The Journalistic Culture in Ukraine in Times of Conflict

A critical analysis of the coverage of English-language media in Ukraine about the *Ukrainian Crisis* and the *War in Donbass*

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by

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Abbreviations

AD   anno Domini

EU   European Union

MH   Malaysia Airlines

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO   Non-governmental organization

UK   United Kingdom

US   United States

USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

"Let's be honest: They're sick of us! How much longer can Europe be bothered with its "sick person"? This is an honorary title that has changed holders a dozen times from Turkey to Great Britain, over the past two centuries.. It is now finally Ukraine's turn, after the epic efforts of brave and fearless Western politicians to somehow ensure its place in Europe."[1]

Yuriy Makarov, 2013

"The menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority."[2]

Homi Bhabha, 1984

In his opinion piece "Advice at the Sickbed" Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Makarov frames Ukraine as the "Sick man of Europe" - a keyword which in political terms describes a state which is loaded with internal problems and thus in need for urgent reforms because they are allegedly necessary for its "cure". Historically this label served other states as an excuse to force reforms on this declared "sick" state as they were in this symbolic analogy considered to be "healthy" and worried about the future of the "patient" - indicating that this word was and still is part of a paternalistic discourse, reproduced by cultural hegemons who define the political, economic and military standards of a certain region (such as Europe[3]) or even the whole world.

The term "sick man" originated in a politically turbulent time: It was first used in the late 19th century as the Ottoman Empire[4] which was a major colonial power at the time exhibited political and military weaknesses. The metaphor of the term "sick bed" here also implied that before its illness, the "patient" has already built up an impressive legacy which needs to be shared out among its

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1 Makarov, Y (2013). Advice at the Sickbed. *The Ukrainian Week*. P. 1
2 Bhabha, H. (1984). Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse. *October, 28, 125,* P.129
3 An example for this cultural hegemonic discourse was the framing of Greece during the European debt crisis
4 That is why in his cited statement Makarov refers to Turkey, which is the historical successor of the Ottoman Empire

heirs in case the disease turns out to be fatal. In the times of colonialism the respective territories and resources of struggling great colonial powers were of special interests to the other states.

Therefore by using this term to describe Ukraine, Makarov produces multiple effects: He compares Ukraine with former major powers such as the Ottoman Empire and thus implies that the state has a rich political, military and cultural historical heritage, a strategically important territory and desirable resources. At the same time he places Ukraine into the group of other former "sick men" of Europe, such as not only Great Britain in the late 1960s but also France, Italy, Greece and even Finland as one of the latest examples[5] - thereby implying that Ukraine has for ages been part of the European continent. By using this rhetoric, Makarov kills two birds with one stone: As he implies that Ukraine is a European state he is also implicitly saying that Ukraine is not a post-Soviet state (anymore) – it is more a "post-European" state which now wants to get back the Europeanness which they once possessed. As it will be described later on in this work, this thinking pattern is typical for a postcolonial condition.

Overall, by applying this term from its distinct intellectual and historical context as being paternalistic and Western, Makarov distorts the authority of the established cultural hegemonic discourse. Since the label "sick man" has historically not been given to these alleged "sick" states by themselves but solely by other great powers, the act of self-labeling, which at first glance might seem as a self-disparagment, can actually be seen as an empowering act – because it is an act of imitation of the powerful discourses of political Europeans/Western hegemons.

Here, the quote by postcolonial scholar Homi Bhabha comes into play: In his famous essay "Of Mimicry and Man" he lays out his idea of *mimicry* – a concept which became a key term for postcolonial studies as it describes exactly

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5 In late 2015 different media labeled Finland as the 'new sick man of Europe' due to its slow economic growth

the kind of imitative behaviour which the quote by Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Makarov illustratively displayed. Based on this psychological phenomenon that humans unconsciously and automatically mimic other humans[6], Bhabha develops a critical understanding of *mimicry* for postcolonial conditions: *Mimicry*, he argues, can turn into an unintentionally subversive tool which destabilizes the dominance of colonial discourse. Though the colonized might rarely realize it while being in the process of *mimicry*, by imitating the colonizer the colonized undermines the powerful colonial discourse, narratives and systems imposed by the colonizer. This occurs as the colonizer has "the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, *as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite*"[7]. But in order for the colonial *mimicry* to function, the difference between the colonizer and the colonized has to be continuously expressed – requiring a "slippage"[8] which gives power not only to the colonizer but to the colonized alike. In essence this act of *mimicry* results in the colonized revealing the ambivalence of colonial discourses and thus evidencing their emptiness. *Mimicry* in the (post)colonial context can therefore in Bhabha's understanding be an empowering instrument to the colonized.[9]

Since its first appearance Bhabha's concept of *mimicry* has been controversially debated, further developed and applied to different postcolonial contexts. One very interesting yet contested implementation has been put forward by US scholar David Chioni Moore who argues due to a geo-cultural peculiarity there is a variation of the initial concept of *mimicry*: In the societies of Central and Eastern Europe *mimicry* can be seen as part of a compensatory behaviour which expresses itself by desiring a "return to Westernness that once was theirs"[10]. The

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6 cf. Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious facial reactions to emotional facial expressions. *Psychological Science, 11(1),* 86-89.

7 Bhabha, H. (1984). Op. Cit. P. 126

8 cf. Ibid.

9 cf. Ibid.

10 Moore, D. (2001). Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique. *PMLA, 116*(1), 111-128.

reason for this is what Moore labels as a *reverse-cultural colonization* – meaning that against the established Western view of colonization in which the colonized are being orientalized and thus seen as passive, feminine or barbaric, "in Russian-Central European colonization this relation is reversed, because for several centuries at least Russia has (…) been saddled with the fear or at times belief that is was culturally inferior to the West"[11]. Thus, Moore does not only claim that the post-Soviet space is postcolonial but also that its "post-colonial desire (…) fixates not on the fallen master Russia but on the glittering Euramerican MTV-and-Coca-Cola beast that broke it"[12].

This work aims at qualitatively investigating this particular shaping of the postcolonial concept of *mimicry* in case of the post-Soviet space by zooming in on one specific social subsystem in one specific post-Soviet state: The English-language print section of the journalism culture in Ukraine in times of conflict evoked by the outbreak of the *Ukrainian crisis* in November 2013 and the subsequent *war in Donbass*. The Ukrainian and international media coverage of these events has been scientifically researched[13][14][15] - as has the postcolonial condition of Ukraine[16][17][18] and the journalism culture in Ukraine in the course of and the period after the Euromaidan events. Likewise, the theoretical intersections between first literature studies and postcolonial studies, second postcolonial studies and post-Soviet studies and third media studies and post-Soviet studies have been studied by scholars in multiple ways. What has

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11 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 121

12 Ibid., P.118

13 Boyd-Barrett, O. (2017). Ukraine, Mainstream Media and Conflict Propaganda. *Journalism Studies, 18:8*, 1016-1034, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2015.1099461

14 Nygren, G.; Glowacki, M.; Hök, J.; Kiria, I.; Orlova, D.; Taradai, D. (2016). Journalism in the Crossfire. *Journalism Studies, 19:7, 1059-1078.* DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2016.1251332

15 Khaldarova, I.; Pantti, M. (2016). Fake News. The Narrative Battle Over the Ukrainian Conflict. *Journalism Practice.* DOI: 10.1080/17512786.2016.1163237

16 Sakwa, R. (2015). Ukraine and the Postcolonial condition. *OpenDemocracy.net* P. 1

17 Horbyk, R. (2016). Ideologies of the Self: Constructing the Modern Ukrainian Subject in the Other's Modernity. *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 3 (2016).* P. 89–103

18 Snyder, Timothy. "Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine and the World." *Slavic Review* 4 (2015): 692–707

however so far almost not been researched at all are the theoretical and practical intersections of these three scientific disciplines – media studies, postcolonial studies and post-Soviet studies. Assuming that the intersectional study of these three fields holds great potential for new and fruitful insights, this work is situated at the theoretical cross-roads and by analyzing the case study of the English-language print section of the Ukrainian journalism culture in times of conflict follows two goals: Draw attention to this existing research gap and exploring the options of this young intersectional research field by offering a qualitative study which provides new and different perspectives on a relevant and scientifically important topic. The goal of this work is however neither the discussion whether and to which degree the post-Soviet space can be considered postcolonial nor the systematic and comparative mapping of the (entire) Ukrainian journalism culture. Also, it aims not at analyzing the causes, actors, implications, consequences and possible solutions of the *Ukrainian crisis* and the ongoing *war in Donbass*.

For the analysis of the English-language print section of the Ukrainian journalism culture and their coverage of the *Ukrainian crisis* and the *war in Donbass*, this work makes use of three theoretical concepts: *Post-Soviet postcoloniality*, constructivist perspective on war reporting and *journalism culture*. The concept of *post-Soviet postcoloniality* assumes that the Russo-Soviet activity was an act colonization and thus that the post-Soviet space is in a postcolonial condition. The *constructivist perspective on war reporting* states that every reality of a war is medially constructed by journalistic systems through various basic and more specific patterns which are characteristically for times of conflict – namely the construction of the image of an enemy, patriotism and self-censorship. The *journalism culture* model provides a theoretical framework for the systematic and comparative analysis of the different sets of ideas of journalists. These three concepts are very well suited for the analysis of

this presented case as Ukraine was a key state in the Soviet Union and continues to be a key player in understanding the (postcolonial) condition of the post-Soviet space – not only but for a great deal because of the current political conflict. This in turn justifies the constructivist approach on war reporting as the journalists working for media in Ukraine are directly involved in and concerned by the consequences of the *Ukrainian crisis*, mainly the *war in Donbass*. The journalism culture model is useful because it allows to systematically compare journalism cultures and it has been already applied to a broad range of journalism cultures across nations, making it possible to form predictions about the Ukrainian journalism culture.

The first central hypothesis of this work are thus that the coverage of *Ukrainian crisis* and the *war of Donbass* of the English-language media in Ukraine shows traces of postcolonial and constructivist war reporting narratives. The second hypothesis concerns the meta-analytical level: The overall structure, quality and typology of the selected opinionated media content corresponds to traditional standards and practices of Western journalism cultures since of its postcolonial condition, the Ukrainian journalism culture exhibits a *mimicry* of a 'return to Westernness'. In other words, the Ukrainian journalists aim at imitating their Western colleagues in order to empower and distinguish themselves from their once colonizer (Soviet-)Russia. The two research questions of this work are therefore:

RQ1: *In how far can the opinionated coverage of the Ukrainian English-language media of the 'Ukrainian crisis' and the war in Donbass be interpreted from a constructivist and postcolonial perspective?*

RQ2: *In how far can the English-language print section of the Ukrainian journalism culture be described in general according to Hanitzsch' model and in specific in regard to its potential postcolonial character?*

Guided by these research questions this work is structured as the following: After the introduction and the description of the three theoretical concepts post-Soviet postcoloniality, constructivist war reporting and journalism culture and their intersections, the third chapter explains the necessary background information to contextualize this research. An insight is given into the current post-Soviet postcolonial discourses in contemporary Ukraine; the *Ukrainian Crisis*, the *war in Donbass* and the coverage about it in Ukrainian and international media as well as into the Ukrainian journalism culture and its recent developments. Then, the methodology is laid out followed by the presentation of the results of the qualitative content analysis in the fifth chapter. In the conclusion, these findings are summarized and critically discussed in regard to recent political debates and scientific research potentials.

Trust in journalism and the legitimacy and authority of journalists seems to be in a deep crisis in many places – social media, blogs and alternative sources of information shake up the traditional roles of journalists. At the same time, questions of national identities and affiliations are being expressed in a more polarized and aggressive manner and thus seem to influence national political elites and societies more than before. These tendencies shape journalism cultures as well and especially in times of conflict when information and interpretation is crucial, it is important to critically examine and compare journalism cultures in order to understand how they function and what role they play in these political conflicts. Thus by investigating the very particular case of the English-language print section of the Ukrainian journalism culture this work wants to gain insights about how media narratives and journalists shape national identities and political preferences in Ukraine. The concept of post-Soviet postcoloniality offers a new perspective and has the potential to disclose to the flaws of existing concepts and narratives. Therefore, such an analysis of the journalism culture in Ukraine is important and relevant – not only because of the ongoing political and

military conflict but also for the sake of the quality and the legitimacy of journalism (culture). Critical (and especially comparative) research on journalism culture can reveal contradictions in the established and often unquestioned norms in global journalism culture – the Western type of journalism culture which often claims for itself to be objective, independent and exclusively reporting the 'truth'. This study tries to add a critical contribution to this relevant field.

Chapter I

The Ukrainian Journalism Culture in Times of Conflict

§ 1 Theory

1.1 Post-Soviet post coloniality *by David Moore*

In both postcolonial and post-Soviet studies, the publication of David Moore's essay entitled "Is the Post in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Towards a Global Postcolonial Critique" evoked great attentionand sparked a controversial debate among international scholars[19]. He argues that the post-Soviet sphere should be considered as a postcolonial sphere – a controversial position given the fact that the established (Western) view on colonialism (and thus postcolonialism) is (still) centered around the idea that is was the 'global South' which was subject to colonization; or as Moore points out the space which was formerly labeled as 'non-Western', 'Third World', 'minority' or 'emergent'[20]. However, the notion 'postcolonial' has exceeded its initial scope Moore notes.

He defines postcolonial cultures based on what he calls a 'rough consensus'[21]: '[T]he cultures of postcolonial lands are characterized by tensions between the desire for autonomy and a history of dependence, between the desire for autochthony and the fact of hybrid, part-colonial origin, between resistance and complicity, and between imitation (or mimicry) and originality. Postcolonial peoples' passion to escape from their once colonized situations paradoxically gives the ex-colonials disproportionate weight in the recently freed zones. And the danger of retrenchment, or of a neocolonial relation, is ever present."[22] Then Moore presents the two main points of his essay: First he criticizes the discipline

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19 Tranzit (2011). The Postcolonial 21st Century: Central Europe and Beyond - A seminar with David Chioni
        Moore and Vít Havránek. P. 1
20 cf. Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 113
21 Ibid., P. 112
22 Ibid., P. 112

of postcolonial studies for being "too narrow"[23] and second he criticizes the discipline of post-Soviet studies for being "too parochial"[24] because both of them do not consider the post-Soviet space as a postcolonial space - a condition which he calls a "double silence"[25].

His definition of the "post-Soviet sphere" includes the Baltic states, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the former Soviet republics and independent 'East Bloc' states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia[26]. Moore argues that these twenty-seven nations – Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the former East Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the remaining Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – have a postcolonial condition, similar to the one of sub-Sahara Africa. "These nations, some young and some quite old, were unquestionably subject to often brutal Russian domination (styled as Soviet from the 1920s on) for anywhere from forty to two hundred years."[27] Though Moore acknowledges that the post-Soviet world just as the postcolonial world is enormously diverse[28], referring to his comparison with postcolonial Africa Moore argues that "it should be clear that the term 'post-colonial,' and everything that goes with it-language, economy, politics, resistance, liberation and its hangover-might reasonably be applied to the formerly Russo- and Soviet-controlled regions post-1989 and -1991, just as it has been applied to South Asia post-1947 or Africa post- 1958. East is South"[29].

Moore argues that postcolonial studies have so far ignored the idea of the post-

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23 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 112
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. P.114
27 Ibid., P. 115
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.

Soviet sphere being postcolonial – a situation which he labels as the "first silence". He takes an example to make his point clear: Referring to an essay by the postcolonial scholar Ella Shohat, he speaks about her approach of describing the striking historical event of the collapse of the Soviet communist model. He argues that Shohat only views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a "distant (…), abstract (…), noncolonial event, and as a loss" since she only looks at it from the perspective and the perceived desires of the "traditionally constituted Third World peoples" - by the collapse of the Second World socialism, they fear an imbalance for their struggle for independence in the global arena. Moore criticizes that this very same event, the collapse of the Soviet Union, was however in the twenty-seven nations of the Soviet sphere, from Lithuania to Uzbekistan, "widely perceived (...) as a decolonization"[30]. So in essence, his argument is that the members of the former Soviet societies classified the collapse of the Soviet Union as an event of decolonization.

In order to explain the "second "silence" - that is the "lack of engagement with postcoloniality"[31] in Eastern and Central European, Caucasian and Central Asian and post-Soviet studies – Moore makes use of different arguments. To begin with he turns again to the three-worlds theory in which "Western Europe and North America constitute the First, the socialist economies the Second, and all that remains – largely the world's economically weakest states – by default become the Third"[32]. According to Moore it is "a historical indebtedness to three-worlds theory"[33] which is one of the causes for this silence. This prevailing theoretical dominance combines with the wide spread of Marxist or strong left positions among many postcolonial scholars in the US and elsewhere[34] which prevent them from taking the perspective of the Russo-Soviet power being of

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30 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 117
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.

colonialist character. Another reason he names is the post-Soviet region's "European-Asian" split and the perceived racial self-identification of those post-Soviets who claim to be "European" - the perceived line that runs between in short "Asiatics" on the one side and Slavs or "Europeans" on the other side prevents the "post-Soviet region's European peoples" from claiming to share the situation of for examples postcolonial Filipinos and Ghanaians.[35] The last factor which Moore identifies as a reason for this silence is the "region's postcoloniality"[36] meaning that the very fact that the post-Soviet space is postcolonial leads to denial of it.

