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Factors of Hybrid Warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

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Аннотация

Данная магистерская диссертация была написана в рамках общих положений основной программы Школы Международных Отношений СПбГУ в исследовании международных отношений. Объектом нашего исследования является сам текущий конфликт в нагорном Карабахе, и предметом данного исследования будут сосуществующие факторы гибридной войны в продолжающемся конфликте. К сожалению, конфликт за нагорный Карабах между Арменией и Азербайджаном все еще находится в политическом, дипломатическом, академическом и военном безысходных положениях.

Больше 20 лет уже были сделаны различные попытки и проведены много научных исследований по поддержанию мира в данном конфликте, но тем не менее, каких-либо реальных признаков развития не было достигнуто. Основная цель нашего исследования состоит в том, чтобы показать необходимость и уязвимость этого региона для международных отношений и раскрыть старые и новые факторы “Гибридной Войны”, которые, в концепционных рамках современных международных отношений, понимаются и проводятся в довольно дифференцированных интерпретациях.

Ключевые слова: Гибридная война, война беспилотниками, Армянский терроризм, поддельные новости, цифровая пропаганда, Нагорно-Карабахский конфликт;

Abstract

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| Description of the goal | <p>This Master thesis has been written within the general provisions of the SPbU School of International Relations' main master program in International Relations Study. An object of our research is the current conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the coexisting factors of hybrid warfare in this conflict will be a subject of the current research.</p> <p>Unfortunately, the conflict for Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan still is in political, diplomatic, academic and military stalemates. More than 20 years various attempts have been already made and carried out a lot of scientific research on peacekeeping in this conflict, but nevertheless, has not been reached any real signs of development. The basic goal of our research is to reveal the necessity and vulnerability of this region for international relations and to unveil old and fresh factors of “Hybrid Warfare”, which, in a conceptual framework of the modern international relations, are understood and conducted in quite differentiated interpretations.</p> |
| Keywords | Hybrid warfare, drone war, Armenian terrorism, fake news, digital propaganda, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; |

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Introduction

Today, it is a pretty implausible desire to find an authentic, internationally proven, unanimously adopted, and academically systemized definition of "war". Most of all contemporary studies on international conflicts are accompanied by the assiduous discourse of social world. As a result, we are inevitably being involved even in the social construction and perceptual interpretations of "war". In that way, my thesis will be binding with academic clarification on one of these constructions and interpretations of war that will be based on newly-interpreted and very quickly-scattered "Hybrid Warfare" concept of XXIth century and its hidden role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan as a main economic power and the biggest country in South Caucasus has been almost more than 25 years existing under conflict with Armenia over its Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenia as a land-locked, economically and territorially smallest country of South Caucasus has been attesting to the drastic degradation for more than two decades. Unsurprisingly, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and unremitting internal struggles for power and ruling of foreign policy tossed up this country closer to the verge of extinction. Unfortunately, the academic research on this conflict is still based on conservative assumptions of "*war*" and "*conflictology*" and there is an obvious scarcity of novel, theoretical and academically-refreshed studies. Nevertheless, if we are going to distinguishably look through contemporary facets and perceptions of "hybrid warfare", we will realize its old and new factors in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This region is situated in the southwest of the modern Republic of Azerbaijan and was partially occupied by illegal separatist regime directly/indirectly supported by the Republic of Armenia. My task is to make more fresh, independent and objective research over the nature of this conflict and to reveal unstudied categories of hybrid warfare's factors in it.

Respectively, each country has its own "*National Security Doctrine*" which are available even on the Internet and not surprise undergone permanent alterations up to these days. One of them, Azerbaijan has a centuries-long history of statehood and established the first-ever democratic Republic in the East in 1918. Azerbaijan has lost its state independence in 1920, and only after disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, could restore it.¹ The official position of the Republic of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh region and its future basically remained constant, it is still considered to be an illegal occupation and breaching of its state sovereignty

¹ The title of the primary source - **NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN** // Approved by Instruction No. 2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 23 May 2007 // p.3 // URL: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154917/Azerbaijan2007.pdf> // Retrieved at 28.10.2017

and territorial integrity. But, sometimes, during peace-process negotiations organized by Minsk Group of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE MG), Azerbaijan has accepted the option of giving autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh, similar to Nakhchivan's autonomy, just within its internationally recognized borders. For instance, on 22 June 2011, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev by giving an interview to "Euronews" TV Channel in Brussels again made clear-cut the official position of one's government.² He has underscored that first step en route peace and stability lay on the implementation of four resolutions (822³, 853⁴, 874⁵, 884⁶) of the UN Security Council adopted for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region and from seven surrounding districts. That is where in return, Azerbaijan has promised wide autonomy to people who are living and who were living, then internally displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh. It has been permanently stated that prosperity and future economic, cultural and demographical development of Nagorno-Karabakh might be constructed by aforementioned efforts and imperatives.⁷ Ultimately, Republic of Armenia neighboring with Azerbaijan has made similar attempts to be independent even in the beginning of XXIth century, but each countries' fate was probably diverting into the regaining of their independence within the collapse of Soviet Union. If we look up their historical and cultural background under the Soviet regime, we will stumble with permanent impediments that sometimes led to mass casualties. According to the "National Security Strategy" of Armenia, Azerbaijan is a basic source of threat to its National Security, territorial integrity and state sovereignty.⁸ Nowadays, Armenian foreign policy over Nagorno-Karabakh region is getting to be more complicated and at

² Ilham Aliyev's interview to "Euronews" TV Channel in Brussels, 22 June 2011, 13:00 // URL: <https://en.president.az/articles/2500> // Retrieved at 29.10.2017

³ UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 822 adopted by the Security Council at its 3205th meeting, on 30 April 1993 // URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/822> // Retrieved at 29.10.2017

⁴ UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 853 adopted by the Security Council at its 3259th meeting, on 29 July 1993 // URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/853> // Retrieved at 29.10.2017

⁵ UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 874 adopted by the Security Council at its 3292nd meeting, on 14 October 1993 // URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/874> // Retrieved at 29.10.2017

