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Master in International Relations (in English)

**Taiwan’s Search for Greater International Space and the US factor**

Master’s Thesis by the 2nd year student

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# Abstract

Taiwan’s international space is the most sensitive and complex important part of the Taiwan issue. Taiwan’s internal political uncertainties and the issue of Taiwan’s international sovereignty are the biggest contradictions in the Taiwan issue, which involves the emergence of Taiwan in international affairs and international occasions. If mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan cannot reach a consensus on this issue, the frequent conflicts will inevitably result in the loss of the interests of the three parties to varying degrees. Based on the interests of the United States and facing the continuous growth of mainland China, Taiwan's strategic position and interests in the United States have gradually risen. This will have a long-term and continuous impact. While doing its best to maintain the separation of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the United States recognizes the "One China" policy, the purpose of which is to continue the global strategy and the Indo-Pacific strategic deployment in Asia. The Taiwan issue has become the biggest uncertain factor between China and the United States. From the perspective of the United States’ maximization of interest, the long-term, international, and regulatory aspects of the Taiwan issue have always been its best options. The first chapter of this paper is titled, The Game between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China in International Space from 1949 to 2000. By combing through the historical process of the struggle between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan for international space, it explains the methods and results used by each of the two sides in the competition for international space. The second chapter, Taiwan search for greater international space: achievements and challenges. Explain why the formation of the Taiwan issue is inseparable from the intervention of the United States, and explain what specific actions or technologies Taiwan has taken to expand international space. And discuss Taiwan's achievements in the international space after 2000, which are mainly reflected in the completion of its own political freedom and economic achievements. Chapter three is about Taiwan's international space from 2000 to 2020. This chapter is based on the three term changes of Taiwan's political parties after 2000. Discuss the situation of Taiwan's international space during the three periods, including the relationship between Taiwan and countries with diplomatic relations, Taiwan's living conditions in international organizations and the free trade agreement signed with Taiwan. The fourth chapter is entitled, The Development Trend of Taiwan's International Space under the Sino-US Game. This chapter is mainly divided into three parts to explain. The first is the development trend of Taiwan’s international space, the second is the development direction of the United States’ Taiwan policy, and the third is the situation and challenges that Taiwan’s international space may face under the Sino-US-Taiwan triangular relationship.

Through the discussion in the above chapters, it is recognized that Taiwan is usually a passive recipient of its own international space issues, and it often bears the consequences of the game or wrestling between major powers in the United States and China. Taiwan must ensure the expansion of its international space and should not be limited to intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization. In addition, Taiwan should be more cautious, recognize own position and role in the strategic planning of the United States, and do not fall into the vortex of the Sino-US game.

【Keywords】 Taiwan International Space Sino-US Relations US-Taiwan Relations *Taiwan Relations Act* *1992 consensus* the United Nations Checkbook diplomacy FTA “One China ”principle “One Country, Two Systems”

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# Introduction

After October 1949, the Communist Party of China established the People's Republic of China, and the government of the Republic of China moved to Taiwan. The Korean War that broke out in June 1950 disrupted all aspects of East Asian international relations and had a profound impact on the entire world structure. Taiwan turned the crisis into peace, giving the Kuomintang regime a ray of life. After North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States immediately dispatched the United States Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait and prevent the People's Republic of China from "liberating Taiwan." Since then, the United States has provided a large amount of economic and military assistance to Taiwan, signed the *Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China* with the government, and provided diplomatic support to retain its seat in the United Nations. In 1971, the United Nations China representative seat was acquired by the People's Republic of China. After that, Taiwan's international status has been suppressed after several periods of severance of diplomatic relations.

The Taiwan issue concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as major issues of China's core interests and national security. It has been affecting the healthy development of Sino-US relations for more than 60 years, and it is also an important factor that has caused tensions, instability and even regression in Sino-US relations. To this day, the Taiwan issue is still one of the issues that erodes and harms mutual trust between China and the United States, and interferes with and undermines Sino-US relations, and directly affects whether the all-round cooperation between China and the United States can avoid a better prospect. The Taiwan issue arose because of China's civil war, which has led to a split across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s international space issue is also called Taiwan’s international activity space issue, international living space issue, international participation issue or foreign exchange issue. The most sensitive and controversial issue of Taiwan is the issue of Taiwan’s international space. Taiwan’s international space involves not only Taiwan’s status in international law, China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s political positioning under the one-China framework. Under the guidance of China's basic principle of "one China", it is impossible for mainland China to allow Taiwan to develop sovereign diplomatic relations in the international arena. But from the perspective of Taiwan, as a political entity that exists and exercises its rights, it hopes to obtain or develop diplomatic relations with dignity and equality in the international arena. From this it appears that the sensitivity and importance of Taiwan’s international space issue are closely related to its own contradictory characteristics. Based on the complex international situation and the current state of cross-strait relations, Taiwan’s international space problem will exist for a long time. Because Taiwan’s international space is neither the external relationship of a sovereign state nor the external relationship of a unified country, but a special external relationship between the two, solving this problem will inevitably undergo a long-term transition.

The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is part of the relationship between the United States and China, and the Taiwan issue has plagued China and the United States for more than 60 years. It is still the biggest obstacle to the development of Sino-US relations and will have an overall impact on both sides in the future. The United States has a strong influence on the actions of the Taiwan authorities in seeking international space. On the one hand, the United States actively supports Taiwan's expansion of international space, and enhances Taiwan's international presence by enhancing its substantive relations with Taiwan, supporting Taiwan's participation in important international organizations. On the other hand, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the US government has also restricted the Taiwan authorities' provocations against mainland China on international space-related issues, with the intention of avoiding conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is of great geopolitical, economic, political and strategic value to the United States. The United States uses the Taiwan issue to consume China's economic and political resources, so as to achieve the purpose of containing China, and the operation of international space is one of the most direct ways.

For China, Taiwan’s international space issue has always been regarded as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, resolving this issue is a necessary element to complete China's reunification. If it is not resolved, it will not only affect the situation on both sides of the strait, but also affect Sino-US relations and Sino-US cooperation. On the other hand, Taiwan’s international space issue has been manipulated by Taiwan’s internal political struggles and has become a tool for Taiwan’s independence. The United States has realized the seriousness of the Taiwan issue and the danger of the Taiwan Strait.

## Research question, aim, objective

How does Taiwan’s pursuit of greater international space reflect the US factor? What are Taiwan’s achievements and challenges in seeking greater international space? How will Taiwan’s international space change from 2000 to 2020 under the alternate rule of the two parties?

Through the analysis of history and current situation, this thesis discusses the future development direction of Taiwan's international space from multiple angles of Taiwan's international space, and tries to put forward some feasible suggestions.

The objective of this thesis is mainly presented in the following aspects, summarizing the historical process of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China for the international space. Analyze the technologies and methods adopted by Taiwan to seek greater international space. Analyze the position, attitude, and methods adopted by the United States on Taiwan’s international space issue. Find out how Taiwan can expand its international space. Analyze the changes in Taiwan's international space under the leadership of different political parties from 2000 to 2020. Predict the future trend of Taiwan’s international space. Suggestions for Taiwan’s search for greater international space.

## Significance

In the international community, the "one China" principle has different understandings of this argument in accordance with the objects of its establishment of diplomatic relations. From the perspective of Taiwan’s international space situation, Taiwan’s diplomatic countries have been declining, and seats in influential international organizations have been replaced by mainland China one by one. Taiwan’s international space has shrunk sharply since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. As Taiwan’s international space is becoming more and more limited, the United States has given Taiwan a lot of help in seeking greater international space due to its own strategic considerations, so as to counterbalance China’s development. To sort out and study this issue is not only helpful for us to better understand the development course and future development direction of the Taiwan international space, but also to better understand the internal political development of Taiwan, the policy changes of the Chinese mainland and the position, attitude and changes of the United States on the Taiwan issue. It is helpful for Taiwan to think about ways to expand its international space in the face of rising competition between China and the United States.

## Research methods and methodology

The whole thesis analyzes the issue in a fundamental way of political science, dialectical materialism and historical materialism worldview and methodology, and uses other research methods and related political theory in different chapters.

In the article about the opportunities and challenges of the relationship between the two great powers. The issue of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait under the relationship between China and the United States, and analyzes specific issues. The normative research methods and policy analysis methods of political science are used to analyze and elaborate the problems. Using the methods of history-comparative analysis, literature review and combing, etc., to elaborate the status quo of mainland China and the United States on Taiwan international space. And try to put forward some suggestions to maintain and promote the development of cross-straits relations, as well as countermeasures in the face of negative impact. The paper will summarize the historical evolution of Taiwan's "international space" in detail, especially under the influence of the United States, and then discuss the factors affecting Taiwan's "international space" issue from multiple perspectives. Try to predict the future direction of this problem, and put forward some practical suggestions for finally solving the issue.

The full text combs and summarizes the evolution of the content of the international space of the People’s Republic of China and the evolution of the international space of the Republic of China (Taiwan) through literature research methods. In the early stage, through the collection of official documents of Taiwan International Space, the International Space of the People’s Republic of China, historical documents and other materials, through reading, summarizing, and collating, I obtained my own description of the issue, and obtained numerous documents through combing and thinking. A summary of these two issues. In addition, through literature research methods and historical research methods, the influencing factors of Taiwan's international space issues are discussed from multiple perspectives of the results of the research.

Comparative analysis is also one of the important methodologies used in the thesis. By comparing three periods, 2000-2008, 2008-2016, 2016-present, I compare Taiwan's changes and conditions in the international space during these three periods. During this period, Taiwan’s international space status table showed strong ups and downs, so it is worth exploring what factors behind this make Taiwan’s international space issue such a manifestation, and to explore the feasibility of Taiwan’s actions on the international stage. Through comparative analysis, it is concluded that the most important factor in Taiwan's international space fluctuations and the current cross-strait situation, what methods can be used to seek the largest international space available to oneself. In addition, through the data and comparative analysis I have consulted, the game between China and the United States, especially the game on the Taiwan issue, concluded that the establishment of a new type of Sino-US relationship must first resolve the issue of strategic mistrust and deal with it. On the Taiwan issue, the United States continues to uphold the "one China" principle. Mainland China has deepened economic and trade exchanges with Taiwan and deepened non-governmental cooperation across the Straits. Under such circumstances, it is possible to maintain the situation in the Taiwan Strait, and China and the United States cooperate in a healthy manner under competition.

## Literature review

Some Chinese scholars have defined the characteristics of Taiwan’s international space issues. Rao Geping, a professor at Peking University Law School, and Xiu Chunping, director of the Institute of External Relations at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believe that Taiwan’s international space issue has always been a highly sensitive political issue. It involves not only Taiwan's status in international law, China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also cross-strait relations and Taiwan's political positioning under the one-China framework. The contradictions and struggles between the two sides of the strait on this issue directly reflect the state of cross-strait relations and have an important impact on cross-strait relations.[[1]](#footnote-0) Guo Zhenyuan, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies and director of the Institute of Cross-Strait Relations at Ocean University of China, said that this issue has always been a sensitive and important issue in cross-strait relations. It is the concentrated expression of the relationship between the two parties in the Chinese civil war that has not yet ended. Its severity and connotation are directly determined by the intensity and connotation of the Chinese civil war. In *Reflections on Taiwan's International Space Issues[[2]](#footnote-1)*, Rao Geping believes that Taiwan's international space issues have always been closely related to the dispute over the island's reunification or independence. This may jeopardize China's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and unity at any time. It may be used as a gambling card to manipulate public opinion and incite hostility toward the mainland, and intensify the pace of "de-sinicization" on the island, thereby hindering the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. It may also be used to play a card of compassion in the international community, to win sympathy and support, and to raise bargaining chips for the separatist forces of "Taiwan independence" in order to submit to the political goals of "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan" and "Taiwan independence". At the same time, it does not rule out the possibility of easing the situation through the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. Striving to expand Taiwan’s space for international activities, in fact, strengthen and solidify the state of separation and division between the two sides of the strait, so as to obey Taiwan’s political strategy of "not independence or reunification," and increase the difficulty of peaceful national reunification.

Some Chinese scholars are making inferences about resolving Taiwan’s international space issues. *Taiwan’s "International Space" Issue-Policy Review and Countermeasures* [[3]](#footnote-2)(《台湾的“国际空间”问题——政策回顾与对策》), Li Yihu briefly reviewed the cross-strait policies on Taiwan's international space issues since the 1990s. Pointed out that the issue involved "Taiwan independence" and Taiwan's public opinion, and put forward some countermeasures. In terms of cross-strait relations, Kong Xiangfeng's *Research on China's "Taiwan-related Diplomacy"[[4]](#footnote-3)*（《中国“涉台外交”研究》）talked about China's policy toward Taiwan in different periods and resolutely struggled with the words and deeds of "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan" in the diplomatic field. Xiu Chunping's *Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's "Space for International Activities"* [[5]](#footnote-4)(《两岸关系和平发展与台湾“国际活动空间”问题》) introduced the Ma Ying-jeou administration's adherence to the "1992 Consensus" to improve cross-strait relations so that Taiwan can gain more "international space". And put forward some views on the proper settlement of Taiwan’s "international space". In terms of Taiwan's relations with non-diplomatic countries (taking the United States and Japan as examples), *The Taiwan Issue in China's Foreign Relations[[6]](#footnote-5)* (《中国对外关系中的台湾问题》) edited by Lu Xiaoheng, *America's Strategic Interests in Taiwan after the Cold War[[7]](#footnote-6)*(《冷战后美因在台湾的战略利益》) by Yang Yongbin, *Cross-Strait Factors and Interactive Game between China and the United States on Taiwan's "International Space"[[8]](#footnote-7)*(《台湾“国际空间”问题上的两岸因素与中美互动博弈》) by Ye Chengcheng, and *Analysis of the Political Positioning and Influencing Factors of the Taiwan Authorities on Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits [[9]](#footnote-8)* (《台湾当局两岸政治定位及影响因素分析》) by Song Ersu, say that from the consideration of geostrategy, economic strategy and ideological strategy. In order to profit from both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, the United States has implemented a "bet on both sides" approach. Taiwan’s international space is one of the hands of the United States in manipulating cross-strait relations, but the United States’ Taiwan policy is more subject to the development of Sino-US relations. *Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: Opportunities and Challenges[[10]](#footnote-9)*, by T. Y. Wang,Wei-Chin Lee &Ching-Hsin Yu, point out Beijing's flexibility in applying the "One China" principle and the Ma administration's pragmatism in making its demands are crucial to fulfilling Taipei's demand for international space and thus cross-strait stability.

Except for some Chinese scholars, research on Taiwan's international space issues. American scholar Dennis V. Hickey introduced the decision-making process of Taiwan’s foreign policy from four aspects related to Taiwan’s foreign relations, international system, government structure, social forces, and personal factors in the book *Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism*.[[11]](#footnote-10) In the article *Why We Need Taiwan[[12]](#footnote-11)*, American scholar John F. Copper briefly described Taiwan's importance to the United States from the perspectives of history, geopolitics, and military affairs. In the book *Taiwan: Nation -State Or Province?[[13]](#footnote-12)*, John F. Copper introduced Taiwan's political economy, foreign relations, and cross-strait relations in detail, and believed that Taiwan should be independent and separated from China. Sow Keat Tok mentioned in *Managing Taiwan’s International Space: Comparing Taiwan’s Experiences in the WTO and WHA[[14]](#footnote-13)*, is China always defensive on sovereignty issues? Does China think that sovereignty is essentially "absolute", "Victorian" or "Westphalian"? Sow Keat Tok hinted that Beijing's "sovereignty" policy is more subtle and flexible than previously thought. By comparing the changes in China's policies towards Taiwan and Hong Kong, the author narrates the role of past world order concepts in China's modern concept of "sovereignty", thus revealing Beijing's deepest concern in dealing with sovereignty issues. Pin-Fen·Kok and David·J·Firestein's article *Threading the Needle: Proposals for U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arm Sales to Taiwan[[15]](#footnote-14)* in the East-West Institute Policy Report 3-2013， Douglas Paal consider that it is time for China and the United States to reconsider the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. If the Taiwan issue, especially the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan, is not resolved, the building of a new type of major-power relationship between China and the United States will not advance. And China believes that the establishment of enhanced strategic mutual trust begins with each party properly handling each other's core interests. This means that the United States must terminate all policies that China does not like, including arms sales to Taiwan, or the United States must abandon its current position of great power in the Asian region. This is too costly for the United States. However, the US has not explicitly expressed its opposition to the path proposed by China for establishing and enhancing mutual trust between China and the US.

Chinese and foreign scholars have a certain amount of research data on Taiwan’s international space issues when they study the Taiwan issue. This also reflects to a certain extent that Taiwan’s international space issue is a subject worthy of constant discussion and research, and it is also a direction worthy of research on the Taiwan issue. Although they all have ideological preferences, they also provide a lot of reference opinions for seeking larger international space issues.

## Research framework

This thesis begins with a separate analysis of the historical process of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China for international space to observe what Taiwan’s international space is facing. Summarize Taiwan’s achievements and challenges in seeking greater international space. Then use comparative analysis to study Taiwan's changes in international space from 2000 to 2020. Finally, discuss the development trend of Taiwan's international space under the triangle relationship between China, the United States and Taiwan.

At the beginning, the question is raised, the introduction part introduces the research background of this thesis, goes back to the relevant academic achievements of various experts and scholars, and gives a certain overview and discussion of their opinions. In response to the above problems, the aim and objective of this article are put forward. Then put forward the research methods and innovations of this article.

The chapters of the main part of this article are roughly arranged as follows:

Chapter 1．The Game between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in International Space

1.1 Three stages of development in which the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China compete for international space

1.2 The content evolution of the scramble for international space by the People's Republic of China

1.3 The content evolution of Taiwan's contention for international space

Chapter 2. Taiwan's search for greater international space: achievements and challenges

2.1 The U.S. factor and manifestations of the Taiwan issue

2.2 Specific actions or technics taken by Taiwan to expand international space

2.3 Taiwan’s achievements in international space in 2000

Chapter 3. Taiwan’s international space in 2000-2020

3.1 The mainland China factor in Taiwan international space

3.2 The ups and downs in Taiwan’s getting a greater international space

3.3 The US factor in the Taiwan’s international space, since 2000

Chapter 4. The Development Trend of Taiwan's International Space under the Sino-US Game

4.1 The development trend of Taiwan's international space

4.2 The direction of the development of U.S. policy toward Taiwan

4.3 The influence of the tripartite relationship between Sino-US-Taiwan on the Taiwan’s international space

Conclusion

## Innovative

The innovations of this paper are manifested in the following three aspects.

First, from the perspective of research content. Although many documents have elaborated on the historical evolution of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan in the international space, it is still a vacancy to combine the two to analyze and discuss. This paper combs the historical evolution and content of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China competing for international space. I divided the two parties' competition for international space into three stages of development, namely 1949-1979, 1979-1988, and 1988-2000. The first stage is the "One China" dispute between the two parties. The second stage was from 1979 to 1988, when the two parties began to form a dual representation dispute. The third stage: From 1988 to 2000, Taiwan's internal political situation achieved the first change of political parties. Taiwan announced that it would start peaceful competition and coexistence with mainland China in the international arena, and demanded to return to the United Nations. First, in addition to this, the paper analyzes the comparison of the three periods after 2000, 2000-2008, 2008-2016, 2016-present, to explore the feasibility of Taiwan's actions on the international stage. Through comparative analysis, it is concluded that Taiwan can seek greater international space under the current cross-strait situation.

