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**ПОСТАВКИ РОССИЙСКОГО ОРУЖИЯ В ИНДОНЕЗИЮ, 1960-е 2000-е гг. И ЕЕ
ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ НА БУДУЩЕЕ**

**RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFER TO INDONESIA FROM 1960-2000S AND ITS
PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE**

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Аннотация

Этот тезис объясняет историю и будущие перспективы поставок российского оружия в Индонезию из эпохи Советского Союза в Российскую Федерацию. В рамках данного тезиса описывается концепция стратегического партнерства России и Индонезии в военной помощи для повышения их оборонных отношений. Цель данного исследования-соблюдать и воспринимать фоне намерения России в поставке оружия, кроме того, признать и воспринять рычагов в передаче оружия. Этот тезис исследован для их соответствующей объяснительной силы в понимании российских поставок оружия в Индонезию в течение ключевого сорокалетнего периода в сочетании объективной техники и исторического фактора, краткого всеобъемлющего фактора и структурированного как количественного метода. Рассматривается вмешательство познания стратегических альянсов как новое значение изменения стратегического партнерства военно-технического потенциала.

Ключевые слова: Передача оружия, стратегическое партнерство, Индонезия, Россия, Советский Союз, военные, оборона

Abstract

This thesis explains the history and future perspectives on Russian arms transfers to Indonesia from the era of the Soviet Union to Russian Federation. The scope of this thesis is describing the concept of strategic partnership between Russia and Indonesia in the military assistance to raise their defense relation. The objective of this research is to adhere and to perceive the background of the Russian intention in arms transfer, in addition, to recognize and to apprehend of leverage in arms transfer. This thesis investigated for their respective explanatory power in comprehension Russian arms transfers to Indonesia during a key forty-year period within a combination of an objective technique and historical factor, a brief comprehensive of the factor, and a structured quantitative method. It examines interference of cognition strategic alliances as a new value of change in the strategic partnership of military and technological capabilities.

Keywords: Arms transfer, strategic partnership, Indonesia, Russia, the Soviet Union, military, defense

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty System

PKI – Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

TNI AD – Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (Indonesian Armed Forces)

TNI AL – Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut (Indonesian Navy Forces)

TNI AU – Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara (Indonesian Air Forces)

INTRODUCTION

The theme of this Master's dissertation is Russian Arms Transfer to Indonesia from 1960 to 2000s and its future perspectives.

Relevance of the Topic. By The end of World War II was a major strategic change to the International geopolitical system. A change that globalizes the struggle of the power of the major actors who are an important part of the international system of the world. The system of cooperation in international relations is one of the most difficult anarchy activities to implement. In an international system that does not have the power of attorney, so the state cannot bear cooperation with other countries even though it has been signed together.

In this new global environment also emerged the emergence of new international actors, and one of them Indonesia. The relationship between Indonesia and he Soviet Union in 1945 had not been clearly defined. In this position, the Soviet Union restored the geopolitical situation in Europe and East Asia after World War II. At the same time, Indonesia was struggling for independence from the Dutch army.

Since the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17th 1945, an active free policy of politics has always been implanted to the present day. The political policy that explains that Indonesia has a free and active principle which means that Indonesia does not side with the power of other countries that are not in line with the value of Pancasila and remain active in carrying out events that occur in the international arena.¹

The links Indonesia with The Soviet Union countries, comparing to Soviet Union with project trade, economy field with bloc members.² Hence, this was a result as policy making to make Indonesia's concern on easing in relationship with the Soviet Union. Indonesia's foreign relations between Moscow and Jakarta bilateral diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union began in 1950 on 3rd February.³ So it opened the Embassy in each country in 1954. Starting from this


¹ The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia, *The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, As amended by the First Amendment of 1999, the Second Amendment of 2000, the Third Amendment of 2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002*, http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/profil/kedudukan/UUD_1945_Perubahan%204.pdf, accessed on 1st of February 2018.

² Russell H. Fifeld, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945-1958*, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958, page: 145, <https://archive.org/details/diplomacyofsouth007542mbp>, accessed on 3rd of February 2018.

³ Розоборонэкспорт (Rozoboronekспорт) , Russian Arms Exporter, *Сотрудничество с Индонезией, Дипломатические отношения между странами установлены 3 февраля 1950 года, Sotrudnichestvo s Indoneziej, (Diplomaticheskie Otnosheniya mezhdru stranami ustanovleny 3 fevralya 1950 goda), Cooperation with Indonesia,*

period of bilateral relations between the two countries began actively in the economic, political, cultural, and military.

Table.1 The Concept Map of Indonesian Foreign Policy Free-Active ⁴



(Description: The implementation of Indonesian Foreign Policy Free and Active must be done consistently, meaning that Indonesia is active in implementing world peace and security, taking part in solving international problems, improving diplomatic relations with other countries. Diplomatic relations done through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Purpose of diplomatic relations this is to improve the national economy and national development through regional and international economic cooperation.⁵

The links Indonesia with The Soviet Union countries, comparing to Soviet Union with project trade, economy field with bloc members.⁶ Hence, this was a result as policy making to make Indonesia's concern on easing in relationship with the Soviet Union. Indonesia's foreign relations between Moscow and Jakarta bilateral diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union

Diplomatic relations established between countries on 3rd of February 1950, <http://roe.ru/export/indoneziya/>, accessed on 1st of April 2018.

⁴ The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia, Op.cit.

⁵ Loc.cit.

⁶ Russell H. Fifeld, Op.cit.

began in 1950 on 3rd February.⁷ So it opened the Embassy in each country in 1954. Starting from this period of bilateral relations between the two countries began actively in the economic, political, cultural, and military.

The first treaty on economic began in 1956.⁸ Since then, the Soviet Union had provided millions of dollars in lending to Indonesia for the construction of economic development in Indonesia. On April 1958, The Soviet Union and Indonesia had agreed to enter into force based on the General Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation.⁹

Since the Agreement had been declared, the amount of shipment for new weapons and military equipment have begun with the aim of re-equipment Indonesian National Armed Forces, such as GAZ-69 ATVs, PT-76 floating tanks, including GAZ-69 ATVs, PT-76 floating tanks, warships, fighter jets, submarines, artillery systems and small arms.¹⁰ Modernization required simultaneous training in the USSR of thousands of Indonesian officers, soldiers and sailors. The military and military-technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union allowed the young republic to overcome dependence on Dutch influence and gain territorial integrity. Despite this, the end of the 1960s saw the almost 20-year cooling of relations between the two countries.

The object and subject. The object of this dissertation is the bilateral relation of arms trade between Indonesia and The Soviet Union from 1960-2000s. The contributing factors that have built partnership in arms transfers between these two countries are considered as a subject this thesis.

The definition of the principle concept. The impact of the superpower of transferring weapons to two stable third world rivals may have had the effect of weakening to bring credibility to the conceptual framework¹¹ that emphasizes congruent security orientations for suppliers and recipients of weapons.

⁷ Розоборонэкспорт (Rozoboroneksport) , Russian Arms Exporter, Op.cit.

⁸ Farizov. I. O, *Советско-Индонезийское Экономическое Сотрудничество (Sovetsko-Indonezijskoe Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo) Soviet-Indonesian Economic Cooperation*, Institute of International Economy and International Relations, Nauka Publication, 1964, page: 45.

⁹ Розоборонэкспорт (Rozoboroneksport) , Russian Arms Exporter, Op.cit.

¹⁰ Loc.cit.

¹¹ David Kinsella, *Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the Cold War*, American Journal of Political Science Vol. 38, No. 3 (Aug., 1994), page: 557-581, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111597>, accessed on 6th of April 2018.

The arms transfer system is an important tool for developed countries to achieve foreign policy, to influence system of security interests, and develop into a more advanced economy.¹² International arms trade is an effective instrument for governments to promote policy interests abroad.¹³ By implementing arms transfers with similar set of interests influence any government using defense trade as foreign policy and military strategy, the strong link to combine the right to self-defense with inherent sovereign right.

For the Soviet Union and Russia separated by distance, diplomatic relations began to get closer in 1955 when the Bandung Conference was held by non-Aligned countries.¹⁴ The Bandung Conference was a conference discussing the post-World War II anti-colonial struggle. Sukarno as one of the pioneers of the Non-Aligned Movement, respected by other world leaders.¹⁵ Because this conference is the first step in showing Indonesia's existence on the international economic and political stage.

From the eyes of the Soviet Union, Indonesia and Sukarno could be considered as potential political allies in third world countries.¹⁶ The Soviet Union met with Indonesia's first President, Sukarno. The relationship between the Soviet Union and Indonesia began to be symbolized by the holding of President Sukarno's first state visit to the Soviet Union from August to September 1956.¹⁷ Based on the relevant cooperation agreements, the military and economic aid were furnished by the Soviet Union to help in shifting of Indonesian military capacity and technology.¹⁸ The Soviet Union had gently support Indonesia to strengthen its defeat capacity and to unloose their coloniaslist the Netherlands.

Research questions of this Master' thesis are whether there are contributing factors have built partnership in arms transfers and why have Indonesia chosen Russia to have arms transfers?. The

¹² Cameron Hobbs, *Arms Transfers and China's Long-Term Goals: An Assessment of China's Current Strategy in the Defense Market*, page: 2.

¹³ Loc.cit

¹⁴ Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference*, Univ. Press of Mississippi, 1956, page: 7-9.

¹⁵ Loc.cit.

¹⁶ Anna Leiber, *A Foreign Policy of Non-Alignment? Indonesia's Position during the Cold War*, GRIN Verlag, 2014, page: 2.

¹⁷ Farizov. I. O, Op.cit., page: 9.

¹⁸ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*, Equinox Publishing, 2006, page: 206.

main problem of this research is will examine Russia's behavior in the arms transfer to Indonesia with some emphasis on describing over the last decade.

The aim is to identify its strategy and assessing its ability to use the arms trade to achieve foreign policy objectives, influence security interests and promote defense modernization.

Objectives. To reach the aim the following objectives have been to set are:

1. To determine the strengthening control of these weapons could to create conditions for economic and social development.
2. To conduct this arms transfers related to security and defense, and as a contribution to military capabilities. The security issues including potentially destabilizing arms transfers and could continue to play role.
3. To understand and to examine which arms had been transferred to Indonesia and what contributing factors were influenced. The scope of this thesis include the history background of Indonesia and Russia in transferring arms to raise defense industry. The relevance is to know background of Russia to produce their own arms and its benefits'.

The chronological frameworks of this thesis cover the period time from 1960 until 2000s. The period time is described by the Agreement of Diplomatic Relations between Soviet Union and Indonesia on 3rd February 1950, and Agreement in Economy and Technology cooperation was signed on 2nd February 1960.¹⁹ According to Agreement that appeared as a foundation of this relation, it was started as period of time this research study. This period time will give reflection to the future perspectives of relation between Russia and Indonesia in the framework of defense strategy.

Methodology. To adhere this research study, the pursuing methods were dominantly applied in first chapters, second chapter, and third chapter. *The historical method* was used by applying historical approach to determine the history of Russia as a reliable arms supplier for Indonesia provided Moscow with an advantage in relations with the Indonesian government. This includes a number of personal relationships, not just the level of professional trust. In addition, Indonesia's conventional military strength was at its height at a time when Russia was supplying them. The dynamics of the

¹⁹ Farizov. I. O, Op.cit., page: 45.

arms transfer from Russia to Indonesia as well as the behavior of the arms market in Russia as arms supplier.

Historical Background of Russian Arms Transfers to Indonesia in period 1960-2000s (reviewing agreements, historical approach of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Indonesia). In this thesis, the historical approach used by the author relates to the conditions have occurred in the past. An attempt has done way to get the facts up to the conclusions about past events or predict future events. Methodology of descriptive analyses involves collecting data describing events, and then organizes, and describes data collection and analysis.²⁰ The term descriptive research refers to the type of question of research, design and analysis of data that will be focused on historical approach of Soviet Union arms transfer to Indonesia how transfer technology. It promotes greater knowledge transfer, and helps explain the extent of technological capability transfer, at least in strategic alliances.

The Dynamics of Arms Transfer from Russia to Indonesia (documentary analyses of arms transfers). This chapter seeks to identify and understand the reasons why strategic cooperation became a fundamental value for Indonesia and Soviet Union relations. The arms transfers and weapons will be described, so it will find causes, the Soviet Union helped to shift the orientation of Indonesia's shackled from colonialism and to unloose Indonesia struggle for the return of West Irian.²¹ On the 2nd chapter have been formulated using explanations dynamic for arms transfers drawn from the academic theoretical literature on international relations as well as strategic partnership. The performance implications of strategic partnership relation between Indonesia and Russia have been a central area of investigation over the past 50 years.

Russian Intention in the Cooperation of Arms Transfer to Indonesia, this chapter will analyse Russian intention in defense industry and predict future what will happen by looking at current and past facts. By examining data of analysis, the predictions and strategy will be applie along within the goals of concept data. The process is studying, modelling data with objective credible source and conclusions.²² On this chapter, author will learn about data analysis from chapter one and chapter

²⁰ The Handbook of Research for Educational Communications and Technology, *What is Descriptive Research?*, <http://members.aect.org/edtech/ed1/41/41-01.html>, accessed on 7th of April 2018.

²¹ Rex Mortimer, Op.cit., page: 207.

²² Nishchol Mishra and Dr. Sanjay Silakari, *Predictive Analytics: A Survey, Trends, Application, Oppurtunities and Challenges*, International Journal of Computer Science and Information Technologies, Vol. 3 (3), 2012, page: 1, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.442.2759&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, accessed on 8th of April 2018.

two. The lesson will conclude with some examples and a summary of each chapter. A look at analyzing data and collecting data related to factors from 1st chapter (why Soviet Union cooperated with Indonesia), on 2nd chapter is an analyze of status quo of Russian arms transfer to Indonesia. On 3rd where author should analyze factors which influence Russia's cooperation with Indonesia, what factors which influence Russia's cooperation with Indonesia in future. And also hypotheses have been formulated using explanations for arms transfers drawn from the strategic partnerships. In this case of chapter hypotheses and conclusion should same and to be related to topic and aim. So, explanatory power in understanding Russia arms transfer to Indonesia during a key forty-year period, combining methodology includes a historical approach to overview of each factor, strategic partnerships and objective grounding for each factor and applying qualitative and quantitative methods.

Theoretical approach. Understanding to accomplish this thesis is aimed at applying conceptual to analysis of **strategic partnership**²³ relation in arms transfer. This is achieved through the use of a model taken from the field of strategic alliance and some of organizational research. It examines interfirm arms transfer within strategic partnership. In partnership' technological capabilities, it should be analyzed as a strategic movement. Hypotheses have been formulated using explanations for arms transfers drawn from the academic theoretical literature on international relations as well as a strategic partnership. This formula of model is designed to help us better understand the goals, properties, and behavior of strategic partnerships. In the name of measure of changes in technological capabilities of partner of alliance, we analyze the existence of technological resources as result of participation in alliance.²⁴

According to Frederic S. Pearson, the meaning of **arms transfers** is a form of dispatch of weaponry or goods, commodities, and services performed with loans, sales, or even grants from

²³ Strategic partnership is a foreign policy tool that can serve to power who are cooperated between subjects and share the sam goals. These goals can stem preferences of main lobbying groups within subjects (social development, or welfare). Strategic alliances bring together the elements of the realist alliances and the liberal intergration theories. Lucyna Czechowska, *The Concept of Strategic Partnership as An Input In The Modern Alliance Theory*, The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2013, No. 2 (4), page: 42, https://repozytorium.umk.pl/bitstream/handle/item/1889/The_concept_of_strategic_partnership_as_an_input_in_the_modern_alliance_theory.pdf?sequence=1, accessed on 3rd of April 2018.

²⁴ David C. Mowery, Joanne E. Oxley, Brian S. Silverman, *Strategic Alliances and Interfirm Knowledge Transfer* (1996) Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, Special Issue: Knowledge and the Firm (Winter, 1996), page: 77-91, <https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250171108>, accessed on 1st of April 2018.

countries to other countries.²⁵ Things are relating to goods and services related to the construction of major military bases, logistic materials for storing, using or even maintaining the arms contained in the major arms transfer agreements. The mechanism of weapons transfers is included in the budget cost framework compared to the military capability itself. A benchmark in the assessment of data, based on the value of weapons transfers to explain how much a country spends resources in order to pay for weapons transfers.²⁶ With regard to weapons transfers, weapons and weapons commitments are required, as the value of weapons transfers serves as a major point to assess actualization of weapon transfer activities.²⁷

Analysis of existing literature. For academic literature, the technological transfer in arms and weapons has built as a relationship to a strategic partnership since the agreement signed in 1950. This arms transfer built in strategic partnership focuses on the development of technological capabilities and contributing factors. It examines several areas of defence diplomacy, including arms sales, defence and security consultations. In this case, the research paper “Strategic realignment of Dejavu Russia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation in the 21st century” had been done by **Alexey Muraviev and Colin Brown**, as the strategic affairs analysts in Curtin University and joined Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pasific Region especially in Indonesia.²⁸ Moreover, this topic has been examined by some scholars and its material of sources study determining factors of how arms transfer started to build in.