⁶ UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 884 adopted by the Security Council at its 3313th meeting, on 12 November 1993 // URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/884> // Retrieved at 29.10.2017

⁷ Baku is ready to grant Nagorno-Karabakh the widest autonomy possible within Azerbaijan borders. This is our final decision," Ziyafet Askerov was quoted as saying by the Azeri news agency APA. // URL: <https://sputniknews.com/world/201607221043467831-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-autonomy/> // Retrieved at 29.10.2017

⁸ The title of the primary source - **REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY** // Approved at the session of National Security Council at the RA President office on January 26, 2007 // pp.3-4 // URL: http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf // Retrieved at 29.10.2017

some points too contradictory. For instance, an official position outlined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia is quite apparent that Armenia accepts peace and consolidation only by participation of self-declared "Nagorno-Karabakh or the Artsakh Republic" in the post-war negotiations as well. It has been clearly documented that "Armenia believes that the improvement of the peace process efficiency is impossible without the full participation of the conflict party Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations." Armenia believes that the conflict settlement should be based on the following principles:

- a) Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement must be based on recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh people's right to self-determination;
- b) Nagorno-Karabakh should have uninterrupted land communication with Armenia, under the jurisdiction of the Armenian side;
- c) the security of Nagorno-Karabakh should be internationally guaranteed.⁹

The latest contradictory is dealing with shadow-policy of Armenian National Committee of America within local political frictions. As an example, we can scrutinize the starting sentence of so-called Artsakh's history with abovementioned official statements. If hidden sponsors of Armenian diaspora who basically chooses its leaders and mostly directs one's country's future economic, political and social policies argue that "The Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh) is an integral part of Armenia",¹⁰ how will we be able to make a definition of self-determination and participation in negotiations as a third independent part, even without referendum of consent of currently living and internally displaced population of Nagorno-Karabakh?!

Generally speaking, in comparison with current Armenian leadership which is more intertwined with ambiguous participation in transition of political regime in so-called "Artsakh Republic" from parliamentary to the full presidential regime and its own opposite transition from presidential one to the parliamentary state, Azerbaijan is more opinionated and encouraged by one's military, economic and cultural power. And as a final point of brief comparative analysis, we can mention the blitzkrieg-war in April 2016 which was lasting four days and considered as the most prevailing violation of the armistice since 1994 that led to the confirmation of uselessness of ceasefire agreements with no date of expiration. Repercussions of these events in Armenia were the election of Karen Karapetyan as the prime minister of Armenia, Vigen Sarkisian as the Secretary of Defense on August 2016, both from the Nagorno-Karabakh region

⁹ The title of the source – "Nagorno-Karabakh issue: Position of Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia // URL: <http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh-issue/#a5> // Retrieved at 22.01.2018

¹⁰ The title of the source – "The history of Artsakh" edited by Armenian National Committee of America // URL: <https://anca.org/nagorno-karabakh-overview-2/> // Retrieved at 23.11.2017

and the Karabakh political spectrum and the plan for recognizing the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh region by the Armenian government in the National Assembly of Armenia without a final approval and without completely being ruled out of the agenda.¹¹ For me, this is quite idiosyncratic how each country has become eligible to successfully use modern, mixed and non-linear methods of war, not only in real life but also within political, economic and cultural aspects. Though this fact is not a novelty, there were being emerged and updated quite new strategies, tactics and systematic changes that redirect and led the understanding of simple war in Nagorno-Karabakh to the more fresh and vitalized factors of Hybrid warfare. From the other standpoint, it requires very well-organized study over these factors and academic clarification upon the concept itself which might be surely associated with the current situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh. Reasonably speaking, we would split apart these factors into two categories:

- a) ***Old factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:*** Talking more about strategical part of conflict, we must argue that the existence of permanent struggles using quite non-linear methods, between Azerbaijani and Armenian political elites, for getting endogenous and exogenous majority of power was a time-worn factor of hybrid warfare, even in the close period of Soviet collapse. This irregular strategy was backed by external supports and found its perspectives in such official documents as Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act. Another inactive factor must be associated with terrorism. Prior to full-scale war operations, complexed with using different irregular methods such as “patriotic volunteers and other paramilitary groups” without military insignia, in the tactical-operational level of war which became another auxiliary factor of hybrid warfare, there were atrocious terroristic attacks on civilians. Aftermath, it became a detonator of massive crimes and national hatreds between Armenians and Azerbaijanis;
- b) ***New factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:*** Nowadays, old struggles for power excellency has been converted into image-making game in the international diplomatic arena, saturated by repetitive and dormant meetings, negotiations, temporal agreements escorted by such external actors as OSCE MG and other international organizations, which are differing with one’s so-called “innovative principles” for alleged peaceful resolution of conflict. Indeed, current Azeri and Armenian power-based stamina is being consumed by those external actors in their

¹¹ The title of the article – “Referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh Region 2.0” edited by IRAS – The Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies // URL: <http://www.iras.ir/en/iraneurasia.iren/doc/note/3076/referendum-in-nagorno-karabakh-region-2-0> // Retrieved at 23.11.2017

own geopolitical games as well, and it entails the demolition of democratization and more secure governments in Azerbaijan and Armenia. This factor is still being consolidated by such legally invalid, internationally mistrusted, thematically distorted armistice as Bishkek Protocol signed on May 5, 1994, in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. It does conduce each leadership to use Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself as a trigger of emergent mobilization and an alternative escape from domestic uprisings based on internal economic and social disorders. Therefore, it became quite a fresh factor of hybrid warfare where the conflict's strategical part turned into the more complexed diplomatic fight in order to get the vast majority of international support. The lack of internationally guaranteed "peace treaty" that must be based on mutual interests and basic principles of international law is another new factor which paves a chiseled way to the most complexed hybrid war in the South-Caucasus region. Today, there is also another convert from old hybrid methods in the tactical-operational level of conflict, whereas terrorism and unnamed paramilitary fighters were replaced with active digital state propagandas developing and differing by fake news, incessant arms race for deterrence, and innovative military technologies inculcating with various irregular methods, that have taken place in the last April 2016 skirmish and denoted even a new battlespace of "drone wars";