Second, on a research perspective. With the rise of China's comprehensive strength, the effect of the United States' "using Taiwan to control China" is gradually declining. The China-US-Taiwan triangle discusses the impact of the tripartite relationship between China, the United States and Taiwan on Taiwan's international space. Discuss how Taiwan, as the passive recipient of the trilateral relationship between Taiwan, China and Beijing, faces the consequences of a great power game or wrestling between Washington and Beijing. Thinking from the strategic thinking of a small country, how should Taiwan face the non-zero combination of Sino-US game and seek greater international space under this circumstance. Secondly, from another angle, the issue of expanding Taiwan’s international space is studied through the US position. The global interest of the United States lies in ensuring its global economic advantages and an order that conforms to the principles of American idealism and realism. Based on the above principles, discuss the US factors in Taiwan's search for greater international space.

Third, from the perspective of research results. Through the study of Taiwan’s search for greater international space, it is discussed that Taiwan is facing the escalating game between China and the United States and the influence and restrictions of China and the United States. In the future, based on the expectations and needs of the people and society in Taiwan, what are the factors and challenges that will be faced in continuing to seek a larger international space?

# Chapter 1．The Game between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in International Space

## 1.1 Three stages of development in which the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China compete for international space

Since 1949, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China have gone through three main stages on the issue of fighting for international space. The first stage was from 1949 to 1979. Due to the civil war between the two parties in China, the Kuomintang army fled to Taiwan on December 7, 1949. The two sides of the strait formed a situation of separation. So far, the cross-strait foreign policy is mainly to compete for China's representation in the international arena. That is, who is the only legal government in China. At this stage, the governments on both sides of the strait believe that China is unique in the world. Because the Republic of China has a legitimate seat in the United Nations and is a founding member of the United Nations, the government of the Republic of China uses this status to diplomatic containment of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of the Communist Party of China on the international stage. And use the legitimate seats of the United Nations and international anti-communist forces to fight against the Communist Party and Russia in the international community. However, as the 1960s entered, national liberation movements prevailed around the world, and more and more independent countries were established. The membership of the United Nations increased by more than 40. More countries have established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and the development of the People's Republic of China has also enhanced its international prestige and status. In particular, the third world countries began to support the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Faced with more voices of support from the third world countries, the United States became less and less effective to solve the problem of the People's Republic of China becoming a legitimate seat in the United Nations by means of "deferred discussion". The establishment of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and France in 1964 had a significant impact on the issue of the representation of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. Since then, the United States has begun to manipulate the "two Chinas" issue and believe that the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China should have representation rights at the same time. Therefore, this stage can be summarized as the "one China" dispute between the two sides of the strait. The diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China bears a profound and distinctive red mark. The Communist Party of China independently develops foreign relations by opposing imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism.

The second stage was from 1979 to 1988, when the two parties formed a dual representation dispute. With the continuous international efforts of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the changes in the international environment, the People’s Republic of China has gained an absolute advantage in the international community and has begun to work towards achieving cross-strait reunification. The People’s Republic of China began negotiations with Western countries to limit Taiwan to a one-China structure, opposing Western arms sales to Taiwan and legislation against Taiwan, and flexibly deal with Taiwan’s issues in international space. China and the United States established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. The United States stated that it had no intention of pursuing the policy of "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan". After terminating the *Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC* signed by the United States and Taiwan in 1954 and establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, the United States still pursues the policy of "two Chinas" for a long time. The Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations is far from over, and the United States factor has become the most important existence of Taiwan in the international space. At this stage, Taiwan authorities fell into the crisis of "legal foundation of the domination". Chiang Ching-kuo began to "de-sinicize", soften the "one China" principle, and develop substantial relations with non-"diplomatic countries", hoping to break through Taiwan's breakthrough in international space and strive to achieve an international pattern equivalent to mainland China. Therefore, this period can be summarized as the diplomatic struggle between the two parties has gradually shifted from the one-China representation dispute to the dual representation dispute.

In the third stage, Lee Teng-hui came to power in Taiwan’s political situation for the first time between 1988 and 2000. After the drastic changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, the balance of US policy towards China is beginning to shift significantly towards the other side of the Taiwan Strait. In 1990, the Taiwan authorities declared that the era of " the legitimate government does not coexist with rebels"[[16]](#footnote-15) was over, and that Taiwan began to seek "double recognition" in order to "compete peacefully and co-exist equally" with mainland China in the world.[[17]](#footnote-16) Lee Teng-hui's " the cross-strait is a special state-to-state relationship " theory[[18]](#footnote-17) triggered tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits after it was published. With "steadfast diplomacy" Taiwan hopes to have more possible diplomatic relations with other countries before the international order is established after the end of the Cold War, and to strive for greater international space in a flexible way. Every year, countries with diplomatic relations submit proposals to the United Nations, requesting to return to the United Nations and participate in the United Nations. The Chinese mainland government has launched massive anti-separatism activities in the field of international diplomacy, countering the Western countries' concept of "using Taiwan to control China" and continuously compressing Taiwan's international space. In general, the diplomatic struggle between the two sides of the strait has become a "struggle for reunification and independence."

## 1.2 The content evolution of the scramble for international space by the People's Republic of China

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it can be divided into four development stages in order to gain greater international space and international status. In the first stage, the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, when Taiwan formed a cross-strait confrontation without reconciliation. International anti-China forces headed by the United States launched a strategy of political isolation, economic blockade, and military encirclement against the People’s Republic of China. The People's Republic of China began to rely on political struggles to gain international status and expand its international space. In the second stage, the People's Republic of China began to shift to economic construction in 1978. The People's Republic of China began to implement the policy of opening to the outside world, gradually deepening the pace of integration into the international society, and demonstrating its initiative to integrate into the international society. The third stage was the return of Hong Kong in 1997. China took "responsible power" as its international status goal and began to focus on shaping its own international image. At this stage, the PRC has achieved its unique position in international space and has begun to become a world power, playing a vital role in global peace, development, and security. The fourth stage is from 2005 till now, when the PRC began to attach great importance to the construction of soft power, and the strategic framework of China's peaceful development was set up and enriched. In 2005, the white paper "China's Peaceful Development Road" proposed to follow the path of peaceful development. Based on this, China stated its willingness to participate in the reform of the international political and economic order as a responsible major power, and the PRC vigorously expanded its national strategic interests. The PRC has taken the initiative to put forward a series of initiatives, which have directly affected the pattern of regional interests and effectively enhanced the voice of the PRC in international affairs.

After the Communist Party of China established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the United States and other major Western countries refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China, continued to recognize the Chiang Kai-shek Group that occupies Taiwan, and supported its seat in the United Nations and other international organizations. The People's Republic of China is excluded from the existing global international system. After weighing the pros and cons, the leaders at this time made the diplomatic decision of “leaving one side” to the Soviet Union. China's strategic choice and the subsequent Korean War had a major impact on the international order, and it also expanded its visibility on the international stage and enhanced its strength on the international stage.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, international anti-China forces headed by the United States launched a strategy of political isolation, economic blockade, and military encirclement against the People’s Republic of China. In 1950, U.S. President Truman put forward the " Taiwan's status is inconclusive " and established the U.S. Military Liaison Office in Taiwan. When the Chinese People's Liberation Army was about to send its troops south to liberate Taiwan, the Korean War broke out and the United States immediately sent troops to intervene. US President Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait to "stop any attack on Taiwan." At the same time, it was pointed out "The decision of Taiwan's future status must wait for the restoration of Pacific security, the signing of the Japan peace treaty or the consideration of joint factors." The Premier of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai also stated that Taiwan is affirmed by the *Cairo Declaration*, *Potsdam Declaration* and the status quo after Japan's surrender. In July 1954, the Chinese Communist Party made a decision that Taiwan must be resolved. It strongly stated that "if foreign aggressors dare to prevent the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan, intervene in infringing on our sovereignty and destroy our country's territorial integrity, and dare to interfere in our internal affairs, then they must bear all the serious consequences of this aggression." In order to complete the reunification of the two sides of the strait, the People's Republic of China has started a game with the anti-communist forces of the West on the diplomatic front, with the purpose of making a diplomatic breakthrough. This stage is when China is moving towards independence, fundamentally changing the old China’s foreign relations, initially establishing a new Chinese diplomatic system, and ushering in a new era of Chinese diplomacy.


From 1949 to 1979, the international status of the People's Republic of China was mainly promoted through political struggles. The People’s Republic of China has also experienced the fight for a seat in the United Nations. When the People’s Republic of China was founded, the then Prime Minister Zhou Enlai informed the United Nations that "the Republic of China has been destroyed and the Chinese seat in the United Nations will be given to the People’s Republic of China." By manipulating the United Nations, the United States did not deal with the issue of representation raised by the People’s Republic of China at the time of the Fourth United Nations General Assembly. Zhou Enlai in 1950 as a foreign minister to the President of the United Nations general assembly, secretary general and 9 council member, apart from Yugoslavia and the Republic of China issued a statement, the central people's government of the People's Republic of China, think of the Chinese Kuomintang reactionary residual group representatives at the United Nations security council is illegal, and claims its kicked out from the security council. This operation was carried out under the suggestion of the Soviet Union, but the result was still to no avail. Later, with the outbreak of the Korean War, due to the obstruction of the United States, the People's Republic of China was defined as an "aggressor" of North Korea. During this period, a proposal for the People's Republic of China to compete for a legal seat in the United Nations was rejected or delayed. At the end of the Korean War, the PRC used the social camp, especially the Soviet Union, to accumulate development relations with other countries, and its international status was rapidly improved. The PRC has a legitimate seat in the United Nations. Because of the national liberation movements around the world in the 1960s, more and more independent countries have emerged. The membership of the United Nations has increased by more than 40. As more and more countries establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, especially Western countries, the most direct reflection is that third world countries have begun to support the PRC in the United Nations. In 1971, the United States first proposed the concept of "two Chinas", believing that the representation of the PRC in the United Nations should be retained but also recognized the representation of the PRC in the United Nations. In the debate on the right on behalf of the PRC, through its own diplomatic means to achieve the purpose, about 80 representatives of Member States to speak. Most developing countries criticized the United States' long-standing anti-China policy and opposed the "two Chinas" proposal put forward by the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s, the struggle for the international status of the PRC relied on the normalization of Sino-US relations and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, winning a legitimate seat in the United Nations and opposing Soviet hegemonism. The PRC put forward the "Three Worlds" theory through strategic adjustments, and made major breakthroughs in diplomatic relations with the United States and other Western countries. Especially the PRC to become a permanent member of the United Nations, marking China has won a broader international space. In 1974, Deng Xiaoping systematically put forward the proposition of the People’s Republic of China on the establishment of a new international political and economic order at the Sixth UN Special Assembly in 1974: First, establish a political relationship between nations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Economic relations. Second, international economic affairs should be jointly managed by all countries in the world. Third, world trade should be built on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and exchange of needs. Fourth, economic assistance to developing countries does not have any political or military conditions attached, and the sovereignty of the recipient country should be respected. Fifth, the international community should provide more technical assistance to developing countries.


In 1978, the People's Republic of China began to shift from relying on political struggle to compete for international space to focusing on economic construction. The People’s Republic of China has begun to implement the policy of opening to the outside world, gradually deepening the pace of integration into the international community, and demonstrating its initiative to integrate into the international community. China actively participates in the existing international rules and integrates into the existing international system, rather than finding a way to "start all over again." China has become a participant in most of the global international systems, has begun to adopt a constructive attitude towards regional systems, and has expressed its desire to continue to promote China's integration with the international community. China's view of international order is constantly enriched and developed, and its role on the international stage is becoming clearer and stronger. From 1980 to 1985, the growth rate of China's industrial and agricultural output value reached 11%, which exceeded the strategic expectations of the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Based on this, Deng Xiaoping set out to investigate China's national conditions and redesigned the long-term development goals of China's modernization, thus forming the theory of the primary stage of socialism and the "three-step" strategic concept. On April 30, 1987, Deng Xiaoping fully expounded the "three-step" modernization development strategy for the first time: the first step was to double the GDP in the 1980s (based on 1980 to reach US$500 per capita) . The second step is to double the GDP by the end of the 20th century (to 1,000 US dollars per capita). The third step is to quadruple in 30 to 50 years in the 21st century (roughly reaching $4,000 per capita). The adjustment of the People’s Republic of China’s overall national strategy to economic construction, the prosperity of the people, and open participation is aimed at striving for a strong international environment for socialist modernization. With the promotion of China's reform and opening up, China's huge economic potential and market potential have attracted many foreign investors, broadened the content of China's relations with other countries, and set off a new upsurge in the development of China's foreign relations. China has initiated and accelerated the pace of integration into the international society, and the era of change in the relationship between China and the international order is coming. Since then, China has become an important force in promoting the reform of the international order, and its initiative has continued to increase.

Facing the end of the Cold War, the traditional exploration of socialist construction suffered a great setback, and the western countries led by the United States blockaded and isolated China. In the face of this, China has accelerated the pace of opening to the outside world. Taking advantage of the opportunities brought by the transfer of capital-intensive manufacturing and labor-intensive manufacturing sectors in high-tech industries in developed countries, China has further developed an export-oriented export-oriented economy.

The rapid economic development has provided China with an impetus to strive for international space, China's national strength has grown, and China's cooperation with the international community has deepened. After the Cold War, Western countries sanctioned pressure and the surrounding environment changed. China took the initiative to improve relations with neighboring countries and promoted the establishment of partnerships with these countries. Today, China has established partnerships with more than 70 countries and groups of countries, forming a network of partnerships all over the world.[[19]](#footnote-18) China's establishment of non-aligned partnerships is a way for China to strengthen and expand its influence on the international stage. With the rise of national power, China's influence in East Asian affairs has gradually increased. Since the mid-1990s, China has changed its passive and passive attitude towards regional cooperation, and has actively cooperated with neighboring countries in economic, security, and military aspects, and has become a promoter of order construction in East Asia. Since 1997, China has taken the "responsible power" as a sign of its international status, paying more attention to the establishment of its own international image, so as to achieve the status of a world power, and achieve a pivotal effect in facing more self-interest issues. China is further shaping its image as a responsible, constructive, and predictable power in the international community, and has begun to provide more global and regional public goods. The oath of a responsible power signifies a qualitative change in the self-identity of the People’s Republic of China. China’s sovereignty-centered, independent power’s traditional identity is related to the responsible power’s new identity. The latter is more directly related to its integration into the international system, that is, China’s state behavior is increasingly being regulated by the international system. China clearly realizes that joining the international system is an important condition for breaking the siege and earning a responsible reputation. In the international community or on major global issues, China is becoming more and more integrated into the international system and becoming more cooperative.

After summarizing the previous period, China published the white paper *China's Road to Peaceful Development* in 2005, which put forward the proposition of taking the road of peaceful development. It emphasizes that "taking the path of peaceful development is to unify China's domestic development and opening up to the outside world, link China's development with the development of the world, and combine the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of the people of the world."[[20]](#footnote-19) In the 21st century, the rise of the People’s Republic of China has accelerated, surpassing Japan in 2010 to become the world’s second largest economic power (FIG. 1)[[21]](#footnote-20). China continues to deepen its "going out" strategy, and has established the BRICS Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the "One Belt One Road" initiative, which shows that China's foreign investment has entered a period of acceleration (FIG. 2) [[22]](#footnote-21).





The leaders of the People's Republic of China are clearly aware that as China fully participates in international affairs, the relevant agenda is rapidly expanding, and it is necessary to seek the consolidation and expansion of common interests with other countries. In 2005, a mutually beneficial and win-win opening strategy was proposed, which is the basic point of the opening strategy in the new historical period. Entering the second decade of the 21st century, China's national strength has been greatly improved, with its economic strength and overall national strength ranking second in the world, and its industrial added value and foreign trade volume ranking first in the world. The report of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward the development goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way by 2020, and Xi Jinping put forward the strategic concept of "Chinese Dream" and "Two Centenary". It can be seen that China's competition for international space has shifted from influencers of regional affairs to influencers of world international affairs. Chinese decision-makers actively participate in international affairs, and they are constructive participants in global economic governance and international order construction.

To sum up, the People's Republic of China has successfully become an important force on the international stage, from relying on political struggle, to focusing on economic construction, to shaping its international image as a "responsible major country", and to forming a posture leading international affairs. The six-in-one strategic layout of economy, politics, society, culture, ecology, and security has constructively promoted the People’s Republic of China from competing for international space to becoming one of the leading forces in the world order. The rise of China has impacted and changed the international power structure and interest structure. The five principles of peaceful coexistence advocated by China, the new security concept and the comprehensive security concept, the democratization of international relations, the diversity of civilizations, the harmonious world, and the Chinese dream have become important conceptual factors affecting the world. With China's full integration into the international society, China has not only become a full participant in the global international system, but also actively participated in the creation of regional systems, becoming an important force in the reshaping of the international order.

## 1.3 The content evolution of Taiwan's contention for international space

Taiwan’s international space issue has always been a highly sensitive political issue. The evolution of space problems includes four different historical periods. In the first stage, from 1949 to 1971, when the People's Republic of China was founded to October 1971, when the People's Republic of China became a legitimate seat in the United Nations Security Council and Taiwan lost its representation in the United Nations, the international space was restricted by the mainland of China and began to compete for the international space with the mainland of China. The second stage was the normalization of Sino-US relations from 1972 to 1978. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States was announced in December 1978. With the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, Taiwan’s international space is clearly at a disadvantage. Proper handling of the Taiwan issue has become an important condition in the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and all countries. Taiwan began to lose more diplomatic countries, and at the end of this stage, only 24 diplomatic countries remained. The third year was from 1979 to 1993. On January 1, 1979, the "Notice to Compatriots in Taiwan" published a proposal to discuss ending the state of cross-strait military confrontation, and proposed the three links across the strait and the expansion of cross-strait exchanges. Taiwan's international status is constrained by mainland China. In the face of external pressure, Taiwan began to propose "steadfast diplomacy" and "all-round diplomacy", and began to strive to participate in the United Nations, actively strive for the number of countries with diplomatic relations, and purchase large quantities of advanced weapons and equipment. The fourth stage has been since 1994. The rotation of political parties has begun on the island of Taiwan. At this stage, cross-strait economic and trade exchanges and personnel exchanges continued to develop rapidly. The opposition to independence and promotion of reunification as the main content of cross-strait political confrontation has been on the rise, and Taiwan's subject consciousness has continued to increase, promoting the "de-sinicization" of the island. And vigorously promoted "steadfast diplomacy" internationally. As a result, the political confrontation between the two sides of the strait has been severely intensified, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait has continued to fall into a state of tension.

The root of Taiwan's international space problem lies in the separation of the two sides of the strait and the resulting state of divide-and-conquer. In the first stage, after the National Government was forced to relocate to Taiwan due to the failure of the civil war in 1949, it insisted on continuing to carry out international activities under the name "Republic of China". In the 1950s and 1960s, in the context of the confrontation between the East and West camps, the United States, out of strategic considerations, used Taiwan as a focal point for containing the Soviet Union and New China, and actively supported Taiwan. For this reason, Taiwan once maintained diplomatic relations with the United States, Japan, Canada, West Germany, France and other major countries in the world, and represented China's long-term seat in the United Nations and other important intergovernmental organizations. Taiwan’s international space issue was highlighted in the 1970s. At that time, the international situation was undergoing profound changes. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was gradually detrimental to the United States. First, the Vietnam War consumed a large amount of American national power and, coupled with the economic crisis, caused domestic turbulence in the United States. Second, the rapid development and external expansion of the Soviet Union have continuously shaken the hegemony of the United States in the world. In order to continue to contend with the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration of the United States intended to win over China, which was antagonistic to the Soviet Union, and took the initiative to approach China to improve bilateral relations. With Kissinger's visit to Huawei from July 9 to 11, 1971, the United States began to change its China policy. In contrast, this has weakened Taiwan's international status to a certain extent. After years of hard work by mainland China and friendly countries, on October 25, 1971, the 26th United Nations General Assembly restored the rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and recognized the representative of the People's Republic of China as the only legal representative of China in the United Nations. And expelled the representatives of the Taiwan authorities in the United Nations organization and all its affiliated institutions.