Other researchers who took part in topic of arms transfer as strategic partnership is **Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad**. The title of paper is “Russia’s role as arms exporter, The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia”.²⁹ In this research paper, these scholars want to express Russia as the world’s largest arms exporter is taking effort to reinforce its position in

²⁵ Frederic S. Pearson, *The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy of International Study*, Westview Press, 1994, page: 7.

²⁶ Loc.cit.

²⁷ Richard H. Wilcox, *Twixt Cup and Lip: Some Problems in Applying Arms Controls in Arms Transfer in The Modern World* by Stephanie G. Neumann and Robert E. Harkavy, Praeger Publishers, 1972, page: 32.

²⁸ Alexey D. Muraviev and Colin Brown, *Strategic Realignment or Déjà Vu? Russian-Indonesia Defence Cooperation in the Twenty First Century*, The Strategic Defence and Studies Centre at The Australian National University, Canberra, December 2008, page: 6, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/94948/wp_sdsc_411.pdf, accessed on 4th of April 2018.

²⁹ Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, *Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia*, Russia and Eurasia Programme, March 2017, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf>, accessed on 1st of April 2018.

weapons system. In this research demonstrated that arms exports play important capacity and role in Russia's economy.³⁰ And as arms supplier, Russia is the ascendant country in Asia Pacific countries. Therefore, as the defense industry in Russia keeps growing, this is an essential condition for some political, social, and economic understanding.

There is one of the researcher who researched "Russian Arms Transfers and Asian Military Modernisation", he is **Richard A. Bitzinger**. In this paper examines the important value of Russian arms transfers and its defence industry in reporting of military aid as part of Asian military modernization. He addressed that Russia as arms supplier had been exported to Indonesia, India, China, and Malaysia.³¹ He elaborated that Russian defence industry regained from the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990, but the arms exports are still to survive. The arms transfer has replete with capability for Asia Pacific militaries, especially in Southeast Asia.³²

In these recent researches, they were seen that the economic development factor in a country greatly influences the policy-making between the two sides to establish bilateral cooperation in the military strategic development. Strategic partnerships also play an important role in military relations. The Soviet Union was an anti-colonial state and they had important role in helping Indonesia to solve their territorial dispute in West Irian. In 1960, the leadership under President Sukarno involved several conflicts with neighboring countries. Arms aid supported by the Soviet Union's military for Indonesia to improve Indonesia's military capabilities during the confrontation. Jakarta received USD \$ 100 billion worth of weapons.³³

Indonesia's military capabilities at that time increased, and Indonesia was able to expel the Netherlands from the western part of Papua Island. The Soviet military aid factor was one of the decisive defeats of the Netherlands in West Irian. The presence of the Soviet Union in blunting the Dutch Navy whose ship was confined to the harbor. Indonesia also launched a "Confrontation" of a war not declared with Malaysia. The conflict ended three years later with Indonesia's recognition of Malaysia as an independent state.

³⁰ Ibid, page: 2.

³¹ Richard A. Bitzinger, *Russian Arms Transfers and Asian Military Modernisation*. Policy Report December 2015, RSIS Nanyang Technological University, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/PR151215_Russian-Arms.pdf, accessed on 7th of April 2018, page: 2.

³² Loc.cit.

³³ Guy J. Pauker, *The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia*, Essay July 1962 Issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1962-07-01/soviet-challenge-indonesia>, accessed on 6th April 2018.

The novelty of the study.

As outlined, the author will explain the relationship between Indonesia and Russia in the transfer of weapons in 1960-2000 so as to analyze its perspective in the future. It explores the respective explanatory Russian arms transfers to Indonesia in a key forty year period, in combining of historical and objective methods, a structured of collective methods of quantitative and qualitative. It explains the history and organization of arms transfer from Russia to Indonesia, which mechanism that had been implemented. In this case, by applying the value of changes in technological capabilities to be participated in alliance.

Primary sources overview.

The main sources will be leaded to some agreements. Sources divided to Agreements between Republic of Indonesia and Soviet Union. Primary sources (official documents from agreements and white paper from Ministry of Defense of Republic Indonesia, SIPRI database, official website (Rozoboroneksport, Ministry of Defense Russian Federation, Ministry of Defense Republic of Indonesia). Secondary sources (academic paper, journals, articles, books).

The source base were divided into **official documents** as primary resource. To be the first documents are Agreement of between The Soviet Union and Indonesia in the technology cooperation. The first agreement consisted of General Agreements about Economic and Technological Cooperation between The Soviet Union and Republic Indonesia. On the agreement be composed of 11 articles.³⁴ The second agreement was Second General Agreements about Economic and Technological Cooperation between The Soviet Union and Republic of Indonesia. On this second agreement consisted of 10 articles.³⁵ From these agreement, The Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, wishing twishing to develop economic and technical co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit between the two countries, have agreed on the following. Proceeding from the friendly relations existing between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Indonesia and taking into account the experience of economic and technical cooperation in the implementation of the General Agreement of September 15, 1956, the two Governments agreed to conclude a Second General Agreement aimed at further assistance in the overall development of the economy Indonesia. This agreement was based on mutual benefit, equality, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the parties.

³⁴ Farizov. I. O, Op.cit., page: 67.

³⁵ Farizov. I. O, Op.cit., page: 72.

Then secondly, white paper from Ministry of Defense of Republic of Indonesia. This is describing defense functions, strategies for creating sovereignty, concepts of political policy, state doctrine, decision-making, and regulations created to understand the national defense function and the safety of the nation from any threats. And also analytical reports SIPRI is an independent website covering global security along with information showing the Armaments Industrial Database, arms-producing, as well as weapons and military services SIPRI database also contains information on arms sales estimates made on open information. It was initiated in 1989 and at the same time the dominating company was the Eastern European Countries, including the Soviet Union. And also the latest version contains data from 2002 including data company in Russia.

Thirdly are online publications and materials from digital media. In examining the writing of this thesis, the role of official online publications such as the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense website includes official coverage of information on state strategy, doctrine and regulation in maintaining the country's resilience. Then supported by Rozoboroneksport website which is representative for Russian Defense Export. The activities included in Rozoboroneksport's task are to strengthen the military and political capabilities of Russia throughout the world, one of which is Indonesia. Rozoboroneksport has the task of saving the country by one of them reaching the position of exporters in the defense industry. So monitor the target of weapon marketing by extending geographic strategic working partnerships and increasing the range of export shipments of Russian military products. Based on a comprehensive analysis Rozoboroneksport creates a national defense system for land, air and sea routes, ensuring the optimal combination of efficiency and cost. So it can include the provision of products and services for military purposes, and licensed production organizations in customer countries, creating military-technical infrastructure objects, joint ventures for technology production and services, joint research and development.

Fourthly, academic papers, journals, and books are secondary sources that are reviewed and describe the results of this thesis writing analysis. Secondary sources are very credible and accurate information for the development of military capability of the country especially Russia in the defense industry.

Approbation. The preliminary result of this has been presented in one of conference in “Lomonosov 2018”. It was organized by Lomonosov State University. In the result, it was an analytical report by applying a historical analysis about Russian Arms Transfer to Indonesia from 1960-2000 and its future perspectives. It was explained that Soviet Union played much more active military role than previously assumed. This deployment fits into a pattern of covert Soviet military interventions in the

developing world between 1960 and 1962, it suggested that in some cases Khrushchev was prepared to use Soviet military units to support wars of national liberation in the developing world.

The Structure of the work. On the 1st chapter methodology of descriptive analysis refers to the type of question of research, design and analysis of data that will be focused on historical approach of Soviet Union arms transfer to Indonesia how transfer technology. It promotes greater knowledge transfer, and helps explain the extent of technological capability transfer, at least in strategic alliances. On the 2nd chapter have been formulated using explanations dynamic for arms transfers drawn from the academic theoretical literature on international relations as well as strategic partnership. The performance implications of strategic partnership relation between Indonesia and Russia have been a central area of investigation over the past 40 years and its future perspectives. On 3rd chapter where author should analyze factors which influence Russia's cooperation with Indonesia, what factors which influence Russia's cooperation with Indonesia in future. And also hypotheses have been formulated using explanations for arms transfers drawn from the strategic partnerships. In this case of chapter hypotheses and conclusion should same and to be related to topic and aim.

Chapter 1: Historical Background of Russian Arms Transfers to Indonesia in period 1960-2000s

**“I hate imperialism. I detest colonialism. And I fear the consequences of their last bitter struggle for life. We are determined that our nation, and the world as a whole, shall not be the plaything of one small corner of the world”
-Sukarno-**

The Soviet Union and Republic of Indonesia partnership as an alignment phenomenon. The Diplomatic Relations demonstrated strategic partnership is substantive and purposeful in security sphere, and many concepts to be applied in this aligned of phenomenon of international partnership. In 1945, the bilateral relations of the Republic of Indonesia and the Soviet Union had not been established.

The Soviet Union prioritized postwar recovery and secured geopolitical conditions in Europe and East Asia, while Indonesia was struggling to prepare for the idea of independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945.³⁶ The beginning of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union began officially on 3rd February 1950.³⁷ After officially establishing diplomatic relations, the First President of the Republic of Indonesia visited the Soviet Union for the first time in 1956. Since the presidential visit, the relationship between the two countries has been developing until now.

1.1 Historical Background the Beginning of Bilateral Relation between Soviet Union and Indonesia (1945-1958)

A. Sukarno Era (1945- 1967)

According to Vladimir I Braginsky, the Russians have kept awe with the archipelago since the 11th century.³⁸ The early 11th century Russian society did not know where the archipelago was, but it was believed that the archipelago was described as Eden Park which is a park full of precious stones

³⁶ Farizov. I. O, Op.cit., page: 4.

³⁷ Farizov. I. O, Op.cit., page: 5.

³⁸ Tomi Lebang, *Sahabat Lama, Era Baru: 60 Tahun Pasang Surut Hubungan Indonesia-Rusia*, Grasindo, 2010, page: 2.

and jewelry.³⁹ While Indonesia was still under Dutch colonial rule, the Russian Empire had placed the First Consul in Batavia with the first and last consul was Modest M. Bakunin with the period 1894-1899.⁴⁰

From the Russian tsarism was one of the key to openin of the door of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Inonesia beginning in 1933. A scientist and world historian named Aleksandr Guber explained that the Soviet Union has known Indonesia since the name of Indonesia is still called the Dutch East Indies.⁴¹

The proclamation of independence declared in 1945 was a form of the struggle for independence after the freedom of colonialism. The struggle for defense of the Republic of Indonesia continues to be tested with the aggressive Dutch attack. The role of the Soviet Union here as a friend is to strongly condemn the Dutch aggression to claim West Irian. The Soviet Union and its allies at the UN supported the Netherlands to stop its aggression to Indonesia. Dutch pressured to get Indonesia back. Beginning in 1948, the Soviet Union sought to establish bilateral ties with Indonesia. So the opening of the Indonesian representative with the agreement signed in Prague, Czech.⁴² However, due to the pressure made back by the Dutch, Indonesia cancelled the Soviet Union's representatives.⁴³

Based on *de-facto*, Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945. However, de jure and based on the United Nations, Indonesia recognized its independence on 27 December 1949.⁴⁴ Official information received by the Soviet Union, that agreement to conclude Indonesian Independece was moment to congrate Indonesia. On behalf of the Soviet Union represented by Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky who sent a telegram to Indonesian Vice President Mohammad Hatta which readed,

“Atas nama pemerintah Uni Soviet, saya dengan hormat memberitahukan kepada Anda, sejak pengakuan kedaulatan Republik Indonesia pada 27 Desember 1949 di Den Haag, Belanda,

³⁹ Loc.cit.

⁴⁰ Tomi Lebang, Op.cit., page: 3.

⁴¹ Tomi Lebang, Op.cit., page: 4.

⁴² Justus Maria Van der Kroef, *The Pattern of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia*, Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1977, page: 4

⁴³ Loc.cit.

⁴⁴ The United Nations and Decolonization, *Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (1945-1999)*, <https://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselgov.shtml>), accessed on 1st April of 2018.

*pemerintah Uni Soviet memutuskan mengakui kedaulatan dan kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia dan bersedia membangun hubungan diplomatik dengan Indonesia”.*⁴⁵

"On behalf of the Soviet government, I respectfully notify you that, since the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia on 27 December 1949 in The Hague, the Netherlands, the Soviet government decides to recognize the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Indonesia and is willing to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia."

The establishment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia was directly presented by Mohammad Hatta who responded to the telegram and confirmed that on behalf of the Indonesian government had received the recognition of independence and sovereignty from the Soviet Union. In reply to the letter, Indonesia was ready to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Mohammad Hatta sent a reply letter on February 3, 1950 and the formal relations were established between Indonesia and the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

The beginning of the establishment of diplomatic bilateral relations between the two countries began in the field of defense and security. The development that had passed through the Soviet Union and Indonesia was the beginning of the evolution of strategic cooperation between Russia and Indonesia today. Prior to the proclamation of independence in August 1945 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the existence of a phase of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union could not yet be illustrated that there was a significant form of strategic partnership.⁴⁷

The collapse of the colonial system could be realized in the conditions of further development and strengthening of the world system of socialism, now it was becoming a decisive factor in the development of human society.⁴⁸ There was a deep inner connection between socialist revolutions and national-free revolutions. The Soviet Union had emerged and embraced as the champion of Asian nationalism and subsequently the Soviet Union had been an active advocate of the interests of the peoples of Asia, including Indonesia. Regardless the Soviet Union was as a reliable supporter of Indonesia's independence struggle against the Dutch. The Republic of Indonesia declared its proclamation on 17th of August 1945, Indonesia had finally completed its struggle revolution for

⁴⁵ Harry A. Poeze, *Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia: Agustus 1945-Maret 1946*, page: 109.

⁴⁶ The Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union – Issues 20-24*, The Service, Soviet Union, 1989, page: 230.

⁴⁷ Central Asian Research Centre, *USSR and Third World, volumes 6-8*, Central Asian Research Centre, 1976, page: 72.

⁴⁸ Isaac Deutscher, *Socialist Competition*, Foreign Affairs, April 1952, Hamish and Hamilton, London, 1922, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/deutscher/1952/socialist-competition.htm> accessed on 1st of April 2018.

political independence from the Netherlands.⁴⁹ But, somehow, there were subsequent condition had shown that the colonialists had given up their intentions to re-establish their positions in Indonesia. It was led by the national-patriotic army forces, Indonesian people once again rose to the sacred struggle. Indonesia has foreign policy is according to the principle of being free, active, and independent, which translated literally Indonesia is not being aligned with another global power countries or blocs as Indonesia is emerging.⁵⁰ In addition, the expression of free to pursue in conducting of an active and independent foreign policy since 1946 and Indonesia must uphold its basic ideology and philosophy of Pancasila.⁵¹

The development of official relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia was established in 1950, supported by President Sukarno's presidential visit in 1956. Since the state visit by Sukarno, the development of the relations between the two countries have become closer. The beginning of relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union began after the independence of Indonesia. Indonesia declared the Indonesian Independence Proclamation of 1945, but the struggle for independence was not easy. Western Bloc and the Dutch still insisted on seizing Indonesia, especially in the West Irian. In this case, the Soviet Union and its allies strongly condemned the Dutch Aggression Military against Indonesia.

Pictures. 1 From left to right: Yuri Gagarin, Nikita Khrushchev, Sukarno, Leonid Brezhnev were in the Kremlin, Moscow, Juni 1961



Source:

https://id.rbth.com/politics/2015/02/24/kisah_persahabatan_jakarta_dan_moskow_65_tahun_pasang-surut_relasi_d_26899, accessed on 25th of April 2018.

⁴⁹ George McT. Kahin, *Sukarno's Proclamation of Indonesian Independence*, Indonesia, Volume 69 (April 2004), 1—4, <http://cip.cornell.edu/seap.indo/1106943306>, accessed on 3rd of April 2018.

⁵⁰ Vibhanshu Shekhar, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st century Rise of Indo-Pacific Power*, Routledge, 2018, page: 6.

⁵¹ The Service, *Daily report: Asia & Pacific – Issues 148-157*, The Service, 1981, page: 47.