He refers to colonization theorists who have argued that "one result of extended subjugation is compensatory behaviour by the subject people"[37]. This behaviour expressed itself in an "exaggerated desire for authentic sources, generally a mythic set of heroic, purer ancestors who once controlled a greater zone than the people now possess"[38]. A similar concept which was described by postcolonial theory and which Moore takes up is *mimicry* which he defines as a behaviour which "occurs when subjugated peoples come to crave the dominating cultural form, which was long simultaneously exalted and withheld"[39]. For the particular case of Central and Eastern Europeans this means that they have a the desire to "return to Westernness that once was theirs"[40]. To conclude Moore argues that "it is (…) a postcolonial desire, a headlong westward sprint from colonial Russia's ghost or grasp, that prevents most scholars of the post-Soviet sphere from contemplating "southern" postcoloniality"[41].

By aiming at locating the Russo-Soviet form of (post)colonial relations in an

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35 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 17
36 Ibid., sq.
37 Ibid. P. 118
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.

analytical taxonomy, Moore addresses the fact that in mainstream analysis of colonization, the type of Russo-Soviet colonial activity can not be categorized as "[s]tandard accounts of Western colonization suggest a three-part taxonomy"[42]. He calls the first type "classic", meaning that a "long-distance but nonetheless strong political, economic, military, and cultural control is exercised over people taken as inferior"[43]. The second type is characterized by "the colonizers settle, turning the indigenous populations into "Fourth World" subject"[44]. The third type he labels as "dynastic" because it describes that "a power conquers neighbor peoples"[45]. Moore argues that even though certain explanatory elements of this established taxonomy are suitable for characterizing Russia as a colonial power, the Russo-Soviet colonial activity cannot be adequately described by it.

Therefore he suggests a new, fourth type of colonization which so far has not been part of this established model of the three types of colonization: The "*reverse-cultural colonization*"[46]. However, this type only applies to the Baltic and the Central European states as Moore specifies. He describes this type as the following: "Once again, the standard Western story about colonization is that it is always accompanied by orientalization,[47][48] in which the colonized are seen as passive, ahistorical, feminine, or barbaric. However, in Russian-Central European colonization this relation is reversed, because for several centuries at least Russia has, again, been saddled with the fear or at times belief that it was culturally inferior to the West."[49] This new type which he suggests sheds an interesting new light on the relations between Western Europe, Central Europe

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42 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 118
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. P. 121
47 cf. Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. (1991). Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The Poetics and Politics of Otherness. 17-44. 10.1007/978-1-137-04144-9_2.
48 cf. Trubetzkoy, N. S. (1920). Europe and Mankind. *Trans. Kenneth Brostrom. Trubetzkoy, 'Legacy'1 -64.*
49 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 121

and Russia because it again emphasizes the concept of mental maps on which the geographic location does not necessarily have to correspond with the cultural mentality, the ideological position and the psychological perception. It tries to explain the special position accompanied by a widespread myth of Russia's supposedly *Eurasian* character: In this understanding, Russia is neither European nor "Asiatic" but located somehow in between while at the same time being particularly more primitive than (Western) Europe[50][51][52].

Moore draws a reflective and balanced conclusion, listing first points which speak against the idea that the Russo-Soviets were colonizers and which thus "characterize the Soviet experiment as noncolonial": "Soviet Union's wish to liberate its toiling masses; its dismantling of many ethnic-Russian privileges in its east and south; its support of many Union languages; its development of factories, hospitals, and schools; its liberation of women from the harem and the veil; its support of Third World anticolonial struggles, seen as intimately connected with the Soviet experiment, from 1923 to 1991; and the fact that some minority of the Soviet sphere's non-Russians wished the Bolshevik regime"[53].

As arguments for the colonial character of Russo-Soviet activity he names "the mass and arbitrary relocation of entire non-Russian peoples; the ironic Soviet national fixing of countless formerly less defined identities and the related tortured intertwining of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz-Tajik border to guarantee an ethnic strife; the genoci-dal settling of the Kazakh nomad .nillions from 1929 to 1934; the forced monoculture across Central Asia and the consequent ecological dis-aster of the Aral Sea; the Soviet reconquest of the once independent Baltic states

50 cf. Riasonovsky, N. (1967). The Emergence of Eurasianism. *California Slavic Studies 4: 39-72.*

51 cf. Trubetzkoy, N. S. (1925). The Legacy of Genghis Khan: A Perspective on Russian History Not from the West but from the East. *Trans. Kenneth Brostrom. Trubetzkoy, 'Legacy', 161-231.*

52 cf. Zamyatin, Y. (1970). 'Scythians.' 1918. A Soviet Heretic: Essays by Yevgeny Zamyatin. Ed. and trans. Mirra Ginsburg. *Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1970.* P. 21-33

53 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 122sq.

in 1941; the invariable Russian ethnicity of the number-two man in each republic; the inevitable direction of Russia's Third World policy from its Moscow center; and tanks in 1956 and 1968 in Budapest and Prague"[54]. To complete his mixed conclusion, Moore stresses the special character of the Soviet Union: "Complicating either argument is that the Soviet Union and its predecessor Russian empire were often as lethal to their Russians as to non-Russians, and that the USSR radically de-valued specifically Russian identity for several decades"[55].

1.2 Constructivist war reporting *by Jan Staiger*

Though the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to an initial short period of worldwide hope for a peaceful global future form the beginning of the 1990s, this phase came to an abrupt closure with 9/11. Since then, many ongoing conflicts remain unsettled, old conflicts re-inflame and new conflicts appear. The research on the conditions, structures and achievements of crisis- and war communication will therefore remain a central task of media and communication studies and is expected to gain even greater importance and relevance in the wake of new challenges for security policies on the one hand and structural changes in the relationships of politics, military and public sphere on the other hand[56]. This is not a new insight for media and communication studies as it occupies itself with the relationships of media and war since a long time.[57] An uncountable number of contributions to the research field of crisis- and war communication have been made and published[58].

One of these useful theoretical perspectives was developed by German scholar

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54 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 123

55 Ibid.

56 Löffelholz, M. (2004). Krieg als Medienereignis. Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert. *VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden*, P. 14

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

Jan Staiger who presents a constructivist social-systemic perspective on war reporting. By situating his concept within the context of these two theories complexes, Stagier is in line with a current major paradigmatic trend as the research on journalism has during the last decades moved increasingly away from normative, naive-realistic and individual-centered approaches to a much stronger empirical, constructivist and social systemic perspectives[59][60]. Staiger's main hypothesis: All phenomena which are relevant within the context of war reporting can without any exceptions be profitably described and explained by the theory of social systems[61]. With this assumption, Staiger follows a general abstraction which other scholars have indicated before that is; reality, including the reality of war, is designed by systems – complex units whose elements are organizing themselves, constantly referencing to themselves and are therefore standing out from their environment[62]. As a consequence, reality is a parameter which is relative to its systems, as it is inseparably connected with the structures and rules, characteristics and requirements of these systems which generate them[63].

He defines *war journalism* as a value-neutral term to describe the type of journalism which does the reporting of wars – the central characteristic of it is to put war as a topic on the agenda and to address aspects which can be set into context with a war. Based on this definition of *war journalism* and the general assumption that war is something which is always a constructed reality, in journalism constructed along particular organization- and journalism specific

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59 cf. Löffelholz, M. (2000b). Theorien des Journalismus. Entwicklungen, Erkenntnisse, Erfindungen – eine metatheoretische und historische Orientierung. *In: Löffelholz, M (ed.). Theorien des Journalismus. Ein diskursives Handbuch. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. 15-60.* P. 31-57

60 cf. Scholl, A.; Weischenberg, S. (1998). Journalismus in der Gesellschaft Theorie, Methodologie und Empirie. *VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden.* P. .25-47

61 cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Selbstorganisation, Nicht-Linearität, Viabilität. Eine konstruktivistisch-sozialsystemische Perspektive auf Kriegsberichterstattung. *In: Löffelholz, M. (2004). Krieg als Medienereignis. Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden*

62 cf. Kneer, G; Nassehi, A. (2000). *Niklas Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme: Eine Einführung* (fourth unrevised edition). Wilhelm Fink, Paderborn. P. 17sq.

63 cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Op. Cit. P. 146

observation patterns, Staiger presents three of such patterns; the third and last one being the most relevant for this study.[64]

1. *Elementary construction patterns:* Journalistic war reporting always represents an achievement of construction by humans for humans. For this reason, their realities exhibit patterns which are attributed directly to the working method of our cognitive system – to the basic patterns of cognitive formation of order by which perceptions, imaginations, ideas, thoughts and other cognitive achievements are being organized. Thus every war observation organizes itself – making use of figurative factors as described by the scientific sub-discipline of figure psychology – in the direction of (possibly closed and simple) contrasts and shapes, similarities, symmetries and groupings as well as (preferably clear and continuous) continuities and coherences. The construction of figures allows humans to quickly organize observations and organize them to mostly integral and contradiction-free units of meaning[65][66]. In addition to that, (war) journalism makes use of schemes – models of its environment – which unite numerous single observations whereby future observations can be faster put in order and system operations can be better coordinated[67].

2. *(News) value of war*

The second pattern is defined by journalistic-specific observation dispositions – whole wars and smallest detail events are being selected and constructed[68]. Staiger refers to the well-established model of Johan Galtung and Mari H. Ruge (1965) of the factors and the values of news. These news factors are partly journalistic-specific and editorial-specific appropriations and partly completions

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64 cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Op. Cit. P. 161

65 cf. Frerichs, S. (2000). Bausteine einer systemischen Nachrichtentheorie. Konstruktives Chaos und chaotische Konstruktionen. *Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag,* P. 91 sq.

66 cf. Kriz, J. (1999). Systemtheorie fur Psychotherapeuten, Psychologen und Mediziner. *Wien: Facultas.,* P. 138ff.

67 cf. Frerichs, S. (2000). Op. Cit. P. 87sq.

68 cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Op. Cit. P. 163

of figure factors and can already be found in a similar form in very daily, non-media related, relevance-orientated observations of the environment of humans[69]. A war event is hence evaluated according to certain factors such as topicality, concern, (political/economic/cultural/geographic) proximity, singularity, surprise, concord, interest-systems, negativity and personalization. The newer, more serious, closer, more extraordinary, more intense, more surprising, more expected, more prominent, more damaging and more personalized a war event is, the likelier it is to be considered news.

3. *The construction of an image of an enemy, patriotism and self-censorship*

The third and for this work most relevant pattern of the construction of the reality of war is a combination of mechanisms of ideological mobilization which take place in war journalism. The first element of this pattern is the idealization and glorification of wars in applying a polarizing black-white-scheme – it is in operation when the image of states, regions, ethnics, political organization and/or representatives are being targeted and (re-)shaped to become an enemy[70]. In most cases, this construction of the image of an enemy blends in with the construction of a threat which helps to accept a strong leadership and makes extreme forms of conflict management[71]. By referring to definitions from the field of social psychology, Staiger defines the image of an enemy as the stereotypical reality construction of a human- or social system who consistently address another human- or social system as inherently negative. Interestingly, Staiger notes that this involves including the projection of "reneged" characteristics of the constructing system – such as aggression, envy, revengefulness, feelings of guilt and inferiority[72]. The difference between the

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69 cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Op. Cit. P. 163.

70 cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Op. Cit. P. 164

71 cf. Kunczik, M. (2001). Feind-Bilder. Wie Stereotypisierungen funktionieren und wozu sie dienen. *In: Deutsche Welle (Hrsg.): 'Sagt die Wahrheit: Die bringen uns um!' Zur Rolle der Medien in Krisen und Kriegen. Berlin: Vistas. 97-104,* P. 99

72 cf. Hörner, K. (1993). Der Begriff Feindbild: Ursachen und Abwehr. *In: Verena Klemm & Karin Horner (ed.): Das Schwert des 'Experten'. Peter Scholl-Latours verzerrtes Araber- und Islambild. Heidelberg: Palmyra Verlag.* P. 34-43

constructing system and the constructed enemy is maximized by pronouncing the own positivity in contrast to negatively constructing the enemy – and by marginalizing or even rejecting content which openly questions this simplistic good-bad-scheme. This leads to a blurring of the usual differences of social subsystems which temporarily subordinate themselves to a common solidarity if the war and related aspects such as the threat, risk, fear and courage become the top issue of the communication within society[73].

The second element which Staiger names is *patriotism* and *self-censorship* – a mechanism which affects journalism when one's own country or close allies are involved, basic interests of society or values are seen as to be in danger and/or a clear image of an enemy is at hand. Then, the concerned journalism culture has the tendency to show open partisanship for its relation- alternatively super system by autonomously constructing the war-related news reality in its terms and by more or less actively urging the audience to adopt this reality.[74] Staiger connects the patriotization of journalistic systems to self-censorhip and states that this phenomenon can be understood as a self-organizing process of the partial reproduction of the realities of political systems of preferences. In doing so, it doesn't make a difference whether journalism takes on his promises on its own initiative or whether it is 'just' giving way to political, social or organizational pressure – without executing the patriotic reality of offerings internally. The outcome is the same: The construction of war is being cleared up from unwanted aspects and presented in a one-sided manner.

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73 cf. Luostarinen, H. (1998). Die Konstruktion nationaler Identitiiten in den Medien. Einführung in ein Forschungsprojekt. *In: Wilhelm Kempf & Irena Schmidt-Regener (Hrsg.): Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien. Miinster: Lit. 143-148.*, P. 145

74 cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Op. Cit. P. 166

1.3 Journalism Cultures *by Thomas Hanitzsch*

Almost 15 years after its first publication, Hanitzsch theoretical approach to journalism cultures has become a widely recognized, established, discussed and applied method to systematically investigate and compare journalism cultures across all nations on the globe. It developed into what Hanitzsch had intended: A "central point of reference in a field where concepts are often used in many different ways"[75]. With his analytical concept of journalism cultures, Hanitzsch filled an important gap in media and communication studies: Before his famous publication entitled "Deconstructing Journalism Culture: Toward a Universal Theory" appeared, there were only few studies which tried to take on the topic of "journalism culture and its dimensional structure at the conceptual level"[76]. According to Hanitzsch, most of the research was instead concerned with the cultures of news production[77]. As a response to this conceptual blank, the German scholar proposed a "theoretical foundation on the basis of which systematic and comparative research of journalism cultures is feasible and meaningful"[78]. Or in other words: An "analytical grid to map diverse journalism cultures onto a set of universal dimensions of global variance"[79]. Hanitzsch conceptualization of journalism culture consists of three essential constituents: Institutional roles, epistemologies and ethical ideologies. These domains are then further divided into seven principal dimensions: interventionism, power distance, market orientation, objectivism, empiricism, relativism, and idealism[80]. These dimensions are analytical tools; meaning that each of them "spans two ideal-typical extremes that rarely become manifest in the "real" world of journalistic practice"; thus, the truth can be mostly found in between the poles[81].

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75 Hanitzsch, T. (2007). Deconstructing Journalism Culture: towards a universal theory. *Communication Theory 17(4), pp. 367-381.* P. 368
76 Ibid., P. 367
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., P. 371
80 Ibid., P. 367
81 Ibid., P. 371

Taking this fully developed model of journalism culture as a starting point and a theoretical base, Hanitzsch and many of his international colleagues carried out the biggest systematic comparative research of journalism cultures in 2011. In this study entitled "Mapping Journalism Cultures Across Nations"[82], the team of scholars investigated national journalism cultures in 18 states, interviewing 100 journalists in each nation – a total number of 1800 journalists. The results of their findings create a broad and international image of practices, role understandings and roles from journalists all around the globe. Since this extensive scope of data allows for statistically meaningful statements about different journalism cultures, the results of this study are very valuable for this work in order to make well-grounded and reasonable assumptions for the qualitative content analysis and to later interpret the results of it. Of special interest here are the results from the analysis of the included Western journalism cultures on the one hand and of the included post-Soviet journalism cultures on the other hand – specifically this means to closer look at the journalism cultures of Austria, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the United States of America on the one hand and at the journalism cultures in Bulgaria, Romania and Russia on the other hand.[83] Importantly, Hanitzsch and his colleagues note that the journalism culture approach which they use "does not suggest that western values are generally 'better' or 'more professional' than others"[84].

Generally, the scholars found that "detachment, non-involvement, providing political information and monitoring the government are considered essential journalistic functions around the globe"[85]. Likewise, qualities such as

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82 Hanitzsch, T., Hanusch, F., Mellado, C., Anikina, M., Berganza, R., Cangoz, I., Coman, M., Hamada, B., Elena Hernández, M., Karadjov, C., Virginia Moreira, S., Mwesige, P., Plaisance, P., Reich, Z., Seethaler, J., Skewes, E., Vardiansyah Noor, D., Kee Wang Yuen, E. (2011). Mapping Journalism Cultures Across Nations. *Journalism Studies, 12(3), 273-293*

83 Unfortunately Ukraine and its national journalism culture were not included into the study therefore the results of the research on Western and post-Soviet journalism cultures are being used as a point of reference and orientation. The Ukrainian journalism culture still needs to be fully scientifically invested and this research gap offers great   potential for useful insight

84 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. 276

85 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. 273

impartiality, reliability and factualness of information are globally appreciated as well "though their perceived importance varies across countries"[86]. Whereas these principles are valued worldwide, certain aspects of journalism cultures seem to be viewed very differently depending on the cultural context: "[I]nterventionism, objectivism and the importance of separating facts from opinion (…) seem to play out differently around the globe"[87]. The scholars found that Western journalists in general tend to disapprove "any active promotion of particular values, ideas and social change"[88] and to orientate themselves to "universal principles in their ethical decisions"[89]. This contrasts to values of journalists in non-Western contexts who „tend to be more interventionist in their role perceptions and more flexible in their ethical views"[90] according to the Hanitzsch and his team.

