BEYOND ONTOLOGY:
ON BLAUSTEIN’S RECONSIDERATION
OF INGARDEN’S AESTHETICS*

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The article addresses the popular reading of Ingarden that his aesthetic theory is determined by ontology. This reading seems to suggest that, firstly, aesthetics lacks its autonomy, and, secondly, the subject of aesthetic experience is reproductive, and passive. The author focuses on Ingarden’s aesthetics formulated by him in the period of 1925–1944. Moreover, the study presents selected elements of Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience, and by doing so, the author aims at showing how Ingarden’s aesthetics was reconsidered by Blaustein, a student of Ingarden, whose theory seems to lead one beyond the scope of ontology. Blaustein, namely, reconsiders Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects by interpreting it in a descriptive-psychological, or phenomenological fashion. The article is divided into four parts. In section 1, the author highlights historical interconnections between Ingarden, and Blaustein. Section 2.1. is devoted to Ingarden’s phenomenological approach towards aesthetic experience as a phasic structure. At this basis, in section 2.2., Ingarden’s early theory of intentional objects is to be discussed. Section 3 concerns Blaustein’s contribution to phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Given that Blaustein formulates his theory in discussion with Ingarden, section 3.1. is devoted to Blaustein’s critical assessment of Ingarden’s method, and aesthetics. Next, in section 3.2., the author presents Blaustein’s original theory of presentations, and its use in aesthetics. Finally, in section 4, the author lists similarities, and differences between Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s aesthetic theories.

Key words: aesthetic experience, descriptive psychology, purely intentional object, theory of presentations, Ingarden, Blaustein.

* I would like to express my gratitude to Thomas Byrne for his help with the language of the manuscript. I also want to thank Marek Piwowarzycy for his helpful comments on the early version of the section devoted to Ingarden. The project was held within the research grant on “The Presence of Kazimierz Twardowski’s Thought in Early Phenomenology in Poland” financed by the National Science Centre, Poland within the OPUS program (No. 2017/27/B/HS1/02455).

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ЗА ПРЕДЕЛАМИ ОНТОЛОГИИ: О ПЕРЕСМОТРЕ БЛАУШТАЙНОМ ЭСТЕТИКИ ИНГАРДЕНА

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В статье рассматривается распространённое прочтение Ингардена, согласно которому его эстетическая теория обусловлена онтологией. В таком прочтении, во-первых, предполагается, что эстетика лишена автономии, и, во-вторых, что субъект эстетического опыта воспроизводим и пассивен. Автор статьи сосредотачивается на эстетике Ингардена, сформулированной им между 1925 и 1944 гг. Кроме того, в статье представлены отдельные элементы феноменологии эстетического опыта Ингардена, с помощью которых автор стремится продемонстрировать пересмотр эстетики Ингардена его студентом Блауштайном: теория последнего выходит за рамки онтологии. В частности, Блауштайн переосмысливает теорию Ингардена о чисто интенциональных объектах, интерпретируя её дескриптивно-психологическим, или феноменологическим, образом. Статья разделена на четыре части. В разделе 1 автор намечает исторические параллели между Ингарденом и Блауштайном. Раздел 2.1. посвящён феноменологическому подходу Ингардена к эстетическому опыту как многофазовой структуре. Исходя из этого, в разделе 2.2. следует остановиться на ранней теории интенциональных предметов Ингардена. Раздел 3 будет посвящён вкладу Блауштайна в феноменологию эстетического опыта. Учтывая тот факт, что Блауштайн формулирует собственную теорию в полемике с Ингарденом, в разделе 3.1. будет рассмотрена критическая оценка Блауштайном метода и эстетики Ингардена. Далее, в разделе 3.2., представлена исходная теория представлений Блауштайна и её применение в эстетике. Наконец, в разделе 4 автор перечисляет сходства и различия между эстетическими теориями Блауштайна и Ингардена.

Ключевые слова: эстетический опыт, дескриптивная психология, чисто интенциональный предмет, теория представлений, Ингарден, Блауштайн.

1. INTRODUCTION

According to a popular reading of Roman Ingarden's (1893–1970) aesthetics¹, which is maintained—to some extent—by the philosopher himself², his aesthetic theory is determined by ontology. In line with this reading, Ingarden mainly emphasizes

¹ “The Controversy dominates Ingarden's philosophic work also in the sense that a large part of his achievements in the theory of art, and indirectly in aesthetics, axiology of man, philosophy of language, and logic arose on the basis of its ontological problematic” (Gierulanka, 1989, 12). See also (Casey, 1973, xx). For recent presentations and discussions, see (Sepp, 2005, 392; Bundgaard, 2013; Bortolussi & Dixon, 2015).

² In the “Preface to the first German edition” to Das literarische Kunstwerk, Ingarden declares: “Although the main subject of my investigations in the literary work, of the literary work of art, the ultimate motives for my work on this subject are of a general philosophical nature, and they far transcend this particular subject. They are closely connected to the problem of idealism-realism, with which I have been concerning myself for many years” (Ingarden, 1973b, lxxii).
the questions of the aesthetic object, its structure, ontological properties, and its relation to other objects, e.g., to the work of art. This, however, has a far reaching consequence: The first-personal aspect of aesthetic experience seems to be completely forgotten here. In other words, one can have an impression that Ingarden did not develop a phenomenology of aesthetic experience at all. Yet, this is false. In the present article I challenge this ontological reading, and one of my tasks here is to discuss Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Secondly, I want to ask about the development of Ingarden’s account in the writings of his student, and later a critic, Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [or 1944]). My ultimate aim is a juxtaposition of both philosophers to show in what respect Blaustein’s reconsideration of Ingarden’s aesthetics goes beyond his position. Of course, Ingarden in his considerations refer to both ontology and phenomenology, and, as I will argue, whereas Blaustein accepts some phenomenological observations of Ingarden, he rephrase, or even reject his ontological theses.

Before summarizing the argument of the study, let me begin with a few historical remarks. Ingarden starts his studies in Lvov in 1911, but after a year he moves to Germany, first to Göttingen, later to Freiburg im Breisgau, and he completes his doctoral dissertation on Bergson in 1918 under Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). In 1918–1925 he works as a high school teacher in Lublin, Warsaw, and Toruń. This period ends with a publication of his Habilitationsschrift (Ingarden, 1925). The book enables him to get a job as a Dozent at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. There in 1927 he starts lecturing on the literary work of art, and in 1931 he publishes his main work on aesthetics — Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet den Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft (Ingarden, 1973b)—which summarizes these lectures. After this he attempts to become a Professor at the university (see, e.g., Ingarden, 1999), and he get a chair in 1933. In 1934–1939 he teaches seminars on aesthetics. Precisely at these seminar meetings, Ingarden develops his phenomenology of aesthetic experience, summarized in § 24 of O poznavaniu działa literackiego [The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art] (Ingarden, 1973a), published in Polish originally in 1937. Ingarden moves from Lvov to Krakow in 1944, and after World War II he develops his aesthetics by introducing, e.g., the idea of an encounter with the artwork, or the concept of a situation to describe aesthetic experience as a whole (e.g., Ingarden, 1975; Stróżewski, 1972). During the Lvov period (1925–1944) Ingarden meets a twelve years younger, talented student—Blaustein, who studies in Lvov probably in 1923–1927. In the summer semester 1925 Blaustein leaves Poland to study in Freiburg im Breisgau under Husserl. After his return to Lvov, he

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3 See, e.g., (Stróżewski, 1972; Küng, 1975; Takei, 1984; Mitscherling, 1997; Kocay, 2002).
writes—under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938)—a doctoral dissertation on Husserl’s theory of act and content. Blaustein comprehends his book as an introductory research to his original research on aesthetic experience as a combination of so-called imaginative presentations. In the 1930’s, he investigates not only the theoretical basis for aesthetics, but he uses also phenomenology to analyze concrete aesthetic phenomena, for instance, listening to the radio, watching a movie in the cinema, or a stage play in a theater. Blaustein’s major work on aesthetics is completed just before World War II in 1939—Die ästhetische Perzeption. Unfortunately, the book manuscript is lost during the war, and Blaustein himself dies with his family in the Jewish ghetto in Lwów. Blaustein — together with Ingarden—is recognized as a member of the Polish phenomenological school in aesthetics (cf. Pazura, 1966, 90; Ptaszek, 2011, 120).