Indonesia's internal political policy deeply affected the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. The harmony of relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union was largely determined by the background of the philosophy of President Sukarno's political thought before 1965.⁵² As the Soviets aimed to gain as many anti-capitalist allies, there would have been new struggles new concept created within victorious Sukarno-PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) led revolution. By the mid-1950s, PKI had gained status a valued partner of President Sukarno, the substantial influence and phenomenal growth of PKI leaders such as D.N. Aidit, Nyoto and Lukman demonstrated the appatent validity peaceful road to establish relation with Soviet relations.⁵³ The Soviet Union visited Indonesia by providing financial assistance in the Soviet economy, military weapons, technology and investment for Indonesia.

Indonesian-Soviet relations particularly appeared to warm after Sukarno's official visit to Moscow in 1956. The man purpose of Sukarno's visit to take part in negotiations resulting Soviet economic and especially military credit and assistance into Indonesia.⁵⁴ Prior to the state visit, the Soviet Union and Indonesia signed a trade agreement in Jakarta, thereby realizing the establishment of Russian chambers of commerce in Indonesia.⁵⁵ At the beginning of the establishment of the chamber of commerce, Indonesia received long-term credit and instead Indonesia would supplied raw materials and other commodities to the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ A long-term of loan with amount USD \$ 100 million was intended to supply military technology to Indonesia.⁵⁷ The loan had been agreed by Sukarno according to his first official state visit to Moscow in September 1956.⁵⁸ As well as generous major supplier of military aid, the Sovieot Union and Sukarno represented againt imperialism and and anti-colonial credibility in the developing world. This policy took Indonesia getting closer with

⁵² Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, *Indonesian Relations with Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and China before 1965: Systemic and Domesctic Factors*, Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Heritages, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 2016, page: 254.

⁵³ Bilver Singh, *Soviet Relations with ASEAN, 1967-88*, Singapore University Press, 1989, page: 55.

⁵⁴ Kurt London, *The Soviet Impact on World Politics*, Ardent Media, 1974, page: 142.

⁵⁵ Деловой Совет по Сотрудничеству с Индонезией, (Delevoj Sovyet po Sotrudnichestvu s Indoneziej), Business Council for Cooperation with Indonesia, *Indonesia-Russia Business Council* http://bcri.ru/ru/indonesian_russian_cooperation, accessed on 13th of April 2018.

⁵⁶ Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965*, Duta Wacana University Press, 1990, page: 294.

⁵⁷ Loc.cit.

⁵⁸ Loc.cit.

Soviet Union and to insure for gaining new sources of strength to oppose the Dutch military forces in West Irian.⁵⁹

Indonesia's relations between the Soviets had a good impact on Indonesia for other Soviet alliances, such as Poland, Romania, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia.⁶⁰ These relationships were certainly influenced by political factors and ideology system off Indonesia. The golden period started before 1965, it was one of the peak relations between Indonesian and the Eastern European countries. Under Sukarno's administration, Eastern bloc countries suited on his political philosophy and it encompassed in taking important role for being strategic alliances.

The relationship before 1965 was one of the golden periods in Indonesia's relations with the Eastern European countries. The ideology of Indonesian political philosophy under Sukarno's leadership played an important role with the state and allies of the Eastern Bloc. Indonesia had a good relationship with Eastern Europe since the late 1950s until the fall of Sukarno after the events of September 1965. Ideological factors played a significant role in relations with communist countries in Eastern Europe. Due to domestic political changes in Indonesia, relations between Eastern Europe countries had changed. Eventhough, Indonesia received financial, lending and investment assistance from Eastern European countries since the mid-1950s.

The harmony of growing relationship between the Soviet Union and Indonesia was one of the positive impact in establishment cooperation with the Eastern Bloc countries. Communist socialist countries that were allies of the Soviet Union such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, East-Germany were among the state partners who had provided financial assistance to Indonesia.

Table. 2 Soviet and Eastern Allied State aid loans ⁶¹

No.	The Date or The year	Country	Amount of Loan
1.	February 1955	East German	USD \$ 9.2 millions
2.	March 1955	Romania	Approximately USD \$ 2 millions
3.	May 1956	Czechoslovakia	USD \$ 1.6 millions
4.	September 1956	Soviet Union	USD \$ 100 millions
5.	1957	Czechoslovakia	USD \$ 0.8 millions
6.	1958	Czechoslovakia	USD \$ 6 millions

⁵⁹ Johannes Soedjati Djwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia Foreign Policy Under Soekarno*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996, page: 36.

⁶⁰ Donald Hindley, *Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications*, Pacific Affairs Vol. 36, o. 2 (Summer 1963), page: 107-119, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2754184> accessed on 9th of April 2018.

⁶¹ Loc.cit.

7.	1958	Poland	USD \$ 39.1 millions
8.	1959	Poland	USD \$ 5 millions
9.	September 1959	Czechoslovakia	USD \$ 14 millions
10.	July 1960	Czechoslovakia	USD \$ 33.8 millions
11.	1960	East German	Amount unknown
12.	May 1961	Bulgaria	USD \$ 5 millions
13.	August 1961	Poland	USD \$ 30.1 millions
14.	September 1961	Hungaria	USD \$ 29.6 millions
15.	November 1961	Romania	(Romanian offer) USD \$ 50 millions

Source : Donald Hindley, *Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications*, Pacific Affairs Vol. 36, o. 2 (Summer 1963), page: 107-119, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2754184> accessed on 9th of April 2018.

From the table above, it could be spelled out that loan credit started from the period of 1955 to 1961. The total loan from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc allies were USD \$ 326.2 million. In 1955, East Germany granted the largest loan of that year for USD \$ 9.2 million. Then resumed in 1956, the Soviet Union provided the largest lending among allied countries totaling USD \$ 100 million. In 1957, loan assistance from Czechoslovakia amounted to USD \$ 0.8 million. The following year 1958, Poland gave as much as USD \$ 39.1 million. In 1960, Czechoslovakia donated USD \$ 33.8 million. In 1961, Hungary granted a loan of USD \$ 29.6 million.

Ideologically, the Eastern Bloc countries committed to have lent some military support for Indonesia in setting aside their ideological system.⁶² The above description could be seen that the Soviet Union provided the largest loan of USD \$ 100 million. Then later, from 1958-1961 Poland gave loans as much as 3 times. The amount of aid was USD \$ 74.2 million. Then, Czechoslovakia provided loan assistance 5 times. Loan assistance started from 1956 to 1960 amounting to USD \$ 56.2 million. Then Romania provided a loan of 2 times a sum of USD \$ 50.2 million. East Germany provided a two-time loan of USD \$ 9.2 million. Hungary provided loans of USD \$ 29.6 million. Then Bulgaria as much as USD \$ 5 million.

In fact, initially, Indonesia convinced the United States would assisted as major arms supplier for Indonesian military. But, the United States couldn't being hypocrite, in fact that the United State are allied with Netherlands in NATO and Western Bloc.⁶³ Indonesia allied with Soviet Union and had received military assistance. All this led to be arms race in Indonesia, as the United State America and the Soviet Union, each of them supported their own allies.⁶⁴

⁶² Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, Pine Forge Press, 2012, page: 15.

⁶³ Blair A. King, *Peace in Papua: Widening a Window of Opportunity*, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, page: 6.

⁶⁴ Loc.cit.

1.2 The Highest Point of Indonesia and The Soviet Union Cooperation in Military and those Contributing Factors (1959-1964)

The Soviet strategy partnership suited on Indonesia's ideology system. Under the Sukarno administration, Indonesia embraced its enlightenment, independence, and seeking for non-colonialist countries to be its strategic partnership and geographically, Indonesia is located on Pacific Ocean, therefore with aim to assist Indonesian military capability, the Soviet Union established its regional security network in Pacific and Europe. Despite of the fact that the Warsaw Pact was exist, the Soviet leadership was concerned about Western Bloc to take any possibilities in building alignment with Southeast Asia, such Indonesia. Because, the prospect for regional order especially in Southeast Asia will clearly multilateral security framework covering the wider Asia Pacific regional power.⁶⁵

The Soviet Union was one of Warsaw Pact's initiators since 1955 and after establishing Warsaw Pact, Eastern Bloc countries involved to sign the sign of peace and security treaty by the Soviet Union, and it was having fully integrated system centred in Moscow.⁶⁶ The presence of the Soviet Union in the Southeast Asia was a very influential step to create security for the Southeast Asian region. Because Indonesia is one of the countries considered one of the strategic partners for the Soviet Union. Between 1955 and 1965, the Soviet Union had their pattern to send large of amount quantities military supply to Indonesia. Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and the Soviet Union were member of Warsaw Pact, they signed trade and payment agreement, the Soviet Union could easily send economic and military aid into one of them countries to avoid anti-Soviet movement.⁶⁷ This military assistance was a form of moral support from the Soviet Union against the Dutch in West Irian dispute in 1962 and the support of Malaysia's confrontation policy of 1963 to 1966.⁶⁸

As the Old regime began, Sukarno's government cabinet was dissolved, and at that time the Soviet Union summoned all Indonesian experts. At the time of the dissolution of Sukarno's cabinet, the

⁶⁵ Acharya Amitav, *Indonesia Matters: Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*, World Scientific, 2014 , page: 62 <http://www.amitavacharya.com/sites/default/files/Indonesia%20Asia's%20Emerging%20Democratic%20Power.pdf>, accessed on 3rd of April 2018.

⁶⁶ William Julian Lewis, *The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy*, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982, page: 67.

⁶⁷ Usha Mahajani, *Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia—1949-68*, Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1970, page: 70.

⁶⁸ Mohd. Noor Yazid, *Hegemonic Powers, Radical Politics & Developmental State: The Case of Indonesia-Malaysia Political Relations during the Cold War*, Penerbit Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 2007, page: 208.

Soviet Union still had a harmonious relationship with Indonesia, until the coup d'etat of the September 30th Movement of 1965. The September 30th Movement of 1965 did not affect the relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. General Nasution convinced the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union to maintain working with the Indonesian armed forces. They were trained in Czechoslovakia and Egypt.⁶⁹ Not only Czechoslovakia, but also Poland had transferred some military equipment to Indonesia, because of Poland was ally of Eastern Bloc and member of Warsaw Pacts.⁷⁰ Based on the Soviet Union naval doctrine for the Indian Ocean, the Indonesian navy had received 4 destroyers and 2 submarines shipping from Soviet Union Far East then the Black Sea and Pacific Ocean.⁷¹

Nikita Khurshev had the official state visit in February 1960 and it was the first step to establish relationship with of Indonesia. Both countries signed the agreement for the long-term credit for military aid and the Soviet Union enlarged loan fund from the original USD \$ 100 million to USD \$ 250 million along with the aid of the hospital construction which is now called Rumah Sakit Persahabatan.⁷² This agreement was established in order to enhance multilateral forces on the basis of the Soviet ideology which wassocialist and anti-colonialism. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union underlined that between the two sides the state should not interfere with the domestic political activities of any of the countries. Because this understanding was upheld in honor of Indonesia as Russia's strategic partner. This agreement also marked the extent to which strategic relationships had been established for the Soviet Union and Indonesia.

Pictures. 2 The Leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev was saluting the Indonesian Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia



⁶⁹ Guy J. Pauker, Op.cit.

⁷⁰ Donald Hindley, *Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications*, Pacific Affairs Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1963), page: 107-119, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2754184> accessed on 9th of April 2018.

⁷¹ A. Sella, *Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East*, Springer, 1981, page: 48.

⁷² Larisa M. Efimova, *Soviet Policy in Indonesia during the "Liberal Democracy" Period, 1950-1959*. Wilson Center, 2011, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/soviet-policy-indonesia-during-the-liberal-democracy-period-1950-1959>, accessed on 6th of April 2018.

Source: https://id.rbth.com/politics/2017/01/23/bagaimana-uni-soviet-membantu-indonesia-merebut-irian-barat_wyx686673, accessed on 24th of April 2018.

The officers of the Navy, Army and Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia were trained in the military and civilian academic institutions of the Soviet Union. In addition to support their aid, the Soviet Union sent some Air Force military advisers to Indonesia to undertake bilateral cooperation between the Soviet Union and Indonesia.⁷³ According to Michael Leifer, Indonesia was the only largest non-communist country receiving military assistance from the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ After the official state's visit by General Nastion to Moscow, Indonesian military capability was supported by elements of command and control model of the Soviet Union after the visit.⁷⁵ Increased military resilience with Soviet military aid, making Indonesia's military capability sharply increased in less than eight years. Factors that contributed strongly to arms transfer were to seizure of the West Irian dispute with the Dutch in 1960. At this stage, the Indonesian armed forces were strengthened by Soviet military aid along with military training in the Soviet Union.

At that time, the Netherlands had recognized Indonesia as an independent, but it did not recognize West Irian as part of Indonesia. The seizure of this region was a confrontational phase, as the Dutch launched their military aggression against Indonesia. The Dutch military aggression had been helped by The United States in building a large number of military bases in Biak, West Irian.⁷⁶ While Indonesia was assisted with the military armed equipment from the Soviet Union which had been made Indonesian military capabilities far more powerful than ever. Geopolitically, the Soviet Union gained political interests from military aid investments in Indonesia. The idea of strategic partnership as a tool of policy of foreign to commit ini military assistance with Indonesia. This mechanism of this concept would floated to outperform alliance the Soviet Union and China.⁷⁷ At that time, the dominating issue for Soviet defense policy was to engage in military or political relations in China.

⁷³ William H. Frederick, Robert L. Worden, *Indonesia: A Country Study*, Government Printing Office, 2011, page: 315

⁷⁴ Acharya Amitav, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2014, page: 63.

⁷⁵ Leszek Buszynski, *Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia*, Routledge, 2013, page: 23.

⁷⁶ F.X. Baskara Tulus Wardaya, *Cold War Shadow: United States Policy Toward Indonesia 1953-1963*, PUSDEP (Pusat Sejarah dan Etika Politik/ Center for History and Political Ethics) with Galangpress, 2007, page 95.

⁷⁷ Vidya Nadkarni, *Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing Without Alliances*, Routledge, 2010, page: 46.

By analysing at the historical background of the Cold War, there was ideological rivalry in politics and military capabilities with the Soviet Union. This may indicate that having a strategic partner with Indonesia was a global step by reinforcing the Soviet political ideology and it was desirably supported the Soviet Union's geopolitical position in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. The strategy undertaken by the Soviet Union was in establishing strategic partnership with Indonesia greatly affected the movement of Western Bloc. Soviet Union suited on Sukarno philosophical ideology which was an anti-colonist person. Indonesian had been supported and largely armed by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Western bloc had worked to disadvantage of their movement in particular marine service military operations would be limited. Western Bloc and The United States were alliance and it must support the Netherlands. The United States opposed the Soviet Union in Indonesia, but also it aggravated the security dilemma faced by the United States because of the Kennedy administration's determination to support Sukarno.⁷⁸ In the form of military aid, the Soviet Union proved that military support of the Soviet Union was real and strongly condemned the Dutch Military Aggression in order to claim for West Irian. This one of supporting to build up military capabilities in Indonesia and this required assistance from Soviet Union in struggle against the Dutch Military Aggression to relinquish West Irian.⁷⁹

The support of the Soviet Union sincerely wanted to establish and contribute in strategic partnership with Indonesia without any intervention in Indonesia's internal political activities. The potential development of Indonesia's military capability was influenced by the Soviet military. This deterrence factor can appear to the Dutch for its own military aggression. That way Indonesia can negotiate with the Dutch to reclaim West Irian.⁸⁰ Thus it can be asserted that the Soviet Union as a major supplier of military weapons to Indonesia was trying to strengthen Indonesia's position in the struggle for West Irian dispute. Indonesia had earlier hoped the United States would help them to persuade the Netherlands to release West Irian.⁸¹ As it was described above, under the administration of John F. Kennedy, the United States would foster economic development of Indonesia Kennedy

⁷⁸ James W. Douglass, *JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters*, Simon and Schuster, 2010, page 377.

⁷⁹ Rex Mortimer, Op.cit.

⁸⁰ Loc.cit.