In the second stage, in May 1972, Nixon visited China and China and the United States issued a joint communiqué. In the communiqué, the United States expressed its position of recognizing "one China." With the 26th UN General Assembly and Nixon's visit to Huawei, Taiwan's foreign relations have taken a turn for the worse, and many countries have severed diplomatic relations with it. By February 1973, only 39 countries continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. On the international stage, the status of the two sides of the strait had been reversed. Among the international organizations, the only 13 United Nations agencies that Taiwan had participated in were the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation. Taiwan is becoming increasingly isolated internationally. The severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan in 1979 was a major blow to Taiwan's foreign relations. The frustration of Taiwan's foreign relations has produced a linkage effect on the island, causing people to question the Kuomintang government's ability to govern and the legitimacy of representing China as a whole, and shaken the Kuomintang's dominant position in Taiwan. In view of this situation, "substantial diplomacy" has begun. In order to cope with Taiwan's declining number of seats in international organizations, the Taiwan authorities have increased flexibility of their foreign policies. In the past, when there was a Chinese seat in international organizations, Taiwan took the initiative to withdraw, but after policy adjustments, Taiwan no longer took the initiative to withdraw. Taiwan has been regarded as part of China in many international organizations. Taiwan is no longer the only representative of China in international organizations, but remains in international organizations under the name of "Chinese Taipei" or "Taiwan, China."

In the third stage, with the succession of Lee Teng-hui as the supreme leader of Taiwan and the changes of external environment, the Eastern Europe changed dramatically and the US-Soviet pattern came to an end. In the context of the development of multi -polarity in the world, Taiwan relies on the economic advantages of the "Asian Tigers" to enhance its diplomatic posture, and puts the importance of Taiwan's own interests above the interests of the whole China. "steadfast diplomacy" began to transform into "substantive diplomacy". In order to prove the existence of Taiwan, it will not hesitate to establish formal diplomatic relations based on economics. If economic relations are difficult to be achieved, the second best option is to establish cultural or other exchange relations. Taiwan has begun to accept "dual recognition" and must compete peacefully and coexist on an equal footing with mainland China in the international arena. A phased two-China policy directed at one China, and strengthened and improved relations with non-diplomatic countries through various methods such as vacations, transit, economic assistance or private visits.

In the fourth stage, Taiwan’s international space has been compressed and eased since 1994 due to the foreign policy implemented by the alternation of political parties, but the overall international space has become smaller and smaller. In 1999, the first change of political parties occurred in Taiwan, and Taiwan put forward "one country on each side" in a different tone from mainland China in cross-strait relations, which raised the confrontation and friction to the international stage. The Taiwan authorities put forward the " beacon diplomacy" in the foreign relations policy, and carried out the radical foreign policy against the mainland of China in the world. Compete with mainland China for diplomatic relations and establish a "diplomatic early warning" and "rescue diplomatic" mechanism. Promote the substantive relations of non-diplomatic countries through various forms such as transit, vacation, parliament, and economic assistance, and join intergovernmental international organizations in a more independent way. In 2007, Taiwan directly applied for joining the United Nations in the name of "Taiwan". As of the end of 2020, there are only 15 countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan. "Congressional diplomacy" is another important means for Taiwan to open up international space. It has won the support of U.S. congressmen on many issues to a certain extent, and has promoted the signing of free trade agreements between the two sides. In terms of relations with Japan, it promotes substantive relations between Taiwan and Japan from the perspective of the legislature, and strives for Japan to give Taiwan more support in the international arena. At this stage, Taiwan’s expansion of international space is often interfered with by the "Beacon Diplomacy". Once the Taiwan authorities make excessive actions, in order to avoid angering the Chinese mainland, countries that have established diplomatic relations with the Chinese mainland often make explanations or statements at this time, criticizing Taiwan in words, or restricting them in the next stage of interaction with Taiwan. With the Kuomintang in power in 2008, the issue of cross-strait international participation was resolved through the diplomatic strategy of "diplomatic truce". Taiwan's foreign relations and not from the cross-strait relations, Taiwan at this stage of the "1992 consensus" focused on the implications of their statements. Under the "diplomatic truce" proposed by Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan's foreign relations have made much progress and the international space has been significantly improved. Regarding the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic countries, mainland China did not deliberately sabotage, but instead rejected Taiwan’s diplomatic countries’ request for the establishment of diplomatic relations, so that the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic countries did not significantly decrease. In foreign affairs, we should give top priority to US-Taiwan relations, actively repair and enhance mutual trust, and encourage the US to actively support Taiwan's participation in international relations.

On the one hand, the United States expressed its support for Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer, on the other hand, it urged the Chinese mainland to open up its international space, expressed its hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits would negotiate on the expansion of the international space, and encouraged Taiwan to participate "meaningfully" and "appropriately" in international organizations. During this period, the United States continued to expand its arms sales to Taiwan. This means that the cooperation between the representatives of the two sides in the security and military fields has maintained a very high level, and the mutual trust between the two sides' high-level leaders has been fully restored. In terms of international organizations, representatives of Taiwan have appeared in many international organization meetings with mainland China under the name of "Chinese Taipei." With Taiwan's pragmatic and low-key attitude and the improvement of cross-strait relations, considerable progress has been made. In 2016, the Taiwan authorities once again changed their political parties. Under Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, with the diplomatic goal of expanding the space for international activities of Taiwan independence, it fully implemented the "alliance with the US to subdue China" policy and actively integrated into the US-led "Indo-Pacific Strategy". Use the power of the United States to consolidate relations with countries with diplomatic relations, expand the space for multilateral activities, and try to reduce its dependence on China's economy and trade through the "New Southbound Policy, NSP." However, the Trump administration pursues the "America first" policy, and the Tsai Ing-wen administration has a one-sided strategy toward the United States, making Taiwan a "pawn" in the United States' strategic game against China. The Taiwan authorities hope to bypass the one-China principle and negotiate with the two sides of the strait and use the United States to expand Taiwan's international space. However, the strategic game between China and the United States continues to intensify, and Taiwan's international provocations for Taiwan independence continue to increase. To this end, mainland China has also increased its strategic resources at home and abroad, safeguarded the one-China framework of the international community, and resolutely contained and limited Taiwan’s expansion of international space and the survival of Taiwan’s independence.

# Chapter 2. Taiwan's search for greater international space: achievements and challenges

## 2.1 The U.S. factor and manifestations of the Taiwan issue

Then leader of the Taiwan region Lee Teng-hui put forward the "two-state theory" of splitting the motherland, making the Taiwan issue a new hot spot in current international politics, and the study of the Taiwan issue has also reached a new height. The study of Taiwan’s international space issues roughly includes three aspects: US-Taiwan relations, cross-strait relations, and international factors affecting the Taiwan issue. U.S.-Taiwan relations and Sino-U.S. relations are also intertwined and complicated, because the Taiwan issue is an important factor affecting Sino-U.S. relations and it is also the primary unfavorable factor affecting Sino-U.S. relations. Since the 1990s, the government of the Republic of China no longer denies the Chinese Communist regime and has given up military force to counterattack the mainland. Since then, the crux of the Taiwan issue has been transformed from the "problem of Chinese representation" into a dispute between unity and independence, and between sinicization and de-sinicization (indigenization of Taiwan). The Taiwan issue is undoubtedly China's internal affair, but due to historical reasons, the occurrence, development, and evolution of the Taiwan issue have a profound international background. In the process of solving the Taiwan issue, it was affected by complex international factors from the very beginning. The international factors affecting the Taiwan issue have always received high attention. Since Chen Shui-bian came to power, he played the "democracy card", "human rights card", and "peace card", which has caused a certain degree of resonance in the international community. Later, some international agreements on the Taiwan issue have been released, making the Taiwan issue face more complicated international factors. The beginning of the 21st century will be a critical period for resolving the Taiwan issue. Grasping the development and changes of the Taiwan issue from the perspective of international relations is of great significance to China's national reunification. Under the conditions that the Taiwan issue has become a regional hot spot and the current Taiwan-related international environment has undergone profound changes, a strategic review of the Taiwan issue and its future evolution will be conducted. It analyzes the various international factors that affect the Taiwan issue, the reasons why international factors intervene in the Taiwan issue and the harm it causes, and puts forward the countermeasures to these international factors.

The occurrence of the Taiwan issue is inseparable from the intervention of the United States. After the Chinese Civil War basically ended, some of the Kuomintang military and political personnel were defeated from the mainland to Taiwan. As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was about to send its troops south to resolve Taiwan, the Korean War broke out and the United States immediately sent troops to intervene. US President Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait to prevent any attack on Taiwan. At the same time, it was pointed out that "the decision of Taiwan's future status must wait for the restoration of Pacific security, and the signing of the Japan peace treaty or consideration of joint factors." Against the background of the East-West Cold War, Taiwan quickly became part of the so-called crescent-shaped defense line of the United States to contain communist forces in the Western Pacific. The basic goal of the United States' Taiwan policy is to separate the island from the mainland. However, China's efforts to fight for Taiwan's return have never given up.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the international situation changed, the United States began to adjust its China policy, and the relationship between the two countries began to thaw. On January 1, 1979, China and the United States formally established diplomatic relations. The United States stated that it had no intention of pursuing the policies of "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan". More than 150 American soldiers stationed in Taiwan, including Colonel Thomson, head of the "Military Assistance Advisory Group" stationed in Taiwan, all left Taiwan, and *Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and China* signed in 1954. It seems that the US factor in the Taiwan issue no longer exists, but after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the United States has still pursued the "two China" policy for a long time, and the Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations is far from over.

On January 1, 1979, the "Taiwan Relations Act" was enacted. Although Sino-US relations are moving towards friendship, in fact, the idea of maintaining the isolation between the mainland and Taiwan to ensure the strategic interests of the United States has continued. There are many reasons for this. For example, in order to promote the implementation of US foreign policy, the concern for the "future well-being of the Taiwanese people", and the strong pro-Taiwan forces in the United States. But the most important thing is the traditional long-term strategic consideration from Perry to MacArthur. So there was the *Taiwan Relations Act*. The *Taiwan Relations Act* treats Taiwan as an independent political entity, compares Taiwan with a sovereign state, and assumes the obligation to maintain Taiwan's security. The United States is the only country in the world that has passed a bill to make a commitment to Taiwan’s security. The *Taiwan Relations Act* clearly states that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC is based on the expectation that Taiwan’s future will be determined peacefully, and the United States will be seriously concerned about any method of determining its future in a way other than peacefully. The bill stated that the United States will continue to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan, and the United States will also resist any resort to force or other high-handed methods that endanger the security of Taiwan’s people and its socio-economic system. This provides a legal basis for the US government to continue to intervene in the Taiwan issue. The concentrated manifestation of the two-sided policy of the United States is that it has always regarded Taiwan as a political entity, and in fact has a tendency to regard Taiwan as a "country." Pursue the diplomatic strategy of developing relations with mainland China and Taiwan at the same time, and even to this day still include Taiwan in the sphere of influence protected by it. After Reagan was elected president, his stance on the Taiwan issue was clearly right deviation, and he planned to invite Taiwan’s KMT Secretary General Jiang Yanshi to attend the inauguration ceremony held on January 20, 1981. After more than 20 years, the U.S. government did not earnestly implement the relevant provisions of the *China-US joint communique*. Especially after the drastic changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, the balance of US China policy began to tilt significantly to the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Before and after the 2000 Taiwan general election, the United States took the trouble to publicly reaffirmed its security commitment to Taiwan and provided political defense to Taiwan. Officials in the United States emphasized that "One China" is actually very rich. It includes three communiqués, the "Taiwan Relations Act", the "Three Nos" policy[[23]](#footnote-22), China and Taiwan's entry into the WTO, etc., thus making "One China" vague. The Taiwan issue has become the biggest external obstacle to Sino-US relations. The reason why the Taiwan issue has not been resolved is to a large extent caused by the two-sided policy of the United States. The Taiwan issue has become the biggest external obstacle to Sino-US relations.

## 2.2 Specific actions or technics taken by Taiwan to expand international space

Taiwan is good at pursuing a policy of checkbook diplomacy in expanding the international space, and an important reason for the failure of Taiwan's foreign policy is also because of this. The number of diplomatic countries of the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations in 1971 and experienced an avalanche decline. Taiwan’s checkbook diplomacy dates back to the late 1980s. In 1979 and 1980, there were only 22 countries left. In the 1990s, following Lee Teng-hui's "pragmatic diplomacy," the total number of diplomatic countries once rose to 30. Mainly to win the establishment of diplomatic relations with countries such as Africa, the Caribbean, and Oceania. At that time, Taiwan's strong economic strength provided considerable temptation for these countries with relatively financial difficulties. However, the financial aid offensive can be effective in relatively small and poorer countries. Although the number of countries with diplomatic relations as a whole has risen, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South Africa, the "three major diplomatic countries" at the time, also broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the 1990s. At the end of 1989, the Taiwan authorities raised 1 billion U.S. dollars to establish the International Cooperation and Development Fund. In 1997, the amount of the fund was increased to 2 billion U.S. dollars to strengthen and enhance foreign relations through the operation of the fund, and expand and consolidate its position in the international community. Since then, the Taiwan authorities have repeatedly stated publicly that diplomacy should be cleared by economy, and economic power is the main backing for expanding diplomacy. Policy of checkbook diplomacy in diplomatic relations, in order to achieve "by pro-government" purpose, after the first economic and political, to develop official relations with some countries official way in the civil society.

In order to win the support of the United States, the Taiwan authorities had a total of 340 million U.S. dollars in project funds in the 1994 "confidential budget." In the implementation of the "Southbound Policy" and "Northbound Policy", China's neighboring countries are targeted, and the intensity of economic, trade and investment is increased to achieve the purpose of enhancing the substantive relationship with countries that have established diplomatic relations with China. For some countries with volatile political situations and economic difficulties, the Taiwan authorities have used economic aid, investment, loans, grants, etc., to woo them to establish or resume diplomatic relations with Taiwan. When dealing with relations with Taiwan, some countries have risen in pragmatism. While maintaining and developing relations with mainland China, they can also maximize economic benefits from Taiwan. In the field of international diplomacy, in order to win the support of other countries, in addition to providing assistance to the government and people of the other side, it is often an "unspeakable secret" to provide financial aid to dignitaries. Generally speaking, if the payment is effective and not exposed, most of the parties acquiesce in existence, but if the news is exposed or the other party takes the money and does not do anything, it will inevitably become a scandal. In order to maintain diplomatic relations, Taiwan’s most famous gift should be in 1994, to South Africa’s "African National Congress" (ANC) party chairman Mandela, which provided more than 10 million US dollars in financial aid. Since South Africa had announced the abolition of the apartheid policy at that time, Mandela was bound to become the next president, but the ANC had been friendly with the CCP for a long time, so Taiwan was eager to make friends with it. At the suggestion of Lu Yizheng, the then ambassador to Fiji, Leader of Taiwan authorities Lee Teng-hui decided to provide 10 million U.S. dollars to settle the huge debt of ANC. However, it was later disclosed by the local leftist media, and Mandela also confessed frankly. In terms of the amount of lobbying to the United States, in July 1997, the FBI estimated that China's illegal election contributions to the United States were less than 100,000 dollars, and its legal lobbying amount amounted to 327,000 dollars, which did not rank among the top ten lobbying countries to the United States. Taiwan ranks as the fifth largest lobbying country for the United States, with a total of US$4.217 million, of which the government is US$1.431 million and the others are US$2,786,000, including the US$2.5 million paid by the Taiwan Research Institute to Cassidy. Cassidy lobbied 36 US congressmen in 1996. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office hired 8 companies to lobby and spent a total of 920,000 US dollars. According to a report by the Asahi Shimbun on November 11, 1997, there were 55 current U.S. Senate members, 122 members of the House of Representatives, and 8 governors who visited Taiwan in 1997. Then, after the outbreak of the Asian economic crisis in 1997, the Taiwan authorities also took advantage of some countries' urgent need for economic assistance to visit and sign official agreements with politicians of some countries, hoping to promote an intergovernmental assistance mechanism.

No matter by any standard, Taiwan is in a difficult geopolitical position. The pressure from mainland China is increasing, the domestic obstacles to sustained growth and innovation are great, and Taiwan’s diplomatic partners are disappearing. Countries that broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan after 2000 have a common feature, they chose Beijing instead of Taipei out of economic considerations. In the past, when the two sides of the strait struggled to win diplomatic partners, it usually depended on the amount of economic assistance provided. However, China has long changed its strategy and now uses state-owned enterprises as the vanguard to carry out infrastructure construction and improve transportation facilities to attract allies. Later, Beijing gradually introduced economic aid and investment to strengthen its political influence in these countries. In contrast, Taiwan has not jumped out of a diplomatic model centered on providing financial aid to former diplomatic partners. Faced with the challenges posed by the huge economic dividends brought about by China's "One Belt One Road" initiative, Taiwan must fundamentally re-examine its foreign policy.

In fact, international affairs activities are also disguised money aid expenses, such as supporting certain political parties or candidates in some friendly countries, providing anti-riot equipment for the royal family of a diplomatic ally, assisting in airport reconstruction projects of diplomatic Allies, hiring local public relations companies to make diplomatic breakthroughs, and so on. All this is another "interpretation" of money diplomacy. Taiwan often spends large sums of money in the name of diplomacy. The people don't know the usefulness of this kind of money diplomacy, or how many rebates are available for diplomatic aid. Everything is informed by "national security" and "state secrets.

In recent years, since Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the two sides of the strait lacked channels for dialogue and lack of a basis for mutual trust. In addition, her government actively joined forces with the United States and Japan to fight against mainland China, leading to confrontation in cross-strait relations. Previously, the diplomatic truce between the two sides of the strait has opened up a new way to stop using money in vicious international competition. However, because Tsai Ing-wen refused to recognize the *1992 Consensus*, this made cross-strait relations lose the political basis for peaceful development, and diplomatic wars have reignited. Mainland China has begun to use theft of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners to compress Taiwan’s international space and exert maximum pressure on Taiwan. Given the imbalance of economic power across the Taiwan Strait, the Tsai administration therefore united with the United States to consolidate diplomacy and use the United States to counter and contain China. The consolidation of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners is equivalent to safeguarding the strategic interests of the United States. Facing China’s increasingly complex economic aid policy, the Tsai government should change its binomial foreign policy and use polynomial thinking to deal with diplomacy instead. Otherwise, even if there is another breakthrough in Taiwan-US relations, Taipei will only become a victim of the struggle between Washington and Beijing. Once the two reach a compromise, Taiwan will really become the abandoned party. The DPP’s statement has not changed since it came to power. The severance of diplomatic relations was the result of “Beijing suppression”, “money lure” and “interests leading” the former diplomatic partners. With such a simple excuse, the DPP government has never reflected on whether its cross-strait policy is reasonable or whether its diplomatic strategy is wise. If the public accepts this kind of shirking remarks and believes that everything is due to China's manipulation and oppression, then Taiwan under the DPP will not be responsible for any diplomatic mistakes. If the DPP government’s cross-strait policies are not adjusted, the impact on Taiwan’s foreign affairs, national defense, and economy and trade will be a bottomless pit. At this moment, Taiwan has a sense of national demise, partly from the shrinking of Taiwan’s international space. Even the power of the United States cannot prevent these countries from severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The United States does not recognize the "Republic of China," but the Taiwan government uses its emphasis on sovereignty and Beijing's suppression as an excuse to lead the people to become proud and complacent. The short-sighted attention to Taiwan’s official recognition continues a victimized narrative that ignores how the Taiwanese public views diplomatic relations. Since Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016, Beijing has exerted greater pressure on Taipei. Beijing has also prevented Taiwan representatives from participating in international conferences as observers. China’s aggressive diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan shocked the Taipei authorities because they felt they were being systematically driven to despair. With the number of countries that have established diplomatic relations with Taiwan declining, can Taiwan counter China's diplomatic aggression? In recent decades, as China's economic and military strength has increased, most countries have abandoned their relations with Taiwan in favor of Beijing. China's growing global influence means that Taiwan is becoming more and more isolated. Tsai Ing-wen is pro-American and anti-China, and Taiwan-US relations have escalated due to external factors and opportunities. However, if her diplomacy comes at the expense of cross-strait peace and makes Taiwan a pawn in exchange for protection, it may exacerbate the island’s diplomatic isolation. For example, we have also seen that after establishing a relationship with the Republic of China (ROC) for more than a century, Panama announced that it would establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), leaving the Republic of China only officially recognized by 20 countries.

Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to losing formal diplomatic relations because a country can recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) or the People's Republic of China. Although the Cold War prompted many anti-communist countries to recognize the former, the end of the Cold War and China's own economic and political rise made it difficult to maintain relations with this most populous country. Except for the Holy See (Vatican), few countries that recognize the Republic of China have ideological reasons behind maintaining official relations. Most countries are relatively poor countries and require international assistance. Although both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been criticized for engaging in checkbook diplomacy, they seem to be doing so. In the long run, Taiwan’s aid may not necessarily help Taiwan. A study of diplomatic recognition from 1950 to 2007 found that as a country’s exports as a percentage of GDP increase, they are more likely to recognize China rather than Taiwan. In other words, if Taiwan’s aid is used wisely, it may accelerate a country’s transition to China’s recognition.

## 2.3 Taiwan’s achievements in international space in 2000

Taiwan completed its political transition on May 20, 2000. Chen Shui-bian, the tenth leader of the Republic of China, officially stepped onto the highest political stage in Taiwan. Together with her partner Annette Lu, completed the first party rotation and peaceful transfer of power in Taiwan’s history. This time, the rotation of political parties is a qualitative increase in Taiwan's international influence, and it has allowed the world to see the major achievements of Taiwan's democratic development. The new government’s foreign policy features are:

1. Weigh the development of the international situation and make full use of Taiwan’s various political, economic, and non-governmental forces and advantages to effectively safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity.

2. We do not want to be an enemy of the CCP, and hope to coexist peacefully with the CCP in the international community.

3. Use constructive and creative thinking and methods to expand the level of exchanges between my country and other countries in the world, highlight Taiwan’s willingness and ability to feed back to the international community, and hope to play a more active role in promoting the peace, stability and sustainable development of the international order character of.

The foreign policy of the entire report reflects Taiwan’s desire to expand international space. Since 2000, due to the change of political parties, Taiwan's political ecology has undergone tremendous changes. The Taiwan authorities believe that the purpose of promoting Taiwan’s diplomacy is to safeguard the sovereignty and dignity of the Republic of China to ensure Taiwan’s survival and development on the international stage. Also emphasized that on the basis of Taiwan’s previous diplomacy, continue to consolidate the friendship with countries with diplomatic relations, enhance the substantive relations with countries without diplomatic relations, and actively participate in international organizations and activities to strengthen the goal of promoting the existing all-round steadfast diplomacy. By the time Chen Shui-bian became Taiwan's leader in 2000, Taiwan had 29 diplomatic relations with five countries in Asia, two countries in Europe, eight countries in Africa and 14 countries in America. The number of countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan in Central and South America and the Caribbean region accounts for half of all the countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It is a major force supporting the development of international space. On February 1, 2000, Taiwan became an extra-regional observer of the Central American Confederation, which has laid a cooperative foundation for the bilateral and multilateral relations between Taiwan and this region. The trade cooperation between Taiwan and Africa mainly reflects the characteristics of "checkbook diplomacy", which encourages Taiwan manufacturers to invest in friendly countries, and helps improve their health care, agricultural technology and personnel training by combining with non-governmental public welfare organizations or soliciting medical personnel, so as to consolidate diplomatic relations and revitalize local economy. In Europe, Taiwan established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia in 1999. In its foreign relations with Europe, Taiwan has shown mutual respect at the religious level, and has continued to consolidate its relations with the Holy See, and has made every effort to consolidate its relations with the Holy See. The five countries with formal diplomatic relations in the Asia-Pacific region often speak to help Taiwan in various international organizations and conferences.[[24]](#footnote-23) The Republic of Palau established diplomatic relations with Taiwan on December 29, 1999. President Kunio Nakamura of Palau and President Bernard Dawiyoga of the Republic of Nauru attended the inauguration ceremony of Chen Shui-bian as the 10th leader of Taiwan. Representatives of three other friendly countries also led delegations to the scene to congratulate him. In 2000, Taiwan had economic, cultural and technological cooperation with more than 150 countries in the world that it did not have diplomatic relations with. It had 97 diplomatic offices in 63 countries, 13 of which bore the name of the Republic of China and 84 of which bore the name of Taipei.

Taiwan's achievements in international space are mainly reflected in its relations with the United States. In January 2000, the United States House of Representatives passed the *Taiwan Security Enhancement Act* (TSA) by a vote of 341-70 to support the construction of human rights security. The Act received a strong response from the Chinese mainland, which also aroused a heated debate in the US political and social circles on the US-Taiwan relationship and US-China relations. In addition to the significance of this bill, the two sides have greatly strengthened the military defense, and the establishment of exchanges and direct communication channels between the two militaries has made the US-Taiwan alliance equal to the establishment of a substantial military alliance. In particular, the provisions of the Act mention that "Taiwan's final status shall be determined by the consent of the people of Taiwan", which further enhances Taiwan's status on the basis of the *Taiwan Relations Act*. Based on the "One China" policy and the Taiwan Relations Act, the US government has shown political concern over Taiwan affairs, and has publicly stated that it would be "gravely concerned about any use of force or the threat of use of force to resolve cross-Straits issues" to interfere in China's internal affairs. But the bill did not have enough votes in the Senate to become a domestic law. Nevertheless, it also reflects the US administration's serious concern over Taiwan affairs.

Taiwan’s achievements in international organizations, as of 2000, Taiwan has formally participated in 16 intergovernmental international organizations, 970 non-governmental international organizations, and 30 non-governmental international organizations with headquarters or secretariats located in Taiwan. Although it has not been effectively developed on UN issues, it still seeks participation with UN affiliated agencies through various channels.

In September 1999, the *New Ventures and Venture Capital* initiative proposed by Taiwan was included in the joint statement of the APEC Ministerial Annual Meeting. The report was submitted and passed at the first meeting of senior officials in 2000. The research results will be presented at the APEC Leadership Conference and the Ministerial Annual Conference in November.

According to the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) report, Taiwan's overall investment environment ranks third in the world. In the *World Economic Freedom in 2000* report published by the American Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal in January 2000, Taiwan was listed as the eleventh largest economic liberalization country in the world. In the 1999 *World Economic Forum* survey, Taiwan’s overall competitiveness was ranked 4th in the world, and its individual economic competitiveness ranked 19th in the world.

In general, Taiwan was generally recognized by the world on international space issues in 2000. Especially after the political peaceful transfer in 2000, Taiwan was once evaluated as a politically free area by Western countries. The World Human Rights Report published by the United States in 2000 even pointed out that Taiwan has excellent performance in political democracy, freedom of speech, and assembly. Second is the international performance of the economy. Taiwan is already the eighteenth largest economy in the world, with an average income of about US$13,400. During the election of Taiwan’s leader, seventy-three countries and international organizations sent ninety-five celebration groups with a total of 972 people to Taiwan to observe the ceremony. This indicates that Taiwan has demonstrated its own free and democratic system through the leadership transition election, which has been recognized by the Western countries. In 2000, Taiwan's foreign affairs mainly focused on democracy and economy and trade, actively participated in various international human rights, humanitarian and democratic activities, sought to establish partnerships with civil organizations both inside and outside the island, and expanded the scope of international cooperation and exchanges, in order to effectively safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty and security.

In fact, during this period, Taiwan-US relations have not deteriorated. The United States still provides substantial support to Taiwan. The severance of diplomatic relations only "de-officializes" relations. Although publicly claiming to adhere to the "one China" political stance, it has also shown an act of expanding US-Taiwan relations in actual actions. After the severance of diplomatic relations, the US military in Taiwan left, and the original Taipei embassy in the US became the "American Association in Taiwan" (AIT), which was called a private organization by the United States and its responsibility was to promote the development of US-Taiwan trade and finance. The Taiwan authorities set up the "Coordination Committee for North American Affairs" (CCNAA) as a counterpart agency, which is a special unit of the Taiwan Executive Yuan. At the same time that Taiwan and the United States broke off diplomatic relations in 1979, the U.S. Congress enacted the *Taiwan Relations Act* to regulate U.S.-Taiwan relations and promised to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons to resist any compulsory activities that could endanger the safety of the people of Taiwan or the social and economic system. This ensures that the two parties maintain substantial relations, such as economic and trade cooperation, visa-free treatment and other measures, and promotes exchanges and cooperation between the people of the two places. Facing the crisis of severing diplomatic relations, Taiwan began to strive for more countries with diplomatic relations in the international community. Checkbook diplomacy became a means to retain or strive for more countries to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The fact is that checkbook diplomacy sometimes works, sometimes not necessarily. And as China's growing global influence means that Taiwan is becoming more and more isolated. Taiwan has not jumped out of a diplomatic model centered on providing financial aid to former diplomatic partners, which has also become an important reason for the failure of Taiwan's foreign policy. However, in 2000, Taiwan achieved its first party change, which won the recognition of values from many Western countries, and thus gained universal recognition in the world for political democracy on the issue of international space. For Taiwan, this is an achievement that has attracted the attention of the world.

# Chapter 3. Taiwan’s international space in 2000-2020

This chapter discusses the situation of Taiwan's international space based on the three shifts of Taiwan's political parties since 2000, including the relations between Taiwan and its diplomatic Allies, Taiwan's living situation in international organizations and the free trade agreements Taiwan has signed. The international situation, cross-strait relations and Taiwan's situation are the three major factors that determine Taiwan's diplomacy. Therefore, the first part of this chapter will discuss how mainland China's international movements affect Taiwan's foreign relations, and evaluate Taiwan's "self-positioning" in the international arena through mainland China's strategic goals and movements. The second part will compare the changes and conditions of the international space through three historical periods: 2000-2008, 2008-2016, and 2016-present. The third part discusses the attitude and actions taken by the United States on the issue of international space expansion, and discusses and evaluates the results.

## 3.1 The mainland China factor in Taiwan international space

The Chinese government has always consistently adhered to the “one China” principle and resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. Taiwan’s international space has always been a key political issue in cross-strait relations and an important factor influencing the development of cross-strait relations. Taiwan's international space is the most important issue in Taiwan. Taiwan's manipulation of its own expansion of international space issues has become an effective tool for Taiwan independence forces on the island to manipulate elections and shape their sense of tragedy, and the Chinese government is firm on the principled stand of the international community in handling the Taiwan issue. Comply with international law and the one-China principle to become a requirement of a country that has established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, and to reach a formal agreement or understanding with the Chinese government on the Taiwan issue, recognizing the Chinese government’s principled stand on the Taiwan issue. Countries that have established diplomatic relations with China cannot establish mutual official institutions with Taiwan, cannot conduct any official exchanges, and the two parties cannot sign official agreements or documents. So far, more than 160 countries have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, and the one-China principle has become the consensus of the international community.

When other countries negotiate with Taiwan, China has established principles and positions in the following three aspects. First, a country that has established diplomatic relations with China and a country that establishes navigation with Taiwan should follow international law and international practice. China's territorial land, territorial waters, and airspace sovereignty are integral. In accordance with international law and international practice, countries that have diplomatic relations with China may not establish any form of official aviation relationship with Taiwan or sign any official aviation agreement. If you need to establish a civil aviation relationship with Taiwan, you must negotiate with the Chinese government through diplomatic channels in advance, and you can fly with Taiwan’s private airlines only after obtaining the consent of the Chinese government. Some countries have opened air services with Taiwan before the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and they can continue their private commercial transportation arrangements after changing the official nature of air services with Taiwan through negotiations with the Chinese government. The second, the issue of arms sales to Taiwan by countries that have established diplomatic relations with China. All countries that have established diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, refrain from providing arms or equipment of any kind to Taiwan in any form or under any pretext, and have the obligation to refuse to sell, provide or help Taiwan produce arms. Although the principle and position of the Chinese government have been repeatedly reiterated, some countries still sell arms to Taiwan for political and economic reasons. As a result, cross-strait tensions have escalated over the arms sales issue. Third, countries that have diplomatic ties with China cannot develop official or unofficial relations with Taiwan. As a part of China, Taiwan has no right to represent China in the international community. It may not establish diplomatic or consular relations with foreign countries, establish institutions of an official nature with each other, or conduct exchanges of any form with an official nature. Developing relations between Taiwan and countries that have diplomatic relations with China involves China's sovereignty. To develop relations with Taiwan, foreign countries should first respect China's sovereignty and take non-interference in China's internal affairs as a prerequisite. Relations between Taiwan and countries that have diplomatic relations with China can only be non-government economic, trade and cultural relations under the one-China principle.

From an economic point of view, the benefits of China's development outweigh the threat to Taiwan. From 2009 to 2019, China and Taiwan have always maintained a trade surplus, and mainland China is already Taiwan's largest trading partner. The mainland Chinese is Taiwan's largest import and export market and the main source of its trade surplus. According to statistics from the General Administration of Customs of Taiwan, in 2018, the import and export trade volume between China's Taiwan and the Mainland was US$141.87 billion, an increase of 8.3% year-on-year; the trade surplus was US$34.30 billion, an increase of 11.6% year-on-year, a rapid growth rate. Among the many factors affecting cross-strait relations, economic benefits have their objective operating laws and are not affected by subjective ideas. Through the analysis of global value chains and East Asian production networks, due to the huge disparity in market size, geographical distance, language and culture, and close social networks across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s industrial development and foreign trade must rely on mainland China. This law will not change because of changes in Taiwan's political situation. No matter who is in power in Taiwan, he must follow the laws of economic efficiency to promote economic development, so that it is possible to stabilize Taiwan's economic fundamentals. In addition, since the reform and opening up, Mainland China has experienced rapid economic growth, absorbed a large amount of foreign investment, and enjoyed the fruits of economic development. At the same time, faced with the high unemployment rate of domestic state-owned enterprise reforms, environmental protection backwardness, serious pollution, and frequent natural disasters, it still ignores the situation. The national economy and people's livelihood have rapidly increased military expansion. What's more, under the premise of its own peaceful international environment and Taiwan's long abandonment of counterattack against the mainland, the actual military expenditures continue to increase, making Taiwan and the international community feel more "China threat."

The influence of mainland China's military expansion has had a major impact and impact on the stability and peace of cross-strait relations. Taiwan has become more and more natural on the issue of arms sales, and has had more exchanges with other countries on military cooperation. According to the analysis of the current signs of development, the two sides of the strait will develop under a pattern of continuous stalemate and conflict, and it is very unlikely that they will find room for resolution in the short term. With the continuous increase of China's hard and soft power, the right to speak in the international community can have a direct impact on Taiwan. As a result, the degree of "China Threat Theory" will continue to increase. Especially in the military, the actual operation content of the military intimidation force depends on the variables extended within mainland China, and whether Taiwan's internal actions make the Chinese government operate a "China threat" to influence Taiwan.


Taiwan’s expansion of international space affects mainland China’s attitudes directly because of changes in its internal political ecology. Mainland China has always handled all Taiwan affairs in accordance with the "one China" political principle. The close relationship between the two parties determines the dimensions of Taiwan’s international space to a certain extent. The prerequisite for Taiwan to properly handle the issue of international space is to handle cross-strait relations, because Taiwan’s politics, economy, and culture affect Taiwan’s participation in international space. Taiwan and China have always had very different values in expressing the positioning of cross-strait relations. From the situation of "the legitimate government does not coexist with rebels" in the Chiang Ching-kuo period to "two Chinas" after Lee Teng-hui took the throne in 1988, to 2000 after Chen Shui-bian took office, he chanted "Taiwan and China, one country on each side." After Ma Ying-jeou took office, "One China, each expresses it", saying that cross-strait relations are a special kind of relationship, but "not two Chinas" or "state-to-state relations." In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen refused to recognize the *1992 Consensus* and always regarded Taiwan as a country, and believed that it was unfair for the United States to define Taiwan as a political entity. This also gave rise to a different "view of China" within Taiwan. At that time, Taiwan's top leader Tsai Ing-wen said that the two sides had never reached a consensus on cross-Straits issues. The main reasons were that the two sides had different views on economic issues, political parties on the island were competing for political positions, and there was no consensus on the issue of reunification or independence on the island, which were the main reasons for the lack of consensus on the mainland policy in Taiwan. China's policy towards Taiwan has been observed to be inconsistent with consensus within Taiwan and has often been used as a tool for political and partisan warfare.

The good and bad relations between Taiwan and Mainland China have also made Taiwan less effective in expanding international space. The confrontation between the two sides of the strait has always held back Taiwan's performance on the international stage and in international affairs. Mainland China's lack of mutual trust between the two sides of the strait has made Taiwan very vigilant on the issue of operating international space. Therefore, Mainland China's attitude on this issue is restrictive. From the global political environment, "one China" is the consensus, despite some countries want to contain China's development by splitting the situation in the Taiwan Strait, but are based on the norms of international relations and the "one China" as a precondition. In the process of economic and trade exchanges with China over Taiwan do not want to cause conflicts among the communication process and unpleasant. Based on this taboo issue, cooperation in the mainland China have shown that standing position, recognize and practice the "one China" policy.

At the symposium on the 30th anniversary of the issue of *Message to Compatriots in Taiwan*, Hu Jintao, then China's leader, also expressed his understanding of Taiwan's feelings on the issue of participating in international activities without creating the confused concept of "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan", and attached importance to and resolved relevant issues. Mainland China has always had no objection to Taiwan's non-governmental economic and cultural exchanges. One of the most important barriers for Taiwan to expand its international space is Mainland China, and Mainland China's position and principles are very firm and clear. With the current growth and decline in cross-strait competitiveness, the current non-recognition of the *1992 Consensus* and the promotion of the "de-Sinicization" policy directly affect Taiwan's industries that rely on the mainland market and the growth and decline in foreign relations with the mainland. If cross-strait relations continue to cool down, not only will Taiwan continue to reduce its diplomatic relations, but its international space will continue to be restricted, and it will also impact Taiwan's economic development.

