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Научный руководитель:

Дмитрий Сергеевич Евстафьев,

Кандидат экономических наук,

Доцент кафедры европейских исследований

Рецензент:

Акопов Сергей Владимирович,

профессор, Департамент прикладной политологии,

«Национальный исследовательский университет

«Высшая школа экономики»

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Scientific adviser:

Dmitry Sergeyevich Evstafev

Candidate of Economic Sciences

Associate Professor of European Studies

Reviewer:

Akopov Sergey Vladimirovich,

Professor, Department of Applied Political Science,

Saint Petersburg campus of

the Higher School of Economics

Saint Petersburg

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ABSTRACT

Abstract: Research on the specificity in the new infrastructure that support trade between BRICS and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The purpose of the research is to identify the potential and direction trade between BRICS and ASEAN, especially in the context of China-ASEAN, Russia-ASEAN, India-ASEAN and Belt and Road Initiative or BRI. From the research results, it is found that the Silk Road is trade and investment opportunities. For China, the new infrastructure is helping to expand China's influence on the world stage through funding, infrastructure development, and investment with Chinese companies. This is also the way to reduce excess supply in the country by investing in construction materials produced in China to invest in various project partners increasing the role of the renminbi as the world's major currency. The Russian Far East region is a gateway between Europe and Asia, The China-Russia infrastructure construction project can increase trade value. From the point of view of logistics, this route may be a new transportation for ASEAN to penetrate into the Eurasian Economic Union, which uses rail transportation as the main route reducing transportation costs and being faster than before. Besides, The Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) is one of the most important routes for ASEAN to expand trade and investment that India needs to expand its influent in the ASEAN region, the same as china. Currently, many ASEAN governments are loaning from China, in order to invest in building the infrastructure in a very shortage country. The negative impact of cooperation on the new infrastructure is not only an economic relation, but also a geopolitical relation. Therefore, it is considered a sensitive issue in foreign policy, which effect on relations with other Great Powers. However, ASEAN may have to be cautious of Chinese influence. China as an important creditor will hold economic influent with many conditions for the benefit of China solely.

Keywords: BRICS, ASEAN, FTA, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China, Trade, New Infrastructure

АННОТАЦИЯ

Аннотация: Исследование специфики новой инфраструктуры, поддерживающей торговлю между БРИКС и Ассоциацией государств Юго-Восточной Азии (АСЕАН). Целью исследования является выявление потенциала и тенденции торговли между странами БРИКС и АСЕАН, особенно в контексте Китай-АСЕАН, Россия-АСЕАН, Индия-АСЕАН и Инициативы «Пояс и дорога» или BRI. По результатам исследований выяснилось, что Шелковый путь - это торговые и инвестиционные возможности. Для Китая новая инфраструктура помогает расширить влияние страны на мировой арене через финансовую помощь, развитие инфраструктуры и инвестиции в китайских компаниях. Это также способ уменьшить избыточное предложение в стране, инвестируя в строительные материалы, произведенные в Китае, чтобы инвестировать у различных партнеров по проекту, повышая роль юаня как основной мировой валюты. Дальневосточный регион России является воротами между Европой и Азией. Китайско-российский проект строительства инфраструктуры может увеличить динамику торговли. С точки зрения логистики, этот маршрут может стать новым транспортом для АСЕАН, чтобы проникнуть в Евразийский экономический союз, который использует железнодорожные перевозки в качестве основного маршрута, снижая транспортные расходы и будучи быстрее, чем раньше. Кроме того, путь через Бангладеш, Китай, Индию – Экономический коридор Мьянмы (ВСІМ) является одним из наиболее важных маршрутов для АСЕАН по расширению торговли и инвестиций, необходимых Индии для расширения своего влияния в регионе АСЕАН, так же как и в Китае. В настоящее время многие правительства стран АСЕАН берут кредиты у Китая, чтобы инвестировать в строительство инфраструктуры в стране с очень дефицитными ресурсами. Негативное влияние сотрудничества на новую инфраструктуру имеет не только экономическое, но и геополитическое отношение. Поэтому он считается деликатным вопросом во внешней политике, который влияет на отношения с другими великими державами. Тем не менее, АСЕАН, возможно, следует проявлять осторожность в отношении влияния Китая. Китай как важный кредитор будет оказывать экономическое влияние, создавая множество условий исключительно в интересах Китая.

Ключевые слова: БРИКС, АСЕАН, ФТА, один пояс и один путь, Китай, Новая инфраструктура

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INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH BACKGROUND, APPROACH AND STRUCTURE

Introduction

Significance of the Research

For many decades, the five emerging economies known as the BRICS have been playing an important role with developing countries and markets, especially countries in Southeast Asia. BRICS's relations with Southeast Asia is one of the promising relations in Asia and that of the 21st century endowed with strong strategic links in the present-being global economic players, ASEAN is a partner with varied commonality of interests ranging from trade to that of security-both traditional and non-traditional concerns. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 2019 the China's second largest trading partner¹, have been working with political trust, mutual respect and a win-win partnership.² Both countries have attracted trade and investment from all over the world and make the ASEAN-China region as a growth pole. India-ASEAN trade and investment relations have been growing steadily, with India being the ASEAN's sixth largest trading partner³ and have been also working on enhancing private sector engagement, ASEAN India-Business Council (AIBC) as a forum private sectors from India and the ASEAN countries on a single platform for business networking and sharing of ideas. ASEAN and Russia agree that they have potential for enhanced economic cooperation and trade relation, including encouraging the private sector and SMEs of the both sides to explore business opportunities with each other. Bilateral trade between African and ASEAN countries is growing fast, with ASEAN various companies operated in Africa, primarily in manufacturing, oil and urban development. Brazil's efforts strengthen ties between Mercosur and ASEAN, making Latin American countries and Southeast Asia have played a strengthening role.

BRICS has an important role to stimulate global economic in accordance with the current global contexts for increasing participation of developing countries and emerging markets. China has launched

¹ Voice online. อาเซียน แชนหน้าสหรัฐฯ ขึ้นเป็นคู่ค้ารายใหญ่อันดับ 2 ของจีน (Online). (January 15, 2020).

<https://www.voicetv.co.th/read/aRFCV2nwR>, [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

² The State Council Information Office of the People Republic of China, Xinhua. China, ASEAN usher in new era for deeper strategic partnership, wider pragmatic cooperation (Online). (December 26, 2018). http://english.scio.gov.cn/in-depth/2018-12/26/content_74314600.htm, [Accessed November 1, 2019.]

³ EfinanceThai. พาณิชย์ ร่วมลุย FTA อาเซียน อินเดีย หวังการค้าปี 65แตะ 2 แสนล้านดอลลาร์ (Online). (July 18, 2019).

<https://www.efinancethai.com/LastestNews/LatestNewsMain.aspx?release=y&ref=M&id=clZPcWFGGenRoZDQ9>. [Accessed November 1, 2019.]

a dialogue on BRICS Plus in emerging markets and developing countries from five different regions. One of them is Thailand, which is a representative country of Southeast Asia.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is composed of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam which formed on August 8, 1967 with multiple goals— accelerating economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region.⁴ It also aims to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law, under the principles of the United Nations Charter. Asia-Pacific is the fastest growing region for the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) in the world, especially in Southeast Asia. Leading manufacturers of consumer products invest continuously in this region, which has resulted in shipping and logistics sectors benefiting.

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) aims to achieve the ASEAN Community Vision (2025)⁵ that will allow Southeast Asia or ASEAN to be stable, wealthy and be able to compete with other regions. ASEAN plays an important role in transportation links through CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) to China along with "the Belt and Road Initiative or BRI of China". China is promoting Chengdu to be a hub for connecting with important regions of China and connecting with Central Asia. As mention previously, the development of transportation will provide long-term economic benefits to ASEAN for creating economic opportunities for ASEAN through border trade to China and for exporting goods to Central Asia, Europe and other BRICS countries as well. Especially, in the context of South-South cooperation, it is important step for the BRICS to create comprehensive economic cooperation. ASEAN is an important goal of BRICS in expanding cooperation to create benefits in the economy and trade and investment. Various factors, as mentioned above, are therefore important targets for BRICS in expanding cooperation to create benefits in the economy and trade, investment in BRICS.

BRICS has reached out to develop developing countries from each region of the world, which can together create a driving force that benefits the global economy by finding ways to collaborate further by pulling together the potential, diversity and strength that each country has together.

⁴ Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. ก้าเนคอาเซียน (Online). <https://www.asean2019.go.th/th/abouts/birth-of-asean/>, [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

⁵ The AEC Blueprint 2025 seeks to significantly enhance the third characteristic of the AEC Blueprint 2015 on "Equitable Economic Development" by deepening existing elements and incorporating other key elements. (source: asean-thailand.org, <http://www.asean-thailand.org/asean/view.php?cate=&id=165>). [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

Definitions and Objectives

The subject of the research is the new infrastructure that support trade between BRICS and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The purposes of this study were to identify the potential and direction trade between BRICS and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially in the context of China-ASEAN, Russia-ASEAN, India-ASEAN and Belt and Road Initiative or BRI.

Scope of the Research

The research is divided into three parts.

Chapter 1: Genesis of trade relations between BRICS and ASEAN in the context of the world globalization

The researcher focuses on the background of BRICS-ASEAN economic relations, Trade strategy in the framework of the BRICS mechanism, The BRICS role in ASEAN and Trade relations of each BRICS countries in ASEAN. Currently, ASEAN has cooperated with three countries in BRICS (China, Russia and India) as well as cooperation with MERCOSUR, which has Brazil as a member. BRICS has an important role to stimulate global economic in accordance with the current global contexts for increasing participation of developing countries and emerging markets. China has launched a dialogue on BRICS Plus in emerging markets and developing countries from five different regions. One of them is Thailand, which is a representative country of Southeast Asia.

Part 2: ASEAN - BRICS strategy on new infrastructure development infrastructure

The research focuses on ASEAN - BRICS new infrastructure development on Belt and Road Initiative or BRI (especially, China, Russia and each country in ASEAN) in the development of transportation infrastructure. The New Silk Road has a strategic idea of "One belt One Road" policy, one of the important policies of China at present and covering the development and construction of 2 transportation routes: 1) Silk Road Economic Belt is the Silk Road economy by land linked from the west side of China via Central Asia, West Asia (Russia) and to Europe (Austria) and 2) 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is a route connecting from southern China port through Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Africa and the end in Europe (Belgium). The Silk Road is an important strategy in expanding interests between China and countries covering many regions. Especially, ASEAN may become one of the most favorable routes for trade and investment in the future.

Part 3: The analysis

The researcher analyzes the commercial benefits from the development of new transportation foundation divided into three parts: (1) Trade Opportunities and trade cooperation of BRICS in ASEAN (2) Problems and barriers in the development of economic cooperation (3) Development Opportunities in the future of BRICS in ASEAN.

Selection of cases, methodology and approach

In the dissertation, the research was studied and analyzed data as the basis for analyzing and explaining the New Infrastructure to Support Trade between BRICS and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Sources consist of 2 types of data which are primary source and secondary source.

1. Information from the Primary Sources: News reporting information, Official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, statements of the country's leaders, interviews of minister or government releases etc.
2. Sources from Secondary Sources: thesis, political science documents, articles, newspapers, books and related academic documents, information from various electronic media in Thai, English and Russian etc. However, the research is a type of document research.

Data are collected from the two types of data sources mentioned above with the concepts, theories and related researches. In addition, records are used from the study and literature review, collecting and arranging the systematical information. Divided data into 2 parts, which are concepts and theories in the contents of BRICS and ASEAN.

This research is based on the concept of Robert E. Baldwin (1985) that the analysis of the political economy of trade policies combine the framework of The Economic Self-Interest Approach. In the research of the New Infrastructure to Support Trade between BRICS and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The National Interest Policy is based on the fact that every government has a policy to protect the national interest maintaining the country to survive, to secure and to prosperous under the regulations of the balanced world, to be able to maintain honor and prestige in the world community, and to promote the ideological and social structure of the people for the advancement of the country (Evans, Graham and Newnham, Jeffrey, 1998). Nowadays, the world society exists on international relations in a network by strengthening the community in various regions, the organization of membership regulations and the form of Strategic Partnership for cooperation with common goals recognizing mutual benefits (Martinelli, Alberto, 2005). Therefore, national interests have been relating to national policy decisions in relation and to external environments affecting to the country's sovereignty, foreign policies and

domestic factors. Components of national interests consisting of self-preservation, security, well-being, prestige, Ideology and strengthening the power of country (Lerche, Charles O. and Said, Abdul A., 1995).

National interests are an important goal of foreign policy formulation. The national interests may be classified into various dimensions on the basis of different norms for using in policy formulation (Xuetong, Yan, 2006) as following:

1. On the basis of interests, it is divided into political interests, such as security interests, economic interests and cultural interests.

2. On the basis of time, it is divided into constant Interests, such as national survival, safety and variable interests which change according to the environment, such as short-term benefits for 1-2 years, medium-term benefits for 3-10 years and long-term benefits around 10 years and more.

3. On the basis of importance, it is divided into vital interests, such as freedom and extremely importance interests, such as the strategic balance between countries and important interests as economic growth etc.

4. On the basis of the scope, it is divided into universal interests, such as the country's sovereignty and partial interests, such as having a partner country and individual interest (such as modernity of countries that are comparable to other countries, etc.).

These four foundations cover the goals of foreign policy formulation related to nationalization of benefits and build cooperation in the form of strategic partnerships. The strategic partnerships are based on strategy to support the success in the scope that covers widely to time, mechanism, scope, authority, etc.

Overview of Sources and Literature

The trade relations between BRICS and ASEAN is continuously expanding and has the potential for extensive growth becoming one of the important points that not only to the two economic groups, but also to the global community as a whole. In fact, the two economic groups have become an important link in the development of economics and society around the world. The following are the books that the researchers choose to read in order to understand the trade relations and new transportation development of BRICS and ASEAN.

For ASEAN, The AEC Blueprint 2025 seeks to significantly enhance the third characteristic of the AEC Blueprint 2015 on “Equitable Economic Development” by deepening existing elements and incorporating other key elements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2016). ASEAN recognizes that regional economic integration is a dynamic, ongoing process as economies as well as domestic and external environments are constantly evolving (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2016). The main objectives of this characteristic are to enhance economic

connectivity involving various sectors, namely, transport, telecommunication and energy, in line with and in support of the vision and goals of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) and its successor document, as well as to further integrate and cooperate in key sectors that complement existing efforts towards creating an integrated and sustainable economic region, with the aim to maximize their contribution in improving the overall competitiveness of ASEAN and strengthening soft and hard networks in the region (the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of Thammasat university, 2016). In this context, ASEAN has initiated two studies for the AEC Blueprint 2025 by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), as well as inputs from other stakeholders. The measures taken will create a more strongly networked, competitive, innovative and highly integrated ASEAN (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2016). ASEAN Economic Community by 2025 shall be highly integrated and cohesive; competitive, innovative and dynamic; with enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation; and a more resilient, inclusive, and people-oriented, people-centered community integrated with the global economy (KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION ON ASEAN 2025: FORGING AHEAD TOGETHER, 2016).

Southeast Asia, is dealing with low levels of infrastructure development eventually holding back their economy. The developing countries as the foundation and multilateralism are an essential stage for China to reach out to small and middle-range states. The development of Laos and Cambodia under the umbrella of the BRI with the aid of Chinese-led institutions is aimed at sustainable infrastructure capabilities for the host nations. The securing of greater influence in the region, attaining natural resources and access to energy sources, strengthening of the bargaining position on regional disputes and forming of a sub-regional group with Southeast Asian nations for economic cooperation lead to a greater strength of China in the region, which is ultimately a set up to becoming a regional hegemon. The multi-theoretical approach provided a new angle, compared to the existing literature, into the peripheral actions of Beijing. (Martijn Bomas, 2018.)

China and ASEAN as neighbors are linked together by geography and interests. For a better future, they need to frankly express their perspectives to each other and define their common goals and share their agendas in both bilateral and regional affairs (Zhang, 2017). Aimed at promoting regional connectivity and integration, the BRI is based on China's awareness of the fact that poor infrastructure has been a bottleneck for most developing countries. The success of BRI depends on mobilizing resources not only from China and the countries along the road, but also from the rest of the world. Towards this end, China unilaterally set up the Silk Road Fund and founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with other countries. As a new model of win-win cooperation, BRI is not exclusive and welcomes the involvement and support of the world community (Zhang, Y. and Wang, Y., 2017). Besides highlighting the need of developing countries and mobilizing resources to eliminate poverty and

narrow the development gap through BRI, China also plays an active role in the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), the G20, Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and other international institutions. Faced with a slow recovery of the world economy and rising protectionism, China works hard to keep its economy on the right track for restructuring and shows a strong interest in and responsibility for defending the positive trend of globalization against protectionism (Zhu, 2017). As President Xi Jinping remarked, ‘to pursue peaceful development in keeping with the development trend of the times and China’s fundamental interest is a strategic choice made by our party’ (Xi, 2014). Towards this end, while engaging and protecting the existing international system, China also intends to reshape the existing order and promote a new type of international relations based on partnership and cooperation (Ma, 2017). As a big rising power, China will surely play a more active and contributory role in international affairs in the future (Gao, 2014: 18–19). The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) put forward by China is a good example for understanding how China intends to play such a contributive role.⁶

For Russia, Russian strategy and foreign policy on Southeast Asia about what factors are affecting change prior to issuing a guideline that can be seen by Action Theory, the expression of Russian foreign policy has strategic reasons (Ekaterina Koldunova, 2017) based on internal and external factors that are: (1) Internal Russia factors is caused by Russia's strategic approach based on Pragmatism, such as maintaining influence zones and emphasizing regional balance to play an important role as the Great Powers with China and the United States. (2) The external factors of modern Russia will not attach importance to the export of Russian influence, will not focusing on the creation of political ideological and will not in revolute or against Western influences. (3) External factors from modern Russia will focus on principles of cooperation with regional organizations, such as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), ASEAN on the Path of Community, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), etc.

