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**Canadian and Russian Arctic Governance Systems: A  
Comparative Analysis**

**Канадская и российская системы управления  
Арктикой: сравнительный анализ**

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**Key Words:** Arctic Governance, Human Security, Canadian Arctic Policy, Russian Arctic Policy, Post Colonialism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Arctic Council, Arctic Policy-making, International cooperation.

**Abstract:**

This study compares both Canadian and Russian domestic Arctic governance systems and explores factors that impact Arctic policy making, positing that shared Arctic ambitions provide common ground for improved diplomatic relations. An exploration of theoretical context affecting Arctic IR is provided, followed by a historical analysis of both governance systems, and then a comparative analysis of the latest Arctic policies of Canada and Russia, set against 7 dimensions of human security consideration. Ultimately, the analysis of Russian and Canadian governance, in terms of their latest Arctic policies, puts forward that as changes occur more rapidly due to global warming, there will be a greater need to establish improved governance frameworks to accommodate new circumpolar changes. Non-state actors are felt to have a stronger influence over Canadian policy, whereas interdepartmental competitiveness and jurisdictional overlap is described as encumbering Russian policy. In terms of economic ambitions, legal frameworks, and improved human security provision, there is broad policy alignment, however, there are differences in terms of military defence and the proposed scale of utilisation of the NSR. The paper concludes that there is far greater policy alignment than there is discordance, and that there is ample scope for the human security progress made in these policies to be built upon.

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## 1. Introduction and Background

Few would dispute the increasing significance of the Arctic region in International Relations, not only owing to trade routes opening up as a result of global warming,<sup>1</sup> but equally due to the vested interest powerful state actors have in this emerging source of natural resources.<sup>2</sup> However, from a policy standpoint, even though the circumpolar North has provided a working example of how International Relations diplomacy (IR hereafter) can bridge divides between historically conflictual relations, there remain challenges between Realist and Liberal intergovernmentalist approaches to ensuring continued peace and prosperity in the region, which necessitate a more pragmatic road map for future policy cooperation. Essentially, it is a question of suitably incorporating human security concerns into a framework which is mutually palatable for state-led, and non-state-led, parties interested in the region's continued development.

In recent years, much of the literature on Arctic IR has focussed around the competition for dominance over maritime affairs<sup>3</sup> and natural resources,<sup>4</sup> territorial claims,<sup>5</sup> or the impact of emerging Russo-Chinese cooperation. Indeed, the study of the interactions between Realism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism has run alongside a broader questioning of the role that bilateral and multilateral relations will play in shaping the future of the region,<sup>6</sup> and the significance that non-state actors such as the Arctic Council will play in further developing

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<sup>1</sup> George Backus, "Arctic 2030: What Are the Consequences of Climate Change?: The US Response," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 68, no. 4 (2012): 9–16, doi: 10.1177/0096340212451568.

<sup>2</sup> A. Zabanbark and L. I. Lobkovsky, "Circumpolar Oil-and-Gas-Bearing Basins of the Arctic Part of the North American Continent," *Oceanology* 55, no. 5 (2015): 750–59, doi: 10.1134/S0001437015050185.

<sup>3</sup> Haig Cholakian, "Arctic Agenda: A Heated Race for Control of the World's Coldest Waters," *Harvard International Review* 39, no. 2 (2018): 48–52.

<sup>4</sup> Zabanbark and Lobkovsky, "Circumpolar Oil-and-Gas-Bearing Basins of the Arctic Part of the North American Continent."

<sup>5</sup> Lucas Laursen, "Russian Claim Heats up Battle to Control Arctic Sea Floor," *Science* 349, no. 6249 (2015): 678, doi: 10.1126/science.349.6249.678; Jeffrey J. Smith, "Reach for the Top Canada's 2019 Extended Continental Shelf Claim in the Arctic," *Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy* 4, no. 2 (2019): 246–52, doi: 10.1163/24519391-00402008.

<sup>6</sup> Ekaterina Ananyeva, "Russia in the Arctic Region: Going Bilateral or Multilateral?," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 10, no. 1 (2019): 85–97, doi: 10.1177/1879366518814655.

multi-lateral relations between states.<sup>7</sup> Yet underpinning this, there are broader human security concerns and representational challenges regarding indigenous populations which must be addressed, not least how an intergovernmental forum can provide otherwise marginalised indigenous populations with a platform to affect policy.<sup>8</sup>

Situations such as the 2014 Crimean Crisis limit relations between Canada and Russia, undermining diplomatic relations globally and resulting in diplomatic deterioration which subsequently slows progress in the Arctic. The question becomes, whether stronger systems of co-governance can be established, in the face of wider geo-political tensions between Arctic nations. Although there are many factors, this paper will look at how these tensions are shown as stemming from Canada and Russia having key differences in their governance structures. However, due to the unique nature of the Arctic, there is sufficient common ground, both literally and metaphorically, for progress to continue, particularly in terms of Arctic policy agendas, which show a region that experiences peace and cooperation.

The general features of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Realism as they pertain to IR are well documented, and there have been calls from as far back as 2012 for the establishment of neutral ground on which to build stronger relations,<sup>9</sup> with calls for a human security foundation to Canadian policy,<sup>10</sup> and for greater regional cooperation on human security across the region.<sup>11</sup> By the advent of the 2019 revision of Canada's arctic strategy,<sup>12</sup> Bouffard, Charron and Ferguson had argued for the mutual benefit of improved Russo-Canadian relations,<sup>13</sup> with Sergunin and Konyshv outlining the key actors and decision

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<sup>7</sup> Andrew Chater, "An Explanation for the Growing Institutional Capacity of the Arctic Council," *The Northern Review* 48 (2018): 51–80, doi: 10.22584/nr48.2018.003.

<sup>8</sup> Evgeniia Sidorova, "Circumpolar Indigeneity in Canada, Russia, and the United States (Alaska): Do Differences Result in Representational Challenges for the Arctic Council?," *Arctic* 72, no. 1 (2019): 71–81, doi: 10.14430/arctic67955.

<sup>9</sup> Valery Konyshv and Alexander Sergunin, "The Strategy of Canada in the Arctic and Russia: Is It Possible to Find Mutual Understanding?" 8, no. 98 (2012): 4–26.

<sup>10</sup> Wilfrid Greaves, "For Whom, from What?," *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 67, no. 1 (2012): 219–40, doi: 10.1177/002070201206700115.

<sup>11</sup> Heather Exner-Pirot, "Human Security in the Arctic: Foundation of Regional Cooperation," *Working Papers on Arctic Security* 1, no. January 2012 (2012), doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18371.40480.

<sup>12</sup> Government of Canada, "Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter," *Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy*, (2019), 1–23.

<sup>13</sup> Jim Bouffard, Troy, Charron, Andrea, Fergusson, "A Tale of Two Russia's" in *Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World*, ed. P Whitney Lackenbauer and S Lalonde, *Breaking the Ice Curtain* (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019).

makers that could practically affect change in Russian Arctic policy making<sup>14</sup> and Lagutina having summarised their key concepts of both domestic and international priorities.<sup>15</sup> Key to the debate surrounding Russian policy development, was the question of the approach to bilateral or multilateral relations at the state and non-state levels.<sup>16</sup>

Though historically, a considerable amount of research has centered around Americo-Canadian<sup>17</sup> and Sino-Russian<sup>18</sup> relations, there is an apparent scarcity of papers analysing Canadian and Russian relations directly on the domestic governance level, and how that applies to the circumpolar IR. Given that the majority of the Arctic landmass is Canadian and Russian territory, there still appears to be relatively little research cross-analysing their governance systems, or hypothesizing how their future relations might develop in light of the apparent differences in their governing heritages. Indeed, the question remains, how might a better understanding of these differences in governance approach serve to better inform policy design, bilateral and multilateral negotiations both, and diplomatic relations in general?

To that end, the aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the Canadian and Russian governance systems as they relate to the Arctic, to factor in the often neglected human security considerations of indigenous peoples, and argue for an evolution in how both nations handle Arctic indigeneity, economic, and environmental issues, as constructive aspects of a more holistic approach to governance of the region as a whole. The objectives behind this research are: Firstly, to detail and highlight Canadian and Russian governance, and Arctic governance, in terms of human security, liberal intergovernmentalism, and postcolonialism approaches. Secondly, to give a general overview of Canada and Russia's Arctic governance systems, particularly on domestic policies regarding indigenous peoples, the environment and

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<sup>14</sup> Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshv, "Forging Russia's Arctic Strategy: Actors and Decision-Making," *Polar Journal* 9, no. 1 (2019): 75–93, doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2019.1618549.

<sup>15</sup> Maria Lagutina, "Russia's Arctic Policy in the Twenty-First Century: National and International Dimensions," *Polar Record* 55, no. 6 (2019): 526–27, doi: 10.1017/S0032247419000664.

<sup>16</sup> Ananyeva, "Russia in the Arctic Region: Going Bilateral or Multilateral?"

<sup>17</sup> Whitney Lackenbauer and Rob Huebert, "Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20, no. 3 (2014): 320–33, doi: 10.1080/11926422.2014.977313; Ted L. McDorman, "Canada, the United States and International Law of the Sea in the Arctic Ocean," in *Polar Oceans Governance in an Era of Environmental Change* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 253–68, doi: 10.4337/9781781955451.00024.

<sup>18</sup> Michal Lubina, *Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful* (Leverkusen-Opladen: Leverkusen-Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2017), doi: 10.3224/84742045; Paul Stronski and Nicole Ng, *Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic*, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018).

economy. Lastly, Canadian and Russian domestic governance systems on these three criteria will be compared (economy, environment, and indigenous peoples) and a comparative analysis will be carried out of “Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework” (2019) and Russia’s “Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035” (2020) in terms of human security’s 7 dimensions.

This paper identifies the key characteristics of both Canada and Russia’s most recent Arctic policies, it details how they differ, and the consequences of those differences, and the ways in which they are similar, exploring the implications of those similarities. Moreover, it looks to orient these policy developments within a wider context of seven aspects of human security considerations. It is argued that greater regional autonomy should be afforded the circumpolar regions of Canada and Russia, with an attempt being made to mirror more closely more progressive approaches to human security. While the challenges to such an approach are many, and vary considerably based on the Canadian governance context as much as the Russian (as will be explored in more detail), the resulting benefit to both environmental considerations and human security provision would, as will be outlined, potentiate improved bilateral and multilateral relations at both the state and non-state levels.

The remainder of this paper is divided into the following sections. In section 3, a theoretical framework for Liberal Intergovernmentalism is outlined, along with an analysis of the underpinnings of Human Security, and, of particular relevance to the Canadian and Russian Arctic situation, an exploration of Colonialism and Post-Colonial theory.

Section 4 is comprised of a historical overview of the region, contextualising the history of indigenous peoples in the Russian and Canadian Arctic, exploring the environmental concerns which disproportionately affect the region, and expounding upon the governance system issues facing regional Russo-Canadian cooperation. Building on this foundation, cooperation between Canada and Russia will be chronicled as far back as the Soviet era, alongside an exploration of instances of collaboration in scientific research, maritime safety, and business ventures, before an analysis will be made of non-state actors which influence relations through intergovernmental forums.

In sections 5 and 6, the latest Arctic strategies of Canada and Russia will be analysed in much greater depth, with 7 dimensions of human security being applied to each approach, with a view to analysing how well they achieve these key goals of Human Security satisfaction.



Finally, in the conclusion, a more detailed outline of how greater cooperation might be achieved will be posited, taking account of the unique challenges and contextual issues outlined in the preceding three chapters – ultimately, a call for a thawing in relations will be made, so that the interests of the Arctic can be disentangled from the broader international context, with a view to providing a model in Arctic IR for how non-Arctic geo-political conflict might be reconciled with a more humanistic focus. In spite of the benefits of the Arctic Council as a forum for handling current and future governance dilemmas, it is equally beneficial for both Canada and Russia to have functioning, well-organised governance systems domestically and regionally which extend beyond the Arctic Council. As a potential source of economic growth and strengthened international trade, it is both countries best interest to adapt and be prepared for the unique demands of this new theatre of international politics.

## **2. Research Methodology**

### *2.1 Limitations and Challenges to the Research*

The standout limitations to this thesis concern the process of data collection. Firstly, not reading Russian to an advanced level, the analysis is based on documents written or translated into English, which raises questions of translation theory. Secondly, given the scope of the subject matter being covered, and the scale of the issues facing the region, time constraints have limited the number of documents sourced and included. To narrow the focus to something slightly more manageable, three areas of governance are focussed on: the economy, environment, and indigenous peoples, in relation only to the latest Arctic policies released by Canada and Russia. The timeframe will also be limited to narrow the focus further, from 2009 to 2020.

### *2.2 Qualitative Research Design and Case Study*

Comparative analysis and case study techniques will be used for research purposes regarding the thesis topic. Qualitative approaches have defined the strategy of comparative analysis used in this paper, providing the context within which the items have been compared, the grounds

for comparison, units of comparison, and the hypothesis for research. Through using comparative analysis techniques, it is possible to generalize knowledge relating to Arctic relations between Canada and Russia's Arctic governance systems, through Arctic policy implementation and comparisons, establishing chains of incremental progress, identifying patterns, and then proceeding with further conclusions to explain why they have certain differences, similarities, and challenges, based on three theories: Human Security, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and Post-colonialism.

The development and analysis of theoretical propositions in section 3, prior to the case study research process, is advantageous in progressing the logic of the research design and data analysis. As demonstrated and discussed, the comparative method of Arctic strategy and policy is used, and its application to Arctic governance for Canada and Russia has been applied, using a theoretical framework for framing an informed outline of theoretical and empirical literature. Firstly, the theories outlined in section 3 and the Arctic history overview gathered in section 4 will be incorporated, while two Arctic policy documents from sections 5 and 6 will be used to gauge, in particular, how Canada and Russia advance their national interests and/or common objectives. More specifically, how Canada and Russia pursue those domestic interests on both the domestic and international stages will be explored, including their comparative successes in promoting their national priorities through their Arctic policies and policy agendas.

Moreover, this case allows for an appraisal of Canada and Russia's commitment to domestic environmental, cultural, and economic leadership, and their cooperative efforts intended to serve the whole Arctic community. Indeed, the Northern Arctic strategies are a case in point, chosen because of their current relevance, as they are two of the most up-to-date Arctic strategies. And finally, the analysis of these strategies will be used within the theoretical framework underpinning the thesis as a whole.

Based on Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory assumptions, both the Canadian and Russian Arctic policies steer towards cooperation and call for mutually beneficial policy outcomes among the Arctic states. From a postcolonial perspective, Canada and Russia can be expected to continue to promote their own economic interests as a priority, yet throughout this thesis, it is shown that applying human security's 7 dimensions comparison is the useful method when examining Canada and Russia's latest Arctic policymaking and agendas. Also reflected in these policy papers, however, is a significant focus on with national interests, resources, sovereignty and security concerns in the region.

The fourth chapter will also outline how Canada and Russia's Arctic governance has evolved in their northern territories, particularly concerning the situation of indigenous Arctic peoples and the environment. Historical developments, the evolution of Arctic domestic governance, and the contemporary challenges which faces Canada and Russia's Arctic regions will be analysed using digital archives and scholarly journals, looking not only at how these comparative cases show a certain post-colonialist narrative which can be seen in Canada and Russia's domestic interests and pursuits, but also why there are remaining challenges both federally and regionally.

### *2.3 Primary Data: Document Analysis*

Document analysis has a tradition within qualitative research, and the analysis will be primarily based on governmental documents, policy statements and strategies, so as to portray a more encompassing idea of the political situation in the circumpolar north, a detailed blend of primary and secondary sources will complement the two core texts that the analysis centres around. Added to this primary research will be various supporting documents relevant to Canada's and Russia's Arctic sovereignty and northern territories, as well as scientific publications and research reports have also been incorporated.

Using a binary comparison then, which is the comparison of two items/States/cases, Canada and Russia's Arctic governance systems will be compared via two case studies of "Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework" (2019) and Russia's "Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035" (2020). Three central questions will be addressed as both governance systems are compared and contrasted: 1) Why are there pronounced differences, 2) How are the similarities significant to the region's future, and 3) Does either policy meet the 7 dimensions of Human Security requirements (Economic, Food, Health, Environmental, Personal, Community, and Political security)?

Aiming to complete an intensive comparison of themes and concepts concerning Russian and Canadian Arctic governance, the main qualitative data was sourced primarily from government websites and digital archives, speech/conference transcripts, and official party documents. Of the conference transcripts, Vladimir Putin's speech (September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2011) at

the second International Arctic Forum RIA Novosti was of particular use, as were two key policy documents, Russia's *Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035* (2020) and Canada's *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (2019).

Both policy documents were of considerable value to the research, giving insight into Canada and Russia's domestic priorities, as well as intentions, helping to chart a trajectory from earlier governmental publications of relevance, including the *Human Development Report 1994* and *The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics*.

Two units of comparison for political intentions and processes will be used, while also including variables to examine particular tendencies by comparing particular historical events and activities to understand the logic behind them, as they pertain to present Arctic policies. After trying to determine similarities and differences between the item-to-item comparison, an attempt will be made to determine what the logical/social laws are which determine why there are these particular results are found. For example, when comparing and contrasting Arctic policies in terms of the environment, deductions would be made from a human security and post-colonial frame. When using comparative analysis, it is important to formulate a certain hypothesis, and as such, data collection and analysis will formulate a hypothesis which can then be divided in several different stages. Variables will be used, both independent and dependent, which relate to the logic behind relations between independent variables, and how they influence dependent variables.