⁸¹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, page: 20.

and citing from his statement that the level of hostility and mutual recrimination between the United States and Indonesia rose.⁸²

The relationship between Indonesia and the Soviet Union that developed from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s prioritized pragmatic relationships than political and ideological elements intrinsically. Political concessions constitute access to military assistance such as military training for the deployment of military bases and technology. The beginning of the peak of the collapse of relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union ended at the beginning of the New Order regime. The Communist Party leader, Nyoto, was executed in February 1966 and the arrest of 15 ministers in Sukarno's cabinet era. The emergence of Supersemar which is one form of the overthrow of the Sukarno government, resulted in Indonesia has a dualism of political policy. Under Indonesian law, it was still led by Sukarno, but on the other hand, Suharto took the power of Sukarno with Supersemar.⁸³

1.2 .1 The Contributing Factors of Russian Arms Transfer to Indonesia

Partnership in training in Science and technology is one of the important things which greatly affect the progress of Indonesia's economic development. After the Soviet Union and Indonesia Agreements, high-quality workers, technicians and engineers were sent to the Soviet Union for training.⁸⁴ The Soviet Union was alliance with Eastern Bloc against anti-colonialism. Western Bloc allies had carried out and dominated the colonialism, at the same time Eastern Bloc-Soviet Union accommodated strategy for those countries had been colonized by Western Bloc.⁸⁵ So that in the colonial period, Indonesia could not develop, because everything was undercontrolled by the Dutch. The fetters of colonialism did not liberate the colonial state to develop.

⁸² James W. Douglass, Op.cit., page 376.


⁸³ Supersemar was acronym important occasion. It was the Presidential Order on March 11 and it was issued on March 11, 1966. The contents were instructions to General Chief of TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) Suharto. But, instead of this letter was made a form of legitimacy Suharto overthrow the First President Sukarno. Indonesia. President (1967-1998: Soeharto), *State Adresses, 1967-1978*, Departement of Infromation-Indonesia, 1978, page: 439.

⁸⁴ Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, *Culture and Life*, Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, 1975, page: 25.

⁸⁵ American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, volume 28*, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1976, page: 17.

In contrast to the power of the colonial state, countries of the Eastern Bloc and The Soviet Union helped developing countries to provide solutions and to be freed from colonialism.⁸⁶ The socialist state has the characteristic that to stab the aid necessary the development of education and the creation of nationalist fundamentals. It is a basic part of the socialist countries. Because the economic fundamentals built will create an independent economic foundation.

Table. 3 Scheme of Contributing Factors



(From the scheme above, it is describe the beginning of the formation of Soviet Union and Indonesia relation. The Soviet Union was suited on Sukarno's philosophy. As an anti-colonialist, the Soviet Union was allied with Indonesia. Thus a bilateral relationship agreement was established between the two parties. Hence, Indonesia is freely from colonialist, but not for West Irian. The Netherland forced Indonesia to claim West Irian part of Dutch East Indies. The Soviet Union embrace independent, but West Irian is still colonized. The Soviet Union assisted along with their military capacity. But, the case for Malaysian Confrontation, Indonesian was not supported by Soviet Union.)

In enhancing bilateral relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union collaborated for the training of technical and scientific workers in the field of technology. This form of training is one form of solution in economic progress in Indonesia for the training of technicians and engineers. The Netherland colonized Indonesia in 3.5 centuries. Therefore, Indonesia must rise from the adversity of the invaders so that Indonesia is able to stand independently with the welfare of

⁸⁶ Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, Op.cit., 2016, page: 231.

its people.⁸⁷ The colonizing country made Indonesia close to the poverty of illiteracy, the political and economic dependence of the colonial state, even the violation of human rights.

As Soviet Union declared themselves as anti-colonialism, they played an important role unlike the occupying country. The socialist state sought to embrace Indonesia by providing scientific assistance and high quality with the inclusion of an independent economic base system. In this regard, the economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union government was closely linked to the training assistance that contributes to the development of Indonesia's national economy. This was not only limited to economics and technology, but also the development of education to produce human resources to play an important role in advancing the Republic of Indonesia. By implementing modern science and technology, Indonesia had barely to strengthen the political and economic system in newly independent state.

In this case, it was marked by the fact that the provision of economic aid from the Soviet Union to Indonesia was very diverse. Indonesian technicians and specialist studied directly in companies, organizations, and research institutes in the Soviet Union. Indonesian scientists studied to learning various techniques for the construction of facilities and then they had to apply them in Indonesia. This reflected a positive response to the agreement between Indonesia and the Soviet Union in the sphere of economy, technology and military. The Soviet-Indonesia Agreement had important aspects to enhance economic development and ensure the cooperation of information security. It should be pointed out that the agreement that had been implemented by the important factors of the seizure of territory with the Dutch after Indonesian Independence and Soviet support to the Malaysian Confrontation.⁸⁸

1.3 The Degradation Relationship between Indonesia and the Soviet Union (1965-1989)

B. Suharto Era (1968 - 1998)

In 1965 it was the highest point in the strategic partnership partnership between the Soviet Union. But at this point, Sukarno's governmental rule established with the Soviet government under the leadership of Khrushchev, it slowly began to be overthrown by the coup of the New Order regime.

⁸⁷ Nasir Tamara, *Indonesia Rising: Islam, Democracy, and the Rise of the Indonesia as a Major Power*, Select Pub., 2009, page: 4.

⁸⁸ Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, *The Indian Journal of Politics*, volume 13, Departement of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, 1979, page: 24.

According to Guy Pauker, “Soviet advances in Indonesia are truly amazing”, though in the end it had to face the decline of this relationship.⁸⁹

Capability of Soviet military helped Indonesia to counter Dutch Military Aggression in the struggle for West Irian dispute. Indonesia could regained West Irian with the development of military power from the assistance of the Soviet Union. Another factors could be analyzed, that military aid of the Soviet Union in support of the Malaysian Confrontation. President Sukarno who opposed the Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia and Malaysia was under the formation of British support and allies of the Western Bloc.⁹⁰

But on the other hand, Soviet Union who had an ideology of anti-colonialist, had seen desire for Malaysia to become as a new nation. In this situation, Soviet Union was placed on dilemma, because the context of struggle in anti-colonialism, but on the other hand, Soviet Union and Indonesia were having a strategic cooperation in military defense.⁹¹ In that way, the problem of West Irian could be said that strategic and political support for Indonesia was needed. But for supporting the Malaysian confrontation, the Soviet Union did not intervene to help Indonesia in further steps.⁹² Therefore, the strategic relationship between Indonesia and the Soviet Union became alleviated.

Domestic political issues also affected Indonesia's relationship with the Soviet Union. Soviet and Chinese relations influenced the political calculations of Indonesia in 1960.⁹³ It was included the power of the Communist Party of Indonesia in 1955-1957. Here was the Indonesian political situation between politicians and the army of military. Although, Indonesia has declared its independence, but on the other case, Indonesia must face domestic political problems due to the power to rule the country.

President Sukarno felt himself trapped in the internal politics that took place in 1965. It was unclear who and the leader of this issue. But this was one of the “smooth way” to shift the Sukarno

⁸⁹ Guy J. Pauker, Op.cit.

⁹⁰ Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, Routledge, 2012, page: 11.

⁹¹ Central Asian Research Centre, *China and the Bandung Spirit, The USSR and Indonesia, The USSR and Africa 1996, USSR, China, Africa, Asia, Mizan volume 4*, Central Asian Research Centre, 1966, page: 20.

⁹² Nadia Derkach, *The Soviet Policy towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Disputes*, Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 11 (Nov., 1965), page: 566–571. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642136>, accessed on 20th of April 2018.

⁹³ David Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967*, Equinox Publishing, 2007, page: 185.

government from the Old Order era to the New Order. Indonesia's policy has shifted slowly toward the West.⁹⁴ The relationship between Indonesia and Soviet Union were declining.

In the early years of Suharto's reign was the end of bilateral defense cooperation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union. The technicians, engineers, and students from Indonesia who studied in Soviet Union, they must return to Indonesia until 1970. Under the New Order regime, regulation of financial and logistic had been tightened. Indonesian students and other technicians who had been training in Soviet Union, they had been commanded to be back home until 1970.

The early years of Suharto's reigning, it was clearly described as the end intensity of bilateral defense cooperation between Indonesia dan Soviet Union. By the late 1960s, regulation based on the agreements with Soviets had been withdrawn. It was more strictly to support Indonesia by logistically and financially. Budget reductions were protected by the New Order from 83% in 1963 to a historic level of 25 %, and technically speaking, the New Regime refused to be provided by Soviet Union for credit for military spare parts and arms equipment.⁹⁵

During the reigning of New Regime, Suharto stimulated to be focused on Indonesian's economic development, therefore in this case, he endeavored in maintaining bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in economic development.⁹⁶ In the late 1980s, the Soviet leader – Gorbachev wanted to implement the regulation of glasnost and perestroika.⁹⁷ But this was being one of Suharto's consideration whether wanted to rebuild a strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, nor Suharto was not convinced by Gorbachev's understanding of modernizing the Soviet Union with glasnost and perestroika would be implemented successfully. Whereas previously, Suharto had made a state visit to Moscow in 1989.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ C. Roberts, A. Habir, and L. Sebastian, *Indonesia's Accent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order*, Springer, 2015, page: 360.

⁹⁵ Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia (The Armed Forces of Asia Series)*, Paul & Co Pub Consortium, 1997, page: 105.

⁹⁶ Embassy of Indonesia, *Focus on Indonesia*, Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, 1986, page: 13. Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp, *Soeharto: The Life and Legacy of Indonesia's Second President: an authorized Biography*, Marshall Cavendish, 2007, page: 190.

⁹⁷ Joseph Gibbs, *Gorbachev's Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika*, Texas A7M University Press, 1999, page: xi. Glasnost and Perestroika were transliterations from Russian words «гласность и перестройка». The word glasnost is derived from the meaning of the word “sound”, and intrinsically means “openness” and perestroika means “reconstruction”. This policy was realized by Mikhail Gorbachev as a form of economic and political reform that began in June 1987.

⁹⁸ Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp, *Soeharto: The Life and Legacy of Indonesia's Second President: an authorized Biography*, Marshall Cavendish, 2007, page: 190.

Pictures. 3 President Gorbachev was with his wife, Raisa Gorbachev and President Suharto was with Tien Suharto



Presiden Mikhail Gorbachev dan tamunya di Kremlin (1989)

Source: (http://kepuustakaan-presiden.perpusnas.go.id/photo/?box=detail&id=282&from_box=list_245&hlm=1&search_tag=&search_keyword=&activation_status=&presiden_id=2&presiden=suharto)

Based on the fact that had been described, the highest achievement of aid from the Soviet Union were from sphere of economic, technological, education, and especially defense security. Soviet military assistance was one of the form of achievement in reaching positive strategic partners for the people of Indonesia and the authorities. The Indonesian military capability combined with the Soviet Union's military assistance was fully supported in the struggle for West Irian dispute in 1963. This was reinforced by the statement of former Jakarta governor Ali Sadikin stating that acceptance of assistance from Russia was the greatest and last support used to seize Indonesian land occupied by the Netherlands.⁹⁹

1.4 The Collapse of Soviet Union and the Transition to Russian Federation (1990-2000s)

The era of the New Order regime, the path of the Suharto government was oriented to the United States. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became a major supplier to the Indonesian military.¹⁰⁰ The United States was calling on Indonesia to have an anti-communist understanding of America's growing position in Southeast Asia. The United States implemented the

⁹⁹ Mikhail Tsyganov, *Индонезия решила закупить в России дизельные подлодки*, (*Indoneziya reshila zakupit' v Rossii*) *Indonesia decided to buy diesel submarines in Russia*, Ria Novosti, 2006, <https://ria.ru/society/20061019/54946923.html>, accessed on 13th of April 2018.

¹⁰⁰ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Op.cit, page: 145

domino theory of anti-communism in Southeast Asia.¹⁰¹ But it didn't give effect to Vietnam, because, it was proved the Vietnam War won by North Vietnam.

The American policy that describes human rights concerns, but it takes a further role, such as interfere of political internal system. One of the devastating human rights that Indonesia had violated was the Santa Cruz Massacre.¹⁰² The case was in the international spotlight, the United States of America declared embargo on the procurement of military forces for Indonesia.¹⁰³ The arms embargo has carried out by the United States in 1990, it made the capacity of Indonesian military operations became substantial. The collapse of Soviet Union was not about losing the second super power country, but it was about the Soviet Union reborn as a new state as Russia.

The transition which was not easily lived by Russia that was once the ideology of communism, tried to become a liberal democratic system.¹⁰⁴ Russia re-established relations with Southeast Asia. By looking back geopolitics strategic partnerships had been built by the Soviet Union. Russian policy has been changing and taking an active to accommodate since post Cold War Asia.¹⁰⁵ Russia seeks targets for strategic partners in Asia. Southeast Asia is the right choice to restart the fabric of relations previously built by the Soviet Union.

The existence of an arms embargo by the United States, this was a gap for Russia to reestablish Indonesia's interest in the military power of Russian technology. From SIPRI data, when Asia was having crisis in 2017, Indonesia has spent defense budget and acquisition of Russian military and arms transfer about USD \$ 1 billion.¹⁰⁶ In this case, Russia could implement its intention to rebuild relation with Indonesia as a major supplier in technology and military experts.

¹⁰¹ Rachel Kleinfeld, *Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform*, Brookings Institution Press, 2012, page: 132.

¹⁰² USA International Business Publications, *Indonesia Diplomatic Handbook*, International Business Publications, 2007, page: 45.

¹⁰³ Murray Hiebert, Ted Osius, and Gregory B. Poling, *A U.S.-Indonesia Partnership for 2020: Recommendations for Forging a 21st Century Relationship*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2013, page: 7.

¹⁰⁴ Anatoly M. Khazanov, *What Went wrong? Post-communist transformations in comparative perspective*, in *Resructuring Post-Communist Russia* by Yitzhak Brudny, Jonathan Frankel, and Stefani Hoffman, Cambridge University Press, page: 25.

¹⁰⁵ Yangwen Zheng, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi, *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle or Hearts and Minds*, BRILL, 2010, page: 27.

¹⁰⁶ SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1998 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press, 1998, page: 299.

Table. 4 Indonesia Government Budget

No.	Year	Government Budget	Defense and Military Budget
1.	1960	46 billion Rupiah (USD \$ 1 billion)	15, 3 billion Rupiah (USD \$ 347,7 million)
2.	1961	53 billion Rupiah (USD \$ 1.2 billion)	26.5 billion Rupiah (USD \$ 602,2 million)
3.	1962	It was higher but no informations	

Source: Guy J. Pauker, *The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia*, Essay July 1962 Issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1962-07-01/soviet-challenge-indonesia>, accessed on 6th April 2018. (It was one Rupiah equals 2,5 cents or 44-46 Rupiah to 1 USD \$)

In this regard, Russia has a clear background for rebuilding defense military ties with Indonesia in 1990. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its place in the international defense industry. From period year 1990-1994, Russia lost 11% in its defense industry, compared with the percentage of the Soviet Union as much as 37% in 1989.¹⁰⁷ And because of the anti-communism understanding of the United States, Vietnam is the only partner in the Russian defense industry in Southeast Asia. But it did not rule out that Russia would approach Indonesia in re-established.

In the face of this situation, Indonesia needs to improve its military capabilities, but internal political conditions has been situated Indonesia in a complicated condition. Of course, it was correlated with the history of the Malaysian Confrontation, Indonesia should compete with Malaysia in the military capacity. The arms race in Southeast Asia will certainly show the dominated country of Southeast Asian as a regional leader.

C. Habibie Era (1998-1999)

During the New Order regime than Indonesia had been thought to Reformation. As Habibie was vice-president for Suharto, when the reformation began Suharto resigned and Habibie had been mandated to be the 3rd President of Indonesia. Habibie finished his doctoral program in aeronautical engineering from local technical institute in Germany.¹⁰⁸ He proposed to consider the purchase of

¹⁰⁷ Tarja Cronberg, *Transforming Russia: From a Military to a Peace Economy*, I.B. Tauris, 2003, page: 64.

¹⁰⁸ Paul R. Bartrop and Steven Leonard Jacobs, *Modern Genocide: The Definitive Resource and Document Collection [4 volumes]*, ABC-CLIO, 2014, page: 821.

aircraft from Russia. Hence, Habibie's strategy was to maintain and improve the economic prosperity of Indonesia in the future. Indonesia should prioritize the wisdom of local capital rather than withdrawal of foreign industry capital. Because, in the development of aircraft manufacturing, IPTN plays an important role for the training of young technicians.¹⁰⁹ In that case, target of domestic industry can affect the development of Indonesia's prosperity, wealth, and education for future student who interested to study at IPTN, Bandung, Indonesia.