In addition, the dynamics of the Russian policy on relations within each countries of Southeast Asia and the factors of changes on the Great Powers relations, such as the United States and China, have resulting in changes in accelerating relations between Russia and the states and the organizations of Southeast Asia in the form of Multidimensional relationships included economics, society, culture and disputes in the South China Sea driving force. The Great Power Relations, such as Russia - China and Russia - United States have been affecting the creation of economic and political relations with Southeast Asia linked currently to the issues what Russia needs: (1) Russia needs to maintain the economic and

⁶ Muhammad Azizul Haque argued that China’s bid to assume global responsibility is very clear from its endeavours to ensure peace, stability, and development of China and the rest of the world. This is evident in China’s efforts and roles in the proposed establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Bank, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), etc. (Haque, 2014).

political statuses and roles in Asia and Southeast Asia. (2) Russia has to be a partner with China and Vietnam due to issues in (1). (3) Russia has no choice in the role of the South China Sea causing to choose China as a partnership. (4) Russia has considered Southeast Asia as the confrontation area of the United States and China. Because of articles 1-4, Russia has to focus on Southeast Asian and build multilateral cooperation with ASEAN in order to maintain a balanced bilateral political and economic competition. In all ASEAN countries, Vietnam has developed the closest relations with Russia. The Great Power as China, Russia is focusing on building cooperation with China by connecting Vietnam and ASEAN under the Eurasian Economic Cooperation (EAEU) to connect with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The insights into Russia's policy in SEA through the prism of ASEAN prospective plans, traces the increase in bilateral cooperation in Eurasia, and assesses the potential of the ASEAN-EAEU format and its implications for Russia's policy in SEA. Since the establishment of the Russia-ASEAN Full Dialogue Partnership, critics have continuously charged that it is not living up to its true potential (Martynova, 2014; Rangsimaporn, 2009; Sumsy et al., 2012). A fundamental reason has been Russia's failure to coordinate its projects in SEA with ASEAN strategic planning. The latter concentrates mainly upon the narrative of connectivity by embracing three dimensions: physical connectivity, institutional connectivity, and people-to-people connectivity. In the realm of physical connectivity, the Russia-ASEAN relations encounter numerous shortcomings. The key reason is the poor level of transport infrastructure in the Russian Far East and its insufficient integration into the logistics network of the Asia-Pacific region and the high costs of transport services in Russia, as compared to those in the Asia-Pacific countries, also matter. The low throughput capacity of the Russian ports and railways, mainly the Trans-Siberian Railway, as well as the absence of direct flights between large Russian (apart from Moscow) and SEA cities, adds to the Russia-ASEAN physical connectivity deficiencies. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the Russia-ASEAN total trade in goods accounted that is dramatically lower than the corresponding exchanges between ASEAN and its other dialogue partners. The institutional realm of connectivity is presented by the structures of the Russia-ASEAN Full Dialogue Partnership. The main platforms are the Russia-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), the ASEAN-Russia Joint Cooperation Committee (ARJCC), the ASEAN-Russia Joint Planning and Management Committee (ARJPMC), the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership Financial Fund (ARDPFF), the ASEAN-Russia Business Council (ARBC), the ASEAN-Russia Working Group on Science and Technology (ARWGST), and the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs 1) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016). This multidivisional organizational structure, however, does little to unlock the true potential of the Russia-ASEAN cooperation and allows it only to maintain contacts at the level of reasonable sufficiency. (Evgeny Kanaev and Alexander Korolev, 2018)

For India, the free trade in goods agreement signed between India and ASEAN in 2009 has also facilitated the development of supply chains and production networks in many products such as electronics and automobiles, including vehicle and component manufacturing. However, there remain certain challenges to establishing a supply chain, such as non-tariff barriers, poor connectivity, and quality of infrastructure, among others. ASEAN is an important Indian important trading partner. The fulfillment of commitments under the FACEP is essential for strengthening the trust and ties between both the parties. Of course, a formal structure for economic cooperation has been put in place through the FACEP package. However, FACEP must not be seen as an instrument of economic cooperation alone, but should be seen as a strategic platform for wider engagement with South East Asian countries. The vision statement gives direction for further intensification of cooperation in the spheres of politico-security, economic, social, cultural, and connectivity pillars through specific concrete measures. ASEAN members and India share a vision of a peaceful, prosperous, resurgent Asia, which will contribute to global peace and security. Further, for ASEAN, India may not only prove to be a reliable partner, but also a co-investor of political and economic stability in the region. (R. Rajesh Babu, 2013)

For Brazil, the effects of integration in the case of ASEAN and MERCOSUR showed a challenge for creators of a more just regional policy model, as well as those in the process of integration, how to create a more equitable distribution model through the integration of created wealth, and how to apply the created model for the purpose of realizing the goals of regional policy. This confirms once again that an appropriate level of competitiveness of the domestic economy needs to be developed before integration, so that the economy can deal with competing forces at the level of integration rather than go into integrative processes at all costs. (Hasan Mahmutović, 2018)

Much progress has been made for BRICS after 7 years development. The establishment of the NDB is the most important achievement. So far, the status of all five members is equal and their rights, positions, and interests are well distributed and balanced in the power structure of the group. They appear to be gaining interests in upgrading and advancing this group in the international arena and expecting their rights to be much equally represented and voices to be better heard in international organizations. However, as we have seen, various internal factors prevent it from developing as a powerful economic group. The future prospects for the BRICS depends on its institutionalization, the successful investment of infrastructure from the NDB and the bank's improved governing structure and profitable operation, the adoption of systemic reform measures of relaxing the supply-side restrictions and constraints in the governmental regulations in terms of innovation and high-upper supply (Liu Ming, Pacific Review, 2016.).

China is unequivocally the “Leading Giant” of BRICS Group. The rapid economic growth and expansion of influence throughout the whole Asian region inspires and accelerates the other BRICS economies development. The countries are believed to catch-up Chinese growth- strategies and

technologies. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from China are also very important. This paper focuses on China's gains, her current position of a "Leading Giant" in Asian region, her goals, obstructions and indispensability within BRICS. Economic activities in these countries also have significant ramifications on the rest of the world, considering their enormous economic strength and their contribution towards world GDP growth. Finally, the BRICS countries have been globally integrating through trade and financial undertakings as they continue to play a significant role in the global economy. (Maxwell, Z. Shamase, 2017)

The main is the role BRICS countries have played in the formation of regional (free) trade agreements. Recent developments and directions were taken by the BRICS countries either individually or in aligning with each other at the regional and mega-regional levels. The Challenge of BRIC Multinationals. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. The recent feasibility of RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region, the BRICS economies are trying to figure out how to counter-balance these moves of the west economies. China is the economy which is getting affected the most by these Mega-RTAs and it has made various strategic cooperation strategy to counter these RTA's impact. China, at present, is engaged in actively pushing for its own FTA strategy. Following the phrase 'close neighbours are better than distant relatives' China has concentrated in improving their relation with Asian economies (Wen Jin Yuan, 2012).

For a thorough understanding of the BRICS strategy. Usually comprehensive in character and content, the structural features of the nascent BRICS Plus as a new model in international economic relations, focus on the potential of the BRICS Plus for development finance, connectivity and financial stability. This potential, in turn, materializes, first, through cooperation among regional development banks and funds, including the NDB, and, second, through cooperation among RFAs (referred to as the BRICS CRA+). The concluding section looks at the rationale of the BRICS Plus framework and its consequences for the global economic architecture and the future of regionalism. It makes policy proposals for cooperation of the BRICS with partners within the BRICS Plus framework, as well as with international economic organizations (Yaroslav Lissovolika and Evgeny Vinokurov, 2018).

CHAPTER I

1. Genesis of trade relations between BRICS and ASEAN in the context of the world globalization

At the regional and the global levels, international cooperation and organization all have affected on the process of movement for the world system under the framework of developed globalization. These international organizations are collaborating with the interests of each member country under the chaos that the interests of each nation are important in the global political arena, such as BRICS and ASEAN.

1.1 Background of BRICS-ASEAN relations

Nowadays, free trade and international investment, considered the heart of the world economic growth, play an important role. Especially in BRICS countries, the high-growth countries consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has been expanded their trade balance, including countries in ASEAN as well. However, the negotiations on collective free trade agreements (FTAs) are difficult because the integration of the BRICS countries does not have a bound form compared to the Customs Union, the Common Market, the Economic Union or the Northern Union with each different characteristics and limitations country in BRICS. FTAs by country seem to be more appropriate in this context. In this regard, ASEAN has negotiated or has reached an agreement FTA with some countries in the BRICS countries, such as India and China. ASEAN is pushing for trade negotiations with India and open negotiations with Brazil, Russia and South Africa to achieve FTA with all of BRICS countries. Emerging and developing economies can coordinate and effectively use the International Financial Architecture to address common concerns. The Group of 20 (G20) can be a particularly useful platform for this. In addition, BRICS has made rapid strides in burden sharing and financial integration towards a more robust global economy.

Over the past 50 years, since the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on August 8, 1967, according to the Bangkok Declaration.⁷ ASEAN has moved towards

⁷ Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. กำเนิดอาเซียน (Online). <https://www.asean2019.go.th/th/abouts/birth-of-asean/>, [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

becoming an ASEAN Community in 2015⁸ and ASEAN has developed continuously by accelerating the strengthening of the connections between each country in physical geography, regulations and citizens in order to make ASEAN a truly unified community. ASEAN has expanded relations and supported cooperation with ASEAN External Relations to support the creation of the ASEAN Community and to encourage the Great Powers to interact with ASEAN creatively by focusing on the maintenance of ASEAN centrality in regional architecture, under the framework of the ASEAN PLUS THREE, East Asia Summit and related summits as well as relations with dialogue partnerships and other external parties, with the unique attitude of ASEAN to promote the role and safeguard of ASEAN interests.⁹

Currently, ASEAN has close relationships with 10 Dialogue Partners consisting of 9 countries and 1 Regional organization which are ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Australia, ASEAN-New Zealand, ASEAN-USA, ASEAN-Canada, ASEAN-Republic of Korea, ASEAN-India, ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Russia and ASEAN-European Union (EU).¹⁰ In addition, in accordance with Article 44 of the ASEAN Charter¹¹, ASEAN interacts with other external parties, such as Sectoral Dialogue Partners (Pakistan, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey), development partners (Germany) and Papua New Guinea as an ASEAN Special Observer. Relations and cooperation with these external partnerships, aside from helping to strengthen peace and promote economic development in the region, also help to solve challenges together in problems caused by climate change, Natural disaster, Terrorism and transnational crime to enhance the quality of life of people through cooperation in education, public health and sustainable development.

General relations between ASEAN-Russia

Russia was granted the status of Dialogue Partnership in 1996 and most recently received the status of Strategic Partnership at the 33rd ASEAN Summit in 2018. ASEAN and Russia have organized 3 summits (the 1st in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, the 2nd in 2010 in Hanoi and the 3rd on November 14 in Singapore) and a special ASEAN-Russia summit (Commemorative Summit) on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the ASEAN-Russian relations in 2016 in Sochi, Russian Federation. Russia joined the

⁸ Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. กำเนิดอาเซียน (Online).

<https://www.asean2019.go.th/th/abouts/birth-of-asean/>, [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

⁹ A proposal by the BRICS Think Tanks Council. TOWARDS A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR BRICS (online). (2015). http://www.nkibrics.ru/ckeditor_assets/attachments/55cca92662726921aa020000/na_puti_k_dolgosrochnoy_strategii_stran_briks_angl.pdf?1439476006. [Accessed April 4, 2020.]

¹⁰ Aasean.org. Free Trade Agreements with Dialogue Partners (online). <https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/free-trade-agreements-with-dialogue-partners/>. [Accessed April 4, 2020.]

¹¹ Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. CHARTER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (online). <http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/contents/files/asean-media-center-20121203-180519-958411.pdf>. [Accessed April 4, 2020.]

High Commissioner for the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) on November 29, 2004.

In political and security dimensions, Russia interacts with ASEAN in various cooperation frameworks, including ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) PMC+1, ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus), Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) + Russia, and East Asia Summit (EAS). The issues that ASEAN and Russia attach importance to are cyber security and counter-terrorism. In addition, Russia has also tried other actions to demonstrate its intention to strengthen ASEAN-Russia relations, including the establishment of the Russian Permanent Representative to ASEAN in Jakarta, and the appointment of the ambassador to the Russian Permanent Representative to ASEAN (Currently Mr. Alexander Ivanov). The 3rd ASEAN-Russia Summit on November 4, 2018¹², the meeting announced the improvement of relations between ASEAN and Russia as a Strategic Partner and certified 3 documents, including: (1) Joint ASEAN-Russia Leader's Statement on the Occasion of the Third ASEAN-Russia Summit: Moving Towards a Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit (2) Memorandum of Understanding between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Eurasian Economic Commission on Economic Cooperation to promote economic cooperation (3) Statement on ASEAN and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. In addition, both sides agreed to promote cooperation to drive the implementation of the ASEAN-Russia Comprehensive Plan of Action 2016-2020, as well as the expansion of cooperation between ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). ASEAN Defense Ministers 'Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), Thailand and Russia are co-chair of the Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine in 2014-2016 to establish the ASEAN Center of Military Medicine: ACMM and on April 7, 2016¹³, General Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan presided over the official ACMM opening ceremony.¹⁴ ACCM held the 1st Board of Directors meeting of the ACMM on August 1-5, 2016.¹⁵

In economic dimension, the main channels of economic cooperation between ASEAN and Russia are the ASEAN-Russia Business Council and the Eastern Economic Forum, held regularly in September of every year in Vladivostok. Trades between ASEAN and Russia in 2017 totaled approximately 16.7

¹² Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN – Russian Federation Summit on Strategic Partnership(online). (November 14, 2018). <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5360>. [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

¹³ Tanongsak Rongtim, Deputy Director, Joint of Intelligence, Royal Thai Armed Forces. AEAN Center of Military Medicine: the important role of the Royal Thai Armed Forces in Global Community (online). http://www.dsdw2016.dsdw.go.th/doc_pr/ndc_2560-2561/PDF/8407p/8407พลตรี%20ทงศักดิ์%20รองทิม.pdf. [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

¹⁴ MRG ONLINE. ประวัตร” เปิด AM-HEX 2016 มี 18 ชาดิร่วม ฝึกแพทยทหาร-ทีมช่วยภัยพิบัติ (online). (September 5, 2016). <https://mgronline.com/politics/detail/9590000089039>. [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

¹⁵ MRG ONLINE. ประวัตร” เปิด AM-HEX 2016 มี 18 ชาดิร่วม ฝึกแพทยทหาร-ทีมช่วยภัยพิบัติ (online). (September 5, 2016). <https://mgronline.com/politics/detail/9590000089039>. [Accessed March 1, 2020.]

billion US dollars increased by about 40 percent by 2016.¹⁶ Thailand is the 4th trading partner after Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia respectively. The main products that Russia exported to ASEAN are fuels and petroleum, minerals, grains, iron and steel, and the main products that Russia import to ASEAN are electric machineries, electrical equipment and components, nuclear reactors, boilers, animal fats and oils obtained from animals or plants, boats and floating buildings, rubbers and articles of rubber. In addition, ASEAN intends to promote trade cooperation enhancing familiarity between ASEAN and the EAEU by establishing a MOU between the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) and ASEAN, which was signed during the 3rd ASEAN-Russia Summit on November 14, 2018 in Singapore.¹⁷ The MOU will promote economic cooperation, trade and investment in fields such as customs clearance and trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, standards, technical regulations and inspection processes, certification for investment and development of MSMEs etc.

In social and cultural dimensions, Russia attaches great importance to promoting ASEAN-Russia relations at a public-to-people level through the activities of the ASEAN Center located at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). By declaring 2016 as the Year (ASEAN-Russia Year of Culture 2016)¹⁸ and organized activities, such as the 4th ASEAN-Russia Youth Summit on October 25-26, 2016 in Siem Reap, the 1st ASEAN-Russia University Forum in Vladivostok in September 2016 and the ASEAN-Russia Youth Symphony Orchestra in April 2017 in Vientiane. In addition, Russia has hosted the 1st Conference of Young Diplomats of Asia-Pacific between September 11-13, 2018 in Vladivostok, which is the same as the 4th Eastern Economic Forum. ASEAN and Russia have established the ASEAN-Russia Working Group on Education and have organized the 1st Working Group during the 10th ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting and other related meetings in Naypyidaw on October 28 - November 1, 2018. In addition, ASEAN and Russia have implemented ASEAN-Russian Plan of Action on Science Technology and Innovation (ARPASTI) 2016-2025 by giving importance to the promotion of connections between people, national institute, science and technology, education, tourism, health and cultures.

¹⁶ ASEAN Secretariat News. Joint Media Statement of The Seventh AEM-Russia Consultations (online). (September 1, 2018). <https://asean.org/joint-media-statement-seventh-aem-russia-consultations/>. [Accessed March 21, 2020.]

¹⁷ ASEAN Secretariat News. ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic Commission sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Economic Cooperation (online). (November 21st, 2018). <https://asean.org/asean-eurasian-economic-commission-sign-memorandum-understanding-economic-cooperation/>. [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

¹⁸ ASEAN Secretariat News. ASEAN, Russia to broaden cultural ties (online). (May 19th, 2016). <https://asean.org/asean-russia-broaden-cultural-ties/>. [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

General relations between ASEAN-China

ASEAN-China has been a Dialogue Partner since 1997.¹⁹ China was elevated to the Strategic partnership and the 10th year anniversary. ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Relations in 2013, during which Thailand served as the ASEAN-China Relations Coordinator, and the 25th anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations in 2016, and the 15th anniversary of the ASEAN-China strategic partnership in 2018.²⁰ ASEAN and China have cooperation covering 12 major branches, which are (1) Agriculture (2) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) (3) Human Resources Development (4) Mekong Basin Development (5) Investment (6) Energy (7) Transportation (8) Culture (9) Public health (10) Tourism (11) Environment and (12) Industry which China is driving to take advantage of China's progress in the industries to support the development of ASEAN countries.

In political and in security dimensions, China is ASEAN's first dialogue partner on The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) during the 7th ASEAN-China Summit on October 2003 in Bali and is also the first country to show readiness to sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The government under the leadership of President Xi Jinping attaches importance to the development of relations with ASEAN by adhering to 3 principles which are: (1) Developing friendly relations and giving priority to ASEAN in the implementation of China's foreign policy (2) Develop a more comprehensive and deeper strategic partnership between ASEAN and China (3) Resolving disputes in the South China Sea with some ASEAN member countries through friendly dialogue through equal and mutually beneficial discussions.²¹ About the disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN-China has a mechanism for Joint Working Group on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (JWG-DOC) and Senior Officials Meeting on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (SOM-DOC) to promote cooperation and strengthening trust, to prevent from expanding conflicts and to create a favorable atmosphere for peaceful resolution. Both sides have encouraged the full and the efficient implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and have expedited negotiations for the Code of Conduct (COC) to be completed rapidly. Recently, the ASEAN-China Foreign Minister's Meeting on August 2, 2018 in Singapore announced the use of Single Draft COC Negotiating Text as a basis for negotiations for the preparation of the COC and the 21st ASEAN-China Summit on November 14, 2019 will announce that the Leaders looked forward to the completion of the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating

¹⁹ ASEAN-China Centre. ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS (online). (2020-03-13). <http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2020-03/4613.html>. [Accessed April 1, 2020.]

²⁰ ASEAN-China Centre. ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS (online). (2020-03-13). <http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2020-03/4613.html>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand. ความสัมพันธ์อาเซียน-จีน <http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/contents/files/partnership-20170418-133335-058032.pdf>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

Text by 2019. In addition, China will propose that ASEAN and China negotiate to complete the COC within 3 years (2019-2021).