## 3.2 The ups and downs in Taiwan’s getting a greater international space

In terms of Taiwan's foreign diplomatic relations from 2000 to 2008, the challenge to Taiwan's expansion of "international space" mainly came from the strong performance of mainland China in international activities. The continuous shrinkage of China's diplomatic space for Taiwan made Taiwan's diplomacy very passive during Chen Shui-bian's administration. In the past eight years, Taiwan-US relations have also experienced a strong impact from the deepening of Taiwan's indigenous democracy and the emphasis on "subjectivity." Faced with its own situation, Taiwan proposed in 2002 to actively promote its development in international organizations and its substantive relations with countries with diplomatic relations. On August 4, 2007, Qiu Yiren changed the name of "Beacon Diplomacy" to "Attack Diplomacy."[[25]](#footnote-24) This is particularly manifested in the emphasis on Taiwan's main image in the international community. In order to distinguish it from mainland China, the name of the overseas organization was changed to "Taiwan Representative Office", and the word "TAIWAN" was added to its passport and so on. Throughout this period, the number of countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan dropped from 29 at the end of 1999 to 23 in 2008. During Chen Shui-bian’s administration, he lost 9 countries with diplomatic relations. Figure 3 shows the time of the countries that have broken diplomatic relations with Taiwan during this period. In addition, during Chen Shui-bian’s tenure, diplomatic relations with Taiwan were established in Kiribati in November 2003, and Saint Lucia in May 2007 restored diplomatic relations. Despite the fact that Taiwan’s overall diplomatic relations are shrinking, Taiwan’s diplomatic budget during Chen Shui-bian’s administration has greatly increased, but the international space has become narrower and narrower. According to statistics, the diplomatic budget in 1993 only accounted for 1.11% of Taiwan’s gross product (GDP), which increased to 1.82% in 2008.



The chart is drawn by the author himself through data

During this period, the Taiwan authorities began "parliamentary diplomacy" in order to expand the international space. It refers to that individual and group members of the Congress, such as the speaker, deputy speaker or members of the Congress, increase the exposure and popularity of a country on international occasions and build a good national image by visiting, receiving, attending international conferences and exchanges, participating in the operation of international organizations or establishing friendly fraternity groups between the congresses. It even takes the place of administrative departments to convey national policies and ideas or establish friendly and cooperative relations, so as to consolidate state friendship and assist government diplomacy.[[26]](#footnote-25) On April 9, 2002, "Taiwan Caucus" was established. It can be understood that some members of the US Congress who are concerned about the Taiwan issue organized to exert systematic influence and pressure on the US policy towards Taiwan and Sino-US policy, thus forming negative impact. Although Taiwan did have a breakthrough on its own international space issues, especially from July 10 to 13, 2004, when Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited Taiwan in his personal capacity. This action caused damage to the relationship between mainland China and Singapore, and made mainland China pay attention to Taiwan's actions in Southeast Asian countries. The number of diplomatic countries in Taiwan during this period was affected by the rapid rise of mainland China, and there were more countries that broke diplomatic ties than countries with diplomatic ties. Coupled with the alternate ruling of the two parties, the diplomatic problems caused by ideology are mainly reflected in the lack of continuity in diplomacy due to the difference in positioning of Taiwan.

The performance in international organizations. Although Taiwan has actively participated in the activities of international organizations during this period, it is of little significance to the substantive advancement of international space. After Chen Shuibian came to power in 2000, a new "NGO International Affairs Committee" was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan. Administratively and economically, efforts have been made to increase support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people in Taiwan to expand their participation in INGO activities, and the number of Taiwan's participation in INGO has also been increasing. According to statistics, the number of Taiwan participating INGOs was about 1,000 in 2000, and it increased rapidly to 2,074 in 2003 and 2,157 in 2006.[[27]](#footnote-26) Joined the World Trade Organization in January 2001 under the name " The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" (Chinese Taipei), joined the International Cyber Crime Joint Defense Organization under the name "Taiwan" in August 2004, and joined the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission in December 2004, etc. . During Chen Shui-bian's administration, Taiwan has also been applying to participate in the United Nations and the World Health Assembly, but there are still no satisfactory results. As of 2008, Taiwan has applied for membership of the United Nations 16 times. During the entire process, Taiwan has changed to separate actual jurisdiction and representation. Taiwan applied to join the United Nations and WTO for the first time in 2007 under the name of "Taiwan". Through constant debates among the representatives of various countries, Taiwan has constantly protested *the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758* regarding Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China and the "one China" principle. During the whole process, some countries protested “*Resolution 2758”* to the United Nations Secretariat, and the United Nations Secretariat did not make similar interpretations afterwards. Taiwan has also been widely reporting and discussing through the international media, emphasizing the view that Taiwan is independent of its sovereignty and is by no means affiliated with any country. According to the report of the first session of the seventh session of Taiwan, more than 2,000 news articles have been published or discussed on this topic in Taiwan. Regarding the issue of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, the three votes for Taiwan’s application for membership in the World Health Organization are considered:

Regarding the three voting results of Taiwan's application to

join the World Health Organization

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The main reason for the vote | Number of Opposed Countries | Number of approved countries | Number of abstaining countries |
| Observer | 128 | 19 | 5 |
| Observer | 133 | 25 | 2 |
| Membership | 148 | 7 | 2 |

The chart is drawn by the author himself through data

Provisions of Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the World Health Assembly regarding applications for observers "The Director-General may invite countries that have applied for membership, territories that have applied for associate members, and countries that have signed but have not yet accepted the Constitution to send observers to meetings of the World Health Assembly (WHA)"[[28]](#footnote-27) Strictly speaking, the possibility of Taiwan participating in the conference alone and with legal qualifications is very small. Only after cross-strait negotiations and forming political mutual trust within the framework of the "one China" principle can it be possible to participate in the conference in the name of "Chinese Taipei." In fact, at this stage, the issue of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations can be interpreted as an asymmetric structure of international political and legal basis, making it difficult for Taiwan to participate in international organizations that can only be participated by sovereign states. On this issue, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have formed an uneven game relationship, and constitute the arena and test ground for cross-strait relations. Taiwan in the international community widely recognized as a part of China, from the point of view of cooperation on the international stage, may not participate in international organizations as a sovereign state qualifications, unless the organization's rules expressly allow non-sovereign countries to participate in some form.

Taiwan and the free trade agreement at this stage, the free trade agreement is an agreement that Taiwan uses to accelerate trade liberalization through regional alliances, which can help companies enter the global market and gain a competitive advantage. In 2004, in order to promote trade liberalization, Taiwan successively signed Free Trade Agreements with countries in Central America. The Taiwan-Panama Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 2004, includes a preface and a total of 234 articles in Chapter 21. The content of the agreement includes market, investment, and service industries. This is also the first free trade agreement signed by Taiwan after it joined the WTO. Its overall benefits will be of great guiding significance to Taiwan's future policy of actively negotiating and signing Free Trade Agreements with other countries and building a global economic and trade network. This has also strengthened Taiwan's willingness to promote free trade agreements with other countries and regions in the future. The Taiwan-Guatemala Free Trade Agreement is the second official free trade agreement. On March 10, 2003, Taiwan and Guatemala signed the *Joint Statement on Taiwan-Guatemala Negotiation and Signing of Free Trade Agreement* in Taipei. In December 2003, Taiwan invited Guatemalan officials to Taiwan for the first round of negotiations. On July 31, 2004, Guatemala’s Minister of Industry and Commerce Cuevas was invited to visit Taiwan. The two sides negotiated a free trade agreement and then submitted a draft consultation framework to Taiwan. On December 7, 2004, Guatemalan Minister of Industry and Commerce Cuevas came to Taiwan again to sign the consultation framework document. The two sides also held four negotiations from March to July 2005 and reached a consensus on the terms of the agreement. The Taiwan-Guatemala Free Trade Agreement entered into force on July 1, 2006. Taiwan’s third free trade agreement was reached with Nicaragua, a Central American country. After intensive consultations and negotiations between the two sides, Taiwan and Nicaragua reached an agreement in early 2006 and entered into force on January 1, 2008. The Taiwan-Nicaragua Free Trade Agreement took effect. After the failure of the Cancun Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2003, the multilateral trading system with the WTO as the main axis was hit hard, which accelerated the efforts of countries and regions to seek new economic and trade cooperation by signing FTAs. Countries have used regional alliances to deepen trade liberalization and regionalization, and actively carry out FTA negotiations to avoid the crisis of being marginalized under the global division of labor system. As a result of regional integration, trade has become more liberalized, but there are also hidden complex trade competition and location strategy motives, which affect the expansion of global layout and economic territory and the direction of political and economic development of countries in the next stage. Taiwan is a small and outward-oriented economy. Facing the world's actively integrated economies, Taiwan is also working hard to participate in its economic and trade development in the international community. It can be said that since Taiwan's entry into the WTO, Taiwan has actively negotiated and signed free trade agreements with various countries, which ensures long-term substantial economic and trade relations with various countries. Joining the FTA is also embodied in political interests, including the ability to develop closer interdependent relations with members in the region, and strengthen political integration. This is a good opportunity for breakthroughs in Taiwan, which is frequently isolated in terms of diplomacy. From the perspective of the FTA signed by Taiwan at this stage, it can be seen that the three are Central American countries, and the estimated economic benefits and trade volume between the two sides are not large, so the impact on the industries of both sides is small, so there is a lot of space for reaching an agreement, but this does not hinder the accumulation of experience in negotiation and implementation. In addition, it is possible to stabilize political relations with friendly countries by signing FTAs, so that countries with diplomatic relations can become Taiwan’s supporting force in opening up international space on the international stage.

From 2008 to 2016, Taiwan began to find a way out for diplomacy, using the current situation to find opportunities for the economy. The real manifestation of Taiwan's foreign relations is that Taiwanese government officials have participated in many intergovernmental exchanges and cooperation. Since current international security concerns mainly come from regional conflicts and trade protectionism, after the relaxation of cross-strait relations, the international community has lowered the doubt that the Taiwan Strait may trigger military conflicts. The basic thinking of "viable diplomacy " is to extend cross-strait reconciliation to the diplomatic field, stop vicious competition with mainland China in the international community, and avoid resource wastage. The concrete manifestation is that it no longer expands diplomatic countries, and strives to avoid diplomatic activities involving one China, in exchange for China to give Taiwan international space. "viable diplomacy" is divided into two aspects: "active diplomacy" and "diplomatic truce." The "diplomatic truce" is a method of "flexible diplomacy", emphasizing that the two sides should stop the "diplomatic war", and all developments harmful to Taiwan should be put on hold. "Active diplomacy" means to concentrate key resources and strengthen ties with "diplomatic countries" in order to strengthen the level of national development in the region, actively integrate into the Asia-Pacific regional cooperative economic system, increase cooperation with international organizations, and create a favorable international environment To develop Taiwan, work together to promote non-governmental exchanges between the country and civil society, invigorate Taiwan’s relations with countries with diplomatic relations, and actively create an international environment conducive to development. However, it is not difficult to find that "survival diplomacy" is seeking greater international space for Taiwan and is also trying to seek the international status of a "sovereign independent country."

Since Ma Ying-jeou came to power, he has criticized the former leader Chen Shui-bian's "beacon diplomacy", thinking that the deterioration of cross-strait relations is a direct factor of this policy, making Taiwan's diplomatic situation more difficult. Ma Ying-jeou advocates "no reunification, no independence, no military" in cross-strait relations, and has maintained good relations with other "countries with diplomatic relations", and has participated in exchanges and cooperation between governments of many countries. Taiwan’s cooperation with diplomatic countries is mainly reflected in the fields of infrastructure assistance, medical humanitarian assistance, economic and trade cooperation, cultural exchanges, and communication technology. It provides assistance to stabilize the foreign relations between the two parties. From the perspective of the number of diplomatic countries with Taiwan, during his administration, he lost 1 diplomatic country, leaving 22 countries. The reason is probably because during Ma Ying-jeou's " diplomatic truce", the mainland declined Gambia's request for diplomatic relations. It was not until Ma Ying-jeou stepped down to warn that Tsai Ing-wen, who was about to take office, agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Gambia. The Ma Ying-jeou government adjusted the way of dealing with countries with diplomatic ties, attached importance to the quality of cooperation, and worked hard in a more pragmatic direction. Reject the practice of "checkbook diplomacy" and avoid giving generous financial aid. This has greatly improved the quality of cooperation, and is more conducive for Taiwan to focus on global development and actively participate in international economic organizations, so as to promote Taiwan to the world, and provide a good development prerequisite for Taiwan to go international and expand Taiwan's diplomatic cooperation. In the last ruling cycle, the foreign policy caused the vicious competition with mainland China in the international field, and most of the countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan were involved in the cross-strait conflict, and Taiwan's international space was substantially affected by the cross-strait confrontation to a certain extent. As for Taiwan and the United States, they share similar values in the fields of economy and trade, anti-terrorism, civil rights and so on. Taiwan-US relations have always been attached great importance to by every leader, including Ma Ying-jeou. During this period, the reconstruction of Taiwan-US relations was the top priority of Taiwan's government towards US relations. The initial deal, which included nearly $6.4 billion in arms purchases, fulfilled U.S. commitments under the *Taiwan Relations Act* and symbolized a commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The United States removed Taiwan from the *Special 301 Report* in early 2009. New US government officials have expressed support on different occasions for Taiwan and US officials to increase exchanges and support Taiwan as an observer of the World Health Assembly (WHA). And continued to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the *Taiwan Relations Act*. Relations with Japan, cultural exchanges have become the main theme, strengthened youth exchanges between the two sides, newly opened routes between the two regions, two-way sightseeing and other activities. At the same time, it also restarted the three-year-long fishery talks with the Japanese side to negotiate on the handling and management of fishery disputes between the two parties. Ma Ying-jeou has often emphasized Taiwan-Japan relations on many occasions, and designated the two parties as a "special partnership" and designated 2009 as the "Taiwan-Japan Special Partnership Promotion Year."

During this period, Taiwan participated in many intergovernmental exchanges and cooperation. In addition to Ma Ying-jeou's many transit visits to the United States, Su Qi, Secretary General of the National Security Council, visited the United States in September 2008 and May 2009. Lai Shinyuan, chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Council, visited the US every year from 2008 to 2012. In May 2010 and October 2012, Vice Minister of Defense Andy Yang visited the United States. In January 2011, President of the Legislative Council Wang Jin-ping visited the United States. Minister of Culture Long Ying-tai visited the United States twice in August 2012 and August 2013. In January 2013, President of the Legislative Council Wang Jin-ping also led Vice Chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) Jiang Xiaoyan and four legislators to attend the inauguration ceremony of President Obama and meet with US political dignitaries. On the US side, according to incomplete statistics, since September 2011, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Kumar, Administrator of the Agency for International Development Shah, Deputy Secretary of Energy Penaman, Assistant Secretary of State Fernandez, Deputy Secretary of Commerce Sanchez and other senior officials have visited Taiwan. In addition, the United States and Taiwan have a large number of congressmen and lawmakers to visit each other.[[29]](#footnote-28)

In addition, Ma Ying-jeou stated that "Taiwan-US relations can be analyzed using US arms sales to Taiwan as an indicator." During the two terms of office, the United States sold three batches of weapons to Taiwan, worth up to 18.3 billion U.S. dollars. Cooperation in the military field can be understood as the best in history. Through 8 years of hard work, a good high-level mutual trust has been established.

In 2008-2016, measure of Taiwan's comprehensive national strength and international circumstances, to develop pragmatic aggressive foreign policy, no matter from sustained deepening diplomatic relations, to enhance cooperation with the essence of no diplomatic Allies, expand the participation in international organizations and activities, to promote Taiwan's international image, or to improve the quality of service for the people of the evaluation, "viable diplomacy" goal has been reached. The Ma Ying-jeou government recognizes the *1992 Consensus* in cross-strait relations, and positions cross-strait relations as not "state-to-state" relations. Enhancing the sincere attitude of peaceful coexistence and developing cross-strait relations is of positive significance to China's great cause of peaceful reunification. It is conducive to enhancing mutual political trust between the two sides of the strait, promoting cross-strait cooperation and development, promoting emotional communication between people on both sides of the strait, and increasing mutual understanding between Chinese people on both sides of the strait. On the whole, the Ma Ying-jeou government's proposition on the development of cross-strait relations is conducive to promoting the peaceful development of both sides of the strait, and it also draws a blueprint for the development of China's peaceful reunification. Although Ma Ying-jeou does not challenge the Chinese mainland and realizes the peaceful coexistence of both sides of the strait, his foreign policy has always adhered to the diplomatic principle of "maintaining Taiwan's interests and adhering to equality and dignity." In fact, Taiwan's interests here mean that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the Republic of China, which does not really advocate peaceful reunification of Taiwan. In other words, the foreign policy of Ma Ying-jeou's government still insists on opposing the reunification of China and advocating that the Republic of China has sovereignty over Taiwan. From the perspective of Taiwan's own mobility, international diplomacy depends on different circumstances. When Taiwan joins the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the mainland China also agrees that Taiwan can participate as an observer. All this reflects the flexibility of Ma Ying-jeou's foreign policy.

Taiwan’s performance in international organizations at this stage, Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations, and the 63rd United Nations Congress in 2008 are the key points for the adjustment of "pragmatic" strategies. The Ma Ying-jeou authorities changed the past DPP Chen Shui-bian directly challenged the "United Nations membership" collision strategy, claiming to consider the two major factors of "international reality" and "legal limitations", and no longer emphasized "national name" and membership. In terms of tactics, they continued to seek proposals from friendly countries and put forward the slogan of "low-key, gentle, pragmatic participation." To observe Ma Ying-jeou's handling of Taiwan's participation in international space from two approaches, he avoids talking about "accession" and only mentions "participation." In an interview with the media, Ma Ying-jeou mentioned that "Taiwan's participation in international organizations is more sensitive than bilateral relations." Therefore, as the governor, he is more cautious in facing Taiwan's participation in international space issues, so at this stage, will not discuss long-term plans for participation in international organizations.

"Chinese Taipei" is currently the name clearly supported and accepted by Ma Ying-jeou's authorities. Since 2008, the two intergovernmental international organizations WHA and ICAO that the mainland supports Taiwan's participation are both called "Chinese Taipei". The Taiwan authorities once stayed in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to protest under the name " Taipei, China ". Public opinion generally believes that "Chinese Taipei" is the most "dwarfed" name. It is also because of a certain kind of "name" anxiety that in 2015 when Taiwan joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AIIB's name issue before the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the Ma Ying-jeou authorities took the lead in disclosing that the name "Chinese Taipei" was the bottom line and did not accept "China, Taipei".[[30]](#footnote-29) As for the status of the Taiwan authorities in participating in international organizations, it mainly depends on the nature of the international organizations themselves. Intergovernmental international organizations are divided into political organizations and functional organizations. Generally, in political intergovernmental international organizations, the mainland is more cautious about Taiwan's participation, such as APEC. After several rounds of gaming, the mainland finally accepts Taiwan to participate in APEC activities as an "economy". However, most of Taiwan's members have joined functional, non-political international organizations as observers, or with the status of "admission criteria" appropriate to these organizations. The difference in status also means different rights and obligations. For example, the Asian Development Bank is an international economic and financial organization, and Taiwan’s status in ADB is a “full member”, which is the highest status among intergovernmental international organizations that the Taiwan authorities have joined. In addition, there are identities specially established for the Taiwan authorities due to the special circumstances of the Taiwan authorities. In 2013, Taiwan was invited to attend the triennial conference held in Canada on the 24th as the chairman of the ICAO Council. It has the same rights as observers and can only attend without speaking space.

It can be said that the policy of "viable diplomacy" has successfully created a stable and peaceful favorable environment for Taiwan's long-term development. It has indeed expanded its foreign relations and enhanced Taiwan's international status. The "pragmatic" strategy adopted by the Ma Ying-jeou administration is essentially "accumulate qualitative change with quantitative change, exchange space with time" The policy is made after comprehensive assessment of multiple factors such as international support, intra-island and cross-strait relations. It is a choice based on "accepting reality" and does not mean a change in its ultimate goal. Every opportunity that Taiwan gets to participate is the result of mutual games and compromise between the two sides of the strait, international organizations, and other external factors. The so-called participation of Taiwan in various modes has gone through several rounds of contests, consultations and coordination, and was finally accepted and recognized by mainland China, the Taiwan authorities and international organizations. After cross-strait relations embarked on the track of peaceful development in May 2008, although they have achieved positive interactions with the Taiwan authorities in participating in international organizations through a "pragmatic" strategy, they have clearly entered a difficult period of development. Whether cross-strait relations enter the "deep water zone" or cross-strait relations are unstable, it will lead to mutual influence, mutual restraint, and mutual involvement between the two.