Hanitzsch and his team describe these results in more detail by looking at the different constituents of journalism culture. The first essential constituent of journalism culture describes the *institutional roles of journalism in society* by looking at both "its normative responsibilities" and "its functional contribution to society"[91]. The first dimension of this constituent is *interventionism* – which the scholars define as "the active support of particular values, groups and social change"[92] - and their study has shown that Western and non-Western/post-Soviet journalism cultures tend to handle this characteristic differently. Whereas the professional journalism cultures in the West "embrace much more the ideals of detachment and non-interference in their occupational self-awareness"[93], journalists in developing states and transitional democracies such as the selected post-Soviet states Bulgaria, Romania and Russia tend to gravitate towards

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86 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. 273
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Hanitzsch, T. (2007). Op. Cit. P. 371
92 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. 280
93 Ibid., sq.

interventionism. The scholars explains this with the idea that these journalists are "most willing to promote social change in contexts where such transformation rapidly occurs*or where it seems needed"[94]. The second dimension *power distance* reveals another striking division between both the Western and the post-Soviet journalism cultures investigated: Even though the "monitoring the political and economic elites is indeed a function of journalism globally"[95], there are significant differences between Western journalism cultures in which "acting as a watchdog of the government and a watchdog of business elites" usually goes hand in hand and the two post-Soviet states Romania and Russia where the „least vigilant and critical journalists seem to come from"[96]. Especially for Russia, the scholars identify a "[r]elatively weak power distance, indicated by the willingness of journalists to convey a positive image of political and business leadership"[97]. The third dimension *market orientation* – which is "reflective of the primary social focus that guides news production"[98] - shows again somewhat mixed results: Whereas in the post-Soviet state Russia the orientation towards the audience is relatively strong, the focus among European journalists tends to lie on "[p]roviding interesting information"[99]. Another difference is the perception of motivational and participatory functions of journalism: Whereas Russian journalists do not strongly support the idea of "motivating people to participate in civic activity and political discussion"[100], this aspect play a big role in Western journalism cultures in Germany, Austria and Switzerland – but interestingly in Bulgaria and Romania, so two post-Soviet states, as well[101].

The second essential constituent of journalism culture addresses the

94 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. 281
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Hanitzsch, T. (2007). Op. Cit. P. 374
99 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. .281
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.

epistemologies which are "commonly defined as the study of knowledge and the justification of belief"[102]. Hanitzsch defined this constituent as the one being "concerned with the philosophical underpinnings of journalism that are instrumental in doing news work"[103]. Here, the international researcher team found "evidence for the global importance of impartiality and neutrality, (…) factualness and reliability of information"[104]. However, there are some strong differences in the two dimension *objectivism* and *empiricism*. When it comes to the first dimension objectivism, both in Western journalism cultures such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland as in the journalism culture of the post-Soviet Russia, "[a]llowing the news to be influence by beliefs and convictions is clearly disapproved of"[105] by the journalists. Likewise, Impartiality appeals strongly both to Western journalists in Germany and Austria and to journalists in Romania. As for the second dimension *empiricism*, the results also differ: The "separation of facts and opinion"[106] is handled differently among journalists in Russia (but also in Spain) who have "the most favorable attitude towards providing analysis"[107]. Though American journalists partly share this view, journalists in German, Austria and Switzerland have the "least positive attitude"[108] about it. Also, journalists from these three Western cultures "find it especially important not to publish material that cannot be verified"[109] - Russian journalists however "seem to be most willing to publish unverified information"[110].

The third and last essential constituent of journalism culture are the *ethical ideologies* which stem from general ethics theory in which one can "distinguish

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102 cf. Dancy, J. (1985). An introduction to contemporary epistemology. *Malden, MA: Blackwell.*
103 Hanitzsch, T. (2007). Op. Cit. P. 375
104 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. 282
105 Ibid., P. 283
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.

between ethical ideologies and moral values”[111]. Here, the scholars found that “most journalists (…) tend to obey universal principles regardless of situation and context”[112].As for the first dimension of *relativism* the results showed that journalists from Western cultures “exhibit a stronger tendency to disapprove of a contextual and situational ethics”[113] whereas their Russian colleagues on the other side “tend to be most open to situational ethical practices”[114]. The second dimension *idealism* also reveals an interesting difference between Western and post-Soviet journalists: Although both agree that “questionable methods of reporting should be avoided”[115], the journalists in Western cultures support this idea stronger that their post-Soviet colleagues. Professionals from the post-Soviet journalism cultures in Bulgaria, Romania and Russia “exhibit a relatively strong normative orientation with regard to the acceptance of harmful consequences”[116], their Western colleagues do not share this position.

1.4 Theoretical intersections

These three theoretical concepts coming from the two scientific disciplines media studies and postcolonial studies have numerous conceptual overlapping – they can be found in the area of tension between constructivism, cultural hegemony and objectivity. Coming from the postcolonial studies, Moore's new theoretical approach is largely embedded in a discipline which applied main principles from constructivism. Moore's work shared the same assumption which is underlying Staiger's perspective on war reporting: Everything which is object to human perception is the product of a constant constructive process, (post)colonial discourses and mental maps as well as realities of war. The question of how and why then certain discourses and constructed realities

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111 Hanitzsch, T. (2007). Op. Cit. P. 378
112 Hanitzsch et al (2011). Op. Cit. P. 284
113 Ibid., P. 285
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.

dominate other alternative ones is subject to the field of cultural hegemony – a concept based on Marxist philosophy which describes the domination of a ruling class over a culturally diverse society in order to manipulate the culture of that society and to influence their values, discourses, perceptions, beliefs and explanations. Since this domination leads to the ruling-class worldview getting imposed onto the society and therefore becoming the accepted cultural norm, the concept of objectivism comes into play. It discussed the question to which extend anything can be seen to be objectively true – cultural norms are a fiercely debated object to such debates. Thus constructed (post)colonial narratives and realities of wars which are enforced and reproduced through the practice of continuous cultural hegemony descriptively are and normatively have to be critically questioned and if needed deconstructed applying the philosophical concept of objectivism – in order to examine how and why certain narratives and realities are being constructed. This all is vital for the scientific study of journalism cultures as journalists and media constantly produce, reproduce, change, establish, refine or destroy narratives and discourses by the selection of their language, their content and thus constantly influence the values, discourses, perceptions, beliefs and explanations in the culture of their respective society.

Thus, Hanitzsch' approach of a systematic and comparative investigation of journalism cultures can and does use elements of both constructivism and cultural hegemony. Questions such as whether certain journalism cultures dominate culturally because the beliefs and values which they have successfully constructed have a stronger influence than other alternative types of journalism cultures can and are partly addressed by Hanitzsch and his concept of journalism cultures.

From this short overview of conceptual connections it becomes clear that all of the three theoretical perspectives intersect in multiple dimensions. Derived from this fruitful theoretical tangential points, the two research questions aim at

finding out in how the coverage of the Ukrainian English-language media can be interpreted from a postcolonial and constructivist perspective and – based on the data sample – how the Ukrainian journalism culture can be described; in general and in regard to its potential postcolonial character. for this study are the following:

Given the fact that Ukraine was in a state of internal conflict when the *Ukrainian crisis* broke out and that this led to a strong national discourse about the national identity, it can be expected that the opinionated coverage of the English-language media of the *Ukrainian crisis* and the *war in Donbass* will show characteristics of both postcolonial positions and constructivist war reality reporting. Especially since these English-language media are appealing to an international audience in both Ukraine (the international Ukraine-based political, business and cultural elite, expats etc.) and outside of Ukraine in mainly Western centers of political and business decision power and competence (think tanks, government state departments, policy analysts etc.). As for the second research question, the expected outcome of the analysis is the product a conceptual conceived idea: If Ukrainian journalists adhere to the idea of their own condition being a postcolonial one and this in turn implies a behaviour that Moore calls a 'return to Westernness' mimicry then it can be expected that these Ukrainian journalists mimic the typical Western type of journalism culture. This would mean that they embrace values which are traditionally associated with Western journalism such as objectivism, critical distance to the issues covered and a broad variety of viewpoints, opinions, information and narratives.

§ 2 Context

2.1 Mapping Ukraine

The task of localizing Ukraine as a nation within a historical, geopolitical, cultural and economic context on a European or even a global map is a complicated one – its long, diverse and at times turbulent history forbid overhasty conclusion and instead call for a close look at the details. The basic assumption that before being able to analyze and understand any nation's internal discourses, media and journalism culture, it is essential to throw light on its historical, political and cultural peculiarities first, is especially true for a nation such as Ukraine: "The path to Ukrainian statehood has been exceptionally long and arduous"[117][118]- and it is far from being over. Currently the state is undergoing tremendous political, economic, cultural and social reforms and the society is transforming at a historic pace. As Richard Sawka puts it: "History is raw and alive"[119] in Ukraine meaning that the past is far from being settled but is instead subject of many still ongoing debates – a consequence of the fact that contemporary Ukraine is "the product of many changes"[120]. These numerous historical changes are reflected in the national internal developments ever since Ukraine gained independence in 1991: It has become evident that there is an "absence of the concept of a Ukrainian nation and national identity"[121] and this "has led to a controversial, often ambivalent process of identity formation"[122]. The main reason for this is that Ukraine is not only a nation which is split along ethical, linguistic and religions lines but also between strong political-ideological divisions. The immense diversity leads to tensions: This previous and current Ukrainian struggle for a national identity is not only a consequence

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117 Sakwa, R. (2015). Frontline Ukraine: crisis in the borderlands. *I. B. Tauris, London.* P. 7

118 cf. Wilson, A. (2000). *The Ukrainians : Unexpected nation*. New Haven, Conn. [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press.

119 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 9

120 Ibid., P. 11

121 Korostelina, K. (2013). Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers, 41:2, 293-315, DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2012.747498.* P. 293

122 Ibid.

and an expression of the state's complex history but also a key in understanding not only the political, economic and cultural situation in which Ukraine as a single state actor is in but also the larger geopolitical context and implications which its at first glance merely national struggle has as well. Mapping Ukraine as both a nation with a rich and difficult history on its path to statehood and as a key geopolitical actor in the continuation of new forms of a new-old East-West conflict remains a continuous and challenging, yet important undertaking for scholars.

2.1.1 Historical and geopolitical conditions

As with many other nations, Ukraine's current political disputes and identity struggles can largely be attributed to an ongoing conflict between two ideological camps which claim to have the correct interpretation of history: On the one side are those who "assert that the country is an autochthonous cultural and political unity in its own right"[123] and on the other side stand those who believe "that they are part of the same cultural, and by implication, political community"[124]. The key part of history which has been dividing Ukrainians for centuries and still so doing until today is the time of the Kievan Rus. The were a "loose federation of East Slavic tribes from the ninth to the thirteenth century ruled by the Rurik dynasty"[125] and are today often seen as the 'mother tribe of all Slavs'. The long struggle over the right interpretation of their heritage is sparked continuously by the blurred lines between ethical, linguistic and religious origin and identity. Those who believe in the common ancestry in Kievan Rus emphasize the same ethical Slavic background and the same religious beliefs which arose when in AD 988 the conversion to Orthodoxy by the Kievan Prince Vladimir the Great took place – and act which "endowed the modern Russian,

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123 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 8
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.

Ukrainian and Belarusian nations with a shared religion"[126]. However those who are convinced that Ukraine has "long ago set out on its own developmental path"[127] highlight that "the early Slav state was already fragmenting when the Mongol invasion of 1240 destroyed Kiev and separated the various people"[128]. From this short excursion into history it becomes clear that "Ukraine (…) is a cleft country with two distinct cultures"[129]. These two models of Ukrainian statehood which can be labeled as 'monist' and 'pluralist'[130] have been separated by a what Huntington calls a "civilizational fault line between the West and Orthodoxy"[131]. This line run through "the heart"[132] of the Ukrainian nation as done so "for centuries"[133]. What unites both parts of Ukraine is the long history of dependence: Wheres as "western Ukraine was part of Poland, Lithuania, and the Austro-Hungarian empire"[134], eastern Ukraine and later all of the Ukrainian territory belonged to Russia. The "decisive event"[135] which led to this development occurred in 1654: A Cossack leader named Bohdan Khmelnytsyk who led an uprising against Polish rule agreed to "swear allegiance to the tsar in return for help against the Poles"[136].

It is this special tension between Ukraine and its neighboring power Russia which has marked the state's history for as long as it has existed. The main two camps correspond with the respective idea of Ukrainian statehood: On the one side there is the view that "Russia and Ukraine are just two aspects of a single civilization"[137] - a position which is widespread in Russia[138]. In this regard,

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126 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 8
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Huntington, S. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order.* New York: Simon & Schuster., P. 165
130 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 8
131 Huntington, S. (1996). Op. Cit. P. 165
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 8
138 Ibid.

"Ukraine was often described as 'Malorossiya'"[139], a pejorative term which emphasized the alleged inferior character of Ukrainians. On the other side "Ukrainian nationalists argue that their country long ago set out on its own development path"[140], cultivate a "long tradition of Ukrainism"[141] and argue that "the Ukrainian version of the East Slavic language represents the emergence of a wholly distinct ethnic identity"[142]. This tension between these two sides "has played out in manifold struggles and conflicts over the centuries"[143] and so the EuroMaidan events and their ideological underpinnings came as no surprise to attentive observers of the Ukrainian nation and its history.

"Contemporary Ukraine is a product of many changes"[144] and a complex ethnic regional distribution. There is the Donbass region in the East which "despite the extensive links with Russia and ethnic intermingling"[145] has had "an identifiable sense of belonging to the Ukrainian community"[146]. Then there is the Western region of Ukraine known as Galicia which was part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire until 1918 and where Russians are seen as "invaders and occupiers"[147] - strong ressentiments which are still present to this day[148]. Then there is/was the Crimeans peninsula which is considered to be "the heartland of Russian nationhood"[149] and the center which evolves around the predominantly Russian-speaking capital Kyiv. This mentioned cultural-historical line and the different historically shaped identities in the various regions also influence the religious affiliations in Ukraine which are "equally complex"[150] as the ethnic, linguistic and ideological composition. On the one hand a major portion of the Western

139 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 8
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., P. 11
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid., P. 12
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid., P. 13

Ukrainian population has been supporters of the Uniate Church "which practices Orthodox rites but acknowledges the authority of the Pope"[151] and historically "western Ukrainians have spoken Ukrainian"[152] and have been "strongly nationalist in their outlook"[153]. On the other hand, the people of Eastern Ukraine "have been overwhelmingly Orthodox and have in large part spoken Russian"[154].

2.1.2 National identity narratives in independent Ukraine

If post-Soviet Ukraine is defined as a nation which was colonized and which was part of a totalitarian system then its current national development has to be analyzed with a special regard to its formation of national identities because "[t]he movement from colonialism and totalitarianism to political pluralism is connected to the construction of a state and the reshaping of national identities"[155].[156][157][158][159]. In Ukraine, this transformation was a "controversial, often ambivalent process of identity formation"[160] because of the "absence of the concept of a Ukrainian nation and national identity"[161] which presented itself since it gained independence in 1991. According to Richard Sakwa, the dominating Ukrainian state-building narrative is that "Russia, in various disguises since 1243 (the date considered the breaking point of old Kievan Rus' under the impact of the Mongol invasion) imposed a colonial pattern of domination over Ukraine"[162]. Karina Korostelina however found five different shared narratives in her study: First a "Dual Identity" which derives its pride for Ukraine from "the prominent spirituality of the people and their orientation

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151 Huntington, S. (1996). Op. Cit. P. 165sq.
152 Ibid. P. 166
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Korostelina, K. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 293
156 cf. Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. *London: Sage.*
157 cf. Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.*
158 cf. Gellner, E. A. (1994). Nationalism and Modernization. I*n Nationalism, edited by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, 55–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press.*
159 cf. Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity. *Reno: University of Nevada Press.*
160 Korostelina, K. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 293
161 Ibid.
162 Sakwa, R. (2015). Ukraine and the postcolonial condition. *Open Democracy.* P. 1

towards higher values"[163] but also from viewing Ukraine as the "modern successor of the Rus'[164]"[165]. The second narrative is Pro-Soviet grounded on the pride for "the cultural values and history of Ukraine, including Kievan Rus', the national revolution under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,[166] the Allied victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the technological achievements of Soviet Ukraine (e.g. airplanes, rockets, science)"[167]. A "Fight for Ukrainian Identity" is the third narrative – its source of pride is "Ukraine's original history, culture, language, literature, and democratic traditions"[168]. It exhibits strong conceptual parallels with Ukrainian postcolonial narrative as it embodies the idea that "Ukraine has survived as a nation, escaping and recovering from past slavery, and emerged like a Phoenix rising from the ashes"[169]. Korostelina labels the fourth narrative as "Recognition of Ukrainian Identity"[170] because it highlights the idea that "Ukrainian people are hard-working, are devoted to their land, and have supported democratic traditions since the Middle Ages."[171] Similarly to the previous one, this narrative alos shows overlapping with the postcolonial view on Ukraine as it holds up the following conviction: "Ukraine is a peaceful, free society not dependent on power, patronage, or totalitarian ideology, all of which highlights the importance of preserving its difference from Russia."[172] The last narrative alludes to the culturally diverse Ukrainian society as is entitled "Multicultural-Civic" - it is founded on the pride for "the achievements of the Ukrainian people and the beauty of its land."[173]

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163 Korostelina, K. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 296
164 Korostelina: 'Kievan Rus' (also Kyivan Rus' or Rus) was the first eastern Slavic state (late ninth to mid-thirteenth century). It is considered the earliest predecessor of modern Ukraine and Russia.'
165 Korostelina, K. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 296
166 Korostelina: 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657), leader of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who organized a rebellion against Polish rule in Ukraine that ultimately led to the transfer of the Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper River from Polish to Russian control.'
167 Korostelina, K. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 299
168 Ibid., P. 301
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., P. 304
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., P. 306

2.2 Post-Soviet postcolonial discourses in contemporary Ukraine

In the debate about these different narratives regarding Ukraine's national identity, postcolonial theory has become a popular approach among Ukrainian scholars. But in the evolving research field of postcolonial post-Soviet space, Ukraine represents a special and highly controversial case. Not only because of the ongoing conflict in the Eastern part of the country but especially because of its geographic location and close political and historical interconnection with Russia (which is in turn the main reason for the ongoing conflict between the two states), "the position of Ukraine" can be seen as "the problematic touchstone for postcolonial theory"[174].

