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Table of Contents

Introduction **4**

Main Focus and Relevance 4

Aim and Objectives 10

Theory and Methodology 10

Literature and Sources Review 15

Limitations to the Research 19

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framing of Securitisation of Migration **21**

1.1. Securitisation Theory 21

1.2. Securitisation of Migration 31

Chapter 2

Context: 2015-16 Migrant Crisis **42**

2.1. Origins of the Crisis 42

2.2. EU Response Policies 48

2.2.1. Quota System 54

2.2.2. EU-Turkey Deal 57

2.2.3. Frontex 60

Chapter 3

Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Policy Evaluation **64**

3.1. Quota System 64

3.2. EU-Turkey Deal 69

3.3. Frontex 72

3.4. Criticism: Human Rights Perspective 77

Conclusion **83**

List of Primary Sources and Literature **89**

Appendix – Security Lexicon **99**

List of Abbreviations

EU – European Union

HRW – Human Rights Watch

IOM – International Organisation for Migration

MEH – Meaning Extraction Helper

MSF – Médecins Sans Frontières

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

Main Focus and Relevance

The main topic examined in the present research is the outcome of the 2015-2016 period that has been described as the "European migrant crisis", which has dominated all formats of socio-political discourse in the European Union since its very beginning. The origins of this situation can be traced back to 2011 and the events which have become known under the name "Arab Spring," when a series of demonstrations against political regimes occurred in the Middle East. One of these countries was Syria, where the aforementioned circumstances provoked a major civil war, resulting in the subsequent military involvement of foreign powers – such as the United States and Russia, and subsequently caused a wave of refugees towards neighbouring countries and Europe. According to official data, in 2015 and 2016 over 1,4 million refugees and migrants reached Europe, predominantly arriving from conflict-ridden countries – the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Iraq.[1] This migration wave was the biggest Europe had seen since World War II and it was decidedly unprepared to face the resulting situation.

Nowadays – five years since the "crisis" started, EU Member States and collective institutions are still struggling to deal with the issue of migration and it remains as one of the central topics in the European socio-political discourse. In recent years, several policies have been undertaken to improve the situation while upholding European values, but at the same time migration has become a point of disagreement between EU Member States and a major proponent of a populist wave, led by a securitisation rhetoric. This research will therefore examine the effects of the crisis on European policies and political discourse in the context of securitisation. More specifically, the overemphasis of European Union's main political actors and institutions in the discourse will be looked into, as well as the dominant role it plays in the formation of public attitudes towards immigration and the subsequent official policies of the collective European institutions.

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[1] Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019.

Firstly, for the purpose of the research it is necessary to point out the distinction between the three widely used terms “migrant,” “refugee” and “asylum-seeker.” The difference between them is important, as it does not only define the official status of the people arriving in the European Union, but oftentimes directly affects the attitudes of politicians, media and individual citizens towards them. All three of the aforementioned terms are used for people who have fled their country of residence for various reasons and have crossed international borders seeking to settle someplace else. The most widely used term is “migrant,” which does not have an official international legal definition and is often applied as an umbrella term by different stakeholders. Thus, the wide use of this term may often include refugees and asylum seekers as well, as part of “mixed migration” – movements of people who cross international borders for different reasons. Traditionally, a migrant is someone who is moving outside their country of origin by choice, as opposed to forcefully, in order to reconnect with family or in search of a better life, among other reasons. A refugee is defined as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.[2] Whereas an asylum-seeker is someone who is seeking international protection under the 1951 UN Convention and has yet to be legally recognised as a refugee because they’re waiting for their asylum claim to be processed. UNHCR suggests that due to the necessity of the individuals belonging to the groups of refugees and asylum-seekers to receive international protection, that the use of the umbrella term “migrant” should be conducted carefully. Furthermore, the distinction between refugees and asylum-seekers on the one hand and economic migrants on the other hand is important for the perception of the persons holding the aforementioned statuses. For instance, many Europeans seem to be more accepting of refugees as persons fleeing life-threatening conditions than economic migrants, who are perceived to have a choice in whether to move out of their country. Nonetheless, the so-called European “migrant crisis” is often presented in a way that does not offer clear distinctions between the people entering the EU and they appear to represent a holistic concern for the political and public opinion.

Indeed, the issue of immigration has risen to the top of European concerns in recent years and has overtaken economic themes, which persistently topped the charts of the most important

[2] 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees // United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). – 2010. Article 1(A)(2). – P. 14.

issues for Europeans after the 2007-08 world financial crisis. Latest data indicates that immigration is still the number one concern for European citizens, with 34% claiming it's the most important issue facing the EU at the moment.[3] Consequently, since the very beginning of the migration crisis, the security frame has been among the most widespread and arguably the one holding the most power to affect the public opinion.

In recent years, right-wing and populist parties across Europe have used the migration issue as an opportunity for greater public exposure and a means to receive more votes, with many succeeding in this endeavour. Most notable examples to mention could be AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), which is now the biggest opposition party in Germany, the League party in Italy, with its leader Matteo Salvini becoming a key figure in nationalist movements in Europe, the rise of the Vox party in Spain, the Greek Solution and Golden Dawn parties in Greece, as well as Viktor Orban's government in Hungary. These represent just some of the examples of a rising nationalist wave in Europe, fuelled primarily by their anti-immigration rhetoric. Indeed, in the recent European parliament elections, one in three respondents claimed that their primary reason for voting was the issue of immigration.[4] The right-wing and nationalist parties also gained a significant number of seats in the European parliament after the latest elections of May 2019, attempting to increase their influence in Brussels. Soon after, a far-right political group – "Identity and Democracy," was formed within the parliament with nine nationalist European parties as members, including the German AfD and the Italian League. The group overall holds 73 seats in the total of 751, which still does not account for the seats occupied by other nationalist parties belonging to another right-wing coalition formed within the parliament – the "European Conservatives and Reformists Group," as well as parties which were not attached to any coalition after the election – such as the Greek far-right party Golden Dawn, which won 2 seats in the European parliament. Overall, the two conservative groups currently hold a total of 135 seats in the parliament, in addition to the 51 seats held by the Non-attached members, which are predominantly composed of nationalist and far-right parties.[5] This means that approximately

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[3] Public Opinion in the European Union: Standard Eurobarometer 92 of November, 2019 // European Commission, 2019. – P. 15.

[4] The 2019 Post-Electoral Survey: Have European Elections Entered a New Dimension? // Eurobarometer Survey 91.5 of the European Parliament: A Public Opinion Monitoring Study. European Parliament, 2019. – P. 51.

[5] 2019 European election results [Electronic resource] // European Parliament. URL: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en (accessed: 27.03.2020)

one fourth of the European parliament is currently in favour of nationalist and anti-immigration policies, despite the fact that the numbers of arriving migrants and refugees have radically dropped since 2016.

Given this situation, migration does still represent a topic of urgency for the European Union and dominates the socio-political discourse. This was also comprehensively reflected by Stefan Lehne in 2018, indicating that the EU was still in shock mode despite the height of the crisis in numbers being in the past – "The EU received 43 percent fewer asylum applications in 2017 than it did in 2016. The mass reception centres have mostly emptied, and the school gyms and army barracks have reverted to their original functions. But while the acute crisis has ended, the situation has hardly normalised. The 2018 Italian elections demonstrate that concerns surrounding migration and asylum continue to dominate the public space and shape national and EU politics. Border controls at several internal Schengen borders are still in place, and migration remains the top concern of EU citizens.".[6]

The motivation behind the research was thus an intention to examine how the recent discourse around the migrant crisis in the European Union has been shaping and influencing agendas of EU political institutions in a security context. While a lot of past research focused on the crisis itself and the subsequent "shock" the European Union faced due to the unprecedented numbers of arriving migrants and refugees, this research paper focuses primarily on the period after the crisis that took place in 2015-2016, with a deeper examination of the developments in the past five years. Latest data indicates that numbers of migrants and refugees who arrive in Europe have significantly dropped since 2016, with total arrivals decreasing from 1,032,408 in 2015, to 373,652 in 2016, and 185,139 in 2017.[7] These statistics might lead to the false impression that the worst is over and the current numbers present a manageable task for Member States and European institutions. In fact, in March 2019 the European Commission released a factsheet debunking "myths" about migration, where it was stated that the EU was no longer in crisis

[6] Lehne, S. The EU Remains Unprepared for the Next Migration Crisis [Electronic resource] / S. Lehne // Carnegie Europe. URL: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/04/03/eu-remains-unprepared-for-next-migration-crisis-pub-75965 (accessed: 13.04.2020)

[7] Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019.

mode.[8] Nonetheless, that is not precisely the truth. Firstly, the numbers of arrivals have not decreased significantly since 2017, with the arrivals in 2019 numbering 125,472.[9] Secondly, the EU is still struggling with the implementation of a common immigration and asylum policy, which has led to major divisions within European institutions, as well as procedural delays due to ineffectiveness and high level of bureaucracy. It is thus necessary to point out that the relevance of the crisis is not only measured in numbers of the arriving refugees and migrants, but in the effectiveness and intensity of policies undertaken in order to face the issue, as well as the socio-political context in which it is being presented across Europe. The primary role in these conditions is occupied by the main EU institutions, which hold the sole decision-making power with regards to collective policies of the European Union and which are obligatory for the EU Member States.

A major turning point in the migrant crisis was the 2016 agreement between European Union and Turkey, which aimed at decreasing irregular migration in Europe. Indeed, for the years 2015 and 2016, numbers of arriving migrants and refugees reached all-time highs with over one million arrivals. The vast majority of the arriving people were refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, while the rest came from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Africa, among others. Many of them had to turn to criminal networks of smugglers for assistance in their transportation and knowingly faced a dangerous trip through the Mediterranean to reach the Greek shores.

After the application of the EU-Turkey deal, the numbers of arrivals decreased significantly. According to the agreement reached between the European and Turkish governments, the failed asylum seekers that entered Europe through Greece would be taken back to Turkey in exchange for a large amount of money that was given to Turkey by the EU in order to accept these people. However, this meant that only individuals registered to have entered Europe through the Greek islands would qualify to participate in this refugee exchange programme. Consequently, the Greek islands essentially turned into major reception centres, where people would have to wait for long periods of time for their asylum applications to be processed to find out whether they could enter the Greek mainland and then, potentially, other EU member states, or to be taken

[8] Facts matter: Debunking myths about migration // European Commission, 2019.

[9] Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019.

back to Turkey as failed asylum seekers not qualifying for refugee status. In addition, as seen in the below graph (Figure 1), arrivals to Greece have in fact increased since 2018 – further aggravating the situation.



Figure 1 – Monthly Arrivals in Greece in 2018-2020 (By Sea and Land)

Source: UNHCR

As a result, due to extremely slow procedures and ineffective bureaucracy, refugee camps on Greek islands such as Lesvos and Samos have been painfully overcrowded, with people having to exist in unacceptable living conditions. This has created tensions between the Greek government, Greek island citizens and the EU, as the latter is blamed for not offering sufficient help to deal with the new continuing arrivals to the already overcrowded reception centres. Those who are successfully granted asylum have to be accepted by various EU countries according to certain quotas, in order to ease the burden on "first contact" states such as Greece or Italy. But this process has been met with many issues and delays, with countries like Slovakia

and Hungary illegally refusing to take in refugees.[10] Furthermore, this specific case underscores the main issue facing the European Union in terms of facing the migration crisis – absence of efficient institutional policies at the highest level, which could manage to be both efficient and correspond with the EU's human rights obligations. The Greek situation is thus one of the signs that the migrant crisis in Europe is far from over and shall continue to dominate the socio-political discourse in the upcoming years.

Aim and Objectives

Consequently, the aim of the present research is to reveal whether the official immigration policies of the EU have been securitised and if they correspond with EU values and human rights obligations.

In order to achieve this aim, the following objectives have been set:

- The outcome of the 2015-2016 European migrant crisis will be evaluated through the use of securitisation theory
- Quantitative and qualitative analysis tools will be applied to conduct content and discourse analysis
- The relation between the discourse and official policies will be established
- The correspondence of EU human rights obligations and official immigration policies will be evaluated

Theory and Methodology

The theory through which the main theme of the research shall be examined is Copenhagen School's "securitisation" theory – a term introduced by Ole Wæver in the mid-1990s in his work

[10] The Court dismisses the actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the mandatory relocation of asylum seekers // Court of Justice of the European Union. – 2017. Press Release № 91/17.

"Securitisation and Desecuritisation".[11] Other influential figures in the formation of this theory were Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, who along with Wæver wrote arguably the most significant contribution to the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework in security studies – "Security: A New Framework for Analysis," published in 1997. Overall, the theory represents a combination of constructivism and classical political realism in its approach to the concept of security.

With the appearance of securitisation theory, significant attention was paid for the first time to non-materialist aspects of security. In classical terms of state-military approach in security studies, security is largely defined in terms of military capabilities and actual distribution of power, whereas in the re-evaluation of securitisation theory, security as seen as a concept that can be constructed through a speech act – "It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one".[12] By extension, there are specific securitising actors – usually political elites, who claim that extraordinary measures can be taken whenever a specific object is being threatened. Consequently, said object or issue can be moved from the sphere of normal politics to emergency politics and the security realm, legitimising the undertaking of extraordinary measures. In that context, anything can become a security issue if a securitising actor successfully claims so and the process of securitisation itself is intersubjective, largely depending on the perception of the audience and the delivery of the actor. Therefore, an issue can become a security concern not simply because it represents objective threat, but rather because it is presented as such. Therefore, security is a speech act – "the word security is the act; the utterance is the primary reality,"[13] through which issues can be socially constructed by actors as threats to security. In this case, securitising actors are those that "are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security".[14] Based on this suggestion, securitising actors need to have an active role and legitimacy within the discourse, therefore

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[11] Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 46.

[12] Wæver, O. Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery / O. Wæver // International Studies Association Conference (17–20 March, Montreal). / International Studies Association, 2004. – P. 13.

[13] Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization. – P. 46.

[14] Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de Wilde. – London: Boulder; Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 31.

political and security elites are more likely to occupy this position. At the same time, there can also be functional actors, who do not create their own constructions but rather disseminate and popularise the rhetoric of securitising actors. This is a position usually occupied by the various types of media.

But it is not enough to examine the discourse alone and focus on language. The research would not be completed without examining the actual policies that were undertaken within the scope of securitisation of migration. Later additions to securitisation theory moved beyond the idea of the "speech act" and investigated practices and policies as well, in order to offer a more holistic view. Namely, the practice-oriented approach to the theory is represented by such scholars as Huysmans, Balzacq and Bigo of the Paris School. This direction of the theory underscores the importance of institutions and their policies as a means to evaluate the effects of the discourse – "to focus only on the role of political discourse in the securitisation process is to underestimate the bureaucratic professionalisation of the management of unease".[15] That is why the present research will examine both the language and the subsequent immigration policies of EU institutions in order to provide more effective analysis.

For the specific case of migration, it is important to examine the role of collective identity and its role in the process of securitisation. According to the Copenhagen School, existential threats to collective identity could be internal or external developments that can be seen in negative terms as invasive and in positive terms as evolution of identity. But due to the fact that "identity" is predominantly viewed in conservative terms, it is rather easy to create the rhetoric of a challenge or threat to identity through an "us" versus "them" logic. This can create tales of danger that will unite communities against those on the outside, by underlining the differences between them. For instance, in ancient Greece, a similar concept was used to separate the Hellenic nation from everyone else who did not belong to it and was therefore part of the barbaric "them." Despite Greek city-states not being united in one common Pan-Hellenic state and often fighting each other, their collective identity still united them against external threats, such as the Persians. Thus, the "holders of the collective identity" have significant influence and power due to the importance of maintaining and reproducing a language, a set of behavioural customs or a

[15] Bigo, D. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease / D. Bigo // Alternatives. – 2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 74.

conception of ethnic purity. Consequently, for the topic of migration the concepts of external threat and collective identity are centric in whether it will be securitised based on how close-minded or open-minded the holders of said identity are.[16] And the main method to determine the level of securitisation suggested by the Copenhagen School is discourse analysis, which pays a lot of attention to language and frames, since those are the main tools through which security is constructed.

In the case of the 2015-16 European migrant crisis, securitisation was an evident development, which could be observed through institutional policies, political speeches and the media. The most common stereotypes around migrants and the perceived problems created by immigration were among the most popular in use – words such as “crime,” “security,” “threat,” becoming widespread in many socio-political discussions on migration. Consequently, the issue became an urgent one, demanding “extraordinary” measures, which were accepted as necessary by the majority of the public.

Thus, the role of language is of major importance in the process of securitisation of migration. The methodology of this research will therefore include discourse analysis, conducted on official documents of EU institutes – laws, speeches, statements and press releases. This analysis will aim at pinpointing specific words pertaining to securitisation being present in the examined texts. The approach of the Copenhagen School which views the securitisation process as a “speech act” will be of primary significance at this stage. Further on, the approach of the Paris School, which expands on the discursive essence of securitisation theory by looking at the resulting policy aspect, will be applied to examine the immigration policies of EU institutions. Thus, the “quota” system, the EU-Turkey agreement and the role of Frontex will be looked into from the perspective of securitisation theory – firstly, by analysing the language of EU institutions, and secondly, by looking into the formulation of actual policies decided within the framework of these three research areas.

However, the aforementioned type of qualitative methodology will be combined with a quantitative method, in order to offer a more comprehensive and clear picture of the situation. This part of the analysis will be based on Baele and Sterck’s proposed methodology, which takes

[16] Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. – P. 23.

into account the repetitive nature of securitisation language – more specifically, they suggest that the "speech act" may occur with regularity, instead of as an isolated incident.[17] Thusly, they create a relevant dictionary with words pertaining to securitsation and call it "security lexicon". The composition of the lexicon is based on the security glossaries of the "UN Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies" and the Palgrave Handbook on Security Studies.[18] Next, they employ the text analysis software LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) in order to count the occurrence of the words in their security lexicon within a collection of pertinent documents. Afterwards, they apply statistical analysis in order to present their research results. Through this method, it is possible to include a large number of relevant texts pertaining both to discourse and policy practices and therefore receive a complete and unbiased illustration of the securitisation process and its intensity. The hypothesis at this stage is that the increased frequency of securitising language indicates the intended presence of a securitising move. This means that the ratio of words contained in the security lexicon over the total words in the texts represents the "security ratio" – and the higher it is, the higher is the level of securitisation. As a comparison, Baele and Sterck provide a sample of a "low" security ratio contained in generic texts and a sample of a "high" security sample ratio contained in hard security texts – these are then compared to the ratios encountered in the immigration policy texts.