Taiwan's international space since 2016, Since the DPP came to power in 2016, the *1992 Consensus* has faced a crisis of identity. The DPP’s cross-strait policy was shaped under the concept of Taiwan independence and adopted a decoupling approach of "full offshore substitution." This orientation not only undermines the *1992 Consensus* that is the basis for the peaceful development of the two sides of the strait, but also undermines the future expectations of peaceful reunification. In his speech on the 40th anniversary of *Message to Compatriots in Taiwan*, Xi reiterated its historical significance and institutional thrust. It confirmed the *1992 Consensus* as the political basis, and planned and anticipated the constitutional direction and path of "peaceful reunification, ‘one country, two systems’", and clearly put forward the reality and operability of the "reunification" goal. Faced with a more resolute attitude on the Chinese mainland, she said that in order to defend the survival and development of the "Republic of China", "one country, two systems" must be rejected, and that this is not a provocation, but just the basic responsibility of safeguarding "national sovereignty." Tsai Ing-wen has not much new ideas about the "One Country, Two Systems Taiwan Program", focusing on reiterating his resolute rejection of one country, two systems and emphasizing the importance of Taiwan's democratic system in geopolitics. The DPP's political confidence mainly comes from the political support of the "Taiwan Independence" bsce and the external support of a series of Taiwan-related acts of the United States, and it hopes to attempt political speculation in the special historical stage of Sino-US trade friction, seeking to make use of Sino-US contradictions to gain further political benefits for Taiwan independence. With the escalation of the confrontation between the United States and China, the situation in the South China Sea is tense, the military confrontation on the Sino-Indian border, the Hong Kong " Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement " and the passage of the *Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* by the Chinese government have also aroused strong internal forces in Taiwan. Response. For Taiwan, many factors have become a challenge to the regional security environment.

In terms of security in the Asia-Pacific region, in the face of territorial sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the United States has promoted the "Rebalance to Asia" policy. What follows is that China, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc. have also explored countermeasures accordingly, making the security situation in the region constantly changing. On the economic front, the progress of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region continues to accelerate. The "Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement" (TPP) has had an important impact on the economic development of the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and so on, have increased the challenge of Taiwan’s integration into the regional economy. After the Tsai Ing-wen authorities came to power, they continued to promote "steadfast diplomacy" with "economic diplomacy" as the essence. With "relying on the United States, uniting with Japan and resisting China" as the main axis of its foreign policy, it chose to be a strategic "pawn" of the United States in an attempt to expand the space for international activities for Taiwan independence. However, when the one-China principle has become a universal consensus of the international community, the predicament of Taiwan's foreign relations has further intensified. Under the influence of the Tsai Ing-wen authorities' continued promotion of "Taiwan independence diplomacy," the election of leaders in the Taiwan region, and the increased efforts of the United States and Japan to play the "Taiwan card", the cross-strait contests on international occasions will become more acute and complicated. After 2016, as the DPP Tsai Ing-wen came to power, he chose to "rely on the United States to unite Japan against China."

Taiwan's investment framework talks with the United States have not made progress, and the bilateral investment treaty (BIA) that the Tsai Ing-wen administration has long hoped to achieve is impossible. Japan is also supporting the push for Taiwan to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The Tsai Ing-wen authorities formulated a clear economic "break away from China" strategy, and the " New Southbound Policy" as an important part of it will surely become an important tool for strengthening its external relations to counter the economic magnetism of mainland China.[[31]](#footnote-30) The Tsai Ing-wen authorities have vigorously increased their support for the "New Southbound Policy" in the 2018 fiscal budget expenditures. Fiscal budget expenditures have clearly shown that they "emphasize the South over the West", which increased from NT$2.81 billion in 2017 to NT$7.26 billion, an increase of 63%, the largest increase in various budgets. However, there is no special budget for cross-strait exchanges. The Tsai Ing-wen authorities are full of confidence in its "New Southbound Policy" and will advance it with greater efforts in the future to accomplish its political goals. It is worth noting that ASEAN is now Taiwan’s second largest trading partner and second largest investment destination, and it values the market capacity of Southeast Asia. According to data from the Taiwan authorities, the total trade volume between Taiwan and ASEAN in 2018 was US$92.758 billion, an increase of 13.52%. In absolute terms, the scale of the trade economy between Taiwan and the new Southbound countries has gradually increased. According to a poll conducted by Chinese National Federation of Industries, more than 80% of Taiwanese businessmen are highly interested in the "New Southbound Policy" layout. The three most valued countries are Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand.

In the first half of 2018, Dominica, Burkina Faso and El Salvador successively broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Currently, there are only 17 diplomatic countries in Taiwan. The Taiwan authorities have stepped up to maintain existing diplomatic countries, continue to use economic and technological means to consolidate relations, and use methods like financing strategies to assist diplomatic countries and expand overseas markets for Taiwanese companies. In June, it signed an economic cooperation agreement with Swaziland; in December, it exchanged visas with Palau. However, there are still not a few countries with diplomatic relations that may be lost. Haiti, Palau and even the Vatican are all listed here, which makes the Taiwan authorities very troubled. Regarding international organizations, as far as 2018 is concerned, the Taiwan authorities only participated in the informal meeting of leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization. It continues to be rejected by important international events and organizations such as the World Health Assembly (WHA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO). The official websites of many international airlines and world-renowned multinational corporations mark "Taiwan" as "Taiwan of China". The East Asian Olympic Committee decided to cancel Taichung City from hosting the 2019 East Asian Youth Games. This has made the Taiwan authorities' foreign affairs plight more and more difficult.

With the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2019, Taiwan has also been involved in a pandemic disaster that threatens human lives. Transportation, trade, and tourism have also affected Taiwan's foreign relations. During the epidemic situation, Taiwan has worked hand in hand with the international community under bilateral and multilateral frameworks to spread its own successful anti-epidemic experience and donated medical supplies to more than 80 countries. The idea of "Taiwan can help, and Taiwan is helping" took this opportunity to spread the voice of Taiwan, which has also been universally affirmed by the international community. Although personnel exchanges were stagnant during the epidemic, Taiwan used video conferences and international media video interviews to let the world see Taiwan. The government worked hard to promote the sharing of Taiwan's epidemic prevention experience with dignitaries from other countries, scholars, heavyweight media, and foreign people.

Since 2016, Taiwan has experienced two leadership elections, and the political struggle between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the DPP will intensify. As the government of Tsai Ing-wen is deeply troubled by the political dilemma and the disastrous defeat of local public officials in the election, the government of Tsai Ing-wen takes more provocative actions in the foreign field to divert the conflict. In particular, the "Taiwan independence" trend in the island increases the pressure on Tsai Ing-wen, and the cross-strait confrontation escalates on international occasions, with sharp and complex competitions. Relations between the United States and Taiwan have reached a peak in the past four years, the highest level since diplomatic ties were severed 40 years ago. Taiwan credits the Trump administration for the passage of 10 US arms sales to Taiwan and a number of "friendly Taiwan bills" in the US Congress. At present, after the U.S. election, public opinion and people in Taiwan have questioned the China policy of U.S. President Joe Biden. The relationship between the United States and Taiwan will directly affect the development of Taiwan's foreign relations and international space in the future. How to maintain Taiwan's relationship with the United States and China in the future will also be an important issue for the Tsai Ing-wen government. Judging from the current diplomatic policy plan of the Tsai government, there are mainly the following visions: to strengthen cooperation with countries with diplomatic relations and establish sustainable partnerships; strengthen relations between countries with similar concepts to Taiwan; assist Taiwan’s economic transformation and upgrading, and actively explore Overseas business opportunities; continue to strive to participate in international organizations and make specific contributions; actively communicate with all parties to maintain regional peace and stability; continue to use humanitarian assistance to enhance Taiwan’s high-quality international image; fully utilize non-governmental diplomatic capabilities; continue to improve services for the people efficacy. Through these efforts to achieve with hope, promote active peaceful diplomacy in the region, create "New Asian Value", and work with partners in the region to achieve the goal of "deepening democracy, free choice, sustainable creation, and peaceful resolution of conflicts", and further build on Taiwan Friendly and conducive international environment.

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and related activities to increase Taiwan’s international visibility is a consistent approach of the Taiwan authorities to expand "international space." Under the constraints of the one-China framework of the international community, Taiwan's participation in international organizations and multilateral activities must adhere to the one-China principle embodied in UN Resolution 2758. There has always been a proposition in Taiwan that cross-strait relations take precedence over foreign relations. During Ma Ying-jeou's administration, the two sides of the strait properly handled the issue of Taiwan's participation in activities of international organizations on the basis of the *1992 Consensus*, which placed great pressure on the Taiwan authorities. However, the strategy of the Taiwan authorities is to bypass the "one China" principle and negotiate with both sides of the strait, and to use US power to expand international participation in "Taiwan independence". Taiwan’s foreign department stated that participation in the UN system and various international organizations is an established policy and long-term goal. In the future, it will uphold the principles of pragmatism, professionalism, and contribution, and continue to strive to participate in more international organizations. Including full participation in the relevant meetings and mechanisms of the World Health Organization (WHO), prioritizing participation in regional economic integration mechanisms, especially the “Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” (CPTPP).[[32]](#footnote-31) Based on the current situation, Taiwan’s space for activities in international organizations continues to shrink.

Taiwan currently has memberships in 37 intergovernmental international organizations or their affiliates, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and participates in 21 intergovernmental international organizations or their affiliates as observers. At this stage, Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations continue to expand and deepen its position in international organizations based on the principle of "pragmatism, professionalism, and contribution."

Since Tsai Ing-wen came to power, his refusal to recognize the "1992 Consensus" that embodies the one-China principle has caused Taiwan's cross-strait negotiations to participate in the activities of relevant international organizations no longer exists. From 2017 to 2019, three attempts to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer were rejected, and the arrangements for participation in the ICAO Assembly were difficult to continue. INTERPOL also only allowed Taiwan to participate in activities as an "observer," and repeatedly clearly reiterated its firm stand on the one-China principle. In September 2019, representatives of Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Vatican did not mention Taiwan in the general debate of the 74th session of the UN General Assembly.[[33]](#footnote-32) Among them, Nicaragua did not mention Taiwan in the United Nations for two consecutive years, and Paraguay did not replace Taiwan for the first time in seven years, causing concern on the island. Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, there are more voices supporting Taiwan’s participation than ever before. For example, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and other dignitaries publicly supported Taiwan's participation in WHA as an observer in different ways. In 2020, Taiwan will use *Taiwan as an Important Partner in the Global Implementation of the Permanent Development Goals* (SDGs) to express to the international community the expectations of the Taiwanese people for participating in the United Nations. Up to now, Taiwan has 14 professionals in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) serving as APEC sub-forum cadres, seeking important statements from the "Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation" to incorporate Taiwan's governance concepts and epidemic prevention results. And in 2020, 15 plans proposed by APEC will receive APEC subsidies, with a total amount of more than 1.23 million U.S. dollars.[[34]](#footnote-33) Taiwan has promoted its participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Eleven friendly countries have voiced their support for Taiwan. Eight senior police officers of friendly countries have made short videos supporting Taiwan, and Acting Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Murphy and others have publicly expressed their support. The Taiwan authorities have stepped up efforts to "de-sinicize" internally, and the cross-strait antagonism has continued to rise, and initiated the "application for Taiwan to participate in the 2020 Tokyo Olympic referendum". The East Asian Olympic Committee (EAOC) believes that the Taiwan authorities have politicized sports issues and blatantly challenged the Olympic model. It considered that it would pose a huge political risk to the 2019 East Asian Youth Games and seek "Taiwan Independence" international space operations, then the EAOC cancelled the right to host the 2019 East Asian Youth Games in Taichung City.[[35]](#footnote-34)

Since the DPP came to power, the basis for cross-strait pragmatic negotiation has ceased, and the Taiwan authorities have been rejected by some international organizations. In addition to the WHO Assembly, there is also the ICAO Assembly. By the 2016 ICAO General Assembly, Taiwan was not invited. There is also participation in the International Criminal Police Organization and the United Nations Fisheries Conference. The former is that the organizer does not invite Taiwan to participate in the conference, and the latter is invited out of the venue by the organizer. Even when invited to the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Industrial Technology Research Insititute, a private organization representing Taiwan, was severely restricted and Taiwanese officials were not allowed to enter the venue. Under such circumstances, Taiwan hopes to make its voice heard on international occasions by playing a "edge ball". For example, in December 2017, at the UN Cyber Governance Forum, Paraguay, the country with diplomatic ties that hosted the meeting, arranged the political councillors of the Taiwan authorities to attend the forum by video speech, or arranged the diplomatic ties to speak for them at the UN General Assembly, and participated in more NGO meetings, thus creating an image of being "oppressed" in the international community. In fact, Taiwan's shortcut to the international community lies in Beijing. Without the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one and the same China, the international space of the Taiwan authorities will only be increasingly compressed. Similarly, the mainland has also clearly implemented the "one China" principle on international occasions.

In terms of free trade, as of December 2, 2020, a total of 305 regional trade agreements (RTA) have been notified to the WTO and entered into force.According to the data of the Trade Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, Taiwan has entered into FTA agreements of 9 countries and regions concerning Taiwan's participation in global regional economic integration, which are: Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Taiwan-El Salvador - Honduras FTA, Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), New Zealand, Singapore, Paraguay (Economic Cooperation Agreement), Kingdom of Swaziland (Economic Cooperation Agreement).Based on the FTA that has been signed, the trade coverage is only 9.69%.For every 100 yuan of export goods, less than 10 yuan will enjoy nearly zero preferential tariffs.

As the United States withdrew from the TPP, the TPP became the "Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership" (CPTPP). Although the United States is missing, it still accounts for 20% of Taiwan’s trade. Moreover, four of the CPTPP members, including Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, are still Taiwan’s top 10 trading partners. Taiwan’s participation in CPTPP will benefit the manufacturing industry, which is mainly export-oriented, to expand the market. The Taiwan authorities hope to participate in the second round of CPTPP negotiations under the support of the Japanese government, but there has been no actual progress at present. The Taiwan authorities believe that joining TPP, a high-standard and large-scale regional economic cooperation block, can improve the degree of internationalization of the economic and trade field in Taiwan to a certain extent, and objectively can also greatly expand the space of international activities in Taiwan, which is a rare opportunity for Taiwan to expand open diplomacy. From the perspective of agreement model and development prospect, TPP led by the United States and Japan, RCEP and "10+3" led by China are completely different regional economic integration roads. Taiwan hopes to join TPP to conduct all-round contact with the United States and Japan in the name of economic and trade cooperation. At the same time, it also hopes to balance the huge economic influence of mainland China by joining TPP, and to disperse the risk of the island's over-dependence on the mainland China

Taiwan's current leader tsai ing-wen, after taking office, announced the implementation of policy of the "new south", hope to strengthen the Taiwan region and the whole of southeast Asia and other countries, which not only reflect the anticipation that the Taiwan authorities hope into economic globalization, more reflect the democratic progressive party (DPP) mainland authorities to weaken the economic and trade ties with Taiwan, reflects the democratic progressive party (DPP) the wariness of dense to mainland China. The overall goal of the "New Southward Policy" is to seek to establish strategic partnerships including economic and trade relations with 10 ASEAN countries, 6 South Asian countries, and 18 countries in Australia and New Zealand through long-term, deep cultivation and close ties in all directions. Focusing on the overall goal, the Taiwan region has established four main work axes: economic and trade cooperation, talent exchange, resource sharing, and regional connection, and established a mechanism for consultation and dialogue through links in economic and trade, technology, and culture.[[36]](#footnote-35)

As for the "New Southbound Policy", first of all, the "New Southbound Policy" is an important means to get rid of Taiwan's economic dependence on the mainland. The Taiwan authorities hope to disperse the export market and investment area through the "New Southbound Policy" and avoid affecting Taiwan's economic security due to the close economic and trade links between the two sides. Second, by the "New Southbound Policy" to establish and consolidate the Taiwan region in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the competitive advantage of South Asia, Taiwan authorities hope that through the "New Southward Policy " output technology in Taiwan capital, increase personnel exchanges and offset the Belt and Road, RCEP, FTAAP, China-ASEAN free trade area such as the influence of regional economic cooperation in Taiwan area. Finally, the "New Southbound Policy" can change the status quo of Taiwan's participation in regional economic cooperation to a certain extent.

## 3.3 The US factor in the Taiwan’s international space, since 2000

The Taiwan issue has been around for more than 70 years. From a historical perspective, the United States has provided almost all aspects of support and assistance to Taiwan during the period of containment and isolation of New China. It has ensured Taiwan's position in the international community for a long time, and the United States has maintained good diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which has made it difficult for mainland China to obtain a legal seat and legal representation in the United Nations. As China's strength continued to grow since the 1970s, the United States began to face up to the power of mainland China for its confrontation with the Soviet Union, seeking cooperation and contact with mainland China. Although it caused the end of US-Taiwan diplomatic relations, the United States considered Taiwan’s important position in the Asia-Pacific region and passed the *Taiwan Relations Act* to maintain the continuation and close cooperation of US-Taiwan relations. The continuous growth of China's overall strength and its tough attitude to seek cross-strait reunification have created great challenges to the interests and position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and are also unfavorable factors affecting the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. For this reason, the United States maintains the state of separation between Taiwan and the mainland by strengthening Taiwan’s military strength through arms sales to Taiwan, and supporting Taiwan in international space. This method can directly and effectively consume mainland China’s resources and energy. It guarantees America's superpower status and America's "priority" political position.

During the Bush administration, like most Republican politicians, they regarded China as a strategic opponent of the United States and curbed the rapid development of mainland China by strengthening Taiwan-US relations. In the 2000 presidential campaign, the Republican candidate Bush Jr. overthrew the Clinton administration’s line of "strategic partnership" with China.[[37]](#footnote-36) In his view, "China is not our strategic partner, nor our enemy." The relationship between China and the United States is explained by the relationship of "competitors", and he advocates strengthening ally with Asian democracies. Let China form a great power in a region with a strong democratic alliance, and let China feel no threat in such an Asia-Pacific environment, and will not do whatever it wants. With regard to the Taiwan issue, Bush Jr.'s China policy and Taiwan policy have made everyone feel a clear tendency to be friendly to Taiwan. Although he publicly claimed to adhere to the "One China" political stance, he also demonstrated an act of expanding U.S.-Taiwan relations in actual actions. George W. Bush abandoned his father’s "strategic ambiguity" stance, saying that the United States should take all means to defend Taiwan. If you think from the ideology of Bush Jr. cabinet members, his cabinet members are mainly conservative realism, who believes that maintaining common external threats is a prerequisite for maintaining the United States' leadership in world security affairs. In order to maintain the U.S. dominance in East Asian security, the U.S. needs to make China a major threat, use the Taiwan issue to stimulate China, and create tensions in international security. The George W. Bush administration has always been unconfident in the US's international hegemony, so it uses Taiwan's military confrontation to contain China's development strategy. On the other hand, through strengthening economic and trade interaction with China, the complementary interests of China and the United States have helped the United States get rid of economic recession.