Several elements of comparison will be used, such as: frame of reference, grounds for comparison, organizational scheme, and the linking of units. Of particular relevance, frame of reference research implies taking into account the context in which the objects of analysis are compared. In this case, it is important to consider whether Canadian and Russian Arctic policy cases represent the whole that the paper looks to identify, and how specific processes developed while examining its logic and social laws.

Within the secondary analysis, existing information will be revisited, and reconsidered in light of the findings, focusing particularly on the qualitative material, particularly as this can offer up useful conclusions to compliment the primary analysis phase's results, or at the very least bring them into question. As the launch point for the carrying out of this methodology, a detailed search of the SPBU library online databases, EBSCO, and many secondary articles

and reports sourced both from this platform were sourced, along with materials from region/topic specific journals, the findings of which, will be presented in the following chapter.

### **3. Theoretical Frameworks**

What follows in this chapter will outline the theoretical frameworks for the thesis, those of Human Security, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and Postcolonialism. Though the theory gives rise to a multiplicity of views on IR and the prospect of future expansions in co-governance and cooperation, the principal objective about which this paper will revolve is to take the theories as foundations for better explaining state actions and predicting events within the region. While Human Security theory argues that the most crucial threats are environmental, socio-economic, and cultural-linguistic, which are pertinent collectively to states, Liberal Intergovernmentalism holds that, effectively, it is to the mutual benefit of each state's interests that they cooperate through non-state channels alongside more traditional IR means of diplomacy. Underlining this, Postcolonialism theory maintains that there is a negative influence still at play in global politics, based around historical dominance of former-colonial powers, which is as pervasive as it is systemic, preserving the domineering self-interest of the former power over its former subject – a factor which cannot be ignored in any analysis of the Arctic region.

#### *3.1.1 Human Security Theory*

Tracing its history back to the end of the Cold War,<sup>19</sup> to a period in which there was a strong push to eliminate both the arms race and the threat of nuclear war, the founders of human security took this moment as a catalyst to ask fundamental questions of where the focus of security ought to be. Namely, whether it is the state or the individual that should be prioritised when protection is provided through policy, legislation, and the mechanisms of government.<sup>20</sup>

Having undoubtedly reached the end of an era, there was an ideological move away from military security as the predominant concern for IR, making way for a dual consideration

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<sup>19</sup> Exner-Pirot, "Human Security in the Arctic: Foundation of Regional Cooperation," 2.

<sup>20</sup> Heather Exner-Pirot, 2.

of human security.<sup>21</sup> Defined as an approach which focuses on “human development, well-being, and dignity,”<sup>22</sup> one can see within the original human security literature the importance of food underscored as essential to community security, as demonstrated in the 1994 UNDP, the Human Development Report on New Dimensions on Human Security.<sup>23</sup> In essence Paris highlights seven core elements of human security:

“(1) Economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty); (2) food security (e.g., access to food); (3) health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from diseases); (4) environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion); (5) personal security (e.g., physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); (6) community security (e.g., survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups); and (7) political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppress.”<sup>24</sup>

Of the criticisms of this theory, Paris makes the case that this concept is too broad and equally ambiguous, concluding that while human security is a well-meaning set of beliefs which have been successfully applied in several cases, the fact that it offers little substantial meaning or guidelines for academics and policymakers in the real world is a considerable limitation as a concept.<sup>25</sup>

Though it can be argued that such criticisms help to strengthen and make theories more concrete as they evolve in a dialectic with their detractors’ counterclaims, the importance of human security in the Arctic is evident, with it serving as the very foundation upon which regional cooperation and governance has thrived. Organizations such as the Arctic Council were created specifically with the protection of human security in mind, not only in terms of

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>22</sup> Exner-Pirot, “Human Security in the Arctic: Foundation of Regional Cooperation,” 5.

<sup>23</sup> “World Development Report 1994,” *United Nations Development Programme*, (1994), doi: 10.1596/978-0-1952-0992-1.

<sup>24</sup> Roland Paris, “Human Security” Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 26, no. 2 (2001): 90, [www.gpia.info/publications%0Awww.gpia.info](http://www.gpia.info/publications%0Awww.gpia.info).

<sup>25</sup> Roland Paris, “Human Security” Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 90.

environmental protections, but also for societal and cultural survival, centred around cooperation between the invested parties for their mutual benefit and safety.

Central to this thesis then, will be a comparative and contrastive analysis of Canadian and Russian Arctic governance systems, showcasing how human security has always been a significant factor in the region, and highlighting how this will continue to be so in the future for the development of future governance building.

### *3.1.2 Human Security: Criticisms*

Further expounding upon the criticisms of human security, an exploration of its being categorised as an ineffective and overly-broad concept for the Arctic will follow. Developing this line of argument, Buzan describes human security as a “reductionist, idealistic notion that adds little analytical value,”<sup>26</sup> while Chandler summarises three main problems with human security, summarising them as: 1) over-emphasis on post-Cold War security threats; 2) placing of these threats in the developing world; and 3) utilization of short-term planning for long-term strategizing.<sup>27</sup> Basically, the unifying theme apparent in the literature is that there is little faith that human security can follow through on its promise to transform how we approach and practice security.

In response to Chandler’s critique, Owen provides a thorough defence of human security, asserting that anything determined solely through a lens of military security is ultimately flawed.<sup>28</sup> Human Security, however, is not a broad or narrow list, but rather is defined by threats which genuinely, directly affect people, and is a concept that encompasses varied insecurities while narrowing the threats down in a political context, as seen by evidence-based policymaking processes “narrowing the focus on the list of relevant hazards to regions, populations, and states.”<sup>29</sup> Therefore, it is implied that human security, as a process to

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<sup>26</sup> Barry Buzan, “A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value.,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 369.

<sup>27</sup> David Chandler, “Review Essay: Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (2008): 427–38, doi: 10.1177/0967010608094037.

<sup>28</sup> Taylor Owen, “The Critique That Doesn’t Bite: A Response to David Chandler’s ‘Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark,’” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (2008): 445–53, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26299803>.

<sup>29</sup> Wilfrid Greaves, “For Whom, from What?,” *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 67, no. 1 (2012): 236, doi: 10.1177/002070201206700115.

determine actual threats to humans, is a valid and epistemologically sound theory about which to develop policy and research.<sup>30</sup>

Concerning the Arctic itself, Greaves outlines how there are secondary critiques surrounding human security, and it is not a useful tool for analysis concerning Arctic cultural and social contexts.<sup>31</sup> Arguably derived from liberal origins, this theoretical focus on the individual security places its importance squarely alongside state security. A case in point would be Buzan's argument that individuals find meaning in relation to their societies, and are not so easily catered for in general terms.<sup>32</sup>

That said, as Greaves summarises, people as a whole exist in set "communities and economic, social, and political contexts from which their security cannot be readily separated."<sup>33</sup> With regard to the second criticism, human security could fall into another tired trope of "virtuous imperialism" by an interventionist and hegemonic west.<sup>34</sup> Greaves notes that such critiques are undermined by their focus on narrow, violence-centric approaches to human security rather than a holistic framework.<sup>35</sup>

### *3.1.3 Human Security: Canada*

At the vanguard of the international community, Canada has become a leader in using human security as a unifying framework for security policies, championing the principles outlined in the Canadian Northern Dimension of Foreign Policy, those of sustainable development, the participation of indigenous peoples, environmental protection, and cultural diversity.<sup>36</sup> In the post-cold war era, many have alluded to human security being a "central pillar, political leitmotif and ethical guide" in global Canadian affairs.<sup>37</sup> Noted as having made substantial efforts to prioritise the human security agenda on matters of circumpolar significance, it is

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<sup>30</sup> Greaves, "For Whom, from What?" 236.

<sup>31</sup> Greaves, "For Whom, from What?" 236.

<sup>32</sup> Buzan, "A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value," 370.

<sup>33</sup> Wilfrid Greaves, "For Whom, from What?" 237.

<sup>34</sup> Greaves, 237.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 238.

<sup>36</sup> Heather Exner-Pirot, "Human Security in the Circumpolar North: What Role for the Arctic Council?," *Seeking Balance in a Changing North*, (2008): 6.

<sup>37</sup> Greaves, "For Whom, from What?" 238.



unsurprising that Canada took the lead in the formation of the Arctic Council back in 1996, as much to improve its own domestic situation around satisfying northern indigenous groups, as to put itself at the centre of the stage geopolitically.<sup>38</sup>

Although Canada's human security agenda is broadly regarded as a positive, there are several challenges in terms of how Canada has defined and used human security. Mainly, the issue is summarized as stemming from the Canadian method being concentrated largely around the prevention of violence towards humans. Essentially, Greaves argues that in the process of ignoring the socioeconomic and inter-subjective aspects of human wellbeing, the Canadian method is missing the main point and core of holistic human security. The problem is placing the central importance on the role of violence, which is a tool that allows Canada to privilege the state and its institutions over the individuals at the analytical centre of human security, or to put it more conceptually, it ultimately "retains a state-centrism and conceptual narrowness that undermines employing people as the referent objects of security analysis."<sup>39</sup>

Concerning Human Security in Canadian history, one of the most famous Canadian participants is Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's minister of foreign affairs and international trade from 1996-2000. Although he claimed "sustainable human security" was vital in terms acknowledging violent and nonviolent threats concerning the holistic human security definition defined by the UNDP, Axworthy remained at arm's length.<sup>40</sup> By indicating that "Canada has both the capacity and the credibility to play a leadership role in support of human security," and identifying four key policy areas: peacebuilding, anti-personnel landmines, protecting the rights of children, and promoting an international system of rules-based trade<sup>41</sup>, the foundation was established for much of the developments that followed. However, one key obstacle is that the Canadian approach is based on an "inside/outside distinction" and has failed in certain cases to take account of global neoliberalism as a potential systemic issue that could perpetuate human insecurity<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>38</sup> Exner-Pirot, "Human Security in the Circumpolar North: What Role for the Arctic Council?" 7.

<sup>39</sup> Greaves, "For Whom, from What?" 220.

<sup>40</sup> Greaves, 220.

<sup>41</sup> Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," *International Journal* 52, no. 2 (1997): 183-96, doi: 10.2307/40203196.

<sup>42</sup> Greaves, "For Whom, from What?" 226.

One means of mitigating such shortcomings, it is argued, is the adoption of the holistic approach to human security, particularly concerning indigenous peoples and Arctic populations, including them in political, economic, and social frameworks. Notably, there are blockages at the federal level, as indigenous peoples lack legal and representative status, as The Indian Act<sup>43</sup> and similar legal frameworks only served to mould a tenuous relationship between the federal government and First Nations, Metis, and Inuit peoples, that has still “marginalized and infantilized aboriginals, making so-called Indians a special class of persons, legal dependents on the crown, [and] children in the eyes of the law.”<sup>44</sup> Human insecurity of this kind could be said to be a symptom of the constitutional and legal frameworks imposed by the state, and the evidence is seen in the poor conditions at present in these communities.

Regarding the quality of life in Canada’s North, there are statistically significant differences between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples which became more noticeable as time progressed. Summarizing the main findings of the CWB index, factoring in the First Nations, Inuit, and non-Aboriginal communities, spanning a period from 1981 to 2006 it is clear that:<sup>45</sup>

- First Nation and Inuit communities are both 20 and 15 points lower than non-Aboriginal communities respectively.
- Of the 100 lowest scoring Canadian communities on the index, 96 were First Nations, yet only one First Nations community ranked among the highest 100 in 2006.
- Of the lowest scoring 500 communities, 34 were Inuit, yet no Inuit communities ranked in the highest scoring 500.
- While First Nation, Inuit, and aboriginal communities saw scores gradually rise from 1981 to 2006, the gap between First Nation/Inuit and non-Aboriginal communities actually decreased slightly in the earlier part of this period, before widening again between 2001 and 2006.

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<sup>43</sup> The Government of Canada, “The Indian Act” (1876).

<sup>44</sup> Greaves, “For Whom, from What?”, 227.

<sup>45</sup> Indigenous Services Canada, “Community Well-Being Index. Report on Trends in Inuit Communities, 1981 to 2016,” 2019, 1–44, <https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1421175988866/1557322849888>.

### 3.1.4 Human Security: Russia

In terms of human security, official documents and statements indicate that the Russian Arctic is predominantly geared towards national, economic, and military security.<sup>46</sup> The strongest player in the Arctic, Russia can be said to have the most at stake economically in the region, and therefore be the most invested in the region being stable and fertile.<sup>47</sup> As with the conditions in many Arctic areas, the Russian Arctic experiences difficult socio-economic problems owing to a lack of human security considerations in the region, which brings a lot of insecurity and instability to communities residing there. Facing a host of issues, the indigenous peoples of Russia's north have to contend with economic conditions which clash with traditional ways of living, rising rates of disease and infant mortality, and alcoholism, none of which is represented in the official narrative of national security in the region.<sup>48</sup>

A case of particular note would be the environmental situation in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF hereafter), where 27 scientists have listed impact zones where pollution has resulted in health deterioration within domestic Arctic circle regions, as fallout from industrial and military activities.<sup>49</sup> Of the areas most affected in the AZRF, up to 15% of the Murmansk Region is estimated to be contaminated,<sup>50</sup> and the Barents Sea area also possesses the largest amount of military and civilian in the world. Understandably, it cannot be overstated that the AZRF is at considerable risk from nuclear contamination, with “tens of thousands of cubic meters of highly radioactive nuclear waste have collected there.”<sup>51</sup>

Historically, from the years 1964 to 1991, radioactive waste was dumped in the Barents and Kara seas, and the figures of radioactive waste amounted to 319,000 curie in the Barents Sea and 2,419,000 curie in the Kara Sea.<sup>52</sup> It was then in 2017 when the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment proposed an agenda to clean up the garbage in the Arctic thus, since 2010 the AZRF has been “regularly cleaned, as a result of which in 2012 the territory of Alexandra Land, which is part of the Franz Josef Land archipelago, was completely cleaned

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<sup>46</sup> Lassi Heininen, Alexander Sergunin, and Gleb Yarovoy, *Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War* (2014), [https://www.uarctic.org/media/857300/arctic\\_eng.pdf](https://www.uarctic.org/media/857300/arctic_eng.pdf).

<sup>47</sup> Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, 11.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

up; for the period from 2012 to 2015, 40 thousand tons of waste were disposed of in the Arctic and 200 hectares of land were reclaimed.”<sup>53</sup> Special environmental zones have been set up, natural environment areas have been reclaimed, and pollution monitoring systems put in place, alongside which a designated conservation area has been set up around the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and adjoining islands.<sup>54</sup> More precisely, there are 164 areas protected at the federal level, including 12 state reserves, 8 nature reserves, 5 national parks and a botanical garden<sup>55</sup> at present. Stakeholder participation has increased across the region and projects have been implemented to reverse the legacy of environmental damage from the 20<sup>th</sup> Century,<sup>56</sup> with the Russian Arctic aiming to evolve from a ‘resource base’ into a zone of sustainable development.<sup>57</sup>

At the second International Arctic Forum in RIA Novosti (September 23, 2011), Putin gives some insight about the focus of the Arctic as can be seen from this excerpt from his address: “Developing modern infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route is a major objective. We are launching a comprehensive transport project designed to ensure the dynamic development and exploration of our northern territories, resolve vital economic and social challenges and create new production lines and jobs.”<sup>58</sup>

### *3.1.5 Human Security in the Arctic*

An important element to consider when talking about the Arctic is that the political objectives in the Arctic are traditionally of an economic nature (such as: controlling shipping lanes, oil and gas exploitation). Because of this, the economic aspect a military conflict would obstruct instead of furthering political objectives.<sup>59</sup> Michael Byers confirms this idea in an interview “No Militarization of the Arctic” (2013) saying:

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<sup>53</sup> Maximova, “Ustoychivoye razvitiye Arkticheskoy zony”, 35.

<sup>54</sup> Maria Lagutina, “Russia’s Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities,” *Department of World Politics*, n.d., 22.

<sup>55</sup> Press Service of the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia. “Arkticheskiye zapovednyye territorii”.

<sup>56</sup> Lagutina, “Russia’s Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities,” 82.

<sup>57</sup> Lagutina, *Russia’s Arctic Policy*, 82.

<sup>58</sup> Putin, Vladimir. “Vladimir Putin’s speech at the second International Arctic Forum” (speech, second International Arctic Forum, RIA Novosti (September 23, 2011) <https://narfu.ru/en/media/news/21110/>

<sup>59</sup> Exner-Pirot, “Human Security in the Circumpolar North: What Role for the Arctic Council?” 4-5.

“First of all, Russia can't afford to militarize the Arctic. The expense would be prohibitive. The country also needs Western capital and technology to develop its oil and gas resources. And it's also a member of the World Trade Organization. We're not talking about a Cold War here. When we see these statements from Canadian and Russian leaders, they're driven mostly by domestic politics. The reality is that Canada and Russia are integrated in a global economy.”<sup>60</sup>

As many Arctic authorities have illustrated, due to the investment, technology, and time it would take, it is in the interests of the Arctic Eight to guarantee the region is “stable and that the governance framework is as predictable as possible.”<sup>61</sup>

Therefore, this paper will argue that the focus on traditional security issues in the Arctic has become an obstacle regarding crucial resources and even deviates attention away from the human security issues that afflict the Arctic such as the environmental, economic and cultural nature. The analysis of Russian and Canadian governance in terms of Arctic policies will be looked at by these human security objectives: protection of the environment; sustainable economic promotion; and the preservation of cultural practices of the indigenous inhabitants of the Arctic. As the changes occur more rapidly due to global warming there will be a great need to establish a governance framework to deal with these changes, as it would be difficult during the chaotic climate.