Both biographical sketches show that Ingarden, and Blaustein share similar research interests in aesthetics. Yet, the whole picture is quite complex. There are, of course, mutual interconnections, or even continuations between both thinkers. After all, Blaustein participates in Ingarden’s lectures on aesthetics as early as 1927. In his memories on Blaustein, Ingarden (1963, 87) notices that in the Lwów period he met Blaustein “almost every day,” and they discussed on aesthetics widely. It is not surprising, then, that in one of his later letters, Ingarden (1959) calls Blaustein “my student” [mój uczeń], which suggests that he comprehends Blaustein as a continuator of his own phenomenological project. This is evident if one refers the “Foreword to the Polish Edition” of Das literarische Kunstwerk, where Ingarden (1960, 15) acknowledges, and appreciates Blaustein’s attempts to develop the research project presented in this book also beyond the limits of the philosophy of literature, e.g., to study a radio experience. Indeed, in three reviews of the German edition of Das literarische Kunstwerk, Blaustein (1930a; 1932; 1935–1937) postulates to extend the thematic scope of the research program formulated in this book. So, following Dziemidok (1980, 178), it is justified to claim that “Blaustein’s views on many basic issues of aesthetics were inspired by Ingarden”.

Nonetheless, Dziemidok’s thesis should be read in an adequate context. My point is that the Ingarden-Blaustein discussion is marked also by critical reconsiderations, and reexaminations, or even breaks. Even if Blaustein accepts, and uses the theory of purely intentional objects, he criticizes Ingarden’s method: in contrast to Ingarden’s ontological phenomenology, he offered to understand phenomenology as descriptive psychology which concerns types of concrete experiences,

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4 On Blaustein’s position in the school of early phenomenology in Poland, see (Plotka, 2017).

5 More on Blaustein’s philosophy, also in the context of aesthetics, see (Dziemidok, 1980; Miskiewicz, 2009; Rosińska, 2013; Plotka, 2020c).

6 See also (Ptaszek, 2011, 120).
rather than—as Ingarden would insist—ideas of experiences. In response, Ingarden (1960, 15) accuses Blaustein of falling into psychologism by reducing the object of consciousness to a mere mental image. If Ingarden is right, Blaustein in fact misreads his aesthetics. All in all, the systematization of the Ingarden-Blaustein discussion is necessary. Remarkably, the discussion is explored (to some extent) only by Dziemidok (1980). In this study, I attempt to fulfill this striking lack in the scholarship on early phenomenology.

The article is divided into two main parts: section 2 is devoted to Ingarden and section 3 to Blaustein. In section 2.1. I present Ingarden's phenomenology of aesthetic experience as a phasic structure, divided into three parts: a passive preliminary emotion, concretization, and an emotional response to the aesthetic value. The first phase is described as a transition of the practical attitude to the aesthetic one. I describe this transition as distancing from the world. The second phase is grasped as a result of the preliminary experience, and it consists in a fulfillment of the spots of indeterminacy. The last phase consists in responding to aesthetic values which are constituted in a “polyphonic harmony” of Gestalt qualities. Next, in the section 2.2., I examine Ingarden's theory of purely intentional objects as heteronymous in relation to the act. Here, I will sketch out a difference between purely intentional and also intentional objects. This will enable me to reconstruct the structure of aesthetic experience according to Ingarden. Section 3.1. is mostly polemical. It presents Blaustein's critical assessment of Ingarden's method and his aesthetics. Blaustein's main goal is to reinterpret eidetic phenomenology of Ingarden in a Brentanian fashion as descriptive-psychological discipline. I will argue that this shift in methodology has far reaching consequences in Blaustein's view of Ingarden's aesthetics. I attempt at describing these consequences in section 3.2. where I will present Blaustein's theory of presentations. I analyze Blaustein's understanding of a psychological representation, different relations between the presenting content, and the object, and, finally, his theory of intuitive, and non-intuitive presentations. Next, I use all these descriptive distinctions to reconstruct Blaustein's view of aesthetic experience, wherein I focus on two examples: perceiving a painting, and watching a theater play. In concluding remarks (section 4), I will list main similarities, and differences between Ingarden, and Blaustein. Let me add that in the present juxtaposition of both thinkers, I do not claim to present their theories in length; this would require a separate study. I focus instead on selected elements which bind, or differ both approaches. In this examination, I aim at showing how, if at all, Blaustein's contribution to aesthetics situate him outside Ingarden's ontology, or, speaking metaphorically, how he leads us beyond ontology.
2. EARLY AESTHETICS OF INGARDEN:
BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Ingarden’s aesthetics, as Gniazdowski (2010, 167) rightly states, is divided into three complementary parts which mirror a general structure of experience as such. So, (1) experience has its subjective, i.e., first-personal character. In classical terms, experience gives us an object in different ways, or—to employ Husserl’s term—in different *modi*. One can, for instance, judge about something, think of it, or want it. So, different acts correspond with different ways of experiencing the object. In aesthetics this means that while perceiving, say, a work of art, one perceives it in a specific way. Here Ingarden uses *phenomenology*, which enables him to explore these ways, or *modi* of experience (cf. Ingarden, 1961; 1973a). Next, (2) given that every experience is intentional, i.e., it has its object, aesthetic experience is also directed towards its specific object. In general terms, for Ingarden, ontology is an *a priori* discipline, which enables one to describe possible modes, forms, and materials of every (non-contradict) whatsoever (cf. Mitscherling, 1997, 79–121). Ontology thus defined explores topics connected to every existing object, despite whether it actually, factually, or ideally exists. Briefly speaking, ontology is a general theory of an object. Accordingly, Ingarden’s aesthetics adopts an ontological framework and consequently it develops an ontology of the work of art. Here, as we will see below, Ingarden sketches a difference between the work of art and the aesthetic object, and he investigates their structures and interrelations. Finally, (3) while experiencing something, one constitutes values, say, a value of truth while judging that “I am reading a paper right now”. Therefore, *axiology* is necessary to examine this aspect of experience and it is of crucial importance for aesthetics. After all, aesthetic experience has an axiological aspect, since the object presents itself as aesthetically valuable; Ingarden (1961, 311)⁷ holds that the ultimate aim of aesthetic experience is to “realize” aesthetic values. In a word, the third part of Ingarden’s aesthetics is his axiology understood as the theory of aesthetic values. Since Blaustein refers in his aesthetics mainly to Ingarden’s ontology and phenomenology, I will limit my exposition in this part of the article to these two subdisciplines of Ingarden’s philosophy. In section 2.1., I will present components of Ingarden’s early phenomenology of aesthetic experience. At this basis, in section 2.2., I attempt a reconstruction of his contribution to aesthetic ontology in the theory of purely intentional objects.