According to Habibie, the engineers and technicians will be proficient and experts in the field of aviation especially aircraft manufacturing, within the empowerment of human training in Indonesia. Along that, involvement of young generation will give positive affect the economic development, especially in the sphere of technology.¹¹⁰ In the regime of new order, Suharto and Habibie had prioritize the ideology of economic development. Consideration in the purchase of Russian military aircraft would opened a new step for Indonesia to re-establish military capacity with Russia and Indonesia would have been equal military capability with Singapore.¹¹¹

Ministry of Defense of Republic of Indonesia has published the White Paper as guidelines in maintaining the national security and security of the Republic of Indonesia. It is described the issue of global security and military market competition is too complex. This is because of the bipolar international system division, so security issues become the global spotlight.¹¹² Security issues such as terrorism, human trafficking, illegal logging, and transnational crime.¹¹³ To confront it, Indonesia must be ready to operate and ready to counter the threat not only coming from foreign countries that in any country can threaten Indonesia's security.

On White Paper, Ministry of Defense of Republic of Indonesia has stated to prioritize in combating the radicalism of rebellion, maintaining the integrity of Indonesia's maritime, and the protection of the Indonesian ecosystem. The White Paper also outlines that some of the threats to Indonesia's security include military aggression by foreign powers, and internal circumstances affecting Indonesia's defense security.

D. Abdurrahman Wahid Era (1999-2001) and Megawati Era (2001-2004)

¹⁰⁹ Aircraft Industry, *The Changing Structure of the Global Large Civil Aircraft Industry and Market: Implications for the Competitiveness of the U.S. Industry*, DIANE Publishing, 1998, page: 531.

¹¹⁰ Eur, *The Far East and Australasia 2003*, Psychology Press, 2002, page: 50

¹¹¹ Herbert David Croly, *The New Republic, Volume 149*, Republic Publishing Company, 1963, page: 12.

¹¹² Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008*, Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2008, page: 13.

¹¹³ Loc.cit.

Pictures. 4 Vladimir Putin held talks with Indonesia's President Megawati Sukarnoputri



Source: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/28510>, accessed on 28th of April 2018

The discussion between bilateral cooperation Indonesia with Russia was established during Megawati's term as President replacing Abdurrahman Wahid who was sick. Megawati made her third visit since Suharto's visit in 1989. President Putin warmly welcomed Megawati's visit. On 21 April 2003, Putin and Megawati signed a new phase of diplomatic relations between Russia and Indonesia.¹¹⁴ Agreements describing foreign investment, education, military, and technology.¹¹⁵ On behalf of the two sides of the country, the security sphere is the fundamental form of the diplomatic relations between Russia and Indonesia.¹¹⁶ Security framework has started to re-establish cooperation Indonesia and Rusia and it had been started with the purchase of six Russian warplanes.¹¹⁷

Table. 5 Indonesian Aircraft Orders from Russia 1997-2004 ¹¹⁸

Year	Platform	Total	Amount (US \$ Million)
2000	Mi-17-1B	4	18
2001	Mi-17-1	2	12
	Mi-2	8	
2003	Su-27SK	2	192,9
	Su-30MK	2	
	Mi-35P	2	

¹¹⁴ Chin Kin Wah and Daljit Singh, *Southeast Asian Affairs 2005*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, page: 33.

¹¹⁵ Loc.cit.

¹¹⁶ Loc.cit.

¹¹⁷ Leo Suryadinata, in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004* by Daljit Singh and Chin Kin Wah, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, page: 102.

¹¹⁸ SIPRI, *Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1950 to 2017* http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php, accessed on 2nd of April 2018

Source: SIPRI, *Transfers of Major Weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1950 to 2017*
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

For further developments on Indonesia's strategic partnership with Russia, Indonesia wants a military cooperation capable and unlimited in military capacity. Embargo weaponry from the United States was one reason why Indonesia should purchase of Russian arms equipment, but on the other hand Indonesia must also develop the quality and nation capacity of the Indonesian military itself. In fact, Indonesia has many companies in defense Industry such as PT. Pindad (small arms and munitions), PT. PAL (shipbuilding and repairment), PT Dahana (explosive), and PT LEN industry (electronics and communications).¹¹⁹ Utilization of the domestic strategic in defense industry will develop the capacity and skills of local firms to be more independent and Indonesia must develop its own defense industry instead of depending on foreign investment.¹²⁰

Megawati signed agreement on purchase of Russian arms equipment. It was one of strategy to protect national defense of the Republic of Indonesia. However, there were some contrary on Megawati's internal cabinet that there were still many domestic problems in Indonesia that must be prioritized.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Alexis Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, *Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia*, Brookings Institution Press, 2007, page: 105

¹²⁰ Loc.cit.

¹²¹ Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests*, 2014, Routledge, 2014, page: 345.

Chapter 2: The Dynamics of Arms Transfer from Russia to Indonesia

The transition period is a form of fact that becomes a field of the science of International Relations. After the Cold War, in the last decade, the international system has been established for more than 50 years. The international system formed will be two Blocks, the Western Block and the Eastern Bloc. In this case, both Blocks want to prove the existence of unlimited potential capability form in order to run the political system in accordance with the interests of the authoritative authority in politics. To obtain the utility of potential capability is not restricted so that they implement the political system in accordance with the state authorities.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a significant form of the polarity movement of the international system has changed because it deals with globalization. The form of dependency on security can result in an opportunity to create a threat to the world's people who live in peace and which is defined as a security system that produces opportunities but also a threat to the country in the world.¹²² How the international political security system brings the capability within the government to accommodate politics.

2.1 The Strategic Partnership of the Soviet Union between Indonesia

A form of strategic partnership cooperation is a foreign policy tool implemented for state actors undergoing realist and liberalist approaches.¹²³ The main purpose of this form of cooperation is to achieve the goal for the main subject of state actors who support welfare and social development to create the security of other states. Strategic cooperation is a form of foreign policy tool associated with occupation as an actor with a role in the approach of realism and liberalism.¹²⁴

Essentially there is a partnership of cooperation between state actors who have the same intention. Intentions and objectives are initially a priority to demonstrate the well-being of a benchmark so that it is supported to safeguard the security of strategic partners.¹²⁵ So it can be stated that strategic alliances consolidate the form of realism alliance and the application of liberal integration theory. Strategic Partnership represents a new mode of state-to-state alignment. This

¹²² Lynn E. Davis, Globalization's Security Implications, Issue Paper Rand: 2005, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2005/IP245.pdf, page: 1, accessed on 3rd of April 2018.

¹²³ Lucyna Czechowska, The Concept of Strategic Partnership As An Input in the Modern Alliance Theory, The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2013, No.2 (4), page 42.


¹²⁴ Loc.cit.

¹²⁵ Ibid, page: 43.

meaning of phenomenon is undefined by a lack of definitional precision, resulting in a frequent misapplication of the term. Therefore, strategic alliance rectify and apply conceptual of this phenomenon in international relations.¹²⁶

The Soviet Union-Indonesia strategic partnership was a model of this new alignment phenomenon in this case. As we know, strategic partnership is related significantly in terms of security and many concepts adapted from organization's research as it is applicable to enlarge our concept of strategy in security in the sphere of international system. By identifying the historical background, this is chapter is formulated using explanations dynamic for arms transfers drawn from the academic theoretical literature on international relations as well as strategic partnership. The performance implications of strategic partnership relation between Indonesia and Russia have been a central area of investigation over the past 50 years in the field of alliance and this chapter could assist us in better grasping of dynamics arms transfer, purpose, properties and behavior of arms transfer as a strategic partnership.

Table. 6 The Concept of Strategic Partnership in Russian Arms Transfer to Indonesia



¹²⁶ Stefan Bergsmann, *The Concept of Military Alliance*, http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/05_small_states_04.pdf, page 21, accessed on 5th of April 2018.

Here is the explanation of above concept is in establishing strategic partnerships needed a created value, therefore it could generate all activity. From the results of created value, Soviets arms transfer was a form of support for Indonesian military assistance to the shackles of colonialist who was claimed one province in Indonesia. The realization of arms transfer was fully supported by long-term agreements with both countries. In the sphere of military, Indonesia has not only received military arms assistance, but also the technicians, engineers, and students were sent to the Soviet Union to have training in some countries in Soviet Union. Along with that, Soviet Union had sent military advisors to improve and enhance the military capacity.

The desired value of this arms transfer, Indonesia was received amount of loan and military equipment from Soviet Union and some Eastern Europe countries. In order to strengthen the Indonesian defense of security. As anti-colonialist, Soviet Union wanted Indonesia to grow the military capability without the shades of colonialism.

Geographically speaking, Indonesia lies between the two oceans, Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean in Southeast Asia region. So, it is required and needed to cultivate military capacity to keep Indonesian maritime clear from any illegal activities. Under the Sukarno government, Indonesia became the spotlight of the world. Indonesia, as an independent country willing to seek an alliance who didn't interfere their domestic political ideology. Therefore, Indonesia established strategic partnership because the Soviet Union never intervened with any Indonesian internal politics.

2.2 Process and Factors of Soviet Union as Arms Exporter to Indonesia

The support of the anti-colonialism movement of the Soviet Union was a form of strategy with Indonesia to Sukarno's goal of liberating the East Indies from Dutch colonial rule.¹²⁷ Open aid and support for the supply of Soviet military weapons. With the help of this military weapon, after the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, Indonesia must return to war against the Dutch within 4 years of want to gain complete independence and reclaim West Irian from the Netherlands.

After the Independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, Indonesia has not been separated from Dutch colonialism. Sukarno knew that the Dutch had occupied West Irian because they wanted

¹²⁷ K. M. De Silva and Ronald James May, *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, Pinter, 1991, page: 159.

West Irian under their authority.¹²⁸ The Dutch had occupied West Irian with Kareel Doorman.¹²⁹ In the struggle for West Irian, relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands were getting worse. President Sukarno and General Nasution said that missions cold war with Netherland started in early November 1960.¹³⁰ In fact, the problem of territorial dispute of West Irian was one of the factors of Indonesia through Sukarno's philosophy of political thought to order Nasution to buy heavy weapons belonging to the Soviet government.

The offer of military aid from the Soviet government was initiated by Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev during a state visit in February 1960.¹³¹ The state visit of the Soviet Union initiated the signing of Indonesia's agreement with the Soviet Union in the sphere of economy, technology and military.¹³² But earlier, General Nasution had previously dismissed Soviet government military aid. Because General TNI Nasution prioritized to obtain heavy weapons from the United States.¹³³ Initially, the Indonesian Army requested assistance from President Eisenhower, but Eisenhower did not want to sell arms to Indonesia because the Netherlands was a United States alliance in North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO.¹³⁴ But on the other hand, President Sukarno wanted to show that the Eastern Bloc of the Soviet Union could be a counterweight to the Western Bloc.

Nasution's decision to Moscow in late December 1960 was the beginning of the arms purchase negotiations. Nasution with representatives of Indonesia represented by diplomat Ganis Harsono has signed an agreement which was completed on January 6, 1961.¹³⁵

The process of purchasing weapons whose factors are influenced by the struggle for West Irian for Indonesia. And for the Soviet Union the sender of military supplies is a form of defending the form of unity and peace in Southeast Asia. Nasution's state visit to Moscow was a form of appreciation of

¹²⁸ Mark S. Williams, *Indonesia, Islam, and the International Political Economy: Clash or Cooperation*, Taylor & Francis, 2017, page: 64.

¹²⁹ Danilyn Rutherford, *Laughing at Leviathan: Sovereignty and Audience in West Papua*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012.

¹³⁰ Bilveer Singh, *Papua: Geopolitics and the Quest for Nationhood*, Routledge, 2017.

¹³¹ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and Sergey Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3*, Penn State Press, 2004, page: 807.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Leonard C. Sebastian, *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006, page: 281.

¹³⁴ Audrey Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, University of Washington Press, 1997, page: 82.

¹³⁵ Antonie C. A. Dake, *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists Between Moscow and Peking, 1959-1965*, Mouton, 1973, page: 296.

the friendship between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. Here is a quote from Nasution's speech at the Kremlin State Palace.

*“I certify that the Republic of Indonesia and the Soviet Union have different systems and ideologies. Indonesia holds Pancasila, and the Soviet Union-Marxism. However, in a cooperative relationship between Indonesia and the Soviet Union was based on anti-colonial political system.”*¹³⁶

2.3 The Types of Weapons that Soviet Union / Russia had transferred to Indonesia

In this section of chapter, author will describe the types of weapons that had been transferred from the Soviet Union era then the Russian Federation to Indonesia.

2.3.1 Soviet Union Era 1957-1965

The reconstruction of strategic partnership between the Soviet Union and Indonesia was built at a time when the Soviet Union developed regional security cooperation in the Asia Pacific and Europe. The existence of Soviet Unis in regional security especially in Southeast Asia is one form of strength to align strategic issues for the Soviet Union.

In the field of trade for arms transfers, the Soviet Union had military supplies transferred to Indonesia. The Soviet Union in August of 1958 first sent a MiG-15 jet trainer from Czechoslovakia.¹³⁷ And the pilots trained in Czechoslovakia and Egypt, showcase their ability to operate MiG-15 jet trainers.¹³⁸

Referring to arms transfer database from SIPRI, the following is arms database the transfer from the Soviet Union to Indonesia in periode1957-1965.¹³⁹

Table.7 Transfers Major Weapons from Soviet Union to Indonesia

Supplier/Recipient	Order	No. Designation	Weapon Description	Year(s)) Weap	Year(s) deliveri es	No. deliver ed	Comments

¹³⁶ Abdul Haris Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama*, Gunung Agung, 1983, page: 5.

¹³⁷ Royal Aeronautical Society Australian Division, *Aircraft-Volumes 36-37*, Aeronautics, 1957, page: 7.

¹³⁸ Aeronautics, *Interavia, volume 23*, Interavia, 1968, page: 193.

¹³⁹ SIPRI, *Transfer of Major Weapons: Deals with Deliveries or Orders made for 1950 to 2017*. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php, accessed on 1st of April 2018.

				on of order			
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	8	Project-122/Kronstadt	Patrol Craft	(1957)	1958	(8)	Second-hand (but only few years old)
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	2	Bunju	Tanker	(1958)	1959	(2)	Second-hand navy
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	28	Il-14	Transport Aircraft	1958	1959-1960	(28)	Avia-14 version from Czechoslovakian production line
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	32	Il-28	Bomber aircraft	1958	1959	(32)	B-228 version from Czechoslovakian production line
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	8	Mi-1	Light helicopter	(1958)	1959	(8)	SM-1 version from Polish production line
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	15	MiG-15UTI	Trainer aircraft	1958	1958-1959	(15)	CS-102 version from Czechoslovakian production line
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	30	MiG-17	Fighter aircraft	1958	1958	(30)	S-104 version from Czechoslovakia

							n production line
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	40	MiG-17PF	Fighter aircraft	1958	1958-1959	(40)	LIM-5P version from Polish production line
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	12	Project-613/Whiskey	Submarine	1958	1960-1962	(12)	Second hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	4	Skory	Destroyer	(1958)	1959	4	Second hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	4	Mi-4A	Helicopter	(1959)	1960	4	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	3	An-12	Transport aircraft	(1960)	1961	3	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	25	P-15/SS-N-2A	Anti-ship missile	(1960)	1961-1965	(25)	For Komar FAC
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	12	Project-183/Komar	FAC	(1960)	1961-1965	(12)	Second-hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	14	Project-183/P-6	FAC	(1960)	1961-1962	14	Second-hand Navy
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	1	Project 68/Sverdlov	Cruiser	1960	1962	1	Second-hand; Indonesian designation Irian; It used only few years due to cost and

							complicated technology.
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	1	S-75 Dvina/SA-2	SAM system	(1960)	1961	(1)	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	25	V-750/SA-2	SAM	(1960)	1961	(25)	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	1	Atrek	Support ship	(1961)	1962	1	Second-hand; aid
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	18	BK	Patrol craft	(1961)	1962	(18)	Second-hand Navy; aid
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	100	K-13A/AA-2	SRAAM	(1961)	1962-1963	(100)	For MiG-21 combat aircraft
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	100	KS-1 / AS-1	Anti-ship missile	(1961)	1961-1962	(100)	For Tu-16 combat aircraft
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	35	MiG-19	Fighter aircraft	(1961)	1961-1962	(35)	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	18	MiG-21F-13	Fighter aircraft	1961	1962	(18)	MiG 21F-13 version
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	6	Project-254/T-43	Minesweeper	(1961)	1962-1964	6	Second-hand Navy

The Soviet Union to Indonesia	1	Project-310/Don	Support ship	(1961)	1962	1	Possibly second-hand (but maximum 3-4 years old; aid; Indonesia designation Ratulangi)
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	3	Skory	Destroyer	(1961)	1962-1964	3	Second-hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	24	Tu-16	Bomber aircraft	(1961)	1961-1962	(24)	Second-hand (probably)
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	6	An-12	Transport aircraft	1962	1964	6	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	10	BRDM-1	Reconnaissance AV	1962	1964	(10)	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	30	BTR-152	APC	(1962)	1963-1965	(30)	Second-hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	100	BTR-40	APC	(1962)	1963-1965	(100)	Second-hand (possibly);.delivered could be up to 130
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	75	M-30 122mm	Towed gun	(1962)	1963-1964	75	Second-hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	22	Mi-4A	Helicopter	1962	1963-1965	22	Incl. 1 for VIP transport

The Soviet Union to Indonesia	9	Mi-4PL	ASW Helicopter	1962	1963-1964	9	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	1	Project-255/T-301	Minesweeper	(1962)	1962	1	Second-hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	7	Project-50/Riga	Frigate	1962	1962-1964	7	Second-hand
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	50	PT-76	Light tank	(1962)	1964	50	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	66	BTR-50	APC	(1963)	1963-1965	64	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	50	K-13A/AA-2	SRAAM	(1963)	1965	50	For MiG-21 combat aircraft
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	8	MiG-21F-13	Fighter aircraft	1963	1965	8	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	3	Project-577D/Uda	Oiler	(1963)	1963-1964	3	
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	12	Il-28	Bomber aircraft	(1964)	1965	12	Incl 10 Il-28T torpedo-bomber and 2 Il-28U trainer version
The Soviet Union to Indonesia	8	Mi-6T	Transport helicopter	1964	1965	8	

The Soviet Union to Indonesia							
The Soviet Union to Indonesia							

In the beginning of agreement, the Soviet Union provided military assistance of USD \$ 100 million, then added to USD \$ 250 million.¹⁴⁰ And during Nasution's visit to Moscow, the amount of military aid provided by the Soviet Union was USD \$ 450 million.¹⁴¹ The mechanism of payment was 20-year-long with interest rate of 2.5 % and Indonesia has paid all of Indonesia's by the end of 1990.¹⁴²

Nasution mentioned that Indonesian Armed Forces prioritized for Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU). Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) received 12 submarines, fast rocket boats, and amphibious equipment and Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) received fighter jets, bomber planes, and air defense systems along with its radar.¹⁴³ Then Indonesian Army (TNI-AD) acquired artillery pieces.