To this end, it is obvious that deadlock here might be overcome by pure understanding of relationship between regime types and conflicts which are a lot more complex than is often argued in the literature, and that the Karabakh peace process has been undermined by the worst of two worlds: intense elite competition, but without the restraint and widened participation that democratisation could assure.¹²

What is a "Hybrid Warfare"? Different interpretations of existing data

It is quite conspicuous that modern discussions upon local military policies and their intrusion into the body of international relations are getting rapidly enhanced. For the first blush, there is an inevitable issue on the road of our research upon enshrouded linkage between "Hybrid

¹² The title of the article – "Regimes and peace processes: Democratic (non)development in Armenia and Azerbaijan and its impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" edited by Nina Caspersen // Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University, United Kingdom // URL: <https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/MVZ208/um/43679843/Caspersen.pdf> // Retrieved at 24.11.2017

Warfare" concept and its ever-upgrading components in an unstable Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijan Republic which has been attesting to many distinguished historical events for more than 20 years. Undoubtedly, this research will contribute to the academic disclosure on how the concept of hybrid warfare is often too narrowly concentrated on a conflict's "kinetic" facets and had not been paid its tribute on such new and ambiguous aspects as a digital struggle for primacy in the minds of population, self-interpretation of strategic arms race on different battlespaces and superiority of national brinkmanship. In practice, hybrid warfare is being commenced by establishing strategic objectives and employing means that breach another state's sovereignty during not only a wartime but also within peace negotiations. Findings further point to prosperous results when coercive infringement is accorded to minimize the chances of international military and juridical responses.

Today, there are, approximately, more than 250 articles, 50 books and other sources that indicate and define different interpretations of hybrid warfare concept, but, in general, three of them are most valuable definitions of theoretical and practical assignments of hybrid warfare. First one chiefly relates to Frank G. Hoffman who is a father-founder of this concept and his disciples. Dr. Hoffman is serving at the National Defense University (hereinafter, NDU) as a Distinguished Research Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies. He formerly directed the NDU Press operations which include the journals Joint Force Quarterly. From August 2009 to June 2011, he has served as a senior executive and as the Senior Director, Naval Capabilities, and Readiness in the U.S. Department of the Navy. He started at the NDU in 2011 and became a Distinguished Research Fellow in December 2016. Mr. Hoffman holds a Ph.D. in War Studies from King's College London.¹³ By giving one's theoretically endorsed interpretation, Mr. Hoffman does not forget to make a comparative analysis of alternative concept – "compound war". In his seminal article "Hybrid vs. compound war", written for Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy in October 2009, Dr. Hoffman underscored that contemporary researchers rely on the new adjectives and prefer to retain oversimplified depictions of warfare in two distinct bins: conventional and irregular. He quoted: "I do not share their concerns about new adjectives if they help us think about, debate and prepare for the future. I have a more huge concern about preparation for the future, just looking backward. I am afraid that we will face more complicated phase in the constantly changing character of the modern conflict, and it would allow us to understand better the modern

¹³ Frank G. Hoffman - Member - FPRI Board of Advisors // URL: <https://www.fpri.org/contributor/frank-hoffman/>
// Retrieved at 24.11.2017

conflict and it is better to prepare our operational forces for success. We need a sound appreciation of history, and we need to understand the ever-evolving character of the emerging future all at the same time. In short, as warfare evolves, which Clausewitz reminds us it will do in every age, our professional lexicon should evolve, too.”¹⁴ Alongside with one's interpretation, he has also mentioned the ideas of his colleagues. He stated that there are a number of hybrid definitions. For instance, Marine Lt. Col. Bill Nemeth's graduate work on Chechnya and hybrid warfare was path-breaking research. He defined hybrid warfare as "the contemporary form of guerrilla warfare" that "employs both modern technology and modern mobilization methods."¹⁵ Likewise, Nathan Freier of the Center for Strategic and International Studies was one of the originators of the hybrid warfare construct when he worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the national defense strategy. "This strategy has stated in the one's well-known "quad chart" of four threats - traditional, irregular, catastrophic terrorism and disruptive". This strategy noted that in the future, the most complex threats would be combinations of these four. Freier's version defines a hybrid threat as an actor who uses two of the four modes of conflict. Meanwhile, retired Army Col. Jack McCuen paid its tribute mostly on the loci of the asymmetric battle, fought on three decisive battlegrounds "within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community."¹⁶ This definition emphasizes the battle of the narratives and reinforces Nemeth's emphasis on modern information tools and mass mobilization. Dave Kilcullen who is another advocate of this new concept, in one's prolific book "The Accidental Guerrilla," supported hybrid warfare as the best description for today's modern conflicts. Nevertheless he emphasizes a combination of the irregular modes of the conflict, including civil wars, an insurgency, and terrorism. Other contributors to hybrid wars find more utility in conceptualizing the hybrid threat in terms of how the adversary is organized or his legal status (states and nonstate actors as proxies).¹⁷ Talking more about Mr. Hoffman's inferential logic over this sort of interpretations, we must underline his main separations within hybrid warfare's strategic and operational levels. In another outspoken article "Hybrid Warfare and

¹⁴ The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy // p.1 // URL: <http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf> // Retrieved at 24.11.2017

¹⁵ The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy // p.1 // URL: <http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf> // Retrieved at 24.11.2017

¹⁶ The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy // p.1 // URL: <http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf> // Retrieved at 24.11.2017

¹⁷ The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy // p.2 // URL: <http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf> // Retrieved at 24.11.2017

Challenges", he has stated that "as difficult as compound wars have been, the operational fusion of conventional and irregular capabilities in hybrid conflicts may be even more complicated. However, compound wars proposed synergy and combinations at the strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion, and simultaneity which we expect at the operational and even tactical levels in wars where one or both parties mix and merge all range of methods and modes of the conflict into the battlespace. Irregular forces in cases of compound wars worked generally as derivation or economy of force in separate theater or in the next operational zone, including a non-combatant echelon".¹⁸ Thereafter, we can surely assert that his definition of "hybrid warfare" focused on the adversary's modes of conflict. He obviously eliminates "destructive technology" and includes "destructive social behavior" or crime as the fourth modality. To many military theorists, it is inconvenient with this element and they do not want to deal with something that our culture sharply rejects as a business of law enforcement agencies. But the interrelation between the criminal and terrorist organizations is conventional, and the emergence of the narcoterrorist and odious transnational organizations which use smuggling, drugs, human trafficking, extortion, etc., undermines the legitimacy of the local or national government, rather obviously.