In economic dimension, China is the number one of trading partner of ASEAN in the past 3 years, China-ASEAN trade volume reached 514.8 billion US dollars with a year-on-year increase of 13.8 percent.²² China exported 279.1 billion US dollars' worth of goods to ASEAN, up nine percent a year-on-year, and imported goods worth 235.7 billion US dollars, an increase of 20 percent on an annual basis.²³ For Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2015, there was a direct investment from China in ASEAN worth 8,200 million US dollars, which is ranked No. 4 of the partner countries.²⁴ China is the first negotiating country that proposes to establish a free trade area with ASEAN. Both sides signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in November 2002. Later, at the 16th ASEAN-China Summit on October 2013, Bandar Seri Begawan agreed to raise the level of ASEAN-China FTA: ACFTA to facilitate trade and investment between them. ASEAN and China have opened branch offices of the ASEAN-China Trade and Economic Promotion Association in Yiwu and Wenzhou, in Zhejiang, under the framework of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area on January 6, 2011, which is considered as the first private-sector cooperation.

In social and in cultural dimensions, China supports ASEAN's efforts to bridge the development gap through the implementation of a collaborative project under the concept of Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) and Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP EAGA). Recently, China has pushed for the establishment of the Mekong-Lan Chang Cooperation framework, which covers 3 branches in ASEAN as follows: (1) Politics and security (2) Economy and sustainable development and (3) Society, culture and interaction between people. For education Cooperation, China has established 10 vocational and training centers for ASEAN in 6 provinces of China (Guangxi, Yunnan, Fujian, Sichuan, Guizhou and Heilongjiang). China will increase the amount of scholarships for ASEAN member countries and promote the exchange of 100,000 students by 2020.²⁵ At the 18th ASEAN and China Summit, in 2016 was considered that is a year of educational exchanges. Public Health Cooperation, During the ASEAN-China Minister of Public Health Meeting on July 6, 2012 in Phuket, a memorandum of understanding was signed on the ASEAN-China Public Health Cooperation. For science and technology, ASEAN-China held the first Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology on September 22, 2012 in Nanning.

²² CGTN. China-ASEAN in numbers: Trade ties (online). (September 11, 2018).

<https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414e3145544d7a457a6333566d54/sharep.html>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

²³ CGTN. China-ASEAN in numbers: Trade ties (online). (September 11, 2018).

https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414e3145544d7a457a6333566d54/share_p.html. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

²⁴ Asean.org. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics (online). https://asean.org/?static_post=foreign-direct-investment-statistics. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

²⁵ ASEAN Information Center. (May 3, 2017). http://www.aseanhai.net/mobile_detail.php?cid=4&nid=7156. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

China has proposed the China-ASEAN Science and Technology Partnership Program (STEP) to develop science cooperation.

General relations between ASEAN-India

ASEAN and India began the formal relations in 1992 as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner and completely upgraded to a Dialogue Partner in 1995. ASEAN upgraded relations with India to a Strategic Partnership in 2012 at the special ASEAN-India Summit on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of ASEAN-India relations. On January 25, 2018, India hosted the ASEAN-India Summit on the 25th anniversary of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit in New Delhi. The meeting endorsed the Delhi Declaration, which documents are the outcomes of the meeting in significant enhancing ASEAN-India cooperation in all dimensions connecting and reducing development gaps and looking forward to expanding relationships. On August, 3 2018, Thailand took over the 3-year ASEAN-India Relations Coordinator from Vietnam for a period of 3 years (Agenda 2018-2021) and on November 15, 2018, Singapore hosted the ASEAN- India Informal Breakfast Summit.

In political and in security dimensions, ASEAN and India attach importance to counter-terrorism, maritime security cooperation and the development of the Indo-Pacific concepts to achieve security and stability in the region. India participated in the ASEAN Conference on Political and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (ARF) and adopted the Joint Statement with ASEAN on the International Counter-Terrorism in 2015. In addition, in 2003, India became a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and participated in the East Asia Summit (EAS). Cooperation in the security dimension with India will help ASEAN to cope with various security challenges and result in regional stability and security, peace, and security.

In economic dimension, India is the 6th largest trading partner and the 7th investment partner in ASEAN.²⁶ The total trade value between ASEAN-India in 2017 was 71 billion US dollars²⁷, with ASEAN exported 31 billion US dollars and 40 billion US dollars imports from India.²⁸ ASEAN and India aim to expand the value of trade and investment of both sides to achieve mutual trade goals of 200 billion US dollars by 2022 through the utilization of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement, such as

²⁶ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India- ASEAN Relations. (August, 2018). <https://mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

²⁷ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 15th ASEAN-India Summit and 12th East Asia Summit in Manila, Philippines. (November 7, 2017), <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29102/15th+ASEANIndia+Summit+and+12th+East+Asia+Summit+in+Manila+Philippines+November+14+2017>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

²⁸The Economic Times. Full implementation of India, Asean FTA to boost trade. (Jan 23, 2018). <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/full-implementation-of-india-asean-fta-to-boost-trade/articleshow/62618818.cms>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

the fully developing the capabilities of both sides of the MSMEs by leveraging technology and the digital economy, and supporting the resolutions of the 2nd RCEP meeting commitment to conclude negotiations for an agreement RCEP in 2019. India places great importance on the blue economy to promote the efficient and sustainable use of marine resources. ASEAN and India have signed Free Trade Agreement on Trade in Services and Investment Effective on July 1, 2015. ASEAN and India attach importance to all-round connectivity by land, boat and air, especially in Thailand - Myanmar - India highway projects and expanding the route to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. India has sponsored line of credit about 1 billion US dollars for ASEAN Member States to support the ASEAN Digital Linked Program. Economic cooperation between ASEAN and India will help promote economic development in the region, affecting the economic development and well-being of ASEAN citizens.

In social and in cultural dimensions, both sides pay attention to the connection of civilization and culture between each other by organizing cultural activities and regularly carrying out programs and exchanges at the public level, such as youths, reporters, politicians and diplomats exchange programs etc. India is cooperating in the narrowing development gap in ASEAN by establishing English language training centers in CLMV countries, as well as promoting cooperation with ASEAN in potential areas in India such as information technology science, medicine and pharmaceuticals. The ASEAN-India Science and Technology Fund has been set up in 2016 to develop scientific and IT cooperation, and the ASEAN-India Green Fund to support activities to promote adaptation and mitigation of climate change in the region. In addition, India also has cooperation with ASEAN in other fields such as the development of traditional medicine, funding training for Ayurveda for ASEAN personnel and pharmaceutical production, etc. For the connection between people, India has organized an annual exchange program between many groups of people, including students, reporters, politicians and diplomats. ASEAN will get benefit from the ASEAN-India cooperation program on issues such as education, innovation and science, and ICT, developed ASEAN's human resources to be ready to create a network between people and to deal rapidly with the world changing dynamics.

1.2 Trade strategy in ASEAN under the framework of the BRICS mechanism.

China in particular is building new development institutions (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – AIIB), mega-regional projects (‘One Belt One Road’), as well as new economic alliances across the globe.²⁹ BRICS Plus is a model for cooperation between emerging economies and developing

²⁹World Economic Forum. BRICS-plus: Alternative globalization in the making?. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/brics-plus-an-alternative-to-globalization-in-the-making/>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

countries that BRICS Plus will help to develop economies from different regions participated in negotiations and consultations. In addition, BRICS will cover more economic areas on a global level when compared to other platforms. Emerging and other developing economies are increasingly reaching a role in regional and international economies, especially in global governance. Over the past two decades, merging economic countries has been the most important mechanism on global economic growth which the economic growth rates are higher than developed countries. This kind of framework may be realized through China's initiative to create a BRICS Plus circle that according to China's foreign minister Wang Yi will represent a new platform for the South-South cooperation via holding dialogues with other major developing countries or groups of developing countries to establish a more extensive partnership.³⁰ The new BRICS Plus initiative is coming not just at the right time as the BRICS is seeking to find new gateways to development, but it will also perhaps be one of the first truly global undertakings of the developing world in shaping a new, more balanced economic order. This in turn is made possible due to the unique nature of the BRICS, which is represented by one or several major powers in virtually every continent of the developing world.³¹

The 9th BRICS Leadership Conference was held from September 3-5, 2018 in Xiamen, China. China once again had the opportunity to welcome the BRICS leaders after hosting the BRICS Leadership Conference in China in 2011. President Xi Jinping met with BRICS leaders on various issues, such as promoting concrete cooperation in depth, cultural exchange, and the push for creating mechanism and cooperation system, etc., which is a reinforcement to drive the new economy, to enhance global governance and send good signals to protect world peace and stability to foster in-depth BRICS partnership relationships. In the past 10 years, the cooperation mechanism of the BRICS countries has expanded from economic cooperation to politics, society and culture and has formed a collaborative structure that covers widely on several dimensions and levels. Meanwhile, BRICS, closed cooperation with the United Nations, G20 and other international organizations, has played an important role in strengthening unity and protecting the interests of developing countries and proposing ideas and strategies to deal with important issues and global challenges. The BRICS countries become a major force in driving the global economy, driving reforms and organizing the new world order, and protection of world peace and stability.

BRICS Plus is an extension of the cooperation between the development banks and other development institutions created by BRICS, including the Economic Development Board (EDB), the

³⁰ World Economic Forum. BRICS-plus: Alternative globalization in the making?. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/brics-plus-an-alternative-to-globalization-in-the-making/>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

³¹ World Economic Forum. BRICS-plus: Alternative globalization in the making?. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/brics-plus-an-alternative-to-globalization-in-the-making/>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the SAARC Development Fund (SDF), the Structural Convergence Fund of Mercosur (FOCEM), China Development Bank (CDB), The China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund (CAF), and New Development Bank (NDB). The NDB may coordinate the BRICS initiatives, while the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) may play a role which can act as a platform to collect funds from Developing countries and developed countries within the network of regional development institutions, cooperation may be targeted in venture capital projects, including initiatives and programs aimed at achieving significant development goals.

Thus, rather than expanding the core set of BRICS members, the BRICS initiative seeks to create a new platform for forging regional and bilateral alliances across continents and aims at bringing together the regional integration blocks, in which BRICS economies play a leading role.³² Accordingly, the main regional integration blocks that could form the BRICS platform include Mercosur, South African Customs Union (SACU), EEU, SAARC, as well as the China-ASEAN FTA.³³ Altogether, in such a setting 35 countries form the BRICS circle: SACU (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland), SAARC (SAFTA members: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), China-ASEAN FTA (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia), EEU (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) and Mercosur (core members as well as acceding members: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Venezuela).³⁴

Today, the BRICS cooperation will not only benefit 5 BRICS countries, but also play an important role on a global level. Encouragement of unity between emerging markets and developing countries with the BRICS platform is consistent with the common interests of all countries. Therefore, the Chinese side has reviewed the past experience and proposed the BRICS concept to drive and create innovation with more extensive partnership relations. During the BRICS Leadership Meeting, China also invited Thailand, Mexico, Tajikistan, Egypt, and Guinea to negotiate with BRICS to plan cooperation between emerging countries and developing countries. This negotiation meeting had an important topic of Expand cooperation in mutual depth benefits to promote common development and discussed important issues such as follows the sustainable development agenda and strengthen the relationship of partners in the wide development, etc. After the meeting, the Chinese side declared a statement to summarize the resolution of the meeting on issues of sustainable development agenda, strengthening southern-southern cooperated relationships, and the world economic governance, etc. This

³² Yaroslav Lissovlik. BRICS-PLUS: ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION IN THE MAKING?. Russia in Global Affairs. <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/brics-plus-alternative-globalization-in-the-making/>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

³³ Yaroslav Lissovlik. BRICS-PLUS: ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION IN THE MAKING?. Russia in Global Affairs. <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/brics-plus-alternative-globalization-in-the-making/>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

³⁴ Yaroslav Lissovlik. BRICS-PLUS: ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION IN THE MAKING?. Russia in Global Affairs. <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/brics-plus-alternative-globalization-in-the-making/>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

negotiation can reflect the spirit of BRICS, emphasize on win-win cooperation, expand the network, integrate emerging and developing countries, aim to solve the global development problems and support the creation of the new powerful global south-south cooperation platform.

Thailand, an important country in Southeast Asia and an important role on a global and regional levels, is an enthusiastic participant and international advocate. In addition, Thailand is also a good neighboring country of China. "China - Thailand is not another distant brotherhood" is a common understanding of people from all circles of both countries and is the main stream of development of Chinese-Thai relations. The Chinese side invites Thailand to participate in the negotiation meeting as the only representative in the Southeast Asia region, reflecting that the Chinese side attaches great importance to the relationship between China-Thailand and the role of Thailand on the world stage. The Chinese side welcomed the comments and suggestions regarding the beneficial BRICS cooperation from the Thai side in the negotiation meeting and witnessed the signing of the relevant cooperation documents. This meeting is useful for encouragement in the all-round strategic partnership between China and Thailand to another development level. The Sino-Thai relations have entered a critical period in which quality must be upgraded to another level. The Chinese side is willing to work closely with the Thai to strengthen strategic links, such as Thailand 4.0, the Special Economic Corridor of the Eastern region of Thailand, establishment as a sincere partnership and participate in the process of China-Thai railway³⁵ development as a symbolic project of mutual cooperation that is beneficial to each other and is an important element in creating connectivity in the region under "One Belt, One Road", which not only plays an important part in driving the Thai economy, but also add the Thailand status as a regional transportation hub and also be a model for cooperation in other fields between China and Thailand in the future.

1.3 Trade relations of each BRICS countries in ASEAN

Russia-ASEAN

Russia fully supports multilateral trading systems based on regulations in the WTO. Although ASEAN does not have a free trade area with Russia, the trade dynamics of both sides are substantially positive. ASEAN and Russia have adhered to principles of international acceptance and international law. ASEAN important instruments and principles are the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Bali Principles, and ASEAN's Core Norms, as well as support ASEAN Community

³⁵ Yaroslav Lissovlik. BRICS-PLUS: ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION IN THE MAKING?. Russia in Global Affairs. <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/brics-plus-alternative-globalization-in-the-making/>. [Accessed April 5, 2020.]

with an important goal of working together as future strategic partners, taking advantages of closed cooperation in many dimensions, and connecting with other regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.

In general, Russia hopes to play a role in the promoting regional security by supporting ASEAN Centrality and strategic partnership based on both sides in the mutual interests and strategic links within and between regions. Both sides agreed to propose to set a trade target approximately a billion US dollars by 2025³⁶, the feasibility study of a free trade area between ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic Union, the participation in the Russian regional trade alliance agreement, and the establishment of the ASEAN-Russia Committee (ASEAN-Russia Panel) to develop cooperation strategies on energy and food security as Thai proposed.³⁷

Regarding the economy, both of them have focused on increasing trade and investment value between ASEAN and Russia and strengthening the capacity of entrepreneurs, especially small-sized and medium-sized enterprises, focusing on the role of technology innovation and personnel exchanges. Russia proposes to establish a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and ASEAN as well as promoting economic partnership between ASEAN and The Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as the China Silk Road Project. In Thailand, there is stressed the importance of eliminating trade barriers in non-tax obstacles, promoting the role of the private sectors and the exploiting advantages of each country. In addition, Thailand also supports ASEAN-Russia cooperation in food security and sustainable developments.

On the 20th anniversary of the ASEAN-Russia relations ASEAN leaders officially visited Russia to attend the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit between 19-21 May 2016 which is considered a good opportunity to develop relationships to meet the interests of both sides. Leaders in each country have discussed various issues, security in the region, dealing with new challenges as well as the development of cooperation between ASEAN-Russia in many dimensions such as education, communication and energy led to the joint signing of the Sochi Declaration and adopted a comprehensive action plan to promote ASEAN-Russia cooperation between 2016 - 2020. The conference was an attempt by Russia to strengthen domestic and international economic stabilities. Due to the past The Russian economy is often tied to the Europe economies and other Western countries, resulting in The Russian economy when the European economy is a stagnation and experiencing problems. President Putin considered that the one way to solve the problem is to implement the policy "Turn to the East", focusing

³⁶ Department of ASEAN Affairs | การประชุมกลุ่มผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิดูอาเซียน-รัสเซีย ครั้งที่ 2. (April 8, 2559). <http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/th/news/2352/66169-การประชุมกลุ่มผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิดูอาเซียน-รัสเซีย-ครั้งที่2.html>. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

³⁷ Department of ASEAN Affairs | การประชุมกลุ่มผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิดูอาเซียน-รัสเซีย ครั้งที่ 2. (April 8, 2559). <http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/th/news/2352/66169-การประชุมกลุ่มผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิดูอาเซียน-รัสเซีย-ครั้งที่2.html>. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

on Southeast Asia as a group of countries with rapid economic growth and abundant natural resources. In the past, even though Russia and ASEAN have operated diplomatic relations for 20 years, those relations are only superficial. This extraordinary ASEAN-Russia summit took place as an important step in developing closer relations to achieve the main goal of increasing trade stability for their countries.

Analyst from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore commented that although the Russian policy has turned attention back to the Eastern countries, Russia is still unable to play a more economic role in Southeast Asia. The trade network between Russia and ASEAN is mainly limited to the trade in weapons and nuclear technologies.³⁸

If considering bilateral relations between Russia and some countries in ASEAN will find a long-relationship, such as the relationship between Thailand and Russia that began in the year 1897 with King Chulalongkorn and King Nicholas II, as well as keeping a distance during the Cold War, while Russia was very close to Vietnam during that period and continues to be affected after the Cold War era that can be seen from the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Vietnam and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) led by Russia.

On the occasion of the 120th anniversary of the Thai-Russian diplomatic relations in 2017, the Ministry of Culture of both prepared an event for celebrating in Bangkok, Moscow and St. Petersburg which Russia plans to establish the Russian Cultural Center in Bangkok. In addition, they agreed to increase trade value between them by opening markets for various products and supporting cooperation between the private sectors through the Sister Cities for Commercial Cooperation project. This authorities has invited Russian businessmen to invest in the Rubber City project and other projects in the special economic zone. Meanwhile, the Russian side has invited Thai private sectors to invest in the new Far-Eastern Economic Zone of Russia, especially in the food and agricultural sectors.

The 11th ASEAN-Russia Senior Officials Meeting, hosted by Thailand on July 17, 2019 in Bangkok, has followed up on the progress of the implementation of the Trade and Investment Cooperation Plan 2017, in which there are various types of activities. Including policy discussions between high-level representatives Meetings between senior officials and experts in the areas that both mutual benefits, such as science, resources and the environment, agriculture, energy, industry, information and communication technology, human resource development, SMEs Tourism, Electronic Commerce Economic, role of women and remote area development etc. ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at the end of 2018 to drive cooperation in the regional economy between ASEAN and EAEU. In this regard, the meeting agreed

³⁸ นโยบาข “หันเหตวันออก” ของรัสเซียต่ออาเซียน. (December 12, 2561). <http://aseanwatch.org/2018/12/12/นโยบาข-หันเหตวันออก-๗/>. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

that operations should focus on cooperation in new areas that will be useful to support the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), such as digital technology innovation, Intelligent city, agricultural cooperation and promoting sustainability enhancing mutual benefits.