The same logic will be applied in the present research, through the use of a different software – the text analysis programme MEH (Meaning Extraction Helper), which will be used to measure word presence in the given relevant texts. The advantages of such a method are multiple: it provides a completely unbiased analysis with an entirely automated text review process; it can review a large number of texts, thus providing highly representative results; and the novelty of this method in securitisation theory analysis offers the opportunity for original findings in the researcher's own areas of choice. In the present research, 50 different official documents of EU institutes centred around each of the three policy areas under analysis – the Quota system, the EU-Turkey agreement and the role of Frontex, will be reviewed against Baele and Sterck's proposed security lexicon. Overall, 150 texts will be analysed and statistical analysis will be

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[17] Baele, S. J. Sterck, O. C. Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims / S. J. Baele, O. C. Sterck // Political Studies. – 2014. Vol. 63, №. 5. – P. 1125.

[18] Ibid. – P. 1127.

employed in order to present the results. Lastly, comparative analysis will be employed in order to compare levels of securitisation between the three examined fields.

As the final step of the research, the aspect of human rights and how European immigration policies correspond with them will be examined. This concluding part will take into account official EU documents relevant to immigration policies, as well as criticism the EU has received from various academics and international organisations with regards to its human rights obligations in the handling of the migrant crisis.

Literature and Sources Review

The primary sources utilised in the present research are vastly composed of official documents of the European Union's institutions, as well as other international organisations and non-governmental organisations. This includes press releases, legal documents, speeches and statistical data available on the official websites of the EU institutions such as the European Commission[19], European Council[20] and Frontex[21]; United Nations[22] and its relevant agencies and services, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)[23] and International Organisation for Migration (IOM)[24]; lastly, various NGOs primarily within the humanitarian and human rights sector, such as Amnesty International[25] and Human Rights Watch[26]. These sources can be classified geographically – firstly, those sources that have been released and made accessible directly by EU institutions and official representatives and, secondly, those available from international organisations not bound by direct association with the European Union.

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[19] Official website of the European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en

[20] Official website of the European Council. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/

[21] Official website of Frontex. URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/

[22] Official website of the UN. URL: https://www.un.org/en/

[23] Official website of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). URL: https://www.unhcr.org/

[24] Official website of International Organisation for Migration (IOM). URL: https://www.iom.int/

[25] Official website of Amnesty International. URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/

[26] Official website of Human Rights Watch (HRW). URL: https://www.hrw.org/

Moreover, the literature applied in this research consists of previous works written by various scholars on the topic of migration in Europe. These predominantly consist of scholarly and online articles, books and conference papers. These secondary sources can be classified chronologically – dating back before 2015, which is marked as the beginning of the European migrant crisis, and those dated from 2015 and afterwards. While the former group reflects on the historical perspective of migration in Europe and the world, the latter includes information specific to the European migrant crisis itself and is more relevant to the present research. For instance, the works of scholars such as Benard[27], Bonifazi[28], Jennissen[29], Naito[30] and Czaika[31] can be included in the pre-2015 group, as their examination of European migration predates the events of the migrant crisis. Then, other notable examples such as the works of Jones et al.[32], Lindgaard[33], Nas[34] and Pinos[35] can be incorporated in the post-2015 group, since they speak of events and policies that occurred after the start of the crisis.

Additionally, the literature also includes works of notable representatives of securitisation theory, as well as more specifically those focused on the securitisation of migration. These works

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27 Benard, C. Migrant Workers and European Democracy / C. Benard // Political Science Quarterly. – 1978. Vol. 93, №. 2. P. 277.

28 Bonifazi, C. Evolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europe / C. Bonifazi // International Migration in Europe / ed.: C. Bonifazi, M. Okólski, J. Schoorl, P. Simon. – Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008. – P. 109-119.

29 Jennissen, R. Van Der Gaag, N. Van Wissen, L. Searching for similar international migration trends across countries in Europe / R. Jennissen, N. Van Der Gaag, L. Van Wissen // Genius. – 2006. Vol. 62, №. 2. P. 37-38.

30 Naito, M. Integration or Exile: German "Ausländerpolitik" And Turkish Migrants / M. Naito // Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies. – 1995. Vol. 27, Special Issue: Proceedings of The Hitotsubashi University International Symposium On "The World and Japan in the Age of Multiculturalism. P. 71.

31 Czaika, M. de Haas, H. The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory? / M. Czaika, H. de Haas // The International Migration Review. – 2014. Vol. 48, №. 2. P. 285.

32 Jones, W. Teytelboym, A. Rohac, D. Europe's Refugee Crisis Pressure Points and Solutions / W. Jones, A. Teytelboym, D. Rohac // American Enterprise Institute. – 2017. – P. 4-5.

33 Lindgaard, J. EU Public Opinion on Turkish EU Membership: Trends and Drivers / J. Lindgaard // FEUTURE. – 2018. Online Paper №. 25. – P. 1.

34 Nas, Ç. The EU's Approach to the Syrian Crisis: Turkey as a Partner? / Ç. Nas // Uluslararası İlişkiler-International Relations. – 2019. Vol. 16, №. 62. – P. 64.

35 Pinos, J. C. Building Fortress Europe? Schengen and the Cases of Ceuta and Melilla / J. C. Pinos // Centre for International Border Research. – 2019. – P. 4.

can be classified chronologically as well – from the emergence of Copenhagen School's securitisation theory approach between the late 1980s-1990s, to its subsequent progression and additions of the Paris School, up to the most modern approaches to the theory of the 2000's and 2010's. The earlier works include those of Buzan[36], Wæver[37], Wæver et al.[38], Buzan et al.[39] and Baldwin[40]. Moving on to the 2000s, the literature incorporates Huysmans[41], Bigo[42], Williams[43], Smith[44], Emmers[45] and Balzacq[46]. Furthermore, chronological classification can be used for the specific issue of securitisation of migration, as it started out to gain interest in the late 1990s and

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36 Buzan, B. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations / B. Buzan. – Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD., 1983. – P. 1-217.

37 Wæver, O. Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word / O. Wæver // Paper presented at the Research Training Seminar, Sostrup Manor (June, 1989). – P. 3.

Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 46-85.

38 Wæver, O. Buzan, B. Kelstrup, M. Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe / O. Wæver, B. Buzan, B. M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre. – New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. – P. 23-45.

39 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J.H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. – P. 23-122.

40 Baldwin, D. A. The Concept of Security / D. A. Baldwin // Review of International Studies. – 1997. Vol. 23. – P. 8.

41 Huysmans, J. Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security / J. Huysmans // Alternatives. – 2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 43.

Huysmans, J. What's in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings / J. Huysmans // Security Dialogue. – 2011. Vol. 42. – P. 372-376.

42 Bigo, D. When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe / D. Bigo // International Relations Theory and The Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community / ed.: M. Kelstrup, M. C. Williams. – London: Routledge, 2000. – P. 172-174.

Bigo, D. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease / D. Bigo // Alternatives. – 2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 72-79.

43 Williams, M. C. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics / M. C. Williams // International Studies Quarterly – 2003. Vol. 47, №. 4. – P. 511.

44 Smith, S. The Contested Concept of Security / S. Smith // Critical Security Studies and World Politics / ed.: K. Booth. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 2-37.

45 Emmers, R. Securitization / R. Emmers // Contemporary Security Studies / ed.: A. Collins. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. – P.139.

46 Balzacq, T. The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies / T. Balzacq // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2008. Vol. 46, №. 1. – P. 76.

Balzacq, T. 'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases / T. Balzacq // International relations. – 2016. Vol. 30, №. 4. – P. 12.

arguably reached its peak due to the European Migrant Crisis in the 2010's, with both the Copenhagen School's and the Paris School's representatives still producing important works on the issue. Examples of earlier works include Huysmans[47], Buonfino[48], Ibrahim[49], Karyotis et al.[50], while more contemporary works can be represented by Vaughan-Williams[51], Tsoukala[52] and Völkel[53].

The addition of the present research to the previous literature on securitisation theory and the European migrant crisis stands in the focus on EU institutions themselves, not taking into account significantly the position of Member States and the disagreements within the EU on the highly politicised topic of migration. It focuses on specific main policies of the EU as an institution and explores them through the lens of securitisation theory with both discourse and policy analysis and the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods – the most complete set of methodology for the application of securitisation theory, which is rarely encountered in previous works. These methodology shortcomings were specifically pointed out by Baele and Sterck in their 2014 article on the securitisation of migration in Europe, where they proposed a more effective and complete research method for the application of securitisation theory.[54] Thus,

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[47] Huysmans, J. The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration / J. Huysmans // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2000. Vol. 38, №. 5. – P. 751-771.

Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU / J. Huysmans // New International Relations Series. – London: Routledge, 2006. – P. 65-153.

[48] Buonfino, A. Politics, Discourse and Immigration as a security concern in the EU: a tale of two nations, Italy and Britain / A. Buonfino // Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala (2004). – P. 19.

[49] Ibrahim, M. The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse / M. Ibrahim // International Migration. – 2005. Vol. 43, №. 5. – P. 167-169.

[50] Karyotis, G. Patrikios, S. Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece / G. Karyotis, S. Patrikios // Journal of Peace Research. – 2010. Vol. 47, №. 1. – P. 46-47.

[51] Vaughan-Williams, N. Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond / N. Vaughan-Williams. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. – P. 3.

[52] Tsoukala, A. Looking at Migrants as Enemies / A. Tsoukala // Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and Within Europe / ed.: D. Bigo, E, Guild. – London: Routledge, 2017. – P. 161.

[53] Völkel, J. C. When Interior Ministers play diplomats. Fatal ambiguities in Europe's securitised migration policy / J. C. Völkel // Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies / ed.: A. Jünemann, N. Fromm, N. Scherer. – Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017. – P. 86-93.

[54] Baele, S. J. Sterck, O. C. Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims. – P. 1120.

their proposed methodology combining qualitative and quantitative methods will be applied in this research as well. Consequently, the resulting analysis will include unbiased quantitative content analysis combined with qualitative discourse analysis, in order to provide more validity to the results.

Limitations to the Research

As previously mentioned, in the course of the present research the focus will be given to the main policies of the collective institutions of the European Union which were decided in the aftermath of the migrant crisis of 2015-2016. The most noteworthy policies and decisions that will be evaluated in this dissertation are composed of 1) the quota system introduced in 2015 to facilitate the resettlement of refugees and migrants arriving in the European Union, 2) the EU-Turkey deal on refugees, which represents the most noteworthy example of cooperation of the EU with third states on the refugee issue, and 3) the continually reinforced role of the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex), which continues to take place to this day. These three main policies will be examined through the lens of securitisation theory and it will be evaluated and revealed how migration is securitised through them.

In addition, and on a more complementary scale, other notable policies of the EU institutions and agencies shall also be mentioned, as well as some policies and positions of separate Member States, in order to provide a more holistic picture of the issue. Nonetheless, the final research results will be based on the aforementioned three main EU policies and for the sake of this study it will be considered that the positions of separate Member States do not affect the official EU positions as an independent international organisation with strict decision-making procedures obligatory for all its Members. The Council of the European Union holds legislative and policy-making powers along with the European Parliament. It also has special decision-making procedures in the form of consensus and qualified majority voting (QMV), in case consensus cannot be reached. According to Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty which is applicable to this day, the qualified majority option as a binding voting mechanism was extended to multiple areas, among which are common foreign and security policy, asylum, immigration, and border

control.[55] Therefore, even if there is disagreement between Member States on specific issues and there is no opportunity for consensus, the topic can be put to the vote and in case it is voted through with qualified majority, states that compose the minority have to comply with the rules. The Member States are fully aware of these regulations and despite the fact that they may not wish to belong to the minority, they still have to follow the final decision because after being voted through, it becomes an official EU law and there is no opportunity to decline its application. Thus, despite some separate positions or policies of specific Member States of the EU, their importance will be considered only as a non-integral variable component of the institutional position of the EU towards the 2015-2016 migrant crisis – which is the primary focus of the present study.

[55] Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union of 26 October, 2012 // Official Journal of the European Union. – 2012. Article 16. – P. 24.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framing of Securitisation of Migration

1.1. Securitisation Theory

Securitisation theory can be positively called a European academic brainchild, which was developed during the late 1980s-1990s. It has a direct connection with the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies, which follows a more social constructivist approach to the concept of security. The School initially emerged from Copenhagen's Peace Research Institute (CORPI) and its formation can be directly attributed to Barry Buzan's fundamental 1983 work "People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations". In fact, one of the Institute's research projects was entitled "Non-military Aspects of European Security," previewing the direction of the emerging field of securitisation.[56] Bill McSweeney first uses the name "Copenhagen School" in 1996 and underlines the importance of Buzan's work: "His book and the revisions of the second edition (1991) have been the stimulus for further exploration of the security problem at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. Together with Buzan, the collaborators have produced several publications on the security theme, sufficiently interrelated to warrant the collective shorthand the 'Copenhagen school' of security studies."[57]

Some of the most notable architects of the theory also include Ole Wæver and a range of other scholars from the Copenhagen School, as well as representatives of further revisions of the theory – notably the Paris School. While Buzan initialised the reconceptualisation of security in the 1980s, the inception of the securitisation concept can be attributed to Wæver in the mid-1990s, at which point more holistic scholarly works on the theory started to emerge. Already in 1989, Wæver first conceptualised securitisation in his paper "Security, the Speech Act:

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[56] Huysmans, J. Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security / J. Huysmans // European Journal of International Relations. – 1998. Vol. 4, №. 4. – P. 479.

[57] McSweeney, B. Review: Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School / B. McSweeney // Review of International Studies. – 1996. Vol. 22, №. 2. – P. 81.

Analysing the Politics of a Word", examining the non-military aspects of European security and opening the proverbial gates to a new body of work within the field of security studies.[58]

Initially, the novelty of securitisation theory at the time of its introduction was in the fact that it represented a rather radical departure from the usual way security had been perceived up to that point and it aimed to challenge the traditional realist and neo-realist approaches to security studies.[59] The discursive element introduced by securitisation scholars challenged the objectivist vision of threats in the context of the realist perception of security.[60] During the Cold War era, security analysis was predominantly focused on military concepts and the political contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. The realist perception of the international system as a field of power struggle between nation-states dominated the polarised climate post-WWII, as well as during the Cold War. Security was predominantly perceived as a continuation of the power concept from that perspective and was examined within balance of power models. After the end of this period, more diverse approaches to the theory of International Relations started to emerge, including the popular field of security studies. Within the newly developed critical and constructivist waves which took off in the 1980s, security was also re-considered and its framework was broadened to non-material ideas, such as identity and context. It was a way to challenge the monopoly of the military within the field of security, by introducing concepts such as the environment, human rights or health as belonging to the security realm. Barry Buzan characteristically writes back in 1983 that "security clearly is a difficult concept" and recognises, in the words of W.B. Gallie, that it is also an "essentially contested concept".[61] Therefore, security is perceived as largely dependent on context and it can be subjective, rather than simply represent a universal and positive concept.

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[58] Wæver, O. Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word / O. Wæver // Paper presented at the Research Training Seminar, Sostrup Manor (June, 1989). – P. 3.

[59] Williams, M. C. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics / M. C. Williams // International Studies Quarterly. – 2003. Vol. 47, №. 4. – P. 511.

[60] Wæver, O. Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery / O. Wæver // International Studies Association Conference (17–20 March, Montreal) / International Studies Association, 2004. – P. 8.

[61] Buzan, B. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations / B. Buzan. – Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD., 1983. – P. 7.

The word itself – “security,” in its traditional positive perception represents in most minds the existence of a specific threat against which protection must be provided. In that sense, security analysis can be called the process of determining the biggest threats and the subsequent ways to deal with them, which then have to be finalised by policy makers. Securitisation theory, on the other hand, reverses this process and suggests that not only traditional security threats can fit within the concept of “security”. This search for a new approach to security emerged from the lacking attempts within the academic community to define it as an independent concept. In fact, Buzan described security as “an underdeveloped concept,” in addition to underscoring the lack of “conceptual literature on security” before the 1980s, which was still evident in the following years.[62] Defining security as a concept is also a drastically different endeavour from evaluating the conditions under which it can be obtained – which had been the prevalent object of security studies. David A. Baldwin accurately writes that “military force, not security, has been the central concern of security studies.”[63]

Buzan then underscores the inter-subjectivity of the security concept, explaining that “the word itself implies an absolute condition – something is either secure or insecure – and does not lend itself to the idea of a measurably-graded spectrum like that which fills the space between hot and cold.”[64] Furthermore, bringing in the element of context and subjectivity, he points out that it is insufficient to study the concept of security without specifying a “referent object” – what it is that has to be secured. [65] But the search for this referent object must also be combined with the determination of its necessary conditions, thus combining concept and empirical examination. For instance, something that creates positive security for the state, such as surveillance technology, can also be used as a method of control over its citizens, thus creating negative security for them. Therefore, Buzan insists that security of the individual, the state and the international system is intertwined and “no inference should be drawn that security can be isolated for treatment at any single level”.[66] He also develops the so-called “security sectors” to underscore the interconnection present within the concept of security threats. Thus, apart from

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[62] Ibid. – P. 1.

[63] Baldwin, D. A. The Concept of Security / D. A. Baldwin // Review of International Studies. – 1997. Vol. 23. – P. 8.

[64] Buzan, B. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. – P. 217.

[65] Ibid. – P. 10.

[66] Ibid. – P. 14.

the already widely used sector of military security, he adds economic, political, societal and ecological levels of security analysis.[67]

Despite initially viewing the referent object as more state-centric, Buzan later develops the concept of "societal security" as more fitting to examine the European security agenda after the Cold War.[68] Wæver then proposes to evolve Buzan's five suggested sectors of state security and reconceptualise them as a duality of state and societal security instead.[69] He also notes the limiting consideration of the state as the usual primary referent object within the field of security and proposes a solution – "My colleagues and I have therefore suggested a reconceptualisation of the security field in terms of a duality of state security and societal security."[70] This shift was significant, as it allowed for the inclusion of issues such as migration in the security sphere, whereas before it could not qualify for the state security debate. Within this framework, for the sake of answering a specific research question, the researcher can determine their own research object and focus on its environment – whether it's the individual, the state, or the international system. In this case, it will be important to ask for whom, from what and by whom security is provided.