Postcolonial studies have never been a strictly limited field of research and its debates are very often controversial and ever evolving as the very matter of postcolonial theory itself – identifying, analyzing and deconstructing power relations and discourses in order to create new intellectual room for different interpretations, new perspectives and definitions – is a postmodern, post-structural and thus highly ambiguous one. Introducing a new case to the studies of postcolonial theory is therefore always an interesting yet disputed undertaking because it "raises a host of theoretical questions, since postcoloniality is neither spatial nor territorial, but establishes a condition that shapes a whole web of cultural and political relationships"[175]. This is especially true when the focus of postcolonial studies is widen to the extend that literally almost any part of the world can be potentially included in the analysis – or as Moore has noted that there is "on this planet, not a single square meter of inhabited land that has not been, at one time or another, colonized and then postcolonial"[176].

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174 Horbyk, R. (2013). Paper Empires. Orientalism in the Mediated Portrayals of India and Ukraine: A Case Study of British and Russian Press. *East/West* 16: 203–22., P. 89
175 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 1
176 Moore, D. (2001). Op. Cit. P. 112

2.2.1 A controversial debate

Consequently, postcolonial studies remain a complex and contested discipline which tend to spark academic controversy – a reaction which is visible in the most recent discussion about the postcolonial status of Ukraine: The "question whether Ukraine is postcolonial may seem an abstruse matter" and thus one which is "best left to scholars"[177]. And these scholars debate fiercely over the status of Ukraine as a postcolonial subject. Some scholars see the postcolonial approach as a suitable tool to analyze Ukraine's current cultural, social and geopolitical role and stress the power asymmetry between Russia and Ukraine, exposing a Russian imperial hegemony[178][179][180]. Others point out the difficult implications of Ukraine's complex past and the thus the shortcomings of postcolonial theory in describing the Ukrainian case[181][182][183]. For them, the example of Ukraine "represents a wide variety of colonial experiences that are hard to group under the umbrella of postcolonial theory"[184]. Hrytsak argues that applying the postcolonial paradigm to Ukraine does not capture the historical reality of the country because within "the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, Ukraine was more core than colony" and adds that "[c]olony fits the Ukrainian lands of the Habsburg monarchy better"[185]. He further states Ukraine embodied two opposite extreme roles in the past which explain the diverse and contradicting Ukrainian colonial experiences - "as the core of the Russian and Soviet projects, on the one hand, and as the center of the anti-imperial and anti-

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177 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 1

178 cf. Kappeler, A. (2014). Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial Past And Competing Memories. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*

179 cf. Snyder, T. (2015). Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine and the World. *Slavic Review 4 (2015): 692–707*

180 cf. Riabchuk, M. (2015). Postcolonial Syndrome: Observations [in Ukrainian]. *Kyiv: KIS, 2011. 240 p. ISBN 966-2141-66-5*

181 cf. Hrytsak, Y. (2015). The Postcolonial is not Enough. *Slavic Review 4 (2015): 732–37*

182 cf. Mogilner, M; Gerasimov, I. (2015). Deconstructing Integration: Ukraine's Postcolonial. Subjectivity. *Slavic Review 74, no. 4 (winter 2015): 715–722. 2014.*

183 cf. Horbyk, R. (2016). Ideologies of the Self: Constructing the Modern Ukrainian Subject in the Other's Modernity. *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 3 (2016): 89–103*

184 Hrytsak, Y. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 733

185 Hrytsak, Y. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 733

Soviet resistance, on the other"[186]. Hrytsak concludes that because of the frequency of power turnovers Ukraine inhabits a special status; that is it was "not just a colony (if it was one!), it was a contested borderlands"[187].

In order to gain a clearer and better understanding of this extraordinary status of Ukraine, it is important to take a closer look at the different periods in the turbulent Ukrainian history. For scholars such as Hrytsak, these various historical phases underline the ambivalence of the Ukrainian case. Roman Horbyk sums up this uneasiness with the application of postcolonial theory to Ukraine: "Of course, it is impossible to speak about Ukraine's colonial situation without admitting its ambivalence, On the one hand, Ukrainians were active colonizers of steppes north of the Black See populated by Turkic peoples; similarly, Ukrainian cultural and ideological domination over Muscovy in the second half of the 17th century suspiciously reminds of cultural imperialism. On the other hand, Ukraine was the victim of its own creation. First, the imperial ambitions of medieval Kyiv pushed it northwards establishing principalities that already in pre-Mongol times were challenging its domination. Second, the authority of the Russian Empire over the Hetmanate was only possible because significant party of its population, elite, and masses, found it conductive to their interests. The very idea of an Orthodox Slavonic empire was born in Kyiv and the empire was built with many Ukrainian hands."[188]

This brief summary of the role of Ukrainians as both partly colonizers and colonized illuminates the complexity of the subject and "the fact that any narration is ambivalent"[189] or, as the famous postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha has put it, "Janus-faced discourse of the nation"[190]. As this is true for almost any

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186 Hrytsak, Y. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 733sq.
187 Ibid., P. 734
188 Horbyk, R. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 94
189 Yurchuk, O. (2013). Some Notes Concerning Ukrainian Postcolonial Studies. *In: Slavia Occidentalis.,* P. 154
190 Bhabha, H. K. (1990). *Nation and narration*. London: Routledge. P. 3

subtopic of postcolonial studies, in the context of Ukraine this "Janus-faced" narration was publicly very visible in the past five years and continues to be so until today. The outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis which led to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict in the East of the country has evoked a "war of memories" in which both sides "use and abuse history as a political weapon"[191]. It is a battle for moral righteousness and historical interpretative authority in which – contrary to the nature of postcolonial studies which tend to be a field exclusively interesting for and researched upon by scholars - "the controversies about the heritage of Kievan Rus', the interpretation of Mazepa, the Holodomor ad WW II are not only academic, but also political issues"[192].

2.2.2 Postmodern and nationally-orientated postcolonialism

This observation that the case of Ukraine is not only of interest for the theoretical niche of postcolonial studies but has very practical political implications for both states but especially Ukraine leads to the next important trend within the postcolonial debate in contemporary Ukraine: There are two theoretical camps which approach the Ukrainian version of postcolonial studies in a different way.[193] These two types of postcolonial approach in Ukrainian science can be labeled under two main conflicting terms which best reflect the authors' understanding of the developments which are unfolding itself in Ukraine since gaining independence[194]: On the one hand a "postmodern postcolonialsm" (Marko Pavlyshyn) and on the other hand a "nationally orientated postcolonialsm" (Petro Ivanyshyn). Petro Ivanyshyn who proposes these two types of postcolonial approach in Ukrainian science is clear on his point of view as he does not only identify two trends within the current debate but also judges them morally and sees them as two extreme and incompatible

191 Kappeler, A. (2014). Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial Past And Competing Memories. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, p.115
192 Ibid.
193 cf. Ivanyshyn, P. (2005). Natsional 'no-ekzystentsial 'na interpretatsiia (osnovni teoretychni ta prahmatychni aspekty). *Drohobych,* P. 75
194 Yurchuk, O. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 148

poles of thought. He especially rejects the 'postmodern postcolonialism' for the 'lack of patriotism' and views the situation as one in which Ukrainian scholars have no alternative but to clearly choose one of the two sides: "(…) the choice of a young postcolonial scholar at the repulsive face of colonialism is maximally specified. He can choose either literary studies as postmodern (neo-imperial) game indifferent or openly hostile to national culture or literary studies as an intellectual struggle for the revival and strengthening of national and cultural identity"[195].

Olena Yurchuk criticizes this suggested sharp division into two types of the Ukrainian version of postcolonial studies as "too dogmatic"[196] and reproaches Ivanyshyn's "denial of postmodernists' creative activity"[197] for being "superficial and ideologically-biased"[198]. Beyond this seemingly simplistic dichotomy, there are certain Ukrainian scholars who aim at a more analytical and less ideological adaption of postcolonial theory to the Ukrainian case – such as Mykola Riabchuk. For Sakwa, "Riabchuk is rather more subtle and locates his thinking in a more sophisticated postcolonial problematic – the more complex cultural interchanges between master and servant, imperial power and the subaltern"[199]. Yurchuk however notes that he can clearly be identified as a representative of one of the two camps as he can be considered one of the Ukrainian intellectuals who "focus on the prospects for Ukrainian political nation-building"[200] and thus one who belongs to the 'nationally orientated postcolonialism'.

195 Ivanyshyn, P. (2005). Op. Cit. P. 75
196 Yurchuk, O. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 148
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 4
200 Yurchuk, O. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 149

2.3 Reporting of the Ukrainian crisis and the War in Donbass

As already mentioned in the introduction this work does not aim at analyzing or explaining the causes, actors, implications, consequences or possible solutions of the *Ukrainian Crisis* and the *War in Donbass*. This major topic is important yet very complex and thus needs to be extensively researched upon – here in this study it can only be briefly addressed in order to know the basics of this ongoing conflict to understand the here presented research on its respective media coverage. A brief chronology of the events: The *Ukrainian Crisis* is by now an established term which describes "profound tensions in the Ukrainian nation and state-building processes since Ukraine achieved independence in late 1991, which now threaten the unity of the state itself"[201]. In detail, the *Ukrainian Crisis* began when the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union on 21 November 2013. His decision provoked mass protests from the supporters of the agreement – an organized national movement which soon was entitled as *Euromaidan*, referring to the main square Maidan Nezalezhnosti ('Independence Square') in the center of Kyiv where the protest started. These protests led to a revolution which brought about the ousting of Yanukovich. This, in turn, sparked unrest in the largely Russophone regions in the East and South of Ukraine which were traditionally strong supporters of Yanukovich. After Russia intervened militarily in those regions mentioned and annexed/reunited with the then-autonomous Ukrainian region of Crimea, a political crisis of international dimension unfolded. Since Russia's intervention seemingly encouraged the Russophone Ukrainians who were already demonstrating, the protests in the Eastern regions of Donestk and Luhansk developed into a war between the protestors and the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government. As this conflict progressed the Russophone Ukrainian

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201 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. IX

opposition in Donbass developed into a pro-Russian insurgency – often assisted and supported by the Russian military and its special forces.[202][203]

In their evaluation scholars and experts share the rough consensus that these events which unfolded in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 "were driven by developments beyond Ukraine's borders" and reciprocally „internal tensions have become internationalized"[204]. As Rutland notes „[o]f course, domestic factors also played a crucial role, and Ukrainian political actors at all points across the political spectrum must share in the blame for what transpired. But it was Ukraine's ambiguous geopolitical position, and the clumsy interventions of competing outside powers pursuing their own self-centered agendas, that pushed Ukraine's log-jammed domestic politics over the brink into violent civil war"[205].

2.3.1 The Ukrainian case in the global media coverage

Being little to not at all present in the international media coverage before, "Ukraine was all over the international headlines from the end of 2013 through summer 2014"[206]. Extensive media research has shown that reporting on the 'Ukrainian crisis' and the following War in Donbass followed the elementary media construction patterns which scholars have already analyzed in many prior cases: "The fast changing, complex story was usually narrated through rather simple frames and the greatest attention was devoted to issues with international significance"[207] but as the conflict went on, the War in Donbass prolonged and the annexation of Crimea seemed more and more to be irreversible, "the story

202 cf. Higgins, A.; Kramer, A. E. (2014). Pro-Russian Insurgents Balk at Terms of Pact in Ukraine. *The New York Times*. P. 1

203 cf. Tsvetkova, M. (2014). Special Report: Russian soldiers quit over Ukraine. *Reuters*. P. 1

204 Sakwa, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. X

205 Rutland, P. (2015). An Unnecessary War: The Geopolitical Roots of the Ukraine Crisis. *In A. Pikulicka-Wilcewska, & R. Sakwa (Eds.), Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing*. P. 122

206 Dyczok, M. (2015). The Ukraine Story in Western Media. *In A. Pikulicka-Wilcewska, & R. Sakwa (Eds.), Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing*. P. 186

207 Ibid.

began slipping from the international news"[208]. This phenomenon makes the Ukrainian crisis and the War in Donbass a typical case which "reflect the nature of how global media organizations function"[209]: The journalists operate in a non-stop 24/7 rhythm, are pressured by tight budgets, lack a strong people power of correspondents present on the ground (in this case directly in Ukraine), need to cater the interests of different audiences, have to pursue objective reporting as a normative goal and thus describe two perspectives on a story and present the news in comprehensible and simple language and narratives[210].

It is within this challenging area of tension that journalists and international media organizations function – in times of conflicts and wars, these generally difficult conditions can lead to "crossfire situations" for journalists, in both literal and metaphorical sense[211].

The reporting on the war in Ukraine especially during its peak in the year of 2014 has evoked such a situation: Many journalists were "not only killed, wounded, and beaten while conducting their work"[212] but the coverage also revealed many examples of "partisanship in mainstream media, and the media was accused of spreading disinformation and propaganda"[213]. As studies have shown, these patterns can be found in the coverage of media of all the political actors involved – the West with US and European media, as well as Russian and of course Ukrainian media. Most probably because of these patterns, there were a number of shortcomings in international reporting. For Dyczok, the greatest one was "that causes of violence were not adequately explored"[214].

Interestingly, research shows that the mainstream media reporting about the 'Ukrainian crisis' and the War in Donbass "correlates strongly with the political-

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208 Dyczok, M. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 186
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid., sq.
211 Nygren, G.; Glowacki, M.; Hök, J.; Kiria, I.; Orlova, D.; Taradai, D. (2016). Journalism in the Crossfire. *Journalism Studies, 19:7, 1059-1078.* DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2016.1251332, P. 1
212 Ibid.
213 cf. Boyd-Barrett, O. (2017). Ukraine, Mainstream Media and Conflict Propaganda, Journalism Studies, 18:8, 1016-1034, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2015.1099461
214 Dyczok, M. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 188

historical context of each country"[215]. This result corresponds with one of the aspect of the theoretical approach by Jan Staiger presented earlier in this paper – viability; that is the concept that as long as the journalistic coverage is compatible with the environment and practically fits into existing narratives of the subsystems surrounding it (politics, society, science etc.), it is not under threat. Empirically in the case of Ukraine this means that the themes in the coverage "are related to the audience and the political situation in each country according to classical principles of news values"[216]. As a result, the "framing of the conflict is closely related to the political situation in each country"[217] - this influences "how the war is described and what words are used to label the conflict and actors"[218]. Besides Staiger who explains this phenomenon with a mix of a constructivist and a social systemic perspective, it can also be understood with the model of Hallin and Mancini and their concept of a "political journalism"[219] which describes a "professional culture where journalism is closely connected to politics in a system"[220].

2.3.2 Differences between Ukraine, Russia and the West

In specific this means that the media coverage and reporting on the 'Ukrainian crisis' and the War in Donbass differed greatly in all states investigated. In a broad and detailed research, Gunnar Nygren and his colleagues have looked at the war reporting in four nations: Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Sweden. The results seem somewhat foreseeable: In Ukraine, the researchers found a "clear patriotism both in the coverage and among all three media outlets supporting the national struggle"[221] and that partisanship prevails over neutrality in the

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215 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 15
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
219 cf. Hallin, D. C.; Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems: Three models of   media   and   politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
220 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 15
221 Ibid., P. 16

coverage[222]. Strikingly, they "was no direct control or pressure over information flows from both the political and military elite"[223], resulting in a "patriotic discourse"[224]. This patriotic coverage was accompanied by a strong support for traditional Western values and Ukraine's political and cultural integration into Europe and the West in general.

