reason, the EU adopted the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013, that was an initial effort to take into account

²⁶⁹ Ibid p.12

²⁷⁰ Elisa Lopez Lucia, “Performing EU Agency by Experimenting the ‘Comprehensive Approach’: The European Union Sahel Strategy”, in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2017),

²⁷¹ Bernardo Venturi, ‘The EU and the Sahel: A laboratory of experimentation for the Security-Migration-Development Nexus’, Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2017

²⁷² Ibid

²⁷³ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Time to Reset African Union-European Union Relations”, in ICG Africa Reports, No. 255 (17 October 2017), p. 8, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/5677>.

cybersecurity. The attention since then has been high and most of EU States have developed their own cybersecurity national policies or initiated discussions with their expertise. With the EU Cybersecurity strategy, the EU was adopting a set of legislative proposals, specifically on network and information security²⁷⁴, investing almost €600 million for research and innovation in cybersecurity projects (2014-2020 period).²⁷⁵ Moreover, in this regard the EU count on cooperation with international partners like NATO and in 2015 the fight against cybercrime became one of the three pillars of the European Agenda on Security.

One of the most important strategic aim of the EU's Cyber Security Strategy is the development of a cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the CSDP.²⁷⁶ The strategy foreseen several points, including the adoption of the proposal for a Directive on network and information security.²⁷⁷ In particular, according to this strategy the implementation of the Directive would have promoted a better cooperation between law enforcement and cybersecurity authorities and the first step of confronting cybercrime would have been ensuring full implementation of the existing EU legislation. What has been emphasized in the strategy but also during all these years, in speeches by the High Representative is need for cooperation and how cooperation remains the main role player in the fight against cybercrime. Since cybercrime has a borderless nature and it's flexible, cyber criminality needs competent judicial authorities able to ensure swift cross-border access to evidence and information. But also, the strategy emphasized the need for cooperation with the private sector in order to fight online crime.²⁷⁸ Finally, the EU stated that the response to cybercrime must involve a real chain that goes from Europol's European Cybercrime Centre to Computer Emergency Response Teams in the Member States affected by attacks, and goes further to internet services providers and so on.

Therefore, cybersecurity is not only an issue for states but also for the EU, in this case for the EU's CFSP and CSDP.²⁷⁹ As stated before, the EU has a responsibility regarding

²⁷⁴ European Commission, "Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: an open, safe and secure cyberspace", Brussels, 2013

²⁷⁵ European Union, "EU Cybersecurity initiatives: working towards a more secure online environment", January 2017

²⁷⁶ Bendiek A. and Pander E. Maat, "The EU's Regulatory Approach to Cyber-security", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), WP NR. 02, October 2019

²⁷⁷ European Commission, "The European Agenda on Security", 2015

²⁷⁸ Ibid p.19-20

²⁷⁹ Annegret Bendiek, "The EU as a Force for peace in International Cyber Diplomacy", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), No. 19 April 2018

common security and defence, however Member States need to develop the right policies able to tackle risks and cyber threats. Besides the National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) that most of them have adopted, only few have included a military perspective of cyber defence in their national approaches.²⁸⁰ This means that cyber defence is the main component of cybersecurity only of few Member States.

Since 2013, the EU tried to cope with this threat by launching cyberdialogues with China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States. In this regard, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has played a huge role in the cyberdialogues, since it coordinated all the processes.²⁸¹ At the European level, there's a complex organization that establishes who has to undertake cyber-defence activities. In this case, the institutions that are in charge for doing that are, the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the EU Council and the European Commission.²⁸² In November 2014, the EU released the "Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF)" that established priorities:

- Supporting the development of Member States cyber defence capabilities: so that member states should be able to deliver effective cyber defence capability. Also, it should be done in relation with CSDP missions and operations. The EU argued that 'the EEAS in cooperation with member states will further integrate cyber capabilities in CSDP missions and operations'²⁸³
- Enhancing the protection of CSDP communication networks used by EU entities: the EEAS has been put in charge for the development of a clear understanding security and network defence and develop its own IT capacity.
- Promotion of civil military cooperation: there should be a coordination between civil and military domain. Cooperation should also involve national authorities.
- Research and technology