Dr. Hoffman has also underlined that he defines hybrid threat as any opponent who simultaneously and adaptively uses the alloyed combination of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battlespace for the achievement of the one's political goals. There is a number of questions, lifted by definition of Mr. Hoffman. Five various elements of definition concern them:

a) A modality against structure: Whether our definition has to focus on modes of the fighting of the opponent or on its structure (a combination of the states, non-state actors, foreign fighters)?

b) Simultaneity: Whether force has to use at the same time four various modes of the conflict or show an opportunity to use all four during the campaign?

c) Fusion: Whether force has to combine various forces, regular and irregular, to the battleground or it has to mix various modes of the conflict? How much does coordination qualify and in what level of war?

d) Multimodality: Whether the actor has to mix all four ways or three of four enough to make the conflict hybrid?

¹⁸ The title of the article - "Hybrid warfare and challenges" edited by Frank G. Hoffman // URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf> // pp.36-37 // Retrieved at 25.11.2017

e) Criminality: Is criminality a deliberate mode of conflict, or simply a source of income or support for gangs and terrorists?¹⁹

Complexed definition of “Hybrid Warfare” for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Despite genuine interpretation of “Hybrid warfare”, there are other two definitions given by NATO-financed researchers from its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, RAND Corporation etc., and Orthodox school, mostly represented by Russian scientists in international relations who held the earliest ideas upon “new warfare types”. One of them was Russian military strategist (Георгий Самойлович Иссерсон / "Новые формы борьбы" / “New forms of struggle”), who was one of the father-founders of “Deep Operation Theory”²⁰ in Soviet Armed Forces and Evgeny Messner who also was well-known military scientist and anti-communist activist fighting for “White movement” within Russian Civil War (1917-1922). Being an assertive anti-communist and military theoretician of the Russian diaspora Prof. Messner has served as General Staff colonel of the Russian Imperial Army, during the civil war fought on the White side, mainly in the headquarters of the units. He was the last chief of staff of the Kornilov Division in the Russian Army. He was unique theorist with his “psychological warfare”, which is one of the main components of the current concept of “hybrid warfare”, within the context of one’s very prolific book “Myatej Voyna”.²¹ The main idea was dealt with the brainwashing of plain folk within appropriate countries and the pivotal role of insurgencies in non-linear warfares, where the best explanation of this concept could be defined through author’s innovative quotation: “If you want a peace, defeat the “Myatej Voyna”.” The third one is considered to be Igor Nikolaevich Panarin who is a graduate of the Higher School of the KGB. He worked at the Soviet Embassy in London. Several years ago, Panarin was invited to work in a closed state structure, and for some time he disappeared from the information field. He was famous with a mixture of “informational warfare” in one’s seminal article “Gladiators of the

¹⁹ The title of the article - “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy // p.3 // URL: <http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf> // Retrieved at 25.11.2017

²⁰ The title of the source – “New forms of struggle”, Moscow: Voengiz, 1940., G.S. Isserson // URL: <http://militera.lib.ru/science/isserson/index.html> // Retrieved at 26.11.2017

²¹ The title of the book – “Myatej Voyna” written by Evgeny Messner // URL: http://militera.lib.ru/science/0/pdf/messner_ea01.pdf // Retrieved at 29.11.2017

hybrid war”.²² According to his ideas, “hybrid warfare” is not anything new, but rather deep-historical experience used predominantly by British Empire in order to reinstate the USA into one’s leadership and to fight against world communism. For him, hybrid war is a combination of military-political, political-diplomatic, financial-economic, information-psychological and information-technical methods, as well as technologies for color revolutions, terrorism and extremism, special services, special forces, special operations and public structures diplomacy, carried out under a single plan by state authorities, military-political blocs or Transnational Corporations (hereinafter TNC). The last one is the outstanding “eurasianist” Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin who is still popular with one’s “Network-centric warfare (hereinafter NCW)”²³ theory which converts information supremacy within “hybrid warfare” into fighting sword by efficiently tying well-informed military organisms in the battlespace. For him, in the postmodern geopolitics in order to attain its full capacity, NCW has to be profoundly trusted in operational workmanship. Notwithstanding, we are still not able merely to relate these fresh ideas and new technologies to the modern platforms, organizations, and warfare doctrines.

In comparison with western interpretations of “hybrid warfare”, Russian concept should be called as “Gibridnaya Voyna” in order to differentiate and make a comparison between two coasts of an academic valley. Reasonably speaking, it has to be accepted that Russian “Gibridnaya voyna” has got its own strategic and operational stages pursuing of the full devastation of enemy’s legitimate power over appropriate territory, population and natural wealth. However, it could be similar or dissimilar in strategic and operational stages with westernized interpretations of “hybrid warfare”, they come together in their finite goals. Consequently, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict holds apparent facets of both interpretations that hereinafter will be combined in one, common “hybrid warfare” concept. If Mr. Hoffman was talking about enemy’s modes of fighting mixed with simultaneity and fusion of different forces on various battlespaces by paying one’s paramount vision on operational part of conflict, Russian “Gibridnaya voyna” mostly relies on vulnerability and importance of psychological, diplomatic, political, informational, economic, financial and cultural victory over enemy in the strategical part of conflict. Meanwhile, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during these almost three decades since its re-ignition has attested to both factors of “Hybrid warfare” and “Gibridnaya voyna”. As a result of long academic observation and qualitative research with my thesis