⁷ See also Gniazdowski (2010, 168).
2.1. Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience in the 1930’s

Ingarden formulates his phenomenology of aesthetic experience in the context of the following question: How does one get knowledge of the literary work of art while reading, say, a novel? As we will see, for Ingarden, the cognition of the work of art, and thus cognitive acts, are different than the contemplation of the work, and thus aesthetic acts, or experience. To examine the difference, in § 24 of O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego [The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art], Ingarden (1973a, 175–218; see also 1961) describes the structure, and character of aesthetic experience. The important point is that aesthetic experience is not limited to the contemplation of artistic objects, but can also refer to non-artistic objects, e.g., a landscape. This form of experience has a specific function: it constitutes (or creates) its unique object, namely the aesthetic object as a whole, which, in turn, is irreducible neither to the work of art, nor to the real object. This means that aesthetic experience can (yet does not have to) begin with the perception of a real object, but it can also concern also a fictional, i.e., non-real object (Ingarden, 1961, 290; 1973a, 178–179).

Next, aesthetic experience is understood by Ingarden as temporal. This means that it is neither momentary, nor reducible to a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. In turn, as Ingarden (1961, 295; 1973a, 187) puts it, aesthetic experience has phasic structure, and as such it is divided into three main phases: (1) its beginning is mainly passive, and it consists in a preliminary emotion. This moment is described by Ingarden as a transition of attitudes: from the practical one to the aesthetic one, and it is understood as a distancing from the world. Next, (2) the result of the preliminary experience is concretization of the aesthetic object by fulfillment of the spots of indeterminacy. Finally, (3) an experience of the value of the object is constituted as an emotional response to the value. This, in turn, can—yet, it does not have to lead—to the formulation of the aesthetic judgment and conceptual expression.

8 For a more straightforward phenomenological analysis of the experience of reading, mainly in Husserl, see (Byrne 2017a; 2017b).
9 By “cognitive acts” Ingarden understands in this very context such acts as, e.g., knowing the story presented in a novel, noticing the structure of the text, identifying rhetorical devices used by the author of the text, etc.
10 It is worth to note, however, that cognitive acts can (yet do not have to) be founded on the basis of aesthetic experience. For Ingarden, cognitive experience can be both heteronymous, and autonomous in relation to aesthetic experience.
11 On Ingarden’s understanding of the fictional objects, also in comparison to Husserl, see (Plotka, 2020a).
In regard to (1), Ingarden (1961, 296; 1973a, 188) claims that the phase is “passive” and “fleeting” since one is “struck” with a peculiar quality or with a multiplicity of qualities which focus his or her attention, and which are not indifferent to him or her. In sum, one is “excited” about the quality or qualities. This preliminary emotion founds the change of a man’s attitude. Ingarden identifies further subphases of the preliminary emotion:

a) an emotional, and as yet still in germ, direct intercourse with the quality experienced,
b) a sort of desire to possess this quality and to augment the delight promised by an intuitive possession of it, c) a tendency to satiate oneself with the quality in question, to consolidate the possession of it. (Ingarden, 1961, 296; cf. 1973a, 190)

The preliminary emotion breaks the familiarity of the world, or rather it breaks man’s natural, i.e., practical life. For Ingarden, then, aesthetic experience interrupts the flow of daily life, and it situates the subject outside his or her practical interests. The shift of attitudes from the practical to the aesthetic consists in a shift from man’s focus on the fact of real existence of a particular quality to the qualities themselves. A conviction about the real existence of the world is neutralized, which Ingarden (1961, 300; 1973a, 195–196) describes as the phenomenon of “forgetting the world.” This, however, as we will see below in section 3.3., situates Ingarden’s position close to Blaustein for whom aesthetic contemplation also situates us outside the world of praxis.

Ingarden opposes the preliminary emotion with (2). Properly speaking, in this phase the preliminary emotion is passing and the aesthetic object is created. For this reason, in contrast to the preliminary emotion, which was passive, the present phase of experience is strictly active, though it does not introduce visible changes in the real world. According to Ingarden (1961, 302; 1973a, 197), whereas the preliminary emotion opens one to experience the aesthetic quality, this emotion is still “initial,” and it invites one to improve the quality. Therefore, while experiencing the work of art, one seeks new aesthetic qualities, which can found further elements of the aesthetic object. The ultimate aim of this phase is to create the aesthetic object formed in a unity of qualities, which are harmonized in the object. Strictly speaking, the aesthetic object is a new, yet heteronymous, object which, in turn, is understood by Ingarden as the subject of properties, i.e., aesthetic qualities. The process of concretization, thus described, is an active element of aesthetic experience. Curiously enough, this active

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12 “The new subject should be chosen in such a way that it could be a substratum just of the qualities given; or, in other words: this substratum is determined in its qualitative equipment by the choice of the qualities grasped as well as by the relations between them. As this new subject of properties—having been posed by us—begins, in turn, to appear itself in concrete qualities given in an evident way, it assumes that character of a separate entity, which becomes present to us” (Ingarden, 1961, 304).
concretization of the object also indicates an intersubjective level of experience sine it establishes, as Ingarden (1961, 305; 1973a, 203) puts it, “emotional community of experience.” The community enables an emotional response to the formed aesthetic object. To be precise, Ingarden holds that the emotion responses to “the structure of the qualitative harmony in the content of aesthetic object.” This means that the experienced object presents itself in certain Gestalt qualities. If this is indeed the case, the phase (2) corresponds with some aspects of Blaustein’s view of aesthetic experience, which, according to his theory of imaginative presentations, is directed toward Gestalt qualities, and moreover is intersubjective through and through.

Aesthetic experience, as described by Ingarden, culminates in (3). This phase consists in an “appeasement” of emotions which are finally formed as an emotional response to a harmony of qualities (Ingarden, 1961, 307–308; 1973a, 207). Here one can once again change their attitude to the investigating-cognitive one and, as a result, one is able to evaluate the aesthetic object by judging it as aesthetically beautiful or as ugly. Whereas the former evaluation arises in a positive response to the value, the latter is founded on a negative response. In both cases, however, the experience makes this judgement valid. This phase can end with cognitive act, yet this is not a necessary condition to experience the object. Nonetheless, Ingarden (1973a, 173–174) clearly emphasizes that this cognitive act is not aesthetic experience.

To sum up this part of the article, aesthetic experience is for Ingarden a complex phenomenon, which has a phasic structure. It involves emotional, active (i.e., creative), and passive elements, which all can culminate in a cognitive act. According to Ingarden, the aesthetic experience is active, or, as he puts it, full of dynamism. Given this, we can conclude, first, that aesthetic experience is not strictly determined by the ontological structure of the artwork, as Rybicki (1975, 95), Dziemidok (1980, 93, 106) claim. After all, the new, aesthetic object is created. Second and more importantly, Ingarden rejects the primacy of signification (or the primacy of cognition) in experiencing the object, but — as presented above — the experience is first and foremost emotional. Significations play a role after aesthetic experience if one changes the aesthetic attitude for the cognitive one.