Hence, the representatives of the Copenhagen School start to pose these questions during the 1990s and attempt to fill the conceptual void evident in security studies. As Michael J. Sheehan writes in 2005, this expansion of the security concept was a significant development that broke the traditional stereotype of it as being largely limited to national security.[71] Steve Smith also underscores the contribution of the Copenhagen School, calling it "one of the most interesting developments in the contemporary study of security".[72] In one of the most prominent scholarship

[67] Ibid. – P. 75.

[68] Smith, S. The Contested Concept of Security / S. Smith // Critical Security Studies and World Politics / ed.: Booth, K. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 2.

[69] Wæver, O. Buzan, B. Kelstrup, M. Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe / O. Wæver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre. – New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. – P. 23.

[70] Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 55.

[71] Sheehan, M. J. International Security: An Analytical Survey / M. J. Sheehan. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 48.

[72] Smith, S. The Contested Concept of Security / S. Smith // Critical Security Studies and World Politics / ed.: K. Booth. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 37.

works of the School, which gave the concept of securitisation its most complete treatment to date – "Security: A New Framework for Analysis" by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, security is defined as a "speech act" – "by saying the words, something is done".[73] This conceptualisation of securitisation is a significant step, which indicates that words do not only depict reality but can also construct it. For example, calling the Greek refugee camp Moria a "living hell"[74] creates an image of lawlessness, wretchedness and misery – adding to the contempt over the issue of the migrant crisis in Europe. In the same way, repeatedly connecting the issue of migration with security in socio-political discourse creates a sense of urgency, even by merely making that verbal connection.

Therefore, it is evident that securitisation analysis should study the discourse around the threats instead of the nature of those threats, since socio-political context can determine certain things as threats and policy makers themselves can classify them as security problems. For instance, just like migration, climate change can be named a security threat – an existential problem that could be overriding normal issues. From that perspective, dealing with this arisen problem becomes a priority – a necessity, and not just an object of normal politics. Thus, because it is a necessity, it is not bound by normal political rules and extraordinary measures can be allowed – such as deployment of weapons, special services or political violence. The urgency of the situation legitimises the measures – something that otherwise could not be done is considered necessary and the relevant audience recognises that, granting policy makers the right for the respective extraordinary measures. As written by Buzan et al., "the distinguishing feature of securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action "because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure").[75] Consequently, this approach departs from the traditional notion of "security" and "threat," developing them as more critical and discursive concepts.

[73] Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J.H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J.H. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 26.

[74] Chapman, A. A doctor's story: inside the 'living hell' of Moria refugee camp [Electronic resource] / A. Chapman // The Guardian, 2020. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/09/moria-refugee-camp-doctors-story-lesbos-greece (accessed: 07.04.2020)

[75] Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de Wilde. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 26.

As previously mentioned, a central component for securitisation theory is the referent object, but there are others that deserve equal attention. Overall, the so-called "securitising move" is shaped by four fundamental pieces: the referent object, the securitising actor, the existential threat, and the audience. As pointed out by Buzan et al., the key points are "who securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions what explains when securitisation is successful)".[76] This creates an apparatus of closely tied concepts that researchers can use and apply in a specific case, in order to demonstrate the basic idea of securitisation. The formation of the securitisation move occurs when a referent object depicts an existential threat and justifies to the relevant audience the use of specific extraordinary measures – something vital, such as the state, freedom, or future welfare has to survive. In "Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security," Buzan and Wæver examine the existence of securitisation in the implementation of extraordinary measures, thus indicating that the issue is securitised in the final step of the process and not in the initial one – when the issue is taken into the realm of security through a speech act.[77]

The concepts of the referent object and the securitising actor are important within this pattern because they define what is securitised and by whom. For instance, in broad terms it could be assumed that the state itself may want to securitise the state in order to survive. But usually there is more distinction to such situations, for instance when the state is seen as a nation – an identity community – in which case groups of people, such as political parties, can speak on behalf of the society and attempt to securitise it against external threats. As Wæver points out: "But societies are, of course, highly differentiated, full of hierarchies and institutions, with some better placed than others to speak on behalf of "their" societies. But "society" never speaks, it is only there to be spoken for."[78] Thus, the analysis becomes more specific and more distinct, allowing the application of securitisation theory for a multitude of cases.

Then, the existential threat is also an essential piece of the securitising move. It represents an extraordinary problem that has to be resolved no matter what – it is unacceptable to be left

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76 Ibid. – P. 32.

77 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security / B. Buzan, O. Wæver. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. – P. 73.

78 Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 85.

unmanaged. Therefore, it must be prioritised and treated with a sense of urgency through the implementation of extraordinary measures. Those measures are also the price of security, since they require effort and have a cost. In that sense, security can be seen as a necessary evil requiring the handling of a problem through extraordinary means, when normal measures are not sufficient. From this perspective, security may also be considered as an extreme form of politicisation, since the framing of the issue as requiring emergency means "takes politics beyond the established rules of the game".[79] Furthermore, Copenhagen School insists that security gained through the application of emergency measures and the bypassing of the usual democratic procedures is not the preferable option – "It is better, as Wæver argues, to aim for desecuritisation: the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere."[80] Wæver also suggests that de-securitising politics "would be more effective than securitising problems".[81] Moreover, the process of de-securitisation itself is also a new important agenda in security studies that is worthy of analysis – the "unmaking" of a security problem. If certain phaenomena can be securitised, then they can be de-securitised as well and this offers more understanding to the creation of specific security issues. For instance, migration was securitised in the early 20th century, but was later de-securitised post-WWII when many European countries were in need of additional workforce to develop their economies.[82]

Last, but not least, the role of the audience is extremely important, because only in the case that the audience accepts the securitising move and offers its consent can the actual securitisation of the issue occur. Emmers underlines the role of the audience, indicating that the successful securitising move depends on the conviction of the audience that a referent object indeed suffers from an existential threat.[83] Moreover, "if no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of a securitising move, not of an object actually being securitised," is specifically pointed out by

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[79] Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de Wilde. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 23.

[80] Ibid. – P. 4.

[81] Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 57.

[82] Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU / J. Huysmans // New International Relations Series. – London: Routledge, 2006. – P. 126.

[83] Emmers, R. Securitization / R. Emmers // Contemporary Security Studies / ed.: A. Collins. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. – P.139.

Buzan et al.[84] Essentially, it's not only a matter of threat speak – anyone can claim something is a threat. It must be something more – the acceptance of the audience that because of this alleged threat they will be willing to resort to extraordinary measures, like military action or border closures. In that sense, the final decision is on a way taken by the relevant audience, which allows and gives validity to such measures. But this does not only apply to the audience of a democratic state, for instance, and can be equally relevant in any other political system.[85] Subsequently, depending on its structure, the audience can be a specific group of people, such as an inner circle of generals in an autocratic system. Even in this situation, the leaders of the state have to justify the validity of extraordinary measures and explain their necessity in order to convince their audience. That is the crucial point when securitisation takes place and moves an issue into the security sphere.

As a result of its detailed approach, securitisation theory can be applied in many different case studies, which can include a specific side of a conflict or an entire conflict constellation, with the examining of multiple sides. The processes of securitisation can then be singled out and various security constructions can be studied separately or against each other. The researchers can then make their conclusions about the nature of securitisation of a specific issue and examine whether it could even be de-securitised – taken out of the security realm and back into the sphere of normal politics, thus de-escalating the level of securitisation. In this case, the role of the security analyst is to observe and interpret and it should not be confused with the role of the securitising actor. The analyst does not judge the actor's actions, but merely examines the conditions under which they take place[86] – whether the actor has managed to gain support, what is their audience, the type of extraordinary measures that have taken place and what could be the implications of such securitising practice.

This approach made the theory popular among scholars studying issues that had not traditionally been considered as part of the mainstream security realm until the 1990s – such as climate change, human rights, or immigration. The focus had therefore been shifted from state security in the more realist terms of sovereignty and anarchy, to concepts such as identity, community

[84] Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. – P. 25.

[85] Ibid. – P. 24.

[86] Ibid. – P. 33.

and individuals.[87] It is also an interesting process to examine how exactly these issues fit into the security framing and whether the security labelling changes something within them or causes new types of actions around them. A lot of the scholarly works on securitisation theory have focused on exactly this – exploring what happens when an issue is transformed from non-security to security. It is a process of examining which referent objects gain the interest of securitising actors and why, which threats earn the biggest focus and which extraordinary measures are then decided. The studying of this process is a powerful tool provided by securitisation theory as a significant contribution to security studies.

Nonetheless, the theory has also produced its critics, notably noting the normative dilemma within securitisation. As analysts applying securitisation theory are to remain objective in their evaluation and merely observe, it is difficult to speak or write security without becoming part of the performative power of the securitisation process. Jef Huysmans points out that there is a risk of becoming impartial to subjectivity in security studies and replicating the fearmongering of policy makers, if not legitimising their actions. "Speaking and writing about security is never innocent," he states.[88] Didier Bigo also shows a concern for the conceptualisation of security applied in securitisation theory, more specifically in the notion that exceptional and even "measures beyond the law" are necessary for securitisation, further adding to the sense of emergency and danger.[89]

Overall, these critiques emerged from the so-called Paris School, with both Huysmans and Bigo representing its direction in security studies, focusing on the way security is institutionalised and how this leads to securitisation. Furthermore, the Paris School pays attention to bureaucratic processes taking place in the security apparatus and shifts its analysis towards policies,[90] as opposed to Copenhagen School's focus on rhetorical structure and discourse in the process of securitisation. Huysmans therefore argues that in the framing of security as a speech act, "the

[87] Smith, S. The Contested Concept of Security / S. Smith // Critical Security Studies and World Politics / ed.: K. Booth. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 4.

[88] Huysmans, J. Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security / J. Huysmans // Alternatives. – 2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 43.

[89] Bigo, D. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease / D. Bigo // Alternatives. – 2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 72.

[90] Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. – P. 153.

notion of 'act' rather than speech carries the political investment… of the securitisation approach".[91] He then goes on to point out that while a lot of focus had been given to the study of speech, discourse and rhetorical structures of security language, the part involving the "act" itself had been offered far less attention and examined largely as a result of the performative power of speech.[92] Furthermore, Huysmans pays attention to the role of institutions within the security complex, indicating how securitisation can creep up through institutionalised practices that do not gain a lot of prior showcasing: "Securitising in contemporary world politics develops significantly through unspectacular processes of technologically driven surveillance, risk management, and precautionary governance. These processes are less about declaring a territorialised enemy and threat of war than about dispersing techniques of administering uncertainty and 'mapping' dangers."[93] This also largely coincides with Bigo's work on securitisation as a result of institutionalisation of security. For instance, he points out: "Internal (in)security must be analysed in connection with institutional knowledge and knowledge of the agencies, their devices and practices, including their discursive practices, as these are determinant factors in understanding how definitions of those who provoke fear, the adversary and the enemy are socially constructed".[94]

Furthermore, Huysmans and the representatives of the Paris School view the process of securitisation as more technocratic and one where internal and external security sometimes merge, spilling out on a transnational level – which can be observed in the security agencies of the European Union, for example.[95] The bureaucratic actors thus have a privilege to securitise issues through their routine practices which can construct and transfer meanings of security to the audience. This way, a pattern or a trend can be formed in which the exceptional state of affairs requiring extraordinary measures becomes the norm and no longer has a sense of dramatic change, which was evident in the conceptualisation of securitisation by the Copenhagen School.

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[91] Huysmans, J. What's in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings / J. Huysmans // Security Dialogue. – 2011. Vol. 42. – P. 372.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid. – P. 376.

[94] Bigo, D. When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe / D. Bigo // International Relations Theory and The Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community / ed.: M Kelstrup, M. C. Williams. – London: Routledge, 2000. – P. 174.

[95] Ibid. – P. 172.

When we transfer to the realm of "extraordinary means as the norm", Balzacq suggests that the consent of the audience no longer plays such a significant role, because the process has already been institutionalised.[96]

Overall, the two Schools complete each other's work by providing a comprehensive analysis of both the discourse – the formation of the securitising move, and the policy – applied as the result of the securitising move. The study of securitisation processes thus becomes more complete and equipped with a sufficient set of tools.

1.2. Securitisation of Migration

Migration was not always traditionally seen as a potential threat. In post-WWII Europe, it represented economic development, as it provided the necessary workforce to rebuild after the war. But as the world transitioned to its post-Cold War state, things started to shift. The marginalised concerns within the security realm that departed from the traditional focus on state-military reached the forefront of academic interest with the development of critical and constructivist directions in the security field. Thus, migration also started to be viewed as an issue within the security realm with the emergence of the new directions in security studies from the 1980s. Ibrahim notes that "with the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has undergone a transformation. As a result, migration has increasingly been described in security terms".[97] Subsequently, the perception of migration as a threat to the nation's identity, economic prosperity and safety became rather commonplace in the EU, especially with the observed increase of arrivals of third-country nationals to Europe in the past decades. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have also contributed to the general sense of unease surrounding the issue of immigration. Since then, various directions in security studies have focused on the study of migration as a security issue, with the most prominent being securitisation theory developed by the Copenhagen School.

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[96] Balzacq, T. The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies / T. Balzacq // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2008. Vol. 46, №. 1. – P. 76.

[97] Ibrahim, M. The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse / M. Ibrahim // International Migration. – 2005. Vol. 43, №. 5. – P. 167.

According to Wæver, state security should be considered alongside societal security[98] – a concept which contributed to the broadening of the security sphere and allowed issues such as migration to fit into it. Consequently, Buzan et al. describe migration as one of the main points in the societal security agenda – more specifically, they indicate how migration can become a security threat through the changes that it may provoke to the national identity. The community may change with the transformation of population through cultural and linguistic influence from the newcomers, with people starting to see themselves differently as a result. In this case, the identity of the citizens is seen as being threatened by the arrival of migrants.[99] This situation may lead to migration finding itself on the security agenda of a state: "Society can react to such threats in two ways: through activities carried out by the community itself or by trying to move the issue to the political (and potentially the military) sector by having the threat placed on the state agenda. At the state level, the threat of immigration, for example, can be addressed through legislation and border controls."[100] Thus, escaping from the traditional security threats of the Cold War that were mostly military in nature, the concerns that fit within the security sphere multiplied and provoked subsequent arrangements from states. In EU, the protection and control of outer borders, as well as the introduction of new respective policies has become essential, since migration has evolved into an existential threat and has gained both national and international dimensions. For instance, new institutions like Frontex were added to the EU framework of migration management and policies like the Quota System were introduced, in addition to the progressing development of a common asylum policy.

However, this was not the case during the 1950s and 1960s, when migrant communities were seen as additional manpower in much of Western Europe. The deteriorated post-War economic conditions prompted countries like Germany, France and the Netherlands to promote positive migration policies in order to attract extra labour force. This was a way to gain competitive advantage with cheaper and more flexible workforce, against the more expensive domestic options. As a consequence, the legal status of migrants as guest workers was of far less interest to European societies than it is today. But the situation changed in the following decades: more

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98 Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization. – P. 55.

99 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. – P. 121.

100 Ibid. – P. 122.

restrictive migration policies started to be introduced in the late 1960s-1970s, in order to protect the social rights and welfare of the domestic workforce in the labour market. Huysmans suggests the European Council Regulation №1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers[101] as the first example of securitisation of migration in Europe post-WWII. The guest workers also started to gain more permanent residence status and as family reunions occurred, their population numbers increased, which, in turns, contributed to the development of bigger public awareness of the presence of migrant communities. Subsequently, political discourse started to link migration to undermining of public order.[102] Afterwards, during the 1980s, a common European migration policy became one of the priorities in European integration processes and thus it started to be institutionalised and take collective form. Intergovernmental cooperation on immigration policies was established and agreements such as the Schengen Treaty (1985) and the Dublin Regulation (1990) were signed during that period. Finally, it can be stated that by including immigration as one of the key themes in the European integration process, it became securitised. And, in the long run, the combination of the Europeanisation and the securitisation of immigration in the EU resulted in a greater focus of the issue in security terms and led to security policies that aimed at protecting the external European borders.

Therefore, the issue of European internal security has developed over time to include immigration as one of its key components, as indicated by Huysmans. More specifically, he writes that Pillar III of the EU on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Agreement all encompass the development of a common restrictive migration policy within the European area.[103] This further reflects the social construction of immigration as a security problem within the EU, which started to emerge since the 1980s and represented the perception of migration as a potential threat to European integration. The association of the immigration issue with criminality and even terrorism post-9/11 – especially in the case of Arab and Muslim immigrants, has occurred in an environment of a general politicisation where migrants and refugees are seen as a threat to national identity, welfare and unity. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, migration became an existential

[101] Regulation (EEC) №1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community // European Economic Community (EEC). – 1968.

[102] Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. – P. 65.

[103] Huysmans, J. The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration / J. Huysmans // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2000. Vol. 38, №. 5. – P. 751.

security issue in the entire Western world, starting to be perceived as a direct threat to national safety. Bourbeau observes this change: "By the end of the 1990s (i.e. before 9/11), the United States Immigration and Naturalisation Service had more employees authorised to carry guns that any other federal enforcement force. International migration has become a key security issue and is perceived, in some eyes, as an existential security threat".[104] Later on, after the tensions provoked by the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, the increasing influx of immigrants to Europe was described as an "invasion," adding to the growing rhetoric of danger surrounding the issue.[105] These events saw countries such as France and Italy campaign for the reintroduction of temporary internal borders within the Schengen area.[106]

Subsequently, the height of the 2015-2016 migrant crisis in Europe further deepened the connection between the security and immigration issues, overtaking the political agenda in Europe. The culmination of this rhetoric on migration has become known as "Fortress Europe" – an idea which already from the early 2000s had been representing the closure of European borders to irregular migrants through a system of strict border checks, as well as erection of walls and detention centres. Overall, the concept of "Fortress" has dual meaning for Europe and while it has been seen in a positive light by populist and nationalist movements in the EU, for others it represents a shameful notion – the distancing from traditional humanitarian European values. It is also seen as a discursive concept and more symbolic, rather than a representation of a set of official policies, as the term itself is not designated to include specific meanings. According to Jaume Castan Pinos, "the notion of Fortress Europe has become more associated with a politics of symbols rather than state capacity to control immigration".[107] Nonetheless, the fact remains that migration has firmly established itself as part of the security realm in European discourse and five years after the start of the migrant crisis the situation has not changed.

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[104] Bourbeau, P. The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order / P. Bourbeau. – New York: Routledge, 2011. – P. 1.

[105] Mamadouh, V. The Scaling of the 'Invasion', A Geopolitics of Immigration Narratives in France and The Netherlands / V. Mamadouh // Geopolitics. – 2012. Vol. 17, №. 2. – P. 392.