### *3.2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory*

Central to the theory surrounding the study of regional integration, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI hereafter) evolved out of mid-1960s traditional intergovernmentalism, first outlined by Hoffmann in 1966.<sup>62</sup> Emerging in response to neofunctionalism, a previously dominant regional integration theory, in many ways intergovernmentalism proved to be a successful approach for better explaining the processes

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<sup>60</sup> Byers, Michael. “No Militarization of the Arctic” (2013). <https://www.dw.com/en/no-militarization-of-the-arctic/a-17290994>

<sup>61</sup> Exner-Pirot, “Human Security in the Circumpolar North: What Role for the Arctic Council?” 4-5

<sup>62</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” *The European Union* 95, no. 3 (1998): 157–71, doi: 10.1007/978-1-349-14817-2\_17.

behind the integration of states in supranational organizations, and the decision making in international bodies generally.<sup>63</sup> LI, however, is a revised framework of intergovernmentalism, which aims at explaining integration by state preferences as being driven by issue-specific preference functions about how to manage globalization.<sup>64</sup>

To begin with, the key assumptions and features of LI will be highlighted, and then the theory will be used to examine important historical and relevant Canadian and Russian Arctic governance systems. By way of a conclusion, an analysis of the criticisms against LI will be outlined, detailing the theories of particular usefulness in relation to the purpose of this paper.

In essence, LI provides a theory of intergovernmental decision making which accounts for a certain level of anarchy within IR. Two basic assumptions are made about international politics within LI: One, that states are actors, depicted as moving to achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining rather than a central authority making and enforcing political decisions.<sup>65</sup> Two, that states are rational. Rationalism is an individualist/agency assumption, by which actors navigate various options of courses of action and chose one that maximizes or satisfies their benefit under the given circumstances.<sup>66</sup> In this sense, agreement to cooperate or establish international institutions is therefore explained as a collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations.<sup>67</sup>

In keeping with LI theory, decisions to cooperate internationally can be seen as a three-stage framework with a distinct theory for each step: a ‘liberal’ or societal national preference formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations, and a functional theory of institutional choice.<sup>68</sup> For example, EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders.

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<sup>63</sup> Hoffmann Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”.

<sup>64</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism,” in *European Integration Theory*, ed. Antje Wiener, Tanja Börzell, and Thomas Risse, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 65–87.

<sup>65</sup> Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 68.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 67-68.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 68.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 69.

Indeed, LI is built around the idea that self-governing rational individuals and private institutions with varied interests are the basis for actors in international politics<sup>69</sup>. The sum of their mixed interests is in continuous competition for influence over the state, and these dominant actors on the domestic stage are thusly allowed to lobby and influence the discourse of governments and global interactions.<sup>70</sup> In order to predict and comprehend state actions and positions of power, it is deemed vital to analyze what purpose and goal each state wants, and those interests which are domestic in origin, which also makes LI unique versus other schools of thought that surmise state preferences as being exclusively set.<sup>71</sup> As such, Moravcsik promotes an analytical approach that systematically provides “multi-causal explanations, rooted in a thorough understanding of state-society relations, interstate bargaining and institutions.”<sup>72</sup>

### 3.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism Criticisms

In looking to understand the theory more completely, there are three main criticisms of LI which need to be addressed. The heart of the critical argument is that LI is said to exaggerate when it comes to the detailing of broader trends in regional integration.<sup>73</sup> Firstly, rational institutionalists imply that LI is unable to provide sufficient explanations for everyday decision making, particularly in its focus on treaty amendments which amount to only a small portion of EU policy making. Secondly, another potential weakness in LI, historical institutionalists argue, is due to the overlooking of the countless consequences which comes from LI attention on intergovernmental decision-making; LI is seen as misleading in its false promise of integration. Finally, there is a belief that LI does not empirically correspond in its hypothesis, resulting in questions left unanswered, particularly on its responsibility to follow through in confirmation and limitations.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (December 1, 1993): 473–524. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x.

<sup>70</sup> Mareike Kleine and Mark Pollack, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56, no. 7 (2018): 1493–1509, doi: 10.1111/jcms.12803.

<sup>71</sup> Kleine and Pollack, 1495.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, 1495.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 1495.

<sup>74</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew Schimmelfenning, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism.”

While these criticisms may have some standing, they mainly appear to be overstated and are open to being deconstructed. To begin with, LI is a theory of intergovernmental decision-making under anarchy.<sup>75</sup> Essentially, LI's inherent theoretical claim is not that the "producer interests prevail" or "economics dominates policy", but rather that it is state preferences concerning how to manage globalization.<sup>76</sup> Recent empirical research makes the case that LI theory actually applies widely encompassing every-day decision making. However, this does not allude to LI having the capacity to explain everything, and it does not mean that institutions do not matter, for example, various entities such as the EU in regards to central banking, supranational adjudication, and competition policy.<sup>77</sup> The claims concerning LI being unable to foresee negative consequences, even after entering 'rational grand bargains,' can be acknowledged in two parts. The first is when faced with an unavoidable shift, such as a change in government and policy. The second is supranational organizations that will try and build up their influence, which will in turn become an inevitable process of limiting governments. An ancillary factor that should also be kept in mind is with the negotiation of treaties, which are ultimately 'incomplete contracts' in that they are subject to revisions and diluting,<sup>78</sup> potentiating further unpredictability.

Although these criticisms are valid and true to an extent, it can equally be argued that they are the result of over-analysis. LI does not clearly shy away from these issues, and comfortably accommodates their existence within its framework. Similarly, and the reason for institutional involvement in decision making is precisely to elaborate on agreements and to credibly assure compliance against future unsatisfied governments, therefore the above arguments require further substantiating to be held as genuinely limiting factors.<sup>79</sup> In fact, LI makes the case that there is suitable evidence supporting that state preference functions concerning integration have more often than not been stable.<sup>80</sup>

It is clear that governments, in general, can predict potential policy consequences and are aware of their actions. What is important to note is that LI explains integration under most

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<sup>75</sup> Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 73.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 70.

<sup>77</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Area Crisis," *Journal of European Public Policy* 22, no. 2 (2015): 177–95, doi: 10.1080/13501763.2014.994020.

<sup>78</sup> Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism," 75.

<sup>79</sup> Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 76

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 76.



conditions, but not under those which go against its assumptions about preferences, bargaining, and credible commitments.<sup>81</sup> While the scope of the theory is defined by its assumptions, LI also explains policy-making where social preferences are relatively certain and well defined.<sup>82</sup> The variance of outcomes should be correlated with the underlying uncertainty in the circumstances being analyzed, and the most stable areas are economic preferences, where they are deemed reliably predictable, particularly in agriculture and trade.<sup>83</sup> In this way, countries can be seen to manage consistent preference functions for decades, including being able to shift in response to changing market conditions and even sudden policy failures.<sup>84</sup>

Importantly, when national preferences involve large and predictable downside risks, we observe the construction of international institutions that maintain national interests, for example, in agriculture, the member states are national ministers and restrict the role of the European Parliament and employ voting rules to maintain tighter control.<sup>85</sup> Less predictable are national preferences in economic areas such as monetary policy, where economic knowledge is more uncertain.<sup>86</sup>

Another important aspect is that, unless there are instances of high transaction costs from influential supranational entrepreneurs, intergovernmental bargaining based on asymmetrical interdependence dominates interstate bargaining.<sup>87</sup> Bargaining, negotiation, and international regimes predict that open and non-coercive negotiations will be more efficient when information is broadly available and it is only when governments are not able to access critical informational and bargaining skills where this may become a problem in terms of third parties influence.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism," 76

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 76.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 76.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 76.

<sup>85</sup> Donald J. Puchala, "Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A Review Article," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 37, no. 2 (1999): 317–331, doi: 10.1111/1468-5965.00165.

<sup>86</sup> Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism," 76.

<sup>87</sup> Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, "77.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 77.

### 3.2.3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Arctic

To refocus what was outlined above, LI has the ability to anticipate domestic, economic, and state interests, which governments then use to develop a common Arctic policy. Therefore, this concept demonstrates how policy creation is an example of a form of intergovernmental bargaining. From this summation, three propositions can be drawn in terms of governance systems and intergovernmentalism as it pertains to the Arctic region: Firstly, that Arctic policy (from Canada and Russia) is determined based on economic pressures from domestic actors and institutions; secondly, that the Arctic policies are designed to promote Canada and Russia's geopolitical interests; lastly, that Canada and Russia as asymmetrical states can be predicted to shape their Arctic policies around a common theme of cooperation based on interdependence and interstate bargaining.

### 3.3.1 Postcolonialism Theory

Postcolonialism explores the impact of colonial and imperial histories, and their legacies, particularly drawing attention to how colonial influence had a hand in shaping societies, governments, and people's ways of thinking.<sup>89</sup> One could be forgiven for assuming the 'post' in postcolonialism suggests that the effects of colonialism had somehow been eradicated, yet it is a theory which is interested in raising awareness around the different and valid perspectives in readings of history, and offers a relevant perspective on current events that were influenced by the significant fallout of declining colonialism, the retreat of colonial powers, and the emergence of new states born of a synthesis of old ideas and new. Chiefly, it deals with the "disparities in global power and wealth accumulation and why some states and groups exercise so much power over others" as a central theme, one which is important for analyzing how the Arctic and its communities were affected historically and those impacts we still feel today.<sup>90</sup>

In terms of the historical foundations of the theory, Young<sup>91</sup> outlines three fields in which postcolonial theory can be illustrated: 1) humanitarian (moral), 2) liberal (political) and

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<sup>89</sup> Sheila Nair, "Introducing Postcolonialism in International Relations Theory," *E-International Relations*, 2017, 1.

<sup>90</sup> Sheila Nair, "Introducing Postcolonialism in International Relations Theory," 1.

<sup>91</sup> Robert Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).

3) economic.<sup>92</sup> To summarize, humanitarians/economists viewed anti-colonial campaigns in terms of morality, while in contrast, politicians, specifically liberals, made the case for unrestrained and morally dubious colonial expansion as a way to ‘civilize’ heathens. The credit for the very first anti-colonial campaign is to Bishop Bartolomé Las Casas (1484-1566) of the Roman Catholic Church in Spain in 1542.<sup>93</sup> Historians maintain that 50 years after Christopher Columbus ‘found’ the “new world” in 1492, Las Casas “questioned the moral and legal grounds of the Spanish occupation of America.”<sup>94</sup> In this regard, Las Casas’ campaign to recognize the “full humanity of the Indians” and condemn the conquistador invasion as “social sins,” resulted in Casa being dubbed the inventor of twentieth century Latin American liberation theology.<sup>95</sup>

In IR, postcolonialism focuses on analyzing how discourses and concepts of power, the state, and security, are used to enforce the status quo and frame understanding and thinking about the world. Postcolonialism primarily offers a unique perspective that is not found in traditional theories, such as the concept of sovereignty or culture with the creation of the state which were “imposed on the colonial world by European powers.”<sup>96</sup>

### 3.3.2 *Economic Justification*

Regarding its economic justification, postcolonialism details a world order that is dominated by major state actors and their interests which shape world views. IR realist and neo-realist strands of scholarship are not interested in questions of culture and culturally derived notions of what counts as morality. Since states simply exist, and by their nature pursue their interests, or else are pressed to do so by the systems of anarchy, the rules that govern state interaction are not seen to have anything to do with culture.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Lazare S. Rukundwa and Andries G. Van Aarde, “The Formation of Postcolonial Theory,” *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 63, no. 3 (2007): 1171–94, doi: 10.4102/hts.v63i3.237.

<sup>93</sup> Rukundwa and Van Aarde, 1175.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, 1175.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, 1175.

<sup>96</sup> Nair, “Introducing Postcolonialism in International Relations Theory.”

<sup>97</sup> Sanjay Seth, “Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 1 (2011): 167–83, doi: 10.1177/0305829811412325. 175

Historically, the Americas' natural resources and the allocation of gold and silver was an influence on the growth and success of capitalism in Europe, and that lucrative element from the colonies created "captive colonial markets", which in turn guided Europe's relations with the world outside Europe.<sup>98</sup> Running concurrently with this appropriation of the Americas' resources, was the emergence of the 'Westphalian System' in response to the Thirty Years' War, which made concrete the territorial integrity of sovereign states, and their colonial territories and imperial aspirations were solidified, as their overseas territories were treated as extensions of the state itself. In effect, however, rather than granting colonial nations equality and sovereignty, it was in fact merely a means of developing commercial enterprise and exporting European governance and organizational systems in a process of enforced acculturation.<sup>99</sup>

In truth, the extraction of wealth and pillaging of land and colonies at the expense of the inhabitants' culture are as relevant today as they were in the past. In analysing Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Young notes that contrary to popular belief, colonies are not a result of good planning and policy, but in fact the result of European colonialist greed creating a systematic disorder and injustice.<sup>100</sup> Postcolonialism's utility then is evident when challenging ingrained beliefs that states behave and the hierarchical international order which has emerged from this power and sense of historical entitlement. Not only does it offer an analysis of injustices and oppressions deeply rooted in history, but also answers as to why certain cultures and societies are not thriving, and what that means to those states which govern them.

### 3.3.3 Postcolonialism History

Historically, the Arctic is regarded as one of the few regions in the world that has such expansive issues of defined sovereignty, and thusly colonialism in this area is more obscure. Viking longboats are depicted reaching the shores of Iceland, Greenland, and beyond, long before the classical age of discoveries credited to the likes of Columbus, Cabral, da Gama and their ilk; though undoubtedly this latter period marked the unity in thinking between

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<sup>98</sup> Seth, 172.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 172.

<sup>100</sup> Robert J C Young, "Postcolonialism An Historical Introduction Anniversary Edition," 2016, 3–28.

“colonialism, modernity, and capitalism.”<sup>101</sup> European colonialism during the first and second ages of modernity mobilized local resources, and local populations, into colonial administrations that shared many features with the systems of the colonizers; the Arctic falls similarly within this description.

Making Arctic colonialism distinct, however, was the unusual scale of reliance on local communities to maintain over-stretched and under-resourced colonial administrators, who struggled particularly owing to their poor supply links and fractured connections to major cities in their homelands.<sup>102</sup> By contrast with other colonial settlements, the relative isolation of Arctic outposts necessitated a deep involvement in the concerns of local indigenous populations, with the proximity of colonial subjects uncharacteristic of the broader colonial era.<sup>103</sup> So sporadically scattered were the various Arctic settlements, that they defy generalizations which encompass the wider colonial situation at the time.<sup>104</sup> Indeed, given the complexities of such settlements, wider conceptions of both colonialism and postcolonialism are superseded by indigenous histories and the realities contemporaneous to the colonial Arctic at large, all of which are a direct result of the vast distances between these imperial outlands and the metropolitan bases of colonial powers, with Jensen reminding that “such a colonial matrix also produces postcolonial specificities.”<sup>105</sup>

### 3.3.4 *Criticisms of Postcolonialism*

Postcolonialism has withstood and undergone extensive criticisms and critiques from many theorists across a wide range of fields of study (literary, political, religious).<sup>106</sup> Many note that postcolonial theory is ‘ambiguous, ironic and superstitious,’<sup>107</sup> with Jacoby arguing how postcolonial theory is problematic for researchers because of its “lack of consensus and clarity.”<sup>108</sup> This lack of clarity, together with its fluidity and ambivalence, is considered a vital

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<sup>101</sup> Lars Jensen, “Approaching a Postcolonial Arctic,” *KULT - Postkolonial Temaserie* 14 (2016): 49–65, 53.

<sup>102</sup> Jensen, 53.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, 53.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, 53.

<sup>105</sup> Lars Jensen, “Approaching a Postcolonial Arctic,” 54.

<sup>106</sup> Rukundwa and Van Aarde, “The Formation of Postcolonial Theory,” 1175.

<sup>107</sup> Rukundwa and Van Aarde, 1175.

<sup>108</sup> Jensen, “Approaching a Postcolonial Arctic,” 54.

flaw, as the term is not only without an agreed-upon fixed definition, but also keeps changing through “new forms of social collectivity” as they emerge over time and space in a postcolonial world.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, it is difficult to keep pace with the rapidly changing world while at the same time keeping the definition (if any) of postcolonial theory intact.

In attempting to pin down a more concrete definition, theorists appear to have struggled with the evolution of thought within society in relation to the fixed reference point of a shared history, especially as there are such rapidly evolving values and interpretations of it. Addressing the respective controversy surrounding the prefix ‘post’ in this compound noun, Slemon concedes it is a “vexed areas of debate within the field of postcolonial theory”, while Moore stated that ‘post’ implying after-colonial is “naïve, inadequate, or utopian” at best.<sup>110</sup> Slemon sees it as coming into being as a facet of imperialism, “a concept that is itself predicated within large theories of global politics and which changes radically according to the specifics of those larger theories.”<sup>111</sup> With this in mind, it is as such that it will be regarded throughout the remainder of the paper, cognisant that it is an imperfect lens clouded by other theories.

### 3.3.5 *Postcolonialism in the Arctic*

There would be little controversy if the Arctic region were described as a collection of systems that promote the contemporary neoliberal order.<sup>112</sup> Arguably, it consists of many sub-Arctic nation-states, to which postcolonial theory can be applied as a methodology to investigate the limitations and unexplored interests of the Arctic. Analyzing how agency works for Arctic peoples, definitions of sovereignty, and conceptualizing the Arctic as a region through the prism of Canada and Russia’s Arctic populations, opens the way to an assessment of the impacts of governance and the negative effects of Eurocentric approaches to the Arctic. As postcolonialism challenges set boundaries, it is useful as an interdisciplinary approach to

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<sup>109</sup> Rukundwa and Van Aarde, “The Formation of Postcolonial Theory,” 1175.