2.2. The object of aesthetic experience: a sketch of the theory of intentional objects

As claimed in section 1, Ingarden’s aesthetic theory seems to be determined by ontology. Indeed, in the “Preface to the first German edition” to Das literarische Kunstwerk, Ingarden declares:
Although the main subject of my investigations in the literary work, of the literary work of art, the ultimate motives for my work on this subject are of a general philosophical nature, and they far transcend this particular subject. They are closely connected to the problem of idealism-realism, with which I have been concerning myself for many years. (Ingarden, 1973b, lxxii)

It is true that Ingarden “closely” connects aesthetical investigations with the problem of idealism-realism, yet it is too hasty to accept the thesis that the author of Das literarische Kunstwerk devaluates aesthetics in favor of ontology. Ingarden’s (1973b, 9–12) intention is to show that the question of the literary work of art requires one to ask the question of: How does the work of art exist? In short, aesthetics requires ontology, this, however, does not mean that ontology determines aesthetics. Ontology rather provides the conceptual tools to analyze different types of art. This is precisely the case of Das literarische Kunstwerk. While analyzing the content of the idea of the literary work of art, Ingarden (1973b, 30) identifies the work as many-layered object which is divided into four layers: (1) word sounds, (2) meaning unities, (3) schematized aspects, and (4) the stratum of represented objects. Every stratum exists in a specific way, and ontology enables one to describe these ways adequately. Ingarden’s key insight into the idea of the literary work of art in particular, and into aesthetics in general, is his theory of purely intentional objects; the theory describes the way of existence of different layers. In § 20 of Das literarische Kunstwerk, he writes:

By a purely intentional objectivity we understand an objectivity that is in a figurative sense “created” by an act of consciousness or by a manifold of acts or, finally, by a formation (e.g., a word meaning, a sentence) exclusively on the basis of an immanent, original, or only conferred intentionality and has, in the given objectivities, the source of its existence and its total essence. (Ingarden, 1973b, 117)

A purely intentional object, then, is an object, which does not build a whole with the act in which it is “created.” It is dependent in its existence on the act, but it is not a part of the act since this would lead us back towards psychologism. Therefore, “creation” does not meant that one produces an object which exists independently of the act, i.e., it cannot be “created” outside the act; the object is rather heteronymous, and exists only as an object of the act, but not as its part. For instance, if one imagines a Pegasus, this object exists purely intentional, meaning it has “the source of its existence” in the act of imagining; moreover, the imagined Pegasus has features ascribed only in this act, e.g., having wings as an eagle, etc., but the object is not a psychic part of the act. Rather it is transcendent as purely intentional (not psychic) entity. This general theory is useful for understanding the existence of different strata of the literary
work of art: while reading a book, one images characters presented in the novel, however, their existence is purely intentional. More importantly, the theory can be also used in aesthetics: while contemplating, for instance, a painting one constitutes the work of art in a purely intentional fashion, and on this basis, one can also constitute an aesthetic object, i.e., the object of aesthetic contemplation. So, according to Ingarden, an aesthetic object is non-identical to any real object, say a painting, sculpture, or the literary work of art. One can destroy, for instance, canvas, but the aesthetic object is different than a material thing. Following Ingarden, the aesthetic object is formed by successive encounters with the art object in a process, which he calls, a concretization\(^\text{13}\). This process involves the formation of an aesthetic object, which finally becomes the purely intentional object. To understand the way of existence of the object, let me refer to some elements of Ingarden's early ontology.

In Ingarden's (1929, 165–168; cf. 2013, 109–155; 2016, 171–219) ontology, which was formulated as early as the 1920's, i.e., before publishing Das literarische Kunstwerk, one finds a precise description of four basic existential-ontological relations: (1) autonomy, and heteronomy, (2) originality, and derivativeness, (3) self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency (or separability, and inseparability), finally, (4) dependence, and independence\(^\text{14}\). Given this, a purely intentional object is (1) heteronymous, (2) derivative, (3) self-sufficient, and (4) dependent. Ingarden uses this description in the context of the work of art, and the aesthetic object respectively. The work of art is constituted purely intentionally in an act that “creates” an object with certain properties, e.g., a painting with a property of presenting a landscape, or being a portrait. This object is heteronymous, because it is constituted by the act of apprehension which apprehend, say, colors on canvas as a representation of the landscape\(^\text{15}\); derivative, because it is produced by the act of apprehension, or as a result of the act of concretiza-

\(^{13}\) On the concept of concretization, see (Takei, 1984; Szczeponska, 1989, 32–38).

\(^{14}\) According to Ingarden, to describe the object as (1) existentially autonomous means that it has its existential foundation in itself, while it is existentially heteronomous if it has its foundation outside of itself; (2) the object is existentially original if it is not "produced" by any other object; in turn, the object is derivative if it is produced by any other entity; (3) the object is existentially self-sufficient if it requires for its being the being of no other entity which would have to coexist with it, while it is existentially non-self-sufficient if this is not the case; finally, (4) the object is existentially dependent if it is possible for an entity to be self-sufficient and still require the existence of some other self-sufficient entity; in turn, the object is existentially self-dependent if is it is self-sufficient and moreover it does not require any other entity for its existence. Cf. (Mitscherling, 1997, 90–99; Simons, 2005; Piwowarczyk, 2020).

\(^{15}\) The object is heteronymous also in the sense that it has features ascribed by the act. E. g., if one imagines a Pegasus with white wings, the color is ascribed within the act of imagining. In other words, the object does not have features on its own.
tion; *self-sufficient*, because it does not build a whole with the act, so it is a transcendent, non-psychic, yet purely intentional entity, and as such it is separable from the act; finally, *dependent*, because it requires the existence of a certain act, for instance, the act of concretization. To be clear, although the object is heteronomous and derivative it is *not* reducible to mental experiences; just the opposite, it is transcendent through and through (Ingarden, 1973a, 14). Furthermore, if one contemplates the work of art (or different non-artistic object), one can constitute the aesthetic object which — according to the description presented in the section 2.1.—is a purely intentional object which has ascribed properties as *qualitative equipment*, i.e., the *qualitative harmony* in the content of aesthetic object. This object is *heteronymous*, because it exists only due to the act of aesthetic contemplation, and without this act, there is no aesthetic object at all; *derivative*, because it is created by the act of aesthetic contemplation; *self-sufficient*, because it is a separable part of the entire act of the aesthetic contemplation, and it has features—the qualitative harmony—ascribed by the contemplating act; and finally *dependent*, because it requires for its existence the act of aesthetic contemplation.