The trade volume between the two parties has reached 9.88 billion USD in the first half of 2019.³⁹ In 2019, Russia and ASEAN have continued to increase cooperation to promote multilateral negotiations under the East Asia Summit on Regional Security Architecture. Russia relies on the enhancement of existing mechanisms led by ASEAN. In seeking to create a system in the region is based on mutual trust and respect for the legislative interests of all countries. ASEAN and Russia understand that the situation in many dimensions is in progress. Mutual strategic confidence is based on equality and multilateral systems. Russia is confident that the evolution of ASEAN's concepts of regional architecture should be open, transparent and cover regional structures according to the formation of the military alliances and the force. Russia is concerned with outside-regional efforts for ASEAN strategic dominance. Russia is confident that ASEAN will continue to grow as an independent center in the midst of the New World Order which Russia is actively promoting the unity of ASEAN making the community progress with people as center towards the future and will not leave anyone behind. In addition, the strategic partnership opens new perspectives for scientific cooperation in complex issues such as aerospace, aviation, nuclear power, military, and industry. Russia is considered extremely flexible in the technological transfers to the allies.

Currently, statistics of Russian tourists traveling to Southeast Asian countries are approximately 2 million people per year, which more than half of them travel to Thailand. This is a good opportunity led to wider contacts and exchanges between the citizens of ASEAN and Russia. For this reason, ASEAN and Russia have a great potential and Moscow government hopes that their strategic partnership will surely be driven to ensure a sustainable and mutual strategic in the future.

China-ASEAN

ASEAN and China have been continuing to strengthen cooperation in all directions in accordance with the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030 adopted at the China-ASEAN Summit for the long-term development of bilateral ties. Under the Vision 2030, both sides should integrate the Belt and

³⁹ Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. ASEAN-Russia Ministerial Meeting. (August 1, 2019). <https://www.asean2019.go.th/en/news/asean-russia-ministerial-meeting-2/>. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

Road Initiative to the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, and consolidate the 3-X cooperation framework.⁴⁰

Over the years China has expanded its exports of electronic products, construction materials, power equipment, construction machines, as well as technology in new energy, high-speed trains and agriculture to ASEAN countries, while the regional bloc's food, daily goods and bulk commodities have gained access to the Chinese market. By the end of 2018, China has been ASEAN's largest trading partner for nine consecutive years. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became China's second-largest trading partner in the first half of 2019.⁴¹ China's customs data showed that China's trade with ASEAN rose 10.5 percent to 1.98 trillion yuan (\$288 billion) in the first half of this year, as China's trade with the US dropped 9 percent to 1.75 trillion yuan (\$254 billion).⁴² Besides Malaysia, China has also become a huge market of various goods from other ASEAN member countries, such as more tropical fruits are entering the Chinese market from the Philippines and Cambodia as the largest Cambodian rice importer are importing rice with other agricultural products, etc.

In 2018, the 15th anniversary of the ASEAN and China Strategic Partnership, by recognizing the "Vision of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership 2030" which is considered as a guidance for all-round relations. In the past, both parties have tightened their cooperation in accordance with the vision, such as, China remains the ASEAN's No. 1 trading partner and aims to increase the value of trade and investment between 1 trillion and 150 billion US dollars respectively.⁴³ ASEAN and China to promote the links between them by construction plans to link between the ASEAN Master Plan (Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025: MPAC 2025) and China's BRI, including support for multilateral and regionalism to promote stability and prosperity in the region.

China and the ASEAN are cooperating on more international affairs, economic and trade cooperation grown steadily. When global economic growth slowed and trade protectionism gained track in 2018, the China-ASEAN trade volume reached a record high of \$587.8 billion, a year-on-year increase of 14.1 percent.⁴⁴ In the first half of 2019, the ASEAN for the first time overtook the United States to become China's second-largest trading partner, and trade volume of the whole year is expected to reach

⁴⁰ Xinhua. China, ASEAN to formulate strategic partnership vision toward 2030. (November 13, 2017). https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-11/13/content_34491398.htm. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

⁴¹ Xinhua. China-ASEAN trade continues to boom amid global growth slowdown, uncertainties. (July 23, 2019). <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/23/WS5d367792a310d8305640082a.html>. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

⁴² Xinhua. China-ASEAN trade continues to boom amid global growth slowdown, uncertainties. (July 23, 2019). <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/23/WS5d367792a310d8305640082a.html>. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

⁴³ Xinhua. Spotlight: China-ASEAN trade continues to boom amid global growth slowdown, uncertainties. (July 23, 2019). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/23/c_138249953.htm. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

⁴⁴ Huang Xilian. New era for China-ASEAN relations. China Daily Global. (October 10, 2019). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-10/10/content_37514628.htm. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

\$600 billion.⁴⁵ Friendly people-to-people exchanges have become ever more prosperous.⁴⁶ Last year saw a total of 57 million people visiting between the two sides, and nearly 4,000 flights every week.⁴⁷ China is the largest source country of tourists for the ASEAN countries, and more and more ASEAN people are choosing to work and study in China. At the sub-regional level, both are advancing the Lancang-Mekong cooperation and the cooperation between China and the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area. In light of their common values of openness, inclusiveness and mutual learning between civilizations, both have stepped up communication to address the hotspot issues for regional peace and stability.⁴⁸

On November, 3 2019, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister and Minister of Ministry of Defense chaired the 22nd ASEAN-China Summit to determine the relation direction and cooperation between ASEAN and China that includes exchanging ideas on regional and international issues of common interest with 10 member countries in ASEAN and the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China attended. ASEAN and China meetings have strengthening strategic partnership to a deep level for mutual benefits in the region. The relationship between ASEAN and China is considered that one of the most dynamic from the relationship developments in the last 10 years, considered an important pillar that supports peace, prosperity and regional sustainability. Cooperation in emerging industries is accelerating as well, including in digital economy, e-commerce, smart city and 5G. The two sides have agreed to designate in 2020 as the Year of the China-ASEAN Digital Economy, offering an opportunity to expand cooperation in these areas.

Both sides also stressed the importance of maintaining a sustainable security dynamics between each other, which promote trust on a strategic level and collaborate to strengthen the architectural structure in regions with ASEAN as the center through various mechanisms, as well as made concordant efforts to safeguard the rules-based multilateral trading system and combat protectionism and unilateralism. ASEAN economic attaches importance to promoting marine economic cooperation, establishing economic links between ASEAN and the Greater Bay Area (GBA), which is a high-economic dynamic area. ASEAN and China set the year 2020 to be "the year of ASEAN-China Digital Economy Cooperation" which they believe that will help expand economic and trade opportunities for regional prosperity.

⁴⁵ Huang Xilian. New era for China-ASEAN relations. China Daily Global. (October 10, 2019). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-10/10/content_37514628.htm. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

⁴⁶ Huang Xilian. New era for China-ASEAN relations. China Daily Global. (October 10, 2019). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-10/10/content_37514628.htm. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

⁴⁷ Huang Xilian. New era for China-ASEAN relations. China Daily Global. (October 10, 2019). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-10/10/content_37514628.htm. [Accessed April 10, 2020.]

⁴⁸ Huang Xilian. New era for China-ASEAN relations. China Daily Global. (October 10, 2019). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-10/10/content_37514628.htm. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

India-ASEAN

India has a population of 18 percent of the world population and has an economic growth rate of 7.6 percent in 2016.⁴⁹ At the same time, ASEAN (ASEAN), consisting of 10 member countries, has a GDP approximately 2.6 billion US dollars and has a population in total 630 million people. Both India and ASEAN have a rapidly expanding middle class population, along with changing consumer tastes from higher incomes.⁵⁰

In 2019, the 16th ASEAN-India Summit was organized to review ASEAN-India cooperation in the politics, security, economy, society and culture in the past year, as well as to jointly determine the direction of ASEAN-India relations in the future and to discuss for exchanged views on important regional and international issues with leaders from 10 ASEAN member countries and Prime Minister of the Republic of India.⁵¹ India is an intimate country to Southeast Asia and a strategic partnership with ASEAN that will work together to promote regional stability, dynamic economic growth and sustainable development. ASEAN rejoices at the Prime Minister of India focusing on ASEAN, especially through the Look East policy, making more dynamic strategy between "ASEAN-India". India's support of ASEAN's core and cooperation in ASEAN-led mechanisms in regional architecture, especially the ASEAN perspective on Indo-Pacific Security.

ASEAN appreciates that India supports the ASEAN core on the basis of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and through various mechanisms in which ASEAN plays a leading role, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Conference on Cooperation in politics and security in the Asia-Pacific region (ASEAN Regional Forum: ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus dialogue partners (ADMM plus), which leads to peace, stability and progress in the region as well as appreciating India for supporting ASEAN's views on the Indo-Pacific concept based on the 3M principles, which are mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit. This partnership will help promote ASEAN-India strategic partnership more advanced, emphasizing cooperation in combating terrorism, resisting extreme violent concepts, transnational crime and cyber security cooperation.

India is the 6th trading partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but trade figures seem far from the common goal that they will be pushing for an ASEAN-India trade value up to 200 billion US dollars by 2022 by leveraging the ASEAN – INDIA Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA)⁵².

⁴⁹ อินเดีย-อาเซียนสัมพันธ์ใกล้ชิดมากขึ้น. (April 25, 2561). <https://www.prachachat.net/finance/news-148045>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁵⁰ อินเดีย-อาเซียนสัมพันธ์ใกล้ชิดมากขึ้น. (April 25, 2561). <https://www.prachachat.net/finance/news-148045>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁵¹ Department of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. การประชุมสุดยอดอาเซียน-อินเดีย ครั้งที่ 16 (November 3, 2019). <https://www.asean2019.go.th/th/news/16th-asean-india-summit-2/>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁵² 'อาเซียน-อินเดีย' ดันการค้ามูลค่า 2 แสนล้านดอลลาร์สหรัฐในปี 65. (November 3, 2562). <https://www.komchadluek.net/news/politic/396884>

As trade figures in mid-2018 were 73.63 billion US dollars, while investments were at 1.73 billion US dollars considered as the 7th of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the number of Indian tourists to ASEAN is approximately 2.79 million people.⁵³

In this regard, ASEAN is pleased to initiate a review of the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) in order to make the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement more convenient, practical and convenient for business sectors. Even more Including eliminating trade barriers and emphasizing the importance of regional economic integration through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations by 2019. They have been promoting cooperation in biodiversity, tourism, education, academic and youth exchanges, science and technology, innovation and ICT. ASEAN and India to increase their efforts in implementing the ASEAN-India Action Plan 2016-2020 and the success of the ASEAN-India Tourism Cooperation in 2019. In addition, India's efforts to support people-to-people connections between ASEAN and India connections.

In the ASEAN-India Summit, there are discussions on ways to increase the utilization of the ASEAN-India Fund for the development of infrastructure and digital connectivity projects between ASEAN and India, for the use of marine resources for economical use, for marine cooperation, for tourism, for transport, for mass communication, for energy, for education and for culture, as well as for the rehabilitation of the ASEAN-INDIA Business Council to promote business relations between them. Prime Minister Modi attaches great importance to the India's Act East Policy, emphasizing the way that India and ASEAN share the same vision which India wishes to connect the northeast region of India with ASEAN through Myanmar and Thailand to reach Lao, Cambodia and Vietnam in the future through the Trilateral Highway project. The implementation of the Master Plan on Linkages between ASEAN in 2025 will be a connection point with other frameworks, including ASEAN-India to create a seamless connection from South Asia to Northeast Asia and from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. India, as a country with a coastline of more than 5,000 kilometers, is interested in maritime cooperation corresponding to ASEAN in the Blue Economy, which has academics, private economists and relevant organizations exchanged views on cooperation approaches in the area of marine resources, marine links, maritime security and diplomacy for the benefits of the ASEAN-India people.

Besides, Both of them is also expanding cooperation negotiation on the ASEAN-India Air Transport Agreement (AI-ATA) and the ASEAN-India Maritime Transport Agreement (AI-MTA) for progress, including and promoting private-sector cooperation between ASEAN and India for

⁵³ Bangkokbiznews. (October 30, 2019). <https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/852632>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

empowering small-sized and medium-sized enterprises, as well as cooperation in science, technology and innovation. ASEAN-India Economic Cooperation Plan will focus on 3 important issues:

1. Linking in various dimensions which all ASEAN leaders have agreed for pushing the construction and opening the project India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to connect India-Myanmar-Thailand to complete rapid. India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway will be a link between India and Southeast Asia that will be another trade route and pass way that will benefit all parties. ASEAN leaders also agree to expand the Trilateral Highway to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam as well.

2. Economic corridor development, which is the source of assigning to the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) headquartered in Jakarta and supported by Japan, has conducted studies and researches about the transformation of land areas and land transportation routes into economic corridors and about expanded plans linking the highway project to various countries.

3. Negotiations on regional economic partnership (RCEP) agreements in which India plays an important role in this partnership, while ASEAN has committed to pushing for negotiations to make this agreement towards the final goal unchanged to enable the negotiation of the RCEP to be successful within the year 2019.

Besides, ASEAN-India are also promoting and developing sustainability, such as the marine waste problem that is an urgent issue for all countries to take immediate action and to reduce the disparity in which India is a developing country with high experience in sustainable development.

The future potential in ASEAN-India economic relations can also be deduced from India's willingness to undertake domestic reform and to better engage at regional and global platforms. Of late, India has introduced several policy measures – Make in India, Skill India, Smart Cities, Digital India – in its home economy.⁵⁴ In particular, the Make in India initiative is trying to revitalize the manufacturing sector. The idea is to improve competitiveness and bring back manufacturing investments that had fled to other Asian destinations.⁵⁵ This is not only expected to create jobs in the domestic market but is also likely to help India specialize in one particular activity of manufacturing value-chain, thereby integrating

⁵⁴ RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS. (October 30, 2018). ASEAN-India Economic Relations: Low Base, Large Potential.

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_68@50.pdf. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁵⁵ RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS. (October 30, 2018). ASEAN-India Economic Relations: Low Base, Large Potential.

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_68@50.pdf. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

better with other countries in the region. The latter was acknowledged during the ASEAN-India Summit in 2015.⁵⁶

South Africa – ASEAN

In terms of trade, the two countries agreed in 2012 to enhance bilateral relations and to conduct a joint study to explore trade opportunities by signing a Joint Trade Committee (JTC) in Jakarta, to provide mutual benefit for the economic development of both countries.⁵⁷

South Africa has diplomatic relations with all ASEAN member countries. The high-level official visit from South Africa to ASEAN member countries aim to promote trade and investment and to increase cooperation in other sectors. For example, in 2013, representatives of Vietnam and Thailand visited to South Africa and South Africa president visited Malaysia in August 2013. For South Africa, the trade level with ASEAN member countries is still a challenge. Cooperation between ASEAN and South Africa has the potential to grow in terms of trade, infrastructure development, technology transfer, education and tourism. South Africa must establish and expand its levels of strategic engagement and benefits in order to increase trade and investment in the aforementioned business sector. the ASEAN Pretoria Committee (APC), which decided to work with South African leaders to advise them on other alternatives to accelerate trade and investment exchanges, is an initiative that tends to attract the attention of both businesses. This side will give South Africa an opportunity to improve relations with ASEAN countries.

The relationship between South Africa and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is promising with the ASEAN recently pledging to boost search for ways to increase cooperation in areas of investment, trade and tourism in South Africa. This comes after the ASEAN Pretoria Committee (APC) a committee of diplomats representing the interest of ASEAN member states in South Africa, held its first meeting of 2014 to discuss ways of strengthening multifaceted cooperation between ASEAN and South Africa.⁵⁸

The importance of Asia in the South African foreign policy is commonly attributed to the level of bilateral relations and increasing trade relations South Africa has with the Asian emerging powers such as China India and Japan to name a few. However, it is of great interest to reflect on South African

⁵⁶ OVERVIEW ASEAN-INDIA DIALOGUE RELATIONS. (July, 2017). <http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/Overview-ASEAN-India-as-of-July-2017-r2-cl.pdf>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁵⁷ Kenny Dlamini, (July, 2014). The prospects of South Africa's engagement with ASEAN countries. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/asean_policy_brief.pdf. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁵⁸ Kenny Dlamini. South Africa and ASEAN countries: the need for strategic partnerships. <https://www.igd.org.za/infocus/7327-south-africa-and-asean-countries-the-need-for-strategic-partnerships>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

foreign policy approach and relations with the Southeast Asia region, contrary to the general focus on South Africa's engagement with the dominant Asian emerging powers.⁵⁹

Over the past decade, business between ASEAN and Africa has increased significantly. With its limitless potential and scope for development, Africa is emerging as the last growth engine of the global economy. The World Bank reports that Africa's collective GDP is now greater than Brazil or Russia, and almost half of all its countries have achieved middle-income status.⁶⁰ Growth rates are not expected to fall any time soon, and by 2030 African spending power is predicted to reach 1.3 trillion US Dollars.⁶¹ Africa is also becoming a destination for investment from ASEAN. Even though trade is growing, there are currently more than 200 companies from ASEAN operating in Africa, predominantly involved in agribusiness, manufacturing, oil and urban development.

Among the ASEAN nations, the biggest traders with Africa are Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, while South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt have the largest import markets in Africa for ASEAN goods. Additionally, the Asian Development Bank is understood to develop trade agreements between Asia and Africa, which may see a later stage of ASEAN reaching out to one of the African trade blocs. Such a move would follow developing trade patterns. Seven ASEAN nations have formed the ASEAN-Pretoria Committee to boost trade with South Africa, and Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos have seen sharp increases in trade since the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie strengthened economic ties with French-speaking African countries.⁶² Among ASEAN countries, Thailand is leading the way in term of exchange and trade with the African continent. Building on this strong business flow, Thailand should also be able to become the bridgehead for academic exchanges and research between ASEAN and Africa.⁶³ However, in these external relations there is no reference to an African individual states, the only reference made is ASEAN relations with sub-regional communities such as SADC but those relations are in informal manner and inactive.⁶⁴ This dynamism on the part of ASEAN is coupled with the increasing receptiveness on the part of African countries to strengthen ties with South-South partners.