<sup>110</sup> David Chioni Moore, “Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique,” *PMLA* 116, no. 1 (May 2001): 111–28.

<sup>111</sup> Moore, 111.

<sup>112</sup> Jensen, “Approaching a Postcolonial Arctic,” 54.

encompass how political, economic, cultural freedoms, and environment are currently intertwined with past colonialist systems.<sup>113</sup>

Even between Postcolonialism's pioneer theorists such as Ashcroft, Tiffin, Griffiths, Bhabha, and Spivak, very few scholars have analyzed or acknowledged the Arctic region to the extent that it merits.<sup>114</sup> Therefore, postcolonialism is under-represented in the Arctic, implying that colonial analysis from other parts of the world can still be used as a similar method of comparison in regards to history and power structures. In this way, it can be argued that the postcolonial prism can be used to dissect how the Arctic has "historically been constructed to serve the imperial interests of states that have imposed their sovereignty on the Arctic (Canada, the US, Russia, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden.)"<sup>115</sup> Other contingent factors of self-determination and political agency for Arctic peoples must also be in context of environmental threats from resource extractions, which risk their livelihood in terms of food (hunting/ fishing) and clean water/air conditions.<sup>116</sup> Although these Arctic peoples live on a metaphorical goldmine, their rights are disregarded and, in fact, they receive very little benefit from these treasures. While the Arctic is a vast region, this study will be limited to including only the Canadian and Russian Arctic regions, as to explore beyond this would be beyond the scope of the paper.

### *3.4 Conclusion*

To summarise, the criticisms that human security is too broad and insubstantial a concept have been explored, yet in contrast to this, it can be seen as having informed both Russia and Canada's most recent policies (see section 5). Its importance in providing a foundation for regional cooperation has been outlined, typified by the centrality of the Arctic Council to protecting environmental and social aspects of the region. As an evidence-based policymaking research process, it still offers considerable benefits to regional populations. Though said to be symptomatic of constitutional and legal frameworks imposed by the state, its holistic

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<sup>113</sup> Jensen, "Approaching a Postcolonial Arctic," 50.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, 51.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, 51.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 52.

approach offers solutions which particularly benefit those in the arctic previously most neglected.

Between LI and Postcolonial theory, a double-edged sword is demonstrated, in that the prevalence of self-governing rational individuals and private institutions are empowered, and able to lobby and influence states for the benefit of regional citizens, and yet, many of those private institutions benefitted from the exploitative elements of colonialism, thus creating systemic injustice, inequity and disorder. The cementing of such hierarchies means that states are disproportionately affected through their reliance on LI, by private sector institutions which benefitted most from colonialism. While LI cooperation is rational, and enables greater statecraft and diplomacy between Canada and Russia, postcolonialism theory still provides the additional caveat whereby Canada's colonial past may impact on policy and still benefit a historical dominant strata of society rather than indigenous and regional Arctic populations.

## **4: A Historical Overview**

### *4.1 Introduction*

Both exploring and providing a historical overview of Russian and Canadian history as it pertains to territorial governance, particularly concerning indigenous rights, this chapter will go on to outline domestic governance structures and internal challenges faced. Finally, a summary will be provided of Russo-Canadian cooperation, detailing their mutual interests and objectives.

#### *4.1.1 A Historical Governance Overview of The Arctic*

As mentioned in chapter one concerning theoretical frameworks, existing IR conceptions of sovereignty, state authority, and security are the basis of most analysis and focus when considering governance, relations, and environmental cooperation in the Arctic, which some authorities on postcolonialism would argue lead to neglecting the perspectives of indigenous groups. These perspectives and influences are considered important as indigenous traditional



cultures, beliefs, and knowledge are connected to the Arctic's ecosystem, and are impacted by climate change.<sup>117</sup> Because of this real and present danger, indigenous political participation is vital. The case can be made that indigenous leadership has assisted in creating the Arctic's "unique cross-cultural and political system, which has strong aspects of collectivity, integration with the ecosystem, and responsibility, rather than simply state security and power."<sup>118</sup>

Detailing how identifying the importance of Arctic indigenous oral history is to research, Allemann and Dudeck<sup>119</sup> demonstrate how it serves to pass down values through generations, wherein their appreciation for the land and a deep sense of responsibility for ensuring the environment does not come to harm run throughout. For example, as Cruikshank explains, in indigenous traditions and beliefs about glaciers, there is a weight on "human agency, choice, responsibility, as well as the consequence of human behaviours."<sup>120</sup> The case can be made from a postcolonial standpoint, that in order to delve into the behaviours and motivations of state and non-state actors in the Arctic regions, IR would be wise to incorporate knowledge systems that are based in a particular social, political, and historical environment. This example will benefit IR as it can highlight collaborative, cooperative, and innovative political systems in cross-Arctic relations, where this broader environmental respect could be utilised to create new bonds with indigenous peoples.

## 4.2 Russia

Historically, Russians are recognized as the first European explorers and inhabitants of the Arctic, which is reflected in the figures as half of the Arctic population live in the Russian territories.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, Russia has an extensive historical presence developing northern

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<sup>117</sup> Lyudmila Bogoslovskaya et al., "Indigenous Peoples of the North: Traditional Culture and Knowledge for the Environment," *Climate Change Adaptation: Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Inhabiting the Arctic and Far North*, (2015), 1–17, [https://iite.unesco.org/courses/climate\\_change/en/index.html](https://iite.unesco.org/courses/climate_change/en/index.html).

<sup>118</sup> Master International, Relations Thesis, and Robyn Mitchell, "Views from the Arctic : Broadening International Relations beyond Its Prevailing Assumptions Master International Relations Thesis Track : Global Order in Historical Perspective Word Count : 14984 Reference Style : APA," (n.d.), 20.

<sup>119</sup> Lukas Allemann and Stephan Dudeck, "Sharing Oral History With Arctic Indigenous Communities: Ethical Implications of Bringing Back Research Results," *Qualitative Inquiry* 25, no. 9–10 (2019): 890–906, doi: 10.1177/1077800417738800.

<sup>120</sup> Julie Cruikshank, "Glaciers and Climate Change: Perspectives from Oral Tradition," *Arctic* 54, no. 4 (2001): 377–93, 391.

<sup>121</sup> D. A. Mokhorov, T. A. Baranova, and A. A. Donenko, "Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Arctic," *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science* 302, no. 1 (2019), doi: 10.1088/1755-1315/302/1/012155, 1.

territories, with Lagutina highlighting that the AZRF covers the largest part of the Arctic territory as the AZRF's territory stretches over 3.1 million square kilometers, accounting for 18% of Russia's territory;<sup>122</sup> and 20 thousand kilometers of the national border of the Russian Federation passes through the Arctic region. The largest number of the Arctic population lives in the AZRF, with approximately 2.5 million people live in the AZRF which is roughly half of the Arctic's entire population.<sup>123</sup> Extremely rich with resources, the AZRF has great transit and military provisions, meaning it is considered one of the most important drivers of strengthening the economic and geopolitical positions of the country. Unsurprisingly, Russia is actively developing the economy of the Arctic territories: 10 % of Russia's GDP and 20% of Russia's exports are currently produced in the Arctic.<sup>124</sup> Thus, for Russia, the Arctic is not some distant territory with a harsh climate and difficult living conditions, but a fully integrated part of the state territory, the governance of which is an essential component of modern Russia's policy.<sup>125</sup>

#### 4.2.1 A Paradigm Shift in Arctic Governance History

In terms of historic changes in Russian Arctic state governance, there are four main stages of Russia's presence in the Arctic: the initial period, the imperial period, the Soviet period and the present stage.<sup>126</sup> Lagutina notes how "chronologically, Russian Arctic actions evolve from the initial disorganised and spontaneous economic activities, to later reactive and unsystematic explorations, and finally to systemic and strategical military, academic and industrial presence."<sup>127</sup> When the Soviet Union collapsed and until the 2000s, the Kremlin disregarded the Northern Arctic.<sup>128</sup> As was referenced in human security theory, the end of the Cold War created a less military centered focus for Moscow, and the Arctic region ceased to be a zone of potential confrontation.<sup>129</sup> It is noted that in the Yeltsin era, the lucrative aspects of the North

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<sup>122</sup> Russian North 2.0. "Zapolyarye".

<sup>123</sup> Smorchkova and Zlenk, "Gosudarstvennaya politika", 64.

<sup>124</sup> Klimenko, *Russia's new Arctic policy*.

<sup>125</sup> Lagutina, "Russia's Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities," 5.

<sup>126</sup> Lagutina, "Russia's Arctic Policy in the Twenty-First Century: National and International Dimensions."

<sup>127</sup> Lagutina.

<sup>128</sup> Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshchev, "Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard and Soft Power?," *Polar Journal* 4, no. 1 (2014): 69–87, doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2014.913930, 40.

<sup>129</sup> Sergunin and Konyshchev, 40.

was overlooked and in the 1990s, and Russia's northern territories were considered by the federal government to be a “burden or source of various socio-economic problems rather than an economically promising region.”<sup>130</sup> This resulted in a chain of events where the far northern regions were almost “abandoned by Moscow and had to rely on themselves (or foreign humanitarian assistance) in terms of survival.”<sup>131</sup>

However, the difficult conditions started to change and improve in the early 2000s when the Putin government and its new agenda came into power, resulting in general socio-economic improvement in Russia.<sup>132</sup> As a result of the increased governmental interest, Russia thusly became one of the first Arctic states to develop its northern strategy, as on June 14, 2001, the Russian Cabinet approved a draft document titled "Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic" (Government of the Russian Federation 2001) which outlined Russia's national interests and main strategies in the Arctic.<sup>133</sup> On September 18, 2008, President Medvedev approved the Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and Beyond (Medvedev 2008). The six-page document enumerated Russian national interests in the region: developing the resources of the Arctic; turning the NSR into a unified national transport corridor and line of communication.<sup>134</sup>

#### 4.2.2 Russian Government Structure

Due to this renewed refocussing on the Russian Arctic by the Kremlin, Arctic policy-making received a significant boost, resulting in a highly centralised process.<sup>135</sup> In terms of Russian governance structures, this is best outlined by Sergunin and Konyshchev in “Forging Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Actors and Decision-Making” wherein they reason that although the sub-national and non-state actors obtained some role in shaping Moscow’s Arctic policies in the

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>131</sup> Valery Konyshchev, Alexander Sergunin, and Sergei Subbotin, “Russia’s Arctic Strategies in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis,” *Polar Journal* 7, no. 1 (2017): 104–24, doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2017.1335107.

<sup>132</sup> Konyshchev, Sergunin, and Subbotin.

<sup>133</sup> Konyshchev, Sergunin, and Subbotin.

<sup>134</sup> Sergunin and Konyshchev, “Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard and Soft Power?” 41.

<sup>135</sup> Sergunin and Konyshchev, “Forging Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Actors and Decision-Making,” 6.

post-Soviet era, the “centre of the decision-making system firmly remains in the Kremlin and the executive agencies”.<sup>136</sup>

Of the ministerial departments and governmental agencies which have responsibility over the continued socio-economic, environmental and cultural development of the AZRF, most notable would be the Ministry of Economic Development, which in coordination with a number of state organs, oversaw the 2014 State Programme for the region.<sup>137</sup> The implementation of industrial policy in the region is principally overseen by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, while gas, oil and mining falls under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), along with the balancing of environmental issues facing the ecology of the AZRF.<sup>138</sup> Regarding relations surrounding human security, The Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs manages relations with indigenous peoples of the Russian North.<sup>139</sup> As far as the logistical considerations for the region are concerned, the Ministry of Transport, via the NSR, oversees navigation along this vital shipping lane, and in collaboration with the Department of State Policy on Maritime and River Transport, and the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, form the main governing body which implements the International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code (2014-2015).<sup>140</sup> Yet problematizing the balance between government departments charged with handling shipping and transit in the region, was a power struggle over control of the NSR, which between 2016-2018 saw infighting between them break out over the perceived mismanagement of the NSR, and failing to adopt an appropriate Arctic Transportation System, with NSR Administration head Dmitry Smirnov even being arrested on corruption charges.<sup>141</sup> Clearly, such bureaucratic quagmires hamper efforts to meet the unique challenges of the region ahead of its most crucial era in IR.

In terms of external threats to Russia, its Security Council is comprised of the heads of its various agencies and ministries, answering to the chair of the security council, the President.<sup>142</sup> Given its members, it functions as another key body for establishing Arctic policy, with the Council setting the agenda for both domestic and foreign policy alike, outlining

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>141</sup> Sergunin and Konyshev, “Forging Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Actors and Decision-Making,” 6.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, 6.

core interests, underscoring threats and securing the country's military, economic and social information.<sup>143</sup> In its advisory capacity to the President, it highlights internal and external policy matters, while contributing to presidential decrees on issues national security, with documents of strategic significance being vetted, debated and revised before being signed off by the President. That said, those analysts closest to the Kremlin suggest that it is in fact the Presidential Administration which actually takes the lead in coordinating Russia's arctic policy, in lieu of the Arctic Commission or Security council themselves.<sup>144</sup> In effect, with the Presidential Administration overlapping in so many functions with the security council, with it also drafting presidential documents and legislative positions, forwarding candidates for key positions within government, it could be argued that it supersedes the Security Council in many regards.

Complicating matters further, Serguinin and Konyshv explain how it is common practice for there to be an appointed special envoy to handle issues of greater international import, selected by the Kremlin specifically for the task, who answer directly to the president and, by default, his administration.<sup>145</sup> A case in point would be the appointment of Arthur Chilingarov as Special Envoy for Arctic and Antarctic Affairs, much to the chagrin of the Foreign Ministry, who already had a representative dealing with the Arctic Council and BEAC.<sup>146</sup> Indeed, such inter-departmental rivalries and a culture of competition within government can only impact negatively on Arctic governance, not in the least as a first point of contact as an arctic liaison is not clear with such levels of bureaucratic abstraction – as Serguinin and Konyshv point out, this runs counter to Putin's spirit of greater centralization.<sup>147</sup>

Add to this the Federal Assembly, which, after collaborating with foreign parliaments and international organisations such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament etc., actually has less ability to directly influence policy, and has its power diluted considerably by the aforementioned state and non-state actors than, for example, the U.S. Congress.<sup>148</sup> That said, the executive branch, and Arctic policy makers in general, are still more effective when party controls the assembly which is fully behind the president. An example of this, would be

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>144</sup> Serguinin and Konyshv, 9.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>147</sup> Serguinin and Konyshv, 9.

<sup>148</sup> Serguinin and Konyshv, 10.

how legislative initiatives in the Arctic are certain to have support when Putin's own party, 'United Russia', are in control of the State Duma and the Council of the Federation, even if opposition parties are able to make amendments, which underlines how parliament does possess the institutional framework necessary for generating and administering Arctic policy itself.<sup>149</sup> Indeed, there is a special Committee on Regional Policy, Northern and Far Eastern Affairs set up by the Duma, which in certain cases, alongside other committees, can be involved in legislative matters in the Arctic, providing additional oversight. Similarly, the Council of the Federation has a counterpart institutional structure, with the Committee on Federalism, Regional Policy, Municipal Administration and Northern Affairs, which is also charged with managing issues arising in the AZRF, further complicating the jurisdictional overlap.<sup>150</sup>

Composed of regional members of the Russian Federation and its municipalities, at the sub-national level of government.<sup>151</sup> At the return to a Russian federal system, however, many sub-national units became active once more in shaping domestic and foreign policies on the Arctic and beyond, through the development of international contacts (paradiplomacy) as a means of pressuring the federal centre to trade their loyalty to Moscow for regional allowances and concessions.<sup>152</sup> Acting across regional lines and resolving various municipal interests throughout the AZRF, there is a shared responsibility of problem solving, via lobbying in broader contexts to achieve shared aims, with regional administrators even partaking in federal decision-making processes to the extent that their voices are heard before final decisions being made. A prime example cited by experts on the region would be the Murmansk region being involved in preparing international agreements which directly affected it (the outlining of maritime borders, establishment of customs regimes, visa regimes and the like).<sup>153</sup> What is more, state-oriented bi-national matters often grow to becoming transnational issues, owing to the proximity to the EU, which shapes paradiplomacy across the sub-national units of the Russian Arctic. This speaks to a growing trend of sub-national matters becoming oriented around Europe, with regional actors influenced by the EU financially, along with other related funds, largely on account of previously closed off, peripheral regions of Russia now being opened up to cross-border networking, and benefitting from it decidedly. These activities can

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Sergunin and Konyshov, 15.

be conceptualised in two ways, as direct (developing their own external relations), and as indirect (influencing federal foreign policy). Ultimately, it is the more general devolution of power in Russia since 1990 that has enabled Arctic sub-national units to conduct their own foreign relations, allowing them to develop into legitimate international actors.