[106] Allen, N. EU moves to end passport-free Schengen travel [Electronic resource] / N. Allen // The Telegraph, 2011. URL: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8511019/EU-moves-to-end-passport-free-Schengen-travel.html (accessed: 16.04.2020)

[107] Pinos, J. C. Building Fortress Europe? Schengen and the Cases of Ceuta and Melilla / J. C. Pinos // Centre for International Border Research. – 2019. – P. 4.

Furthermore, as the focus of security studies started to shift from state to societal aspects, in the same way if started to pay more attention to the individual. This brings forward the notion of cultural identity, which is seen as threatened through migration because it comes with different customs, languages, ethnicities and religions. Wæver observes that "survival for a society is a question of identity, because this is the way a society talks about existential threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as 'us'".[108] The subsequent sentiment of "us" versus "them" is therefore evident in this rhetoric – the identity of the accepting country is in danger of being transformed under the weight of the migrants' own identities. A divide between the host state and the groups of migrants is therefore created. As also supported by Buzan, "the main threats to security come from competing identities and migration"[109] and "the threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society".[110]

This direction towards the individual was also reflected in the fact that international organisations and states began to discuss the issue of "human security" in addition to already firmly established concepts of state security and human rights. This can be both understood in terms of security of the migrants themselves, who often have to make dangerous journeys to reach their destination and live in subpar conditions, as well as in terms of security for the citizens of the host countries, who may see threats to their welfare and national unity in the arrival of third-country nationals.[111] However, describing migrants as a threat to human security is a rhetoric popular among nationalist circles and creates concerns from a humanitarian perspective. Notably, in the case of the EU, the security discourse depicting migrants as a danger has seen a response within some states, such as the United Kingdom, where the issue of immigration was present at the core of the 2016 referendum vote on "Brexit" – the formal exit of the UK from the European Union. A study conducted by Goodwin and Milazzo in 2017 reflected the role of the anti-immigration sentiment for the UK citizens' decision to vote "leave" instead of "remain", indicating the public's fears about the state of national economy, culture and

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108 Wæver, O. Buzan, B. Kelstrup, M. Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe / O. Wæver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre. – New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. – P. 25.

109 Ibid. – P. 43.

110 Ibid. – P. 45.

111 Ibrahim, M. The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse. – P. 169.

welfare.[112] Through the use of survey data of the British Election Study (BES), the researchers of this study explored how anti-immigration discourse affected the public opinion. The results of the study can be observed in the following graph (Figure 2).



Figure 2 – Anti-Immigration Sentiments by EU Referendum Vote Choice (%)

Source: 2014-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel

It was evident from the UK study that migration was in fact a notable cause for the eventual results of the referendum. Populist attitudes ended up prevailing and the discourse showed a clear anti-immigration sentiment from the perspective of societal security. At this point, it is important to note that the association of migration with insecurity creates a dangerous rhetoric and, as stated by Huysmans, "to the extent that the Europeanization of migration policy fosters the securitisation of migration it sustains a radical political strategy aimed at excluding particular categories of people by reifying them as a danger (for example, to cultural values, to the provision of social assistance, to public safety, to health, etc.)".[113] This construction of threat

[112] Goodwin, M. Milazzo, C. Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit / M. Goodwin, C. Milazzo // The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. – 2017. Vol. 19, №. 3. – P. 457.

[113] Huysmans, J. The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration. – P. 771.

speak is thus discriminatory and harmful towards migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers and makes their inclusion within the EU community that much more difficult. Furthermore, it goes against the values of solidarity, humanitarianism, social integration and civility that are promoted within the EU community of states. From that perspective, Huysmans accurately identifies how migration is securitised in Europe through a rhetoric of danger and fears of social disintegration, which can be identified in the previous example of the UK.

Furthermore, such securitisation can also provoke interventionist politics under the umbrella of extraordinary measures, that may override the usual democratic procedures. In the case of Brexit, this was evident through the emergency procedure of a referendum and withdrawal from the EU – an unprecedented case for a Member State up to that point. This leads to the realisation that the security of EU nationals is maintained at the expense of third-country nationals, who are excluded from the benefits offered to the privileged European citizens. The threat rhetoric and the subsequent restrictive measures on migration and asylum indirectly systematise the wider notion that the presence of immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers is unwanted and the preservation of the stability and homogeneity of the EU is the more preferable option. On that note, Huysmans states that "emphasising restrictions and control implies a negative portrayal of groups of migrants. Such a policy risks sustaining public expressions of racism and xenophobia in the present political context".[114] The policies of migrants' integration in European societies, on the other hand, while they may initially present an image of positive multiculturalism, they can also indirectly reflect a national motive to preserve the cultural homogeneity of society. In this case, migrants are once again seen as a hindrance to the preservation of cultural uniformity and attempts are made to resolve this by integrating them in the European societies. Therefore, integration policies can indirectly support the notion of migrants as "disruptors," and that only integrated migrants can potentially co-exist peacefully within a societal formation, while those who have not been integrated successfully may present danger to uniformity.[115]

Focusing on security policies as a whole, Huysmans (2006) questions whether these are generally effective ways of dealing with security problems and suggests the example of migration. For instance, he suggests that the role of restrictive measures on immigration and

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[114] Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. – P. 75.

[115] Ibid.

asylum in the form of stricter visa obtainment policies and border controls may not be the best way to prevent illegal immigration. In a paradoxical way, such policies may prevent people from obtaining a regular visa or asylum status, thus further increasing illegal immigration because legal entrance into Europe will be made more difficult for them. This inherent tendency of security studies to view policies through a security lens is seen as rather problematic and cannot always represent effectiveness of a policy from an ethical and political understanding. Huysmans also notes the institutionalised inherent tendency of security agents to present issues through a security lens. For example, it is part of the police's work to provide security knowledge – "They have a professional disposition to represent and categorise a policy concern in a security discourse and to propose security measures to deal with it." As a result, he continues, "immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are framed as a security problem which is different from an approach by means of a policy which emphasises that asylum is a human rights question and/or which proposes human rights instruments to deal with the issue".[116] Bourbeau mentions case studies from Canada between 1996 and 2001, where it was observed by editorials that in the treatment of immigrants "the government was clearly 'paranoiac' with its security concerns, that it 'cultivates a cult of hostility,' and that attempting to create a security fortress is pointless from the beginning".[117] This leads to the conclusion that while securitisation is in fact an effective way to study the issue of migration, it does not pre-dispose the researcher to justify specific institutional policies resulting from such securitisation. Thus, de-securitisation – a concept first suggested by Wæver, represents a suitable way to re-establish the balance between the effective and the ethical discussion of migration management. This process can encompass both the study of efficient immigration policies and the treatment of migrants as more than existential threats to society.[118]

This concept also brings us to the issue of the relationship between securitisation and human rights. How does one affect the other and can they co-exist? According to the main presumptions of the theory, securitisation of migration may provoke sentiments of public concern regarding threat to welfare, uniformity, as well as criminality and terrorism, and can thus provide excuse for extraordinary exclusionary immigration policies. In that context, it may create fertile ground

[116] Huysmans, J. The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration. – P. 757.

[117] Bourbeau, P. The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order. – P. 87.

[118] Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. – P. 127.

for populism and right-wing political movements, the rise of which has been observed in Europe in recent years. Balzacq speaks of the field of "insecurity" mentioned by Bigo and examines the effects the redefinition of security can have on equality and justice: "The field of the insecurity professionals has brought under the same banner a variety of issues, such as migration, asylum, terrorism, and drug trafficking. As a result, all these issues have been handled through the exclusive lens of security, at the expense of other possibilities, such as social inequality or global injustice".[119] Buonfino, examining the phenomena of immigration in Europe – specifically the case of Italy, speaks of the dilemma between moral responsibility versus national security when it comes to migrants. She then examines the use of negative terminology in discourse about migrants and how this reflects on their socio-political perception: "Treating immigration and asylum, which are two very human phenomena, as 'things' to be curbed eases the process of securitisation and partly avoids the political confrontation with issues such as human rights, public feelings about the destiny of migrants".[120] Therefore, it is suggested that the issues of security, immigration and humanitarian values are intertwined within the European discourse. Buonfino then further confirms this notion, stating that "in European discourses, instead, security is implied within discussions of humanitarian assistance, fundamental rights and protection".[121] Bourbeau also identifies interconnections between security problems and the issue of human rights within the context of international migration.[122] Bigo then suggests that the humanitarian discourse is a by-product within the securitisation process, which oftentimes may affect a potential divide between recognised asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, as the former can be regarded as more privileged from the perspective of human rights protections.[123] Tsoukala also contemplates the connection between the weakening of the individual's position as the subject of human rights in the post-9/11 era of counter-terrorism, which she identifies as a natural outcome of the "prevalence of the risk-focused mindset".[124]

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119 Balzacq, T. 'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases / T. Balzacq // International relations. – 2016. Vol. 30, №. 4. – P. 12.

120 Buonfino, A. Politics, Discourse and Immigration as a security concern in the EU: a tale of two nations, Italy and Britain / A. Buonfino // Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala (2004). – P. 19.

121 Buonfino, A. Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe / A. Buonfino // New Political Science. – 2004. Vol. 26, №. 1. – P. 25.

122 Bourbeau, P. The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order. – P. 34.

123 Bigo, D. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. – P. 79.

124 Tsoukala, A. Security, Risk and Human Rights: A vanishing relationship? / A. Tsoukala // Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2008. – P. 3.

Therefore, the consideration of human rights is an important aspect of securitisation that must be taken into account. For instance, in the analysis of migration in Greece during the 1990s, Karyotis and Patrikios mention that while securitisation itself was reflected in the restrictive immigration policies of the Greek government, those were also mostly aimed at taking care of short-term necessities and remained inconsiderate towards the human rights of immigrants.[125] Thus, while the conducted policy analysis reflected the presence of securitisation, it also indicated a lack of humanitarian considerations, which received criticism from NGOs. As Greece moved towards improving its international image and presenting a more cosmopolitan view of itself ahead of the 2004 Athens Olympics, the discourse on immigration also started to shift towards more positive images. New government leaders voiced their commitment towards treating migrants as beneficial for the country's economic development and were aiming at a "substantial and effective immigration policy within a modern framework and with respect to human rights".[126]

To conclude, the process of cross-border movements of people identified as immigration is a complex mechanism which has been at the center of international discourse for many decades. But it wasn't until the 1980s that it found itself at the forefront of security frameworks, with emphasis on policing and control. The inclusion of migration in the threat discourse has coincided with new developments in security studies – namely, new directions which were marginalized before the end of the Cold War, limited by the focus on the bipolarity of the international system. The subsequent evolution of security studies also included the development of securitisation theory, introduced and implemented by the scholars of the Copenhagen School. Securitisation thus became one of the most prominent directions in the security field to examine immigration as a security phenomenon and study the processes under which it becomes securitised in states and international communities. Since most of the scholars that developed and offered further additions to securitisation theory were European, they largely focused on examining the issue of immigration in Europe across various timelines, but especially since the 1990s. That is why academic works on securitisation arguably offer the most comprehensive

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[125] Karyotis, G. Patrikios, S. Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece / G. Karyotis, S. Patrikios // Journal of Peace Research. – 2010. Vol. 47, №. 1. – P. 46.

[126] Ibid. – P. 47.

analyses of European migration and represent comprehensive and holistic tools to examine this phenomenon.

The same theoretical framework can be applied to the 2015-2016 European migrant crisis, which saw immigration at the core of a security rhetoric – a fact still relevant to this day, based on the latest observations of socio-political discourse and Eurostat polls on public opinion. The fundamental principles of securitsation theory apply in this case, as we have the securitising actors – the EU institutions; the existential threat – the mass influx of immigrants as a result of the Arab Spring, culminating in 2015 and 2016; the referent object – European uniformity and welfare; and, lastly, the audience – the European citizens, who observe the situation and legitimise the policies decided by the governing political institutions. The process of securitisation is largely discursive in nature and occurs through a "speech act", but the result of securitisation observed in the decided policies is also an important piece of the puzzle, which offers a complete picture of language and action combined. For this reason, both the discourse and the actual policies it results in have to be examined. Furthermore, the consideration of humanitarian concerns is also important within this framework, as it offers a viewpoint of the securitisation practices from an ethical and human rights standpoint.

Chapter 2

Context: 2015-16 Migrant Crisis

2.1. Origins of the Crisis

The issue of mass displacement and migration has turned into one of the most prominent political issues of our times. However, it is by no means a new phenomenon. Refugee crises and mass migration are complex issues that the world has already dealt with for many decades. These events have been fuelled primarily by conflict, political instability and environmental or economic collapse. But they also depend on many other different elements, such as historical and cultural ties, demographic factors and social conditions. Moreover, the processes of migration are also affected by the deeper transformations happening in the world due to the rapidly progressing processes of globalisation. As a result, the issue of world migration presents an increasingly changeable and complex picture, which has to be approached taking into account many different variables.

Until World War II, the European migration waves were predominantly negative, as millions of people decided to cross the ocean to reach the New World. Approximately 55 to 60 million Europeans made the trip between 1820-1940, the majority of which settled in the United States. Nonetheless, there were also movements within Europe – while the Western part of the continent maintained a fairly positive migration balance, the other regions presented a largely different picture, since people attempted to leave the more economically depressed parts of Europe to reach the more developed ones. For instance, many Ukrainian and Polish workers settled in France or Germany, while Italians also sought work in France, as well as in Switzerland.[127] This picture mostly characterised the migration movements in Europe until the post-war period.

[127] Bonifazi, C. Evolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europe / C. Bonifazi // International Migration in Europe / ed.: C. Bonifazi, M. Okólski, J. Schoorl, P. Simon. – Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008. – P. 109.

Subsequently, one of the biggest changes in the history of humanity took place after World War II, when the entire international system was essentially restructured and the world attempted to return to stability amidst a sense of geopolitical and economic uncertainty. This period also produced one of the largest mass migration waves in history, which possessed different characteristics compared to the previous pre-war migration patterns. More specifically, three phenomena affected the European migration movements in the second half of the 20th century: shortage of labour force in Western and Northern Europe, the process of decolonisation, as well as the existence and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Bloc.[128]

Firstly, many European countries attempted to rebuild their national economies in the aftermath of the war and attracting migrants became a viable prospective to fuel that progress, especially amid a significant shortage in local labour force. By estimation, approximately 20 to 30 million migrant workers along with their family members travelled around Europe in search of occupation and improved living conditions after World War II.[129] For instance, West Germany was one of the countries who had the biggest need for additional labour manpower in order to support its recovering economy. Until the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, this shortage in workers was predominantly covered by the arriving migrants from East Germany. However, after the erection of the Berlin Wall this was no longer an option and West Germany had to find other solutions to its problem of workforce shortage. Thus, special agreements for the recruitment of workers were signed by West German authorities in the early 1960s with various countries such as Turkey, Italy, Spain, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. This way, the Federal Republic of Germany accepted a major inflow of labour force, representatives of which were commonly known as “Gastarbeiter”. During that time, Turkey was one of the countries providing Europe with the biggest supply of additional manpower, concluding agreements with Austria, Sweden, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, in addition to West Germany.[130]

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[128] Jennissen, R. Van Der Gaag, N. Van Wissen, L. Searching for similar international migration trends across countries in Europe / R. Jennissen, N. Van Der Gaag, L. Van Wissen // Genius. – 2006. Vol. 62, №. 2. P. 37.

[129] Benard, C. Migrant Workers and European Democracy / C. Benard // Political Science Quarterly. – 1978. Vol. 93, №. 2. P. 277.

[130] Naito, M. Integration or Exile: German "Ausländerpolitik" And Turkish Migrants / M. Naito // Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies. – 1995. Vol. 27, Special Issue: Proceedings of The Hitotsubashi University International Symposium On "The World and Japan in the Age of Multiculturalism. P. 71.

Moreover, the process of migration to Europe was further facilitated by the pre-existing ties between European countries and their former colonies, even after the process of decolonisation had started. This was initially reflected in the mass returns of Europeans who had settled in the colonies back to their native countries. For instance, arrivals of over one million people were estimated to have occurred in France from Algeria. But equally significant inflows of returnees were noted for France from other colonies, as well as for the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy. Subsequently, these movements were followed by new migration waves of native populations of the former colonies to the European countries they were formerly controlled by. Major inflows of people were thus recorded for countries such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France and Portugal.[131] Overall, in the aftermath of the process of decolonisation, a lot of the post-war migrants came from former European colonies, such as India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, among others. This resulted in the growth of multiculturalism in Europe, as well as in a social and demographic evolution.

Lastly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain resulted in new migration waves from Eastern Europe and former Soviet states that reached many parts of Europe. This period also coincided with the age of increased market liberalisation and rapid globalisation, inciting political and ideological changes, as well as contributing to increased migration flows.[132] Whereas before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 there were significant political obstructions to emigration, as soon as they ceased to exist, residents of former Soviet countries had the opportunity to join the global migration movements. Furthermore, the subsequent ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics and the former Yugoslavia produced forced migration movements which contributed to the overall increase of emigration from these countries to Western Europe.[133] These combined developments significantly changed the geography and demographics of migration flows in Europe since the early 1990s.

Nonetheless, other diverse factors that contributed to the expansion of the post-war migration waves can also be named. One of these can be considered post-industrial migration and the

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[131] Bonifazi, C. Evolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europe. – P. 115.

[132] Czaika, M. de Haas, H. The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory? / M. Czaika, H. de Haas // The International Migration Review. – 2014. Vol. 48, №. 2. P. 285.

[133] Bonifazi, C. Evolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europe. – P. 119.

technological advancements of that time, which made international travel more accessible to a wider audience. Family migration is also a significant factor, which included family formation and reunification.[134] Additionally, the singing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the subsequent continuous expansion of the European Union was also an important encouraging factor for positive migration to Europe. But in more recent years, another mass wave of refugees and migrants reached European shores, but this time it was described as a "crisis" and attracted massive international attention.