Both the George W. Bush administration and the Obama administration have continued the basic policies of previous U.S. administrations on the Taiwan Strait, especially the U.S. policy toward Taiwan, which is basically based on the Taiwan Relations Law, and there will be no any earth-shattering changes.[[38]](#footnote-37) The mainstream view of the United States believes that the election of Ma Ying-jeou has ushered in a new era of positive cross-strait interaction. In 2008, Bush Jr. and the then Chinese President Hu Jintao also stated that the United States was pleased with the improvement of cross-strait relations when they met in Hokkaido, Japan. The Obama administration also believes that the progress of cross-strait relations is what it wants to see and hopes that cross-strait relations will continue to improve. The mainstream view of the United States believes that the election of Ma Ying-jeou has ushered in a new era of positive cross-strait interaction. In 2008, George W. Bush and the then Chinese President Hu Jintao also stated that the United States was pleased with the improvement of cross-strait relations when they met in Hokkaido, Japan. The Obama administration also believes that the progress of cross-strait relations is what it wants to see and hopes that cross-strait relations will continue to improve. The U.S. government has been supportive of Taiwan on international space issues, and Hillary Clinton said in January 2009 that she would continue to support Taiwan's efforts to expand its international space, including becoming an observer at the World Health Assembly. During her visit to China, she once again proposed to the leaders of the Chinese mainland more flexibility in dealing with the issue of international space, arguing that it is more important for Taiwan's international space to develop to a certain extent in a form acceptable to the people of Taiwan and for Taiwan's voice to be heard internationally.[[39]](#footnote-38) The United States knows that for Taiwan to participate, it must first receive the support of mainland China. The United States has expressed through various channels that Ma Ying-jeou is in the right direction to resolve the issue of Taiwan’s international participation by recognizing the *1992 Consensus* and negotiating with China.

On the military front, the Obama administration has also been continuously strengthening Taiwan's militarization. He believes that the most important factor for the US to ensure that both sides of the strait have no intention of taking military actions is to balance the military strength of both sides of the strait. Alan Romberg, director of the East Asia Office of the Stimson Center in the United States, proposed that the maintenance of basic arms sales to Taiwan by the United States is beneficial to the continued improvement of cross-strait relations, because after receiving US arms sales, Ma Ying-jeou will be able to win firm public support in further promoting cross-strait relations than if he did not. But this is entirely to rationalize the rhetoric of selling arms to Taiwan.

The main performance of the United States towards Taiwan is to resolutely safeguard its strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait. The starting point of the US policy toward Taiwan is to safeguard its strategic and economic interests in the Taiwan Strait. The basic method is to keep interfering in Taiwan Strait affairs, and is not willing to be marginalized in its role in the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. To maintain US influence in Taiwan Strait affairs, arms sales to Taiwan are the main means. On June 19, 2008, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in an interview with The Wall Street Journal that the relationship between the US and Taiwan itself is independent and important relative to cross-strait relations. He mentioned that "I want to remind everyone that the United States and Taiwan also have bilateral relations, and we hope to see that Taiwan has a real international space." Rice's speech is to emphasize that the United States attaches importance to Sino-US relations and affirms the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, while emphasizing that there is also a side of US-Taiwan relations. At the same time, the United States has been maintaining the basic relationship pattern of "U.S. main Taiwan obeys." Taiwan’s policy toward the United States takes the basic interests of the United States in East Asia as its consideration to promote the development of Taiwan-U.S. relations, which conforms to the basic thinking of the United States. But there are two sides to Taiwan Strait policy. When dealing with Taiwan, the United States highlights and emphasizes the *Taiwan Relations Act* while when facing mainland China, the United States will abide by its commitments, the "One China" policy and the three Sino-US Joint Communiqués have always been positions. In January 2010, Mr Ma described Taiwan-US relations as "in the right direction, with strong mutual trust and frequent interactions".[[40]](#footnote-39) During this period, Taiwan-US political relations have continued to develop steadily. The United States believes that the United States is Taiwan’s most important friend and that the United States should be placed first in its diplomatic strategy. The high-level mutual trust between the United States and Taiwan has also been well developed because of Ma Ying-jeou's "pragmatic" diplomatic strategy. This is reflected in the restoration of the cabinet officials responsible for trade, agriculture, transportation, and energy that were interrupted during the Chen Shuibian administration. On November 15, 2010, former US President Bill Clinton took a special plane to visit Taiwan. During this trip, Clinton delivered a speech *Foreseeing Taiwan's Economic Prospects and Directions from 2010*. Clinton said in his speech that the Taiwan Strait issue is relatively easier to resolve than the Middle East issue, and he is optimistic that cross-strait issues will one day find solutions. If cross-strait issues can be resolved satisfactorily, it will become a model for global dispute resolution. Although the purpose of Clinton's trip was commercial, the visit of the former US president was highly valued by the Taiwanese government.

On October 2, 2012, the U.S. government announced that Taiwan became the 37th visa-exempt member of the United States and the seventh visa-free member in the Asia-Pacific region to travel to the United States. The Taiwan authorities give the U.S. visa exemption treatment a high degree of political significance. They also regard the U.S. visa exemption treatment as a proof of their foreign policy. They believe that the visa exemption granted by the United States is a new achievement in Ma Ying-jeou's diplomacy. In June 2013, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed an overwhelming number of votes to support Taiwan's becoming an observer of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The bill required the Secretary of State to order the U.S. delegation to ICAO to support it. In July, President Obama signed the case. The US Secretary of State will study and formulate strategies for Taiwan’s participation in the ICAO Assembly as an "observer". After nearly 5 years, Taiwan was finally invited to attend the three-year ICAO conference held in Canada on September 24 as the Chairman of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council. On November 2, 2015, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the bill supporting Taiwan’s participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) as an observer with 392 votes in favor and no one against. In this case, the INTERPOL Washington Central Bureau under the U.S. Department of Justice must request the headquarters to grant Taiwan observer status on behalf of the United States, and seek other members to support Taiwan in obtaining observer status. On May 18, 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the *National Defense Authorization Act of 2017*, which included many amendments such as inviting Taiwan to participate in the Pacific Rim military exercises, enhancing high-level military exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan, and clearly specifying the progress of arms sales to Taiwan. Taiwan’s relations with the international community, especially relations with the United States, have always been in an unequal position. From the perspective of the cabinet structure of Ma Ying-jeou's government, many people have studied in the United States for a long time and are very clear about American politics and foreign policy. Therefore, the Ma Ying-jeou administration's US policy is based on the pursuit of Taiwan's political and economic interests, and strives to reach agreement with the US, rather than being as tough as Chen Shui-bian. Among them, actively striving for the purchase of the US military is to take into account the vital interests of the US Defense Industry Group. As some scholars believe that "both strategic planning, weapons procurement, in the market, the issue of the world trade organization negotiations, free trade agreement negotiations, the participation of international organizations, the implementation of a diplomatic truce, on both sides of the Taiwan and cross-strait military mutual trust mechanism of supervision, not almost entirely dependent on the United States, or follow the US’s lead."[[41]](#footnote-40)The basic pattern of Taiwan-U.S. relations has determined that the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s policies towards the United States must be constrained by the United States.

Since 2016, Taiwan-US relations have continued to improve steadily. During this period, they also experienced the 40th anniversary of the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In addition to enhancing mutual trust, the two sides have also continued to strengthen partnerships through relevant channels and expand areas of cooperation. The Trump administration has recently continued to make many public statements that are friendly to Taiwan and reiterate its commitment to Taiwan. For example, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly tweeted after the election of local public officials in Taiwan, emphasizing that Taiwan’s constitutional democracy is a model in the Indo-Pacific region, also publicly praised Taiwan as a success story of democracy, a reliable partner and a good force in the world.

The United States has made frequent moves on the Taiwan issue, vainly attempting to use the "Taiwan card" to contain the peaceful development of China's mainland. The US Congress passed the *Taiwan Travel Act* in March 2018, the *John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019* in May, and the *Asian Reassurance Initiative Act* in December 2019. These three bills requiring the government to strengthen US-Taiwan relations, especially military relations, have been signed by Trump. The *Asian Reassurance Initiative Act* signed by Trump on December 31, 2018 comprehensively elaborates on the framework of the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. In addition to its China policy, the Act specifically lists “commitment to Taiwan” clauses. This actually indicates that the US policy is to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between the US and Taiwan. The US president should provide Taiwan with defense materials that meet its needs on a regular basis, and should encourage high-level US officials to visit Taiwan in accordance with the *Taiwan Travel Act.* Under the guidance of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," the United States announced three arms sales to Taiwan in April, July, and August of 2019. Including providing support for the training, maintenance and logistics of Taiwan F-16 fighter jets in the United States; 108 M1A2T tanks worth 2 billion U.S. dollars; 66 F-16V fighter jets worth more than 8 billion U.S. dollars. As of the end of 2019, Trump has sold arms to Taiwan 5 times since he took office. The frequency and performance have exceeded Obama's first term. Among them, the F-16V is the largest US arms sale to Taiwan in more than 20 years.

The United States cooperated with the Tsai authorities to "rectify Taiwan's name." In order to demonstrate its support for the DPP’s “de facto Taiwan independence” policy, the United States agreed to change the name of Taiwan’s “Coordination Committee for North American Affairs” (CCNAA) to “Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs” in June 2019. CCVAA is the counterpart institution of the "American-Taiwan Association", which is like "rectifying the name" of Taiwan in the international arena. Tsai Ing-wen issued a statement, saying it was the first time that "Taiwan" and "the United States" had been put in the name of an agency on an equal basis, and that Taiwan's representative body dealing with U.S. affairs had been "rectification of name." The Trump administration has fully exaggerated the so-called "debt trap", "influence penetration", "predatory economy" and other new types of "China threat theory", and went to the front line to prevent Taiwan's diplomatic countries from adjusting their relations with Taiwan. In February 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo attended the 19th Micronesia Leaders’ Meeting in Palau and specifically mentioned Taiwan’s status as a "trusted partner"[[42]](#footnote-41), It is a policy signal to the South Pacific countries that the United States maintains the status of Taiwan’s diplomatic relations.

Looking back on the history of the development of US-Taiwan relations, the United States has intensively assigned high-level officials to visit Taiwan, especially on the eve of Taiwan’s important elections, which is rare in the past. The US move is to create a sign of good US-Taiwan relations and to create "political achievements" for Tsai Ing-wen. In March 2018, Huang Zhihan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific Affairs of the U.S. State Department, visited Taiwan, and Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Ju visited the United States. In June, the "American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)" Taipei Office officially launched the new Neihu building. Harper, co-chair of the "Taiwan Connection" of the US House of Representatives, and Mo Jian, chairman of the "American Institute in Taiwan" attended the event. In July, Chen Mingtong, director of Taiwan's mainland affairs, visited the United States. In August, Tsai Ing-wen passed through the United States, and the United States opened the Taiwan media to report during the transit. In October and November before the "Nine-in-One" election, the United States also successively appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scott Busby and Chief Deputy Assistant Administrator Nishida Zhen of the Environmental Protection Agency to visit Taiwan.

Judging from the current direction, path, and strength of the US intervention in the Taiwan issue, as well as the complexity of American politics, the US Taiwan Strait policy is still being adjusted in the direction of tilting Taiwan. The United States will concoct Taiwan-related bills to increasingly label Taiwan as an "independent political entity" or even a "state." The US administration has begun to go from scratching the ball to undermining the policy boundary reached by China and the United States on the Taiwan issue. The United States itself has become the party that accelerates the change of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, which will increase the pressure on the strategic differences and conflicts between China and the United States in the management and control of the Taiwan Strait.

Now the Biden administration of the Democratic Party of the United States, whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party is in power in the United States, will not abandon the strategic use value of Taiwan, but the specific methods of the two will be different. Both the Democrats and the Republicans hope to enhance US-Taiwan relations. This is also the common position of the White House and the Senate and House of Representatives. Trump's lack of awareness of the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue may cause unexpected risks; Biden is expected to be more cautious and will not go too far beyond the scope of the traditional US policy on Taiwan. In order to fight against the mainland, Taiwan is willing to be a pawn for others; to be a good pawn, it has to be deliberate. This is the greatest sorrow of the Taiwan authorities. There is no doubt that after Biden is elected, the US policy to contain China's development will continue, and the struggle between the United States and China will not stop immediately. However, the rise of mainland China is an irreversible trend. If the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party government still insists on going its own way and insisting on "resisting China," it must consider the mainland's countermeasures.

# Chapter 4. The Development Trend of Taiwan's International Space under the Sino-US Game

## 4.1 The development trend of Taiwan's international space

The trend of the Taiwan issue determines the dimension of Taiwan's international space. As the most sensitive and game-playing existence of the Taiwan issue, the Taiwan issue also brings space for uncertain factors to the Taiwan issue. As the game between China and the United States has escalated in recent years, the United States has stepped up its efforts to play the "Taiwan card". The Taiwan authorities also hope to use the power of the United States to create Taiwan's international breakthrough in the international community. However, the current assessment of Taiwan's international space has failed to achieve the results expected by the authorities, and Taiwan's international space has been further reduced. Tsai Ing-wen enters her second ruling cycle in 2020, and still refuses to recognize the *1992 Consensus*, and at the same time, she has tried her best to "lean on one side" to the United States in policy. Although the United States has given Taiwan the greatest degree of support it can do in the international community, the Taiwan authorities’ foreign policy has been ineffective against the backdrop that the one-China principle has become a basic norm in international relations recognized by the international community. The dilemma of foreign relations has further intensified.

Taiwan to strive for greater international space, despite the support of the United States and allies, but the participation of international organizations did not achieve a breakthrough. In 2019, the US Congress passed the International Safeguards and Strengthening Initiative for Taiwan's Diplomatic Relations Act of 2019. The US Secretary of State and officials of the American Institute in Taiwan have publicly supported Taiwan's efforts to maintain international space activities on many occasions, and Taiwan's diplomatic Allies have also expressed their support for Taiwan's participation in international organizations. But in fact, the biggest obstacle to Taiwan's participation in international organizations comes from the Chinese government. This is also the point for the Taiwan authorities to recognize the facts. The Chinese government’s suppression of Taiwan’s international space has suffocated Taiwan, which has caused the people of Taiwan to distrust and resent mainland China, making it more difficult for China to complete reunification. If the best path to complete peaceful reunification is for the mainland of China to show the greatest goodwill to the people of Taiwan, this will also benefit the relationship between China and the international community. This concrete manifestation is to show to the international community that China has greater sincerity to pay for gains in exchange for better relations. If the relationship with Taiwan is handled effectively, China's right to speak in the world may be further enhanced, and other countries will also benefit more from China's rise. This will intensify the connection between China and the world, and the win-win and multi-win situation will establish China's weight in the world. Allowing Taiwan to have more international space is a topic that must be listed by Taiwan as the most important issue in its relations with mainland China. Only when Taiwan is in harmony with the Chinese mainland can it be possible to exchange more international participation from the Chinese government, so that there will be more progress on the issue of Taiwan's participation in more international organizations. Otherwise, there will be a diplomatic dilemma during the Tsai Ing-wen administration. For example, the 73rd World Health Organization Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland in May 2019 and the 40th ICAO Conference held in Montreal, Canada in September rejected Taiwan’s participation. Since 2016, Taiwan formally applied to INTERPOL to join as an "observer", but it has not yet succeeded. On the one hand, the Tsai Ing-wen government in Taiwan emphasized the value role of Taiwan, and on the other hand, it highlighted the threat of mainland China to the region, and cross-strait relations have gradually come to a deadlock.

With reference to Ma Ying-jeou’s experience in Taiwan from 2008 to 2016, as cross-strait relations tend to ease, Taiwan’s international space is also showing a trend of expansion. Regarding the relationship between Taiwan and countries with diplomatic relations, Ma Ying-jeou’s policy of “diplomatic truce” announced that he would no longer engage in short-term engagement with the Chinese mainland and cease “checkbook diplomacy”, thus improving the situation of severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In terms of participating in international organizations, Taiwan has successfully attended many important international conferences as an observer or invited guest. All this is based on the effective improvement of cross-strait relations. Another aspect of the expansion of Taiwan's international space is the US factor. During this period, Taiwan and the United States have had close cooperation and avoided conflicts with representatives of mainland China in international organizations and international conferences that Taiwan can participate in. This is actually the fact that the Taiwan government recognizes its own status quo and peacefully coexists with mainland China, while on the other side it introduces international forces to balance the influence of mainland China on Taiwan.

Looking at Taiwan’s international space in conjunction with the two parties’ ruling situation in Taiwan after 2000. From the standpoint of advocating Taiwan’s independence, compared to reunification, Taiwan’s independence is a very vague and undefined concept. According to the definition of sovereignty in international law, it is possible to be defined as a sovereign country if it has territory, people, government, and foreign relations. Taiwan has never held sovereignty in legal theory. Taiwan want to give up at this stage, "Republic of China", so that Taiwan is Taiwan, but the possibility is too low, based on this idea, almost impossible for Taiwan to the United Nations, international organizations or global support. Taiwan is already clearly a weak actor in international politics. It is often the patent of international power that determines its own destiny. Therefore, the deciding makers in Taiwan's search for greater international space are China and the United States. Faced with the two options of reunification and independence, Taiwan’s rulers are more willing to use "maintain the status quo" as a slogan to guide the people of Taiwan to believe that even if there will be no major breakthrough in the future of Taiwan, it will not fall into a rupture. In fact, maintaining the status quo is a result of evading decision-making. The planning goals reached by Taiwan in the future are not clear. This actually tacitly agrees that Taiwan's future will remain determined by China and the United States. The Tsai Ing-wen government of the Taiwan authorities has too vague policies regarding the future development of Taiwan. However, only because of the rejection of the *1992 Consensus* attitude, mainland China launched sanctions against Tsai Ing-wen. Judging from the evolutionary history of her governance, Tsai Ing-wen’s status quo policy has gradually ossified both sides of the strait and cannot plan Taiwan’s future. As a result, Taiwan’s international space will only become more restricted due to the ossification of cross-strait relations.

In summary, the future development of Taiwan’s international space must return to a realistic perspective. At present, under the *1992 Consensus* as the basis of cooperation, there is international space development permitted by mainland China. In the future, as China continues to increase its comprehensive strength and the United States' military strength that is difficult to shake, the international order is likely to move toward a bipolar structure dominated by China and the United States. If Taiwan has been immersed in the fantasy of "beautiful democratic system" created by itself, and wants to win the sympathy of the international community through this act, so as to strive for greater international space, but its identity as a weak actor in international politics will not be able to undertake the responsibility of expanding international space. It can be said that the international space will continue to be dominated by China and the United States. With the visible development path of China and the United States, the influence of the United States in playing the "Taiwan card" will decrease along with the growth of China's economic strength and comprehensive national strength. At that time, Taiwan's decision-making power in international space was difficult for Taiwan itself to decide, and it would always be attached to China on the international stage.

## 4.2 The direction of the development of U.S. policy toward Taiwan

Since the United States has always prioritized its exchange policy when developing relations with China in the past four decades, its relations with Taiwan can only be carried out in a low-key manner. However, the Trump administration has completely reversed the thinking of the exchange policy of the past 40 years, and changed the original idea that engaging with China can promote China's liberalization and democratization. In the past, the government's greatest achievement is the trump injected fresh energy to the US-Taiwan relations, but he is not sure that "disrupt the line between substance and symbolism" approach is the right one, sometimes policy intentions may not match their effect, not only affect US-China relations, also let us in Taiwan partner think Taiwan is a "tool" is used to deal with Beijing. Therefore, the most important task for the United States in the future is to clarify the role of Taiwan in its Asian policy. In the future, the United States will spend a lot of time prioritizing the issue of the new crown epidemic, the issue of US economic recovery, the issue of domestic social division, and the issue of repairing allied relations. Under such circumstances, the value of Taiwan being used as it was during the Trump era is greatly reduced, and it may be selectively forgotten and functionality left aside. The competitive situation with China is bound to be more important than US-Taiwan relations, and handling US-Taiwan relations is only a part of Sino-US relations. The United States’ Taiwan policy will be more obvious if it says more and does less.