2.3.1.1 The Indonesian Navy

Table. 8 Arms Equipment for Indonesian Navy

Weapon Description	Ordered	No. Designation	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year(s) deliveries	No. delivered	Comments
Patrol Craft	8	Project-122/Kronstadt	(1957)	1958	(8)	Second-hand (but only few years old)

¹⁴⁰ Kurt London, Op.cit.

¹⁴¹ Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Op.cit.


¹⁴² Geoffrey Jukes, *The Soviet Union in Asia*, University of California Press, 1973, page: 277.

¹⁴³ Abdul Haris Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas Jilid 5: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama*, Gunung Agung, 1983, page : v.

Submarine	12	Project-613/Whiskey	1958	1960-1962	(12)	Second hand
Destroyer	4	Skory	(1958)	1959	4	Second hand
Anti-ship missile	25	P-15/SS-N-2A	(1960)	1961-1965	(25)	For Komar FAC
FAC	12	Project-183/Komar	(1960)	1961-1965	(12)	Second-hand
FAC	14	Project-183/P-6	(1960)	1961-1962	14	Second-hand Navy
Cruiser	1	Project 68/Sverdlov	1960	1962	1	Second-hand; Indonesian designation Irian; It used only few years due to cost and complicated technology.
Support ship	1	Atrek	(1961)	1962	1	Second-hand; aid
Patrol craft	18	BK	(1961)	1962	(18)	Second-hand Navy; aid
Minesweeper	6	Project-254/T-43	(1961)	1962-1964	6	Second-hand Navy
Support ship	1	Project-310/Don	(1961)	1962	1	Possibly second-hand (but maximum 3-4 years old; aid; Indonesia

						designation Ratulangi)
Destroyer	3	Skory	(1961)	1962-1964	3	Second-hand
Helicopter	22	Mi-4A	1962	1963-1965	22	Incl. 1 for VIP transport
ASW Helicopter	9	Mi-4PL	1962	1963-1964	9	
Minesweeper	1	Project- 255/T-301	(1962)	1962	1	Second-hand
Frigate	7	Project- 50/Riga	1962	1962-1964	7	Second-hand
Oiler	3	Project- 577D/Uda	(1963)	1963-1964	3	

Chart.1 Years Weapon of Order 1957-1965 for Indonesian Navy



From the table and chart above, the Soviet Union helped Indonesia especially in the field of defense through sophisticated military transfers. The delivery of Soviet military aid substantially strengthened the position of the Indonesian Navy. General Nasution suspected US support for PRRI.

¹⁴⁴ And to compensate for the Dutch Ship of Kareel Doorman, Indonesia had a KRI Irian which was the Sverdlov-class cruiser, Soviet designation project 68b, Ordzhonikidze. And several other warships such as Whiskey submarine and Frigate Riga, and other Navy platforms. ¹⁴⁵

Prior to the delivery of the KRI Irian (The Sverdlov-class cruiser), Sukarno was in a panic, due to Kareel Doorman's ship plan heading to West Irian. As Indonesia's strategic cooperation partner, the Soviet Union's assistance could directly for Dutch darting in 1962. In this case, Indonesia had to deter the Dutch Navy assisted by the United States. The Soviet Union sent submarines in support of Indonesia's struggle for West Irian. The sea base point started from Surabaya, then moved to Bitung.¹⁴⁶ By deploying the whole range of Indonesian Armed Forces, Indonesia had placed an attacking force in Biak which was the main military base of West Irian.¹⁴⁷ Thus, Soviet assistance in order to help Indonesia to recapture West Irian had approved that Indonesia Navy was the second most powerful in the Asia Pacific region.¹⁴⁸

2.3.1.2 The Indonesian Air Force

Table. 9 Arms Equipment for Indonesian Air Force

Weapon Description	Ordered	No. Designation	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year(s) deliveries	No. delivered	Comments
Transport Aircraft	28	Il-14	1958	1959-1960	(28)	Avia-14 version from Czechoslovakian production line

¹⁴⁴ Bradley R. Simpsons, *Economics with Guns: Amerika Serikat, CIA, dan Munculnya Pembangunan Otoriter Rezim Orde Baru*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama-2008.

¹⁴⁵ Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*. Routledge, 2013, page: 47.

¹⁴⁶ Floribert Baudet, Eleni Braat, Jeffrey van Woensel, and Aad Wever, *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali*, Springer, 2017, page: 91.


¹⁴⁷ John Saltford, *The United Nations and The Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: The Anatomy Betrayal*, Routledge, 2003, page: 35.

¹⁴⁸ Johannes Soedjati Djiwandono, Op.cit.

Bomber aircraft	32	Il-28	1958	1959	(32)	B-228 version from Czechoslovakian production line
Light helicopter	8	Mi-1	(1958)	1959	(8)	SM-1 version from Polish production line
Trainer aircraft	15	MiG-15UTI	1958	1958-1959	(15)	CS-102 version from Czechoslovakian production line
Fighter aircraft	30	MiG-17	1958	1958	(30)	S-104 version from Czechoslovakian production line
Fighter aircraft	40	MiG-17PF	1958	1958-1959	(40)	LIM-5P version from Polish production line
Helicopter	4	Mi-4A	(1959)	1960	4	
Transport aircraft	3	An-12	(1960)	1961	3	
SAM system	1	S-75 Dvina/SA-2	(1960)	1961	(1)	
SAM	25	V-750/SA-2	(1960)	1961	(25)	
SRAAM	100	K-13A/AA-2	(1961)	1962-1963	(100)	For MiG-21 combat aircraft
Anti-ship missile	100	KS-1 / AS-1	(1961)	1961-1962	(100)	For Tu-16 combat aircraft
Fighter aircraft	35	MiG-19	(1961)	1961-1962	(35)	
Fighter aircraft	18	MiG-21F-13	1961	1962	(18)	MiG 21F-13 version

Bomber aircraft	24	Tu-16	(1961)	1961-1962	(24)	Second-hand (probably)
Transport aircraft	6	An-12	1962	1964	6	
Helicopter	22	Mi-4A	1962	1963-1965	22	Incl. 1 for VIP transport
ASW Helicopter	9	Mi-4PL	1962	1963-1964	9	
SRAAM	50	K-13A/AA-2	(1963)	1965	50	For MiG-21 combat aircraft
Fighter aircraft	8	MiG-21F-13	1963	1965	8	
Bomber aircraft	12	Il-28	(1964)	1965	12	Incl 10 Il-28T torpedo-bomber and 2 Il-28U trainer version
Transport helicopter	8	Mi-6T	1964	1965	8	

Chart.2 Years Weapon of Order 1957-1965 for Indonesian Air Force



Prior to West Irian dispute, Indonesia had received MiG-15 operated by Indonesian pilots. They were specially trained in Czechoslovakia to show their appearance on the day of the Republic of Indonesia National Army in October 1958.¹⁴⁹ The delivery of armaments from the Soviet Union was a form of military force and a moral injection for the Indonesian Armed Forces. For the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU), Indonesia received such a TU-16 bomber, MiG-21 fighter, and other aircraft platforms to exert force against the Dutch and its allies.

2.3.1.3 The Indonesian Army Forces


Tables. 10 Arms Equipment for Indonesian Army Forces

Ordered	No. Designation	Weapon Description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year(s) deliveries	No. delivered	Comments
2	Bunju	Tanker	(1958)	1959	(2)	Second-hand navy
10	BRDM-1	Reconnaissance AV	1962	1964	(10)	

¹⁴⁹ Guy J. Pauker, Op.cit.

30	BTR-152	APC	(1962)	1963-1965	(30)	Second-hand
100	BTR-40	APC	(1962)	1963-1965	(100)	Second-hand (possibly); delivered could be up to 130
75	M-30 122mm	Towed gun	(1962)	1963-1964	75	Second-hand
50	PT-76	Light tank	(1962)	1964	50	
66	BTR-50	APC	(1963)	1963-1965	64	


Chart. 3 Years Weapon of Order 1957-1965 for Indonesian Army Forces



According to Bradley, the success of the Nasution Mission had an impact on the Cold War to seize West Irian dispute from the Netherlands.¹⁵⁰ The great influence of the Soviet Union further strengthened the Indonesian War Force. Nasution as an Army leader with anti-communism ideology was sympathetic to Soviet within assistance that modernize the Indonesia Armed Force

Charts. 4 Soviet Union Arms Transfer to Indonesia from 1957 to 1965

¹⁵⁰ Bradley R. Simpsons, Op.cit.



From the chart above it could be assured that Indonesia prioritized the Indonesian Air Force in increasing its military capacity. But not with the abundance of military tools, it proved that Indonesia was able to increase its military capability with the help of the Soviet Union.

2.3.2 Russia Federation Era (2001-now)

Table. 10 Arms Equipment for Indonesian Army

Supplier/Recipient	Ordered	No. Designation	Weapon Description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year(s) deliveries	No. delivered	Comments
Russia Federation to Indonesia	12	BTR-80A	IFV	2001	2002	12	USD \$ 6.5 million deal
	2	Mi-2	Light Helicopter	2002	2003	2	Second-hand
	2	Mi-8MT/Mi-17	Transport helicopter	2002	2003	2	Mi-17 version

	4	Mi-8MT/Mi-17	Transport helicopter	2002	2004	4	USD \$ 18-22 million deal (loaned from Malaysian company; probably include USD \$ 3 million lost in corruption); Mi-17 version
	25	9M114 Shturm/A T-6	Anti-tank missile	2003	2003	25	For Mi-35P combat helicopters; designation uncertain
	16	Igla-1/SA-16	Portable SAM	2003	2003	16	For Mi-35P combat helicopters; designation uncertain
	2	Mi-24P/Mi-35P	Combat helicopter	2003	2003	2	Possibly ex-Russian; part of USD \$ 193- USD \$ 197 million deal (incl barter), Mi-35P version

	2	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	2003	2003	2	Part of USD \$ 193-197 million deal (incl.barter); possibly ex-Russian Su-27 modernized to Su-27SMK
	2	Su-30MK	FGA aircraft	2003	2003	2	Part of USD \$ 193-197 million deal (incl.barter); originally 20 ordered 1997 but cancelled after 1997 financial crisis and renewed 2003; option on 8-18 more
	6	Mi-8MT/Mi-17	Transport helicopter	2005	2008	6	Mi-17V-5 armed version
	17	BMP-3	IFV	2008	2010	17	455 million Rupiah (USD \$ 40-50 million) deal; BMP-3F version

	1	BREM-L	ARV	2008	2010	1	
	3	Mi-24P/Mi-35P	Combat Helicopter	2008	2010	3	Mi-35P version
	75	R-73/AA-11	SRAAM	2008	2010	75	For Su-27 and Su-30 combat aircraft
	60	RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder	BVRAAM	2008	2012-2013	60	For Su-27 and Su-30 combat aircraft
	3	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	2008	2010	3	Part of USD \$ 300-353 million deal; Su-27SKM-2 version
	3	SU-30MK	FGA aircraft	2008	2009	3	Part of USD \$ 300-353M deal; Su-30MK2 version
	10	Kh-29/AS-14 Kedge	ASM	2009	2012	10	
	10	Kh-31A1/AS-17	Anti-ship missile/ARM	2009	2011-2012	10	Kh-31P anti-radar version
	10	Kh-59M/AS-18 Kazoo ASM	ASM	2009	2012	10	


	6	Yakhont/ SS-N-26	Anti-Ship Missile	2009	2011	10	For modernized Yani (Van Speyk) frigate
	6	Mi- 8MT/Mi- 17	Transport helicopter	2010	2011	6	USD \$ 56 million deal; Mi-17-V5
	6	Su-30MK	FGA Aircraft	2012	2013	6	USD \$ 470 million deal; Su-30MK2
	37	BMP-3	IFV	2013	2014	37	USD \$ 114 million deal; BMP-3F version
	11	Su-35	FGA aircraft		(2017)		USD \$ 1.1 billion deal (incl. USD \$ 570 million paid in commodities and 35% offsets); selected but not yet ordered by end-2017

2.3.2.1

Table. 11 Arms Equipment for The Indonesian Navy

Order	No. Designation	Weapon Description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year(s) deliveries	No. delivered	Comments
6	Yakhont/ SS-N-26	Anti-Ship Missile	2009	2011	10	For modernized Yani (Van Speyk) frigate

Charts. 5 Russian Arms Transfer for Indonesian Navy



In the transition to the Russian Federation, Russia began to re-open relations with Indonesia by sending one of the Yakhonts as an anti-ship missile in the frigates of Russia.

2.3.2.2 Tables. 12 Arms Equipment for The Indonesian Air Forces


Order	No. Designation	Weapon Description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year(s) deliveries	No. delivered	Comments
2	Mi-2	Light Helicopter	2002	2003	2	Second-hand
2	Mi-8MT/Mi-17	Transport	2002	2003	2	Mi-17 version

		helicopter				
4	Mi-8MT/Mi-17	Transport helicopter	2002	2004	4	USD \$ 18-22 million deal (loaned from Malaysian company; probably include USD \$ 3 million lost in corruption); Mi-17 version
25	9M114 Shturm/AT-6	Anti-tank missile	2003	2003	25	For Mi-35P combat helicopters; designation uncertain
16	Igla-1/SA-16	Portable SAM	2003	2003	16	For Mi-35P combat helicopters; designation uncertain
2	Mi-24P/Mi-35P	Combat helicopter	2003	2003	2	Possibly ex-Russian; part of USD \$ 193-USD \$ 197 million deal (incl barter), Mi-35P version
2	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	2003	2003	2	Part of USD \$ 193-197 million deal

						(incl.barter); possibly ex-Russian Su-27 modernized to Su-27SMK
2	Su-30MK	FGA aircraft	2003	2003	2	Part of USD \$ 193-197 million deal (incl.barter); originally 20 ordered 1997 but cancelled after 1997 financial crisis and renewed 2003; option on 8-18 more
6	Mi-8MT/Mi-17	Transport helicopter	2005	2008	6	Mi-17V-5 armed version
3	Mi-24P/Mi-35P	Combat Helicopter	2008	2010	3	Mi-35P version
75	R-73/AA-11	SRAAM	2008	2010	75	For Su-27 and Su-30 combat aircraft
60	RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder	BVRAAM	2008	2012-2013	60	For Su-27 and Su-30 combat aircraft
3	Su-27S/Flanker-B	FGA aircraft	2008	2010	3	Part of USD \$ 300-353 million

						deal; Su-27SKM-2 version
3	SU-30MK	FGA aircraft	2008	2009	3	Part of USD \$ 300-353M deal; Su-30MK2 version
10	Kh-29/AS-14 Kedge	ASM	2009	2012	10	
10	Kh-31A1/AS-17	Anti-ship missile/ ARM	2009	2011-2012	10	Kh-31P anti-radar version
10	Kh-59M/AS-18 Kazoo ASM	ASM	2009	2012	10	
6	Mi-8MT/Mi-17	Transport helicopter	2010	2011	6	USD \$ 56 million deal; Mi-17-V5
6	Su-30MK	FGA Aircraft	2012	2013	6	USD \$ 470 million deal; Su-30MK2
11	Su-35	FGA aircraft		(2017)		USD \$ 1.1 billion deal (incl. USD \$ 570 million paid in commodities and 35% offsets); selected but not yet ordered by end-2017

Charts. 6 Russian Arms Transfer for Indonesian Air Forces




From the charts above, it is clearly said that in era Soviet Union dan Russian Federation, military equipment for Indonesian Air Forces always dominated.