It can be stated that the migration wave of 2015-16 was already years and even decades in the making, with refugees and migrants arriving in Europe since the 1980s and 1990s from conflict-ridden states in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. For instance, from 1989 until 1992, the number of asylum applications had risen to 695,000 and then decreased to 455,000 by the end of the 1990s. In 2001, it increased again to 471,000.[135] For this period, the main countries of origin were Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan.[136] The influx of arrivals had not stopped since then and only varied in numbers and origins, but was never deemed as unmanageable or called a "crisis." Larivé recognises the Lampedusa shipwreck of October 3rd, 2013, in which over 300 refugees lost their lives, as the "first wake up call for Europe".[137] It was shocking for Europeans to see such a tragedy, but the issue of mass migration from countries such as Syria, Somalia and Eritrea had soon died down and lost attention, despite warnings from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).[138] Furthermore, the apparent ineffectiveness and flawed design of the common European asylum and immigration policy was one of the signs that the EU would be unprepared should the migrant arrivals reach significant numbers. Even prior to the crisis the issue of migration regulation was one of the most politicised and weakly integrated European policies. Furthermore, the uneven experiences of member states with

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[134] Jennissen, R. Van Der Gaag, N. Van Wissen, L. Searching for similar international migration trends across countries in Europe / R. Jennissen, N. Van Der Gaag, L. Van Wissen // Genius. – 2006. Vol. 62, №. 2. – P. 38.

[135] Van Mol, C. de Valk, H. Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective / C. Van Mol, H. de Valk // Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors / ed.: B. Garcés-Mascareñas, R. Penninx. – New York: Springer, 2016. – P. 37.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Larivé, M. H. A. A Crisis for the Ages The European Union and the Migration Crisis / M. H. A. Larivé // Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence. – 2015. Vol. 15, Special. – P. 3.

[138] Ibid.

immigration, their response capacity and their different political stances on the issue were certainly important factors that further aggravated the situation and helped to turn migration into one of the most sensitive topics in the European public debate.

Indeed, in pure volume, the 2015-16 crisis has been the single biggest influx of immigrants to Europe since the Second World War, with over one million arrivals in 2015 alone.[139] This wave of mass-migration was primarily prompted by the events known as the "Arab spring," when millions of people from the Middle East, as well as North Africa, were forced to flee their homes in search of safer living conditions. A general political and socio-economic instability in the Arab world, wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, repression in Eritrea were all among the causes of mass internal displacement of tens of millions of people. In 2016, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Nigeria were among the top countries with the biggest forcibly displaced populations in the world. In Syria alone, over half of the population was forced to live in displacement. At the same time, many other refugees opted for sanctuary in neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey – with the latter country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world for several consecutive years.

However, despite the majority of the refugees being considered internally displaced or opting for refuge in nearby countries, another large group of people decided to take the dangerous trip to Europe through the Central or Eastern Mediterranean routes. These events took place within what has been described as a worldwide refugee crisis, with official UNHCR data indicating that the number of forcibly displaced people at the end of 2016 numbered 65,600,000 – the highest since World War II. These numbers also included 2,8 million asylum seekers and represented a growth of 300 thousand over the previous year, indicating a global record high for the fifth consecutive year. [140]

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[139] Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019.

[140] Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016 // United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 2016. – P. 2.



Figure 3 – Trend of Global Displacement & Proportions Displaced | 1997-2016

Source: UNHCR

Within this framework is also how the peak of the European migrant crisis was reached during the years 2015-2016 and the EU was subsequently faced with many difficulties in its response. The Arab uprisings had a major impact on migration flows in Europe and affected primarily the Mediterranean borders, through which the vast majority of refugees from countries such as Syria or Libya entered the EU. In addition, this situation brought along a lot of complexities and issues that the international community still has not been able to overcome. Furthermore, the migrant "crisis" of 2015-2016 persists as one of the main points of disagreement within the EU, with no common holistic immigration and asylum policy in sight, as many member states attempt to apply their own practices under the umbrella of sovereignty. Ultimately, the combined pressure of border protection in addition to the maintenance of liberal European values and respect of human rights creates a complicated balance which has to be maintained by the EU institutions. This has led to common European policies which aim to reflect a humanitarian approach to the migrant and refugee influx, but have still received criticism from NGOs and human rights organisations for their ineffectiveness, which reflects a lack of political will to resolve the situation. Nonetheless, despite a lack of internal political agreement and organisational difficulties, the EU is still an independent system of institutional governance with a powerful

international position and policy-making powers that are binding for its Member States. Furthermore, the process of integration with shared rules and the openness of borders have always been at the heart of the European project. In light of this, it is important to examine the main common migration policies that were decided upon by the European institutions and which aimed at an effective response to the mass migration wave that hit Europe in recent years.

2.2. EU Response Policies

Early on in 2015, it was evident that Europe would be seeing an unprecedented number of refugees and migrants fleeing conflict, human rights violations and poverty in the Middle East and Africa. On 18 April 2015, there was a major shipwreck in the Mediterranean near the Libyan coast which resulted in the death of over 800 migrants, making it the deadliest shipwreck in the Mediterranean at the time.[141] This massive tragedy turned the attention of Europeans to the humanitarian aspect of the issue and saving lives in the Mediterranean became a priority. The Times of Malta ran a powerful article on the inaction of European institutions with regards to the situation that expressed the general frustration felt within Europe – "Still, the EU dithers. Although the increasing magnitude of immigration is new, the problem itself has faced the EU for well over a decade. Efforts at solutions have been marked mostly by empty words of faux-compassion in the face of the horrifying deaths in Europe's own waters and have led to weak and politically unworkable plans".[142] Moreover, criticism was directed at the EU by the international community, urging it to respond with effective measures. More specifically, the UNHCR noted: "There needs to be a European-wide protection response to the recent tragedies which have claimed so many lives of migrants and refugees fleeing war, persecution and violence. This

[141] Editorial - The EU dithers over immigration [Electronic resource] // The Times of Malta, 2015. URL: https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/editorial-the-eu-dithers-over-immigration.564685 (accessed: 01.04.2020)

[142] Bond, K. Spindler, W. UNHCR welcomes EU Mediterranean plans, but says more needs to be done [Electronic resource] / K. Bond, W. Spindler // The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). URL: https://www.unhcr.org/553623109.html (accessed: 01.04.2020)

response should be based on the fundamental European values of human rights, human dignity, solidarity, and respect for human life."[143]

The EU was thus faced with a difficult task and had to decide on specific solutions as fast as possible, despite the complexities of the migration issue. On 20 April 2015, an Extraordinary meeting of Foreign and Interior Ministers of the EU was held in Luxembourg in order to assess the situation and discuss potential actions. During this session, the Ministers discussed the migration situation in the EU following the recent incident in the Mediterranean. It was agreed to improve the fight against human trafficking, better coordinate EU actions to protect lives at sea and increase the support to countries that were severely hit by the refugee influx. Frederica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said at the meeting: "Today, we gave a strong EU reaction to the tragedies we have seen in the last few days. We need to act fast and act together".[144]

A Special Meeting of the European Council was then held on 23 April, where the Council's President, Donald Tusk, stated: "Saving the lives of innocent people is, of course, the number one priority for us. But saving lives is not only about rescuing people at sea. It is also about fighting the smugglers and preventing illegal migration flows."[145] The main goals were to strengthen the EU's presence at sea in order to avoid more tragedies, but to also discuss policies that would help to contain the migration pressure. The decisions taken at the meeting included actions directed at the improvement of EU sea operations, strengthening the fight against trafficking in accordance with international law, prevention of illegal migration flows and the reinforcement of EU's internal responsibility and solidarity.[146] Soon after – on 13 May, 2015, the European Agenda on Migration was adopted by the European Commission, presenting a detailed

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[143] UNHCR calls for a European-wide protection response to the tragedies in the Mediterranean // The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 2015.

[144] Foreign Affairs Council, 20 April 2015 [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/04/20/ (accessed: 01.04.2020)

[145] Remarks by President Donald Tusk ahead of the Special European Council [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-tusk-doorstep/ (accessed: 27.03.2020)

[146] Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement/ (accessed: 01.04.2020)

response plan for the improvement of migration management. The plan focused on the following areas: reducing irregular migration, saving lives at sea, protecting the external EU borders as well as initiation of policies on asylum and legal migration.[147] The shared responsibility of the EU Member States in the execution of this plan was also stressed. Following the adoption of the Agenda, on 27 May, 2015, it was also proposed by the Commission to organise an emergency relocation of 40,000 people from Greece and Italy to the other Member States, as well as to adopt a common action plan to counteract migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean.[148]

The effectiveness of sea rescues was increased from this point forward, but the arrivals continued to rapidly increase as well, with the main influx also shifting from the Central to the Eastern Mediterranean route. This can be reflected in the below graph (Figure 4).



Figure 4 – Monthly Irregular Arrivals 2015-2020

Source: Council of the EU

147 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration // European Commission – 2015. Article III. – P. 7.

148 European Commission makes progress on Agenda on Migration [Electronic resource] // European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_5039 (accessed: 02.04.2020)

In 2015, over 885,000 border crossings were recorded through the Eastern route, with the majority of the refugees and migrants travelling from Turkey to the Aegean islands in Greece. This route change was mainly prompted by the additional transportation opportunities at the border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, such as shuttling and busing services. The Eastern passage therefore became more accessible and attractive for people wishing to cross over to Northern and Western Europe through Turkey, then Greece and then the Balkans.[149]

Additionally, the highly increased number of arrivals from that point forward was also a result of the Chancellor's Angela Merkel's announcement in late August, 2015 that Germany would override the Dublin Protocol and allow asylum-seekers to remain in Germany while their asylum claim is being processed, rather than returning them to the first contact state – in most cases Greece or Italy. As stated by Chancellor Merkel during her interview to the German public broadcast channel ZDF, "The issue of asylum could be the next major European project," that would "preoccupy Europe much, much more than the issue of Greece and the stability of the euro".[150] Based on Germany's decision, the country would be able to process Syrian asylum applications which would otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of another EU state. This made Germany the first country to officially suspend the Dublin Regulation drafted in the 1990s, which requires that all refugees must apply for asylum in the specific country through which they first entered Europe. Soon after, the Czech Republic followed suit and permitted Syrian refugees to have their asylum application processed there or continue their trip to another country.[151]

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[149] Katsiaficas, C. Asylum Seeker and Migrant Flows in the Mediterranean Adapt Rapidly to Changing Conditions [Electronic resource] / C. Katsiaficas // Migration Policy Institute (MPI). URL: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/asylum-seeker-and-migrant-flows-mediterranean-adapt-rapidly-changing-conditions (accessed: 01.04.2020)

[150] Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries // Report prepared for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, 2015.

[151] Change in Czech refugee policy [Electronic resource] // Prague Post, 2015. URL: https://www.praguepost.com/eu-news/49584-change-in-czech-refugee-policy (accessed: 01.04.2020)

This was a significant change, since until then several European countries which represented desirable destinations for refuges and migrants, such as the United Kingdom, used the Dublin Regulation as a valid excuse to send the refugees away and prevent them from staying within their borders. Moreover, the strict application of the Dublin system would have meant that Greece and Italy would be left to crumble under the weight of the large numbers of arrivals they kept seeing since early 2015. This also came in addition to the pre-existing criticisms that the Dublin Regulation had received by the international community, with UNHCR stating in its 2014 report on the implementation of the Dublin system: "The lack of clear guidance and common standards in aspects of the Dublin procedure, such as bias and the assessment of family links or dependence, has contributed to diverging practices and inadequate implementation. In practice, this has led to a lack of common understanding and hampers efficient cooperation between Member States. One key consequence is the failure of the Dublin system in its objective to ensure swift access to an asylum procedure".[152]

The German government's decision had its critics that largely blamed it for the escalation of the migrant crisis. But in the existing context, it was a necessary decision given the alternative options. Already by that point many refugees and migrants arrived in Greece and then continued their trip through the Balkans to Hungary and then Austria in order to reach their main destination – Germany, which was the final station for them even before Merkel's infamous "welcome". Furthermore, 700,000 asylum applications had already been made in the EU between January and September 2015, which already represented a significant increase over the number of applications for the entire 2014. The situation further escalated in September 2015, when the Hungarian government presided by Viktor Orbán attempted to enforce the Dublin system by cutting off the access of refugees to Budapest's railway station which connected Hungary and Austria by train. Tens of thousands of refugees were stranded outside the station in a makeshift camp, unable to leave. The German announcement that it was suspending the Dublin Regulation and the subsequent dialogue and agreement with Hungary and Austria allowed these people to obtain a clear path towards Germany. [153] This was a far better alternative than having

[152] UNHCR Study on the Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014.

[153] Jones, W. Teytelboym, A. Rohac, D. Europe's Refugee Crisis Pressure Points and Solutions / W. Jones, A. Teytelboym, D. Rohac // American Enterprise Institute. – 2017. – P. 4.

large numbers of refugees remain in severe living conditions in Hungary, with little to no chance to apply for asylum, or returning them back to overburdened Greece.



Figure 5 – First Time Asylum Applicants Registered in the EU Member States, 2014/2015

Source: Eurostat

As a result of these developments, a total of 1,255,640 applications for asylum were made in the EU by the end of 2015, which was more than double the numbers recorded in 2014.[154] This is reflected in the above graph (Figure 5).

Taking into account the aforementioned events, already starting from the summer of 2015 the EU had to work on a common solution that would further decrease the burden on the states in the front line of the migrant crisis, while also trying to reach agreement between Member States in order to implement harmonised policies.

154 Asylum in the EU Member States: Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2015 // Eurostat, 2016.

2.2.1. Quota System

Given the unprecedented number of arrivals, the central issue for the EU now started to become the protection of outer borders to reduce irregular inflows and the effective management of the arriving groups of refugees and migrants. In order to ease the pressure on Greece, on the shores of which the vast majority of arrivals were observed – over 800,000 out of a million in 2015,[155] the EU attempted to negotiate a scheme according to which the refugees and migrants could be redistributed among member states. Based on existing EU regulations and more specifically the Dublin Agreement, asylum applications have to be processed by the country of their first entry into Europe. Within this framework, Greece along with Italy would have to deal with unmanageable numbers of asylum seekers, with little to no ability of proportionate management of the situation. Thus, in addition to the already made relocation proposal of 40,000 people from Greece and Italy to other Member States, the European Commission put forward additional suggestions regarding a relocation scheme based on certain quotas.

A new set of actions were proposed on 9 September 2015, which included a relocation of an additional 120,000 refugees from countries directly impacted by the refugee crisis, as well as more tools of assistance for Member States. Then, on 14 September 2014, the previously discussed proposal of relocation for 40,000 refugees from Greece and Italy was finally adopted; three days later – on 22 September, the proposed relocation of 120,000 refugees was similarly approved as well by the Home Affairs Ministers. This decision represented a collective will to implement common solutions, which could be executed through the cooperation of EU agencies and Member States. As mentioned in the official statement of the European Commission, "The European Commission has been consistently and continuously working for a coordinated European response on the refugees and migration front. Relocation is part of a comprehensive approach to deal with the ongoing refugee crisis". [156] Therefore, the EU had by that point

[155] Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019.

[156] European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees [Electronic resource] // European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_15_5697 (accessed: 02.04.2020)

decided on the relocation of a total of 160,000 refugees primarily from Greece and Italy to other Member States and it was up for further discussion how exactly this would happen.

Initially, a proposal was made by European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, to arrange the distribution of the 160,000 refugees among Member States based on a compulsory distribution system. Only the UK, Denmark and Ireland would be absolved from participation, as they had previously opted out from the European common asylum system. According to the suggestion, the allocation would be applicable for those "in clear need of international protection," with a rate of status recognition higher than 75% (for example, Syrians or Iraqis) and would also be decided per country based on "40% of the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average number of past asylum applications, 10% of the unemployment rate".[157] The mechanism would additionally come with a financial support of 780 million euros for the involved Member States.

However, there was a disagreement among member states on whether these measures would be taken on voluntary or mandatory basis. This direction was rather anticipated and largely affected by national policies and views of different EU member states on immigration. In particular, Eastern European member states of the EU such as Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Poland and Czech Republic refused to take in any refugees based on the proposed quota system, thus denying the possibility of it becoming mandatory.[158] The reasoning given by these countries was simply the fact that they had no experience with migrants and did not present an attractive destination for them, which was somewhat accurate since most migrants and refugees preferred to settle in Western European countries. That period also coincided with the widely released image of Aylan Kurdi – a 5-year old boy from the Syrian Arab Republic who was found deceased lying face down on the beach, giving major international attention to the European migrant crisis and especially the urgency and the humanitarian aspect of it. Being unable to reach a consensus on the distribution quotas and due to the critical nature of the situation, the European Commission opted to follow majority voting procedures for the proposed relocation scheme. The decision was thus put up for a vote according to the EU decision-making regulations and was

[157] Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action [Electronic resource] // European Commission, 2015. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_5596 (accessed: 02.04.2020)

[158] Jones, W. Teytelboym, A. Rohac, D. Europe's Refugee Crisis Pressure Points and Solutions / W. Jones, A. Teytelboym, D. Rohac // American Enterprise Institute. – 2017. – P. 5.

then adopted by qualified majority, which automatically made it an official EU law, binding for all Member States.

The four countries of the Visegrad group – Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Czech Republic were strongly opposed to the decision and refused to take in any refugees based on quotas. Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico was quoted stating, "As long as I am prime minister, mandatory quotas will not be implemented on Slovak territory".[159] Poland was among the countries who sided with the positive majority, while still opposing the quota system – "We are prepared to accept migrants but not quotas," Poland's interior minister, Teresa Piotrowska, stated.[160] Hungary, on the other hand, organised a national referendum in order to have its citizens decide on the application of the quota system. The majority voted "no," as the government of Viktor Orbán had campaigned, but the results were hardly lawful from the perspective of the country's obligations under EU law, which holds primacy over Member States' national law. Hungary, along with Austria, Czech Republic and Poland were ultimately excluded from the relocation programme. Evidently, the situation underscored the divisions between Member States on the management of asylum claims, which by that point had turned into an existential issue for the European Union.

Nonetheless, by the year 2019 approximately 63,000 people had been resettled since the adoption of the scheme in 2015.[161] The progress of relocation procedures has been slow and lengthy, but commitments by Member States continue to be made for the resettlement of an additional number of 30,000 refugees for 2020.[162] This indicates that despite delays and initial disagreements between Member States, decisions of EU institutes are met with commitment and the agreed migration policies see continuous implementation years after the start of the migrant crisis. As characteristically stated by Dimitris Avramopoulos – the EU Commissioner for

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[159] Barigazzi, J. de La Baume, M. EU forces through refugee deal: Countries outvote Eastern European opponents of plan that relocates asylum-seekers [Electronic resource] / J. Barigazzi, J. M. de La Baume // POLITICO, 2015. URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-tries-to-unblock-refugee-migrants-relocation-deal-crisis/ (accessed 27.03.2020)

[160] Ibid.