In Russian media, the reporting about the Ukrainian Crisis and the War in Donbass did not only presented itself very differently – it was also based on other previous traditions and narrative foundations: "Anti-western narratives were already a salient feature of Russian political and media discourse before the crisis in Ukraine began[225] [226], but the crisis has imbued them with particular vitriol."[227] Therefore the war reporting in Russian (mainstream) media contained very different features than the Ukrainian: The "coverage related more to the 'Western threat' against the Russian world than the actual war in Ukraine"[228]. Other scholars who have analyzed the Russian coverage note that the reporting about the 'Ukrainian crisis' has "accentuated the position of Russian television as the government's strongest asset in its information warfare"[229] and that is „has taken a key position in advancing the strategic narratives of the government, presenting stories about the cause, nature and resolution of the conflict to domestic and international audiences"[230]. They have also shown that these narratives "have centred, on the one hand, on the hostility and self-interest of Western states behind the regime change in Kiev and, on the other, on the idea

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222 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 16
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 cf. Smyth, R.; Soboleva, I. (2014). Looking beyond the economy: Pussy Riot and the Kremlin's voting coalition. *Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(4), PP. 257-275.*
226 cf. Yablokov, I. (2014) . Pussy Riot as agent provocateur: conspiracy theories and the media construction of nation in Putin's Russia. *Nationalities Papers, 42(4), PP. 622-636.*
227 Hutchings, S.; Szostek, J. (2015). Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse during the Ukraine Crisis. In A. Pikulicka-Wilcewska, & R. Sakwa (Eds.), *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives* Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing. P. 174
228 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 16
229 Khaldarova, I.; Pantti, M. (2016). Fake News. The Narrative Battle Over the Ukrainian Conflict. *Journalism Practice.* DOI: 10.1080/17512786.2016.1163237. P. 891
230 Ibid.

of a fascist threat spreading in Ukraine"[231].[232][233]

Among western media reports, there were variations and – just as mentioned about – the „information and presentation is shaped by country of origin, the editorial policies of the media outlet, the form of ownership of the media outlet, and type of medium"[234]. In the two EU-states Poland and Sweden, the results of the research on the reporting of the 'Ukrainian crisis' and the war in Donbass were very different: The researchers conclude that the coverage in Poland was even more "anti-Russian" than in Ukraine[235]. The reporting focused on "Russian aggression, international sanctions, and threats against Poland"[236]; leading to a situation were the coverage "becomes part of strong nationalistic tendencies in Poland, in the same way that the coverage of the war in Georgia in 2008 was used in Ukraine"[237]. In Sweden however, the "media clearly distances itself from the conflict compared to the other countries"[238] in the study which Nygren and his colleagues undertook. The biggest themes of Swedish media in covering the 'Ukrainian crisis' and the war in Donbass were "international politics and MH17"[239]; thus Swedish coverage can be seen as part of the western news system[240]. According to the researches, Swedish journalists did not take a stand in their coverage – however, there was a strong "dominance for western actors and perspectives"[241].

231 Khaldarova, I.; Pantti, M. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 891

232 cf. Cottiero, C.; Kucharski, K; Olimpieva, E.; Orttung, R.W.. (2015).War of Words: The Impact of Russian State Television on the Russian Internet. *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 43 (4): 533–555.* DOI:10.1080/00905992. 2015.1013527

233 cf. Hansen, F. S. (2015). Framing Yourself into a Corner: Russia, Crimea, and the Minimal Action Space. *In: European Security 24 (1): 141–158,* DOI::10.1080/09662839.2014.993974

234 Dyczok, M. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 187

235 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 16

236 Ibid.

237 cf. Taradai, D. (2014). How News Domestication May Blur Conflict: Coverage of 2008 South Ossetia War in Ukraine. *Central European Journal of Communication 7 (1): 67–81.*

238 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 16

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid.

As for the other main Western actor in the conflict, the US, researcher Oliver Boyd-Barrett has found that the focus of "Western media representation of the Ukraine crisis speaks to US and Western attitudes and ambitions in relation to NATO expansion to Russia's borders and how these in turn relate to perceptions of Russia as a potential aggressor, potential target (…) or potential competitor in a struggle for influence over the continental land-mass that separates Western Europe and China (...)"[242]. Thus, he argues that there is a particular propaganda in Western media which "does not announce itself as such but (…) achieves the purposes of propagandists through the ways in which issues are framed; emphasis and omission; privileging of certain sources, perspectives, information over possible alternatives; and in the uses of language (verbal and visual) that assist these effects"[243].[244][245][246] Taking one media narrative as an example, Boyd-Barrett investigated the topic complex of Crimea, Odessa and Eastern Ukraine. He concludes that the "The West and Western media considered that Russia forcibly seized Crimea and assisted local ethnic Russian thugs in the Donbass to establish separatist fiefdoms in Luhansk and Donetsk"[247]. However in contrast to that, Russian and alternative Western media „maintained that Crimeans, following long-established historical preference, overwhelmingly"[248].

2.4 Journalism Culture in Ukraine

Just as with the general political, economic and cultural developments in and of Ukraine – if one wants to understand the Ukrainian media sphere and the journalism culture, one has to not only understand the current developments of the post-Maidan period but also comprehend the Soviet times and the

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242 Boyd-Barrett, O. (2017). Op. Cit. P. 1017
243 Ibid., P. 1027
244 cf. Boyd-Barrett, O. (2015). Media Imperialism. *London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage*
245 cf. Herman, E.; Chomsky, N. (2002). Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. *New York: Pantheon.*
246 cf. Jowett, G.; O'Donnell, V. (2015). Propaganda and Persuasion. *Thousand Oaks: Sage.*
247 Boyd-Barrett, O. (2017). Op. Cit. P. 1018
248 Ibid.

transformations and political, economic and social developments which the post-Soviet period brought after. This section takes a closer look at the media landscape and the journalism culture in Ukraine; first at its recent history and its transformation path of the 1990s-2010s[249] and then at the presence and the consequences of the EuroMaidan protests.

2.4.1 The post-Soviet legacy of the Ukrainian media system

More than a quarter of a century of independence, Ukraine is still strongly influenced by its Soviet past – so is its media system and journalism culture[250][251]. Estimations of how strong the imprint of the Soviet legacy still is vary; some scholars argue that post-Sovietness is "a key feature of the media system of independent Ukraine"[252] while others would highlight the fact that the "Ukrainian media landscape has undergone a number of crucial changes during the last 25 years"[253], implying that it is gradually moving away from its Soviet past. However, there is a clear consensus among scholars that the Ukrainian media system "is a product of broader post-Soviet transformations in Ukraine"[254] and that "the impact of the Soviet legacies on the development of the Ukrainian media has remained very strong during all those years"[255]. This mix of influences from the Soviet past and the present transformation processes come together to form the special character of the Ukrainian media system and its journalism culture – certain scholars even name 'post-Sovietness'[256] as a "key feature"[257] of the Ukrainian media system ever since the country gained independence. According to Kulyk this 'post-Sovietness' has a two-fold consequence: There is "a radical change of the social role performed by the

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249 Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 442

250 Ibid.

251 cf. Kulyk, V. (2010). Dyskurs ukrayinskykh mediy: identychnosti, ideolohiyi, vladni stosunky (The ukrainian media discourse: identities, ideologies, power relations). *Kyiv: Krytyka.*, P. 177

252 Ibid.

253 Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 441

254 Ibid.

255 Ibid., P. 442 sq.

256 cf. Kulyk, V. (2010), P. 177

257 Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 443

media"[258] on the one hand and "the maintenance of many Soviet attributes molding the very media"[259] on the other hand[260]. Dariya Orlova, a Ukrainian scholar specialized on Ukrainian journalism, identifies three features which the Ukrainian media system since the country's independence has inherited from the Soviet times: The "tradition of state state ownership and state control, loyalty to censorship and lack of business management experience among media outlets"[261].

2.4.2 Ukrainian Journalists and Media after EuroMaidan

As it can be expected, the political crisis which followed the EuroMaidan protests and its subsequent chain of events has not only influenced the reality of Ukrainians since late November 2013 but all aspects and subsystems of Ukrainian society, including thus the media sphere and the journalism culture[262][263]. Various studies have found that the Ukrainian media sphere is going through profound changes and is facing many challenges and that its journalists are confronted with numerous (new) ethical dilemmas and are thus in search of independence and professional identity [264][265][266][267]. "Ukrainian journalism culture since 2013 is undergoing a painful process of continuously adjusting to and counteracting the circumstances of conflict, with external and internal propaganda (...), economic pressure being a consequence of the more general crisis, and guidelines coming from the state institutions (…)"[268], according to

258 Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 443

259 Ibid.

260 cf. Kulyk, V. (2010). Op. Cit. P. 177

261 Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 443

262 cf. Ibid., P. 441

263 cf. Pörzgen, G., Reporters Without Borders (2016). Facing Reality After EuroMaidan. The Situation of Journalists and Media in Ukraine. *Reporters Without Borders.* P. 5

264 cf. Ligachova, N. (2015). MediaOBOZ ili mediaAVANGARD? (Media Waggon-train or media Avantgarde?). *MediaSapiens.*

265 cf. Szostek, J. (2014). The media battles of Ukraine's EuroMaidan. *Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media*, *11*, 1–19.

266 cf. Pörzgen, G., Reporters Without Borders (2016). Op. Cit.

267 cf. Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit.

268 Voronova, L. (2017). Crisis and journalism culture transformation: The case of Ukraine. *In Nordmedia conference 2017 : 23rd Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research Tampere, 17–19 August 2017, Abstracts, Division 2, Journalism* P. 1

Liudmila Voronova[269]. A recent study by the international NGO *Reporters without borders* found out that most of the interviewed journalists are worried about the future development of the media landscape and the journalism culture in their country. Most of them "expressed concern that faced with the triple challenge of the war in the east of the country, the economic crisis and the digitization of mass media, Ukraine would be unable to develop the kind of media landscape a democratic society needs to form political opinions and develop a culture of public debate and to provide its citizens with reliable information"[270].

Orlova points out that the Ukrainian media landscape has been affected by the EuroMaidan protests and the impetus for democratization connected to it. She draws a mix conclusion of the post-Maidan period for the journalism culture in Ukraine as it brought both, improvements and setbacks[271]. As advantages which resulted for Ukrainian journalists from the EuroMaidan protests, Orlova names "increased media freedom, new progressive legislation and reinvigoration of the democratic debate"[272]. In contrast to these positive changes, the setbacks for the Ukrainian media sphere are numerous according to her: "Editorial dependence on owners, concentration of mainstream media in the hands of oligarchs, deteriorating quality of content and crisis of professional identity"[273] are some of the problems which Ukrainian journalists are faced with in the After-EuroMaidan era and are „distinctive features of the post-Maidan media landscape in Ukraine"[274].

A broad research which was lead by Swedish scholar Gunnar Nygren examined

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269 cf. Bolin, G.. (2016). From Nation Branding to Information Warfare: Management of Information in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict'. *In: Media and the Ukraine Crisis: Hybrid Media Practices and Narratives of Conflict, Publisher: Peter Lang, Editors: Pantti, Mervi,* P. 3-18.
270 Pörzgen, G., Reporters Without Borders (2016). Op. Cit. P. 5
271 cf. Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 441
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid.

the Ukrainian journalism culture and generated interesting results: "In Ukraine, there is clear patriotism both in the coverage and among journalists in all three media outlets supporting the national struggle. The professional culture favors partisanship over neutrality in this coverage, and journalists define themselves as taking part in the defense of the nation."[275] Almost all of the Ukrainian journalists who the scholars interviewed said that the are facing an "ethical dilemma (…) while covering the war in eastern Ukraine"[276]. This ethical challenge is the "need to balance impartiality against a sense of citizenship or patriotism"[277]. Within this area of tension, the interviewed journalists "acknowledged that they should remain impartial from a normative perspective, but it was extremely difficult when the war is ongoing within their country."[278] According to Sklyarevskaya, this ethical dilemma has led to a division between journalists and "Glory-to-Ukraine-journalists"[279].

Ukrainian journalists Anastasia Magasowa argues that there are three groups of journalists which formed themselves in the face of the *war in* Donbass: First those journalists who openly admit to put national interests and patriotic feelings above professionality, second journalists who quit their job altogether and join voluntary units which provide concrete help in the conflict zones and third those journalists – to who she counts herself - who take a chance on reporting the events in the country in a professional and objective manner[280].

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275 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 16
276 Ibid., P. 10
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
279 cf. Voronova, L. (2017). Op. Cit. P. 1
280 cf. Magasowa, A. (2016). Ich bin eine Landesverräterin. *Tageszeitung*. P. 1

Chapter II

Analysis of Ukrainian English-Language Media Coverage

§ 3.Method

3.1. Qualitative Content Analysis

In order to systematically and content-wise coherently analyze the media coverage about the Ukrainian crisis, the method of qualitative content analysis according to Philipp Mayring is being applied in this study. For the approach of this research, the qualitative content analysis method seems very suitable because it is designed for "empirical, methodologically controlled analysis (…) of larger texts"[281]. This method serves the purpose of analyzing fixed communication in a systematic and rules and theory based manner – with the aim of drawing conclusions of particular aspects of this communication[282]. This systematic and rules and theory based manner is one of its main advantages – the qualitative content analysis is very well established in the scientific practice and highly recognized as a professional methodological tool because of its predefined and clear procedure and thus its validity. Despite the fact that the qualitative content analysis is following a specific and predefined model, it always has to be adapted to the given material and to the specific research question[283].

The main aim of the qualitative content analysis is the reduction of the complexity of the material and to then be able to make general statements based on the given material. In order to reach this goal, a system of categories and criteria has to be defined and formulated which then serves as the basis of the analysis and the structuring of the given material. This category system can be

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281 Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/ Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, *1(2), Art. 20*, P. 2

282 Mayring, P. (2010). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken. *11., aktualisierte und überarbeitete Auflage. Weinheim und Basel: Beltz Verlag.* , P. 13

283 Ibid., P.49

seen as a kind of code book; only that the focus in this method lies on the qualitative aspect and not on the quantitative aspect – which is usually associated with a code book as part of a study. But this is the obvious strength of the method of qualitative content analysis: It aims at systematizing a qualitative and content focused approach in order to make the results comparable. In order to achieve this, a system of categories is being created in which all the aspects which seem to be relevant for the interpretation of and which ought to be filtered out of the given material are included[284].

In this work, the qualitative content analysis was done both deductively and inductively. First, the main analytical categories were developed deductively by opertionalizing the theoretical concepts of Moore, Staiger and Hanitzsch which were presented in the first chapter. The subcategories were partly developed dedutively and partly inductively in order to combine the advantages of both processes and to adjust the data sample to the particular research questions.

3.2 Data sample

The available data sample for the analysis consist of 108 articles published in English on the websites of the two Ukrainian English-language media *Kyiv Post* and *Ukrainian Week*. According to their official publication reference by the respective newspaper as well as their style, content and tone, these selected articles can be classified exclusively as opinion pieces. All other journalistic formats of news coverage and reporting were not included into the data sample of this study. The main reason for this specific selection is the fact that these opinion pieces belong to the so-called opinion-forming type of text[285] and fulfill an appealing and enlightening function[286] because they do not exclusively

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284 cf. Meier, S. (2014). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. *Blog Universität Paderborn.* P. 1

285 cf. Kaczmarek, D. (2010). Zur Kommentarleistung, oder warum man „wie die Biber heult". *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, S. 45-56,* P. 1

286 cf. Brinker, K. (1997). Linguistische Textanalyse. Eine Einführung in Grundbegriffe und Methoden. *4. durchges. und erg. Auflage. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag,* P. 108sq.

represent a piece of news in a rational and from its context separated manner but instead refer to the content of a piece of news by adding explanatory and evaluating elements[287]. By the means of this evaluation of a certain piece of news, comments and opinion pieces call a particular stance towards a specific matter. With doing so, comments and opinion pieces ideally function as "a role model for the societal discourse"[288] because they do not only describe the matter which is articulated within a given piece of news but also put it on some sort of subjective rating scale[289].

Furthermore, opinion pieces were included into the sample regardless of the author's profession, nationality and employment status at one of the selected media. Also, only opinion pieces which were published in full length and directly on the website of the respective newspaper were included in the sample. Finally, in order to compose a data sample which strictly is connected to the topic of this research, only those opinion pieces which were filtered by the keywords 'Ukraine', 'Russia' and 'Conflict' were included into the sample.

3.3 The media

The two media chosen for this study are the English-language newspaper *Kyiv Post* and the international edition of the *Ukrainian Week*. These two newspapers were chosen for this study because of their national and international reach and audience, the amount of their news content in English – but also because they both still have a print edition which symbolizes a higher visibility in the Ukrainian media landscape and public sphere. It has to be mentioned here that there are other English-language print and online media in Ukraine, namely the economic focused publication Business Ukraine, the Ukrainian Journal, the entertainment magazine What's On and the regional newspaper Lviv Today. At

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287 Nowag, W.; Schalkowski, E. (1998). Kommentar und Glosse. *Konstanz: UVK Medien.,* P. 46sq.
288 Ibid., P. 39
289 Kaczmarek, D. (2010). P. 5

first it was considered to include these media into this study but the scope of this analysis and the topic-specific orientations of these newspapers led to the decision not to put them into this research. However, for further research it would be of great interest to systematically investigate the English-language media in Ukraine.

Kyiv Post

The *Kyiv Post* is the only English-language newspaper in Ukraine where it is produced and published. It consists of both a print version which is published weekly and appears every Friday and an online version. Currently the Kyiv Post's print circulation is 10.000 copies. The number has fallen in recent years – it has reached its peak of 25.000 copies in the year of 2008. The Kyiv Post initiated a new model of selling corporate print subscriptions for delivery in 2011 – the aim was to replace the to date free delivery policy with paid subscriptions. Due to this distribution model by which businesses located in Ukraine buy their corporate subscription to the Kyiv Post, the weekly print version of the newspaper is distributed for free in more than 160 locations in Ukraine, including cafes, restaurants, nightclubs, business centers and hotels.[290] Though mainly distributed in the capital Kyiv, the newspaper is also distributed in the cities of Odesa, Lviv, Kharkiv and Dnipro and a few other Ukrainian cities.

The Ukrainian Week

The Ukrainian Week is an illustrated bi-monthly magazine published in Ukraine in English language covering a wide variety to topic such as politics, economics, culture, society and the arts. It is the English edition of *Український Тиждень* – the Ukrainian-language original magazine of the same name which is unlike its English counterpart published on a weekly basis. Since the English edition

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290 Kyiv Post (2018). Where to Get the Kyiv Post. *Kyiv Post*. P. 1

appears far less often, it contains a selection of articles which are regarded to be of most interest to non-Ukrainian readers. The magazine offers a broad spectrum of interviews, analysis, opinions, art reviews, feature pieces, a travel section and event calenders. The magazine is published by ECEM Media Ukraine GmbH (Austria) in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Week was established in November 2007 and is thus one of several Ukrainian language magazines which have appeared in the course of the Orange Revolution in 2004[291]. This "boost to the weekly news magazine sector"[292] took place due to three main reasons: The protests of the Orange revolution which evoked more press freedom, the emerge of a Ukrainian middle class and a flourishing domestic advertising industry[293].