⁵⁹ Kenny Dlamini, (July, 2014). The prospects of South Africa's engagement with ASEAN countries. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/asean_policy_brief.pdf. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁶⁰ ASEAN-Africa: Towards a Renewed Partnership. <http://www.gis-reseau-asie.org/en/asean-africa-toward-renewed-partnership>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁶¹ ASEAN-Africa: Towards a Renewed Partnership. <http://www.gis-reseau-asie.org/en/asean-africa-toward-renewed-partnership>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁶² ASEAN-Africa: Towards a Renewed Partnership. <http://www.gis-reseau-asie.org/en/asean-africa-toward-renewed-partnership>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁶³ DAVID HUTT, (October 8, 2014). ASEAN-AFRICAN TRADE, The not-so-dark continent. <https://southeastasiaglobe.com/dark-continent-africa-asean-trade-southeast-asia-globe/>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁶⁴ Kenny Dlamini, (July, 2014). The prospects of South Africa's engagement with ASEAN countries. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/asean_policy_brief.pdf. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

Brazil -ASEAN

The views of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards ASEAN member countries are as follows:

1. In the era of President Lula's government, focusing on Asian countries could be 60 percent, 65 percent to China and India, 30 percent to Japan and South Korea, 5 percent to emerging partners, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam, 1 percent for Thailand and other countries, believing that such priorities remain in the current government.⁶⁵

2. For ASEAN member countries, Brazil stresses the importance countries with economic potential with role and political stability. Brazil is pleased that Singapore decided to open an embassy in Brazil in 2013 and be confident in the economic progress of Singapore ensuring that Airport management at Rio de Janeiro which Singapore make a bid for Brazil, as well as the Changi Airport. Brazil sees Indonesia's potential and tries to increase relations at all levels with Indonesia and Brazil has a plan to promote high-level visits to Vietnam and encourage concrete cooperation.

3. Brazil sees Thailand's economic potential that Brazil may learn. However, the internal political situation in Thailand made Brazil lacked confidence in Thailand's potential and caused Brazil to somewhat reserve the attitude to interact with Thailand.

The Mercosur - ASEAN was officially launched in Montevideo, Uruguay on 10 August 2016 with the objective of facilitating research and expanding trade relations and the economy between each other. On February 14-15, 2020, the ASEAN Committee in Brasilia conducted an ASEAN Awareness Project to promote the 1st ASEAN Roadshow in Mato Grosso do Sul, at the invitation of Mr. Nelsinho Trad, President of the Brazilian Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and State Senator Mato Grosso do Sul, to discuss the direction of cooperation between ASEAN and Mato Grosso do Sul. Business opportunity from developing regional links under the Bioceanic Road Route program and sharing information about economic potential during economic seminars about Federation of Industry of the State of Mato Grosso do Sul: FIEMS. In addition, the ASEAN committee also visited the soybean and beef cattle farms which are the main industries of the state as well.

The distance between ASEAN and Brazil is considered far and the high cost of marketing. ASEAN exporters are still less interested in Brazil marketing. Brazil uses Portuguese as primary language for business negotiation, which ASEAN businessmen are not familiar with. Brazil has quite a lot of regulations and measures to prevent trade barriers and high import tariffs, resulting in high prices

⁶⁵ มุมมองของบราซิลต่อไทยและสมาชิกอาเซียน .(February, 13 2014). <http://www.thaibiz.net/th/news/15194/170/>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

of ASEAN products when reaching consumers. Also, there is no trade agreement between them to be a tool to reduce trade barriers with ASEAN, as well as ASEAN products are not still well-known and familiar to Brazilians.

Currently, ASEAN and MERCOSUR do not have any formal free trade agreements. However, ASEAN countries are very interested in developing an economic relationship with the South American trade bloc. The group's focus is on securing a strong, mutually beneficial trade exchange with Brazil, all while taking advantage of connections with the other MERCOSUR members as well.⁶⁶

To entice the bloc, and its biggest player, Brazil, ASEAN is advertising the many beneficial and lucrative facets of a trade deal with them. Infrastructure, investment, technology, education, and tourism are just some of the many industries ASEAN members are selling to MERCOSUR in return for an agreement. Moreover, similar political and international agendas between the two regions bode well for ASEANs plea.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ TEAM LATIN AMERICA. OUTLOOK FOR MERCOSUR-ASIA RELATIONS. (July 31, 2019). <https://www.bizlatinhub.com/mercosur-asia-relations/>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

⁶⁷ TEAM LATIN AMERICA. OUTLOOK FOR MERCOSUR-ASIA RELATIONS. (July 31, 2019). <https://www.bizlatinhub.com/mercosur-asia-relations/>. [Accessed April 15, 2020.]

CHAPTER II

2. ASEAN - BRICS in new infrastructure developments under BRI framework

The Silk Road and the growth of BRICS, are not limited only to five countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China or South Africa), but also are expanded to developing countries. At the present, emerging market economies are joining to counterbalance in the world economy, and increasing the growing trade and investment activities among developing countries as ASEAN.

2.1 Genesis of The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)


Before becoming President of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Xi Jinping announced the main mission of China lead the country to achieve the Chinese dream, including the rehabilitation of the country, enhancing the well-being of the people, creation of a good wealth and society, and a plan to restore the Silk Road. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the 21st century Silk Road was initiated by China. The OBOR summit on May 14-15, 2013 has led people all over the world to focus on this project because they suspect how China will become a leading country promoting global trade by persuading leaders in many countries to attend in this project, when the United State in the Donald Trump era adheres to policies "America first". During a visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the first launch of the project "The Silk Road Economic Belt: SREB", which consists of road and rail routes connecting China and Europe via Central Asia and the "The Maritime Silk Road" project will connect Chinese ports with ports in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Europe. All the land and sea routes, there will be investments to improve the ports and build manufacturing industrials and commercial centers. China Development Bank and Exim Bank of China will set up a loan program to support cooperation in basic facilities, industrial and financial capabilities worth up to 83 billion yuan.⁶⁸ China will cooperate with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), BRICS New Development Bank and other

⁶⁸ Department of International Trade Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, THAILAND. รายงานเศรษฐกิจเดือนมิถุนายน 2560 ภาพรวมนโยบาย One belt One Road และการลงทุนของจีนในประเทศแถบ Southeast Asia (online). https://ditp.go.th/contents_attach/173910/173910.pdf. [Accessed April 20, 2020.]

development institutions to jointly Assign financial guidance to projects related to development according to Belt and Road policies.⁶⁹

Figure 2- 1 The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century

Maritime Silk Road



Source: The Wall Street Journal. New Silk Roads China is assembling new trade routes, binding other regions closer to it. [Online] Available from: <http://www.silkroutes.net/orient/mapsilkroutestrade.htm> [March, 2020].

The Chinese word "yi dia yi lu" means "One Belt, One Road", consisting of the Six Economic corridors and the 1 marine route.

1. New Eurasian Land Bridge (from western China to western Russia)
2. China – Mongolia – Russia Corridor
3. China – Central Asia – West Asia Corridor
4. China – Indochina Peninsula Corridor

⁶⁹ Department of International Trade Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, THAILAND. รายงานเศรษฐกิจเดือนมิถุนายน 2560 ภาพรวมนโยบาย One belt One Road และการลงทุนของจีนในประเทศไทยแถบ Southeast Asia (online). https://ditp.go.th/contents_attach/173910/173910.pdf. [Accessed April 20, 2020.]

5. China – Pakistan Corridor

6. China – Myanmar – Bangladesh – India Corridor

The maritime route starts from the coastal cities of China through Singapore, Malaysia, India and the Mediterranean Sea. The BRI Project will cost 1.4 trillion US dollars which involved in 60 countries in Asia, Middle East, Europe, East Africa and North, affected the percentage 65 of the world population and affected on One-third of the global economy and on a quarter of world trade. In the past, the success of the China-Pakistan Corridor Project was cost 62 billion US dollars consisting of building roads, railway routes, power plants, Sri Lanka Port, Indonesia high speed train, and the construction of an industrial estate in Cambodia etc.

BRI is a continuation of China's strategy to link trades in the region and in the world market, and the Going Out Strategy which Chinese government continuous to support investments in foreign countries for many decades. On March 28, 2015, the Chinese government announced the vision with the concept from the Chinese side for the Belt and Road Initiative. There are 2 important proposals and reasons:

1.) The BRI connects Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Western Asia, North Africa and Europe to exchange and create mutual benefits by creating new international economic corridors with the convenient, safe and high effective transportation channels for the benefit of the landlocked countries and the remote areas for reducing the cost of trade, investment and elimination of international trade barriers which driving economic integration, trade liberalization and investments. Political and economic reasons in this proposal is a signal that China needs peace to offer development trade opportunities to the Asia and the world market.

2.) The BRI will adhere economic cooperation as a foundation and a core, and adhere the exchange of people and culture which China is a major supporter without intervening in the internal affairs of each country in the region. This proposal is considered social and cultural reasons and a signal that China will promote cultural exchanges in the public along the Silk Road.

BRI is an important strategy making Chinese influence and interests by linking with various regions. China has high expectations with ASEAN that the Silk Road Policy is a strategy to expand to the South. BRI consists of 2 parts:

1. The Silk Road Economic Belt is a link between countries located in the region. The original Silk Road consists of 3 routes which are

- Route 1 connecting China with Central Asia, Russia and Europe.

- Route 2 connecting China with the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea via Central Asia and Middle East

- Route 3 connecting China with Southeast Asia and South Asia.

The initiative is a regional integration of the economy through infrastructure developments, cultural exchanges and expanding regional trade. New Eurasian Land Bridge is a development of China-Mongolia-Russia, Chinese- Central Asia - Western Asia and the Chinese-Indochina economic corridors etc.

2. Maritime Silk Road, also known as "The Silk Road in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" is an initiative that aims to promote cooperation in various areas. Including investments between China and countries in the ocean region, such as ASEAN, Oceania, North Africa, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean which will be building the Chinese-Pakistan and the Chinese-Bangladesh-India economic corridors etc.

The Silk Road in the 21st century (One Belt and One Road) is considered to change the economic structure of China in order to compete with the Western economic structure of the world by trying to connect the economy and influence in many countries on the Silk Road, and submitting proposals for political, economic and culture to create peace, friendship and mutual benefit with various countries. The BRI vision focuses on the potential of expanding partnerships and investments for the China's benefit and those countries where the infrastructure systems are still underdeveloped to fulfill the commitment to develop a model win-win situation. The increased funds for infrastructure will be welcomed by countries along the BRI route.

The progress of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since 2013 China has announced the One Belt One Road, later as known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the world. China hosted the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing on May 14-15, 2017 with 29 government leaders and more than 110 representatives attending to discuss and push together with the announcement of the success of the project, concluding that this project has new innovations for banks, investments and funds approximately 1.4 trillion US dollars. It is associated with over 65 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa, affecting 65 percent of the world's population, affecting on the one-third of the world economy and on the one-fourth of world trade.

China's aim

The Initiative of BRI, China has geopolitical and geopolitical goals. First, the Chinese economy needs new impulses. In the present, the Chinese economy is growing at a rate of less than 8 percent. Growth in a lower level is inevitable. At the same time, various production capacity of this country is

overflowing, thus China needs a new engine to drive the economy. The OBOR project helps to drain Chinese production capacity. Second, The Silk Road will support China's energy needs, such as gas pipelines in Central Asia and the Deep-Sea Port Project in South Asia. The last one is China's geopolitical goal. China intends to rely on economic development to stabilize in Central Asia, as a region that is full of political fluctuations.

Although China denies that OBOR is not China's "Marshall", the economic development occurring among countries along the Silk Road is the one way to prevent conflicts in the region. The BRI implementation, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund shown that China is ready to play full role at the regional and global level in accordance with foreign policy stepping up to a peaceful power.

2.2 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in ASEAN

The BRI is China's grand strategy to invest in building various infrastructure connecting China with 65 countries and a capital investment of multi-trillion US dollars.⁷⁰ The BRI is the greatest investment project in the history of the world resulting in the new global economy change by connecting the economies of Europe, Asia and Africa. China's goal of the BRI driving is to expand influence and interaction with countries around the world making China to become the world's economic center.

In May 2017, China held the OBOR Summit in Beijing which participated leaders from 30 countries and representatives from 110 countries.⁷¹ Linking China with Southeast Asia and ASEAN is part of the OBOR strategy. China has required to connect southern China with ASEAN, especially the transportation routes from Kunming and Nanning to Singapore which in China called China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, and in ASEAN called the North-South Economic Corridor. ASEAN has a Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, which is the master plan for linking ASEAN by building infrastructure, transportation routes connecting ASEAN countries and China conformed with the BRI Jakarta - Bandung high speed rail route in Indonesia.

⁷⁰ Forbes. China's Grand Strategy (online). (Jan 14, 2019). <https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielaraya/2019/01/14/chinas-grand-strategy/#34b4c0fb1f18>. [Accessed April 20, 2020.]

⁷¹ Ben Blanchard. China to gather friends for biggest summit of year on New Silk Road (online). (APRIL 18, 2017). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-summit-idUSKBN17K0FL>. [Accessed April 20, 2020.]

1. The Indonesia's railways on Java

Figure 2- 2 The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail



Source: Takehiro Masutomo and Teng Jing Xuan. Indonesia's China-Financed High-Speed Rail Project Off Track [Online] Available from: <https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-10-11/indonesias-china-financed-high-speed-rail-project-off-track-101333896.html> [March, 2020].

In 2011, Indonesia announced the national railway master plan of more than 12,000 kilometers, with a network of railway routes and electric trains in various islands. At that time, the high-speed electric rail project was not a government-initiated policy until the president Joko Widodo took a position in 2014. President Joko Widodo visited Japan and China in April, 2014 to strengthen relations and to discuss the possibility of investing in various infrastructure (roads, railways, ports and power plants) to advance Indonesia's strategy to be a Global Maritime Axis (GMA) playing a key role as a maritime power. Japan and China are focusing on investing in the high-speed electric rail in Indonesia, with exploration and feasibility studies in proposals for the Indonesian government.

The first auction result in 2015, the Indonesian government did not accept both proposals because of technical and financial reasons. In addition, the Indonesian government considered that many budgets

are spent on this project, but in the end, the ongoing negotiations with China led to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that Chinese proposal was accepted in construction of the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail. The Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail, a proposed high-speed rail project in Indonesia, connecting the capital city of Jakarta to the textile hub of Bandung with a total distance of 142.3 kilometers and a total worth over 5.5 billion US dollars, is the first Indonesia's high-speed electric rail project and the second project⁷², Japan reach deal on 458 billion JPY on the Jakarta-Surabaya rail project.⁷³ The Indonesian government said the project was a joint venture between China and Indonesia. Indonesia holds 60 percent of the joint venture (PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia-China or KCIC) and all construction funds will be funded percent by the China Development Bank and Chinese firms. Another important reason is that the Indonesian government does not have to guarantee loans for this project which has a goal to start construction in 2016 and take 3 years to build or to be completed in 2019. The project has been delayed due to land expropriation, environmental problems and obstacles in obtaining permits as required by the government.

Analysts have considered that Indonesia has accepted these proposal projects in order to reduce government spending. In addition, the proposal is more comprehensive, including the joint investment plans covered for train production in both light rail and medium-speed trains. Overall, If the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail, a significant challenge, is a successful negotiation, China will be an advantageous position in maintaining the leading role of the economy in the ASEAN and will help China in similar negotiations with other countries. On the other hand, If the project is delayed or experienced problems such as safety issues and environmental impacts, the disadvantage will be with the Chinese side, including the direct impacts on the Indonesian people and the Indonesian government inevitably. Currently, Indonesia is experiencing the problem of illegal labor from China into competition for work, including a career as a representative (Nominee) may be a conflict in the future. At the same time, the Indonesian government expects that this infrastructure investment will be create around 40,000 jobs a year in Indonesia.

⁷² DITA ALANGKARA. Indonesia starts construction of high-speed rail line. (January 21, 2016). <https://apnews.com/512829e6366b4419a7075efba6af105a>. [Accessed April 20, 2020.]

⁷³ KYODO. Indonesia and Japan reach deal on ¥458 billion Jakarta-Surabaya rail project. (September 24, 2019). <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/24/business/indonesia-japan-reach-deal-%C2%A5458-billion-jakarta-surabaya-rail-project/>. [Accessed April 20, 2020.]

2. The China-Laos Railway

Figure 2- 3. The China-Laos Railway



Source: Business Reporting Desk. (July 16, 2019). Heading south at speed: The China – Laos Railway [Online] Available from: <https://www.beltandroad.news/2019/07/16/heading-south-at-speed-the-china-laos-railway/>

The China-Laos Railway project in Laos, China is trying to develop infrastructure in Laos by pushing for the construction of the railway connecting to enter Thailand, in which Laos and China have a memorandum of understanding to develop the railway on April 7, 2010.⁷⁴ Laos decided to choose a medium-speed trains that are not more than 200 kilometers per hour and 120 kilometers per hour for passenger trains. There are two parts of the railway project which in the first phase from Vientiane to Luang Namth is connected to Kunming of China and the second phase from Savannakhet to Laos Ba is connected to Vietnam. The total distance is about 427 kilometers.

However, Laos does not have the capability and technology to build the railway, Laos has entrusted the Chinese side to study the feasibility of the project, including all designs and constructions.

⁷⁴ Laos-China Railway Operational In 2021, 51 Tunnel Entrances Bored. (May 29, 2017). <https://jclao.com/laos-china-railway-operational-in-2021-51-tunnel-entrances-bored/>. [Accessed April 20, 2020.]

The cost of the project is being met by the Laos China Railway Company, owned 30 percent by Laos and 70 percent by China. Laos is committed to paying 720 million US dollars of its share in the next five years, with 250 million US dollars coming out of the national budget and 470 million US dollars being borrowed from the Exim Bank of China (2.3 percent of interest)⁷⁵. For the loan, Laos will loan from the China EXIM Bank at the interest rate of 3 percent. Laos asked China to decrease interest rates, but the negotiations were not disclosed. Finally, Laos has a plan to repay loans from the income of all 5 Potash mines and mining. The Lao government said that the project is a high investment project and low return on investment, but will have good results for the economy. In the initial phase, there will be approximately 4 million users per year and will respectively increase to 6.1 and to 8.1 million users.

Professor Carl Thayer, security analyst at the University of New South Wales in Australia, believes that China's investment in the railway network demonstrates China's efforts to expand its influence in ASEAN, especially Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. China is trying to develop south-trade routes and to link networks in ASEAN. For Laos, the railway project is made Laos more in debt with China.⁷⁶

Professor Dr. Martin Stuart-Fox from the Department of History at the University of Queensland in Australia believes that In international politics, China is using a policy aimed to reduce the relationship between Vietnam and Laos, which has been close since The Indo-china Wars. China is determined to develop relations with Laos to be equal to Vietnam has with Laos.⁷⁷

The loan that Laos received from China, Laos had to bring domestic resources to exchange technology and to hire workers from China. Moreover, Laos' current public debt accounts for almost 90 percent of the country's gross domestic product. Laos disadvantaged in all aspects compared with China and offers various benefits to China because Laos has not bargaining power, lack of funds and knowledges in railway transportation. In addition, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) states that the railway network structure is enormous value that is not suitable for small economies in Laos that the population have only 6 million people mainly depended on agricultures.