[161] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration // European Commission, 2019. – P. 1.

[162] Delivering on Resettlement // European Commission, 2019.

Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, during the Agenda on Migration progress report in October 2019: “Collectively, we have laid down the structural and operational foundations for a comprehensive European migration system that not only responds effectively and delivers results, but also promotes solidarity and responsibility. While there is still more work to do and the situation remains fragile, we are much better prepared than we were in 2015”.[163]

2.2.2. EU-Turkey Deal

In late 2015, it became clear that the EU would not be able to cope with the crisis without getting down the numbers of arrivals. On September 23, 2015, an Extraordinary Meeting of the European Council was held, where Donald Tusk – President of the European Council, stated: “We have now reached a critical point. Today, we are talking about millions of potential refugees trying to reach Europe. In light of this, the most urgent question is how to regain control of our external borders”.[164] The accelerated influx numbers were becoming overbearing and significantly tested the EU’s reception capacity. Consequently, the next step was attempting to externalise border control and to implement common measures with neighbouring non-EU countries in order to prevent the increased number of arrivals in the first place. Since by that point the Eastern Mediterranean route presented the biggest influx of arrivals, Turkey was the country to initiate cooperation with. At the time, Turkey had already been carrying the weight of the Syrian conflict for several years, hosting almost 2,500,000 Syrian refugees within its territory, with many of those attempting to reach Europe from Turkish shores. Thus, the negotiations with Turkey began and on November 29, 2015, the Joint Action Plan on the Implementation of the EU-Turkey deal was adopted by the European Commission.[165]

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[163] European Agenda on Migration four years on: Marked progress needs consolidating in face of volatile situation [Electronic resource] // European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6075 (accessed: 02.04.2020)

[164] Doorstep remarks by President Donald Tusk before the Informal meeting of Heads of state or government, 23 September 2015 [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/23/pec-tusk-doorstep/ (accessed: 27.03.2020)

[165] Meeting of the EU heads of state or government with Turkey, 29 November 2015 [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/29/ (accessed: 02.04.2020)

Originally, the deal aimed at decreasing the influx of irregular migrants and refugees into Europe via the Greek islands. The main points of the agreement included:

- potential accession negotiations of Turkey into the EU
- visa liberalisation talks
- joint action on ending human smuggling networks
- cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria to counteract irregular migration to Europe
- assistance from the EU for Syrian refugees located in Turkey
- additional cooperation in other areas, such as energy and economy.[166]

However, as numbers of arrivals to Greece via Turkey were not decreasing, it was evident that cooperation with Turkey had to be deepened. Negotiations were held at the highest level with the Turkish government and a new reinforced deal – the EU-Turkey Statement, was reached on March 18, 2016. The new goals included counteracting migrant smuggling in the Aegean Sea and decreasing the arrivals to Greek islands, as well as financial aid of 3 billion euros to help Turkey support Syrian migrants in its territory. Additionally, it was agreed to organise resettlement of each legal Syrian migrant in the EU in exchange for each Syrian returned back to Turkey, with capping at 72,000 exchanges. Furthermore, among the agreed points were: the return back to Turkey of all irregular migrants entering Greece after 20 March, 2016 and the emergency relocation of refugees awaiting asylum decisions in Greece in Italy to Turkey, in order to reduce the weight on the available resources of the latter two countries. [167] The reinforced cooperation produced the desirable results, significantly decreasing the refugee influx to Greek islands – more specifically, three weeks before the implementation of the Statement the arrivals to the Aegean islands numbered 26,878, while in the following three weeks they reached a total of 5,847.[168]

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166 EU-Turkey joint action plan [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5860 (accessed: 02.04.2020)

167 EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016: Press Release 144/16 // Council of the European Union, 2016.

168 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: First Report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement // European Commission – 2016. – P. 7.

The agreement with Turkey was hailed as a major success for Europe by EU officials, as after its implementation the numbers of arrivals dropped significantly. A report released in 2018 by the European Commission noted the significant decrease in arrivals – "showing clearly that the business model of smugglers exploiting migrants and refugees can be broken. Despite challenging circumstances, the first year of the EU-Turkey Statement has confirmed a steady delivery of tangible results".[169] More specifically, the total arrivals decreased from 1,032,408 in 2015 to 373,652 in 2016,[170] whereas the daily average decreased from 6,360 in October 2015 to 80 in March 2016.[171] Moreover, by February 2018, 12,476 Syrians had been resettled from Turkey to the EU and extended support had been provided to Greece in order to improve migration management and the work of registration centres, also known as hotspots. Assistance to Greece also included the funding of 1,3 billion euros.[172] While underscoring the significantly positive results of the EU-Turkey deal, the same report released by the Commission additionally pointed out its shortcomings – most notably the slow pace of returns to Turkey from the Greek islands due to insufficient processing procedures and detention capacity in Greece.

However, despite being called a success by EU officials, the EU-Turkey deal has since been criticised by many NGOs and human rights organisations as ineffective and irresponsible towards the rights of migrants and refugees. The biggest criticisms were directed at the slow procedures which saw small numbers of returns to Turkey – only 1,950 from the entry of the agreement into force on March 20, 2016 until October 31, 2019. Furthermore, irregular arrivals on Greek islands were once again on the rise in 2019 with 53,443 sea arrivals between January and November 2019. Most of these arrivals were from the island of Lesvos (23,591 total arrivals), the southeastern Aegean islands (12,693), as well as the island of Samos (9,774). These numbers are significantly increased compared to 2018 (32,494 total arrivals) and from 2017 (29,718 total arrivals).[173] The EU also claimed that its agreement with Turkey helped to reduce

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[169] Daily News 17.03.2017 [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEX_17_673 (accessed: 27.03.2020)

[170] Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019.

[171] EU-Turkey statement: Two years on // European Commission, 2018.

[172] Ibid.

[173] Greece Sea Arrivals Dashboard - November 2019 // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019.

refugee and migration flows to European countries. This attitude has been considered problematic as it shows contempt for the right to asylum of non-European citizens which requires access to the territory of a Member State. In addition, the decrease in arrivals can also be attributed not only to the agreement itself specifically, but also to the successful closures of the borders of some Member States months before the adoption of the EU-Turkey deal. Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia are all cases of either complete or partial border closures to refugees and migrants between 2015 and 2016, which made the Balkan route to Northern Europe less accessible and thus further discouraged arrivals to the Greek islands.

On the other hand, despite the difficulties, EU remains committed to maintaining its deal with Turkey in the long run. While the Turkish government has used the refugee issue as a bargaining method and has recently distanced itself from the Western bloc approaching other international actors, such as Russia and Iran, it is still an important player in the EU neighbourhood and vital for the maintenance of European security. On the other hand, the EU seems unwilling to discuss any accession opportunities for Turkey in the near future, therefore it must maintain a complex balance in its relations with Turkey within the context of the Syrian crisis.[174]

2.2.3. Frontex

Additional EU measures were directed at the strengthening of external borders – this time with the use of EU border control mechanisms. The existing EU mechanism responsible for coordination of border control efforts within the Schengen zone had been established in 2014 under the name Frontex – the main European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders. In the aftermath of the migrant crisis, a common European Border Guard Agency was proposed by the European Commission on December 15, 2015, which extended the mandate of Frontex into a full-scale European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The proposal included more powers and staff, rapid-response teams and enhanced supervision of external borders. The main objectives of Frontex include protection of EU's

[174] Nas, Ç. The EU's Approach to the Syrian Crisis: Turkey as a Partner? / Ç. Nas // Uluslararası İlişkiler-International Relations. – 2019. Vol. 16, №. 62. – P. 64.

external borders against illegal immigration and human trafficking, as well as the coordination of operations to save human lives at sea.

A further expansion of Frontex and its capabilities occurred in December 2019, when it was announced that it would be acquiring “new responsibilities and tools to more effectively support EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries in managing their external borders to provide a high level of security for all their citizens”.[175] The new regulation, which has already entered into force, paves the way for the creation of the European Union's first intelligence service. By 2027, it is estimated that Frontex will be able to rely on a force of 10,000 border guards positioned on land and sea, in order to be able to assist the national authorities of each Member State in controlling the external borders and in migration management. This new manpower will not be a military army, as stated by Fabrice Leggeri, Frontex's executive director, "but we will have, let's say, civilian troops wearing a European uniform. And for certain functions carrying weapons".[176] Furthermore, despite decreasing numbers of migrant and refugee arrivals, Frontex’s budget has been steadily increasing, from 86 million euros in 2013 to 254 million in 2016. Strengthening Frontex signifies the new European Commission's determination to reach an agreement on migration within the EU, as Member States debate the most fundamental issue: should migrants and asylum seekers be redistributed across the EU or remain in the first country of their arrival? At present, all Member States only seem to agree that the EU’s external borders must be protected. This is evident by the continued strengthening of the role of Frontex, which rose from the total manpower of 750 under the previous Commission’s leadership, to the forecasted 10,000. Nonetheless, the main protection of the EU borders will still be under the supervision of national border guards, which shall number ten times the manpower of Frontex – 115,000 in total.[177] But with an increased manpower and a budget of 340 million

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[175] News Release: New Frontex Regulation Comes into Force [Electronic resource] // Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency. URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/new-frontex-regulation-comes-into-force-S0luwe (accessed: 27.03.2020)

[176] Barigazzi, J. EU border force gears up for big expansion: Agency chief calls for code of conduct for NGOs rescuing migrants [Electronic resource] / Barigazzi, J. // POLITICO, 2019. URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-border-force-frontex-fabrice-leggeri-gears-up-for-big-expansion/ (accessed: 27.03.2020)

[177] EU budget: Commission proposes major funding increase for stronger borders and migration [Electronic resource] // European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4106 (accessed: 27.03.2020)

euros, Frontex will indeed have significant duties, which will include conducting border controls along with national services and with the consent of the Member State in whose territory it will be operating. Frontex services will further focus on improving returns, which means returning asylum seekers who did not receive a positive response or redistributing them to third countries willing to accept them. Presently, less than half of refugees and asylum seekers with failed claims actually leave European territory. The solution, as envisioned by Frontex's leadership, is to speed up decisions at national level. Then, Frontex will be able to take over mainly at the level of logistics (arrangements with airlines for the return of migrants, etc.)

At the same time, Frontex's evolution has progressed amidst frequent criticism from different directions, including Member States and various humanitarian NGOs. On the one hand, Frontex has been accused of attempting to create a "Fortress Europe" and showing no concern for the suffering of refugees, while on the other hand, there have been accusations that it does not protect the EU's external borders effectively and that national border protection services are preferable. In the first occasion, Frontex has been said to violate international refugee law with its border closure operations and strict controls, which sometimes see refugees sent back to their countries. This reinforces the view that Frontex represents the EU's first paramilitary force, which, while beginning as simple coast guard service, has seen its powers steadily increase. Concerns have been voiced against lack of transparency in Frontex's operations, as well as democratic oversight over them. Moreover, human rights organsations such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have criticised Frontex of ineffective work in the Mediterranean Sea, where the clash between protection of EU borders and protection of refugee lives creates significant conflicts of interest between various organisations operating in the region. For instance, Frontex had accused MSF of indirectly helping out smugglers in the Central Mediterranean, but refused to share the internal report that these accusations were based on when MSF requested it. Subsequently, MSF's Coordinator of the Forced Migration team, Aurélie Ponthieu. published a response to Frontex's accusations, pointing out the increased death toll in the Mediterranean in 2016, despite the EU search and rescue operations, as well as criticised the implication of Frontex that the suggested alternative for MSF would be to "let people drown as a strategy to

deter the smugglers".[178] From the opposite end, Member States have accused Frontex of intervening in areas where national services should be the sole operating force. For instance, Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban has stated that the strengthening of Frontex will "strip Hungary of its right to protect its own borders."[179] Though, such criticisms have been addressed by the European Commission, which stated that the EU does not intend to take over border control from Member States, but rather to assist them in their operations and with their consent.

Overall – as seen in this chapter, despite problems and criticisms, the EU maintains commitment to its immigration policies. Moreover, the backstory for the 2015-16 European migrant crisis provided in this chapter illustrated the complex conditions under which the EU found itself. The subsequent collective measures decided by the EU institutions to face the crisis included the relocation scheme – also known as the quota system, the agreement with Turkey, and the reinforcement of the role of Frontex – the European Border and Coast Guard. The agreement of these policies occurred in a state of urgency and as the international community observed the events, while migrant and refugee influx in Europe crossed the one-million mark. Consequently, this was a major test for the European Project – not only in the collective capability for quick decisive action, but even more so in the capacity of adopting effective common solutions that would correspond with EU humanitarian values. The implementation of the adopted policies indicated varying levels of success and they were often met with disagreements between Member States. Nonetheless, all three policy areas still remain on the main EU agenda and represent the major tools for the management of the migration situation in Europe.

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178 Ponthieu, A. Bounties not Bodies: Smugglers Profit from Sea Rescues Though No Clear Alternative Available [Electronic resource] / Ponthieu, A. // MSF Analysis. URL: http://msf-analysis.org/bounties-not-bodies-smugglers-profit-sea-rescues-though-no-clear-alternative-available/ (accessed: 26.05.2020)

179 Hungary's Orban vows to oppose EU border-guard plan [Electronic resource] // Agence France-Presse (AFP), 2018. URL: https://www.france24.com/en/20180917-hungarys-orban-vows-oppose-eu-border-guard-plan (accessed: 27.03.2020)

Chapter 3

Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Policy Evaluation

3.1. Quota System

As mentioned in the introductory part of this research, both qualitative and quantitative methods are applied for the present analysis. A specified security lexicon proposed by Baele and Sterck in their research (it can be found in the Appendix) is used to analyse 50 texts focused on each of the chosen immigration policy areas of the EU. The security ratio is then calculated by dividing the total times each of the words in the security lexicon was encountered in the analysed texts, over the total number of words in the texts. The "low" security ratio and the "high" security ratio provided by Baele and Sterck for comparison is 1,26 and 5,27 respectively. The level of security language in the first one is low, since the sample under analysis was taken from generic EU policy texts, and in the second one it is very high, due to the sample having been taken from hard security policies. These ratios will constitute the comparison levels in the present research as well. Thus, if another sample shows a security ratio above 1,26 – this will indicate an increased level of securitisation.

The first policy area under consideration is the relocation and resettlement scheme of the EU, commonly known as the so-called "Quota system". It was introduced by the European Commission in order to organise the relocation of 120,000 refugees from Greece, Italy and Hungary to other EU states. This proposal was approved by the European Parliament on September 17, 2015. This policy area was among the very first collective EU response measures to the 2015-16 migration crisis in Europe.

In order to calculate the security ratio for the EU's Quota system, 50 texts of official EU institutes were analysed – speeches, press releases, factsheets, laws, resolutions. The documents in the sample were chosen to include both representations of discourse as well as official policies, in order to analyse both the rhetoric and the subsequent actions of EU institutions. The majority of the texts were composed and published by the European Commission and European Council. Overall, the chosen sample included a total of 291,625 words. After the automated

check of this sample against the security lexicon through the use of the software MEH (Meaning Extraction Helper), the result indicated 8,857 occurrences of the specified “security words” in the provided documents. As a result, the proportion of these words over the total amount in the sample provides a security ratio of 3,04 – which is significantly higher than the “low” security ratio of 1,26 calculated by Baele and Sterck in their research. Consequently, this indicates an increased use of security language in the discourse and the subsequent policies centred around the EU’s Quota system. Therefore, given these numbers, we can estimate that there is a higher level of securitisation in immigration policies focused on the EU Quota system than in generic policies of the EU.



Figure 6 – Quota system security ratio

Source: Quota system – author’s original research data; Low and high security ratio – Baele and Sterck’s 2014 research

As evident in the above table (Figure 6), the Quota system security ratio is more than twice as high as the “low security” ratio. It is also more than half of the “high security” ratio – which illustrates an above average level in the use of security language, since the latter ratio represents

hard security policies that traditionally contain the highest level of security language. Given the fact that the Quota system scheme is centred around migration management and is not part of the traditional security sphere in the EU, this level of security language is abnormally high. Consequently, we can conclude that the EU's Quota system policies illustrate that migration in the EU has been securitised.

Word	Frequency	Observation Percentage
state	3657	98
protection	1042	96
authority	448	72
security	351	72
emergency	294	72
lebanon	293	44
crisis	278	64
cooperation	258	72
target	201	54
response	184	70
force	160	50
law	153	46
control	113	36
syria	100	50
iraq	83	44
police	77	34
close	76	64
fundamental	71	34
power	53	32
safe	48	34

Table 1 – Quota system top 20 security words

Source: Author's original research

Furthermore, the analysis of the list of "security words" most encountered in the texts (as seen in Table 1) is also indicative of a high level of securitisation. For the analysed texts, the MEH

software provided a set of words from the security lexicon that were encountered in the total amount of words and indicated the value of "frequency" – the total number of times each word appeared in the reviewed documents, and "observation percentage" – the total percentage of all documents where each word appeared. For instance, the top word as seen in the below table is "state", which was encountered 3,657 times and appeared in 98 percent of all the analysed documents.

The frequent use of the word "state" in the context of the analysed texts in the vast majority of cases refers to "Member State" – the countries which compose the European Union. In the context of the securitisation theory model, the EU policy-making institutions such as the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament represent the securitising actor, while the Member States represent the audience which accepts the securitising move. In the case of the Quota system policies, while some Member States have objected their application, the majority was in favour of it – a level of acceptance sufficient for a successful securitising move.

Furthermore, in the above table we can also observe that words such as "emergency" and "crisis" are among the most used in the analysed texts and are encountered in 72 and 64 percent of total texts respectively. As supported by Buzan et al., securitisation occurs when an issue is taken from the area of normal politics to emergency politics – "when a securitising actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is 'normal politics,' we have a case of securitisation".[180] They also point out that "the distinguishing feature of securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure)".[181] The language of panic and unease is thus one of the first instruments to start the process of a securitising move. Additionally, the proposed Quota system policies were among the first response measures in the EU when the migrant crisis took place in 2015-16 – this coincided with the higher securitisation of the migration issue when it started being treated as a topic of extreme importance for the entire European Union. Emergency politics were the

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[180] Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de Wilde. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 24.
[181] Ibid. – P. 26.

subsequent response, with the Quota system proposals and subsequent policy decisions being the first indications of this move of the migration theme to the security realm. The word "response" observed in 70 percent of all texts is indicative of this tendency.