To be precise, Ingarden’s description concerns both the aesthetic object (the object with the ascribed qualitative harmony), and the work of art (the object with the ascribed artistic qualities), but his descriptions do not hold for the real object, e.g., canvas of the painting, or a marble in a sculpture. As claimed above, for Ingarden, the work of art, as well as the aesthetic object are non-identical to any material object. The aesthetic object does *not* represent the material object, but rather is a new, constituted (or “created”) object (just as the art object is created by the artist). To understand this aspect of Ingarden’s aesthetics, let me refer to his analysis formulated in *Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes*, originally published in 1935. Ingarden’s (1935, 33) theory of the individual object refers to Aristotle’s *hypokeimenon* (ὑποκείμενον), i.e., the object as the subject of properties. Although properties of the object are non-self-sufficient, or inseparable from the object, the object is a whole that is self-sufficient. As Ingarden (1935, 68) states, “the subject of properties and the endless multiplicity of properties as properties are essentially connected.” The individual object (1) is determined in all its properties, and as such is self-sufficient; next (2) it is a unity, i.e., a whole that cannot be divided; (3) if the individual object is divided it is destroyed, so it stops to exist; (4) two individual subjects cannot have the same property; (5) yet the individuality of the object is undefined as such since it is a specific moment of the way of existence; finally, (6) if the object is individual, everything that can be pointed out in it is also individual, including properties (Ingarden, 1935, 79–80). To adapt this ontological theory to aesthetics, it is instructive to comprehend the work of art and the aesthetic object as ontologically founded on the
individual object, e.g., a book. Nonetheless, the above mentioned layers have different formal-ontological structure: they are not autonomous. They are rather schematic, or intentional layers and as such they are constituted in corresponding acts, but, at the same time, they are co-constituted by the individual and autonomous object. The material thing, say a book, a brick of marble, then, is autonomous, but both the artwork, and the aesthetic object are—heteronomous. As claimed, the formal structure of the real object (say, canvas) is different than that of the aesthetic object (or the artwork): whereas the former, as the individual object, is determined in all its properties, the latter contains so-called “spots of indeterminacy” (Ingarden, 1973b, 246–254). As early as 1925, Ingarden (1925, 276) refers to the idea that some objects are to be understood as a sketch (Skizze), and as such they cannot be determined in all properties. The spots of indeterminacy as defined in Das literarische Kunstwerk mirror this early concept. They are understood as gaps in a content that cannot be fulfilled by further acts. In this context, aesthetic experience can be described as an attempt at fulfilling the spots by its concretization, i.e., by the act of “creating” the new subject, which would be the subject of aesthetic properties, including qualitative harmony of aesthetically valuable properties. But if this is indeed the case, concretization—contra Rybicki (1975, 95), and Dziemidok (1980, 93, 106)—is a strictly active aspect of experience since it “creates” a new object. However, “spots of indeterminacy” form the content of the purely intentional object, so, as Ingarden (1973b, 371) puts it, the work of art also “works on us,” namely it begins the process of constitution, or “creation” of the new, i.e., aesthetic object.

Concluding this part of the article, let me indicate that for Ingarden the real individual object exists autonomously, and as such it can be an “also intentional” object which is the basis for a constitution of the purely intentional, i.e., heteronomous object, the work of art, or the aesthetic object. Ingarden’s thesis that the aesthetic object can be the object of derivative intentionality means here that it is not founded exclusively on mental (or intentional) acts, but also on the individual, i.e., autonomous object: the real object. This is evident in Ingarden’s (1973b, 317–323) short analysis of the stage play: people on the stage are individual, and autonomous objects; Ingarden calls them

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16 The object is schematic, following Ingarden, in the sense that it is not determined in its properties, so it has spots of indeterminacy. Ingarden introduces these ideas while differing the real, and purely intentional object. He writes: “every real object is unequivocally, universally (i.e., in every respect) determined. Unequivocal, universal determination means that in its total essence [Sosein] a real object cannot have any spots where in itself it would not be totally determined, i.e., either by A or by non-A, an indeed where it would not be so determined that as long as A was its determination in a given respect, it could not, at the same time, in the same respect, be non-A. To put it briefly: its essence does not show any spots of indeterminacy” (Ingarden, 1973b, 246).
“representing objects,” which “represent” purely intentional objects, i.e., the “represented objects,” whereas the performance is a certain concretization. Here people on the stage are ultimately determined in their properties since they are autonomous and individual objects. Moreover, they are also intentional objects, but the objects they represent—the “represented objects”—are purely intentional, and as such—schematic. This ontological description of the stage play formulated by Ingarden would be supplemented by Blaustein with an descriptive-psychological analysis.

3. BLAUSTEIN ON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND ITS STRUCTURE

Blaustein has an opportunity to study Ingarden’s aesthetics since 1927 when the latter holds lectures on the theory presented later (in 1931) in length in Das literarische Kunstwerk. Moreover, in 1930 and in 1931 Blaustein publishes two short books in Polish on Przedstawiania imaginatywne. Studyum z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki [Imaginative Presentations. A Study in the Borderland Between Psychology and Aesthetics], and on Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne. Badania z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations. A Survey from the Borderland of Psychology and Aesthetics], which both adopt and develop some of Ingarden’s ideas. In his books, Blaustein engages not only with Ingarden, but also with, amongst others, Husserl, Brentano, Twardowski, Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), and Stephan Witasek (1870–1915). During the 1930’s, Blaustein closely works together with Ingarden. He participates in Ingarden’s aesthetic seminars, where ideas later (in 1937) presented in O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego [The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art] are discussed. First and foremost, however, Blaustein establishes a permanent dialogue with his Lvov teacher (Ingarden, 1963, 87). At the basis of this cooperation, Blaustein (1937; 1938; 2005) formulates an original phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Given all these influences, and interconnections, the aim of this part of the article is to present, and to discuss Blaustein’s view of aesthetic experience. First, however, in section 3.1., I attempt to reconstruct his continuations, as well as his breaks with Ingarden’s heritage. Next, in section 3.2., I read his theory of presentations, and I reconstruct how Blaustein use that theory when developing his aesthetics.

17 Ingarden notices this fact in a footnote to Das literarische Kunstwerk. See (Ingarden, 1973b, 319–320, fn. 10).
3.1. Blaustein's critical analysis
of Ingarden's method and his aesthetics

It is hard to deny that Blaustein is influenced by Ingarden, first and foremost by his aesthetics, but also (to some extent) by ontology and epistemology. Nonetheless, his reading of Ingarden is critical because of methodological reasons. This, in turn, results in reinterpretation of some basic concepts of Ingarden. Of course, a reconstruction of Blaustein’s critical evaluation of the method of phenomenology has to be understood from within the entire context of methodological disputes in Lvov, especially with regards to phenomenology in relation to descriptive psychology (cf. Płotka, 2020b, esp. 19–23). This, however, goes beyond my aims here. Let me emphasize only the key insight of Blaustein.

In two talks, given by him on the 28th of April and the 5th of May 1928, during the meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society, Blaustein questions the eidetic approach of phenomenology. Phenomenology is understood by him as “descriptive discipline which concerns ideal essences of lived experiences of pure consciousness” (Blaustein, 1928–1929, 164b). In the first of these two talks, he formulates a series of arguments, which show that essences are in fact presupposed in their existence before one starts doing phenomenology. Phenomenology is interested in describing the general objects that exist, as Blaustein puts it (1928–1929, 166a), in “the world of ideas.” If so, however, one presupposes the ontological thesis about the existence of essences before she or he phenomenologically describes essences as such. In a word, phenomenology falls into the petitio principii error. Nonetheless, Blaustein’s reading is problematic. Already in his Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl presents the method of eidetic analysis in discussion with the modern theory of abstraction; precisely in this context, Husserl (1984, 127; 2001, 248; see also Hopkins, 1997) is clearly against a hypostatization of ideas as general objects. Surprisingly, then, Blaustein’s criticism misses the point. But, as Kuliniak & others (2016, 97, 114) suggest, Blaustein’s criticism is directed not towards Husserl, but rather towards Ingarden. Indeed, it is Ingarden (1915, 306; 1919a; 1919b; Szylewicz, 1993, 4) who popularizes the notion of phenomenology as a study of the content of ideas in the act of a direct seeing of essences (immanente Wesenserschauung). In his first presentations of phenomenology, one can find a quasi-Platonic understanding of essences as “ideal objects,” which do not exist in time or in the real space. As such, they are invariable (Ingarden, 1919b, 322). In contrast to Husserl, Ingarden (1919b, 324) claims that in the act of the direct apprehension of essences, there is also a moment of the affirmation of the ideal existence of the general objects. Such objects exist in the world of ideal objects. Even given the fact that Ingarden’s notion
of an idea is ambiguous (Chrudzimski, 1999, 25–29), it is striking that in his early writings in phenomenology, Ingarden, contra Husserl, adopts quasi-Platonic reading of essences. Precisely in this context, one has to understand Blaustein’s criticism of phenomenology.