²⁸⁰ Cîrlig, Carmen-Cristina. 2014. "Cyber defence in the EU." October. Accessed November 2016. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-542143-Cyber-defence-in-the-EU/FINAL.pdf>

²⁸¹ P. Trimintzios, G. Chatzichristos, S. Portesi, P. Drogkaris, L. Palkmets, D. Liveri and A. Dufkova. "Cybersecurity in the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): challenges and risks for the EU", ENISA, (2017)

²⁸² Robinson, Neil, Agnieszka Walczak, Sophie-Charlotte Brune, Alain Esterle, and Pablo Rodriguez. 2013. "Stocktaking study of military cyber defence capabilities in the European Union (milCyberCAP) Unclassified Summary." Accessed December 5, 2016. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR286/RAND_RR286.pdf.

²⁸³ Council of the European Union, "EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework", November 2018

- Improving training, education and exercises opportunities
- Enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners: specifically NATO

One of the main EU agencies on defence, EDA, has the responsibility of the cyber defence sphere, in fact it has a coordinating role.²⁸⁴ However, there are other agencies involved in the in the protection of critical cyber assets like the European Union Agency for Network and Information (ENISA), Europol's European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, Agencies and Bodies (CERT-EU).²⁸⁵ All of them, in May 2018 signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that established a cooperation framework by sharing information, exchanging expertise and practices of cyber security. In particular, EDA is working on cyber situation awareness for CSDP operations and how to integrate cyber defense in the conduct of CSDP military operations and missions.²⁸⁶

All in all, NATO remains the most important partner and a reference point for the European cyber defence cooperation in Europe and the Cyber Defence Pledge intensified EU-NATO cooperation.²⁸⁷ Moreover, in 2017 the European Commission proposed a European Defence Fund (EDF) that aimed in providing a key contribution to Europe's strategic autonomy.²⁸⁸ It also promoted defence cooperation between the EU member states as well as research in defence technologies and innovations.

Conclusions:

Overall, since CSDP was established there has been some results and the EU member states actively participated both in civilian and military missions; however, there are always some differences and each country perceive the CSDP in its way, but national perspectives are a complicated argument that should be analyzed separately. CSDP operations are still a work in progress and it's true that after many years, the EU's security and defense machine is still

²⁸⁴ According to Article 42(3) TEU and article 45 TEU

²⁸⁵ European Defence Agency, "Cyber Defence", fact sheet, 5 November 2018

²⁸⁶ *ibid*

²⁸⁷ NATO, Cyber Defence Pledge (Warsaw, July 8, 2016)

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133177.htm

²⁸⁸ European Commission, European Defence Fund, (2017)

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund_en

based mostly on the cooperation with NATO. As Mogherini said NATO is one of EU's most important partners, especially against cyber threats, working in sync with one other.²⁸⁹

Besides that, threat perception created the path for CSDP operation like Operation Sophia and the operations in Sahel. Threat perception within the EU has evolved bringing new dimensions of the threat, the EU took into account the internal-external security nexus;²⁹⁰ this resulted in the understanding of the EU as a global security actor and security provider, and as a consequence this resulted also in the reshaping of CSDP and missions.²⁹¹ The results are that most of the times, when threats are addressed by the EU official strategies and policies, there will be a specific mention to CSDP and depending on the type of threats, a specific mission will take place.

In conclusion, this chapter has tried to analyze which are the results of threat perceptions, and found several missions like Operation Sophia, EUCAP Sahel Mali and Niger. These missions were created for different reasons but what they had in common that they resulted from threat perceptions. While, regarding cyber security defence, the project is already on the EU's agenda that set the frameworks of actions that will be undertaken in the sphere of CSDP, however it's still a work in progress.

²⁸⁹ European Union, 'Speech by the High Representative Federica Mogherini at the conference "Hybrid threats and the EU: State of play and future progress', (2017) https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/togo/33141/speech-high-representative-vice-president-federica-mogherini-conference-hybrid-threats-and-eu_en

²⁹⁰ Chappell, L. (Ed.), Mawdsley, J. (Ed.), Petrov, P. (Ed.). 'The EU, Strategy and Security Policy'. London: (2016) Routledge,

²⁹¹ Ibid p.89

Conclusion

During the last twenty years the EU addressed many security challenges and threats in its official strategies and policies. Pushed by its core values like human rights, democracy, freedom and peace tried to construct its international role as a security actor. Sometimes, this resulted in CSDP military and civilian missions aimed in stabilizing specific regions of the world. This research shed a light on which are the causes, specifically the threat perceptions that push the deployment of CSDP and its tools. This work developed toward answering the question: how threat perceptions change the CSDP?