#### *4.2.3 Recent Changes in Russian Governance Systems*

More recently, there were important changes in the Russian decision-making system on the Arctic, with Lagutina<sup>154</sup> citing the example of the 12-year Arctic policy of Russia, which saw the creation of the State Commission for the Development of the Arctic in 2015, and in 2019 the Arctic issues were included in the competence of the Ministry for the Development of the Far East. The State Commission is described as a “deliberative body, which coordinates activities of federal executive bodies, executive organs of the constituents of the Russian Federation, public bodies, organs of local self-government, and organizations to handle socioeconomic and other problems concerning national security and the development of the AZRF.”<sup>155</sup> It is noted that the Commission had major changes in approval of the power of the federal authorities. Lagutina explains how this was created to include business and civil society in the Commission’s work, basically, the State Commission has been transformed “from a broad policy network to a more traditional state-dominated structure.”<sup>156</sup>

Further complicating the jurisdictional overlap at the state level in the Arctic, an attempt to answer calls for a dedicated decision-making ministry for the AZRF resulted in, after successive postponements, an attempt by Prime Minister Medvedev to attach the region to the Ministry for the Development of the Far East.<sup>157</sup> As Lagutina points out,<sup>158</sup> however, this integration of these two vital regions to Russia’s economic future still treats the Arctic as subordinate, with the Far East still taking precedent,<sup>159</sup> leaving the question of a region specific body for the AZRF unanswered. The absence of regulatory documentation dealing with the

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<sup>154</sup> Sergunin and Konyshchev, “Forging Russia’s Arctic strategy”.

<sup>155</sup> Lagutina, “Russia’s Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities.”

<sup>156</sup> Blakkisrud, “Governing the Arctic”, 205.

<sup>157</sup> Kruchkova and Vedeneva. “Arktiku otpravili na Dal'niy Vostok”, 1.

<sup>158</sup> Lagutina, “Russia’s Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities.”

<sup>159</sup> Stanulevich, “Kto, kak i zachem reshil”.

region as distinct allows for administrative boundaries and corporate obligations to limit the creation of a more coordinated state policy.<sup>160</sup>

Ambitions set around the NSR, icebreakers, rescue fleets, and infrastructure improvements on land and sea remain unachieved,<sup>161</sup> with them subsequently making up aspects of the latest Arctic strategy for 2035. Much of these delays are credited with being the result of underfunding, sanctions against Russian and foreign the oil and gas companies in the Arctic.<sup>162</sup>

Energy giants internationally are noted by Lagutina as agreeing to deals with local communities to account for the interests and needs of their communities,<sup>163</sup> with federal law being accepted that marks the Russian Arctic as a special economic zone with preferential tax rates and wider reaching perks for businesses to incentivise their further investment in the region.<sup>164</sup> Of benefit to both the region and national economic targets, Russian natural resources bolster Russia's position at the top table of IR globally, and channeling global markets into the AZRF will only serve to further benefit regional development.

Because of the economic importance of the Arctic for Russia, it is socioeconomic development that is still one of the main priorities of Russia's Arctic policy. This is limited and difficult, however, as is explained by Lagutina, because the Russian Arctic's economy has specifically difficult factors to overcome, such as: a "harsh climate, poor transportation, underdeveloped infrastructure, low labor mobility, etc."<sup>165</sup> The Russian Arctic is deemed mostly as "underpopulated region with industrial hubs unevenly distributed across it and with a commodities economy."<sup>166</sup> Despite these challenging conditions, the AZRF's industrial region is counted as being the most solid among the Arctic regions of Arctic nations. To get a better idea of the scale of economic activity in the region, the AZRF's economy produces

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<sup>160</sup> Kolomyts, "Ministerstvo dvukh okeanov".

<sup>161</sup> Lagutina, "Russia's Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities."

<sup>162</sup> Zhuravel, "O novoy gosudarstvennoy politike Rossii", 3.

<sup>163</sup> Lagutina, "Russia's Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities."

<sup>164</sup> Lagutina.

<sup>165</sup> Lagutina, "Russia's Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities," 8.

<sup>166</sup> Lagutina, 8.



roughly “70% of the GDP of the entire Arctic zone and produces more than 20% of exports (gas, oil, non-ferrous metals, fish).”<sup>167</sup>

More recent Arctic developments can be seen with Russia’s Arctic policies. As Lagutina highlights, it was the introduction of a new development model for Russia’s Arctic, and this creation of ‘pillar zones’ (*‘opornye zony’*) that became a “cluster approach” designed to the “specifics of the Russian Arctic.”<sup>168</sup> Thusly, it was through these ‘pillar zone’ projects that a plan was created to “ensure a comprehensive development of the Arctic territories for the purpose of achieving Russia’s strategic goals in the Arctic utilizing in a well-coordinated manner the entire range of functioning instruments and mechanisms of state support.”<sup>169</sup> There are currently 8 pillar zones in 8 constituent entities of the AZRF,<sup>170</sup> and this was used in order to transition from the “‘sectoral’ to the ‘territorial’ principle of the development of Russia’s Arctic.”<sup>171</sup> In essence, it is economic based wealth of natural resources that remains AZRF’s main competitive advantage and drive for future development of the Arctic, which will hopefully benefit Arctic communities by extension. Not only this, but the Russian Arctic’s territorial advantage could be argued to strengthen Russia’s “geopolitical standing in the world community and facilitates its full-scale integration into global markets.”<sup>172</sup>

### 4.3 Canada

It is arguable that the history of Canadian territorial governance, and its link to indigenous peoples, is a central aspect of past and contemporary Canadian identity and Arctic policies. Canada’s North is a vast region made up of, “three territories, encompassing 75 percent of the country’s national coastlines and 40 percent of its total land mass.”<sup>173</sup> Although Canada’s North is sparsely populated, the region is spotted with vibrant communities, many inhabited by Canada’s Indigenous populations. The Canadian Arctic has a smaller population, however

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>169</sup> Lagutina, 8.

<sup>170</sup> Smirnova, “Opornie zoni Arktiki”.

<sup>171</sup> Lagutina, “Russia’s Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities,” 8.

<sup>172</sup> Lagutina, 8.

<sup>173</sup> P. Lackenbauer and S Lalonde, *Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World* (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Global Affairs, 2019), 13, <https://www.electriccanadian.com/lifestyle/Breaking-the-Ice-Curtain.pdf#page=80>.

these communities and the North are a very close integral part of Canada's identity and history.<sup>174</sup> Economically speaking, the Canada Arctic hosts substantial "natural resources, industries, and growing tourism."<sup>175</sup>

Territorially significant, in Canada's North, the Northwest Territories (NWT) was established in 1870, and the Yukon was created in 1898,<sup>176</sup> with the gold rush pushing the federal government to remove land from the NWT in order to solidify the profits from the Klondike Gold Rush<sup>177</sup>. This led to the Canadian government dismantling the NWT until it was "down to a third of its original land mass by 1905,"<sup>178</sup> and as a result, as is explained by Tully, "internal colonization"<sup>179</sup> was inflicted upon indigenous peoples and their territories, as the Canadian government had been using and governing without their permission. In a process that feeds into the postcolonial elements of Canadian history, it is clear that the "appropriation of land, resources and jurisdiction, not for the sake of resettlement and exploitation, but for the territorial foundation of the dominant society."<sup>180</sup> The long-term effects described by Tully describe a community that was in the past, causing "economically self-sufficient and interdependent societies" to be turned into overcrowded reserves which "led to welfare dependency, high levels of unemployment, poor health, low life expectancy, high levels of infant mortality."<sup>181</sup>

In another shift of interest in the Arctic that had been largely ignored, at the end of WWII the Canadian government's attention was directed to the north as it needed to claim sovereignty and create economic opportunities in the region.<sup>182</sup> Similar to the Arctic paradigm shift in Russia around the mid-1960s/70s, there was an increase in pressure from indigenous peoples to attain local autonomy in the north, resulting in a series of court cases.<sup>183</sup> This led to

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<sup>174</sup> Lackenbauer and Lalonde, 13.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>176</sup> Government of Canada, *The North West Territories (1870)*, <https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/canadian-confederation/Pages/northwest-territories-1870.aspx#shr-pg-pnlShareMain>

<sup>177</sup> Greg Poelzer and Ken Coates, "Introduction: Political and Economic Change in Canada's Provincial North," *Northern Review*; No 38 (2014), 2015.

<sup>178</sup> Poelzer and Coates, 6.

<sup>179</sup> James Tully, ed., "The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom," in *Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 1: Democracy and Civic Freedom*, vol. 1, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 257–88, doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511790737.010.

<sup>180</sup> Tully, 39.

<sup>181</sup> James Tully, ed., "The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom,".

<sup>182</sup> Poelzer and Coates, "Introduction: Political and Economic Change in Canada's Provincial North.", 8.

<sup>183</sup> Poelzer and Coates, 9-10.

the Supreme Court installing the rights of Aboriginal peoples in section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 and under liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1973 land claims of the Yukon were agreed upon.<sup>184</sup> The Northwest Territories agreed to the division and established Nunavut in 1999, with a jurisdiction of 85% Inuit.<sup>185</sup> In the 1980s, these agreements and treaties incited sweeping changes in the north such as the “infusion of capital, removal of the Indian Act as a governing document over indigenous peoples in much of the north, royalties from future resource developments, new government structures and enhanced financial opportunities and responsibilities.”<sup>186</sup>

#### *4.3.1 Canada’s Governance in its Northern Territories and Indigenous Peoples*

For a basic governmental structure outline, on Canada’s government website, there are three branches that work together to govern Canada: The executive, legislative and judicial branches<sup>187</sup>: The executive branch (also called the Government) is the decision-making branch, made up of the Monarch (represented by the Governor General), the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet. The legislative branch is the law-making branch, made up of the appointed Senate and the elected House of Commons. The judicial branch is a series of independent courts that interpret the laws passed by the other two branches. Parliament itself is made up of the following three parts: the Monarch, the Senate and the House of Commons. Canada is a constitutional monarchy, which means that the Queen or King is recognized as the Head of State, while the Prime Minister is the Head of Government.

In Canada’s northern territories, there are three groups of indigenous peoples mentioned in section 35 of the constitution: First Nations (Indians), Metis and Inuit.<sup>188</sup> Another distinctive aspect of the country is that Canada is a multinational state consisting of three distinct groups: the English, French, and Aboriginal peoples. Although Canada is a federal state whose power is divided between the national government, the provinces and the territories, it is important to

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<sup>184</sup> Tully, “The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom,” 45.

<sup>185</sup> Poelzer and Coates, “Introduction: Political and Economic Change in Canada’s Provincial North,” 12.

<sup>186</sup> Government of Canada, *CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY: Our North , Our Heritage , Our Future, Strategy*, 2009.

<sup>187</sup> Government of Canada, *Structure of Government*. <https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/how-government-works/structure.html#shr-pg0>

<sup>188</sup> The Government of Canada, “The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982,” (2021), 1–112.

understand that the northern territories are seen as a part of the federal chain and are delegated certain powers which is overseen by the Parliament of Canada.<sup>189</sup> Consequently, this system caused incredible issues for nation building for Canada's North, due to the lack of a long-term strategy for "northern development and political incorporation of the region."<sup>190</sup>

To illustrate further, as the Canadian government focused mainly on resource extraction and sovereignty rights, the Canadian north subsequently fell into a problem of being underdeveloped in terms of: "road systems, community infrastructure, technology, health care, housing quality and education facilities."<sup>191</sup> This lack of foresight, consideration, and a limited colonialist mentality, could be argued to have contributed to the dysfunction, alienation, and poor conditions which greatly hindered the overall nation building process in Canada's North.

Following this sentiment, the Progressive Conservative government instituted the Roads to Resources program 1957-1963,<sup>192</sup> which pursued the building of transportation infrastructure aimed at exploiting natural resources. It was in this transition period where Northern Canada became synonymous with untapped potential, with the solution being the construction of infrastructure to access these resources.

#### *4.3.2. The Aftermath: Environmental and Cultural Crisis in Canada's North*

In *Canada's Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex*, Higginbotham and Spence highlight that this data and review of developments since the 1980s, leading to a conclusion that although the scores for indigenous communities improved over time in terms of well-being, there was a sharp and widening gap between non-Aboriginal communities.<sup>193</sup> Essentially, they argue that these statistics prove that these northern communities are not enjoying the general advancements and high quality of life in Canada. One main issue is the devolution accords which occurred during the time Nunavut was born, where the rights and authority given was actually a result of great

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<sup>189</sup> Dara Lithwick, "A Pas de Deux : The Division of Federal and Provincial Legislative Powers in Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867," (2015).

<sup>190</sup> Poelzer and Coates, "Introduction: Political and Economic Change in Canada's Provincial North," 6.

<sup>191</sup> Poelzer and Coates, 29.

<sup>192</sup> Resources and Development – Northern Development in Canada. 1958 VI/5871.1  
John G. Diefenbaker fonds, University of Saskatchewan Diefenbaker Archival Collections  
VI/5871.1 - 501 Resources and Development - Northern Development in Canada. (1958).

<sup>193</sup> John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, "Canada's Arctic Arctic Agenda : Agenda : Canada's Into the the Vortex," 2019.

limitations. This is due to the rules of resource development and revenues, not including offshore land, and also the revenues which are capped for the territories, ultimately leaving them with “a smaller share than the funds available to the provinces, with the federal government of Canada remaining an active player in the north.”<sup>194</sup> Another factor is that even though there is a smaller population and tax base, these territories still have to supply the same public services, only over much vaster distances, which is complicated further by competing public service providers at the federal, municipal, territorial and indigenous levels, with little jurisdictional clarity available.

In order to fix some of these problems raised above, it would likely fall to the federal government which had “imposed an unsustainable economic system upon the Canadian North, stripping away the traditional economy through policies of settlement and dependence in the first half of the twentieth century, and restricting the resource economy.”<sup>195</sup> Consequently, the outcome that can be seen is a northern economic development paradigm in the Canadian North that is systematically flawed and has been stuck for 50 years, ultimately stemming from a state needing government assistance, along with the effects of the Diefenbaker and Berger doctrines.<sup>196</sup> On top of this, even the noted political gains in terms of devolution and self-governance, in reality, very little has progressed in terms of economic self-sufficiency.

Today, it is evident that Canada seeks to be in a leadership role in circumpolar affairs, particularly while also advancing domestic priorities of social and economic development, environmental protection, greater scientific and traditional Indigenous knowledge, and cultural diversity.<sup>197</sup> How Canada faces its northern challenges and aspirations will be explored in further detail when analyzing Canada’s latest 2019 Northern Strategy in chapter three.

The effects of climate change in Canada are extremely large within its Arctic region. For example, some parts of Hudson Bay have lost more than 90% of their sea ice in the past 30 years. Consequently, the Northwest Passage, has become more navigable, and this has raised issues of security and international environmental regulations. It is not only sea ice that has diminished significantly in recent years, but also ‘glaciers, ice caps, and the freeze-up of

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<sup>194</sup> Higginbotham and Spence, 16.

<sup>195</sup> Higginbotham and Spence.

<sup>196</sup> Higginbotham and Spence.

<sup>197</sup> Higginbotham and Spence.

rivers, lakes, and marshes.<sup>198</sup> Since about 70% of Canada's coastline is located within the Arctic Circle, there are many settlements of Inuit and other indigenous communities in the coastal area. The habitable areas are undergoing severe deterioration as a result of permafrost thawing and coastal erosion, and the government is exploring adaptive measures that include infrastructure development. Given these circumstances, Arctic marine research is particularly important for Canada. Therefore, Canada has implemented a variety of initiatives in this area that include operating a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker specializing in scientific research.<sup>199</sup>

To this end, in 1997, Canada's Oceans Act established the national maritime jurisdictions and listed three basic principles of management strategy: sustainable development, integrated management, and precautionary approaches. Canada drew up the Oceans Action Plan in 2005 and is promoting integrated ocean management under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada.<sup>200</sup> Most notably, five large Ocean Management Areas were established. For example, the Regional Coordination Committee, with both the federal and local governments, and the Beaufort Sea Partnership, included local stakeholders, created an integrated management plan that was made to determine ecologically and biologically important areas. Thusly, Canada made a plan to "establish Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 14 from 10% of its coastal and ocean areas by 2020, in line with the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)."

#### *4.4 History of Canadian and Russian Cooperation*

There are noted relevant historical links and cooperative relations between Canada and Russia which indicate a potential future cooperative possibility. The first historic agreement was signed by Alexander Yakovlev in 1984, the Soviet Canadian protocol on scientific and technical cooperation in the arctic was a landmark first step for improved Russo-Canadian circumpolar relations.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Higginbotham and Spence.

<sup>199</sup> Kanae Komaki, Amundsen Science, and Université Laval, "Canada's Arctic Marine Science Policy" 2, no. 4 (2020): 1–9.

<sup>200</sup> Government of Canada, "Oceans Act," Justice Laws Website, (1996).

<sup>201</sup> Konyshov and Sergunin, "The Strategy of Canada in the Arctic and Russia: Is It Possible to Find Mutual Understanding?"

Since this point, the heart of contemporary Russo-Canadian relations has been based around a succession of economic agreements, the first of which being the Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1991), the Agreement on Trade and Commercial Relations (1992), the Agreement on Economic Cooperation (1993), and the Agreement on Double Taxation (1995), which established a legal basis of mutual benefit between the two nations.<sup>202</sup> Also in 1995, a Russian-Canadian Intergovernmental Economic Commission was established, with the structure of the IEC consisting of a subcommittee on agriculture, and a working group on construction, fuel and energy, mining, and greater cooperation in the Arctic and the North. In terms of security, and equally important, were the 1998 agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, and the 2000 agreement on Air Services and principles of Basic Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the provinces of Canada.<sup>203</sup>

Of the bilateral agreements directly relating to Arctic affairs, on December 18th, 2000, a joint Russo-Canadian policy came into being based around bilateral cooperation in the Arctic North. In October 2005, the Canadian-Russian Business Council (CRBC) was created, which included a working group on agriculture, mining, energy, information and telecommunications technology, transport, finance, forest industry, which also plays a role in Arctic affairs. Moreover, in November 2007, during a state visit to Canada, arrangements were made across 9 branches of industry, for Russian-Canadian Arctic cooperation on agriculture, fisheries, veterinary and phytosanitary controls, along with a host of new financial agreements.<sup>204</sup> All of which adds up to a robust network of non-state actors influencing issues of trade and commerce in the circumpolar north.