In August 2019, the construction project for the China-Laos Railway has progressed at 76.2 percent.⁷⁸ The project is expected to be completed as scheduled and ready to be opened for inaugural tourism on December 2, 2021. At this time, the government of Lao PDR has paid compensation to the

⁷⁵ Surya Chuen. The China-built railway cutting through Laos. (February 14, 2019). <https://www.thethirdpole.net/2019/02/14/photo-story-the-china-built-railway-cutting-through-laos/>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁷⁶ Ron Corben, (April 23, 2015). Laos Looks to Balance China's Growing Economic Influence. <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/laos-looks-balance-chinas-growing-economic-influence>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁷⁷ Martin Stuart-Fox. LAOS: The Vietnamese Connection. *Southeast Asian Affairs*. (1980), pp. 191-209

⁷⁸ Xinhua. China-Laos railway's longest tunnel holed. (December 27, 2019). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/27/c_138661119.htm. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

affected people in the amount of 128.9 million US dollars from the total compensation of 282.9 million US dollars. The Lao PDR government has allocated a budget of 2020 of 45.4 million US dollars as compensation and assigned the Lao PDR Bank. Laos issued bonds to raise funds to compensate for the missing parts. The China-Laos railway construction project has a total investment value of approximately 5,956 million US dollars by the State Enterprise of Laos National Railway (30 percent) Boten Vientiane Railway (40 percent), Beijing Yukun Investment Corporation (20 percent) and Yunnan Investment Holding Group (10 percent) and this project has a length about 414 kilometers from the Laos-China border to Vientiane Capital via Luang Nam Tha, Oudomxay, Louangphabang and Vientiane.⁷⁹ There are 3 main railway stations consisting of Luang Prabang Station, Vang Vieng Station and Vientiane Capital City.

3. Infrastructure Development and Special Economic Zones in Cambodia

Figure 2- 4. The Potential dual-use facilities in Asia



Source: Nikkei ASEAN Review.

Political relation between Cambodia and China is at a high level of attachment. The economic relationship that Cambodia has to rely on China, made China is that one of the top countries to invest in

⁷⁹ Treasures of Laos. <http://treasuresoflaos.blogspot.com/2014/03/chinas-highspeed-train-for-laos-waiting.html>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

Cambodia with China benefiting from the privileges of Cambodia, such as the Most Favored Nation (MFN) and the Generalized System of Preference (GSP), the business of exporting textile from investors from China to the United States, European Union and other world markets (Approximately 30 garment factories are 70 percent been Chinese companies).

In 2008 - 2012, China invested in Cambodia over 4 billion US dollars, especially the new economic land concessions (ELCs).⁸⁰ In tourism business, there are hotels and casinos, the loan agreements between Cambodia's international fund management and China Development Bank (CDB) to invest in the construction of a new airport in Siem Reap, and an agreement to build the expressway from Phnom Penh - Sihanoukville, which is a seaside port, harbor, and be the investment center of China. However, tourism activities were reported that many Chinese tourists have been visiting Cambodia, the spending of Chinese tourists is only often used in Chinese businesses.

For the interesting project is Chinese land concession request in Industrial Estate Area of Cambodia that in 2008, Cambodia approved the 99-year concession to the Union Development Group which is the company located in Tianjin, China, in the amount of 44,100 acres in Koh Kong District, which is a seaside land and is in the fertile forest area of Botum Sakor National Park to develop into a new economic zone. Including the development of Sihanoukville Port, must affect at least 1,163 villagers who have to relocate, with the company acknowledging that each family will receive 1 house and 2 acres of land with compensation in the new community that the company has prepared. However, the villagers found that the house and compensation from the company did not perform as promised which the received land is not suitable for cultivation. In addition, the concession area of the company is also destroying abundant forest resources, causing Cambodian environmental organizations to protest in the years 2010 - 2012. There was a letter to the Chinese president at the ASEAN Summit, but there was no result except the violence in the area. The data from the Council for the Development of Cambodia – CDC, in the years 2013-2017, China invested in Cambodia more than 5.3 billion US dollars⁸¹ which China becoming an investor who invested in Cambodia more than Cambodia investor who invested in its own country.

Jord McCloud, an expert of risk analysis in Cambodia, believes that the reason China's huge invested was because Cambodia is extremely opened country and is country that the investment process is not complicated. In addition, wealthy Chinese investors come from doing business in "black market". The investors are not going to invest in tight regulations, in which Cambodia is one country that Chinese

⁸⁰ Mark Grimsditch. Chinese Agriculture in Southeast Asia: Investment, Aid and Trade in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. (June, 2017). https://th.boell.org/sites/default/files/hbs_agriculture_scoping.pdf. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁸¹ James Massola. China's takeover of Sihanoukville is almost complete, despite base row. (August 9, 2019). <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-s-takeover-of-sihanoukville-is-almost-complete-despite-base-row-20190805-p52e44.html>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]


investors can invest without any questions. For example, when investor needs to opened a bank account in Cambodia, the bank will ask just for the hotel name to be used as an address which such situation cannot occur in Thailand or in the Kerman Islands where is the place for Money laundering.

Reuters reported that the close relationship between China and Cambodia has made China as a "outsider" that influences ASEAN decisions which is clearly seen from 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) and ASEAN Meeting on Political Cooperation and security in the Asia-Pacific region (ARF) in Phnom Penh in July 2012, which is the first time in the history that ASEAN cannot declare a joint statement, while the Philippines accused China of trying to pressure Cambodia's host nation to not bring the South China Sea dispute to the meeting.⁸²

In addition, diplomats attending the meeting revealed that Laos and Myanmar supported Cambodia's position. The reason that China invests in Cambodia, is to expand China's influence in ASEAN through a small country that China can use small fund, but China can create enormous influence. If counting the number of Chinese who come to live and work in Sihanoukville is approximately 10,000 people. In addition, the Chinese Sihanoukville Port can also be used as a military base for Chinese warships and cargo ships.

4. Oil pipeline, gas pipeline and port projects in Myanmar

Figure 2- 5. The China's trans-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines



Source: Reuters

⁸² Manuel Mogato, Michael Martina, Ben Blanchard. ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement. (July 25, 2016). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean/asean-deadlocked-on-south-china-sea-cambodia-blocks-statement-idUSKCN1050F6>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

In the past, Myanmar had a democratic regime, but after the coup, regime is changed to dictatorship. In the year 1957, the use of violence to suppress minorities caused the civil war and domestic human rights violations causing Western countries to boycott Myanmar, then Myanmar has given priority to China and Russia. China has a role as a trading partner and major investor, supplying consumer goods and the main consumption, and a supporter of training and military equipment to the army. Myanmar's Ministry of News reported on March 31, 2015 that China is the largest investor with a total investment of 14.7 billion US dollar, a proportion 33.2 percent of total foreign direct investment (FDI).

In addition, to politics China also protects Myanmar in violation of human rights, such as the Chinese vetoed draft sanctions against Myanmar at the UN Security Council meeting. Later, after the Myanmar general election in 2010 and the dissolution of the military junta in 2011, sanctions have been relaxed resulting in the Myanmar's economy continuously expanding. Myanmar is a new resource that investors are interested in and seeking opportunities. For China, there are investments in Myanmar through projects as following:

1. Kyaukpyu Economic and Technical Development Zone and Deep Seaport in Jiao Piao⁸³, in the west of Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal in the Andaman Sea, the city of Jiao Piao can be linked to Yunnan through Mandalay - Lashio - Muse in Myanmar to Ruilia, a county-level city of Dehong Prefecture in the west of Yunnan province, People's Republic of China, with the construction of a port that can accommodate 300,000 tons of tankers and a comprehensive industrial estate that has an airport, petrochemical plant and steel smelting factories. The project can reportedly carry 22 million barrels of oil per year, which amounts to about 6 percent of China's 2016 oil imports.⁸⁴

2. The Crude Oil Pipeline construction project to transport crude oil from the Middle East and Africa to the Jiao Piao port and then transported via the pipelines to China.

3. The Gas Pipeline construction project is to align the pipeline parallel to the crude oil pipeline. Natural gas comes from many sources in the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar and then transported via pipelines to China.

4. The Jiao Piao-Muse Railway Project is a route connecting the border with Yunnan province of China to Muse, the city of Myanmar, to the destination of Jiao Piao, the city to the Andaman Sea, in

⁸³ Xinhua Headlines. Kyaukpyu port to become model project in China-Myanmar BRI cooperation. (January 18, 2020). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/18/c_138716099.htm. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁸⁴ GREGORY POLING, (APRIL 4, 2018). KYAUKPYU: CONNECTING CHINA TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. <https://amti.csis.org/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean/>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

a distance of 977 kilometers. There are 2 Chinese-Myanmar railway routes, the first one is from Mandalay-Naypyidaw and the second one is from Mandalay-Magway, with both of the destination located in Jiao Piao.

Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC, USA, wrote an article on the Nikkei Asian Review website in November 2017, "China has a clear interest in a new deep-sea port that would be linked overland to its poor southwestern regions as well as give it a strategic outpost on the Indian Ocean and The history of China in the Indian Ocean in using ports for two purposes is not a good example".⁸⁵ Regional security experts have believed widely that the port of Gwadar in Pakistan which was built with financial support from China provided military with the People's Liberation Army of China serviced.

Dr. Brahma Shelley, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, India, wrote an article on the Nikkei Asian Review website in March 2018 that "India and Western nations are worried that Jiao Piao Pier In Myanmar, which China is the largest builder and investor, may also be used for military purposes."⁸⁶

Gregory B. Poling, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS, reported in April 2018 that "China may have dangerous economic negotiations over Myanmar on the dangerous level because Myanmar has too much debt created with Chinese financial support."⁸⁷ "China's large-scale loans and investments have created a lot of criticism in other countries within the region, such as the Maldives. The Chinese government is accused of using these loans and investments as negotiations with the recipient countries to accept the Political and the economic agreement conflicting with the interests of the recipient country" ⁸⁸

The Asia Times news reported that the most important thing that China places in Myanmar is not participating in the peace process, but it is an important economic and strategic access to the Indian Ocean through the Jiao Piao port in western Myanmar, an important part of the new Silk Road, However, the construction of the Jiao Piao port is worried for many people that Myanmar has to pay more than 3.5 billion US dollars in this project.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Nikkei ASIAN Review. Yun Sun: China's latest megaproject courts controversy in Myanmar. (November 16, 2017). <https://asia.nikkei.com/NAR/Articles/Yun-Sun-China-s-latest-megaproject-courts-controversy-in-Myanmar>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁸⁶ Brahma Chellaney, (March 20, 2018). China's stealth wars in the Himalayas. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-s-stealth-wars-in-the-Himalayas>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁸⁷ GREGORY POLING, (APRIL 4, 2018). ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE KYAUKPYU: CONNECTING CHINA TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. <https://amti.csis.org/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean/>


⁸⁸ <https://amti.csis.org/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean/>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁸⁹ BERTIL LINTNER, (APRIL 24, 2018). How China gets what it wants in Myanmar. <https://asiatimes.com/2018/04/how-china-gets-what-it-wants-in-myanmar/>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

While Sean Ternell, Myanmar's economic adviser, commented that "Unreasonably, high price to pay Even before Myanmar expects foreign investment to flow in after the country has an elected government. This hope has faded away because the human rights situation in the country is still poor, preventing Western investors from fully investing in Myanmar. Myanmar is at risk of being a victim of diplomacy and debt traps that the country will be forced to compromise sovereignty in exchange for debt relief. By giving an example Sri Lanka is also a victim of China, referring to the Hambantota Port Project that made Sri Lanka indebted to China."⁹⁰

5. Malaysia's East Coast Rail Link

Figure 2- 6. The Malaysia's East Coast Rail Link (ECRL)



Source: Malasia Rail link

⁹⁰ CHAN MYA HTWETHOMPSON CHAU, (June 13,2018). Myanmar mindful of Sri Lanka's debt crisis when mulling Kyaukphyu SEZ. https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-mindful-sri-lankas-debt-crisis-when-mulling-kyaukphyu-sez.html?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=c644a97b42911b203b733a05a44f8ac6357477d0-1589643756-0-AbuPq1FYI2OL8aUhnpgiIw7PZVsUfult-i7A2zy_zWZ-cgP5eGVcDIJYUgYw7C64tIr5Ui-p7HXWR0bTyu-YsC_eToxLDzX4NA6XxbPZOYqzV-YkGYForGFYZZCc-nbDjt_7Tu5uQiYoRGNfMBxEphEgk-myr7vFOSjopjETdTNxleqpJ9eQYoYDlcfP7UONNRyDh7vWesPUKafYbJqZInOa7Sq1pO9HxnROTHvHEJ1DIaBGA62skOKM0zUVRKrOxSE9WWVJyKiUySClHrIjPCwXAp-LTdi0XMm3as01YcYpfKrPt3MHg6ld8Qme1HyG72WTzIWSHoSZG59engKUMxu-gJV7SnPoh0c8qDc83So9RgKxaE_1QgF-16YBRtM2nw. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

China and Malaysia have plans to build a port in Malacca on the west side of Malaysia in the Malaga Gateway project, with the objective of being a crude oil trading market instead of Singapore and reducing dependence on the Strait of Malacca.

In 2017, the Malaysian government and China jointly invested in the Malaysia's East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project, a double-track coastal railway project from the eastern port to the west port in the Strait of Malacca, a total 68 kilometers, approximately 13 billion US dollars.⁹¹ In terms of investment, 85 percent of the funds are received from the Export-Import Bank of China and 15 percent of the funds from the Malaysian government. The construction period is 7 years and is expected to be completed by the year 2014. In this regard, there is an interesting event that is the government of Najib Razak approves China Communication Construction Company (CCCC) as a design company and construction on this project without bidding (CCCC companies have been banned from bidding on projects that the World Bank lends). In addition, there is a 335-kilometer Malaysia-Singapore high-speed rail project (15 kilometers in Singapore).

In May 2018, after the government election, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad has announced the abolition of the ECRL project, saying that the project is indebted to the country, and will cancel the Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high-speed rail (HSR) project to reduce public debt as well. Analysts are analyzing both sides. One side believes that China is to have a softening attitude towards the Mahathir Mohamad government's needs because in the past 9 years, China is the largest foreign investor in Malaysia. In addition, Malaysia is located in the Strait of Malacca, an important shipping route in the world (value of goods 3-5 billion US dollars a year). Malaysia has a status as a sea trade route in southern of China. In addition, Malaysia is one of the countries that have disputes in the South China Sea with China. Therefore, maintaining good relations with Malaysia, both economically and politically, is a factor that must be considered in managing relations with ASEAN countries.

6. Thailand with One Belt One Road

Thailand has started to study high-speed rail projects since 1995, during the government of Chuan Leekpai, Bangkok - Nong Ngu Hao Airport - Rayong, this project was approved by the Cabinet on August 30, 1994. Later in 2008, when the Abhisit Vejjajiva's government continued the project and opened up opportunities for foreigners to study. With Japan is interested in the Bangkok-Chiang Mai route, while China is interested in the Bangkok-Nong Khai route (to connect China-Laos-Thailand which

⁹¹ Hadi Azmi, Kuala Lumpur. (August 10, 2017). Malaysia, China Embark on \$13 Billion Railway Project <https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/malaysia-railway-08102017183707.html>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

China planning to Singapore), but at that time the Abhisit Vejjajiva's government faced the domestic political problems.

During the Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra's government has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China (MOU) which has a high-speed train route Bangkok - Chiang Mai also included, during the 1st Cabinet Meeting in Chiang Mai on January 14-15, 2012, the Cabinet approved a budget to construct the high-speed trains on the route from Bangkok to Chiang Mai, but the government of Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra faced the problem of issuing a law authorizing the Ministry of Finance to borrow money for transportation infrastructure in the country in the amount of 2 trillion bahts, which is in violation of Article 169, which means that the loan can be used without having to send the Ministry of Finance, then the project has not continuity.

Later, during the government of General Prayut Chan-o-cha (seizing the power, on May 22, 2014), while Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited to Thailand and attend the GMS Summit in December 2014. Both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding on railway cooperation under the Strategic Framework for Development of Thailand's Transportation Infrastructure 2015-2022. In 2015, Thailand and China have studied the suitability, surveyed the design and construction of the railway Standard rail sized 1.35 meters, investment approximately 5.3 billion baht,⁹² divided into 4 phases as following:

Phase 1: Bangkok - Kaeng Khoi, with a distance 133 kilometers

Phase 2: Kaeng Khoi-Map Ta Phut, with a distance 364.5 kilometers

Phase 3: Kaeng Khoi - Nakhon Ratchasima, with a distance 138.5 kilometers

And Phase 4: Nakhon Ratchasima - Nong Khai, with a distance 335 kilometers

The Both sides agreed to jointly implement the Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) design, establishing a joint venture in which China will invest 40 percent, while Thailand invest 60 percent.⁹³ In September 2015, China sent a preliminary study, while the Thai side asked China to consider the value of construction and the estimated revenue from transportation, as well as proposing the Chinese side to increase its capital by 50 percent. The main problem is still the 3 percent interest rate which is higher than the domestic interest rate. When the negotiation of prices and interest cannot be agreed, General Prayut Chan-O-Cha's government announced in March 2016 that Thailand will invest entirely in the Bangkok - Kaeng Khoi - Nakhon Ratchasima high-speed rail project, while the Bangkok

⁹² BBC NEWS. June 22, 2017. <https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-40369155>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]


⁹³ BBC NEWS. June 22, 2017. <https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-40369155>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

- Map Ta Phut route (Eastern Economic Corridor or EEC) and Nakhon Ratchasima -Nong Khai will be postponed until Thailand is ready.

Although the Thai government declared an announcement, the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding and the negotiation also forced Thailand to use Chinese services in all design, construction and technology. Further negotiations have continued to encounter problems as China did not accept Thai procurement regulations and regulations for engineers and architects. On June 15, 2017, Gen. Prayut's government has exercised the power under Section 44 except for the limitations of the law to solve the delay of high-speed rail construction in the Bangkok - Nakhon Ratchasima route, which has started the construction of Phase 1, a length of 3.5 kilometers in 2016.

GMS Economic Corridors

Figure 2- 7. The GMS Economic Corridors



Source: <https://www.learningstudio.info/asean-gms-economic-corridors/>

Currently, ASEAN Economic Community is a topic that has been discussed in all circles and at the same time, we often heard the GMS Economic Corridors which is important for the economic development of the ASEAN region.

GMS Economic Corridors is a transportation link between the major cities in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) which consists of Thailand, China (Yunnan Province), Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. The key factors that make the Greater Mekong Sub-region to be considered strategic areas of trade, investment and development are the enormous purchasing power of more than 250 million people with a combined area of 2.3 million square kilometers⁹⁴ compared to the size of Western Europe.

GMS has various resources and advantageous location where is the central link between South Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia. The Economic Corridor Project is another attempt to raise the level of development, promotion of economic growth and capacity building of GMS countries in the world trade arena through the integration of countries both inside and outside the region.