3.4 Time frame

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict which started with the so-called *Ukrainian crisis* is an on-going conflict which has until the day of the publication of this master thesis has not yet been finally solved. Since this conflict has been going on for more than four years now and this study aims at analyzing the media coverage of this conflict over a longer period of time in order to make more grounded statements, the time frame for the qualitative content analysis is periodically. This means that not only one particular large time frame was chosen but instead, a number of shorter time frames of a week each were selected. Instead of a systematic period pattern, these weeks were selected according to key events which are seen to have had a high importance for the political developments of the *Ukrainian crisis* and the consequential *war in Donbass*. These particular weeks were chosen between a time frame of eight months from November 2013 until July 2014:

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291 Bondarchuk, O. (2007). Booming magazine market flooded with news weeklies. *Business Ukraine*. P. 1
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.

Time frame and key events of qualitative content analysis

Number of investigated week	Start of investigated week	End of investigated week	Key event
1	21st November 2013	27th November 2013	Ukrainian president refuses to sign an association agreement with the EU
2	17th December 2013	23rd December 2013	President Putin announces that Russia will buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian government bonds and allow for a sharp cut in the price Ukrainians pay for Russian natural gas
3	25th January 2014	31st January 2014	President Yanukovych offers opposition leaders Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Vitali Klitschko entry to the government, they decline
4	18th February 2014	24th February 2014	At least 26 protestors are killed in clashes with police
5	16th March 2014	22nd March 2014	A secession referendum is held on Crimea with official results saying that 97 percent of voters back a proposal to join Russia.
6	15th April 2014	21st April 2014	Kyiv's government launches its first formal military action against pro-Russian rebels who have seized government buildings in towns and cities across eastern Ukraine.
7	27th June 2014	2nd July 2014	Poroshenko signs the EU Association Agreement
8	17th July 2014	23rd July 2014	298 people are killed when Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 is shot down by a surface-to-air missile above rebel-held territory in eastern Ukraine.

3.5 Analytic categories

Derived from the theoretical concepts by Moore, Staiger and Hanitzsch and the contextual implications which were explained in the first chapter, these four analytical categories were developed: *Mimicry of 'return to Westernness'*, *reverse-cultural colonization*, *construction of the image of an enemy* and *patriotism and self-censorship.* The elements of Hanitzsch's theoretical concept about journalism cultures have been applied to explain meta aspects of the media and the analyzed content which they have produced – as Hanitzsch suggests not a model with a reference to a specific topic but instead an approach that aims at explaining the decisions, practices and ideas of the journalists of a particular journalism culture.

The first deductive analytical category is the *mimicry 'return to Westernness'*. This concept is directly derived from the theory of post-Soviet postcoloniality as presented by David Moore. Applied to our case study of the coverage of English-language media in Ukraine, this analytical category describes the phenomenon that Ukrainians situate themselves, their nation, their history and their culture in the geo-cultural imagined entity of the 'West'. This self-localization has political consequences: Ukrainians (or in the case of our analysis the journalists working for the chosen English-language media) claim that their political economic and cultural place is in Europe and not within the Russian sphere of influence (anymore). Thus, they claim that Ukraine belongs to the international organization representing this constructed political entity of the 'West', namely the European Union and the NATO.

Coding manual analytical category A: Mimicry 'return to Westernness'

Definition	A Mimicry of 'return of Westernness' is defined as the opinion piece implicitly or explicitly stating that Ukraine

	historically, politically and culturally belongs to Europe and/or the West because their nation is essentially European and/or Western in its character
Subcategories	A1: Ukraine's place today is not (anymore) in the Russian sphere of influence but instead in Europe and/or the West; in specific in its political entities, the European Union and Nato; the reason for this is that Ukraine historically belongs to Europe A2: European/Western politicians should actively support Ukraine in their struggle to re-situate themselves again in the European/Western cultural and political sphere
Anchor example	A1: "Two decades ago, Ukrainians brought an end to the Soviet Union by overwhelmingly voting for independence, thereby opening the door to the possibility of an alternate future for Ukraine based on reestablishing its historic ties to Europe and, yes, the rule of law." A2: „So, Europe still has to get used to the fact that Ukraine is a part of its territory, worth fighting for and worth protecting, because it is its frontier."
Coding rules	Mimicry of 'return to Westernness' does not apply if the opinion piece if it does not imply Ukraine's return
Smallest coding unit	A single word
Largest coding unit	An entire opinion piece

The second deductive analytical category is *Reverse-cultural colonization*. This concept is directly derived from the theoretical approach of post-Soviet

postcoloniality as presented by David Moore. Applied to our case study of the coverage of English-language media in Ukraine, this analytical category depicts the idea that Ukraine was not only colonized by (Soviet-)Russia but that it was colonized by a culture which is/was inferior to their culture. Thus, this category describes the condition that Ukrainians see their colonizer (Soviet-)Russia as culturally inferior, uncivilized, barbaric and aggressive and that they themselves in contrast as a civilized European nation with a highly developed culture. Thus, as part of the (Soviet-)Russian colonization, Ukrainians were forced to live under the tyranny of an inferior culture and therefore did not benefit in any conceivable way from the rule of the colonizer but instead suffered greatly under it. This forced cultural decline has consequences that last until today in the sense that Ukraine is still suffering from the legacy of its Soviet past and is struggling to leave the negative aspects of the (Soviet-)Russian culture behind to start into a new and different future.

Coding manual analytical category B: Reverse-cultural colonization

Definition	A reverse-cultural colonization is defined as the opinion piece implicitly or explicitly stating that Ukraine has been colonized by (Soviet-)Russia; (Soviet-)Russian culture is inferior, uncivilized, aggressive, barbaric; the Ukrainian culture in contrast was highly developed, civilized, peaceful and thus essentially European
Subcategories	B1: Because there is sharp division in their cultures, under the rule of the (Soviet-)Russian colonizers, Ukrainians were forced into a cultural degradation with consequently virtually no advantages but instead many disadvantages B2: Because of the ongoing cultural

	and political influence of Russia, Ukrainians are still suffering from the consequences of this cultural degradation today
Anchor examples	B1"But this does not mean that there is no alternative Ukraine with traditions that go back for centuries, democracies and self-governance; an ancient and strong European culture, powerful resistance against evil – from the hopeless partisan battle against occupiers and colonizers to impressive manifestations of solidarity in peaceful resistance." B2: „Yes, Ukrainians need medicines against depression and disillusionment, from the heavy legacy of totalitarianism and colonization, from the poison of communist habits and stereotypes, which cannot be removed from an organism quickly and poison each of its organs."
Coding rules	Reverse-cultural colonization does not apply if the opinion piece does not specifically mention the cultural aspect
Smallest coding unit	A single word
Largest coding unit	An entire opinion piece

The third deductive analytical category is the *construction of the image of an enemy*. It is derived from the patterns of the construction of war realities as presented by Jan Staiger. Applied to our case study of the coverage of English-language media in Ukraine, this analytical category describes two aspects: First there is the construction of the image of an enemy during the time of the peaking *Ukrainian Crisis* (C1). Since it was the Ukrainian government under former president Viktor Yanukovich which came under harsh criticism and which sparked mass protests with his refusal of signing the association agreement with

the European Union, it is his persona and his former government and surrounding elite circle which are being constructed as an enemy to the Ukrainian people. This aspect is defined as such because the *Ukrainian Crisis* was primarily a national struggle – an internal conflict which thus will expectantly exhibit similar mechanisms than external conflicts. The second aspect of this analytical category is the construction the image of the Russian president Putin and the Russian nation as the enemy of the Ukrainian people (C2). This seems more evident than the first aspect as the *war in Donbass* represents a conflict which is carried out between the Ukrainian army and separatists which are supported by Russia.

Coding manual analytical category C: Construction of the image of an enemy

Definition	Construction of the image of an enemy is defined as the opinion piece implicitly or explicitly stating that the Ukrainian people has a clear enemy and that there is a sharp division between these two
Subcategories	C1: The former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, his former government and surrounding elite circle are being constructed as the image of an enemy of the Ukrainian people (as part of the *Ukrainian Crisis*) C2: The Russia president Putin and the Russian nation are being constructed as the image of an enemy of the Ukrainian people (as part of the *war in Donbass*). Russia is thus not a political ally or a Slavic brother people but instead an enemy
Anchor examples	C1: „I will to everyone willing to fight for our Ukrainian independence

	against the almost imminent threat of neocolonialism and dictatorship to raise an army of millions and put one demand to Yanukovich – immediate snap elections for president of Ukraine.“ C2: "In front of us is the enemy. No matter who tries to convince me otherwise – this is the enemy. You can tell me that Putin has beautiful eyes, and Russia has beautiful birch forests, but what I see on that side is a new Hitler and a new Reich. Any further discussion at this point is irrelevant."
Coding rules	Construction of the image of an enemy does not apply if the image of an enemy is constructed but not clearly presented as the enemy of the Ukrainian people
Smallest coding unit	A single word
Largest coding unit	An entire opinion piece

The fourth deductive analytical category is *patriotism and self-censorship*. It is derived from the patterns of the construction of war realities as presented by Jan Staiger. Applied to our case study of the coverage of English-language media in Ukraine, this analytical category describes two aspects – one is direct, the other can be found on a meta-level. *Patriotism* in this case is characterized by stating the idea that Ukrainians are an autonomous, independent and politically united nation which has its own path that is different from the past Soviet path which Ukraine was violently forced to share with its former colonizer Russia. Since Ukraine has its own strong and distinct culture, there is a sharp cultural division with Russia. Another aspect of this *patriotism* is that Ukrainians are (being called to be) determined, brave and willing to fight for the future and the improvement of their nation because they are truly patriotic and sense a strong

pride in their origin. The second aspect of this analytical category is *self-censorship* which can be found directly or on a meta-level: Directly, this means that presumably unpatriotic media content in which the union among Ukrainians is questioned is being presented in a negative perspective. On a meta-level this means that unpatriotic content does not appear and that all investigated opinion pieces show clear signs of patriotic positions.

Coding manual analytical category D: Patriotism and self-censorship

Definition	Patriotism and self-censorship is defined as the opinion piece implicitly or explicitly stating that Ukrainians are an autonomous, independent and politically united nation with its own path and a culture that is sharply distinguished from that of Russia
Subcategories	D1: Ukrainians are (being called to be) determined, brave and willing to fight for the future and improvement of their nation D2: Unpatriotic media content is not present in the sampe of opinion pieces
Anchor examples	D1: "Furthermore, perhaps more importantly that all else, the events of the EuroMaidan which arose as a results of the current regime's unwillingness to respect the will of the Ukrainian people and recognize the people as determinants of Ukraine's and their own future, these events have expedited irreversibly the development of the Ukrainian nation. After all, the EuroMaidan in Ukraine is a revolution of national dignity." D2: "It is apparent that the Ukrainian media are almost completely silent about the dead-end faced by Ukrainian

	forces in the east. No debate is appearing anywhere on the most probable results of this war and the drain of resources in Ukraine."
Coding rules	Patriotism and self-censorship does not apply if it is stated that the Ukrainian nation has identity struggles, is not united
Smallest coding unit	A single word
Largest coding unit	An entire opinion piece

§ 4 Results

The general results of the qualitative content analysis is that the opinion pieces of the data sample revealed a strong tendency towards a one-sided pro-Western interpretation pattern of the *Ukrainian crisis* and the *war in Donbass.* Though the analyzed opinion pieces were very diverse in their style, content, aims and the professional, political and cultural background of their author, the vast majority of them seemed to be very patriotic (from the perspective of Ukrainian authors) or very supportive of Ukraine's political approximation towards Europe, specifically towards to the European Union (from the perspective of non-Ukrainian authors who were predominantly from the US, Germany, the UK). Virtually none of the analyzed opinion pieces presented standpoint that would go against a certain pro-European Ukraine narrative; that is the idea that though Ukraine is still divided between Europe/the West and Russia, it ultimately belongs to Europe/the West and has to eventually break free from the Russian dependence if it wants to build a successful political future for its nation.

Though the interpretations of certain aspects of the *Ukrainian crisis* such as the motives of the EuroMaidan protestors, the best strategy for the further development of the protest movement, the solutions to Ukraine's economical misery and the potential political involvement and partisanship of the EU and the US vary among the authors - all investigated opinion pieces seemed to interpret the political situation at the peak of the *Ukrainian crisis* and the following *War in Donbass* in a very similar manner. Though the degree of the ideological positioning and judgment varied greatly – some comments being manifest-like with blunt patriotic paroles, while others being critically balanced with a focus on detailed analysis – it was remarkable to identify during the qualitative content analysis that virtually all commentators embraced the idea of a pro-European Ukraine which has to break away from the Yanukovich government and thus the still existing Russian influence and argued Europe/the

West have a responsibility for Ukraine and thus ought to support the efforts of Ukrainian citizens in their struggle against the Yanukovich government. There were virtually no opinion pieces presented which offered an alternative view on the situation; for example which critically assessed not only the role and the geopolitical interests of Russia but also those of the European Union. It is worth mentioning here that despite there being authors not only from Ukraine but from many different national backgrounds both from Western European as well as former post-Soviet states (Ukrainian, US, British, German, Swedish, Lithuanian), among the opinion pieces investigated there was not a single Russian author. Consequently, the picture painted by the published comments about the interpretation of the *Ukrainian crisis* was a very coherent and one-sided one.

Therefore, as a general result of this analysis it can be stated that the English-language media in Ukraine followed a kind of one-sided pro-Western interpretation pattern perfectly corresponds to previous media research about the topic which has found the overall media coverage of the *Ukrainian crisis* to be strongly biased – in the national media of all political actors involved[294].

4.1 Post-Soviet postcoloniality

As the qualitative content analysis has shown there is no clear representation of postcolonial positions in the media coverage of the Ukrainian English-language newspapers Kyiv Post and Ukrainian Week about the *Ukranian Crisis* and the *War in Donbass*. This might most likely be due to the fact that these media publish in the English language and thus give big room to publications of non-Ukrainian Western scholars, experts, analysts, politicians, diplomats and journalists. Though these Western authors often display pro-Ukrainian positions which implicitly indicate that Ukraine was and still is under great Russian influence, they do not clearly name the Ukrainian condition as postcolonial as

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294 cf. 2.3.1 The Ukrainian case in the global media coverage

they do not categorize this Russian influence as an act of *colonization*. But a pattern which all of these either authors of Western origin or authors based in the West (for example Ukrainian diaspora publicists) fulfill is that they situate the West, meaning the US and the European Union, as a kind of protecting power of Ukraine's claimed Western values. This pattern evokes associations which correspond with the concept of a *reverse-cultural colonization* because it implicitly says that Ukraine has to be supported in its national/geopolitical struggle against Russia because it is aiming at completely abandoning Russo-Soviet values and behaviors which are culturally and morally of lower standard and because it is in contrast ready to embrace Western values which are of a cultural and moral higher level.

This being said, despite occasional opinion pieces which are clearly written by Ukrainian authors which speak a very appealing patriotic language, openly and clearly label the Russian political activities as colonial and thus highlight the Ukrainian postcolonial struggle to break free from Russian dominance and aggression, there was little content to be found explicitly demonstrating *post-Soviet postcoloniality*. However those opinion pieces which clearly contained post-Soviet postcolonial positions were pronounced and are thus interesting to look at in detail in order to better understand today's postcolonial discourses in Ukraine.

The first analytical category *'return to Westernness' mimicry* was barely present in the investigated data sample. But the statements of the few Ukrainian authors who voiced the opinion that Ukraine once belonged to Europe and now – more than 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the political momentum of the Euromaidan - has the historical chance to finally return back to the West fit quite clearly in to the analytical category which was operationalized based on Moore's theoretical approach. In this example it becomes evident that the author clearly views Ukraine's approximitation to the

European Union which the *Euromaidan* movement envisioned not as a new path but as the restoration of Ukraine's European past: "*Two decades ago, Ukrainians brought an end to the Soviet Union by overwhelmingly voting for independence, thereby opening the door to the possibility of an alternate future for Ukraine based on reestablishing its historic ties to Europe and, yes, the rule of law.*"[295] The analysis revealed another aspect: The claimed *Westernness* that Ukraine once possessed does not only belong to the political and cultural sphere but plain and simple also to its geographical position as this sentence shows: "*So, Europe still has to get used to the fact that Ukraine is a part of its territory, worth fighting for and worth protecting, because it is its frontier.*"[296] This example taken from the data sample illuminates another detail which Moore aimed at explaining when he stated that the post-Soviet space is postcolonial: In this phrase, there is a sort of defiance that resonates between the lines. The manner in which the author chose its formulation, he implies an historical fatalism that Ukraine belongs to Europe – such a strong argument that leaves no room for alternative interpretation. Also, the author expresses the strategic value of Ukraine for Europe – a position which can be classified as postcolonial as it highlights the cultural important of Ukraine.