2.3.2.3 Tables. 13 Arms Equipment for The Indonesian Army Forces

Orderd	No. Designation	Weapon Description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year(s) deliveries	No. delivered	Comments
12	BTR-80A	IFV	2001	2002	12	USD \$ 6.5 million deal
17	BMP-3	IFV	2008	2010	17	455 million Rupiah (USD \$ 40-50 million) deal; BMP-3F version
1	BREM-L	ARV	2008	2010	1	
37	BMP-3	IFV	2013	2014	37	USD \$ 114 million deal; BMP-3F version

Charts. 7 Russian Arms Transfer to Indonesian Army Forces



From the charts above Indonesia received many artillery platforms from Russia Federation. They were mostly dominated by tanks.

E. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Era (2004-2014)

Pictures. 5 Vladimir Putin met with the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono



Source: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/34491>

The transition period of the Soviet Union to the country of the Russian Federation has made Indonesia re-establish the bilateral relationship between these two friends. During the presidency of Megawati who had visited Russia in 2003, the next president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono pointed

out that there was a greater chance to establish in defense. It started when Russia participated as one of the participants in the defense industry forums and showing the military equipments and major weapons in exhibition. Sukhoi is one of the companies that attracted the attention of President Yudhoyono at that time. So there is a step further defense business between Indonesia and Russia.¹⁵¹ Along with President's programme, Indonesia has plan to modernize its military defense with Russia.¹⁵² Rosoboronexport as the exporter of military goods from Russia is ready to establish business with Indonesia to increase Indonesia's defense capacity.¹⁵³

Russia also helped at the time of Indonesia's tsunami disaster in Aceh 2004.¹⁵⁴ They sent military logistical needs in order to mobilize medical aid.¹⁵⁵ The defense bilateral between is not only prioritized military and security, but also it focuses on humanitarian activities and disaster relief. Within one year after tsunami 2004, Yudhoyono called for emergency assistance to Putin. Russia swiftly helped send the Trans Volga and military regiments to the Air Force, therefore all aid was directed to Aceh.¹⁵⁶ Afterall, the harmonious relationship with SBY gained a mission for Russia to invest in the Indonesian market. The volume of Indonesian trade with Russian investment in 2005 reached USD \$ 680 million or up about 42%.¹⁵⁷

F. Joko Widodo Era (2014-present)

Pictures. 6 Vladimir Putin and Jokowi met in Sochi, Russi.

¹⁵¹Indodefence Expo Forum 2004 International, Sukhoi Company, 2006, <http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/exhibitions/indodefence/>, accessed on 26th of April 2018.

¹⁵² Acharya Amitav, *Indonesia Matters: Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*, August 2014, page: 90.

¹⁵³Розоборонэкспорт (Rozoboroneksport), Russian Arms Exporter, Op.cit.

¹⁵⁴ Jeffrey Frank Jones, Publications Combined: *Russia's Regular and Special Forces in The Regional and Global War*, in *Russian Special Forces Issue of Loyalty, Corruption and the Fight Against Terror* by Graham H.Turbiville Jr, 2005, page: 136.

¹⁵⁵ Vladimir Mukhin, *Миниобороны РФ втягивается в новый региональный конфликт*, (*Minioborony RF vtyagivaetsya v novyj regional'nyj konflikt*) *Ministry Defense of Russian Federation is Drawn into a New Regional Conflict*, http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2005-01-14/1_minoborony.html?auth_service_id=Twitter&auth_service_error=1&id_user=Y, accessed on 30th of April 2018.

¹⁵⁶ Igor' Bykov, *Медицина катастроф*, (*Meditsina katastrof*), *Medicine of catastrophes*, <https://vpk-news.ru/articles/475>, accessed on 29th of April 2018.


¹⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, *Pertemuan Kelompok Ahli (PKA) "60 Years of Indonesia-Rusia Relations: ADVANCING COMMON INTERESTS"*, <https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/siaran-pers/Pages/Pertemuan-Kelompok-Ahli-PKA-60-Years-of-Indonesia-Rusia-Relations-ADVANCING-COMMON-INTERESTS.aspx>, accessed on 20th of April 2018.



Source: <http://setkab.go.id/en/president-jokowi-to-meet-president-putin-in-sochi-russia/>

Under President Joko Widodo's administration, the harmony between Indonesia and Russia remained intertwined and maintained. Jokowi attended conference between ASEAN-Russia. This official visit to Russia, will enhance in deepening strategic cooperation in investment, economy, and defense industry. The investment from defense industry received such as Sukhoi Su-30, Sukhoi Su-27, Mil Mi-35, BMP-3, Mil Mi-17 and Pantsir valued at nearly USD \$ 2 billion.

Charts. 8 Russian Arms Transfer to Indonesia from 2001 to 2017



Bilateral relations with Russia must be maintained, due to the massive project in Indonesia. A global security issue needs a solution, such as how to counter terrorism. The coordination between two countries should be united to prevent of various threats. Indonesia and Russia for the prevention of various threats, thereby strengthening the Russian and Indonesian defense agencies. By comparing the Soviet Union arms transfer to Russian arms transfer firmly design a security framework with differentiate of chronological time. Due to West Irian dispute, Indonesia fully needed military

assistance to deter the Netherlands. In fact, Indonesia gained victory in West Irian, again the Soviet Union became the most potential military partner in Old Regime. Though, Indonesia and the Soviet Union survived for 6 years, it was proven that the Soviet Union took responsibilities in developing Indonesia military capabilities

Chapter 3: Russian Intention as Strategic Partnership in Arms Transfer

The concept of a form of the partnership of work as one significant factor in fostering the wisdom of Soviet-era weapons transfer to Indonesia. In Ian Anthony's research, the weapon transfer policy takes precedence over requests from certain countries. The main factor is can be categorized by the policy of arms transfers in the economic field, then related to military-political issues, so it is associated with technology issues.


In this case, the Soviet Union as a supplier country prioritizes military-political policy to consider the transfer of weapons to Indonesia as a recipient country. Logical consequences of Indonesia's recipient countries in enhancing military capability. A political strategic policy is also one of the factors considered in the transfer of arms. Indonesia as a recipient country for military arms transfers, in this case, should consider the potential supply analysis of technical support from supplier countries in all terms and conditions.

The 50-year military role of establishing Russia-Indonesia strategic partnership developed in defense industry so as to strengthen defense policy in Russia and in Indonesia. The following are aspects and factors that influence the increase of arms transfers from Russia (USSR) to Indonesia. As a potential friend who supplied military defense equipment to Indonesia, the Soviet Union has advantages as an arms supplier compared to the supplying arms suppliers to Indonesia. Here, the history of the history of the Soviet Union made the transfer of weapons very dynamic. Indonesian armed forces with conventional military power, following the development of Soviet weapons supply.

3.1 Concept of Strategic Partnership in Russian Arms Transfer

The author coursed on Kaplan's Strategy Map into a map of strategic Russian intentions in arms transfer to Indonesia. Strategic partnerships that are capitalized with strategic productivity and strategic growth will be result in long-term shareholder value. This is evident from the beginning of the strategic bilateral relations of Indonesia and Russia that have been established since 1950. The Soviet Union assisted Indonesia's military capacity with the support of high-quality armaments to deter The Dutch in West Irian dispute. And geographically speaking, Indonesia is located between Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, which should be an opportunity for Russia in placing their military base.)

Tables. 14 The Map Concept of Strategic Partnership in Arms Transfer ¹⁵⁸




Indonesia did not spend small amount of governmental defense budget on Russian military equipments. Therefore, improving cost structure in arms transfers are included the shipping method,

¹⁵⁸ Robert Kaplan and David P Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Performance*, Harvard Business Review from the July- August 2005 Issue, <https://hbr.org/2005/07/the-balanced-scorecard-measures-that-drive-performance>, accessed on 20th of April 2018.

mechanism that will increase the asset of utilisation and expand opportunities in strategic partnerships. The form of value proposition is to enforce process of arms transfer process should be covered with quality, availability, price, selection, function, service, partnership, and image. From the value of this proposition, the authorities - policy makers in Russia and Indonesia must demonstrate the value of partnership are prioritized teamwork, alliances, leadership, and cultural behaviour. Thus, by building strategic partnership will govern other issues in bilateral relations.

The strategic partnership between Indonesia and Russia had been slugged for almost 50 years. The most common issue of between these two countries are security and defense. Defense and security has took role in establishment of strategic partnership between Indonesia and Rusia. On this chapter, author will describe some contributing factors that sustain to re-establish partnership Indonesia and Rusia. Russia has become a potential and strategic partner in undertaking the capabilities of Indonesia's defense military equipment. Due to ideological differences from China, an arms embargo from the United States, Russia is the most potential partner for Indonesia in arms transfer.

Tables. 15 Russian Intention in Building Strategic Partnership with Indonesia



3.2 Russian Intention in Building Strategic Partnership with Indonesia

Firstly, it has been pointed out that, Indonesia led by Sukarno an anti-colonialist had the same ideology as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union as a major arms supplier in Indonesia has carved out partnership to release West Irian from the Dutch colony. Russia has conventional military power, so

there are some exchange ideas between Indonesian military advisors and Russian military advisors. In addition, it brings the harmonious relationship of the Soviet Union and Indonesia intertwined.

The second factor is Russia as a major arms supplier has been more accommodative, Russia never intervened with any Indonesian domestic politics, comparing to the United States. It is firmly, Indonesia did not spend small amount for defense budget. Due to financial crisis in Asia 1997-1998, Indonesia had a great impact of crisis. The substantial of Indonesian public finance was not prioritized for military and defense. Under the Suharto's administration, he concentrated on economic development.¹⁵⁹

Based on existing facts, under Suharto administration, defence budget only allocated five percent of Gross Domestic Product to defense funds and it was around one-third of state budget.¹⁶⁰ Due to, Suharto prioritized economic development for Indonesia, so it took additional costs to be required in purchasing military weapons.

A third factor can be leveraged by geographical locations that correlated with politics. Russia is a modern transition of the Soviet Union, which never intervened with any internal Indonesian political activities. For the first time Indonesia received a supply of military weapons from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union sincerely supported Indonesia with one of the ship KRI IRIAN previously known as Sverdlov. Geographically, by cooperating with Indonesia, the Soviet Union would accommodate Indonesian military base at some strategic points which had been part of Soviet doctrine in Indian Ocean.¹⁶¹

Pictures. 7 KRI IRIAN / SVERDLOV



¹⁵⁹ Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp, Op.cit.

¹⁶⁰ Jurgen Ruland, Maria-Gabrieal Manea, and Hans Born, *The Politics of Military Reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria, 2002, Springer Science & Business Media, 2012, page: 117.*

¹⁶¹ A. Sella, Op.cit.

Source: https://id.rbth.com/technology/2015/08/14/kri-irian-201-simbol-persahabatan-soviet-dan-indonesia-di-tahun-60-an_390313, accessed on 30th of April 2018.

During Yudhoyono era, Indonesian Armed Forces had offered Russia to implementing military export in credits.¹⁶² Because of the comprehensive Russian military assurances and correlates with internal policy aspect of Indonesia. In addition, having military assistance from Russia, it will not be shackled by long political bureaucracy.

The entity of the United States as superpower could be balanced by Russia. Russia is seeking for emerging regional powers, such as China. In this case, Russia has performed regional power required interdependence alliance with other emerging powers country, such as Indonesia. Military assistance from Russia had to persuade Indonesia performed its military capacity to struggle for West Irian. Indonesia as one of emerging power country is taking part in the form of safeguarding international security.¹⁶³ It could analyze the strategic Indonesian military, the Indonesian Navy Forces must be prioritized for monitoring the geopolitical conditions of Southeast Asia and safeguarding the limits of state security.

In the result of Russia and Indonesia's strategic defense partnership, it became the most potential access for Russia to invest in Indonesia. According to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the amount of Russian foreign capital investment has earned USD \$ 4 billion.¹⁶⁴ From 2001 to 2007, Russian investment increased from USD \$ 210 million to reach USD \$ 904 million.¹⁶⁵ After that, tourism sector also plays an important role in the status quo of Indonesia-Russia relations, because now, Indonesia is one of the most favorite destinations for Russians.¹⁶⁶

In the reign of Suharto, he prioritized economic development, so it made Indonesia stagnated with unprogressed infrastructure. Suharto's transition to the Habibie government was strained. Habibie only reigned less than one year. As an engineer, Habibie focused on technological advances, such as nuclear power. Habibie signed agreement on trade, economy, and technology with Russia.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶² IISS, *The Military Balance*, Routledge, 2018, page: 369.

¹⁶³ The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia, Op.cit.

¹⁶⁴ Russian Federation, *The Russia Business Review – Volume 7*, ZAO Independent Press, 1999, page: 52.

¹⁶⁵ Loc.cit

¹⁶⁶ Richard Benfield, *Garden Tourism*, CABI – Business & Economics 2013, page: 90.

¹⁶⁷ <http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/index.php/in/kolom/eropa/392-enam-dekade-dinamika-persahabatan-indonesia-rusia->

Russia and Indonesia is one example of bilateral relations of the country based on sincerity. Russia had its own transition from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had led for 69 years, after collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia become a federal democrat. In the way, Indonesi had been colonized for 3.5 centuries by the Netherlands, it was finally gained independence in 1945. Indonesia had transformed from the Old Order regime to the New Order and had a reformation. The evolution of both countries shows that the role of state leaders influenced the philosophical system of an ideology and politics. The background of Russian and Indonesian leaders who are each other had an important military position in each country. President Putin is a former Soviet KGB officer and Yudhoyono had served as general in the New Order leadership. The strategic partnership between Russia and Indonesia is supplemented by a history that has been carved out for both countries. The orientation of the strategy of the Soviet Union and Indonesia in defense relations were very accommodating, persuasive, and intensive. Although it was only 6 years with the Soviet Union, Indonesia was able to become one of Asia's two strongest militaries, after China.

From the history of the Soviet Union with the United States in the cold war, the Soviet Union shifted to the Asia Pacific. Thus, the competition of geopolitical conditions in Asia was still dominated by the Soviet Union. The Soviet strategy of establishing an alliance partner in Asia was to strengthen the regional hegemonic position in Asia Pacific. The Soviet Union as anti-colonialist had been searching for a strategic status quo in order to balancing with the United States. As Indonesia just gained its independence day, the Soviet Union interlaced with Indonesia. The arms transfer leveraged the Soviet Union in dynamics of the Asia Pacific geographical conditions.¹⁶⁸ The Russian intention will be analyzed as playing regional power in Asia. Its intention clearly encompass in strengthening its position in Southeast Asia. But, Russia must offer a form of interdependent alliance that can generate cooperation in the military and technology. Like Indonesia, Russia is also one of the arms suppliers for Southeast Asian countries. In particular, the strategic framework of technology and security that Indonesia offers to Russia for the Indonesian National Armed Forces.


3.3 Russian Arms Transfer and Its Future Percpectives

Russia has been a good partner with Indonesia almost 68 years ago. Bilateral relation between these countries are getting developed year by year. As Indonesia proceeds to take a part in leading role in ASEAN and Asia Pacific, Russia and Indonesia will strengthen in establishment in context regional

¹⁶⁸ Gebbadt Chuftrin and Gennadi Illarionovich Chuftrin, *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, Oxford University Press, 1999, page: 4.

power. Sukarno had opened the relationship with Nikita Khurshchev in the early 1950s. Indonesia relations between the Soviet Union had overthrown under Suharto's regime. The diminishing of Suharto Regime, Russia and Indonesia bilateral relation have built on high-level signing agreement as the key to analyze future perceptives. In 2015, President of Republic of Indonesia, Jokowi and President of Russian Federation, Putin signed new strategic partnership agreement.