#### *4.4.1 The Arctic Council*

The designing of Arctic governance was founded on the idea that the main role of the Arctic Council was to promote “cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states.”<sup>205</sup> This stems from the 1990s, which was signified by the end of the cold war, and the easing in

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<sup>202</sup> Konyshchev and Sergunin.

<sup>203</sup> Konyshchev and Sergunin.

<sup>204</sup> Konyshchev and Sergunin.

<sup>205</sup> Oran R. Young, “Is It Time for a Reset in Arctic Governance?,” *Sustainability (Switzerland)* 11, no. 16 (2019), doi: 10.3390/su11164497.

tension in the Arctic region.<sup>206</sup> The Arctic Council has succeeded well with, international cooperation, and environmental issues, since its establishment in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.<sup>207</sup> In terms of the structure, the Arctic Council's leadership is explained to be on a two year rotating chairmanship between the eight member states, made up of six working groups, which are given tasks for specific Arctic initiatives.<sup>208</sup> Additionally, permanent participant status has been given to six indigenous people's organizations (the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich'in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council).

Canada and Russia both collaborate on the Arctic Council, cooperating in Working Groups. The accomplishments within the Arctic Council in this regard are stated as:<sup>209</sup>

- The Arctic Council regularly produces comprehensive, cutting-edge environmental, ecological and social assessments through its Working Groups.
- The Council has also provided a forum for the negotiation of three important legally binding agreements among the eight Arctic States.<sup>1</sup>
- Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011)
- Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013)
- Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017)<sup>210</sup>

#### *4.4.2 Canada in the Arctic Council*

Canada considers itself a leading Arctic state, and a core element of its multilateral approach to the region is the Arctic Council, which has emerged as a significant component of Canada's northern foreign policy. As noted on the Arctic Council website, "Canada held the first Chair

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<sup>206</sup> Young.

<sup>207</sup> Young.

<sup>208</sup> Arctic Council, "Arctic Council - About the Arctic Council," n.d.

<sup>209</sup> Arctic Council.

<sup>210</sup> Arctic Council.



of the Arctic Council from 1996 to 1998, and again from 2013-2015. Canada's primary priorities related to the Arctic include addressing socio-economic and cultural development, environmental protection and climate change, and strengthening relations with Indigenous peoples."<sup>211</sup>

During Canada's chairmanship of the Arctic Council, its goals were primarily to seek development for the Arctic region to the benefit of Northern peoples, including raising mental health awareness in those communities, to integrate indigenous knowledge into the functions of the Arctic Council, and to improve environmental protections to reduce fossil fuel impact on the region as a whole.

Of its main successes, the founding of the Arctic Economic Council as an additional forum for regional cooperation was chief amongst the progress made under Canadian stewardship, with it functioning as an independent forum for business-to-business cooperation. Moreover, Canada made a significant contribution to the development of an action plan to prevent oil pollution, and reduce carbon and methane omissions. Also worthy of note, it assisted in the establishment of the open-access archive project to ease the public's accessibility to the work of the Arctic Council, raising its profile further internationally.

#### *4.4.3 Russia in the Arctic Council*

In terms of multilateral level of Arctic cooperation, Russia sees the Arctic Council as "a key regional association coordinating international activities in the region."<sup>212</sup> One important piece of information is, Russia has never declined to cooperate with its Arctic neighbours or within the Arctic Council. It was the Soviet Union who began talks for Arctic cooperation which has been documented in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk on October 1<sup>st</sup> 1987. In this speech he championed a nuclear-free zone and reducing military activity in an attempt to 'build trust, collaborate in developing natural resources, coordinating scientific research, cooperating

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<sup>211</sup> Arctic Council, "Arctic Council - Canada," n.d.

<sup>212</sup> Lagutina, "Russia's Arctic Policies: Concepts, Domestic and International Priorities," 16.

in the sphere of environmental protection and opening the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to foreign vessels.<sup>213</sup>

This is noteworthy as in 2021, Iceland will hand over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council (AC) to Russia. Lagutina outlines that, the Ambassador at Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is responsible for international Arctic cooperation, Nikolay Korchunov, asserts that Russia's second chairmanship of the AC will be "a comprehensive inclusive approach to responsible governance", based on harmonious equality of all aspects of sustainable development.<sup>214</sup> Falling in alignment with the objectives set out in the "Basic Principals – 2020 Strategy," Russia's chairmanship of the AC will centre around its socio-economic agenda, factoring in the human security dimension that appears integral to international Arctic cooperation. Generally speaking, the issues the AC face are argued to be connected with the priorities in Russia's state policy in the region.

Joint projects between the state, corporations, and in indigenous peoples are proposed, with a separate block dedicated to indigenous issues specifically, namely with a view to holding a summit of Arctic peoples to demonstrate Russian progress in this area. Moreover, cross-border cooperation and inter-regional interaction is being prepared by the Ministry for the Development of the Far East, promoting joint projects between the regions of Arctic states. In this spirit of cooperation, greater international scientific development and joint research has been proposed for the Russian Arctic, with new circumpolar initiatives and projects tabled. Environmental protections are also high on the agenda, with the goal of developing a circular economy around combating climate change and turning back cumulative environmental damage.

Interestingly, youth involvement is also earmarked for greater consideration in Arctic cooperation, with the digitization of telecoms, a rise in distance learning, greater educational programmes planned for indigenous youth, and action taken to decrease inequality in Arctic regions. Biosafety and combatting viral infections in the light of COVID-19 will also play a significant role, strengthening interstate cooperation in ways previously underutilised.

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<sup>213</sup> Viatcheslav Gavrilov, "Russian Arctic Policy" in *Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World*, ed. P Whitney Lackenbauer and S Lalonde, *Breaking the Ice Curtain* (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019), 3, <https://www.electrificationcanadian.com/lifestyle/Breaking-the-Ice-Curtain.pdf#page=80>.

<sup>214</sup> Nikolay Korchunov's Speech.

Over the last several years, Russia has taken an active part in drafting three international treaties on Search and Rescue, Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, and Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation under the auspices of the Arctic Council (all of which have now entered into legal force) and in crafting an Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean which, after lengthy and tough negotiations, was finally adopted and opened for signature in 2018.

In recent updates, the Russian Arctic Council presidential program which was recently published on the Council's website where Moscow tries to reflect the human security agenda in the entire Arctic, not only in the AZRF. A cross-cutting priority of the Russian Chairmanship in the Arctic Council will be "Responsible Governance for Sustainable Arctic" through promoting collective approaches to the sustainable development of the Arctic, environmentally, socially and economically balanced, enhancing synergy and cooperation and coordination with other regional structures, as well as implementation of the Council's Strategic Plan, while respecting the rule of law. More will be discussed in chapter 5 on this matter.

#### *4.4.4 Scientific Research Cooperation*

Since the Soviet era in 1979, Canada and Russia have and continue to have a long history of Arctic cooperation. From the 1979<sup>215</sup> search and rescue agreements, to business and scientific research projects, to the current day Arctic Council cooperation examples, Russia and Canada are seen to work together. As both countries follow, and have a history of following, international rules in the Arctic, it is in both of their interests to cooperate and see each other as neighbours who can help tackle the human security gaps and build Arctic governance structures that face their combined Arctic challenges presently, and in the future. Bridge through domestic governance.

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<sup>215</sup> Michael Byers, "Cold, Dark, and Dangerous: International Cooperation in the Arctic and Space," *Polar Record* 55, no. 1 (2019): 32–47, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247419000160>.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

Canadian and Russian Arctic cooperation has a long and storied history since the Soviet era, from 1979 search and rescue agreements, to scientific and business focussed initiatives, but best typified in the unprecedented levels of cooperation in the Arctic Council; ultimately, Russia and Canada are continuing a rich tradition of working collaboratively. At the heart of contemporary cooperation, it is clear that the succession of existing economic agreements will be vital to maintaining diplomacy, particularly as the modernization of the AZRF and the NSR will act as a trade stimulus for the Arctic region as a whole.

While the indigenous political participation has been shown to be vital for collectiveness and harmony with the broader ecosystem, providing a framework for more environmentally concerned governance, neither Russia or Canada have taken steps to devolve power more directly to their regional administrators, yet it could be argued that IR would benefit from drawing on such diversity and regional knowledge systems which offer socio-political and historical advantages in terms of local governance, and contribute to the more holistic approach desired.

### 5. Qualitative Research and Case Study

This chapter will compare and analyze *Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019)* and *Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035*, looking first at the positives and negatives of these policies, before analyzing them in terms of the 7 human security dimensions.

#### 5.1 Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019)

Carolyn Bennett, Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations, outlined Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework in 2016,<sup>216</sup> which "sets out a long-term, strategic vision that will

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<sup>216</sup> "The Government of Canada Launches Co-Developed Arctic and Northern Policy Framework - Canada.Ca," n.d.

guide the Government of Canada’s activities and investments in the Arctic to 2030 and beyond and will better align Canada’s national and international policy objectives with the priorities of Indigenous peoples and Arctic and Northern residents.”<sup>217</sup>

In summary, the framework is communicated to the public in simple steps. Firstly, in 2016, Trudeau sought to co-develop a policy framework, incorporating peoples from across the Arctic region, factoring in both Territorial and Provincial governments and Indigenous Peoples and Northerners alike, with it replacing Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009) and the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010).<sup>218</sup> Such unprecedented collaboration with the six territorial/provincial governments and Indigenous representatives helped to establish a roadmap for future co-development in the interests of the Arctic as a whole.<sup>219</sup> The scope of recognition for Arctic communities is best summarized as the renewal of ‘Inuit-to-Crown, nation-to-nation, and government-to-government relationships’, which is underlined by the 2019 Budget, which put forward a host of new measures, alongside more than \$700 million in support for the initiative.<sup>220</sup> Of the improved measures, funding was made available to enhance infrastructure in the region, bringing peoples in the remote Arctic into closer contact with urban centres, providing support for cleaner energy production, diversifying further/higher education, alongside increasing the programme for economic development, enabling vital Arctic research to take place, all with a view to promoting Canada as a leader from the front on global Arctic affairs.<sup>221</sup> In sum, the key areas of focus are:

1. Generating comprehensive Arctic infrastructure
2. Strengthening Arctic peoples and communities
3. Ensuring strong, sustainable and diversified Arctic economies
4. Promoting Arctic science and Indigenous knowledge
5. Protecting the environment and preserving Arctic biodiversity
6. Providing global Arctic leadership
7. Providing safety, security, and defence

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> “The Government of Canada Launches Co-Developed Arctic and Northern Policy Framework - Canada.Ca.”

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

Expounding upon the Canadian policy on the *Polar Connection: Home of Polar Research and Policy Initiative* website, Chater outlines how Canada's new policy emphasises eight pillars.<sup>222</sup> Notably northerners are directly mentioned in three pillars:<sup>223</sup>

1. Strong, sustainable, diversified and inclusive local and regional economies
2. Canadian Arctic and northern Indigenous peoples are resilient and healthy
3. The Canadian Arctic and North and its people are safe, secure and well-defended
4. Strengthened infrastructure that closes gaps with other regions of Canada
5. The rules-based international order in the Arctic responds effectively to new challenges and opportunities
6. Knowledge and understanding guides decision-making
7. Canadian Arctic and Northern ecosystems are healthy and resilient
8. Reconciliation supports self-determination and nurtures mutually-respectful relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples

Essentially, this has signalled a dramatic change of ideology compared with Canada's previous 2009 Arctic policy, which had four pillars that emphasized northerners less,<sup>224</sup> promoting the far more nebulous targets of "Exercising Our Arctic Sovereignty, Promoting Social and Economic Development, Protecting our Environmental Heritage, and Improving and Devolving Northern Governance."<sup>225</sup>

In addressing the environmental and societal challenges facing the Arctic, a bottom-up approach is necessitated by the uniquely diverse make up of these Northern peoples.<sup>226</sup> That said, any such approach requires further development for it to have any hope of making a significant contribution to an ever-changing political landscape globally.<sup>227</sup> Environmentally, the adoption of goals from the *UN Framework Convention on Climate Change* for reducing

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<sup>222</sup> "Highlights of Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework," n.d.

<sup>223</sup> Andrew Chater, "Three Takeaways from Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy | The Polar Connection," (2019).

<sup>224</sup> Chater.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Komaki, Science, and Laval, "Canada's Arctic Marine Science Policy."

<sup>227</sup> Robert Falkner, Hannes Stephan, and John Vogler, "International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a 'Building Blocks' Approach," *Global Policy* 1, no. 3 (2010): 252–62, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00045.x>.

carbon-based emissions has seen the integration of monitoring systems by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, guided by the Arctic Council.<sup>228</sup> Komaki cautions that federal resources will be put to the test when it comes to implementing top-down protections to protect the Northwest Passage ecosystem, yet equally argues the profile of the region will be raised by such attempts at protection, further fuelling discussion on the topic, which may facilitate the achievement of environmental aims.<sup>229</sup>

### *5.1.1 Positive Aspects*

In Essence, the Trudeau government approach to Arctic strategy is decisively in contrast to the older conservative Harper government's motto which was the "use it or lose it" Arctic strategy brand which informed the 2009 Arctic policy, as Byers highlights.<sup>230</sup> The focus in the 2009 policy<sup>231</sup> was mainly all about strengthening military capabilities in the Arctic as a place under threat with sovereignty at risk. The most noteworthy difference between the 2009 policy and the 2019 policy is the level of engagement and collaboration that is apparent. A positive movement towards a human security approach, the Trudeau government invited "sub-national actors to contribute to the national Arctic vision, which has resulted in documents from the government of Nunavut and Northwest Territories, as well as a co-written chapter from the three territorial governments and a chapter from Canada's major Inuit organisation, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami."<sup>232</sup> This indicates a modern direction for the Liberal government, as they try to go in a different format in terms of investing more in the Arctic than previous governments. Among its strengths, the strategy addresses the social and economic crisis in Arctic communities and encourages working with Inuit and First Nations leaders to deal with epidemic levels of suicide and tuberculosis, tangible issues that have real world impacts on Canadians lives, rather than focussing on unrealized military developments of little human security benefit.

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<sup>228</sup> The Arctic Council, "Arctic Monitoring & Assessment Programme," (2018).

<sup>229</sup> Komaki, Science, and Laval, "Canada's Arctic Marine Science Policy."

<sup>230</sup> "Canada's Challenges in the Arctic - YouTube," n.d.

<sup>231</sup> Canada, *Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*.

<sup>232</sup> Chater, "Three Takeaways from Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy | The Polar Connection."

Another significant distinction between the 2019 policy and the 2009 one is that, although there are references to Arctic sovereignty, it is more minimized in importance.<sup>233</sup> Framed as being for greater representation and participation of northern Canadians that will follow the “rules based international order in the Arctic,”<sup>234</sup> the 2019 document marks a significant shift in consideration when it comes to Canada’s Arctic militarization, as these will now be through the prism of dialogue with northern Canadians, taking into account climate change threats. Along the same theme, the 2019 policy calls for a de-escalating of Arctic tensions, and emphasises the importance of cooperation. There is a call to have open communication and dialogue with Russia in the Arctic, stating that Canada, “will take steps to restart a regular bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues with Russia in key areas related to Indigenous issues, scientific cooperation, environmental protection, shipping and search and rescue.”<sup>235</sup>

### *5.1.2 Negative Aspects*

For background purposes, Canada’s last domestic northern strategy was issued in 2009 by the Harper Conservatives, and its Arctic foreign policy in 2010. With broad support in parliament, the Liberal government announced their intention to create a new Arctic strategy in 2016, with their new vision released some two and a half years later. Byers asserts that it is likely the Trudeau government fell into the trap of “trying to consult everyone in concerning the north”<sup>236</sup>, which is reflected in the title, as it is not the Arctic policy framework, but the northern policy framework which invited more and more stakeholders to be included. It could be argued that the strategy becomes so large and confusing as a result of the scale and diversity of input included, though equally, such aspirations of inclusivity are a bonus, and a typically Canadian trait. However, the problem arises as a lack of coherence, with condensing needed to ensure the policy is actionable and focussed, with Byers cautioning that there may be an issue with the Trudeau government running out of time to implement it.

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<sup>233</sup> Chater.

<sup>234</sup> “Arctic and Northern Policy Framework International Chapter,” n.d.

<sup>235</sup> Chater, “Three Takeaways from Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy | The Polar Connection.”

<sup>236</sup> “Canada’s Challenges in the Arctic - YouTube.”



What is more, another issue is that the strategy is not a single document, but is a collaboration of chapters written by separate people, which can result in both its aims being diffuse and its messaging unclear. For example: Global affairs Canada wrote one chapter, then Department of National Defence, with no apparent connection between the two, followed by other chapters by the three territorial governments and national Inuit organizations. It is an ensemble of separate chapters, each reflecting diverse input, interests and recommendations, which equates to very little coherency. There still remains hope, however, that the government will assimilate the gathered information and take charge, generating coherent actionable policies. A case in point, in terms of actionable policies, would be the money being put forward in addressing and helping Arctic communities, however, there still is not an overarching framework and vision beyond this comprehensive mission statement, a hallmark perhaps of Anglo-North American approaches to policy and business. Ultimately, the question remains as to how such improvements will be achieved in a 3-year, 10-year, or even 20-year timescale.