As the table also indicates, words such as "security" and "police" were encountered in 72 and 34 percent of all documents respectively. The use of this type of language is most indicative of a security rhetoric in the EU's Quota system migration policies. For instance, the First report on relocation and resettlement, published in 2016, underscored the importance of conducting security checks during relocation procedures. The assistance to the Hellenic Police in refugee facility management was also underlined.[182] This indicates a prioritisation of security concerns by the EU within the scope of migration management. For instance, the document containing the Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece speaks of "general provisions on the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management".[183] The mention of issues such as police and crime in line with asylum and migration indicates increased security concerns in relation to migration management.

Finally, the fact that these security-themed words were encountered repeatedly in the analysed texts is indicative of intended securitisation practices. According to Baele and Sterck, the intensity of repetition of security themes indicates a continuum of securitisation moves.[184] Thus, we can state that all the main characteristics of a successful securitising move are present in the Quota system policies and based on the above analysis and data, the EU Quota system migration policies can be deemed as securitised.

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182 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: First report on relocation and resettlement // European Commission, 2016.

183 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece // European Commission, 2015.

184 Baele, S. J. Sterck, O. C. Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims / S. J. Baele, O. C. Sterck // Political Studies. – 2014. Vol. 63, №. 5. – P. 1124.

3.2. EU-Turkey Deal

The next policy area that was examined in the scope of the present research is the EU-Turkey agreement, which was concluded in two stages in 2016 – from the Joint Action Plan of October, 2015, to the final Statement of March 2016.

The analysis was once again conducted on 50 texts, this time pertaining to the EU-Turkey dialogue and the subsequent agreements on migration management, as the second large policy area in response to the migrant crisis of 2015-16. In summary, this cooperation package aimed at a refugee exchange plan between EU and Turkey in order to ease the migrant inflow pressure on European borders. Turkey would host a Syrian refugee camp and offer the opportunity for asylum application without crossing EU borders, while all irregular migrants encountered in Europe would be sent back to Turkey. In exchange, the EU would offer Turkey financial assistance and a set of other concessions, such as potential visa facilitation and even EU accession talks. The deal has been called a success because it reduced migrant inflows by 97% compared to 2015. But this comparison was made against a year when Germany's borders were open and 1.5 million refugees passed through Greece – something that seems impossible today.

In order to determine whether this policy area has been securitised, a bulk of documents which included official press releases, speeches, factsheets, resolutions, agreements and annexes of EU institutions focused on the cooperation with Turkey was reviewed. The chosen sample amounted in a total of 194,025 words, while the number of words present in the security lexicon totalled in 5,501 words. By dividing the number of "security words" over the total number of words in the examined sample, the result shows a security ratio of 2,84. Comparing this ratio with the samples of "low" and "high" security ratios provided by Baele and Sterck – 1,26 and 5,27 respectively, we can conclude that the policy area of the EU-Turkey cooperation presents a significantly higher level of security language than a generic EU policy area. This result can also be reflected in the below graph (Figure 7). Therefore, the securitisation of migration within the EU-Turkey policy area is once again an evident phenomenon.



Figure 7 – EU-Turkey deal security ratio

Source: EU-Turkey deal – author's original research data; Low and high security ratio – Baele and Sterck's 2014 research

Furthermore, moving on to the results of the analysis word-by-word (as seen in Table 2), we can see that the concentration of security-themed terms is once again very high and indicative of a securitising move. Words in the below table, such as "crisis", "emergency" and "response" underscore the urgency of the situation and illustrate the extraordinary nature of the measures taken under the umbrella of the EU-Turkey cooperation on migration management. This goes in line with securitisation practices, which require an urgent security rhetoric in order to include an area of normal politics in the traditional security sphere. Indeed, were it not for the pertaining extraordinary circumstances, such an agreement between the EU and Turkey would seem highly unlikely. This is especially evident given Turkey's democratic deficit and the generally negative public opinion about Turkey within the EU, with 76% of Europeans being against Turkish membership in the Union.[185] But the necessity of an effective response urged European authorities to seek cooperation with neighbouring states – most importantly Turkey, the country

[185] Lindgaard, J. EU Public Opinion on Turkish EU Membership: Trends and Drivers / J. Lindgaard // FEUTURE. – 2018. Online Paper №. 25. – P. 1.

which hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees in the world. The frequent use of the word "cooperation", which was present in 88 percent of all examined texts underlines this necessity of common actions of the Member States and EU agencies in partnership with the Turkish side. For instance, the EU-Turkey Statement progress report of September, 2016, underlines that "cooperation needs to be deepened to optimise the use of intelligence by all EU, NATO, Greek and Turkish authorities".[186]

Word	Frequency	Observation Percentage
state	1072	90
protection	562	84
authority	490	86
cooperation	282	88
crisis	276	76
syria	258	68
emergency	241	56
security	208	64
law	171	70
response	166	54
police	148	50
target	138	48
force	116	58
close	100	62
safe	90	62
strategy	71	38
intervention	71	26
fundamental	60	40
fight	58	48
control	51	44

Table 2 – EU-Turkey deal top 20 security words

Source: Author's original research

186 Managing the Refugee Crisis, EU-Turkey Statement: Progress Report September 2016 // European Commission, 2016.

Next, the high frequency of the words “security” and “police” – which appeared in 64 and 50 percent of all texts respectively, illustrates the importance of the security narrative for the cooperation between the EU and Turkey in migration management. The primary goal within this sphere is the counteraction of illegal migration and the work of smugglers. The appearance of the words such as “illegal”, “crime” and “defence” in over 20 percent of all the texts also points out the importance of security themes within the scope of this cooperation.

Furthermore, the increased use of the word “Syria”, which was encountered in 68 percent of all documents, indicates the significance of the Syrian conflict as a major driver for the European migrant crisis and by extension drives the necessity for an approach with Turkey. Since the country hosts a large number of Syrian refugees, it is the primary goal of the EU to find common solutions with the Turkish side. As stated in the EU Monitoring Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, “for the past 8 years since the onset of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has been the major reception and transit country for refugees from Syria and other countries in the region, becoming by 2015, the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world.”[187] Therefore, both the urgency and the unique necessity to cooperate with Turkey as extraordinary measures of migration crisis management are underscored.

The above analysis thus makes it evident that the EU-Turkey migration management policy area also presents the main characteristics of a securitising move. It also shows high levels of securitisation, in comparison with other areas of EU policies not encountered in the traditional security sphere.

3.3. Frontex

The last EU migration policy area under consideration is the European Border and Coast Guard, commonly known as Frontex. The agency is responsible for coordinating and maintaining border controls within Europe’s Schengen Area in cooperation with the EU Member States’ own border and coast guards. As the third large policy initiative of the EU in response to the migrant crisis,

[187] Ibid.

the role of Frontex was significantly reinforced starting from European Commission's proposal in December 2015. The expansion of the authorities of Frontex is a continuing process, which is still taking place – with a new package of proposals, including a significant budget and staff increase scheduled for 2020.

In order to examine securitisation levels in this third policy area, 50 more relevant texts were analysed with the help of the MEH software. The documents under examination included official press releases, factsheets, laws, resolutions of EU institutions, including Frontex's own publications, available on the agency's official website. The chosen sample consisted of a total of 537,827 words, while the number of words present in the security lexicon amounted in 18,100 occurrences. As a result, by dividing the latter number over the total amount of words contained in the documents, this offers us a security ratio of 3,37. In the same way as in the cases analysed above, we compare this ratio with Baele and Sterck's sample ratios of low and high security – 1,26 and 5,27 respectively. As evident in the below graph (Figure 8), the ratio pertaining to the level of security in the policies of Frontex is notably high.



Figure 8 – Frontex security ratio

Source: Frontex security ratio – author's original research data; Low and high security ratio – Baele and Sterck's 2014 research

Frontex's security ratio is also increased compared to the ones observed in the previously examined policies – it is higher than the 3,04 ratio of the Quota system and the 2,84 ratio of the EU-Turkey deal. This can be explained by the fact that Frontex is a border guard agency and part of the EU intelligence services, thus having more connection to the traditional security sphere. Nonetheless, it is still an agency heavily focused on migration management and has been a significant part of the EU's package of immigration policies and must therefore be examined as one of them. At the same time, it must be noted that all three policy areas under examination present ratios that are relatively close to one another and significantly higher than the "low" security sample – which indicates an intense presence of security language in these policy areas, subsequently deeming them securitised.

Moving on to the word analysis part (as seen below in Table 3), the frequency of specific words in the analysed documents is also indicative of a high level of securitisation. Firstly, the importance of Frontex as an emergency intervention authority that assists Member States with migration management is signified by the frequent usage of words such as "intervention", "strategic", "response" and "capability". To provide context, one of the analysed documents – the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, states: "Any Member State facing a situation of urgent and exceptional pressure due to large number of migrants trying to enter the territory illegally, which exceeds the capacity of the Member State concerned may trigger a rapid intervention coordinated by Frontex."[188]

Next, the word "protection", which was mentioned in 72 percent of all documents, in the present context references the protection of European external borders in the majority of cases – it is evidently prioritised to the protection of migrants and asylum seekers. Importance is given to the preservation of the Schengen area and effectiveness of border controls, as well as cooperation of Frontex with Member States' national guards to serve this purpose. This context is apparent in one of the examined documents – the European Commission Proposal of 2018, which aimed at the establishment of a significantly reinforced role for Frontex and would enable it to "act as a genuine border police to ensure the protection of EU external borders, to effectively manage

[188] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration // European Commission, 2015.

migratory flows and to contribute to guarantee a high level of security within the Union - a key condition to preserve the Schengen area".[189] Similarly, the reinforced role of Frontex is underlined with the use of the word "police" – essentially giving the agency migration policing powers similar to law enforcement.

Word	Frequency	Observation Percentage
state	3735	92
cooperation	1953	78
control	1034	84
fundamental	929	64
security	862	86
authority	846	74
protection	595	72
strategy	526	42
capability	519	40
intervention	495	58
law	482	62
strategic	477	38
surveillance	441	62
crime	381	56
response	331	48
power	304	48
target	286	46
force	285	66
intelligence	263	32
threat	251	54

Table 3 – Frontex top 20 security words

Source: Author's original research

A notable mention is also the usage of the word "threat". While it is not directly referenced to migrants themselves, the context of its use clearly touches hard security themes. For instance, in the same document mentioned above – the 2018 European Commission Proposal on the

[189] Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard // European Commission, 2018.

reinforced role of Frontex, “threat” is indicated in the following context: “The Agency will develop new types of inter-agency cooperation with the authorities of the aviation sector to better detect and respond to the new threats induced by aircrafts and drones.”[190] This further emphasises the significantly expanded functions of Frontex, which resemble those of a militarised law enforcement agency. In fact, the new role of Frontex has been looked at in the exact same way by the international community, with the agency’s chief, Fabrice Leggeri, stating to EUobserver that he “would not object if you define us as a law enforcement agency at EU level”.[191] Thus, the line between Frontex and police is seen as blurring across the EU and the initial focus on migration has taken a turn towards issues such as terrorism, drug smuggling and document fraud, among others.

This can be supported by an even earlier research published by Aas and Gundhus in the British Journal of Criminology, which aimed at examining the discrepancy between the humanitarian values present in border guard practices and the actual policing practices. By conducting interviews with Frontex officials and examining the agency’s official policy documents, the researchers concluded that there is an evident incoherence between the performative attention to human rights and the real practices, which prioritise security objectives. Consequently, the importance of Frontex as the vital line in “fending off migration pressures at Europe’s doorstep” represents a telling observation of the realpolitik behind the agency’s growing set of authorities.[192]

Therefore, it is evident in the policies centred on the role of Frontex in the EU that security themes take significant priority and the agency’s authority is primarily that of protecting European borders against any irregular activity – including migrants. Therefore, it can be concluded that the immigration policies of Frontex have also been securitised.

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190 Ibid.

191 Nielsen, N. Frontex: Europe's new law enforcement agency? [Electronic resource] / N. Nielsen // EUobserver, 2018. URL: https://euobserver.com/justice/141062 (accessed: 20.05.2020)

192 Aas, K. F., Gundhus, H. O. I. Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life / K. F. Aas, H. O. I. Gundhus // The British Journal of Criminology. – 2015. Vol. 55, №. 1. – P. 15.

3.4. Criticism: Human Rights Perspective

Lastly, it is necessary to evaluate the human rights aspect of the EU's immigration policies analysed in the previous sections. As evidenced by the securitisation theory scholars, it is an important part of the research process, since it takes into account the issue of ethics. Furthermore, as an independent international actor, the EU has specific humanitarian values and human rights obligations according to the international law, as well as its own treaties. Therefore, it is important to examine whether these values and obligations correlate with the immigration policies of the EU institutes. This evaluation will provide a more complete picture within the framework of the present research and offer a final word to relevant scholars, as well as international organisations, such as human rights NGOs.

Firstly, it is required to answer the following question: What are the EU's human rights obligations and pertaining values? Many human rights treaties have been ratified by the European Union – both international and European. This includes such important treaties, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as well as the 2009 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Therefore, the EU has demonstrated its commitment to upholding and defending the basic human rights values preserved in the aforementioned treaties. Furthermore, the EU has always underscored the importance of such values, as indicated in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail."[193] The EU also has other instruments in place to ensure the preservation of fundamental rights. More specifically, when new legislative initiatives are proposed, the European Commission must provide an assessment of their compatibility with fundamental rights, which is later examined also by the European Council and Parliament. The latter institution also produces an annual report on the overall situation of fundamental rights protection within the EU. Moreover, since

[193] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union of 26 October, 2012 // Official Journal of the European Union. – 2012. Title 1: Common Provisions. Article 2.

2014, an annual dialogue is organised with Member States in the EU Council to discuss various subjects pertaining to legal protections of human rights.[194]

It is therefore evident that the EU has an extensive basis for human rights protections and humanitarian values are embedded in its very formation and decision-making process. Indeed, the EU has in place an elaborate asylum mechanism which includes the European Asylum Directive and Asylum Support Office. Nonetheless, these achievements contradict with European refugee and asylum practices – with access to borders and asylum application processes becoming more and more difficult for those that may qualify. European institutions have thus faced extensive criticism for their lack of efficiency in the implementation of immigration policies post-2015. The EU has attempted to balance both security and human rights, with insufficient results – an indication of an apparent institutional weakness in crisis response. Tsoukala points out that the constant reinforcement and establishment of border and immigration controls, the worsening of conditions of entry and deportation measures, as well as the reinforced cooperation with third countries (such as Turkey) have resulted in the weakening of the asylum seekers' legal status in the EU. She goes on to point out the contradictions in such immigration policies – while security agencies and official authorities note the effectiveness of their border protections, the reported numbers of illegal migrants are still extremely high.[195] This situation reflects a multitude of issues within the EU's immigration policy in terms of its efficiency and the aspect of human rights.

Most notoriously, the EU-Turkey agreement was hailed as a success by the European side, but was met with critique by the majority of international community. The Greek National Commission for Human Rights (ECHR) – an independent advisory body to the Greek state on human rights issues, stated in a 2016 report that the agreement was without a doubt a major European double back on human rights issues. It also pointed out that the provision that only Syrians would be accepted as refugees in the EU as well as the agreement on the maximum number of refugees to settle in the EU constituted a direct violation of the 1951 Geneva

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194 The protection of fundamental rights in the EU [Electronic resource] // European Parliament. URL: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/146/the-protection-of-fundamental-rights-in-the-eu (accessed: 28.04.2020)

195 Tsoukala, A. Looking at Migrants as Enemies / A. Tsoukala // Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and Within Europe / ed.: Bigo, D, Guild, E. – London: Routledge, 2017. – P. 161.

Convention.[196] Then, Amnesty International considers that the EU-Turkey agreement is a "shameful stain on the collective conscience of Europe".[197] It also published a report which demonstrated that the Turkish asylum system does not meet the three crucial criteria required by international law for the legal return of asylum-seekers in Turkey: status, sustainable solutions and livelihoods. According to the report, Turkey has been known to deport people to Syria and Afghanistan between 2014-2018 despite provisions of international human rights law to refrain from deportations to places where people could face a serious risk of human rights violations, such as persecution, torture and other dangers. Turkey, however, denies its illegal practices and claims that all Syrians that have been returned to their home country have done so voluntarily.[198] This situation is also made worse by Turkey's own involvement in military operations in Syria. More specifically, Turkish attempts to create a "safe zone" in the north-eastern part of Syria, which involved military attacks on Kurdish-led armed groups in the region, provoked violations of civilians' human rights and war crimes. As reported by Amnesty International, these operations resulted in the displacement of more than 160,000 people in just a week's time. But in case these military actions had been openly criticised by the European Union, Turkish President Erdoğan essentially threatened the EU that he would open the borders and send over 3 million Syrian refugees to Europe from Turkey.[199] It is also characteristic, that the quality and quantity of migrant inflows to Greece seem to depend on the disposition of the Turkish authorities and the state of their relations with Europe. Greek authorities have claimed that economic migrants, who are now the majority of arrivals from Turkey, are more difficult to manage and are knowingly

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[196] Dílosi tis EEDA gia tin katástasi tou sistímatos ipodokhís kai asílou sti khóra [Electronic resource] // ETHNIKI EPITROPI GIA TA DIKAIOMATA TI ANTHROPOU, 2017. URL: https://jmce.gr/portal/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/%CE%94%CE%B7%CC%81%CE%BB%CF%89%CF%83%CE%B7_%CE%95%CE%95%CE%94%CE%91_%CE%91%CC%81%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BB%CE%BF-%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%85%CF%81%CF%8C%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%82.pdf (accessed: 11.05.2020)

[197] EU-Turkey Deal: A shameful stain on the collective conscience of Europe [Electronic resource] // Amnesty International, 2017. URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/eu-turkey-deal-a-shameful-stain-on-the-collective-conscience-of-europe/ (accessed: 08.05.2020)

[198] Sent to a War Zone: Turkey's Illegal Deportations of Syrian Refugees // Amnesty International, 2019. – P. 10.

[199] Ibid. – P. 6.

sent to Europe by the Turkish side.[200] In March, 2020, President Erdoğan once again threatened to stop enforcing the 2016 deal and send millions of migrants to the EU, while the Greek authorities stated that Turkey had turned itself into a "trafficker" and "this relocation of people has nothing to do with international law regarding the right of asylum".[201] This intimidation technique employed by Turkey represented a weakened position of the EU and added to its criticism by the international community – especially since the EU is still committed to the 2016 agreement with Turkey.