But if phenomenology as an eidetic enterprise is impossible, how does Blaustein understand phenomenology at all? In contrast to Ingarden, he suggests that phenomenology should be developed in a Brentanian fashion, as suggested by Husserl (1984, 24, fn. 1; 2001, 176–177) in the first edition of Untersuchungen, namely as descriptive psychology. In his opinion, instead of investigating ideal essences, the phenomenologist should examine individual phenomena, and at this basis she or he should aim at types of these phenomena, where types are to be understood as the lowest species. Therefore, phenomenology is not an eidetic discipline which operates with a questionable—at least in Blaustein’s view—method of seeing essences, but rather it examines individual phenomena, and due to inductive generalizations, it enables one to achieve types of these phenomena. As Blaustein (1928–1929, 165b) puts it, “phenomenology is possible only as empirical and descriptive science of types (the lowest species) of lived experiences of pure consciousness, [s]ince no direct investigation into higher species, unless it is held on the way of inductive generalization, is reliable.” For the Polish philosopher, then, Husserl’s eidetic intuition is replaced by the Brentanian introspection and retrospection.

It is not surprising that this important shift in methodology has far reaching consequences for Blaustein’s philosophy in general, and for his aesthetics in particular. First, however, let me note consequences for his reading of Ingarden, which are clear while analyzing Blaustein’s (1930a; 1932; 1935–1937) three reviews of Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk. In general terms, Blaustein appreciates Ingarden’s detailed analysis of the literary work of art which, in his opinion, are one of the most valuable in philosophical literature of the time. More explicitly, he emphasizes the following five aspects of Ingarden’s theory: (1) his refutation of psychologism in literature which consists in reducing the literary work of art to the psychic life of a reader (Blaustein, 1935–1937, 98b); (2) his theory of meaning according to which meaning is irreducible to the psyche or to ideal entities, and as such it is heteronomous in relation to the acts of understanding (Blaustein, 1930a, 454); (3) a clear differentiation between the act, contents, and the represented objects, which are key notions for understanding what the literary work of art is (Blaustein, 1932, 346); as a consequence of point 3, (4) his accent put on intentional objects which are schematic, and purely intentional (Blaustein, 1932, 347); in this context, let me note that although Blaustein does not adopt Ingarden’s phrase, “purely intentional object,” he was aware that the theory of purely in-
tentional objects—understood as *quasi*-real objects—corresponds with his original theory of imaginative objects (Blaustein, 1935–1937, 101b); finally, (5) his view of the literary work of art as a multi-strata object (Blaustein, 1935–1937, 99a). Despite these positive assessments, Blaustein formulated two charges against Ingarden's aesthetics: (1) the issue of identity of the literary work of art is unclear, since different concretizations do not allow one to comprehend the work absolutely adequately (Blaustein, 1932, 349); more importantly, (2) as a result of his criticism of the phenomenological method sketched above, one has to use “Ockham's razor” on Ingarden's contention that ideas are general objects and metaphysical entities (Blaustein, 1930a, 454; 1935–1937, 101a); simply put, Blaustein rejects the ontological, and metaphysical context of Ingarden's aesthetics. Instead he offers to develop a descriptive-psychological or phenomenological analysis of aesthetic experience, which leads him to his original theory of presentations.

3.2. On the variety of presentations in aesthetic experience

According to Blaustein's (1928, 95) self-commentary, his aesthetics is closely connected to a criticism formulated in his doctoral dissertation on Husserl's theory of act and content. Of course, a detailed reconstruction and a thorough discussion of this criticism is not my aim here (cf. Płotka, 2020c), however, let me note three important points. (1) Blaustein's leading idea is to reinterpret Husserl's lived-experiences as sets or wholes of presentations, which apprehend sense-data. Consequently, lived experiences are, just as for Brentano (1995, 61), presentations or are based upon presentations (Blaustein, 1930b, 61; 1931b, 123). (2) Blaustein claims that presentations are different from sense-data in such a way that whereas presentations are lived through (*durchlebt*), sense-data are just experienced (*erlebt*). By claiming this, Blaustein is following Ingarden\(^\text{18}\). Given this differentiation, only sense-data are originally experienced; in turn, presentations apprehend them, and are founded on sense-data. (3) What follows, Blaustein is interested in lived experiences as such, and their character, rather than in their objects, and structures. What does this reading of Husserl mean for aesthetics? First of all, Blaustein (1937, 399; 1938a, 4; 2005, 4, 136) comprehends aesthetic experience as a complex act what means for him: as a whole

\[18\] As Ingarden emphasizes, „[j]edenfalls sind die Empfindungsdaten—und in noch höherem Maße die Ansichten verschiedener Stufen—Inhalte, die den Bewußtseinsakten auf bestimmte Weise gegenüber treten und selbst (in sich) nicht bewußt sind. D. h. ihre Seinsweise ist die des Erlebtwerdens und nicht die des Durchlebens. Die Seinsweise des Erlebens der Empfindungsdaten dagegen ist die des ‘Durchlebens’“ (Ingarden, 1921, 562).
which combines different presentations. In his analysis, Blaustein examines mainly visual artworks and for this reason, he claims that the basis of aesthetic experience is first and foremost perception, however, components of feelings, judgments, and volitional acts are also present. If sense-data found all experience, different presentations in aesthetic experience are defined by Blaustein in regard to the relation between presentational content and the object. A theoretical basis of Blaustein's aesthetics is, then, an attempt at defining different types of presentations included in aesthetic experience. In turn, for Ingarden the aim of aesthetics is a description of the ontological structure of the object constituted in such an experience. Let me look closer at Blaustein's classification\(^\text{19}\).

To begin with, by “presentation” Blaustein (1930b, 13, fn. 1; 2005, 47, fn. 12) understands an “elementary intentional act *sui generis*.” As such it includes sensations (or sensational acts) or is founded upon sensations. However, this theory cannot be apprehend as a form of naïve sensualism since it also accepts immanent, or introspective sensations\(^\text{20}\). As such, following Blaustein (1931b, 99–100), presentations have the function of a *psychological representation*, which consists in someone’s presenting of the represented object *via* the presenting object. Therefore, the phrase “*A represents […]* for *X—B*, if *X* presents […]. him or herself *B* due to *A*” should be read—within Blaustein’s psychology—as “*X* presents him or herself *B* using *A* in such a way that *A* is given (mostly intuitively) to *X* […], and that *X* comprehends *B* through the presentating content of *A*” (Blaustein, 1931b, 101–102). However, the relation between the presentating content, and the object can be defined at least at four levels as: (1) adequate (if every element of content has a corresponding element of the object, and every element of the object has a corresponding element of content), (2) quasi-adequate (if every element of content has a corresponding element of the object, but it refers to improper object of intention, rather than to the proper object), (3) inadequate (if at least some elements of content have some corresponding elements of the object), and (4) quasi-inadequate (if at least some elements of content have some corresponding elements of the object, but it refers to improper object of intention, rather than to the proper object) (Blaustein 1930b, 53–58). Blaustein uses here the notions of “proper”

\(^{19}\) For the presentation of Blaustein’s theory of presentations in the context of cognitive acts, see Chudy (1981), and in the historical context of inquiries into the nature of intuition, and imagination, see Plotka (2019).