### *5.2 Russia's Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone (2035)*

Regarding Russia's latest policy, the Strategy for Development of the Russian Arctic Zone outlines the role of the region in the country's socio-economic development and national security. It specifies aims and tasks of Arctic zone development, implementation stages, expected results, as well as main mechanisms for strategy implementation. Implementation of this Strategy is scheduled for three stages: the first stage (2020 - 2024), the second stage (2025 - 2030) and the third stage (2031 - 2035). The provisions of the document will be provided by amending the state "Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation" program, regional state programs, as well as by implementing measures of the Northern Sea Route infrastructure development plan.

A summary of the Russian state policy in the Arctic up to 2035 expands the list of basic national interests in the region, seeking greater resources for economic development, looking to secure peace and cooperation in the Arctic zone, while simultaneously accommodating environmental concerns, securing the northern sea route, and safeguarding national sovereignty. The renewed focus on security pursues the twin goals of improving human security for Northerners by assuring higher standards of living, while maintaining traditional security by minimising conflict and national security threats to the region as a whole.

Equally evident, is a noted shift in Russian domestic politics, with the underlining of the importance in economic and population growth in the North. The main messages of the documents are that a peaceful solution will be sought on Arctic issues based in international law and good will, that good neighbouring relations among Arctic states are vital, that support for the Arctic Council (AC) is essential as joint forum, and that this will be achieved while protecting the interests of indigenous peoples and the environment. Crucially, greater economic collaboration between the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) will be pursued with both Arctic and non-Arctic nations, foreshadowing less regional isolation when it comes to trade.

Building on this, the new strategy of development and national security up to 2035 details further goals, with the Russian chairmanship of the AC (2021-2023) high on the agenda, as Russia seeks also to play a more active role on the Arctic Economic Council. Not only will further regional investment be invited from abroad, but improved scientific and educational cooperation will also be targeted. Aside from more active participation state actors and NGOs on international forums, a unified search and rescue system will provide more tangible support to inhabitants of the circumpolar North.

Perhaps the boldest maneuvers planned in the longer term, are the considerable goals for social and economic development in a 15 year timeframe, not in the least as the targets are geographically specific, with precise figures projected, suggesting a considerable level of planning. For example, life expectancy is intended to rise from 73 to 82 years of age, 8 nuclear ice breakers are tabled to be built, including three world-leading class of vessel, 200 thousand jobs are set to be created, along with a rise in regional GDP contribution of around 2.5%. More specifically, pertaining to the maritime Arctic trade route, cargo shipments are projected to increase from 32 million tons to 130 million tons, alongside liquified natural gas production being set to rise from around 9 million tons to 91 million tons. Such specificity in these longer-term goals imply a sizable commitment to their pursuit and attainment which contrasts considerably with the more nebulous Canadian policy ambitions, which should allow for a more careful analysis of policy successes or failures come the end of this policy period.

When compared with the respectively limited ambitions of the 2008 to 2020 policy, though some would argue it is continuity and evolution rather than revolution,<sup>237</sup> there are still

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<sup>237</sup> Ekaterina Klimenko, "Russia's New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather than Change | SIPRI," (2020).

marked improvements. The previously vague remit of using the Arctic as a strategic resource for the rest of the country, maintaining peace and cooperation, preserving ecology and utilising the Northern Sea Route, it is plain to see that the 2021-2035 policy is a more comprehensive proposal which signals a more liberal intergovernmentalism approach to the Arctic's future.

The Russian Arctic Council presidential program 2021-2023 recently published on the Council's website highlights how Moscow will try to reflect the human security agenda in the entire Arctic, not only in the AZRF. To summarize the areas prioritized for multilateral cooperation, there are 4 distinct areas:<sup>238</sup>

Firstly, on the inclusion of indigenous peoples from the Arctic, the sustainable development targets centre around human capital being central, with sustainability being key across climate and individual well-being, education and health, and the promotion of scientific and cultural exchanges, tourism, and the protection of linguistic and cultural heritages for Northern peoples.<sup>239</sup>

Secondly, in terms of broader environmental protections for the Arctic as a whole, combatting climate change in line with the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement are central to a low-emission economy target, with ecosystems and biodiversity being preserved, the mitigation of existing climate damage towards a more ecologically balanced circumpolar North, and the pursuit of renewable energy all being key.<sup>240</sup>

As far as socio-economic development is concerned, the Russian chairmanship continues along its theme of sustainability, targeting economic growth that upholds the priorities of indigenous communities, namely in promoting reliable energy infrastructure, sustainable transport, improving shipping, developing communication systems, and streamlining investment flow for business.<sup>241</sup>

Lastly, raising the profile of the Arctic Council as a leading forum for international cooperation in the region, the Russian chairmanship will seek to further promote Working and Expert groups, the effectiveness of the Secretariat, as well as boosting financing for Council activities. Alongside funding projects and programmes, it will look to encourage dialogue with

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<sup>238</sup> Russian Chairmanship, "Russian Chairmanship 2021-2023," (2021), 21–24.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

AC observers in engagement with the AC. Collaboration between the AC and the Arctic Economic Council, Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and the University of the Arctic, will all be marked for intensification during the Russian stewardship of the AC, with the further promotion of international scientific cooperation, including AC expeditions in the Arctic Council.

### *5.2.1 Positive Aspects*

Particularly in socio-economic areas, the 2035 policy has a variety of positive and forward-thinking goals and objectives. Of direct benefit to AZRF inhabitants, improved medical facilities and equipment will provide a significant boost to the primary healthcare system, with more vehicles available, and an international rescue system addressing the precarity of living in such isolated regions.<sup>242</sup> Greater engagement with the scientific community at large, and providing STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths) education for Arctic citizens, along with improving legal regulations to create better conditions for training of indigenous peoples, will improve the outlook for youth in the region and perhaps counter the brain drain intrinsic with more remote regions of developed countries.<sup>243</sup> Such boosts to professional and educational organisations not only benefit research, but have the subsequent effect of boosting elements within the real economy in a trickle-down process of raising professional competencies and standards.<sup>244</sup> The impact on youth populations cannot be understated however, with creative and sports development support being provided, alongside improved air fare subsidies, state support for housing, all building on the STEM funding and greater environmental protections, creating a more fertile environment for emerging talent and potential community leaders.

That the Russian Arctic strategy will be implemented in three stages: first stage (2020—2024), second stage (2025—2030), and third stage (2031—2035), also provides opportunities for progress checks and the assessment of any shortfalls or target failings, allowing for corrections to be made. This is a well-thought-out and detailed outline that aims to ensure that targets are attained, as amendments will be “introduced to the Socioeconomic Development of

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<sup>242</sup> Klimenko, “Russia’s New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather than Change | SIPRI.”

<sup>243</sup> Klimenko.

<sup>244</sup> Hilde-Gunn Bye and Elizabeth Buchanan, “Russia’s Updated Arctic Strategy: New Strategic Planning Document Approved,” October 2020.

the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation State Programme and the regional state programmes.”<sup>245</sup> Compared to the 2008-2020 Arctic policy, the new 2035 document is different in that for the first time, the main pillars of the development of the Arctic zone policy are centered around improving the quality of life of Russian Arctic populations and a focus on social development.

In terms of military measures, these are noted as being mainly of a defensive nature, focussing on the prevention of threats towards Russia in the region. However, the key messages regarding the documents are that peaceful resolutions will be the first port of call in dealing with emerging conflictual relations, with the AC being a vital organ of the diplomatic process of maintaining peace.

At the heart of the 2035 strategy for Development of the Russian Arctic Zone, domestic priorities are emphasized, with one of the driving forces in the policy being the building of a “comprehensive development of the infrastructure of seaports, and shipping routes in the waters of the Northern Sea Route, the Barents, White and Pechora Seas.”<sup>246</sup> Similarly, the policy highlights the serious threats of climate change which create challenges in the Arctic and issues for Arctic populations, which had previously been referenced, but with too little action taken. Therefore, priorities of its 2021-2023 Chairmanship are around ‘sustainable development of the Arctic’ and promoting programs that assist and reinforce the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples.”<sup>247</sup> As Buchanan explains, the Strategy for Development is an illustration of how important Russia is taking its Council chairmanship.<sup>248</sup>

### *5.2.2 Negative Aspects*

Although the 2008-2020 Russian Arctic policy established the goal of fixing the regional disparities and issues which afflict Russian Arctic indigenous communities, in reality, as was discussed in sections 3 and 4, there remain present and continuous population decreases in almost all areas of the Russian Arctic due to the difficult quality of life in the region. Therefore, the question remains with the new 2035 Arctic policy, as to how much of this funding will this

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<sup>245</sup> Hilde-Gunn Bye and Buchanan.

<sup>246</sup> Hilde-Gunn Bye and Buchanan.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

affect Russian Arctic indigenous lives and communities in a meaningful way. As Russia is already the biggest population in the Arctic, would increasing the population be worthwhile in terms of health and economic conditions, particularly given how some Russian experts<sup>249</sup> make the case that other Arctic countries with smaller populations (Canada and Norway) use the fly-in/fly-out method for their regional labour, as it is the most logical and cost-effective choice.<sup>250</sup>

Another factor in the 2035 policy is that there is a continuing focus of ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity as one of the main interests in the Russian Arctic region. As Russia increases military and hard security dimensions, this indicates a contradiction to the human security elements in the policy. By the federal center throwing more funding and resources behind hard security as a key aspect of the 2035 policy is detracting from the material improvements to quality of life which will benefit the region most, despite the human security benefits tabled. There is very little expectation of armed conflict in the Arctic region, particularly as it is territorially owned by western powers, and as the world is in the nuclear age, it suggests this is as much about power projection as it is actual security.

Despite the emphasis on the socio-economic benefits of the 2035 policy in developing the Arctic, there appears to be confusion how this will be implemented. In order for there to be long-term results, there would likely need to be an organized and cohesive administration that breaks away from gridlock bureaucracies focused on short-term gains. While the long-term targets provide a specific benchmark against which to measure success, it could equally be argued the timescale for their resolution is such, that few in key government positions will still be incumbent in 2035. The point here being that there will likely be little accountability for any failings when this policy period has reached its conclusion. Indeed, it seems that only time will tell in this regard.

### *5.3 Conclusion*

Having compared and analyzed *Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019)* and the *Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring*

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<sup>249</sup> Zuev Stanislava, "The Image of the Future of the Arctic. Experts Discussed the Prospects for the Development of the North," AIF.ru, (2020).

<sup>250</sup> Sergey Sukhankin, "Russia Unveils New Arctic Development Strategy: Focal Points and Key Priorities - Jamestown," Eurasia Daily Monitor, (2020).

*National Security for the Period up to 2035*, it is evident that they echo one another in a number of ways. In terms of the progressiveness of their policy proposals, particularly regarding environmental security, and the importance of safeguarding Northern communities across the Arctic, these policy decisions are a marked improvement on the outdated policies they replaced. Despite the unifying factor of the Arctic Council, the power of corporations and resource-hungry companies do still threaten to undermine the political good will created by such collaboration, and could hamper both nations in achieving their environmental goals.

Indicative of the binding power of common legal frameworks internationally, there is similar alignment in this regard between the two policies, in spite of their differing visions for the region's future. While Russian priorities clearly lie in the NSR, and Canadian interests are more broad, and less reliant on the Northwest Passage, there is a shared direction in policy which is suggestive of improving relations going forward.

Regardless of being embroiled in other disputes internationally, the governance and legal frameworks afforded by non-state forums such as the Arctic Council, along with shared stances on the rights of domestic regional peoples, on economic affairs, and environmental concerns, there is ample cause for optimism in the circumpolar North. Though both nations will likely maintain different stances on coastal borders and maritime claims, particularly concerning military defence, there is the potential for an unprecedented age of positive Russo-Canadian relations elsewhere in the world, if the Arctic can be prioritised and used as a benchmark for how other issues can be reconciled.

## **6. Discussion**

Human security offers a more nuanced understanding of security and threats by bringing the focus away from the state and towards the individual, community, and environment. The comparative analysis of Russia and Canada's Arctic strategies is based on the policy strategies outlined in the previous chapters, with the structure following the 7 human security dimensions raised throughout this paper, those of: 1) economic security, 2) food security, 3) health security, 4) environmental security, 5) personal security, 6) community security, 7) political security. With the goal of analyzing these priority areas and navigate the two Arctic strategies in terms

of these standards, a short summary is first provided, before a deeper analysis of the Arctic strategies in terms of correlating them to the 7 human security dimensions, and with one another.

### *6.1 Economic Security*

Economic security is defined as “a guaranteed basic income for people, in terms of work, or providing a publicly financed safety net,”<sup>251</sup> and is a crucial issue in the Russian and Canadian Arctic zones, and Arctic communities, to quite extreme levels compared with the rest of the country. As unemployment and poverty are particularly damaging issues which perpetuate the region’s quality of life failings, it is important to see how each policy proposes to tackle these obstacles in their approach to domestic-economic security.

Generally speaking, there are several similarities based on common factors, such as having similarly disproportionate economic/employment opportunities in the Arctic in comparison with the rest of Russia and Canada respectively. As has been explored, Canada’s 2019 Northern Policy and Russia’s 2035 Strategy both revolve around recognising domestic socio-economic problems and creating methods to solve them. For example, Canada’s 2019 policy heavily addresses the social and economic crisis in Arctic communities, and encourages working with Inuit and First Nations leaders for the first time, and the Canadian federal government has collaborated with Indigenous representatives, and six territorial and provincial governments, to define and co-develop an economic framework which considers the priorities and perspectives of Arctic and Northern people. The budget to tackle these economic based goals sets aside more than \$700 million to support the Framework, complementing existing efforts to strengthen Arctic and northern communities. This includes new funding to diversify post-secondary educational options in the territories, enhance infrastructure resources to connect Northern and remote communities, increase economic development programming.

In terms of economic initiatives, the Russian Arctic 2035 strategy has multiple far-reaching steps centred around economic and social development for the next 15 years, detailing how the Arctic share in Russian GDP is purported to grow from 7.2 to 9.6 per cent and the creation of 200.000 new jobs. There will be a guarantee of improved living standards and

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<sup>251</sup> “World Dev. Rep. 1994,” 25.



prosperity for people of the Russian Arctic zone, and through this, it will develop the Russian Arctic as a strategic resource base and speed up national economic growth. One of the main arguments in the policy is that building a “comprehensive development of the infrastructure of seaports, and shipping routes in the waters of the Northern Sea Route, the Barents, White and Pechora Seas” will directly bring more economic prosperity to the Arctic regions.

In terms of how these policies differ, the Canadian 2019 policy may be considered more focused on incorporating indigenous voices into real economic goals, even at the expense of non-state interest groups and other governmental priorities. Comparatively, though the Russian 2035 strategy mentions plans to guarantee certain standards of living, there is still a large focus on shipping routes rather than a concise inclusion of indigenous participation in economic frameworks, which ties into the broader concern of a lack of direct representation for regional communities in policy strategizing.

## *6.2 Food Security*

Summarized by the statement “people at all times have the right to physical and economic access to basic food,”<sup>252</sup> the UN claims that the solution to food insecurity is related to economic security (access to steady work and a sufficient income). For food insecurity, the main message is that the problem is not limited food, but an issue of organization in distribution along with purchasing power. Intrinsically linked to the economic security, one of the criticisms is that Arctic communities are overly dependent on the rest of the country, given how agriculturally limited the Arctic regions are. This is a similar issue for Canada and Russia, as both of their Arctic communities suffer from high food costs (i.e.: transportation/shipping costs) and suffer disproportionately during economic downturns. In terms of greater food accessibility, there are plans for both Canada and Russia to attempt opening up this market. For example, Russia has grand plans to improve its maritime trade routes and shipping port development, as noted in Strategy 2035, there are goals to develop the Russian Arctic as a strategic resource base and catalyst to speed up national economic growth. The development of the Northern Sea Route as a globally competitive national transport corridor will be that link, with shipping routes in the waters of the Northern Sea Route, the Barents, White and

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<sup>252</sup> “World Dev. Rep. 1994,” 25.

Pechora Seas. Allowing greater infrastructure development in the Arctic region will open up trade and prosperity for the region, thus allowing for more food and economic security. Whether these trade options will translate to more prosperity for the Arctic communities themselves is yet to be seen, though the federal center would likely benefit more directly.

Canada's 2019 Strategy's \$700 million budget framework includes efforts to strengthen Arctic communities, enhance infrastructure resources to connect Northern and remote communities, and to increase economic development programming. Although there is a mission to connect the gaps between Northern communities and the rest of Canada, it is unclear how exactly this will be executed. There is also a lack of focus on building ports and sea routes for trade, or clear measures to allow more autonomy for the Indigenous economy and resources to grow.

In conclusion, Canada and Russia share a similar vision in their latest Arctic strategies in focusing on bridging the gaps between circumpolar communities and the rest of the countries, funding frameworks and projects which are hoped to build up Arctic infrastructure and a closer link with trade. Hopefully these measures will result in food security for all Arctic peoples in the Canadian and Russian Arctic north.