GMS Economic Corridors focuses on the development of several basic utilities, especially transportation routes, electricity systems, telecommunications, the environment, and the law for using as the Raw-material distribution and the conveyor paths, the tourism support with the objective to promote growth in industries, agricultures, trades, investments and services, to promoting employment, to create opportunities and to improve the equal people quality which the Asian Development Bank (ADB) being the main financial supporter.

The GMS Economic Corridors are divided into 3 main routes which are:

1. North-South Economic Corridor: NSEC connects Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and China, consisting of 3 sub-routes which are

1.1 Route R3A connects southern China with Laos and Thailand. With the beginning from Kunming to Mohan, Bo Ten and Huai Sai of Laos, to Thailand in Chiang Khong district and ending in Bangkok. Currently, R3A is considered that is one of the busiest traffic congestion routes after the 4th Thai-Laos Friendship Bridge (Chiang Khong-Huai Sai) was completed and officially opened on December 11, 2013.

1.2 The R3B route has the same starting point in Kunming as R3A but passes through Myanmar to Tachileik and then enters Thailand at Mae Sai District, Chiang Rai Province and ending destination in Bangkok.

⁹⁴ Xinhua News Agency, (March 20, 2006). CCTV to Shoot Mekong Documentary. <http://english.china.org.cn/english/2006/Mar/162522.htm>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

1.3 Route R5 originated from Nanning city in Guangxi province of China to Hanoi and Haiphong port of Vietnam. For Thailand's provinces along the north-south economic route, there are 13 provinces such as Chiang Rai, Phayao, Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang, Phrae, Tak, Kamphaeng Phet, Uttaradit, Phitsanulok, Nakhon Sawan, Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya and Bangkok.

2. East-West Economic Corridor: EWEC connects Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar. This corridor can call a link between the South China Sea and the Andaman Sea consisting of 3 sub-routes which are:

2.1 The R9 route begins at Mawlamyine to Myawaddy to Thailand in Mae Sot district connected to Tak, Phitsanulok, Khon Kaen, Mukdahan and continued to Savannakhet, Hue and ending at Da Nang in Vietnam.

2.2 Route R12 connects the northeastern region of Thailand with Guangxi with the beginning that is in Nakhon Phanom province entered Laos, in Kham Muan province through Ha Tinh, Vinh and Hanoi of Vietnam and ending in Guangxi. After the opening of the 3rd Thai-Laos Friendship Bridge (Nakhon Phanom-Kham Muan) in November 2011, Route R12 is considered the shortest route to transport goods from Thailand to Guangxi Autonomous Region.

2.3 Route R8 begins at Bueng Kan in the Pak Son district of Laos through Vinh to Hanoi of Vietnam and ending at Guangxi. For Thailand's provinces along the east-west economic corridor, there are 7 provinces which are Tak, Sukhothai, Phitsanulok, Phetchabun, Khon Kaen, Kalasin and Mukdahan.

3. Southern Economic Corridor: SEC connects Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, consisting of 2 sub-routes which are:

3.1 The Dawei - Tiki - Bangkok- Aranyaprathet - Poipet - Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh-Wang Tao route, which has high economic potential by crossing various important cities and cross-border transport in high volume at the Aranyaprathet - Poipet border crossing between Thailand - Cambodia and the Moc Bai - Bavet Border crossing between Cambodia - Vietnam.

3.2 The Dawei – Tiki – BanNamPuron – Bangkok - Siem Reap - Steng – Treng -Yeon route, which is an important economic and tourist route between Thailand and Cambodia, including connecting Thailand to central Vietnam via Cambodia. For Thailand's provinces along this route, there are 8 provinces which are Chachoengsao, Prachinburi, Sa Kaeo, Chon Buri, Rayong, Chanthaburi, Trat and Kanchanaburi.

Integrated plan to support the development of special economic corridor in the region

Later, in November 2017, Dr. Somkid Jatusripitak, the Deputy Prime Minister, gave a keynote address "the Integration plan to support the development of special economic corridor in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC)" at the opening ceremony of the 4th Ship Technology for the Next Decade: Ship Tech IV at Peach Convention Center, Pattaya. The Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) received a huge attention from foreign investors which is considered an important future for Thailand.

China's One Belt One Road project has the high-speed trains to Laos. If Nakhon Ratchasima and EEC connect China's One Belt One Road that means prosperity will flow to Thailand and will be able to use that path to connect to various countries on One Belt One Road. The development of these areas required the important projects are: (1) The construction project of the 3rd International Airport, U-TaPao Airport, to be in line with tourism as well as the largest and the most advanced maintenance repair and overhaul in ASEAN. There will be a flight training center and the aviation industry to upgrade to "City of aviation". (2) The high-speed train project connecting to all 3 international airports and (3) The Laem-Chabang Pier Project by developing into a transshipment Port which is a center for container storages and distributions (as well as a port in Nottingham, Netherlands) to be a port of ASEAN, to support neighboring countries in both inbound and outbound as a logistics hub in the ASEAN region.

At the same time, this area will be a new S-Curve investor attraction, with private and governmental sections. There is also a Digital Park project or an innovative city that has research areas, tax policies and immigration policies that motivate researchers and investors to move into Thailand. The important thing is that the EEC must connect to the One Belt One Road by connecting the high-speed train route from Nong Khai - Khon Kaen - Korat - Kaeng Khoi. Kaeng Khoi area is connected by a double railroad to Chachoengsao, Chonburi, to EEC and connects east to west, from Da Nang of Vietnam - Mukdahan - Tak, with a double rail train to Thilawa in Myanmar as the Special Economic Zone and the fast-growing city. When all routes are connected, industrial products from the EEC and industrial estates in the northeast of Thailand can be linked to Myanmar, India and Bangladesh.

The Great Mekong Sub-region Cross Border Transport Agreement (GMS CBTA) was created on November 26, 1999 with the aim of promoting and facilitating In terms of transportation for both international goods and passengers in the GMS sub-region, GMS consists of 20 protocols with important issues as follows: (1) Facilitation of cross-border international shipping in the GMS (2) Single stop inspection and single window inspection (3) Various systems integration related together, such as customs, immigration systems and safety inspection systems and product standards (4) Exchange of traffic rights by allowing cars in GMS countries to receive goods from other countries in the group under the vehicle quota set by each country and (5) Facilitating cross-border facilitation of persons.


Currently, GMS member countries have signed the agreement and ratified all 20 protocols, with Myanmar, last country ratifying Protocol 3, on September 18, 2015, resulting in the agreement GMS CBTA is fully enforced. After enforcement, The Asian Development Bank (ADB), a major financial supporter, has suggested that the annex and the Protocol addendum should be reviewed and revised to match the current situation and economy and to effectively support trade, investment, and tourism in the region. Most recently, on January 1, 2017 was set to start the GMS Road Transport Permit under the GMS CBTA.

Linking Southeast Asia through the GMS Economic Corridors, both hardware connectivity and software connectivity, will enhance ASEAN's potential in all aspects. Transportation and Logistics Increase channels and opportunities for entrepreneurs who are investing or are looking for ways to invest in neighboring countries to be more convenient.

2.2 One Belt One Road in other regions affecting ASEAN

1. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Figure 2- 8. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor



Source: Reuters

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) is the most progressive project among all 6 economic corridors. The completed sub-projects are coal-fired power stations at Qasim Port, motorway between Peshawar and Karachi which the largest cities in Pakistan and the connected road to the deep-sea port of Gwadar which the Pakistani government intends to push to become the largest port in the country by 2055.

China has invested in more than 60 billion US dollars in Pakistan in building various infrastructures. The key project is the construction of a deep-sea port in Gwadar, which is located on the Arabian Sea coast. This port plays an important role as a sea port in China in the west where China can carry oil and various goods from the Persian Gulf to China directly without going through the Strait of Malacca. However, Pakistan is also facing the same problem as Sri Lanka, which lacks the capital and unable to repay loans to China.

2. Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka

Figure 2- 9. The Port of Hambantota



Source: POTENTIAL OF HAMBANTOTA PORT TO BE MARITIME HUB IN INDIAN OCEAN

<http://www.maritimegateway.com/potential-hambantota-port-maritime-hub-indian-ocean/>

After Sri Lanka gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, the country experienced internal problems between the Sinhalese (Buddhism), the majority of the nation, and Tamil (Hinduism). At that time, Western countries pressured the Sri Lankan government, in the case of Sri Lanka using forces to destroy Tamil, but China is one of the countries that helped and gave loans and investments to Sri Lanka. When the civil war ended in 2009, China has become a lender in Sri Lanka for more than 6

billion US dollars in the large-scale infrastructure development projects such as roads, railways, airports, harbors, and power stations.

Hambantota Port is a new port in the south-eastern part of Colombo, where the Sri Lanka government has desired to develop into a deep-sea port and a new industrial zone. In 2004, Because the port of Hambantota was affected by the tsunami, Sri Lanka needed maintenance and investment, The China Charity Federation had provided 10 million yuan (about 1.21 million US dollars) of emergency aid to Sri Lanka after the tsunami hit the country in December 2004.⁹⁵ The Export-Import Bank of China has invested an additional 85 percent of the project and began operations in 2010, which, according to the plan, this port will develop to be the largest port in South Asia that needed an investment more than 600 million US dollars. The Sri Lankan government lacks of investment, therefore The Sri Lankan has to rely on additional Chinese loans.

Later, the Sri Lankan government faced a financial crisis and was unable to pay its old debts to China on schedule. Including the port of Hambantota is not successful in business. Therefore, on July 24, 2017, the Sri Lankan government announced the sale of 70 percent of the Hambantota Port value of 1.12 billion US dollars to China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited and the company requested to rent the port for 99 years.⁹⁶ By this contract giving special privileges is that the company can negotiate an extension at lease additional 99 years, including requesting to rent a nearby area about 6,000 acres for an industrial estate development.

The BBC News reported in May 2017 that this Hambantota harbor used Chinese capital to build, but the port does not have enough business because of the place without industry source. Chinese developing area into a large economic zone in the immediate vicinity are still causing conflicts with local people. For example, in January 2017, people living in the Hambantota area protested, people said that this area will definitely become a Chinese colony in the future, and there were objections to the project that the Chinese military may use this port as an army base.⁹⁷

Government of India has concerned that China get a stronghold near the southern region of India and China is developing ports in Myanmar and Pakistan. Besides, analysts considered that Sri Lanka is China's maritime oil transportation route from the Middle East, making it a major factor in Chinese investment.

⁹⁵ Xinhua. (May 10, 2005). China to build village for Sri Lanka's tsunami victims. <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/china-build-village-sri-lankas-tsunami-victims>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁹⁶ PTI. China holds back Hambantota Port deal's final tranche of \$585 million to Sri Lanka. (June 10, 2018). <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-holds-back-hambantota-port-deals-final-tranche-of-585-million-to-sri-lanka/articleshow/64532449.cms?from=mdr>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

⁹⁷ BBC NEWS. Sri Lanka signs deal on Hambantota port with China. (July 29, 2017). <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40761732>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

3. Chinese-European railway transportation

Figure 2- 10. The Chinese-European railway



Source: Xiamen Canter Supply Chain Management

The first Chinese-European railway line opened in late April 2015. The total distance is 9,286 kilometers, starting from Chengde - the border of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the west of China through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland, traveling 12 days through 5 countries.

Most of the products exported from China to Europe are electronic components with based production in Chengde. This railway encourages Chengde to use rail transport instead of Air freight to reduce costs. There are not many imported products in Europe such as BMW car parts, wine drinks and meat. The manager of Chengde International Inland Port Operation (CIPO) said that CIPO is a company established by the Chinese government to handle and manage the transportation of goods from China to Europe, including supervising negotiations with relevant agencies in various countries that this train passed. In terms of transportation costs, if comparing freight charges by train are 5 times is cheaper than air freight and take less than 45 days of ocean freight. The benefit of countries that trains pass is the fee for using railway tracks. Currently, the past earnings are not profitable and the Chinese government must subsidize. Despite having a negative return on investment, it is a project with economic benefits that are worthwhile. If the private sector comes to do it themselves, there is not enough motivation.

Since 2011, China-Europe railway express has witnessed rapid development, the scale and quality present the blowout growth. At present, China-Europe railway express has become the landmark achievement of “One belt And One Road” construction. Up to now, there are total 20 railway express from china to Europe. Details as below:⁹⁸

1. China - Europe railway express (Chongqing to Duisburg). It starts from Chongqing Tuanjie village station and leaves from Alashan pass. It passes through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Duisburg station in Germany. The whole journey is about 11,000 kilometers and total transit days is about 15 days.

2. China - Europe railway express (Chengdu to Rhodes). From Chengdu station, exits from Alashan pass, via Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus to Lodz station, Poland, the whole distance is about 9,965 kilometers, the operation time is about 14 days.

3. China - Europe railway express (Zhengzhou to Hamburg). It starts from Zhengzhou Putian station and leaves from Alashan pass. It passes through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Hamburg, Germany. The whole journey is about 10245 kilometers and transit time is about 15 days.

4. China - Europe railway express (Suzhou to Warsaw) It starts from Suzhou and leaves from Manzhouli. It passes through Russia and Belarus to Warsaw station in Poland. The whole distance is 11,200km and takes about 15 days.

5. China - Europe railway express (Wuhan to Czech Republic, Poland). Starting from Wujiashan station in Wuhan and departing from Alashan pass, through Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus to relevant cities in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, the whole journey is about 10700 kilometers, with a running time about 15 days.

6. China - Europe railway express (Changsha to Duisburg). Starting station in Changsha Xiagin cargo yard to Duisburg, Germany, through the Alashan pass in Xinjiang, and through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany. The whole journey is about 11808 km, running days is about 18 days.

7. China - Europe railway express (Yiwu to Madrid). From Yiwu west railway station to Madrid, Spain, through the Alashan pass exit, via Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, France, Spain, the distance is about 13052 km, and the running time is about 21 days.

⁹⁸ Xiamen Canter Supply Chain Management. CHINA-EUROPE RAILWAY EXPRESS. (September 10, 2018). <http://www.canterlogistics.com/CHINA-EUROPE-RAILWAY-EXPRESS-1-2-id6422856.html>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

8. China - Europe railway express (Harbin to Russia). From Harbin-Xiangfang railway station to Biliang railway station in central Russia for 10 days. The whole train runs 6,578 kilometers, 1004 kilometers by Binzhou railway to exit from Manzhouli port station, and 5,574 kilometers by Siberian railway to Beiliang station.

9. China - Europe railway express (Harbin to Hamburg). From Harbin east, via Manzhouli and Russia, from Baikal to Chita, to the Russian Siberian railway, from Ekaterinburg in Russia and Moscow to Malachevich in Poland, to Hamburg, Germany, the whole distance is 9,820 kilometers.

10. China - Europe railway express (Baoding to Minsk, Belarus). It started from Baoding and Manchuria via Russia and finally reached Minsk, Belarus. The whole journey is about 9,500 kilometers, which takes about 12-14 days.

11. China - Europe railway express (Xining to Antwerp). It takes about 12 days to run the first China-Europe railway express in Tibet Plateau from the Shuangzhai railway logistics center in Xining, Qinghai province to Antwerp, Europe's second largest container port in Belgium.

12. China - Europe railway express (Guangzhou to Moscow). It opened on August 29, 2016, starting from Guangzhou Dali station, and departing from Manzhouli through Moscow, Russia. The whole distance is about 11,500 kilometers.

13. China - Europe railway express (Qingdao to Moscow). On June 24, 2017, under the supervision of the Qingdao customs, the train carrying 41 containers started from the Qingdao multi-modal transport customs supervision center and left through the Manzhouli port to Moscow, Russia, marking the official opening of the China-Europe line (Qingdao). The container contains local machinery equipment, tire rubber, household appliances and other goods in Qingdao. The entire route covers 7,900 kilometers and total distance is about 22 days.

14. China - Europe railway express (Changchun to Hamburg). A China-Europe international freight train loaded with auto parts and textiles leaves Changchun international port on October 13, 2017, with 42 carriages leaving Manzhouli for Hamburg, Germany. With the launch of China-Europe train from Changchun to Hamburg, Changchun international port was officially opened. The train, operated by China railway container transport co., LTD., started in several cities in European countries such as Russia, Belarus, Poland, Belgium and Germany, with a maximum speed of 120 kilometers per hour and a journey of about 12-15 days.

15. China - Europe railway express (Nanchang to Moscow). The first China-Europe rail line (Nanchang-Moscow) in Nanchang is set sail at the Tangtang railway port, marking the official opening of the China-Europe rail line from Nanchang to Moscow, April 20, 2018.

16. China - Europe railway express (Tangshan to Belgium). An international container train bound for Antwerp, Belgium, leaves the Jingtang port area of Tangshan port on April 26, 2018. The train started from the port of Tangshan, Beijing and Tanggang, and passed through Beijing, Hohhot, Baotou, Hami and Urumqi. It passed through the port of Alashankou and reached Antwerp, Belgium through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany.

17. China - Europe railway express (Chengdu to Vienna) on April 27, 2018, the first China-Europe rail direct to Vienna, Austria arrived at the destination. The first China-Europe train to Vienna started from Chengdu on April 12, traveling 9,800 kilometers across six countries of Asia and Europe.

18. China - Europe railway express (Wuhan to Hamburg, Germany) was shipped from Hubei-Xiangyang north station, the first visit to Han's "duct" international freight trains carrying Dongfeng-Citroen Automobile co., LTD., Xiangyang factory enterprise production such as engine, auto parts, bearings, instrument, etc., the Hong Kong international airport in Wuhan railway union of central railway station use Han-European trains, to go through the ala Shan Kou, bound for 12000 miles away in Hamburg, Germany.

19. China - Europe railway express (Inner Mongolia autonomous region to southeast Iranian city of bam) central European trains ready for shipment at the Salang logistics park on September 4, 2018. Another international freight railway line from the Inner Mongolia autonomous region has been opened. The first train, carrying 41 containers worth about 10 million yuan, left the Salang logistics park in the southeast of Hohhot and arrived 15 days later in the south - eastern Iranian city of bam, more than 9,000 kilometers away.

20. China-Europe railway express (Urumqi to Duisburg, Germany) on May 28, 2016, the first international freight train from Urumqi to Duisburg left the Urumqi platform. Starting from Xinjiang, China to Germany (Urumqi to Duisburg) west bound international freight train. The starting route is estimated to take 10 days each way, with a total distance of 8000 kilometers.

4. The first Russian-Chinese border bridge

Figure 2- 11. The first Russian-Chinese border bridge



Source: TASS

The first Russian-Chinese border bridge was completed and connected from Blagoveshchensk, Amur region in the Far East of Russia to Heihe, Heilongjiang in the Northeast of China, after spending more than 20 years preparing for construction with the budget, 18,800 million rubles. In 2015, Russian President, Vladimir Putin officially visited the People's Republic of China and signed an agreement with the Chinese government on the bridge construction over the Amur River or the Heilongjiang river in Chinese language. The bridge links the Russian Far East region with the Northeast of Heilongjiang Province in China. Blagoveshchensk is the only district center in Russia, located directly on the state border; across the Amur River is the Chinese city of Heihe. The bridge is estimated to allow about 3 million people, 6 million tons of cargo or 300,000 vehicles cross the border every year. The bridge is over 1 km long, while the entire border crossing is 20 kilometers, including 6 kilometers of road in China and 13 kilometers of approaches in Russia.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Ministry greenlights opening of first car bridge between Russia and China. (MAY 1, 2020). <https://tass.com/society/1155199>. [Accessed April 25, 2020.]