\(^{20}\) Rosińska (2013, 77) writes: “Sensations are the most elementary perceptual processes in which sensual data is given. At this level there is no distinction between a presented object and a presenting content. According to Blaustein, sensations are purely receptive acts. They are intrinsic presentations. All other presentations are based on them, and, in this sense, are derivative—they need sensations. In all other presentations there is a distinction between an object and a presenting content.”
or “improper” objects of presenting content; whereas by the “proper object” he understands the object of direct intuition which is directly founded on sensations, and by “improper object” is to be understood the object of indirect intuition which interprets or apprehends sensations (Blaustein, 1931b, 20). With this in mind, Blaustein (1931a, 124–128; 2005, 24–27) distinguishes three forms of intuition: (1) perceptual or direct intuition where the presenting content is a function of “original sensory contents,” and it characterizes the function as strictly intuitive; (2) secondary intuition where sense-data can be either (a) reproduced (e.g., in the act of remembering), or (b) created (e.g., in the act of imagining, say, a Pegasus), and (3) imaginative intuition. The last form of intuition is instantiated by imaginative presentations in which the presentational content is a function of “original sensory contents,” however, the presentation so-to-speak duplicates the object as both intuitively given in perception and imagined, i.e., the presentation has both proper and improper objects. Let me note that both secondary, and imaginative intuitions are indirect. Blaustein defines also two types of non-intuitive presentations, namely: (1) schematic presentations (if the function of representation is realized by inadequate signs, e.g., judgments; here “the schematized object” is represented by “the schematizing object,” e.g., a schematic presentation of Europe can be schematically represented by a map), and (2) symbolic presentations (if the function of representation is realized by symbols which are founded of conventions, e.g., a skeleton symbolically presents death since a cultural convention binds these two elements) (Blaustein, 1931b, 7–9). Both schematic, and symbolic presentations are non-intuitive, i.e., abstract, and conceptual presentations.

As claimed, Blaustein refers to formulated descriptive differences, and he uses these classifications in his analysis of different aesthetic experiences. At bottom, he agrees with Ingarden that aesthetic experience has temporal structure, meaning it develops over time. Moreover, he is perfectly aware that, given the various kinds of works of art, there are different forms of intuition at play in the domain of aesthetic experiences (Blaustein, 1937, 400–401; 2005, 136–137). For him, the fact of the variety of different forms, or types of works of art is prima facie justified. In this regard he considers, e.g., static works of art, like a painting or a sculpture, where only perception and perceptual presentations can be at play. He notices, however, that given temporal nature of aesthetic experience, other presentations can go to the fore, e.g., additional schematic, or symbolic presentations can modify further experiences, if someone realizes that she or he comprehends objects as possessing a symbolic meaning. Blaustein makes an example in this context by referring to Husserl's (1995, 251–252; 1983, 261–262) famous discussion (from Ideas I) of Albrecht Dürer’s “Knight, Death and the Devil.” In Blaustein’s (1930b, 23–24, fn. 3; 2005, 54–55, fn. 20) view, Husserl
...too hastily claims that the copperplate of Dürer represents, among others, death since the skeleton represents death only symbolically, and not directly; nonetheless, symbolic presentation occurs on the basis (Blaustein speaks of “psychological foundation” in this regard) of perceptual and imaginative presentations. According to Blaustein, then, this particular experience goes as follows: (1) one directly experiences sense-data, which (2) are apprehended in perception as shapes; nonetheless, (3) one sees not the shapes, but through the shapes other objects, i.e., a skeleton, and this is possible because imaginative presentations produce the improper object of intention; finally, (4) one realizes that the skeleton symbolically represents death, and this is possible because of symbolic presentations. All in all, aesthetic experience is constituted as a whole of all these moments, and its aim is to experience aesthetic pleasure (emotional component) which manifests itself in a polyphonic harmony of aesthetic qualities of different layers of the experienced object (Blaustein, 1930b, 47; 1938b, 53; 2005, 184).

What distinguishes Blaustein’s (1936–1937; 1938b, 53–55; 2005, 184–186) view of aesthetic emotions from Ingarden’s position is the claim that the preliminary emotion is not necessary for the experience itself, and moreover, the work of art can found different—other than aesthetic—values, e.g., the educational value in an example of a movie. So, as we see, the structure of the aesthetic experience of perceiving a painting is for Blaustein indeed complex.

Blaustein also uses his theory of imaginative presentations in regard to a theater play, and, consequently, to watching a movie. Let me focus on the first example when Blaustein (1930b, 15; 2005, 48) considers Shaw’s Caesar and Cleopatra. What one directly, or perceptually experiences is something that is happening on stage during the play. However, one sees not meaningless events, but, say, actors’ performances while Caesar talks with Cleopatra; here the different roles are constituted as quasi-real objects in the following way: the imagined object (e.g., Caesar) constituted in the imaginative presentation is given at once as intuitive (the real movements and words happening on the stage) and non-intuitive (Caesar meeting Cleopatra). Whereas the former is the proper object of perceptual intention, the latter is the improper object of the imaginative intention. The difference arises at the descriptive-psychological level: the intuitive object has properties “truly” ascribed to it by the act (e.g., being a man, or woman, having blond, or dark hair), and the non-intuitive object has properties ascribed in the modus “quasi.” From a phenomenological viewpoint, Blaustein compares this experience with illusion, however, what differentiates imaginative experience from illusionary experience is the lack of a belief that the object exist at all (in illusion, according to Blaustein, one has to believe that the illusion is true). Besides the perceptual and the imaginary object, there is also Caesar as a historical figure who...
lived in ancient times. In this context, Blaustein differentiates between (1) the reproducing object, (2) the imaginative object, and (3) the reproduced object. What is intuitively, or perceptually given, then, is only the reproducing object (events happening at the stage; object, or objects which have “truly” ascribed properties); this is the basis for a quasi-adequate presentation, i.e., the imaginative object, which is non-intuitively given (actor comprehended as Caesar; object, or objects which have quasi-ascribed properties); both, however, refer to the reproduced object, either the real, or the fictional one (Caesar as a historical person, or, say a Pegasus; these objects can be situated “somewhere,” and “sometime” in the real, or fictional world).

With this in mind, Blaustein (1938a, 14–15; 2005, 10–11) notices an important phenomenological difference: perceptual acts found imaginative acts, but inasmuch as presentational content in perceptual acts represent their reproducing objects adequately, in imaginative acts the contents cannot represent the imaginative object adequately. If one sees the actor who plays Caesar, the presenting content of this act refers adequately to the person as the person, but can we then say they represent the actor as Caesar either adequately or inadequately? As Blaustein puts it, presentational contents present the object in imaginative presentations only quasi-adequately. The difference is clear: the reproducing object is present in the same surrounding world as the viewer is, namely, in the theater; the imaginative object is present in the world inherent to the work of art, say, a Cleopatra’s Egypt; but the reproduced object is not real, but used to be real in the past. E.g., Caesar’s conversation with Cleopatra is performed on the stage not in the theater, but in the front of Sphinx in Egypt, just as Shaw writes about this in his play. To explain how imaginative objects are given, Blaustein (1930b, 23–24; 2005, 54–55) writes of quasi-real objects. For him, imaginative intuition is the act that creates quasi-real objects if the subject adopts the imaginative attitude. Blaustein (1938a, 13; 2005, 10) characterizes the object as given in a quasi-spatiality and a quasi-time (cf. Rosińska, 2001, 70–71). In other words, what a viewer is looking at is simultaneously the stage in the surrounding world and the quasi-world—which Blaustein also calls the imaginative world. While being directed towards the imaginative world, one “forgets” about the real world; this means for Blaustein: imaginative presentation, and the reference to the reproduced object is possible because aesthetic experience does not contain the belief that the object of this presentation exists. In other words, aesthetic experience distances one from the real world, and enables one to “see” (only quasi-adequately) the non-real (imaginative, or fictional) world. If so, aesthetic experience distances one from her, or his “natural” life, it enables one to “take a rest” from everyday life (Blaustein, 1933, 46; 2005, 125). This, as stated above, is close to Ingarden’s approach for whom aesthetic experience distances one from the world of praxis.