Tables. 15 Russian Arms Transfer and Its Future Perspectives



The most potential sector has been fully supported by since 1957 is in defence industry. The agreement dealt with trade of Indonesian raw materials and commodities, natural resources, like coffee, palm oil, to be equal with Sukhoi. Russia expressed its willingness to have barter with Indonesia, it builds on trust. Not only about military, Indonesia and Russia dealt to cooperate in countering terrorism from their intelligence agencies.

The entity of a memorandum of understanding from Indonesia and the Russian Federation for the peaceful energy of nuclear energy, namely the construction of nuclear power plant and for infrastructure projects, Russia has invested for the construction of railways in Kalimantan.

For some contemporary issues, Indonesia sees Russia as a trustworthy partner, Russia and Indonesia seem to designate strengthening their relations. Both countries have always mutual reciprocal relationship based on honor.

Conclusion

Indonesia as the biggest archipelago country in the world has been one of strategic partner to be involved to with superpower country. Sukarno and Khurshev had opened the door of defense bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. The Soviet Union embraced Indonesia after declaring its proclamation in 1945. The Soviet Union intention to demonstrate relation with Indonesia is one of the strategy partnership in alliance. Both countries had declared as anti-colonist, therefore, the Soviet Union concerned in building relationship with Indonesia, Along with that, Indonesia could be considered one of emerging power in Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific. It would be Soviet's strategy to be hegemonial power in Asia.

The harmony of Soviet Union and Indonesia in military cooperation had lasted less 9 years. In this cooperation, the Soviet leveraged Indonesian military capabilities and defended Indonesia in West Irian dispute with the Dutch. Aftermath the transition from Old Regime under Soekarno's leadership diminished and transformed to New Regime under Suharto's rules. This intimate cooperation Indonesia and the Soviet had became dreary, until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Transition the Soviet Union to Russia Federation had reestablished both countries relations. The re-establishment of strategic partners Indonesia with Russia is a bilateral defense has been on progress. By analyzing history of Indonesia and Russia, Russia has been considered to be the most welcoming country of Indonesia. Russia, therefore it can be predicted as an important role in the regional Pacific region is a potential partner in the economic development of Indonesia. And Russia has also invested and made an important influence in players in the Indonesian economy.

The existencis of Russia can direct Southeast Asian region into multipolarity orientation. As Indonesia is one of the leading country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia should play mportant role in Southeast Asia. To be concluded, Indonesia should not be contingent on other countries, whether if Indonesia has desire to be regional power in Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific.

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
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A. General Agreements about Economic and Technological Cooperation between The Soviet Union and Republic Indonesia. 12th of August 1956. *Генеральное Соглашение Об Экономическом и Техническом Сотрудничестве Между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Республикой Индонезией*



дополнительных Соглашениях, которые будут заключены в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным соглашением.

На основе данных, полученных в результате указанных изысканий и исследований, советские организации дадут Индонезийской Стороне соответствующие консультации.

Статья 3

Советские организации, помимо проведения предусмотренных в статье 2 изыскательских и исследовательских работ, готовы выполнять проектные работы по подлежащим строительству с помощью Советского Союза предприятиям, поставить для этих предприятий оборудование и материалы, которые не могут быть изысканы в Республике Индонезия, а также оказать техническую помощь в строительстве (консультации и авторское наблюдение), монтаже и наладке оборудования и пуске предприятий в эксплуатацию, для чего направят в Республику Индонезию советских специалистов и квалифицированных рабочих на сроки и в количестве по согласованию Сторон. Советские организации также готовы оказать помощь в подготовке индонезийских специалистов для работы на предприятиях, которые будут строиться с помощью СССР, путем обучения их на месте, а также путем обучения на аналогичных советских предприятиях.

Объем поставок оборудования и материалов и оказание технической помощи, в связи со строительством предусмотренных в статье 1 предприятий, будет согласовываться в каждом конкретном случае между Сторонами и определяться в дополнительных Соглашениях, которые будут заключены в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным соглашением.

Статья 4

Советские организации передадут Индонезийской Стороне техническую документацию, информацию и лицензии, необходимые для организации производства соответствующей продукции на построенных в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным соглашением предпри-

тиях. Передача указанной документации и необходимых лицензий на производство будет осуществляться безвозмездно с оплатой Индонезийской Стороной лишь фактических расходов советских организаций, связанных с изготовлением документации.

Передаваемые документация и лицензии будут использованы только в целях производства упомянутой выше продукции в границах Республики Индонезия.

Статья 5

Правительство Союза ССР предоставляет Правительству Республики Индонезия кредит в сумме до 100 млн. (сто миллионов) ам. долларов из 2,5% годовых, с правом использования этого кредита в течение 8 лет на оплату выполняемых советскими организациями проектных работ и поставляемых из СССР в Индонезию оборудования и материалов, необходимых для предприятий, которые будут строиться с помощью Советского Союза в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным соглашением.

Статья 6

Правительство Республики Индонезия будет погашать предоставляемый ему согласно статье 5 кредит в течение 12 лет равными ежегодными долями, начиная через 3 года с даты использования соответствующей части кредита.

Проценты по кредиту будут начисляться с даты использования соответствующей части кредита и уплачиваться в течение первого квартала года, следующего за годом, за который они начислены.

Статья 7

Погашение кредита и уплата начисленных по нему процентов будут производиться Правительством Республики Индонезия путем поставок в Советский Союз индонезийских товаров или переводными фунтами стерлингов, а также свободно конвертируемой валютой по согласованию между Госбанком СССР и Банком Индонезии.

Стороны будут за три месяца до наступления очередного года погашения кредита и уплаты процентов по нему согласовывать на каждый календарный год номенклатуру и цены товаров, а также количество и сроки их поставок.

При погашении кредита и уплате процентов по нему переводными фунтами стерлингов или свободно конвертируемой валютой пересчет фунтов стерлингов или свободно конвертируемой валюты в ам. доллары будет производиться по паритету на день платежа.

Статья 8

В целях учета использования и погашения кредита и уплаты начисленных по нему процентов Государственный банк СССР и Банк Индонезии откроют специальные кредитные счета и установят совместно технический порядок ведения указанных счетов и расчетов по кредиту.

Статья 9

Правительство Союза ССР и Правительство Республики Индонезии согласились сотрудничать и в области использования атомной энергии в мирных целях, в частности, в области применения радиоактивных изотопов в медицине, науке и технике, а также в подготовке из числа индонезийских граждан специалистов по использованию атомной энергии.

В этих целях советские организации примут для повышения квалификации в этой области специалистов из числа индонезийских граждан, в количестве и на сроки по согласованию Сторон.

Статья 10

Расходы Советской Стороны по командированию советских специалистов и квалифицированных рабочих в Республику Индонезию и по приему в СССР индонезийских граждан для прохождения производственно-технической практики, а также для повышения квалификации, согласно статье 9, будут оплачиваться Правительством Республики Индонезии в индонезийских рупиях путем

зачисления соответствующих сумм на специальный счет, который Государственный банк СССР откроет в Банке Индонезии в пользу советских организаций, оказывающих эти услуги. Суммы с этого счета могут быть использованы на текущие расходы советских организаций в Республике Индонезии, а также, по согласованию между Государственным банком СССР и Банком Индонезии, на другие платежи.

Статья 11

Выполнение предусмотренных настоящим Генеральным соглашением изыскательских, исследовательских и проектных работ, поставка оборудования и материалов, командирование советских специалистов в Республику Индонезию и принятие индонезийских граждан в СССР будут производиться советскими организациями на основе контрактов, заключаемых с индонезийскими организациями, уполномоченными на то Индонезийским Правительством.

В этих контрактах будет подробно определяться объем, цены, сроки и другие условия поставок оборудования и материалов и оказания услуг по настоящему Генеральному соглашению.

Контракты на поставку оборудования и материалов должны быть заключены в течение пяти лет, считая от даты настоящего Генерального соглашения.

Настоящее Генеральное соглашение подлежит ратификации и вступит в силу в день обмена ратификационными грамотами, который будет иметь место в Москве.

Совершено в Джакарте 15 сентября 1956 года в двух подлинных экземплярах, каждый на русском и индонезийском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

(подпись)

(подпись)

Публикуется впервые

B. Second General Agreements about Economic and Technological Cooperation between The Soviet Union and Republic of Indonesia. 12 August 1956. Второе Генеральное Соглашение об Экономическом и Техническом Сотрудничестве Между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Республикой Индонезией

**ВТОРОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ СОГЛАШЕНИЕ
ОБ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОМ И ТЕХНИЧЕСКОМ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ
МЕЖДУ СОЮЗОМ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК
И РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ ИНДОНЕЗИЕЙ**

Исходя из дружественных отношений, существующих между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Республикой Индонезией и учитывая опыт по экономическому и техническому сотрудничеству в выполнении Генерального соглашения от 15 сентября 1956 г., оба Правительства договорились о заключении Второго генерального соглашения, направленного на дальнейшее содействие в общем развитии экономики Индонезии. Это соглашение основывается на взаимной выгоде, равенстве, уважении суверенитета и невмешательстве во внутренние дела Сторон.

Статья 1

Правительство Союза ССР соглашается сотрудничать с Правительством Республики Индонезия в сооружении промышленных и других объектов, в том числе предприятий черной и цветной металлургии, химической промышленности, в использовании атомной энергии в мирных целях, текстильных предприятий и сельскохозяйственных объектов, которые необходимы для общего экономического развития республики Индонезия.

Количество и характер таких и других предприятий и объектов, строительство которых будет осуществляться при содействии Союза ССР, будут определены на более поздней стадии по взаимному согласию Сторон и с учетом результатов изыскательских и исследовательских работ, которые будут осуществлены советскими организациями в сотрудничестве с индонезийскими организациями

Статья 2

По просьбе Правительства Республики Индонезия советские организации в сотрудничестве с индонезийскими организациями проведут изыскательские и исследовательские работы по предприятиям и объектам, которые будут сооружаться в Республике Индонезия при содействии Союза ССР.

Перечень, объем и сроки выполнения изыскательских и исследовательских работ, характер участия Сторон в этих работах будут определены в дополнительных Соглашениях, которые будут заключены в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным соглашением.

На основе данных, полученных в результате указанных изысканий и исследований, советские организации дадут Индонезийской Стороне соответствующие консультации.

Статья 3

Советские организации, помимо проведения предусмотренных в статье 2 изыскательских и исследовательских работ, готовы выполнить проектные работы по подлежащим к строительству при содействии Советского Союза предприятиям и объектам, поставить для этих предприятий и объектов оборудование и материалы, которые не могут быть изысканы в Республике Индонезия, а также оказать техническое содействие в строительстве (консультации и авторское наблюдение), монтаже и пуске оборудования и пуске предприятий в эксплуатацию, для чего направят в Республику Индонезию советских специалистов и квалифицированных рабочих на сроки и в количестве по согласованию Сторон. Советские организации также готовы оказать содействие в подготовке индонезийских специалистов для работы на предприятиях, которые будут строиться при содействии СССР, путем обучения их на месте, а также путем обучения на аналогичных советских предприятиях.

Объем поставок оборудования и материалов в оказание технического содействия, в связи со строительством предусмотренных в статье 1 предприятий и объектов, будет согласовываться в каждом конкретном случае между Сторонами и определяться в дополнительных

соглашениях, которые будут заключены в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным Соглашением.

Статья 4

Советские организации передадут Индонезийской Стороне техническую документацию, информацию и лицензии, необходимые для организации производства соответствующей продукции на построенных в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным соглашением предприятиях и объектах. Передача указанной документации и необходимых лицензий на производство будет осуществляться безвозмездно с оплатой Индонезийской Стороной лишь фактических расходов советских организаций, связанных с изготовлением документации.

Передаваемые документация и лицензии будут использованы только в целях производства упомянутой выше продукции в границах Республики Индонезия.

Статья 5

Правительство Союза ССР предоставляет Правительству Республики Индонезия кредит в сумме 250 млн. (двести пятьдесят миллионов) ам. долларов из 2,5% годовых, с правом использования этого кредита в течение 7 лет на оплату выполняемых советскими организациями проектных работ и поставляемых из СССР в Индонезию оборудования и материалов, необходимых для предприятий и объектов, которые будут строиться при содействии Советского Союза в соответствии с настоящим Генеральным соглашением.

Статья 6

Правительство Республики Индонезия будет погашать предоставляемый ему согласно статье 5 кредит по каждому предприятию и объекту в отдельности в течение 12 лет равными ежегодными долями, начиная через год после завершения комплектных поставок из СССР оборудования и материалов по данному предприятию или объекту.

Проценты по кредиту будут начисляться с даты использования соответствующей части кредита и уплачи-

ваться в течение первого квартала года, следующего за годом, за который они начислены.

Статья 7

Погашение кредита и уплата начисленных по нему процентов будут производиться Правительством Республики Индонезия путем поставок в Советский Союз индонезийских товаров и/или фунтами стерлингов, а также другой свободно конвертируемой валютой по согласованию между Госбанком СССР и Банком Индонезия.

Стороны будут за три месяца до наступления очередного года погашения кредита и уплаты процентов по нему согласовывать на каждый календарный год номенклатуру и цены товаров, а также количество и сроки их поставок.

При погашении кредита и уплате процентов по нему фунтами стерлингов или другой свободно конвертируемой валютой пересчет фунтов стерлингов или другой свободно конвертируемой валюты в ам. доллары будет производиться по паритету на день платежа.

Статья 8

В целях учета использования и погашения кредита и оплаты начисленных по нему процентов Государственный банк СССР и Банк Индонезия откроют специальные кредитные счета и установят совместно технический порядок ведения указанных счетов и расчетов по кредиту.

Статья 9

Расходы Советской Стороны по командированию советских специалистов и квалифицированных рабочих в Республику Индонезию и по приему в СССР индонезийских граждан для прохождения производственно-технического обучения и практики будут оплачиваться Правительством Республики Индонезия в индонезийских рупиях путем зачисления соответствующих сумм на специальный счет, который Государственный банк СССР откроет в Банке Индонезия в пользу советских организаций, оказывающих эти услуги. Суммы с этого счета

могут быть использованы на текущие расходы советских организаций в Республике Индонезия, а также, по согласованию между Государственным банком СССР и Банком Индонезии, на другие платежи.

В случае изменения паритета индонезийской рупии по отношению к ам. доллару, который в настоящее время составляет 45 индонезийских рупий за один ам. доллар, Государственный банк СССР и Банк Индонезии осуществят соответствующий пересчет сальдо по специальному счету, указанному в настоящей статье.

Статья 10

Выполнение предусмотренных настоящим Генеральным соглашением изыскательских, исследовательских и проектных работ, поставка оборудования и материалов, командирование советских специалистов в Республику Индонезию и принятие на обучение индонезийских граждан в СССР будут производиться советскими организациями на основе контрактов, заключаемых с индонезийскими организациями, уполномоченными на то Индонезийским Правительством.

В этих контрактах будут подробно определяться объемы, цены, сроки и другие условия поставок оборудования и материалов и оказания услуг по настоящему Генеральному соглашению.

Настоящее Генеральное соглашение подлежит ратификации в соответствии с установленным порядком в каждой стране и вйдет в силу в день обмена ратификационными грамотами, который будет иметь место в Москве.

Совершено в городе Босоре 28 февраля 1960 г. в двух подлинных экземплярах, каждый на русском и индонезийском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

(подпись)

(подпись)

«Известия», 1.III.1960, «Внешняя торговля», 1960, № 3.

СОГЛАШЕНИЕ МЕЖДУ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВОМ СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК И ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВОМ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ИНДОНЕЗИИ ОБ ОБУЧЕНИИ В СССР ИНДОНЕЗИЙСКИХ ГРАЖДАН РАЗЛИЧНЫМ СПЕЦИАЛЬНОСТЯМ В ОБЛАСТИ НЕФТЯНОЙ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТИ

Правительство Союза Советских Социалистических Республик и Правительство Республики Индонезии, исходя из дружественных отношений, существующих между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Республикой Индонезией, и в связи с обращением Правительства Республики Индонезии об обучении в СССР индонезийских граждан в области нефтяной промышленности, согласились о нижеследующем:

Статья 1

Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик будет оказано техническое содействие Республике Индонезии в подготовке около 100 индонезийских граждан различным специальностям в области нефтяной промышленности, для чего советские организации:

примут в 1961—1962 учебном году до 50 индонезийских студентов в высшие и средние специальные учебные заведения для обучения соответствующим специальностям и до 10 индонезийских аспирантов для подготовки научных работников;

примут около 40 индонезийских специалистов для прохождения производственно-технического обучения и производственной практики на предприятиях, промыслах, в геологических экспедициях, исследовательских институтах и других организациях.

Статья 2

Обучение индонезийских граждан в СССР, а также прохождение производственно-технической практики будет осуществляться безвозмездно.