In order to answer this question, it was needed a deep research on which are the threats that are most cited and discussed within the EU by European institutions, press, governments. However, what was more useful was analyzing the official EU policies and strategies and trying to understand the changes of the discourse throughout the years. Moreover, it required also in depth study of the CSDP missions that more than others were the results of threats perceived in Europe, like so called Operation Sophia, EUCAP Sahel Mali and Niger.

The results of my thesis addressed the research question stated earlier. Threat perceptions are important, perhaps more than the threat itself, because when there's a shared perception of the threat, there are high chances that the issue is also commonly understood at a European level. As a consequences, defense policies will be much more coherent and ultimately reach many more Member States in the participations into missions. Especially, Member States will be more willing to actively participate and finance them. Although, the EU described huge migration flows more like a challenge rather than a threat, the EU policymakers and policies, spoke also about threats related with the phenomena, like illegal trafficking of human beings and smuggling, organized crime and terrorism Furthermore, it received a lot of attention by public opinion and institutional attention from Brussel. Additionally, the results of new threats resulted in consciousness about those threats by Member States that not only started to develop their own strategies, for instance national cyber security strategies, but also started to cooperate between them and through NATO. In this regard, It is important to know the history of the European security and defence, because we can understand why many competences nowadays in that field are relegated to NATO, and why cooperation is still crucial for the European security and defence. Finally, constructivism and new institutionalism resulted to be useful for

the studying of threat perceptions and security, because they highlighted how different cultures within the European union influence the choices of Member States, especially inside the European Institutions. On the other hand, institutions and policies help the construction of common ideas and beliefs, pushing member states to collaborate. All in all, these two theories bring novelty into the studying of security strategies, especially in the European context.

Speaking about migration flows and the threats related to that, the EU took immediate actions and the immediate support of CSDP missions on smuggling migrant was a part of the ‘immediate action’ in the European Agenda on Migration. The EU argues that these missions are of crucial importance for the security stability of both Africa and Europe, trying to provide basic human rights and the security stability of the region. These missions show the ambitions of the EU to take into account external objectives in order to serve its internal objectives of holding back migration flows. By doing so, the EU has started to take a different approach, by doing whatever it takes in order to stop migration flows from the places in which migrants start their trips. Even though, there were contrasts and oppositions between Member States on determined threats, even countries that were more reluctant to participate in some missions, ultimately financed them. Behind all these missions, there’s the belief that the security of Africa is also the security of Europe, and that CSDP missions will curb migration flows, organized crime and terrorist attacks. Therefore, internal security priorities within Europe drive both EU policies and CSDP in Africa, specifically related with terrorism and migration.

On the other hand, the discussion is different in regard of cyber security and cyber defence. In fact, the development of a coherent cyber defence capabilities related to CSDP is still a work in progress, and it’s unclear when there will be results, however the fact that it’s on the European agenda means that some steps further have been taken. However, the EU counts a lot on its partnership with international organizations especially with NATO, and encourages not members of the Alliance and not member of the EU in the alliance in the cooperation aiming to promote peace and stability. CSDP is in itself a work in progress policy that tries to find its own dimension between NATO and the willingness to act independently by some Member States. Although, it can be true that there are some cyber-attacks committed by hackers within the EU, most of the time cyber-attacks come from outside the EU borders. Moreover, the EU is not closed to be defined a hard power in cyberspace like the US, Russia and China, however it can be considered a cyber actor, a soft power that tries to build an approach based on resilience. Basically, EU aims not at becoming a strong actor like Russia and the EU, but it

rather seeks to prepare for cyber-attacks, by giving quickly responses and recover quickly from them. Since the moment the EU took into account cybersecurity, it tried to build a culture of cybersecurity, with the help of European agencies and institutions, this said the path is still long and the EU through these action aimed mostly to promote the European values.