### *6.3: Health Security*

Health security is defined as a necessity to guarantee protection from diseases and major health risks. "Threats to health security are deemed a larger problem for people in poverty, particularly children which is correlated to 'malnutrition and insufficient access to health services, clean water and other basic necessities.'"<sup>253</sup>

A large issue in both Canadian and Russian Arctic regions, health security issues are manifest in a definite lack of access to health services, clean water, and basic necessities. However, positively, both the 2019 and 2035 policies tackle these health security issues in their own way. With Canada's 2019 policy, closely collaborating with a network of northern communities and representatives, offering a more substantial focus on health insecurity which the Canadian North faces. There is a push for the Canadian Arctic and northern Indigenous

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<sup>253</sup> "World Dev. Rep. 1994," 25.

peoples to be resilient and healthy, and this will be in the form of funding programs, infrastructure, schools, and health services. Similarly, in the Russian 2035 policy, health security is prioritised in the Arctic, with life expectancy aiming to rise from 73 to 82 years and healthcare making up one of the main tenets of the policy.

Both policies are equally limited in that the attainment of health and well-being targets are not solely related to dollar investments and good will, with a more holistic approach being required, particularly given the unique challenges to mental health such isolated communities give rise to. In this regard, the extent to which these policy commitments are acted on will not singularly be responsible for improving health security in the region, and a broader range of indicators would be required for a judgement to be made closer to the policies reaching their respective resolutions.

In conclusion, while both Canada and Russia emphasize the importance of addressing the extreme health insecurity in the Arctic regions which are facing high amounts of early death rates compared to the majority, further assessment will be required at a later date across a much broader range of primary care and healthcare metrics.

#### *6.4: Environmental Security*

Environmental security is defined as an aim to protect individuals from man-made environmental threats which deteriorate the natural environment<sup>254</sup>. This can be considered as not being able to access clean water, air pollution, and general environmental contamination which decreases lifestyle quality for people.

Both Canada's 2019 and Russia's 2035 policy name check environmental security throughout, showing its significance to their agendas. In Canada's 2019 policy, the \$700 million given to support the Northern Framework includes new funding to support clean energy production, enable critical Arctic research, and protect the environment while preserving Arctic biodiversity. Similarly, Russia lists a plan to 'protect the Arctic environment, development of science and technology, the primordial homeland and traditional way of life of the indigenous minorities in the Russian Arctic' as a central theme in their policy. Negatively, the focus on

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<sup>254</sup> "World Development Report 1994," *World Development Report 1994*, doi: 10.1596/978-0-1952-0992-1.

resource extractions such as Vostok Oil by Rosneft in the Taimyr region, with production of more than 100 million tons of top-quality oil by 2035, promises to be the largest single project in Russian history, which could create more risks in the Arctic's fragile ecosystems. As oil spills do not carry with them strong enough financial and legal consequences to act as deterrents, it is up to both Canadian and Russian governments to address these dangerous loopholes.

Crucially, in line with the aims of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, the Trudeau administration has implemented a moratorium on the issue of new oil and natural gas drilling contracts as of December 2016, bolstering the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework aims to boost the economy,<sup>255</sup> with exploratory drilling under existing leases having been prohibited since July 2019. Under CIRNA Canada, research programmes have been implemented to analyze and predict ocean conditions and obtain scientific data to better evaluate Arctic climate concerns, a case in point being the Beaufort Regional Strategic Environment Assessment programme.<sup>256</sup>

In conclusion, Canada and Russia have equally progressive policies in terms of environmental security compared to past policies, and strongly focus on the importance of a safe Arctic for northern communities and global communities which are all affected. However, corporations and resource-based companies still wield great influence in both Canadian and Russian Arctic matters, yet the Arctic Council may be a uniting presence in achieving these environmental goals.

### *6.5: Personal Security*

Personal security is summarised as people needing to be protected from physical violence from both the state, external states, violent individuals, and domestic abuse. The majority of violence stems from crime statistically.<sup>257</sup> Zeroing in on personal security as a main feature, both Canadian and Russian Arctic policies look to address the high crime rates and violence-

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<sup>255</sup> Government of Canada, "United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders' Statement," (2016), <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2016/12/20/united-states-canada-joint-arctic-leaders-statement>.

<sup>256</sup> KAVIK-Stantec Inc., "Beaufort Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment," (2020).

<sup>257</sup> "World Development Report 1994," *World Development Report 1994*, doi: 10.1596/978-0-1952-0992-1.

related incidents (particularly human trafficking and other external threats) as a very relevant issue for the northern communities.

The Canadian 2019 policy focuses heavily on personal security as can be seen in several cases. As their funding outlines a framework to tackle all of these issues, most notably investing in a comprehensive Arctic infrastructure, strong, sustainable and diversified Arctic economies, providing funding for Arctic science and Indigenous knowledge, protecting the environment and preserving Arctic biodiversity, and safety, security, and defence. The above policy commitments contribute holistically to improving living standards, which in turn reduce the number of indigenous peoples and northern community members living in precarious circumstances, therefore potentially lowering the rates of crime.

In the Russian 2035 policy, there are similar tacit supports for personal security for the Russian Arctic communities, such as preserving the Arctic as a region of peace, with stable and mutually beneficial partnerships and a substantial military, guaranteeing high living standards and prosperity for people of the Russian Arctic zone, developing the Russian Arctic as a strategic resource base and use to speed up national economic growth, and developing the Northern Sea Route as a globally competitive national transport corridor. Along with building safety, security and port infrastructure of the NSR, in bringing innovations, development of science and technology, including reaching 100 per cent families internet coverage, in health care, education and other social infrastructure.

In conclusion, both policies focus on increasing military presence as a deterrent, improving infrastructure, improving education, unified search and rescue plans and unemployment issues which should become catalysts to improved lifestyle conditions and safety in the northern Arctic.

#### *6.6: Community Security*

Best understood as a guarantee to protect people from loss of traditional culture and values, the United Nations declared 1993 the Year of Indigenous People to highlight the continuing

vulnerability of the 300 million aboriginal people in 70 countries as they face a widening spiral of violence.<sup>258</sup>

Both the Canadian and Russian Arctic strategies cite as a priority the maintenance of Indigenous traditional culture and values. Throughout the colonialist past, many Indigenous traditions have been lost and even suppressed due to dominant state interests which has resulted in dire conditions for indigenous Arctic communities. As previously mentioned, Canada has always at the forefront of human security and Indigenous representation. However, conditions remain bleak, which is why the 2019 Arctic policy aims to include indigenous representatives from the Arctic community to be included in future decision-making plans which directly affect their lives. Equally, the Russian 2035 policy focuses on domestic solutions, maintaining that the preservation of Indigenous heritage and environment is a particular focus.

#### *6.7: Political Security*

Political security is defined as a guarantee of freedom of society and political expression being necessary, and a societal focus on maintaining basic human rights<sup>259</sup>.

In Canada's 2019 strategy, there is an olive branch being extended towards the northern Arctic communities regarding more freedom and autonomy through having a greater voice and influence. Through co-developing an Arctic Policy Framework with Northerners, Territorial and Provincial governments, and Indigenous Peoples, the Canadian federal government is making history by working collaboratively with Indigenous representatives that will forge a long-term vision. As this Framework was built with consideration of the priorities and perspectives of Arctic and Northern people, this will hopefully lead to a framework which supports the Government's commitment to "renewing Inuit-to-Crown, nation-to-nation and government-to-government relationships and ensuring that Northerners' needs are recognized, respected, and reflected."<sup>260</sup> Whether these groups will wield genuine political power is yet to be seen, especially as some can point to indigenous communities in Canada where their voices have been silenced or marginalised by land violations when it comes to pipelines and business

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<sup>258</sup> "World Development Report 1994," *World Development Report 1994*, <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-1952-0992-1>.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

interests that override autonomous land rights.<sup>261</sup> As Christie notes, “What I see is a long history of the Canadian government doing its best to avoid acknowledging the existence of other systems of government... the Crown has itself acknowledged that the way it gets authority over territory is through the making of a treaty.<sup>262</sup>”

In Russia’s 2035 Development strategy, there is a lot of inclusive language and focus on legal rights for northern communities, particularly in how it calls for the ‘peaceful settlement of all potential problems in the Arctic on the basis of existing international law and good will’ and to ‘protect the Arctic environment, the primordial homeland and traditional way of life of the indigenous minorities in the Russian Arctic’. However, there is much less inclusion of northern indigenous autonomy in regards to regional influence. As there is limited agency and freedom based on the Russian governance systems, which require the processing of a multitude of competing state departments and hierarchical chambers of government before arriving at presidential advisers for consideration.

In conclusion, both Canada and Russia’s strategies highlight the need for northern indigenous inclusion in Arctic matters, in regards to the economy, environmental protects, and legal rights. However, given both Russia and Canada’s history of disregarding indigenous interests and wishes, the future will tell if there is a meaningful difference in consideration and regional agency.

### *6.8 Conclusion*

In view of the above, in the near future, the authorities are likely to be more preoccupied with domestic policy issues and the region’s internal problems. The most important thing to understanding the current Russian policy in the Arctic is that the AZRF development is amongst its highest national priorities. For Russia, the Arctic is not some remote, hard-to-reach territory, but an actual part of the state territory, fully integrated into the socioeconomic and political systems of the Russian Federation. Thus, Russia has extremely important national interests in the Arctic: from ensuring Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to guaranteeing high living standards and prosperity for the population of the AZRF, to

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<sup>261</sup> Leyland Cecco, “Pipeline Battle Puts Focus on Canada’s Disputed Right to Use Indigenous Land | Canada | The Guardian,” The Guardian, January 2019.

<sup>262</sup> Cecco.

protection of the Arctic environment, to develop the Russian Arctic as a strategic resource base, its economy and infrastructure (first of all, the NSR). Besides that, Russia sees the Arctic as a territory of peace and stable mutually beneficial partnership, both on bilateral and multilateral levels.<sup>263</sup>

Questions have been raised as to the status of the Northern Sea Route as regards its legality, with Canada and Russia both citing long-standing claims to their rights to govern their territory how they see fit, in line with rules at the national level around the Arctic maritime region.<sup>264</sup> Virtually mirroring each other, Canadian and Russian positions legally are in line with the Law of the Sea Convention regarding straight baselines, and the doctrine around historic titles.<sup>265</sup>

Diverging somewhat in the extent to which they are pushing the development of the Northern Sea Route, with Russia bullish and Canada more conservative, beyond this, both governments share the same values and priorities when it comes to the Arctic seas, despite their differences in their vision of the region's waters.<sup>266</sup> Both defend their coastal rights and sovereign borders for national security, share priorities in terms of preserving marine ecosystems, and protect indigenous rights, while ensuring safe transit to the economic benefit of local peoples.<sup>267</sup> Similarly, both nations respect the primacy of the rights of Arctic states in how they govern.<sup>268</sup> In fact, even in the face of disputes elsewhere globally, the AC has remained virtually unaffected by such tensions, with Arctic diplomacy and governance being ringfenced, with international lines of communication over the circumpolar North weathering each storm,<sup>269</sup> with the region growing in significance to both the EU and China, not only due to environmental concerns, but the trade benefits to the international community at large.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> Ananyeva, "Russia in the Arctic Region: Going Bilateral or Multilateral?"

<sup>264</sup> Lackenbauer and Lalonde, *Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World*.

<sup>265</sup> Lackenbauer and Lalonde.

<sup>266</sup> Donat Pharand, "The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit," *Ocean Development and International Law* 38, no. 1–2 (2007): 3–69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320601071314>.

<sup>267</sup> Lackenbauer and Lalonde, *Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World*.

<sup>268</sup> Lackenbauer and Lalonde.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*



Arctic observers and non-Arctic actors with a vested interest in the region prospering, those looking to exploit its vast supply of natural resources, are equally turning their focus to the region, also to the benefit of both Canada and Russia.<sup>271</sup> What is more, with Western sanctions (started in 2014) pushing Russia towards the exploration of new markets and revenue streams, this too has boosted the region, particularly through bringing China into the equation.

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That said, much of this renewed focus on the region can be attributed to a firm will in the international community to ensure there is a solid base upon which to build further reaching trade relations and to establish a foothold for improved regional co-governance, and such cooperation is bringing the Arctic onto the World stage.<sup>273</sup> Yet, it must be remembered that with more stakeholders invested in the region, it also opens the door to new security challenges which may yet determine how the region develops, particularly owing to the proprietorial rights and borders between the Arctic nations.<sup>274</sup> For Russia, the context of its chairmanship in the AC focuses on the environmental, social and economic problems of the region. However, the priorities of the Russia's Chairmanship are closely connected with solving the internal problems of the AZRF, but at the same time Russia is interested in international cooperation in the Arctic on issues of mutual interest pertaining to the socioeconomic agenda.

## 7. Conclusion

Over the course of this paper, the broader contextual concerns have been stated. The significance of Human security as a foundation for further cooperation is clear, the significance of non-state actors like the Arctic Council is beyond dispute, and the impact of human security on the most recent Arctic policies of Canada and Russian have been explored. The long and well-established history of Russo-Canadian cooperation in the Arctic, in spite of mitigating international circumstances, has been reiterated, with policy calls for greater cooperation

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<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Daria Gritsenko, "Vodka on Ice? Unveiling Russian Media Perceptions of the Arctic," *Energy Research and Social Science* 16 (2016): 8–12, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.03.012>.

<sup>273</sup> Lassi Heininen and Matthias Finger, "The 'Global Arctic' as a New Geopolitical Context and Method," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 33, no. 2 (2018): 199–202, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2017.1315605>.

<sup>274</sup> Olga Khrushcheva and Marianna Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic Ambitions," *East European Politics* 32, no. 4 (2016): 547–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2016.1231669>.

trumping divergences around militarization and the utilisation of the NSR. The mirroring across legal and social aspects, across science and technology investment and research collaboration, and around community safeguarding, show historically unparalleled policy alignment between Ottawa and Moscow.

That said, of the structural differences at the governance level, there are, however, factors on both sides which hinder the realisation of the positive forecasts made in the policy targets, centering around efficiency and pragmatics, and the achievability of the goals set. Indeed, on the Canadian side, one could argue that the vagueness and imprecision of the Trudeau government's ambitions, coupled with the business interests of non-state actors (and their considerable lobbying power in Ottawa), could undermine the potential of Canadian goals to be realised. Equally, as far as Russia is concerned, competitiveness between state entities, a lack of devolved authority to regional areas, and the absence of a clear figurehead or spokesperson representing the Russian Arctic as a whole in policy matters internationally, could equally compromise the attainment of Russia's considerably more specific and well-thought out targets.

While Russia, who have traditionally adopted more realist strategies to IR diplomacy, have adopted uncharacteristically LI oriented approaches to the Arctic to date, deserve recognition for further moving away from their typical vertical power structure in Arctic affairs towards a more human security oriented dimension. The significance of Russia's AC chairmanship, and the willingness to engage in patterns of diplomacy more often associated with their Arctic neighbours, shows the emphasis the Kremlin has placed on ensuring economic prosperity in this emerging trade node.

Though both nations have stopped short of allowing for greater regional autonomy in the Arctic at the decision making level, Russian openness to international trade into the often isolated AZRF, and the Canadian incorporation of Northern voices at the policy drafting stage, are indicative of more progressive approaches to indigenous inclusion, and their funding commitments, if upheld, should amount to better living standards across the Arctic. Though some way off the Nordic countries in their treatment of indigenous peoples, the prognosis for the region is an overwhelmingly optimistic one. Whether Canadian policy commitments to Northern peoples are merely rhetorical in nature, meant to placate, or whether or not Russian advances are purely motivated by economic gain, the way that they potentiate improved human security relations for the region are nonetheless significant. In essence, because the political

objectives in the Arctic are mainly of an economic nature (such as controlling shipping lanes, oil and gas exploitation) keeping the region stable is in every country's interest. Therefore, it makes the most sense to focus on human security elements, as they are more pressing than military security.

Ultimately, the analysis of Russian and Canadian governance in terms of their latest Arctic policies allowed for a general conclusion that, as changes occur more rapidly due to global warming, there will be a great need to establish an improved governance framework. The findings of the policy comparison indicate that, although Canada and Russia emphasize and do address most of the 7 human security issues, the ability of cohesive domestic governance needs to be stabilized in order to fix the problems that did not get enough funding and attention in the previous Arctic policy implantation. In conclusion, although there are tensions currently with Ukraine, it is likely that both Canada and Russia will be forced to cooperate to tackle human security issues together in the future, outside of the Arctic council. In official policy and in statements, the Russian and Canadian governments follow a path of continued peaceful and legal co-existence in the region, which offers a solid foundation of cooperation to build upon when needed going forward.

### *7.2 Recommendations for Further Study*

Aside from securing relevant interviews to acquire more qualitative data, given the recent nature of both policies analysed, a more protracted study carried out over time could analyse at each stage the extent to which policy commitments have been met, appraising at the intervals set out in the Russian policy, at the end of the first stage in 2024, the second in 2030, and at the end of the third stage in 2035. Given the absence of fixed points for policy renewal on the Canadian side, it would make sense to adopt the Russian timescale. What is more, quantitative data would be advantageous, particularly around environmental markers, economic indicators, and around metrics of indigenous health, quality of life and standard of living. Equally, a more in-depth look at Russia's Arctic Council chairmanship could provide insights that project their future intentions for the Arctic outside of their policy framework.

Though outside the scope of this study, initially, an analysis of Canada's relationship with America, and of Russia's cooperation with China, were intended to be an aspect of this study. Clearly, as the world moves towards a multi-polar great power balance once more, the

interaction between these power brokers are likely to impact the region greatly, not least owing to the convenience of the NSR as a route for Chinese trade into the world's largest trading market, the European Union. Similarly, as U.S. policy begins to preoccupy itself with Chinese growth, so to might there be implications for their near neighbour Canada, which could impact relations with Russia. Similarly, sovereignty issues around maritime borders, not only around the arctic, but also in the South China Sea, could potentially spill over and negatively impact Arctic relations as trade is jeopardised.

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