²² The title of the source – “Gladiators of the hybrid war” written by Igor Nikolaevich Panarin // URL: http://www.inesnet.ru/wp-content/mag_archive/2016_02/ES2016-02-060-65_Igor_Panarin.pdf // Retrieved at 29.11.2017

²³ The title of the article – “Network-centric warfare and Globalization” written by Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin // URL: <http://federalbook.ru/files/OPK/Soderjanie/OPK-7/V/Dugin.pdf> // Retrieved at 30.11.2017

advisor, we have realized that our definition of “hybrid warfare” in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be as follows: “The new type of warfare that lacks of internationally recognized peace treaty based on mutual interests and separated into two significant levels: a) strategical – mostly puffed up by factors of an orthodox ‘Gibridnaya voyna’ for politico-psychological supremacy over enemy and total obliteration of its full value governance; b) tactical-operational - fully captured by Frank G. Hoffman’s ‘hybrid warfare’ concept based on multimodality, simultaneity, criminal activities, terrorism and other new types of unconventional methods for gaining economy of war and final battlespace victory”. Consequently, our initial task will be a revelation of these two stages of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and make visible some factors of mixed hybridity within the historical background and recent situation in this region.

Nowadays, social mass media plays very crucial role in the interpretation and basic understanding of this conflict. For us, firstly to this extend aforementioned Hoffman’s “disruptive technology” converts to the “disruptive social behaviour”. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it is not just a simple criminal activity like Ramil Safarov has done within NATO-sponsored training seminar in Budapest²⁴ or like Monte Melkonian who was popular with one’s terroristic leadership and massacres in “ARABO” which was division of special fighters under aegis of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (hereinafter ASALA)²⁵ and Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide in the 1980s. Therefore, “disruptive technology” should be defined as criminal activity itself which converts to the “disruptive social behavior” that chiefly laid on “false patriotism”.

In comparison with very well-organized Orthodox and Frank G. Hoffman’s interpretations, NATO’s definition of “hybrid warfare” is varying by its simplicity and lack of academically systemized definition, yet there are an exuberance of articles upon this hot and most discussed topic issued by its such influential think-tanks as the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and RAND Corporation. For instance, “Russia and Hybrid warfare –going beyond the label”²⁶ might be sampled as one of the most popular and fresh articles written by Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith. This article chiefly collects all probable previous definitions, makes a comparative analysis and comes to final definition by rational choice to detect a sponsor or perhaps initiator of hybrid wars. All arrows were directed onto Russia and its new type of

²⁴ The title of the source – “Azeri killer Ramil Safarov: Concern over Armenian anger”, 3 September 2012 // URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19463968> // Retrieved at 03.12.2017

²⁵ The title of the primary source – “The ASALA: A continuing international threat // CIA document approved for release // URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005462031.pdf // Retrieved at 05.12.2017

²⁶ The title of the article - "Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going beyond the label" written by Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith in 2016 // p.2 // URL: file:///C:/Users/Dns/Downloads/ap_1_2016.pdf // Retrieved at 06.12.2017

struggle with the West by mixing all of the new, secret and even irregular strategies, operations, tactics and tools for gaining of extension of its diplomatic, economic and geopolitical influence. The similar disclosure can be attached to such articles as "Hybrid warfare in Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses"²⁷ written by Andrew Radin and "Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: And What Can Be Done About It"²⁸ written by Christopher S. Chivvis, which differing with its variations in the parts relating to the conceptualization of NATO's response to so-called "Russian Hybrid Warfare". And the last, perhaps the biggest collection of NATO's "hybrid warfare" definitions and written discussions on its novelty found its existence in the book called "NATO's Response to Hybrid Threats"²⁹ edited by Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen.

On the recent action sponsored by NATO and organized by the Atlantic Council for discussion of the annexation of the Crimea and military support of Ukraine, to participants it has been told that "there is no coordinated definition of the terms connected with hybrid warfare". In other words, representatives of 28 members of the North Atlantic Alliance could not agree about the accurate definition of what they face. Then, how leaders of NATO can count on the development of effective military strategy if they can not define what, according to them, is the threat of day? And it once again confirms one obvious simplicity and unwillingness of NATO and other western representatives making decisions which want to forget about all "hybrid" and to focus on specifics and interdependence of threats which they face.

Pursuant to the majority of latest news, quotations, and articles arisen from NATO sponsored sources, warfare, whether it be ancient or modern, hybrid or not, is always complex and can hardly be subsumed into a single adjective. Any effective strategy has to consider this heavyweight environment and find ways of its right control and navigation without contextual pruning.³⁰

²⁷ The title of the source – "Hybrid warfare in Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses" written by Andrew Radin in 2015 // URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf // Retrieved at 10.12.2017

²⁸ The title of the source - "Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: And What Can Be Done About It" edited by Christopher S. Chivvis in 2016 // Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2017. // URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf // Retrieved at 13.12.2018

²⁹ The title of the book - "NATO's Response to Hybrid Threats" written by distinguished analysts whose names were mentioned in each chapter of academic research // https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195405/fp_24.pdf // Retrieved at 13.12.2017

³⁰ The title of the article – "Hybrid war – does it even exist?" // NATO Review - 2016 // <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/> // Retrieved at 13.12.2017

Key aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Prior to pass to the literature review of signs, treatises, and possible fresh research over "new type" of war in Nagorno-Karabakh, it would be academically useful to make a brief overview of its key aspects. Why is this region so important? This question must be responded by more fresh and independent research, because of exuberance in the number of journals, books, and articles edited by one-sided or subjective authors and their possible directors. Unless there are fresh approaches, effective mediation and useful academic researches to the peaceful resolution of conflict, factors of hybrid warfare might rope into itself permanent tactical-operational re-engagement of neighboring countries as well. Unfortunately, the significance of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's peaceful resolution based on the fact that geopolitical games bisecting this region might be flamed up by new regional and even full-scale world war amidst leading powers of the international arena.