However the analysis has also shown that there is not only a certain pride about Ukraine's historical European which is then formulated in a manner to highlight Ukraine's strategic and cultural value but also connected to this a certain feeling of inferiority and self-criticism: "*Yes, we should admit that Ukraine as an independent state has so far not demonstrated its most attractive side to the world. But this does not mean that there is no alternative Ukraine with traditions that go back for centuries, democracies and self-governance; an ancient and strong European culture powerful resistance against evil – from the hopeless partisan battle against occupants and colonizers to impressive*

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295 Huntwork, J.; Huntwork P. (2013). Protesters have inspired world with their resolute stand. *Kyiv Post.* P. 1
296 Makarov, Y. (2013). Advice at the Sickbed. *The Ukrainian Week.* P. 1

manifestations of solidarity in peaceful resistance."[297]

Interestingly, though most of the analyzed opinion pieces do not directly name a potential historical belonging of Ukraine to the West, many focus on the potential European/Western future of Ukraine: "*I hope the Ukrainian government will listen to its people and find a path forward to the democratic, economically prosperous, European future its citizens desire.*"[298] It is debatable whether this orientation towards the future rather than the past also fits the larger definition of Ukraine's postcolonial character.

The second analytical category of r*everse-cultural colonization* was likewise barely present in the data sample. But the opinion pieces which exhibited statements about the seemingly superior culture of Ukraine and in contrast to that the seemingly inferior culture of their former colonizer Russia were very clear in their message: "*Yes, Ukrainians need medicines against depression and disillusionment, from the heavy legacy of totalitarianism and colonization, from the poison of communist habits and stereotypes, which cannot be removed from an organism quickly and poison each of its organs.*"[299] Here this metaphor is striking as it is implying that Ukraine is still 'sick' because of being seemingly poisoned from the former colonizer Russia. This implies that before, Ukraine was pure and healthy – a strong image which plays with typical elements of orietalization as described by Edward Said[300] as it portrays the Russo-Soviet culture as poisounous. Thus, the colonization-relation is being reversed: It was not the colonizer who forced a supposedly clean, healthy and stimulating culture on the colonized which enhanced their civilization process but instead it was in this case the Russo-Soviet colonizer who forced a supposedly sick, unhealthy and paralyzing culture on the colonized Ukrainians. In this mentioned example, the metaphor goes even further by saying that Ukraine needs 'medicine' and

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297 Makarov, Y. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 1
298 Pyatt, G. R. (2013). 2014 should be about realizing a better tomorrow. *Kyiv Post*. P. 1
299 Makarov, Y. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 1
300 cf. Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

thereby implicitly meaning that Europe or in general the West should help Ukraine to wipe off this Soviet culture and install a new 'Western' culture. This idea of seeing Europe and close relationships with it as a sort of 'healer' evokes associations regarding Hegel's master-slave dialectic which describes the relation between two self-conscious beings who are moving towards constitution by mutually recognizing the other[301]. Since Hegel's conceptualizes a power relationship it has influenced postcolonial studies[302] and is thus also a suitable approach for post-Soviet postcolonial studies in general.

Furthermore, the analysis of the sample revealed that instead of a focus on the past and the supposed Russo-Soviet colonization of Ukraine, many authors focus on the future of Ukraine. The difference in the development level of the cultures of the supposed former colonizer Russia and the supposedly 'better' culture which Ukraine seems to join resonantes often in the opinion pieces: "*The majority of the population wants to join a democratic Europe and not an authoritarian Eurasia.*"[303] Many authors who wrote about the character of the culture of the supposedly Russo-soviet colonizer were not Ukrainian but foreign professionals such as the U.S. American couple James and Patience Huntwork. They published a comment in the *Kyiv Post* saying that "*their corrupt president [Viktor Yanukovich] is on the verge of delivering them back into the recrudescent evil empire which they rejected so emphatically a generation earlier*"[304]. As many comments in the data sample made us of these allocation about the Russian (Soviet) culture, it can be concluded that *Kyiv Post* and *The Ukrainian Week* purposely chose Western authors who locate Ukraine in a postcolonial condition by approving the idea of *reverse-cultural colonization.*

301 cf. Hegel, G. W. F., Miller, A. V., Findlay, J. N., & Hoffmeister, J. (1979). *Phenomenology of spirit*. Oxford [England: Clarendon Press.

302 cf. Borossa, J., & Rooney, C. (2003). Suffering, transience and immortal longings - Salome between Nietzsche and Freud. *Journal Of European Studies, 33*(130-31), 287-304.

303 Bugajski, J. (2013). Washington needs to send a strong message to Putin not to interfere in Ukraine's internal affairs or risk repercussions. *Ukrainian Week*. P. 1

304 Huntwork, J.; Huntwork P. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 1

4.2 Constructivist war reporting

Generally speaking, the two analytical categories of *construction of the image of an enemy* and *patriotism and self-censorship* often overlapped and were at times difficult to conceptually be separated. Another conceptual complexity was the combined analysis of the internal *Ukrainian Crisis* and the external *war in Donbass*.

The analysis clearly showed that the selected opinion pieces indeed contain narratives which can be categorized as the active *construction of the image of an enemy*. This image however is not coherent but a rather more nuanced and complex picture; depending on the exact publishing time, the author and the degree of analytical level of the piece: It oscillates between former Ukrainian president Yanukovich and his government, the persona of Russian president Putin in particular, the whole of the Russian state including ordinary Russian citizens and the post-Soviet political elites in both Ukraine and Russia in general. The distribution of the different aspects of this *image of an enemy* correspond – as expected – with the political events: The analysis of the data sample from the Nov. 2013 – Feb. 2014 revealed many examples for the construction of former Ukrainian president Yanukovich, his government and Ukrainian political/ business elites as the enemy of the Ukrainian people; a time during which the so-called *Ukrainian Crisis* took place – a conflict primarily perceived as and internal national conflict with mass protests and a serious government crisis.

Later in the data sample, this *image of an enemy* altered and Russian president Putin and the Russian state became the clearly constructed enemy. The opinion pieces published between Mar. – Jul. 2014 exhibit strong narratives which construct Putin and Russia as Ukraine's enemy, corresponding with the secession referendum on Crimea, the protests in the regions of Donezk and Luhansk and the following outbreak of the *war in Donbass* – a conflict primarily perceived as an external international conflict. This difference in conflict dimensions is

exemplified in this phrase: "*Unlike the Euromaidan protests that started in Kiev last fall, this is not a domestic uprising but a full-blown foreign aggression against Ukraine.*"[305] What remains unchanged throughout the whole time span of the data sample however is the construction of the Ukrainian people as closed community which has to defend itself against the construction enemy.

The construction of Yanukovich and his government as enemy of the Ukrainian people often smoothly blends in with a the construction of a more general enemy: The post-Soviet political/ business elites in both Ukraine and Russia. Yanukovich, his government and (personal) elite circles are characterized as the enemy of the progress of the Ukrainian nation ("*until we clean out this evil scum from government offices and parliamentary seats, it is too early to speak about a free Ukraine*"[306]) with their dictatorship-leading style, imperial posturing, obsession with power, self-centered and aggressive behaviour, ignorance towards normal and ordinary people, its corrupt practices and its disregard to democracy and human rights. Often, the construction of this enemy combines different aspects: "*The new politicians must understand that if they repeat the mistakes of their predecessors, they will be punished even more because they betrayed not Yanukovich, but the people who died in the name of the better Ukraine.*"[307] Here, a warning to the new elites to not become the enemy themselves by appealing to their sense of honor and responsibility, the hope for a better future for Ukraine, national pride, patriotic glorification and heroization of the politically active Ukrainians citizens are being linked.

This construction of post-Soviet political/ business elites as enemy is complemented by the construction of a strong national community of Ukrainians who is called to and can successfully – with support from Europe/the West –

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305 Motsyk, O. (2014). Ukraine needs help to stop Russian invasion. *Kyiv Post*. P. 1
306 Tymchuk, D. (2014a). Government inaction inspires pro-Russian extremist violence. *Kyiv Post*. P. 1
307 Leshchenko, S. (2014). The Oligarchs should pay the price, not throw crumbs to EuroMaidan. *Kyiv Post*. P.1

stand up to these elites: "*My last appeal is to the opposition. Don't be afraid of anything! Lead the Ukrainian people to victory over dictatorship by uniting your efforts with the democratic world.*"[308]   Phrases such as "*fight for our Ukrainian independence against the almost imminent threat of neocolonialism and dictatorship*"[309] are other examples. Their occurrence in the data sample is not surprising considering that Kyiv Post published opinion pieces by opposition politicians such as Yulia Tymoshenko, Vasyl Gatsko and Serhiy Leshchenko (both "Democratic Alliance", an oppositional political party).

The second subcategory of the analytical category of the *construction of the image of an enemy* is that Russia's president Vladimir Putin and the Russian nation are being constructed as the enemy of the Ukrainian people. This enemy construction is implicitly and explicitly ("*Faced with a common enemy, the Ukrainians discovered a will to fight.*"[310]) present in many opinion pieces of the data sample but the degree of its scorn varies greatly. On the one end of the spectrum, many opinion pieces express the antipathy towards Putin and Russia moderately and in a rational tone of political analysis. On the other end of the spectrum are comments which are very explicit, emotional, radical and at the same time metaphoric in their representation of Putin and Russia as the enemy of Ukraine: "*In front of us is the enemy. No matter who tries to convince me otherwise – this is the enemy. You can tell me that Putin has beautiful eyes, and Russia has beautiful birch forests, but what I see on that side is a new Hitler and a new Reich. Any further discussion on this point is irrelevant.*"[311] This clear example also illustrates how determined certain authors are in their political convictions regarding this conflict, showing how gridlocked and ideologically loaded this conflict is in general. The larger part of the data sample however can

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308 Tymoshenko, Y. (2013). As long as Yanukovich is in power, Ukraine is under risk of losing independence. *Kyiv Post*. P. 1
309 Ibid.
310 Tkachuk, J. (2014). The demise of Putinism. *Kyiv Post.* P. 1
311 Tymchuk, D. (2014b). This is war, with Russians strating to murder Ukrainians. *Kyiv Post.* P. 1

be localized somewhere in the middle between rational analysis and emotional manifesto. An example is this phrase: "*Russia's chauvinistic self-indulgence is its unquestioned priority, boosted by traditional autocracy that feeds hostility towards its neighbors. None dare call it fascism.*"[312] Another trend which the analysis revealed was that there is no clear consensus among the authors about who is the real enemy – Russian president Putin or the whole of the Russian state namely the Russian citizens themselves. Sometimes, this view shifted within one single comment: "*Earlier, I wrote that the sides of this war are not Russians and Ukraine, but only Putin and Ukraine. Now, with a heavy heart, I have to admit, I was wrong. The war against Ukraine was started by Russians, led by people. Our blood is on their hands and that is an inescapable fact.*"[313]

The third analytical category is *Patriotism and self-*censorship. Though not very strongly present in the whole of the data sample, certain opinion pieces exhibited expressions of patriotism. Interestingly, this patriotism was targeted not at the Ukrainian state including its state institutions, namely the national and local government but instead directly at the Ukrainian people themselves. This appeal to the Ukrainian national identity corresponds with the narrative of the monist model of Ukrainian statehood. This model is "one of integrated nationalism, in which the state is a nationalizing one, drawing on the tradition of Ukrainism to fill the existing borders with a content sharply distinguished from Russia"[314]- as explained by Richard Sawka.

The first subcategory of the analytical category *patriotism and self-censorship* is that Ukrainians are autonomous, independent and politically united nation and are willing to fight for the future and improvement of their nation. This narrative presented itself in different nuances.

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312 Danik, B. (2014a). The Cold War and evil empire forever. *Kyiv Post.* P.1
313 Tymchuk, D. (2014b). Op. Cit. P. 1
314 Sawka, R. (2015). Op. Cit. P. 15

As a very basic observation it can be said that many opinion pieces in the data sample contained a clear construction of a diffuse *We* – an imagined community with shared values, dreams, goals and one common identity. Discursively constructing and addressing this imagined *we* can be seen as a typical characteristic of a patriotic narrative. Taking this narrative of the shared community of a *we* as a base, the opinion pieces were used to either evoke support for the Ukrainian military ("*The only question is, what we can and will do to help our guys, who are standing at their outposts amidst the ocean of hatred*"[315]), to call for concrete and individual action ("*I appeal to everyone willing to fight for our Ukrainian independence*"[316]) or to get Ukrainians in the right frame of mind regarding that despite the hardship that the political and economic divestment from Russia will imply it is necessary to clearly take a stand on this ("*This will be painful for both economies, but essential in showing Moscow that despite centuries of linguistic, cultural and blood ties, Ukraine wants no part of Russia's autocratic ways and is striking out on its own*"[317]).

A few opinion pieces exhibited this pride in the Ukrainian nation by appealing to alleged subconscious feelings and desires: "*For many years we dreamed that the party of Regions would gradually disillusion its voters, lose influence and leave the political arena*"[318]. This example clearly shows that the authors assumes there to be not only a shared common belief but rather a dream – meaning a subconscious layer which is very powerful in influencing actions.

The second subcategory of this analytical category is *self-censorship* meaning that patriotic media content is nor present. As the analysis has shown there is indeed not much evidence of seemingly unpatriotic content – only few articles point out to the possible negative sides of the patriotic mobilization of Ukrainian

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315 Tymchuk, D. (2014b). Op. Cit. P. 1
316 Tymoshenko, Y. (2013). Op. Cit. P. 1
317 Kyiv Post (2014). Ukraine may win yet. *Kyiv Post*. P. 1
318 Kazanskyi, D. (2014). Political Crisis in the East – the Aftermath of the Collapse of the Party of Regions. *Ukrainian Week*. P. 1

media and society, the high costs connected to the *war in Donbass* and the potential losses of the military. In some opinion pieces the lack of controversial debate in the national media is being critized: *'It is apparent that the Ukrainian media are almost completely silent about the dead-end faced by Ukrainian forces in the east. No debate is appearing anywhere on the most probable results of this war and the drain of recourses in Ukraine.'*[319]

In the same context, some journalists engage in self-criticism as they criticize the construction of the image of an enemy and the friend-foe rhetoric – confirming the theoretical idea of Jan Staiger – in the Ukrainian media: *'Instead, attention is focused on the ongoing give- and- take in the fighting and the usual dialectics and some pamphleteering directed at friends and enemies.'*[320] But this is self-critical and unpatriotic media content is by far outweighted by very patriotic content such as a the numerous opinion pieces written by military expert and politician Dmitry Tymchuk (published on his military blog and then shared by Kyiv Post) who, though not be silent about or denying deficits of the Ukrainian military, frames both military successes and defeats in a very partriotic manner[321]. So here it is interesting to see how the editors of Kyiv Post compose the selection of their content and that they actually do mix critical comments with patriotic pieces; though the variety of the data sample as a whole is not that strong.

Another aspect which the few examples of seemingly unpatriotic content revealed was the direct or indirect reference to Russia: *'Diversion of journalistic topics in Kyiv towards abstractions is a living proof that Vlad Putin's game of tiring Ukraine in the east is succeeding.'*[322] This example highlights in a citical and not patriotic manner the connections between the patriotic mobilization within Ukraine and the alleged stratey of Russia in this conflict.

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319 Danik, B. (2014b). The limits of credibility. *Kyiv Post*, P. 1
320 Ibid.
321 cf. Tymchuk, D. (2014). Op. Cit. P. 1
322 Danik, B. (2014a). Op. Cit. P. 1

4.3 Journalism cultures

Besides the results which were generated by applying the four analytical categories, the qualitative content analysis also revealed results on a meta-level regarding the Ukrainian journalism culture of the English-language print/online section. Overall it can be noted that the analyzed two English-language media Kyiv Post and Ukrainian Week did reveal a somewhat mixed culture: On the one hand it became clear that they are strongly attracted by a Western tradition of journalism culture and seek to appear an objective, critical, independent and balanced medium; on the other hand there were signs which contradicted this (self-)representation, meaning that they didn't meet the scientifically formulated standards of Western journalism culture and instead in their choice of content publication resembled some characteristics of typical post-Soviet journalism cultures. This ambivalence perfectly corresponds with other research which has highlighted that the Ukrainian media system is characterized 'post-Sovietness'[323] meaning that it is stuck in between: On the one side there is a "radical change of the social role performed by the media"[324] and on the other side there is "the maintenance of many Soviet attributes molding the very media"[325].