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4. CONCLUSION

Dziemidok (1980, 178) and, more recently, Ptaszek (2011, 120) claim that Blauastein’s aesthetics is inspired, or even influenced by Ingarden’s phenomenology. Given the historical context—discussed in section 1 of the present article—I take this general hypothesis for granted. But, even if Blaustein is indeed influenced by Ingarden, the following questions arise: To what extent are both theories interconnected?, and, more specifically: Which elements of Ingarden’s theory does Blaustein refer to, and how, if at all, does he reconsider this approach? By raising these questions, my aim here is to define specific elements which bind, and differ both approaches to aesthetics. To do this, I discussed at the beginning Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience (section 2.1.), and its ontological background in the theory of intentional objects (section 2.2.). Next, I considered Blaustein’s criticism of Ingarden’s method (section 3.1.). Finally, I reconstructed Blaustein’s theory of presentations, and I asked about its use in aesthetics (section 3.2.). The presented analysis, thus structured, allows me to conclude that, first, Blaustein takes over some particular aesthetic theses or insights of Ingarden; but, second, there are some elements of Ingarden’s aesthetics that are critically discussed, and redefined by Blaustein, and which mark clear breaks with his teacher’s theory. At the end, let me examine these points closer.

First of all, (1) Blaustein agrees with Ingarden that there is no general structure of aesthetic experience for all kinds of art; rather, the character, and structure of experience is strictly connected to the object that is perceived; in Blaustein’s terms, our experience combines different presentations dependent on what one perceives, e.g., schematic presentations if one reads a book, or imaginative presentations if one watches a movie. (2) Both Ingarden, and Blaustein (1938a, 8; 1938b, 26; 2005, 5–6, 165) claim that the subject of aesthetic experience is active while constituting the aesthetic object. As a consequence of the description in point 2; (3) Blaustein (1937, 407; 1938a, 7; 1938b, 42; 2005, 6, 144, 177) comprehends—just as Ingarden does—aesthetic experience as a phasic structure, i.e., some phases of the experience are happening only if other phases are already passed. Next, (4) Blaustein (1937, 403; 1938a, 18; 2005, 13, 138) accepts Ingarden’s view of the work of art as a multi-layered object, and (5) he uses Ingarden’s theory of the spots of indeterminacy to describe aesthetic experience in general (Blaustein, 1938a, 23–24; 2005, 16), and, for instance, the experience of listening to the radio in particular (he considers, e.g., how one does understand the radio broadcast if not all required data are present [Blaustein, 1938b, 14; 2005, 155]). (6) Blaustein (1937, 402; 2005, 139) follows Ingarden in claiming that the aim of aes-

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21 Here Blaustein refers to the Husserlian-Ingardenian idea of the living memory.
thetic experience is to constitute a “polyphony,” or an organized whole of aesthetic value qualities (on different levels, or layers of the work of art), and (7) he comprehends—just as Ingarden (1961, 307–308; 1973a, 207) does—aesthetic experience as directed toward Gestalt qualities. Finally, (8) they both hold that aesthetic experience situates one outside the everyday life, or the world of praxis.

As claimed, however, there are also elements that are critically reconsidered or redefined by Blaustein. (9) Even if he follows Ingarden to emphasize the dominant role of feelings (in relation to the intellectual attitude) in the experience of watching a movie (Blaustein, 1933, 26; 2005, 109), he claims—contra Ingarden—that there are also non-aesthetic feelings, and values, e.g., the value of education, involved in the experience (Blaustein, 1933, 34–35; 2005, 116–117)22. (10) Blaustein (1938b, 53; 2005, 184) agrees with Ingarden that the preliminary emotion is an element of aesthetic experience, but (different than Ingarden) he claims that the emotion is preceded by an anticipation of the emotion, i.e., by the act of perception of the object. (11) For this reason, while Ingarden insists that perception is unnecessary for aesthetic experience, Blaustein holds that there is no aesthetic experience without perception. Additionally, (12) Blaustein speaks of Ingarden’s idea of quasi-judgements which enables one to refer to the object presented in the work of art; for him, the belief moment lacks in these judgements (Blaustein, 1933, 23; 2005, 107), and to explain this—different than Ingarden (1973b, 176–177)—he identifies quasi-judgements with Meinong’s assumptions (Blaustein, 1937, 402; 2005, 139). If this is the case, however, Blaustein misreads Ingarden in this regard.

I think that Blaustein’s criticism of and break with Ingarden’s aesthetics is marked by his critical assessment of the eidetic method. As claimed in the section 3.1., Blaustein offers to understand phenomenology as descriptive psychology, rather than as an eidetic discipline. This important shift in methodology has far reaching consequences for the Ingarden-Blaustein discussion: (13) whereas Ingarden’s aesthetics is developed mainly as phenomenology, and ontology of aesthetic experience, Blaustein’s approach seems to go beyond ontology towards descriptive-psychological analysis; in result, (14) whereas Ingarden speaks of lived experiences, Blaustein prefers presentations, and its complexes, or combinations. (15) Thus, although they both refer also to the notion of “constitution” to describe aesthetic experience in its relation to the aesthetic object, they understand it differently: for Ingarden, constitution is a “creation” of a purely intentional object; for Blaustein, in turn, constitution means a

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“combination” of different presentations. (16) All in all, Blaustein’s central reconsideration, if it is not a misreading of Ingarden’s aesthetics, lies in a different attitude, namely, to reinterpret the Ingardenian idea of pure and also intentional objects in a descriptive-psychological fashion, i.e., to describe these objects from a phenomenological viewpoint, or, in other words, to describe how one does experience these objects. In contrast to Ingarden, then, for Blaustein phenomenology determines ontology. In consequence, even if Blaustein (1937, 401; 2005, 138) adapts Ingarden’s (1973b, 317–323) vocabulary of representing, and represented objects, and he gives some clues to interpret the imagined object given in the imaginative intuition—as defined in section 3.2.—as a purely intentional object which hides, or conceals its true, i.e., purely intentional nature, Blaustein obscures Ingarden’s clear relation between three objects: an also intentional object, a purely intentional object, and the real object (cf. Dziemidok, 1980, 34–35). By employing the theory of representations, namely, he reduces the real object to the complex of sensations which are absolutely adequate; but if sensations are indeed the basis for aesthetic experience, as Blaustein holds, the aesthetic object loses its purely intentional status in favor of the real status. So, paradoxically, Blaustein’s attempt to go beyond Ingarden’s ontology, and to reconsider his aesthetics, is only partial since it misreads, to some extent, the theory of intentional objects.

REFERENCES