Unfortunately, the importance of Nagorno-Karabakh region is still being dated back to the deep centuries. Both major sides of conflict just adore making persistent flashbacks within deep historical frictions. Therefore, it is continuing to re-ignite those negative feelings and mutual disdain between representatives of these nations. Actually, Nagorno-Karabakh region became more important by the leap-up of post-WWI nationalism. Armenians were enticed by the West to get their dream-state on the Eastern Anatolia as a result of the collapse of Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, not only the West but also Armenians were encountered with opposite nationalism installed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Armenians had initiated anti-Turkish movements, crimes, pillages and mass casualties in order to hinder the consolidation of Turkey and finally were swept away in the majority from Anatolia. Aftermath, Nagorno-Karabakh region, Western part of Azerbaijan and Persia became a haven of Armenian minority. Totally speaking, one nation in the face of Armenians was caught by decentralization and dissemination almost over the world.

Indeed, the struggle of these two nations is too similar to one another, because both of them were fighting against Russian and Ottoman Empires. Even in the post-WWI period, there has been achieved an agreement. As a result, in May, 1918, after disorder of the Zakavkaskiy Seym upyt territories of South Caucasus strove for full independence, Azerbaijan has agreed to concede to Armenia, historically Azerbaijani city of Irevan (nowadays known as Yerevan), the National Council claimed that without Yerevan Armenia will have no real capital from now on. In return, Armenia agreed to discard all its claims on the mountainous section of Yelizavetpol

gubernia (around Ganja) and Nagorno-Karabakh region. According to Svante E. Cornell, the inception of a rigid phase of conflict was dealing with border delays within post-WWI peace negotiations. After incorporation of Transcaucasus into the body of Soviet Empire in 1920-1921, the borders amidst Azerbaijan, Armenia, and even Georgia were not determined immediately. The basic reason for the delay was dealt with the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan. The drawing of the border between these two nations was quite problematic. Originally the pendulum, appear, has shaken in favor of Armenia as the revolutionary committee of Soviet Azerbaijan in 1920 under the Soviet pressure has made the statement that Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan have been transferred to the Armenian control. That times Stalin who later became a commissar for nationalities made the decision public on December 2, but the Azerbaijani communist leader Nariman Narimanov then denied the transfer. Four months later, the pendulum swung back. On March 16th, 1921, an agreement between Republican Turkey and Soviet Russia determined that both regions were to be under the authority of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, in exception of Zangezur which was left within Armenia. In 1924, the Nakhichevan has obtained the status of an autonomous region (NASSR) whereas Nagorno-Karabakh had been granted the status of an Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).³¹ That is where we can also find out some signs of the real importance of Nagorno-Karabakh region and obvious reasons for ineludible conflict. Despite all drawbacks, it is quite apparent that even mere understanding of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as itself has undergone a lot of changes and tests completed by great powers en route achieving one's political goals. Correspondingly, the main aspects of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be enumerated as in following details:

a) Academic disputes over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh are still far away from modern provisions of International Law and not capable to escape from insisting of their own legitimacy and debates over latecomers;

b) Ethnic, psychological, religious and cultural factors of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were being undergone some transition periods as ("civil war" (within USSR) - "interstate war" (after collapsing of USSR), and, nowadays (an incomprehensible conflict impregnated with new factors of the hybrid warfare);

³¹ The title of the article – “Undeclared war: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reconsidered” written by Svante E. Cornell who holds Ph.D. at the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey // p. 2 // URL: http://isdpu.eu/content/uploads/images/stories/isdpu-main-pdf/1997_cornell_undeclared-war.pdf // Retrieved at 17.12.2017

Literature review

Due to the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh region with its legal and social status was far away from fresh research, associated with overviews on new types of warfare and its myriad impact on social behavior, lead current academic atmosphere to the vacuum of database simplicity mostly preferring by historians. Today, it is almost impossible to expose new governmental reports, books, projects and even articles based on deep academic research over fresh approaches and estimations for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While seeking those sort of secondary literature that would cover our expectations we have stumbled with a few amounts of books and articles partly related to the factors of hybridity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's strategical and operational parts. Frankly speaking, most of them were merely organized for overarching comparison of the military, cultural, economic, political and social status of conflicting sides, their historical prevalence over one another. There are still too little signs of legal appreciation for conflict's kinetic and new-tactical narratives. Probably, the earnest and the freshest launching of novel and distinguished interpretation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with some of its critical moments could be found in the book which was named quite differently with ambiguous contents. This is about "Oil Wars"³² edited by Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl, and Yahia Said that firstly was published by Pluto Press in 2007, London. Now, I would like to provide my thesis with an overview of its relating content which was called – “Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh”, written by Mary Henrietta Kaldor. She has got a title of Commander of the Order of British Empire and currently serving as Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also working as the Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit.³³

She is very popular with her New-Wars term, which was leaked into one's seminal book - "New and Old Wars". This book has basically altered the specter we understand contemporary war and conflict. In the context of globalization, this path-breaking book has shown that what we think of as war, that is to say, the war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence is becoming an anachronism. In its place is a new type of organized violence which could be described as a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights.

³² The title of the book – “Oil wars” edited by Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl and Yahia Said // URL: <http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page=165> // Retrieved at 22.12.2017

³³ The title of the source – The London School of Economics and Political Science: Marry Kaldor // URL: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchandexpertise/experts/profile.aspx?KeyValue=m.h.kaldor%40lse.ac.uk> // Retrieved at 22.12.2017

The actors are both global and local, public and private. The wars are fought for particularistic political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare. That is why she is considered to be one of the modern key contributors of "hybrid warfare" conception. Kaldor's analysis offers a basis for a cosmopolitan political response to these wars, in which the monopoly of legitimate organized violence is reconstructed on a transnational basis and international peacekeeping is reconceptualized as cosmopolitan law enforcement.³⁴ The case of Nagorno-Karabakh was described by Prof. Kaldor in a quite distinguished style, saturated even with some statistics over human casualties and massive crimes. It again endorses her vivid sensitivity to human rights violations. Nevertheless, it is already not secret almost for all of us how during two centuries this conflict has ditched the vast majority of innocent people from either side. Before the war in the early 1990s, Nagorno-Karabakh had a population of around 180,000. Since then, some 15–20,000 people have been killed and over a million people have been forced to flee their homes from Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as from the Nagorno Karabakh region.³⁵