Furthermore, threat perceptions especially when they are covered by media and national governments result in discussions upon EU institutions and they often result in policies that develop a framework for it. Also, what is more important in the function of the thesis is that threat perceptions created the path for further development of CSDP missions. Nevertheless, It should be highlighted that whether these missions have been successful or not is not the purpose of this thesis. However, after analyzing the purpose of some of the most important missions, especially the ones held in Africa, one can be skeptical about the real results, in fact some regions are still weak, with fragile governments unable to have authority. Conversely, it can also be argued that there have been some shy results, however the CSDP remains a weak tool. In order to be effective, CSDP missions should be reshaped according to specific needs and goals. Still, one should not forget that the CSDP is a relatively young policy, founded in 1999, but established with the current provisions and legal frameworks only in 2009, so it's obvious that there are still some weak points and this should be taken into consideration. Also, Brexit and the going out of scene of the U.K. both as a financier for CSDP operations and as a military power, put much more uncertainty about the future of CSDP and its missions. NATO remains vital for the European security that with the only CSDP would never make it, due to not only individual weaknesses of States but also a collectively weaknesses. Also, contrasts between Member States about missions or security threats most of the time require time, that it is wasted in order to come up with a common agreement. Thus, besides the mere Alliance, NATO is becoming like an instrument for the EU, in order to collaborate on specific delicate issues like cyber security and the EU is pushing even non-members to collaborate within that framework. In fact, Member States are more reluctant sometimes to forge CSDP than NATO. This has to be taken into account, although the cooperation between the EU and NATO is important and should be kept for many reasons, it is also a fact that this makes the hypothesis of a stronger CSDP unlikely, but mostly it means that the creation of a European independent defence from the US is dubious to happen because limited by the EU-NATO cooperation.

This research also discovered that threats have a role in shaping public opinions perceptions, governments perceptions and ultimately the EU that will take into account them.

For instance, cyber security threats are interesting to be analyzed under the CSDP because the EU opened the path for specific competences that CSDP have to acquire in order to defend the cyber sphere. During the past years, the national rhetoric of European parties and governments changed, but also the speeches of HR changed. In fact, although the EU is most famous for its soft power, and for being a soft power actor, it should be noted that it has military and civilian capabilities under the CSDP, and that already deployed many missions, thus is ready to use also its military power.

In conclusion there has been a changing in the discourse and in the words that the HR during the last twenty years have been using. While in 2003, the EU was addressing new challenges rather than new threats, it seemed like the situation changed with the Global strategy of 2016 and with all the CSDP operations that were established. The future of CSDP seems to be very unclear, in fact it should be remembered that the EU has faced and is facing a huge economic crises that has become one of the main perceive threat. However, geopolitics is changing and new security challenges are coming in the EU's way, Libya is one of the main issue at the moment within the European borders. Even though, the EU has extended the CSDP mission in Libya, since the economic situation is getting worst, it is unclear whether the EU will have enough funds to support new CSDP operations, or if there will be structural changes in the policy. It is also unclear whether these missions will have the desired results by Member States. However, the phenomena of the EU that acts through CSDP in specific instable regions of the world will last also in the future and persist, thus internal security interests will dominate the EU foreign policy and this is likely to have further effects on the deployment of new missions.

Abbreviations

AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb
BREXIT	The withdrawal of U.K. from the European Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Defence Fund
EEAS	European External
ENISA	European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
EP	European Parliament
ESS	European Statistical System
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
EUCAP SAHEL Mali	European Union Capacity Building Mali
EUCAP SAHEL Niger	European Union Capacity Building Niger
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IRA	Irish Republic Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion
TEU	The Treaty on the European Union
U.K.	United Kingdom
UBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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
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
Annex

Annex 1. Figures²⁹²




²⁹² European Union External Action website on CSDP missions

Annex 2. Figures²⁹³



Annex 3. Figures.²⁹⁴



²⁹³ Statistics from: Dennison Susi, Franke Ulrike Esther, & Zerka Pawel. "The nightmare of the dark: the security fears that keep Europeans awake at night", European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018

²⁹⁴ Ibid