The meta-analysis of *interventionism* – the first dimension of this constituent – has revealed that journalists working for the two English-language media Kyiv Post and Ukrainian Week tend to lean more towards a post-Soviet understanding of journalism rather than the traditional Western model of journalism cultures; ironically despite the fact that these media strongly support traditional 'Western values' such democracy transparency, rule of law and press freedom. The reason for this conclusion lies in the composition of the analyzed data sample: The choice of authors, shared media content and distribution of presented political positions appears to be very one-sided towards European/Western narratives and

323 cf. Kulyk, V. (2010). Dyskurs ukrayinskykh mediy: identychnosti, ideolohiyi, vladni stosunky (The ukrainian media discourse: identities, ideologies, power relations). *Kyiv: Krytyka.*
324 Orlova, D. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 443
325 Ibid.

thus reflects a clear "active support of particular values, groups and social change"[326] - as Hanitzsch defined *interventionism* in journalism cultures. In contrast to valuing the ideals of detachment (as Hanitzsch has defined as a typical characteristic of Western journalism cultures), the selected opinion pieces illustrated a close proximity to positions of either the political opposition in Ukraine or European/Western politicians. Authors were often either influential oppositional Ukrainian politicians such as Yulia Tymoshenko, Western diplomats such as the former U.S. ambassador in Ukraine Geofrey A. Pyatt or prominent European/Western politicians such as the German European parliament deputy Rebecca Harms. Their opinion pieces were published in full as original or shared content on the newspapers' website without any critical contextualization – in such a form as they could have appeared on a political party's website. Consequently the publication of a full manifesto of for example a political personality such as Yulia Tymoshenko leads to the assumption that the respective media (Kyiv Post) fully supports and thus actively promotes her political views. Especially given the fact that there were no counter opinion pieces by for example Russian analysts, experts or scholars, the analysis has shown that the published opinionated content is strongly biased. Therefore, by using Hanitzsch' approach of mapping journalism cultures, these results can be explained with the journalists' strong desire for a 'Westernization' of Ukraine in terms of political reforms, economic liberalization and social change.[327]

In regard to the second dimension *power distance* the results were different: The analyzed opinion pieces revealed that the journalists from both Kyiv Post and Ukrainian Week are very critical towards their own leading politicians and government and do criticize them openly. But the analysis also revealed a rather weak power distance towards not the own national Ukrainian elites but the European/Western elites as they were seen to be positive and capable for

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326 Hanitzsch et al. (2011). Op. Cit. P. 280

327 According to Hanitzsch this is a typical characteristic for journalism cultures in transitional democracies as their journalists are "most willing to promote social change in contexts where such transformation rapidly occurs*or where it seems needed" (Hanitzsch, 2011, p.280)

bringing about change in Ukraine. Though it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion, the meta-analysis of the third and last dimension *market orientation* again shows that the small section of the Ukrainian journalism culture which is researched upon in this work tends to lean not towards a Western understanding of journalism but rather towards the journalism culture in post-Soviet Russia. The reason for this is that the focus on the audience seems to be – just as in Russian journalism culture – very strong. Both Kyiv Post and the Ukrainian Week have a Western readership consisting of expats, tourists, diplomats and members of Western (especially U.S.) political and business elites[328]. Since their audience represents a particular social niche which mostly has a very specific reason for reading this newspaper, the selected opinionated content seems to reflect their strong wish to cater the expectations of their readers.

The analysis of the first dimension *objectivism* of this constituent is a difficult one as the qualitative content analysis in this work did exclusively focus on the opinionated content and not on hard news. Since the opinion format is by definition influenced by beliefs and convictions, there can only be limited statements made here about the results of this meta-analysis of Ukrainian journalism culture. What can be said is that though the opinion section of any media is designed to represent different beliefs and convictions, the degree of objectivism still plays a significant role in the self-understanding of the journalists and their respective journalism culture. A selection of opinion pieces can be considered objective if it represents the whole spectrum of potential positions and views on a particular (news-worthy) topic. The opinion pieces in the analyzed data sample however clearly showed a tendency to only present positions which support a pro-Western reformation process of Ukraine, including the orientation towards the EU and NATO.

It is equally difficult to come to clear results for the second dimension

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328 According to the analytical website Alexa, about 24 percent of the Kyiv Post readers are located in the United States and only about 5 percent are located in Ukraine

empiricism because the qualitative content analysis was not able to investigate whether the journalists of the respective newspapers double-checked the content they published in order to verify their substance. But what was striking is that Kyiv Post regularly shared full-length publications from a military blog by Dmytri Tymchuk, a Member of parliament of Ukraine, a Ukrainian military expert and an officer of Ukrainian military reserve.

As the previous constituent, the analysis of this constituent is not an easy one: The first dimension *relativism* is difficult to track in the qualitative content analysis as it only analyzed the selected opinion pieces and did not directly ask the journalists about their ethical practices behind. But by the choice of the authors and the content it becomes clear that both analyzed media show a consistency is their editorial line: In both the *Kyiv Post* and the *Ukrainian Week* external and foreign authors constantly make up a major portion of the overall opinion section. Thus it can be concluded that the journalists and editors who are deciding about the composition of the content do adhere to universal principles rather than to "contextual and situational ethics"[329]. This consistent editorial line as observed in the analysis resembles to traditional Western journalism cultures and thus here, the journalists from *Kyiv Post* and *Ukrainian Week* are closer to their Western colleagues than to their post-Soviet colleagues from the Russian journalism culture.

The second dimension *idealism* is equally difficult if not impossible to detect from the results of the qualitative content analysis. Since this dimension looks at methods of reporting the analysis of an already given written material is unable to identify which methods were used in order to generate this content. But what can be noticed from the qualitative content analysis is that both investigated media outlets seem to have strong normative principles which are closely linked to traditional Western values. This can be observed from the fact that many

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329 Hanitzsch et al. (2011). Op. Cit. P. 285

authors who have published their opinion pieces in one of the two media are external, Western experts strongly promoting Western values and the integration of Ukraine into the European/Western hemisphere.

4.4 Limitations

As most case studies, this work has a number of conceptual limitations and shortcomings given the fact that it only looks at a particular data sample from a particular theoretical perspective within a particular given time frame and thus has limited framework. A generalization of results is therefore difficult – the explanatory power of the generated findings can thus only be valued within its narrow frame of investigation.

In this case study the major shortcoming is that general statements about the character of the Ukrainian journalism culture – neither in times of conflict nor in times of peace – cannot be systematically derived from a qualitative content analysis which does not summarize the results of semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian journalists but solely (opinionated) media content. In order to meaningfully map the Ukrainian journalism culture and embed it within the model of global journalism cultures as developed by Hanitzsch a research design with large-scale interviews with Ukrainian journalists would be needed. The case study presented in this work was not able to provide this. Another general limitation lies within the size of first the analyzed data sample of opinion pieces and second within the small number of chosen media outlets. As a qualitative analysis always requires an intensive examination of the generated material, due to limited resources this research was not able to offer conclusions based on a broader sample.

Likewise it can be criticized that the formats which were chosen for the qualitative content analysis were limited to opinion pieces – though arguably useful for a study which aims are detecting ideological positions, it distorts the

picture of the overall media coverage because it completely ignores the more objective and factual journalistic formats such as reports and feature stories which are numerously used in everyday (war/conflict) coverage. As for the selection of the English-language media: There are more examples for English-language media which could have been researched upon (e.g. the magazine *Business Ukraine*) in order to generate a wider and thus empirically more valid picture of the coverage. But for different reasons the selection was limited to *Kyiv Post* and *The Ukrainian Week* – mainly because of their range of distribution, degree of representation, topic focus and size of content output.

A more ambivalent shortcoming of this study connected with the choice of the media is the origin of the authors whose opinion pieces were researched upon. Since many authors were actually not Ukrainian but largely guest authors from mostly Western states such as the US, the UK, Germany or Sweden, the research design which aimed at investigating Ukrainian journalists was somewhat flawed. Though the fact that the analyzed media outlets chose to often publish opinion pieces from non-Ukrainian experts represents in itself an interesting results of this study, it can also be criticized that the both the Ukrainian journalism culture and potential Ukrainian postcolonial identity cannot be accurately researched if not all pieces included in the data sample were actually written by Ukrainian journalists. But this point of criticism rests controversial.

Conclusion

The analysis of this case study of the two Ukrainian English-language media *Kyiv Post* and *The Ukrainian Week* has revealed a very mixed result. While the pre-defined analytical categories corresponding to a *constructivist war reporting* matched a considerable amount of the data sample, the pre-defined analytical categories derived from the theoretical approach of *post-Soviet postcoloniality* did in their narrow and strict definition not strongly correspond to the selected data sample of opinion pieces – a fact which is not entirely surprising considering that opinion pieces refer to particular news events and thus argue in specific detail rather than making fundamental general statements about the (postcolonial) condition of Ukraine. As for the meta-level analysis of the given data sample, the results show that the particular section of the Ukrainian journalism culture which was investigated oscillates between the traditional practices of Western and post-Soviet journalism cultures (namely Russia) - with a slight tendency to lean towards non-Western journalistic practices. In an ironic sense: Though the analyzed data sample did exhibit pro-Western positions and support for typical Western values; it did so in a one-sided, biased and unbalanced manner as virtually non of the investigated opinion pieces would go against a certain pro-European Ukrainian narrative or present a Russian perspective on the topic. This lack of diversity of opinions can be interpreted as a non-Western journalistic practice as it corresponds to the interventionist approach; even though this has to be seen very critical of course as Western journalistic systems also tend to be one-sided – against their high ideal self-expectations. This has proven especially true in the case of the coverage of the *Ukrainian crisis* and the *war in Donbass* as researchers have found biased media coverage in all states involved in the conflict, including Western states[330][331]. In this analysis it has become evident that both media investigated seek to come

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330 cf. Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit.
331 cf. Boyd-Barrett, O. (2015). Op. Cit.

across as media in Western journalistic tradition, implicitly call for a certain political, economic and social reform of Ukraine and appeal to a certain internationally orientated Western(ized) audience.

The categories which operationalized the theory of *post-Soviet postcoloniality* were not able to grasp the wide range of positions and opinions presented itself in the sample of comments. Though a few opinion pieces contained statements which could be interpreted along the theoretical lines which Moore developed, exhibiting some references to Ukraine's lost 'Westernness' for example, the vast majority of the analyzed content is far from being an expression of Ukraine's postcolonial condition. Instead, a similar narrative was strongly present: The idea that Ukraine's future is located within the geographical and ideological context of Europe and that Europeans and especially the EU therefore have to help Ukrainians in their struggle for their future national development. Thus as a result it can be said that the focus of the selected opinion pieces was less centered on the past in general and a lost 'Westernness' or the former Russo-Soviet colonization in detail but instead on the present political struggle for a united Ukrainian nation and the divestment of the close ties with the still important partner Russia.

This focus on the present times and the lack of clear postcolonial positions does not imply that Ukrainians do not embrace a certain postcolonial identity – it could just be a consequence of the chosen format of the selected data sample. Though there are scholars who have detected that "a trend in the Ukrainian media constructs Ukrainians as global subjects by asserting ethnic and racial diversity as part of Ukrainian identity"[332] and thus implying a Ukrainian postcolonial identiy, in general the format of up-to-date news-related media coverage which is probably not the most frequently used channel to convey statements about an entity's postcolonial status – unlike more expressive formats

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332 Bilaniuk, L. (2016). Race, Media, and Postcoloniality: Ukraine Between Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism. *City & Society, 28*(3), 341-364., p.341

such as written polemics, intellectual essays, political blogs and fictional literature. This leads to a two-fold conclusion: On the one hand it is difficult to find a suitable method to detect postcolonial narratives and thinking patterns in media content. On the other hand it shows that Moore's concept of the post-Soviet postcoloniality is ambivalent and has to continuously be seen very critically.

As for the theoretical perspective of *constructivist war reporting*, the results were much more clear. Examples for the representation of both the pattern of the construction of the image of an enemy and the pattern of patriotism – and connected with it self-censorship – were numerously found in the data sample. Even though the chosen time frame for the analysis did not correspond to a clear-cut war but rather to a complex conflict whose exact beginning is hard to define, the operationalization and the application of this theoretical approach seemed to be very fruitful for the analysis of this case study. Since the results revealed such a clear indication for the reproduction of the patterns of the construction of war realities, they confirm the theoretical model which Staiger developed. Thus, the analysis of this work and its results support the conceptual assumption that in times of war, journalistic systems constantly construct realities following typical patterns[333]. In the case of the journalistic systems of the two Ukrainian English-language media investigated in this work this means that they engaged in producing a reality in which first former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and his loyal elites and then second Russian president Vladimir Putin and Russia as a whole are the enemies of the Ukrainian people and that they thus have to unite and bravely fight for the independence and future of their nation. Given the fact that the results of this case study revealed such a clear support of the theoretical model of Jan Staiger, it is useful to continue working with it as a conceptual instrument and to further apply this

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[333] cf. Staiger, J. (2004). Op. Cit. P. 161

model to other case studies in order to further tests its validity.

The results of the meta-level of the qualitative content analysis allow – at least for the small section of the English-language print media – the conclusion that the Ukrainian journalism culture is at present in search of a clear identity connected with practices and ideas. While the analyzed Ukrainian media seek to meet traditional standards of Western journalism cultures (detachment, non-interventionism, objectivity etc.) and promoting such an identity in their self-presentation as a media, in their actual editorial practice of author selection, content diversity and representation of different opinions these media actually tend to lean toward non-Western/post-Soviet journalism cultures as they exhibit elements such as opinion bias, interventionism and political partisanship. This results corresponds with the findings of other scholars who have identified post-Sovietness as a "key feature" of independent Ukraine's media system[334].

This results clearly shows that the Ukrainian journalism culture – just as the state as a whole – is stuck in between its Soviet past, its turbulent political presence and its potential European future. It seems to be that the Ukrainian journalism culture as a subsystem of the entire Ukrainian society is in a process of major transition including the constant re-negotiation of cultural and national identities and of the relation of old established and newly developed/imported journalistic practices, norms and values.

This case study can only be seen as a small contribution to this research field as it only analyzed a small fraction of the whole Ukrainian media landscape and solely used qualitative content analysis of media content and not semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian journalists. However it becomes evident that much more research on the (current) Ukrainian journalism culture is needed in order to map it in a meaningful manner and thus to embed it within the model of global journalism cultures by Hanitzsch. For this, research designs including large-

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334 cf. Kulyk, V. (2010). Op. Cit. P. 177

scale semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian journalists would be especially useful.

In detail, the results of this research provide a small insight into a specific niche of the Ukrainian journalism culture and its practices, confirm other already existing scientific findings about the biased nature of the media coverage of the *Ukrainian Crisis* and the *war in Donbass*, give an example for how postcolonial theory can be applied to Ukraine within a media context and show that the Ukrainian case is typical for how journalistic reporting is enemy-orientated and patriotically framed in times of conflict and war.

Since this work touched upon various sub-topics, its results have an important meaning for the further exploration of a number of research fields: The Ukrainian journalism culture, the postcolonial identity of Ukraine (and potentially other post-Soviet states) and journalistic war and conflict coverage are the research areas most closely linked to the interpretation of the results of this work. But other fields such as the role of (English-language) internationally orientated expat media, the reciprocal influence of politics and media and the generation and composition of media content could also benefit from these results because they hint at journalistic and editorial practices in these specialized niche media. Another topical complex which this work has slightly touched upon is the relationship between "journalistic norms and national/military interests in controlling information flows and distributing the "correct" information"[335] - a conflict which has been already strongly (historically) researched upon[336][337].

In general it can be said that this specific small-scale case study is a first attempt to hint at and try to close a large research gap – that is the large-scale connection

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335 Nygren et al. (2016). Op. Cit. P. 2
336 Knightley, P. (2004). *The first casualty: The war correspondent as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq*. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.
337 cf. Löffelholz, M. (2004). Op.Cit.

between media studies, postcolonial studies and post-Soviet studies. Obviously the frame of this scientific study as part of this master thesis by far too small to close this research gap; since there is so much scientific analysis yet to be done, this work presented here can only provide a starting point for a hopefully soon diversely developing research area.

Though a number of scholars have pointed out the potential benefits of and the importance of a cross-discipline approach[338][339][340][341], the intersectional research between media studies and postcolonial studies is still an underdeveloped field which needs systematic exploration. Both media scholars and postcolonial thinkers have long left theoretical overlapping unnoticed but this is slowly starting to change as first publications try to conceptualize the scientific encounter of both disciplines[342][343]. The set of new research questions which they try to tackle are seemingly the same ones as those which the results of this analysis evoked: Which role do media play in the construction of (postcolonial) identities, how can postcolonial narratives be conceptually operationalized to capture media content and how can postcolonial theory be fruitfully applied to media and communication studies are some of these questions. If the circle is being drawn even wider then it would be interesting to research the links between an activist and interventionist approach of the journalist's role and a postcolonial identity. Likewise, research on how postcolonial views are generated by and influence the enemy-orientated and patriotic version of journalism during times of war and conflict would be an interesting contribution.

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338 Kumar, S; Parameswaran, R. (2018) Charting an Itinerary for Postcolonial Communication and Media Studies. *Journal of Communication* 68:2, pages 347-358.

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Glossary

Colonization	The the action or process of settling among and establishing control over the indigenous people of an area and using their resources to increase the colonizer's power and wealth
Constructivism	A branch of the philosophy of epistemology, constructivism is founded on the premise that there is no objective truth which can be discovered but that humans construct their own world they live in, by reflecting on their experiences.
Eurasianism	A Russian political ideology that envisions Russia's re-emergence as a conservative world power in opposition to the hegemony and liberal values of the West
Euromaidan	Term used to describe mass anti-government protests which took place in Ukraine between November 2013 and February 2014
Mimicry	The unconscious or automatic, or sometimes purposefully imitation of the gestures, behaviors, facial expressions, speech and movements of another person
Patriotism	The quality of being patriotic; devotion to and vigorous support for one's country.
Postcolonial	Relating to a period after the state of colonialism
Post-Soviet Postcoloniality	The idea that because the Soviet Union was a political entity which was based on colonization with the Russo-Soviets being the colonizers, the post-Soviet space is since the collapse of the Soviet Union in a postcolonial condition

Reverse-cultural colonization	According to David Moore, a model of colonization that counter to the standard Western definition of colonization which implies an orientalization of the colonized by the colonizer, the relation between colonizer and colonized is reversed in the Russian-Central European colonization. The Baltic and Eastern European states as colonized orientalized the colonizer Russia because for several centuries Russia framed itself and was framed by Western Europe as culturally inferior
Ukrainian crisis	An established term to describe profound tensions in the Ukrainian nation and state-building processes which began on November 21, 2013, when the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union. Mass anti-government protests to his ousting and the election of a new government.
War in Donbass	An armed conflict in the Donbass region in Ukraine between the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively) and the Ukrainian government which started in April 2014 and continues to date
Westernness	The quality of being Western or of having Western characteristics; specifically the quality of belonging to a Western country or culture, or having Western attitudes and ideas