Furthermore, the EU's cooperation with Turkey despite the latter's contradictive attitudes towards Syrians along with historically lacking implementation of international human rights law indicate that European authorities prioritise security of borders against migrants and leave the humanitarian aspects of such a partnership further in the background. This also adds to the fact that the EU-Turkey deal has been deemed as ineffective in terms of the returns to Turkey, which are made difficult by bureaucracy and procedural delays, while migrants have to wait for their claims to be processed in overcrowded camps, oftentimes with squalid conditions. Lastly, the decreased arrivals to Greece since the Turkey agreement do not necessarily indicate success. Instead of being discouraged to cross over to Europe, Syrians opt for new passages that are longer, more expensive and more dangerous. They can cross over to Egypt and travel to Italy instead of Greece and the statistics for the Central Mediterranean Route right after the signing of the Turkey deal indicated a significant increase in arrivals – a consequence of the deal's implementation, according to the UNHCR.[202] At the same time, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported in February, 2017 that 1 in every 23 migrants attempting to travel on the Central Mediterranean Route within the first several months of 2016 had died.[203]

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200 «Dialogí» stous metanástes pou stélni stin Elláda káni i Tourkía [Electronic resource] // iefimerida.gr, 2017. URL: https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/316800/dialogi-stoys-metanastes-poy-stelnei-stin-ellada-kanei-i-toyrkia (accessed: 19.05.2020)

201 Turkey says millions of migrants may head to EU [Electronic resource] // BBC News, 2020. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51707958 (accessed: 19.05.2020)

202 Desperate Journeys: Refugees and migrants entering and crossing Europe via the Mediterranean and Western Balkans routes // The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 2017. – P. 6.

203 The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than ever // IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC), 2016.

A similar situation that is evident in the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement can also be observed in other European immigration policies. For instance, Human Rights Watch (HRW) connects the EU's cooperation with Libya to abuse of migrants in Libyan detention centres. Based on HRW's report, European authorities provide assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting asylum seekers and migrants at sea, right after they sail off the Libyan coast. After that, they are taken to detention, where they are held in terrible conditions with risk of human rights abuses. Per the claims of the EU Commissioner on Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, the EU is aware of this, but based on on-site interviews which HRW conducted with detainees, the impact of European efforts to improve conditions in the detention centres have been insufficient.[204] Another example is a study conducted by Migreurop at the request of the Green group in the European Parliament, which questioned the guarantees of human rights provided by Frontex, especially in light of the revision of its mandate that gave the agency more authority and policing powers. The research found a large gap between "text and reality" – the attention given to human rights protections on paper, but the absence of their implementation in practice.[205]

Further examining the situation, the problem of the human rights dimension of EU immigration policies remains a general issue. According to Klug, the EU preliminary debates on the 2015 migration crisis focused more on burden-sharing between Member States and less on the dimension of human rights.[206] The major sources of migrant inflows – the Syrian conflict and the political instability in the Middle East and North Africa, are ongoing issues that indicate that migration and refugee flows will not cease in the next years. Völkel points out that since most of the decisions on EU immigration policy take place in the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which is composed of justice and interior ministers of Member States, the securitisation of migration is a natural development and the humanitarian aspect of the issue is overshadowed by security concerns, such as criminal and terrorist networks, as well as formation of refugee

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204 No Escape from Hell: EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya [Electronic resource] // Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2019. URL: https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya (accessed: 20.05.2019)

205 Frontex Agency: Which Guarantees for Human Rights? // Migreurop, 2011. – P. 43.

206 Klug, A. Strengthening the protection of migrants and refugees in distress at sea through international cooperation and burden-sharing / A. Klug // International Journal of Refugee Law. – 2014. Vol. 26, №. 1. – P. 51.

trails.[207] He suggests that restrictive immigration policies will not be able to put a stop to irregular migration in the EU and will not increase internal security.[208] Moreover, according to Vaughan-Williams, there is a discrepancy between the "EU Commission's neo-liberal humanitarian policy rhetoric and the violent reality of many irregular migrant's embodied experiences of their encounter with attempts to police their mobility".[209] The irregular migrant is seen as both as someone to be protected and to protect against – creating a discrepancy between the rhetoric of humanitarianism and the reality of securitisation practices.

As indicated in this chapter, immigration policies in the EU have been securitised. The conducted analysis shows that security themes are prioritised in European discourse and subsequent policies, while the human rights aspect – although present in writing, is underrepresented in practice. This indicates a situation where the EU attempts to balance between two camps – the one of border security and the other of humanitarianism. This division illustrates the EU's institutional weakness in collective decision-making process – an issue that must be overcome, should the EU wish to implement a more effective immigration policy. Given the above criticism, besides the established border controls and agreements with third countries it will be important for the EU to correctly prioritise the safety of individuals – safe transit routes, facilitated integration process, better access to legal status both for asylum seekers and economic migrants. It will also be vital to implement improved procedures in these areas in coordination with Member States, especially when it comes to refugees and asylum seekers – an area where relying on human rights will be of outmost importance.

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[207] Völkel, J. C. When Interior Ministers play diplomats. Fatal ambiguities in Europe's securitised migration policy / J. C. Völkel // Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies / ed.: A. Jünemann, N. Fromm, N. Scherer. – Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017. – P. 86.

[208] Ibid. – P. 93.

[209] Vaughan-Williams, N. Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond / N. Vaughan-Williams. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. – P. 3.

Conclusion

As seen in this research paper, the European migrant crisis of 2015-16 has overtaken the socio-political dialogue in Europe since its very beginning and has replaced economic themes, which had remained prioritised after the 2008 global financial crisis. The unprecedented influx of migrants and refugees to Europe, which was provoked by the events known as the Arab Spring – and especially the Libyan civil war and the Syrian conflict, was a major turning point for the EU's migration policies. Since 2015, several new policy areas were introduced as response measures to the crisis, having been illustrated in the European Agenda on Migration – one of the main documents of EU institutions on post-2015 migration management.

Despite the apparent decrease of arrivals into Europe after 2016, the topic if migration still remains as one of the main priorities within the EU and has become both a point of unity among Member States in the handling of the crisis, as well as a point of disagreement. In its task to provide solutions to this crisis, the EU needed collective solutions and unified actions, which can be illustrated in its common migration policy initiatives. But the situation evidently produced more than just common policies – it may have also led to the construction of a security rhetoric around the issue of migration. Thus, the present research attempts to reveal whether migration in the EU has indeed been framed as a security issue and whether this is reflected through the immigration policies of EU institutions. Furthermore, the ethical perspective of such a security rhetoric is also considered and the subsequent policies are examined through the lens of human rights.

This paper set out the following aim: to reveal whether the official immigration policies of the EU have been securitised and if they correspond with EU values and human rights obligations. In order to achieve this aim, several objectives were also set out. The first one previewed an analysis of the outcome of the European 2015-16 migrant crisis through the lens of securitisation theory. For this purpose, both the theoretical basis of securitisation theory and securitisation of migration were laid out in Chapter 1, in order to provide the theoretical framework for the study. At this stage, it was showcased how securitisation theory can be applied to the case of migration, including the European migrant crisis. Next, in Chapter 2, a comprehensive background of the

2015-16 migrant crisis was also provided, in order to offer the necessary context and information on the events under analysis. The results of this part of the study indicated that the migrant crisis was largely a consequence of the events known as the Arab Spring, but it was also already years in the making. However, despite Europe's broad history of immigration, the EU was unprepared for the major influx of migrants and refugees in 2015 and 2016, due to the absence of an effective common immigration and asylum policy. Consequently, as the research showed, the three new main policy areas in the immigration sphere were decided in a state of urgency and implemented with varying levels of success. Nonetheless, it was also seen that the EU still remains committed to these policy areas and they continue to be applied and reinforced nowadays – indicating the lasting relevance of the immigration issue in European politics.

The next objective included the application of quantitative and qualitative analysis tools in order to conduct content and discourse analysis centred around EU immigration policies. The three policy areas examined in Chapter 2 were selected for this research – based on their importance and prevalence in EU's migration management strategy: the relocation and resettlement scheme – also known as the Quota system; the agreement between EU and Turkey on refugee exchange; the role of the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex). For this purpose, 50 official documents of the EU were selected for each of the policy areas – 150 documents in total. These document packages were then analysed through the application of the automated text analysis software MEH (Meaning Extraction Helper). More specifically, the software run an automated check of the provided documents against a predetermined "security lexicon" composed by Baele and Sterck in their 2014 research on securitisation of migration in the EU (this lexicon can be found in the Appendix). The resulting amount of "security words" was then divided by the total amount of words in each document sample, thus giving us the "security ratio" for each policy. This ratio was then compared with the "low" and "high" security sample ratios provided by Baele and Sterck. The results of this analysis conducted in Chapter 3 indicated increased security ratios for all three examined policies: 3,04 for The Quota system, 2,84 for the EU-Turkey deal, and 3,37 for Frontex. Compared with the "low" security sample ratio of 1,26 – which is representative of generic EU policies not focused on hard security issues, these numbers indicated increased levels of security language and the presence of an intended securitising move, due to the repetitive occurrence of security-related words in the documents.

This quantitative content analysis was backed by a subsequent discourse analysis – the conveying of the security messages within EU immigration policy documents was analysed with examples from the reviewed text samples, in order to provide legitimacy and context for the quantitative analysis. This part of the research also indicated the presence of intended securitising moves, as it depicted repeated conveying of security messages in the texts. According to Baele and Sterck, securitisation is considered as a "continuum", rather than as a single act and a simple yes/no logic would be insufficient in answering the question whether migration in the EU has been securitised. Rather, the research should provide a "measure of the intensity of security narratives".[210] Thus, the analysis conducted in Chapter 3 set out to provide levels of "intensity" of securitisation in the three main policies which were chosen for the research. The final results are illustrated in the below table (Figure 9).



Figure 9 – Summary of research results

Such a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology in the application of securitisation theory has been encountered in only a few previous works on the EU migrant

[210] Baele, S. J. Sterck, O. C. Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims / S. J. Baele, O. C. Sterck // Political Studies. – 2014. Vol. 63, №. 5. – P. 1127.

crisis, with Baele and Sterck's 2014 paper being the first to champion such a method for the analysis of securitisation of migration. The novelty of this methodology stands in the unbiased sampling and analysis of data that includes both discourse and policies centred around migration, which allows to measure the intensity of security language. But as numbers require context – most importantly in the application of securitisation theory, which assigns major importance to language and construction of meaning, this analytical tool requires complementary qualitative discourse analysis. Thus, the present paper implements both methods, in order to provide sufficient evaluation and evidence of securitising moves.

Given the combined research results demonstrated above, all three policies under examination presented increased security ratios and therefore high intensity of securitisation – affirming the presence of securitisation of migration in the EU. Thus, the findings of this part of the research show that the EU institutions' immigration policies have indeed been securitised and the securitisation of migration in the EU after the 2015-16 migrant crisis can be confirmed.

The next objective included examining the relation between the discourse and official immigration policies within the EU. This was achieved through the inclusion of texts that represented the discourse and actual policy documents of EU institutions, thus implementing the analysis of both areas in the research. More specifically, the 150 documents analysed with the MEH software in Chapter 3 included speeches and quotes of EU officials, press releases, as well as official legal documents of the EU, which referred to specific immigration policies. Additional commentary of academics was included to provide reinforcement for the validity of the analysis. This approach supplements previous critiques directed at securitisation theory for its focus on discourse and limited consideration of policies, as well as the role of institutions in their implementation.

It was discovered through this part of the research that the EU has not set out to directly frame migrants as a "threat", but it still resorted to extraordinary measures in handling the 2015-16 migrant crisis and asserted the need to protect itself through the exclusion of others – the "outsiders". This evidently goes in line with typical securitisation practices – as indicated by Huysmans, who references the political myth of the EU as a "homogenous national community or western civilisation," that "existed in the past and can be re-established today through the

exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens".[211] Subsequently, it was established in this part of the study that there is significant connection between the discourse and policy areas of immigration in the EU.

The last objective focused on evaluating the correspondence of EU human rights obligations and its immigration policies. As seen in the last part of Chapter 3, while the EU has signed many international agreements on human rights and humanitarianism remains an important dimension of its decision-making processes, its immigration policies reflect a difficult balance between protecting its own security and protecting the well-being of migrants. Furthermore, as supported by Buonfino, it can be suggested that in the case of migration in the EU, the securitising moves go in parallel with the humanitarian rhetoric, because human rights represent one of the main European values.[212] Indeed, the mention of humanitarianism is present in all the main EU immigration policies, but nonetheless their implementation has been criticised by many academics and human rights organisations. These criticisms reflect a dual reality, where the EU attempts to prioritise both security and humanitarianism, but struggles to balance its commitment to both. As a result, the EU's immigration policy indicates flawed implementation and results, with measures being characterised by inflexibility, delays and high costs. This creates a situation where the EU seemingly fails in both the security and humanitarian aspect of its immigration policy directives – as illegal immigration to Europe does not cease to exist in significant numbers and access to asylum procedures and provision of migrants' safety remain insufficient. As it was seen in this part of the research, the EU human rights obligations appear to correspond with its immigration policy in writing – though security themes still overtake human rights themes. But this correspondence is not present in practice – as evidenced by the examined criticism of the international community.

To conclude, this research paper found that the official immigration policies of the EU have been securitised and their correspondence with the EU's human rights values and obligations – while present on paper, is limited in application. Overall, the migrant crisis has shown that the EU faces a serious deficit in structures and institutions necessary to face such a situation with proper

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[211] Huysmans, J. The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration / J. Huysmans // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2000. Vol. 38, №. 5. – P. 758.

[212] Buonfino, A. Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe / A. Buonfino // New Political Science. – 2004. Vol. 26, №. 1. – P. 36.

competence. Integrated structures, legalised institutions and, above all, clear planning and political will seemed to constitute the main requirements in the successful facing of the crisis, but even the funds which the EU offered with generosity seemed to have been implemented with dubious effectiveness. Still, as evidenced by critiques of academics and human rights organisations, the EU tends to prioritise security over humanitarianism. Reports of human rights violations because of – or despite – the EU's immigration policies, remain a frequent phenomenon, with the most recent depictions of the living conditions in Greek refugee camps described with words such as "hell", "prison-like", "appalling" – all of which the EU is aware of, yet the assistance to Greece has not been sufficient enough to improve the situation.

Undoubtedly, the absence of a comprehensive collective EU-level immigration and asylum policy significantly restricts the EU's capability to ensure human rights protections, as well as manage the consequences of the migrant crisis. But the issues of security and humanitarianism are deeply intertwined within the European discourse – especially when it comes to migration. Thus, the effectiveness of the EU's immigration policy in the long run needs to be capable of balancing both aspects of the problem, as only the proper consideration of the human rights dimension can provide policies that are not disadvantageous to the very individuals that represent potential resource for a Europe with an aging population and economic struggles. De-securitisation and the de-escalation of the security rhetoric represents a suitable way to re-install the balance between effectiveness and ethics in European migration management. A positive step towards this direction could be reforms and improvements to the existing EU legal framework on asylum, as well as the Dublin Regulation, in order to improve responsibility distribution for processing of asylum claims, thus making the process faster and more accessible to refugees and asylum seekers – the primary persons whose protection must be guaranteed by international law.

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Appendix – Security Lexicon

Abatement, ABMT, Ghraib, Afghanistan, Aggression, Airland, Airpower, Alliance, Alert, Alqaeda, Ammunition, Amphibious, Anarchy, Antipersonnel, APT, Arab, Arm*, Assassi*, Assault, Atomic, Attack*, Authority, Balance, Ballistic, Battle, Bin Laden, Biogolical, Bipolar*, Blitzkrieg, Block*, Bomb*, Bullet, Capabilit*, Capitulat*, Casualt*, Catastroph*, Ceasefire, Chechnya, Chemical, Clos*, Cluster, Coerc*, Collaps*, Colonial, Combat*, Compel*, Compromise, Concession, Conciliat*, Conflict*, Contain*, Control*, Cooperat*, Counteract*, Countrerinsurgen*, Counterterrorism*, Countervail*, Coup, Crim*, Crisis, Critical, Cybersphere, Cyberwar, Damag*, Danger*, Decisive, Defen*, Demobilis*, Destab*, Destruct*, Detent, Deter*, Dictator, Dilemma*, Disarm*, Disaster*, Disease*, Disintegrat*, Disobedience, Dispute, Division, Domin*, Drugs, Embargo*, Emergency, Enemy, Escalation, Evil, Existential, Expeditionary, Explos*, Extraordinary, Faction, Failed, Fear, Fight*, Firearms, FLN, Forbid*, Force*, Friction, Fundamentali*, Gang, Gaza, Genocide, Globalization, Guerilla, Gulf, Hamas, Hard, Hazard*, Hegemon*, Hezbollah, Hiroshima, Homeland, Hostage, Hussein, Identity, Illegal*, Imminen*, Incumbent, Infiltrat*, Inhuman, Insecur*, Insurgen*, Intelligence, Interdependen*, Interdiction, Interpol, Intervention, Invade*, Invasion, IRA, Iran, Iraq, Israel*, kill*, Kurd*, Landmine, Law*, Lebanon, Liberat*, Libya, Malacca, Militar*, Missile, Munition*, Muslims, Nagasaki, Narcotics, Nationalis*, NATO, Nazi, Netwar, Nonproliferation, Korea, Nuclear, Offensive, Oil, OSCE, Overwhelm*, Pakistan, Palestine, Partisan, Police, Poverty, Power, Preempt*, Proliferat*, Protect*, Puniti*, Racis*, Radical*, Rescue, Resist*, Resolution, Resources, Response, Retaliation, Revenger, Revolution, Rival*, Rogue, Safe, SALT, SALW, Sanction*, Sarin, Scarc*, Seapower, Secur*, Seperatis*, Shock, Shortage*, Somalia, Sovereign*, Stabilis*, State, Strateg*, Strike, Suicide, Superpower, Surge, Surveillance, Syria, Tactic*, Target, Terror*, Threat, Traffic*, Transnational, Uprising, Values, Vietnam, Violen*, Water, Weapon, WMD, Wound*.

* includes all forms of the word with identical lexical basis and meaning (e.g. “attack*” includes “attack”, “attacking”, “attacker”, etc.)

The security lexicon used for this research is the same as the one produced by Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier Sterck in their 2014 work "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims". They based the lexicon on two reference glossaries: the UN Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies and the Palgrave Handbook on Security Studies, slightly modifying it to fit their research on immigration in the EU.