Ms. Kaldor has also paid special attention to the new format of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by denoting it as a "New War". She has underscored that the war in Nagorno Karabakh is typical of a 'new war'. It cannot easily be categorized as 'international' or as 'civil'. Technically, it was 'civil' up until the collapse of the Soviet Union and became 'international' after the establishment of two independent states – Armenia and Azerbaijan. In practice, it is both local and global, involving a host of global actors such as Russian mercenaries, Armenian diaspora volunteers, and Afghan mujahideen, not to mention international agencies and NGOs like Christian Solidarity, chaired by Baroness Caroline Cox. Likewise, it cannot easily be categorized as state or non-state. The war involved fractions of the Soviet army, volunteer militias and paramilitary groups, and criminal gangs as well as the newly established armies of Azerbaijan, Karabakh, and Armenia. It is best explained in terms of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the struggle among competing networks for the remnants of the state apparatus. These networks used the ideology of extreme nationalism to mobilize popular support. As we see here, the first part of Kaldor's "New War" is mostly puffed up with the identification of strategical part

³⁴ The title of the book – "New and Old Wars" written by Mary Kaldor // Brief overview of book by Stanford University Press, 2007 // URL: https://books.google.ru/books/about/New_and_Old_Wars.html?id=XVgVstFi0XUC&redir_esc=y // Retrieved at 22.12.2017

³⁵ The title of the content – "Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh" written by Mary Kaldor, from the book "Oil wars" // p. 157 // URL: <http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page=165> // Retrieved at 22.12.2017

of the war, and she did not forget to categorize its ever-upgrading actors.³⁶ Notwithstanding, the lack of systemized analysis over particular efforts of these actors during the conflict and within post-conflict period was the main shortcoming of this part of the research. Undoubtedly, our thesis will contribute to this part of research through identification of mere factors of "hybrid warfare" by indicating and explaining of those particular efforts undertaken by major actors of conflict.

On the second phase, Prof. Kolder redirected us to the depiction of operational part of the conflict in the initial phases of Nagorno-Karabakh war a little before and after the collapse of Soviet Union. For her, a key event in the escalation of the conflict in 1989-94 was Operation Ring, carried out by the Soviet forces. Operation Ring involved units of the Soviet 23rd Motorised Rifle Division, together with Azeri special police OMON (Special Police Militia led by Rovshan Javadov) and internal security troops, in massive operations against Armenian villages near the border with Nagorno Karabakh in the north. Pursuant to Ms. Kaldor's consented idea with Eric Melander³⁷ 'officially, the purpose was to neutralize illegal guerrilla formations in the area; but in practice, Operation Ring amounted to systematic ethnic cleansing' (Melander 2001:68).³⁸ A Soviet observer noted that the tactics were very similar to those used by the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Hereinafter, we cannot be sure and academically convinced how it could be called a "systematic ethnic cleansing" without crystal-clear facts and at least a piece of internationally proven evidence to them, though it has simultaneously filtered and fastened by comparative analysis with the case of Soviet intervention in Afganistan. Even though concrete names of one of them were not indicated by Prof. Kaldor, in addition to former Soviet troops, many volunteer groups were formed. Some were criminal gangs. Others were fanatics. In Armenia, they were called "djogads" (hunter's groups) or "fedayeen", meaning fighters willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause. They were joined by volunteers from the American-Armenian diaspora. She has argued that on the Azerbaijani side, some independent entrepreneurs established their own brigades with Russian assistance. But actually, it was not a direct help by Russia, despite heavy weapons and artillery, which mostly were out of order, left in Ganja city of

³⁶ The title of the content – "Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh" written by Mary Kaldor, from the book "Oil wars" // p. 159 // URL:

<http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page=165> // Retrieved at 25.12.2017

³⁷ Eric Melander - Professor at Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden // <http://katalog.uu.se/profile/?id=AA106> // Retrieved at 22.02.2018

³⁸ The title of the content – "Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh" written by Mary Kaldor, from the book "Oil wars" // p. 161 // URL:

<http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page=165> // Retrieved at 25.12.2017

Azerbaijan. The most notorious was Suret Husseinov, who organized a coup against the nationalist President Elchibey in June 1993, which paved the way for the return to power of the veteran communist leader Heydar Aliyev. In addition, villagers organized themselves in self-defense units. These volunteer groups were complemented not by Russian mercenaries, but Chechens and Afghan mujahideen.³⁹ Reportedly, after a visit to Afghanistan by the Iranian Deputy Interior Minister in July 1993, some 1000 Afghan mujahideen from the Iranian backed Hezb-I-Wahdat were recruited (See Kechichian and Karasik, 1995). Both sides had access to equipment left behind by the departing Soviet forces, with Azerbaijan inheriting more material than Armenia. However, the Russian government ‘compensated’ Armenia for its supposed military inferiority in deals arranged between Presidents Lev Ter Petrosian and Boris Yeltsin, as came to light in evidence given to the Russian Duma in 1997. By the end of the war, both sides had established ‘real’ armies (Ter Petrosian, quoted in De Waal 2003). In Karabakh, the Minister of Defence, Serge Sarkisian, now Minister of Defence in Armenia, and the military commander, Samvel Babayan, were able to forge the various paramilitary groups into an effective fighting force. In Azerbaijan, Aliyev disbanded the independent brigades and established an army mainly based on inexperienced press-ganged recruits. Despite huge efforts, this force was not able to recover territory lost to the Karabakh army, which by the end of the war had succeeded in occupying a large part of Azerbaijan’s territory. In addition to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, it captured the territory connecting Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia, known as the Lachin corridor.⁴⁰ But, of course, tactical-operational part of conflict does not limit itself to aforementioned non-linear methods. Respectively, it has been evolving one’s character and hugely filled with other old factors of hybrid warfare, by simultaneity, fusion, multimodality, and criminality of one's nature.