CHAPTER III

3.The Impact on the development of new transportation foundation

3.1 Trade Opportunities and trade cooperation of BRICS in ASEAN

The Silk Road is trade and investment opportunities. China's investment and developed countries along the Silk Road making ASEAN to achieve the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC 2025), especially in the infrastructure connection. In this regard, ASEAN takes advantage of the cooperation mechanism from countries in which China plays a role. It will help to stimulate more using from the free trade agreements and to develop economic cooperation with other countries or regions in which China is already a member. ASEAN Member Countries will have the opportunity to invest in Chinese provinces or autonomous regions on the new Silk Road, such as Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is the main point of the Silk Road Economic Belt and Fujian Province is the main point of the Maritime Silk Road. In addition, many countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion, (GMS) are using of the China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridor (CICPEC) to connect trade and investment with the Pearl River Delta economic region, which is currently developing as a Pan- Pearl River Delta (PPRD) or "Cooperation 9 + 2".

Increasing of efficiency and capacity development in the transportation network system is an important factor in stimulating economic growth and in enabling entrepreneurs in various businesses to take benefits from doing business in accordance with economic corridor is a connection point for transportation systems. For example, travel agencies, gas stations on the main road route, the truck transportation business between railway stations, ports, airports, advertising on trains and restaurants, which supports the growth of the city, the growth of consumption and the economy in the corridors. Besides, the direct and indirect benefits mentioned make the implementation of the infrastructure readiness and facilities preparation plan to support the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which summarized by objectives as follows:

1) Transportation connects between the production base, the main economic city within the country and the domestic trades as results of the airport development to support the AEC, the new double-railroad development, the intercity-highway development of the border crossing land and the Andaman port development resulting in a convenient and efficient link to ASEAN members and the world market which will support the same market and production base.

2) Transportation systems are sufficient to the needs of freight and passenger transportation as results of the expansion of ASEAN highways into 4 - lane roads, increasing efficiency of major airports.

3) Increased efficiency in transportation, resulting in traveling that is convenient, fast, safe, economical, reliable and environmentally friendly as results of the potential development and capability of the important border checkpoints.

China has enormous funds to invest in infrastructure and transportation links connecting China and ASEAN. Southeast Asia is an important region for China. The Asian Development Bank or ADB estimated that Asia needs investment in infrastructure construction around 8 trillion US dollars in the next 10 years. Nowadays, there are many projects in China and ASEAN countries started construction, such as Kunming - Vientiane high speed train route. In addition, China is going to invest in building the Malaysia – China - Kuantan industrial estate, Melaka Gateway port, railroad route along the eastern coast of Malaysia and the train route from Bangkok to Nong Khai.

Russia supports the BRI because Russia needs the trade liberalization and the strengthening of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), therefore; the BRI is the most appropriate for the mentioned objectives. In addition, China and Russia also have cooperation in space, nuclear power. Since China is a large market for goods and is a source of funding for technology as well as infrastructure factors, while Russia is rich in mineral resources which needs capital, technology, and basic factors for effective management.

The Russian Far East region is a gateway between Europe and Asia, existing a geographical advantage that will be coordinated directly at the local level with the Chinese side collaborated throughout agricultures, logistics and ports, hoping to extend to the high-technology and tourism industries as well. In July 2019, a 972-meter electric cable car is started building to pass through a beautiful view linking Heihe City with Blagoveshchensk across the Heilongjiang or Amur rivers to promote tourism between each other, in which each round can carry 80 passengers or in a year it will be able to transport up to 6 million passengers.¹⁰⁰ Heihe is expected to have 10 percent more tourists and this project is expected to be completed in 2021. The China - Russia infrastructure construction project can rapidly increase trade value. Increasing the ease ways of transportation between China and Russia through the new bridge construction project will increase trade value and will reduce transportation costs. If any product is a competitor of ASEAN products, it will increase on cost advantage and on more price level. From the point of view of logistics, this route may be a new transportation for ASEAN to penetrate into the Eurasian Economic Union, which uses rail transportation as the main route reducing

¹⁰⁰ Tian Xuefei and Zhou Huiying in Harbin, China Daily. (July 20, 2019) Cableway to improve border crossing <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/20/WS5d326547a310d8305640008c.html>. [Accessed May 20, 2020.]

transportation costs and being faster than before. Currently, most ASEAN products are used by sea to transport the Russian port of Saint Petersburg in Russia. It takes approximately 1.5 months before being distributed to other cities. This new route may help to save product costs and to increase the ability to compete significantly.

In 6 years, the One Belt One Road policy has been continuously implemented through the following 3 main tools:

1) Development plans in accordance with 6 economics corridors and the development of the Maritime Silk Road

2) Establishing the Silk Road Fund and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to be the main financial institution to support and drive various projects

3) Creating partner countries on the One Belt One Road through cooperation in various stages, both multilateral and bilateral with an organized summit on international cooperation in every 2 years to disseminate ideas, to track performance and to set the direction for future development.

The One Belt One Road policy creates a link between trade routes that are more efficient and create economic and social changes for the countries passed by. China has a clear advantage in delivering goods that are convenient and faster. In addition, there is also moving labors from China to work in countries with the construction infrastructure. However, China's push for the construction of infrastructure, such as roads, railways or gas pipelines in countries that are not ready for economic conditions, these countries have both of risks and opportunities for economic and social problems, such as debt, corruption domestic intervention etc.

Although China's new Silk Road policy is being questioned about sincerity because many countries are suspicious that the BRI is the instrumental in spreading China's influence on the global and BRI is a proactive development strategy that China is fully committed to push causing changes to the balance of power in the world. However, The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) held on April 25-27, 2019, it was received attention. There are both leaders and representatives representing more than 150 countries. The opening statement of President Xi Jinping¹⁰¹ can clearly show the trends and directions of the new Silk Road development strategy that China adheres with integrity to the principles of discussion and creation, promote multilateralism, jointed mission must be done together, pushing all parties shown their own advantage to utilize the ability of each party to implement

¹⁰¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. Working Together to Deliver a Brighter Future for Belt and Road Cooperation, Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China At the Opening Ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. (April 26, 2019). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1658424.shtml. [Accessed May 20, 2020.]

all forms of cooperation, such as bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral. China focuses on strengthening cooperation for international development in order to create more development opportunities for developing countries, to help them out of poverty and to achieve sustainable development, to increase cooperation with the United Nations in promoting development and to try to reduce development inequality. From the above statement shown that the direction of the implementation of the China's new Silk Road is still committed to the pursuit of cooperation at various levels to connect and contact with each other internationally by adding measures to create transparency and focus on environmental protection.

China has been attacked by tactic, the method of action to achieve the objectives of the strategy. This strategy is "debt trap" which is huge loans to many countries, including Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, as well as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and ASEAN countries which are on the path of the China's 21st century Silk Road strategy. If the country loaning from China lacks repayment to China, those countries will be forced to allow China on anything. The obvious example is that Sri Lanka has to authorize to China for 99-year port of Hambantota, where has loaned money from China to build, because Sri Lanka owes a total of 64,000 million dollars to China.

In 2018, Chinese financial institutions provided funds for the BRI project over 440,000 million US Dollars, with 11 Chinese banks opened 76 branches in 28 countries, while banks from 22 countries, more than 50 banks came to do transactions in China.¹⁰² The BRI is benefit both technology and infrastructure. The high-speed train projects will create indirect benefits for the many countries, both employment and expansion of the city development, transportation, construction, including in the real estate sector as well.

Yi Gang, governor of the People's Bank of China said that, 'China would take measures to contain the debt risks related to the BRI projects and take a market based approach in financing projects, rely on commercial funds and private sector investment thus, reduce the amount of funds available for concessional financing. He said that henceforth investment and financing decisions should "fully consider a country's overall debt capacity... to ensure debt is sustainable."¹⁰³

¹⁰² Yi Gang: Deepen investment and financing cooperation for quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative. (April 25, 2019). <https://www.bis.org/review/r190502e.htm>. [Accessed May 20, 2020.]

¹⁰³ Manoj Joshi. Assessing the Belt and Road Initiative. (May 02, 2019). <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/assessing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-50448/>. [Accessed May 20, 2020.]

Finance Minister Liu Kun said that China had published a “debt sustainability analysis framework” to prevent risks from spiraling out of control, based on World Bank and IMF research into low-income nations’ debt capacity.¹⁰⁴

In response to remarks made by Yi and Liu, IMF Chief Christine Lagarde welcomed the decision to focus on long-term success and debt sustainability in building safe and long-standing projects.¹⁰⁵

3.2 Problems and barriers in the development of economic cooperation.

However, the BRI will have tremendous positive effects on ASEAN, BRI is likely have many negative effects on ASEAN as follows:

The huge Chinese investment in ASEAN infrastructures will make China to be an economic leader in the region and to be able to determine the direction of the ASEAN economy. The South China Sea disputes are still pending issues. In 2016, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) granted a judicial resolution that China cannot claim possession of islands in the South China Sea, but China did not accept the verdict. The Chinese attitude has caused damage to China's prestige and reputation in the views of ASEAN countries as China is not responsible and respect international laws which greatly affected the image of China leading to distrust towards China and causing many countries to be paranoid about China's ambition in the BRI.

In addition, ASEAN separated is an important disadvantage of the BRI. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have relied seriously on the Chinese economy; therefore, they have a supportive attitude to the BRI while other ASEAN countries is half resist and half yield. For example, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, have tried to balance the Great Powers in the region without wanting any the Great Power to dominate in the ASEAN region. These countries are still suspicious of the BRI's real goals and be worried that, if they fully supported the BRI, that will make their country too dependent on the China economy and China may dominate their economy losing diplomatic independence and will no longer be neutral which must have an attitude to support China in all matters.

ASEAN members have a different attitude particularly concerned about the economic reliance on China and the deep fear that the BRI will make China dominate the region and will change the geopolitics and economics of Asia risen China to be the centerpiece or center of regional architecture.

¹⁰⁴ Manoj Joshi. Assessing the Belt and Road Initiative. (May 02, 2019). <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/assessing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-50448/>. [Accessed May 20, 2020.]

¹⁰⁵ Manoj Joshi. Assessing the Belt and Road Initiative. (May 02, 2019). <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/assessing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-50448/>. [Accessed May 20, 2020.]

Many ASEAN countries use a half resist and half yield strategy. Although diplomatically speaking elegantly with China, ASEAN has to interact with China and support the BRI, these countries are still suspicious of China wanting to dominate the region. Although China has always said that China will emerge peacefully, there is no country to believe it completely.

Another issue is that BRI divides ASEAN. China invited ASEAN countries to attend the BRI Summit. China has chosen to invite leaders of 7 ASEAN countries to participate in the meeting, namely Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, but China does not invite Thai, Singapore and Brunei leaders to attend the meeting. In the case of Singapore, it is clear that in the past, China was unhappy that Singapore's attitude towards the South China Sea and Singapore is a close alliance with the United States. In the case of Thailand, Thai leaders was not invited because Thai negotiations to build high-speed trains Bangkok - Korat is unsuccessful. In the BRI Summit, leaders of other Great Powers competing with China were not invited to attend the meeting, such as the United States, Japan, India, Australia, as well as leaders from Western Europe. These countries have the same idea: they are suspicious of the risen of China and want to block the spread of Chinese influence.

China cannot be able to take advantages from other countries in ASEAN, except that they will allow China to take advantages. For example, some countries in Africa need of rapid infrastructure development, while ASEAN countries need to consider what they will achieve benefits, if they have joint ventures with China, including the negotiations made both sides have a clear agreement. ASEAN will benefit from direct connectivity within the CLMVT, enhancing regional trade and investment, and utilizing sea routes, which will help reduce disputes between China and other countries. The BRI will support the ASEAN logistic systems and the ASEAN market for entrepreneurs to increased export to "African countries". Currently, exports from ASEAN to European countries normally can still be shipped by shipping, taking approximately 21 to 30 days and 18 days by train from Chengdu to Europe.

Although BRI is a project that benefits other countries in the world, BRI still faces obstacles that prevent some projects from going ahead as planned. The first obstacle is that the limitation of debt support of the countries that China invests in and the construction of infrastructure is a project that requires high investment. The participating countries, which are mostly developing countries, therefore they need to rely on loans from China, causing some countries with already high levels of public debt to bear more debt and to be in the risk of being unable to pay back the debt in the future. For example, Laos and Sri Lanka, which currently have high public debt. The same problem caused the Malaysian government to negotiate to reduce the size of the Eastern Seaboard Railroad Project by one - third from original investment which this project is a part of the Chinese Economic Corridor Plan in the Indo-china Peninsula.

The second obstacle is that the resistance and skepticism in the Chinese proposal. The BRI is a tool that China uses to expand its influence on the world stage. Wherever China invests, If China is not a large lender, China will often accompany domestic labor and construction materials causing some countries to start to see that in the end. China is the main beneficiary of the BRI while the counterparty countries may have to bear enormous debt burden in the future with the rate of debt increased and expensed according to the size of investment in infrastructure development projects and may not create much more employment in the country. These are the main points that competing the Great Powers as the United States of America uses to attack the BRI project and makes many countries in Europe still untrusting to join with China. Aside from the United States and India are also a country that clearly rejects the BRI policy because the joint program between Pakistan and China overlaps the area where India is having ownership disputes with Pakistan. India is not happy that China encroach on Indian sovereignty.

The Chinese maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean is wider especially for economic development and the regional integration and subsequently, to establish military base in the Indian ocean region. However, India's plan in the Indian ocean region is to counter China's growing maritime power in the region. Therefore, in this direction, India has a pragmatic strategy for the regional engagement with all. But balancing China's economic and military intrusion in the region is formidable and more complex challenge. India's relations with ASEAN under the strategic interests and concerns. India's policy towards ASEAN has witnessed a shift from just 'looking towards east' to that of 'engaging with the east' because of the changes in the global politics as a result of 'China's rise'. This 'China factor' has thereby elevated the paradigm of India-ASEAN relations to that of a 'Strategic Partnership' from being 'Dialogue Partners'.¹⁰⁶

For ASEAN, the negative impact of cooperation on the New Silk Road is not only an economic relation, but also a geopolitical relation. Therefore, it is considered a sensitive issue in foreign policy, which effect on relations with other Great Powers. The important thing is that ASEAN member countries may be affected by Chinese migration because China is experiencing a shortage of resources. There is a possibility that Chinese investors will advance to use the land in the form of "land grabbers" in ASEAN which may create economic disparities.

¹⁰⁶ "India's ASEAN Policy and the 'China Factor': From 'Look East' to 'Engaging with the East'", in "Regional Diplomacy: SAARC, ASEAN and BRICS", WORLD FOCUS, Vol. XXXVI, No. 09, September 2015, pp. 104-110.

CONCLUSION

For China, the BRI project is helping to expand China's influence on the world stage through funding, infrastructure development, and investment with Chinese companies. This is also the way to reduce excess supply in the country by investing in construction materials produced in China to invest in various project partners. On the other hand, the BRI project has increased the role of the renminbi as the world's major currency.

China's BRI in ASEAN aims to develop the ASEAN economy and trade hidden the significant goals, such as having a gateway to the south of China, supporting the demand for energy resources and domestic production in China, stimulating of the Chinese economy to release of excess supply in China and expanding the Chinese hegemony in the ASEAN region. China is successful with developing countries or countries that do not have the power to negotiate both economically and politically due to the lack of funds and infrastructure systems necessary for economic growth which is a force for countries in ASEAN to find opportunities to participate in the BRI. As for ASEAN, many countries still rely on the China's economy, causing ASEAN to lack unity, thus they do not have bargaining power. At the same time, most of BRI developing countries have benefited from Chinese capital helping to develop infrastructure. The BRI project will expand trade linking to China with large markets while the BRI also will stimulate economic activities and increase the potential for attracting foreign investment of the countries that China invests in the future.

On the one hand, the high-speed rail projects have required enormous investments and take a long time to pay back, but economic and social benefits that follow are enormous. The new economic infrastructure help people in remote areas to have good infrastructure access, to distribute development to cities by road and to enhance the country's economic development potential from improved transportation systems. The BRI is a path to expand the economic opportunities of ASEAN without considering only financial compensation. As for the issue of debt bearing from China, the government in each country should find the most suitable funding source. In addition, many countries that have not had the extreme high-level of public debts are not in a high risk of debt repayment problems, as in some countries. Everything that China thinks and does, depends on almost all interests. Therefore, in defense of China's progress should be based on the interests of ASEAN. By the way, the best defense is "Knowing China" in which ASEAN countries should be closely observe the progress and assess the operational impact of the "Belt and Road" initiative, as well as formulate trade and investment strategies to support both positive and negative impacts.

Russian strategy and foreign policy toward the region Southeast Asia, Russia wants to maintain its role and relations in the ASEAN region. The Great Powers Relations between China and the United States and the South China Sea disputes are made Russia to emphasize its role and influent in regional economic and security interests in Asia Pacific and its partnership as ASEAN, although Russia has less trade volume than China or the United States.

The Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) is one of the most important routes for ASEAN to expand trade and investment. Since each country is beginning to develop and the overall economy is growing rapidly, including China. This route is in the western of Chinese region. At the same time, the route from ASEAN to India is not far. The development of this transportation routes along the highway AH1 from India to Mae Sot connecting Burma and India throughout the region to support the ASEAN economic. India needs to expand its influent in the ASEAN region, the same as China.

The leaders of the BRICS countries have demonstrated that the establishment of the BRISC bank is a direct blow to the International financial system and it has also remarkably shown the building of the new global economic order that will bring middle economic powers to the global economic affairs. The BRICS bank is going to play an important role in financial policies of the developing countries. Moreover, the BRICS countries have their own currency for trade and exchange among the member countries, this step clearly shows a dent on China's Yuan is going to rise gradually at the global level.

The benefits ASEAN receiving from the Chinese railway route expansion plan in ASEAN is the new infrastructures. Currently, many ASEAN governments are loaning from China, in order to invest in building the infrastructure in a very shortage country. In addition, ASEAN will also benefit from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is an economic cooperation framework between 10 ASEAN countries and six existing partners which China, Russia and India have participated. However, ASEAN may have to be cautious of Chinese influence. China as an important creditor will hold economic influent with many conditions for the benefit of China solely. Even though, the whole BRI projects will cause a lot of Chinese influence in the ASEAN region, in reality, these projects will also create cooperation between ASEAN and other regions.

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