The general direction of the US policy towards Taiwan basically depends on the US policy towards China. In recent years, the United States has not won the victory of "changing China" in its contacts with China, and the frustration of the gradual decline of its superpower status has had to move its strategy toward China in an increasingly tough direction. The dialogue with China adopts an offensive strategy, which also projects the Taiwan issue. In the Trump era, the United States continued to challenge the "one China" principle by comprehensively deepening the substantive relationship between the United States and Taiwan. But there has been no structural change in China-US relations, nor has there been a structural shift in US policy towards Taiwan. In the face of China's economic and diplomatic challenges to the United States, the United States believes that playing the "Taiwan card" should be used as an effective means to contain China. In 2016, before Trump took office, he had a phone call with Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen, which was the first time since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the United States that a US president had a direct phone call with a leader of Taiwan, openly challenging the one-China principle and considering that it might become a bargaining chip. In addition to the signing of *The Taiwan Travel Act* and *Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018*. US Department of Defense issued the "Indian-Pacific Strategy Report," formally made Taiwan the United States included in the planning of them, directly to the United States as Taiwan must strengthen partnership "national." From the list of Taiwan policies, the US government's Taiwan policy will also show increasing offensiveness. When the United States fails to achieve its goal of pressure on China and intensifies its frustration, it will intensify its aggressive actions against China, which will surely continue to be projected on its Taiwan policy. This will make the one China principle guaranteed by the United States exist in name only.

Taiwan's position will be improved in the Sino-US game. Taiwan's geo-strategic position is related to the strategic deployment of the United States in the Indo-Pacific and has always been of important value. The United States will continue to clarify Taiwan's strategic position. From the observation point of view, the intention of the United States to use the Taiwan issue to gain more bargaining chips in the Sino-US game is becoming more and more obvious. Because of the official signing of the *Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018*, Taiwan has been formally recognized legally as a part of the US "India-Taiwan Strategy". In the future, the United States will continue to use Taiwan as an important bargaining chip to contain China, and continue to elevate Taiwan's position and enrich Taiwan's role in its strategic deployment. Since the inauguration of the Biden administration, the demand for the United States to abandon the "strategic ambiguity" has been growing. And "strategy clearity" is the U.S. clearly stated China's response policy when it uses force against Taiwan. In recent years, the US political circles have gradually formed a consensus that China's behavior in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly provocative, and the threat to military stability in the Taiwan Strait is increasing. John Aquilino, the new head of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, said at his confirmation hearing that he was "open to a dialogue" with the defense secretary about the risks and rewards of possible policy changes to secure American support for Taiwan, and to contribute to America's ultimate goal of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region. There is also a possibility that "strategic clarity" will also cause the future Taiwan government to clarify the plans of the United States. Taiwan may show a hardline attitude towards mainland China for this, leading to direct attacks on Taiwan. However, in the face of the Chinese government, no American president or government can afford to do so. To maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, the best way is for the United States to send a comprehensive message to China that combines diplomacy with American defense innovation. At present, Biden has gone from vagueness to clarity, but not too much, based on the current situation, the United States has returned its Taiwan policy to a more traditional "guarantee model." Because in essence, the United States and Taiwan have a lot of room for bilateral relations, and the Chinese government generally can only counterattack the United States and Taiwan after the United States has taken actions that deviate from or challenge the one-China principle. China has become a major challenge in US foreign policy, and the benefits that Taiwan brings to the United States have not changed. Therefore, the US policy toward Taiwan will develop in a clear direction, and the United States will maintain a tough attitude and low-key behavior.

In the relationship between the United States and Taiwan, the two parties have strengthened public diplomacy, competed with China for "Taiwan people's hearts", and further consolidated the civil society ties between the United States and Taiwan. The United States has always maintained cooperation and exchanges with Taiwan's civil society in mass media, sports, and folk culture. This has also become an important part of the development of US-Taiwan relations. For example, since 2005, the American Institute in Taiwan has established a number of American Corner in important cities and surrounding communities in Taiwan, and has actively created a networked virtual American Corner to form an overlay network with both entities and virtual communities. American Corner combined with the American culture books reference service and function of cultural activities, under the coordination of the American institute in Taiwan, has become to show American culture to the Taiwanese people, and promote mutual understanding and cultivate an important window for common values, and is also the current U.S. government play soft power, shaping the image of the tool. Because of long-term historical ties and similar cultural values, the United States and Taiwan have forged a deep friendship. People-to-people exchanges provide the most direct and effective method for mutual understanding between ordinary people in the United States and Taiwan. Commercial relations, economic value chains, language exchange programs, study abroad opportunities, cultural activities, and tourism are all important ways to cultivate and deepen the close ties between the United States and Taiwan, and will greatly enrich the relationship between the United States and Taiwan. It is foreseeable that in order to realize its long-term strategic attempt to manage Taiwanese society, the United States will definitely increase the intensity and breadth of its public diplomacy with Taiwan. Create good public opinion in favor of the United States in order to win the goodwill, trust and dependence of the Taiwanese people, and compete with China for "Taiwan people's hearts."

In summary, with the growth of China's overall strength, the US strategy toward China has turned to an offensive direction. The intensified strategic competition between China and the United States has formed a basic pattern. As a close part of its China strategy, the United States' Taiwan policy inevitably makes its Taiwan policy clearer. Adopting a more offensive strategy on the Taiwan issue. In the future, the United States will raise Taiwan's geostrategic position and win over Taiwan to occupy a position in order to contain China and keep the two sides of the strait divided. This is the main direction of the United States' Taiwan policy.

## 4.3 The influence of the tripartite relationship between Sino-US-Taiwan on the Taiwan’s international space

The tripartite relationship between China, the United States and Taiwan is essentially a game between China and the United States. Taiwan is China's territory since ancient times, adhere to only one China, safeguard national unity, concerns China's core interests, China's foreign policy is an unbridgeable "bottom line." U.S.-Taiwan relations are part of U.S.-China relations, and the Taiwan issue has plagued China and the United States for more than 60 years. It is still the biggest obstacle to the development of Sino-U.S. relations and will have an overall impact on both sides in the future.

At the end of the 20th century, the rapid rise of China became the most concerned political phenomenon, which not only changed the face and structure of international politics in East Asia, but also had a significant and far-reaching impact on the shaping of the future international political order. From the perspective of changes in international political power, China and the United States, respectively, as emerging powers and hegemonic countries in the international political structure, have structural contradictions and strategic conflicts, and even have the possibility of launching wars. The judgment of the US on China's development trend is of great importance. What kind of strategy the US government formulates towards China and where the China-US relationship will go are fundamentally determined by the US government's strategic judgment on the development of China's strength and how it views the impact of China's development on the US. Therefore, whether China becomes a strong competitor of the US is the basic foothold and starting point of the US strategy towards China.

The global interest of the United States lies in ensuring its global economic advantages and an order that conforms to the principles of American idealism and realism. It can be observed that the interests of the United States in various regions are a balance between the use of regional forces to achieve global interests.

The global interest of the United States lies in ensuring its global economic advantages and an order that conforms to the principles of American idealism and realism. It can be observed that the interests of the United States in various regions are a balance between the use of regional forces to achieve global interests. Its strategic goal is to consolidate the leading position of the United States in the world. The U.S. policy toward China is about containment and contacts and exchanges between partners. Therefore, Taiwan has also become a must-play card for the United States. Through Taiwan, the U.S. attempts to control China's development trend and direction. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government began to look for new competitors around the world under the background of losing the Soviet Union, a powerful rival. Now the United States regards China as a "strategic competitor" and a "potential adversary." However, the painful lessons of the September 11 incident forced the United States to formulate a new policy program for entering a new round of global strategic expansion. The 9/11 incident also smashed the United States’ attempt to regard China as a “global strategic competitor” and reconstructed the most important basis for security cooperation between China and the United States. Sino-US relations have thus entered a period of constructive cooperation. It can be seen from this that Sino-US relations are asymmetrical, non-enemies and friends, subject to a third common threat, demand cooperation and conflicts and frictions coexist and are both growing, and a more global cooperative relationship. Long-term US war on terror, determines the stability of Sino-US cooperation on the basis of safety; but the international terrorist forces is not a specific characteristic of the two countries the main threat to each other, which will determine the fragility of the basis for cooperation between the two countries. The conflicts between China and the United States are not inevitable, and the conflicts between China and the United States are not inevitable. The key depends on the United States' strategic judgment on China's rise and its strategy toward China.

The United States regards China as a strategic competitor, and the two countries are already confronting each other in trade, technology, and media. In this COVID-19, China and the United States have also seen frequent wars of words. The tension between China and the US will only intensify, not slow down. The two major impacts of the COVID-19 on the global political and economic landscape will affect global relations in the post-epidemic era through two paths. The first is the adjustment of the global supply chain. Although globalization will continue, European and American countries have discovered after the epidemic that when the manufacturing industry is mainly monopolized by China, especially in the fields of medical supplies, they have exposed their own national security risks. Therefore, the global supply chain will inevitably need to be adjusted to "multi-centralization and regionalization" and, if necessary, to establish a corresponding supply chain in one's own country. The new feature of the current global political structure is gradually moving towards equilibrium, and the trend of multi-polarization is more obvious. Under the premise that the overall pattern of the world tends towards peace and development, whether it is Sino-U.S., China-Taiwan or U.S.-Taiwan relations, they will inevitably seek compromise and reconciliation amidst contradictions and continue to move forward amidst twists and turns. In terms of politics, Trump's “America First” foreign investment policy has clearly weakened the leadership of the United States. The foundation of the existing international order was established under the leadership of the United States after World War II. The absence of the United States and the failure of the existing order to deal with global issues will cause more countries to adopt an "isolationist" tendency. This coincides with the current wave of populism and nationalism. As the members of EU countries have shown, when disaster strikes, citizens are more loyal to their own country than to the EU.

Returning to the framework of the China-US-Taiwan triangle, the frequent verbal wars between Beijing, Washington and Taipei have led to growing hostility. After such a long period of time, such a triangular relationship will inevitably collapse and turn into a distinct and hostile relationship. Against this background, in accordance with Taiwan's emotional tendencies, Taipei must inevitably stand on the side of the United States. From the perspective of Beijing, although the sentiments of “de-sinicization” and “anti-China” on the island of Taiwan remain at a high level of enthusiasm, there is no intention to change the established policies and guidelines such as the “One Country, Two Systems, Taiwan Plan” and the *1992 Consensus*. Even from a certain perspective, the *1992 Consensus* is only a means, and the goal is "one country, two systems." After Beijing has been in Hong Kong for more than half a year of the "anti-revision" movement, it has sent veterans with provincial governance experience in the mainland to be the leaders of relevant departments in Hong Kong to demonstrate its determination to maintain and continue to promote the implementation of "one country, two systems." Taiwan cannot underestimate the determination of the mainland, nor should it expect Beijing to change its strategy towards Taiwan. In other words, the current opposition to "one country, two systems" within Taiwan is in direct conflict with Beijing's persistence. This means that there is no room for rotation between the two. If Taiwan is to engage in a "protracted war" with the mainland, then this rising anti-China sentiment and frontal confrontation measures may need to be adjusted.

In the current US trilateral relations in Taichung, Taiwan is the smallest of the comprehensive national strength and international influence energy side. This cruel factual meaning means that Taiwan is usually a passive recipient, and must bear the consequences of Washington and Beijing's great power game or wrestling, and sometimes even one of them will be used as a bargaining chip at the bargaining table. However, although the facts are cruel, it does not mean that Taiwan, as a passive party or a bargaining chip, cannot profit from it or find a living space. In the face of emerging powers and existing hegemonies that have long dominated the international order, here are China and the United States respectively. Although the two sides will cooperate with each other because of objective needs and consideration of national interests before the outbreak of the war, they will neither treat each other as friends in their subjective perceptions, nor can they let go of their doubts about the other party in their hearts. If you think about the strategic thinking of small countries, there will be no real mutual trust in the process of power competition. Economic factors are more direct than any other variables and immediately influence the policies or behaviors of power. And make good use of the contradictions in the game of great powers to deepen their differences. In any game or game, there is a winner or a loser, but some games are not in a zero-sum game mode, where the players do not always fight each other to the death. The US-China interaction is of course no exception, even in most game situations, it is a non-zero-sum model, which means that it can compete and cooperate at the same time. Taiwan can borrow such a mode of thinking and make good use of the contradiction between the United States and China when seeking greater international space, find an entry point to weaken the cooperation between Washington and Beijing in the current game relations between the two powers, and find Taiwan's strategic survival space. If Taiwan grasps when conflicts arise in US-China relations and cuts into different subject areas to help the US obtain the benefits it wants, and then in exchange for the progress of US-Taiwan relations, it will definitely be countered by mainland China.

In summary, the triangle relationship between China, the United States and Taiwan basically has the following judgments. The United States, first, will not break the bottom line of the "One China" policy, because the Taiwan issue involves Chinese sovereignty and is also the cornerstone of Sino-US relations. White House Press Secretary Psaki mentioned the handling of Sino-US relations and the Taiwan issue in accordance with the principles of the three Sino-US joint communiqués. Second, the United States will respond quickly to China's "pressure" action on Taiwan and show its toughness. Third, the United States regards Taiwan as a so-called "democratic model" and continues to strengthen unofficial exchanges with Taiwan. Fourth, increase arms sales to Taiwan, especially increase Taiwan’s asymmetric "defensive capabilities," in an effort to normalize arms sales to Taiwan. Fifth, actively help Taiwan win international space. The US government will continue to support Taiwan's "meaningful participation" in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and International Civil Aviation. On the Chinese side, first, in the face of the Taiwan issue, the Taiwan region belongs to China legally and is also recognized by international customary law. Recognizing Taiwan as an inalienable part of China has become an international habit. Second, adhere to the one-China principle and oppose "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan" are China's basic stance on the Taiwan issue, and more firmly implement the "one country, two systems Taiwan plan." Third, as Sino-US relations have entered a new trend, cross-strait relations have also become increasingly tense. Whether China and the United States and between the two sides of the strait can get out of the mode of negative interaction in the future depends on many factors. Including Taiwan independence forces and changes in Taiwan's public opinion, the future US government's understanding of the Taiwan issue and its policies, and the interaction between China and the United States. Fourth, mainland China has repeatedly expressed the hope that the two sides of the strait can find a solution acceptable to both sides through consultations. For Taiwan, first, it continues to pin its hopes on the United States in seeking to expand its international space, but Taiwan will always be only a pawn in the strategic positioning of the United States. Because Taiwan does not possess the strategic weight of being a long-term ally of the United States. Second, looking at the current situation, the more the United States plays the Taiwan card, the Taiwan Strait situation will rise, which will put Taiwan itself in a more embarrassing situation, and its own international space will become narrower and narrower. Third, the United States and Taiwan have promoted substantial relations with each other, but in fact they have also pushed Taiwan into a major role in the first chain of resistance, and both sides of the strait have gradually moved away from their expectations for peace.

# Conclusion

Taiwan's international space issues are influenced by the United States, including Taiwan's relations with diplomatic Allies, arms sales to Taiwan, participation in international organizations, signing of free trade agreements with other countries and regions, and people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. It is also the most sensitive and complex part of the Taiwan issue. This article analyzes the emergence, process, and results of Taiwan's international space issue by combing through the historical process of Taiwan's search for a larger international space issue and the conditions and characteristics faced at different stages. And through the current situation facing Taiwan to discuss the development direction of Taiwan's international space, analyze the role of mainland China and the United States in the issue of Taiwan's search for greater international space and what are the factors affecting it.

The issue of Taiwan's expansion of international space judging from the relevant responses of mainland China in the past, it can be seen that the mainland's response is mainly political. Taiwan has gone from losing its legitimate seat in the United Nations to the unwarranted entry of relevant organizations in the United Nations to more and more countries abandoning Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China, which has resulted in fewer and fewer international voices supporting Taiwan. Taiwan's desire to rely on countries with similar ideas such as the United States and Japan to help Taiwan stabilize its diplomatic relations is currently not satisfactory. The United States uses limited resources to support Taiwan in assisting Taiwan in maintaining its international space and diplomatic relations. The effect of mainland China's increasing voice in the international arena diminishes. But facing up to Beijing's opposition and refusal to deal with the Taiwan issue directly makes Taiwan's diplomacy futile. If cross-strait relations remain in a state of "warning" and more voices of the international community lean toward the Chinese mainland, Taiwan will become a victim of Sino-US competition and an abandoned child of the United States. Taiwan’s severe international dilemma has been alleviated through the Ma Ying-jeou authorities who have actively promoted cross-strait relations. Taiwan's intention to maintain "sovereign independence" in the international arena has plunged Taiwan's international space into a deep water zone. The handling of this contradiction will have a decisive impact on the direction of Taiwan's international space issues in the deep water zone. Taiwan’s international space issue is one of the highest-end issues in cross-strait political relations, and its international space issue has an uncertainty that cannot be underestimated. Changes in cross-strait political relations, the international environment, and the political situation on the island of Taiwan will all have an impact on the prospects of this issue, especially the influence of changes in the political situation on the island is the most important.

The United States has a strong influence on the actions of the Taiwan authorities to seek greater international space. On the one hand, the United States actively supports Taiwan’s expansion of international space, and enhances Taiwan’s international presence by enhancing its substantive relations with Taiwan, supporting Taiwan’s participation in important international organizations, and allowing the leaders of the Taiwan authorities to "transit". On the other hand, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the US government has also restricted the Taiwan authorities' provocations against mainland China on international space-related issues, with the intention of avoiding conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. The main motivations for this dual approach of the United States are the strategic interests of "using Taiwan to control China", the ideology of "using Taiwan to transform China", and the basic bottom line for maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. Finally, there is the basic bottom line for stability in the Taiwan Strait, which is also the "red line" that the United States has never deviated from in its Taiwan policy. The United States also recognizes that only maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait is in the best interests of the United States. The United States will not pay for the excessive provocative behavior of the Taiwan authorities.

Taiwan is facing the continuous escalation of the Sino-US game and the influence and restrictions of China and the United States. In the future, Taiwan will continue to seek greater international space. This is not only the need of Taiwan’s politics but also the expectations and needs of Taiwan’s people and society. If China wants to achieve peaceful reunification, it still needs to place its hope on the people of Taiwan. Mainland China should give Taiwan some way out of the international space, but at the same time, it should also guard against the penetration of Taiwan society and the grasp of Taiwan's future direction by the United States playing the "Taiwan card". Taiwan is usually the passive recipient of its own international space issues, and often bears the consequences of the great power game or wrestling between the United States and China. Taiwan should not be limited to intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization when it wants to ensure the expansion of its international space. By making use of Taiwan's rich economic and trade resources, vigorously expand economic and trade exchanges with other countries and regions, and establish semi-official and quasi-official institutions. Mainland China should take the initiative to make good relations with Taiwan, use its international position and influence, and create opportunities for Taiwan to participate in professional international organizations on the basis of the *1992 Consensus*. In the face of the United States, Taiwan should be more cautious, recognize its position and role in the strategic plan of the United States, and do not sink itself into the whirlpool of the game between China and the United States.

Otherwise, to become an abandoned son of the United States would be an injury to Taiwan's 23 million people, and no political party in Taiwan can afford such a disaster. In the face of the United States, Taiwan should be more cautious, recognize its position and role in the strategic plan of the United States, and do not sink itself into the whirlpool of the game between China and the United States. Otherwise, to become an “abandoned son” of the United States would be an injury to Taiwan's 23 million people, and no political party in Taiwan can afford such a disaster.

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