In order to avoid any scarcity of relevant sources, it is quite necessary to dig out some fresh approaches from historical books and corresponding conflict's insightful analysis. Perhaps, the most notorious and objective history handbook of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still "Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War" (Oxford University Press, 2015), written by Prof. Thomas de Waal which has been translated into Armenian, Azeri, Russian, and

³⁹ The title of the article – “The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad” by Michael Taarnby 9/5/2008 // pp. 9-10 // URL: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/57530/WP%2020,%202008.pdf> // Retrieved at 07.12.2018

⁴⁰ The title of the content – “Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh” written by Mary Kaldor, from the book “Oil wars” // p. 162 // URL: <http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page=165> // Retrieved at 07.12.2018

Turkish. Tom de Waal is a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region. He is the author of numerous publications about the region.⁴¹ The palpable scientific variable of this book is quite remarkable in its depiction of facts and impregnable throughout one's comparative analysis. If 1988-1994 period was described as the clash of civil, ethnic and intrastate wars, chaotic operational movements, the verbiage of state apparatuses and as a cocktail of different non-linear methods en route achieving appropriate goals, the 1994-2001 was interpreted as "No war, no peace" period. The major goal and central point of our thesis to catch - where, when and why Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was being injected with newly-studied factors of "hybrid warfare". One moment was very peculiar, and it has been outlined by Prof. Waal that the high point of Heydar Aliev's presidency in Azerbaijan came in November 1997, when three months before, he had made a highly successful visit to Washington, where the Brezhnev-era veteran was feted by such former Cold Warriors as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger.⁴² Even this meeting was presented as a strengthening of the main export oil pipeline running from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, other hot topics such as the future of diplomatic negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and use of all possible methods for a peaceful bargain was on the agenda as well. The following paragraphs were mostly concentrated on conflict's strategical part, in particular, on the domestic and contr-state rivalries for power and governance. The role of mediators was used as a political instrument for the fortification of ruling parties from either side. That is where it was beginning to use some signs on factors of an Orthodox version of "hybrid warfare", which was called as "Gibridnaya voyna". The two sides struggled toward a compromise arrangement to be approved at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter) CSCE summit in Budapest in December 1994. The plan was to give the organization a mandate to create its first-ever international peacekeeping force, specifically for Nagorny Karabakh, in which the Russians would play a major, but not an exclusive, part. Azerbaijan seized this opportunity. The Russians had invited both presidents to come to Moscow before the Budapest meeting. Azerbaijani government sent its deputy foreign minister, Tofik Zulfugarov, ahead to elucidate what the agenda of the Moscow talks was to be. Mr. Zulfugarov said that he concluded the Russians were trying to undermine the coming agreement in Budapest. Aliev, therefore, pleaded illness and did

⁴¹ Thomas de Waal - is a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region // URL: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/experts/479> // Retrieved at 10.01.2018

⁴² The title of the book – “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (Oxford University Press, 2015),” // pp.252-253 // URL: <https://raufgray.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/0814719449.pdf> // Retrieved at 10.01.2018

not come to Moscow, causing Ter-Petrosian to stay away as well.⁴³ According to Zulfugarov: “If they had flown to Budapest from Moscow, no decision on deploying an international force would have been worked out.”⁴⁴ Undoubtedly, this book has played a very crucial role in constructing the roadmap of my academic research, at least, being hiddenly filled with some minor, but significant signs of "hybridity". Probably, the second most interesting fact was dealt with the fall of Levon Ter-Petrosian's efforts to make a braver plea in front of his nation for prosperous economic development of Nagorno-Karabakh region and peoples of either country. It was late, but even the most radical opposition members Vazghen Sargsyan and Karen Demirchian have put their consent on peaceful meditation and even some mutual concessions were discussed within the "Goble Plan" which was named in honor of a former U.S. State Department specialist on the Caucasus, Paul Goble, who had written a briefing paper in 1992 in which he proposed the idea of a territorial exchange to resolve the Karabakh dispute.⁴⁵ Basically, in return for Armenia's being given the “Lachin corridor” linking it to Nagorny Karabakh, Azerbaijan would receive a land corridor across Armenia's southern Meghri region connecting it with Nakhichevan.⁴⁶ But again, the problems arose from the deep operational part and radical Armenians from Diaspora did not let to such efforts to be realized. They have endorsed it with such "false patriotic" arguments as Armenian lands will not be sold out. As the most horrible result from all of this, we can use Waal's specially mentioned "massacres" when after the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visited Yerevan en route Istanbul, Vazghen Sargsyan, and Karen Demrichyan were assassinated. The fight for power was getting quite a perilous way.

This dangerous period had masterfully been interpreted by Prof. Svante E. Cornell who holds a Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University, a B.Sc. with High Honor in International Relations from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey, and an honorary doctoral degree from the Behmenyar Institute of Law and Philosophy of the National

⁴³ The title of the book – ““Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War” (Oxford University Press, 2015),” // pp.254-255 // URL: <https://raufrey.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/0814719449.pdf> // Retrieved at 15.01.2018

⁴⁴ Interview with Iskandarian, 1 December 2000. // from the primary sources of “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (Oxford University Press, 2015), written by Prof. Thomas de Waal // Retrieved at 15.01.2018

⁴⁵ Interview with Muradian, 5 May 2000. Muradian's high-up connections have stimulated speculation that he was working for the KGB. He, of course, denies it, although he does concede that one of his contacts was the Armenian KGB chief Yuzbashian. It does seem unlikely that the KGB would have recruited someone who did such sustained damage to the Party, the Soviet Union—and ultimately to the KGB as well // from the primary sources of “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (Oxford University Press, 2015), written by Prof. Thomas de Waal // Retrieved at 23.02.2018

⁴⁶ The title of the the book – ““Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War” (Oxford University Press, 2015),” // pp.263-264 // URL: <https://raufrey.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/0814719449.pdf> // Retrieved at 15.01.2018

Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan. He is also a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of Military Science. Currently, Dr. Cornell directs the Institute for Security and Development Policy and to be considered one of its co-founders. He is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, the Joint Center operated by Institute for Security and Development Policy (hereinafter ISDP) in cooperation with the American Foreign Policy.⁴⁷ Respectively, in his seminal "Report no. 46" edited in 1999 in the Department of East European Studies at the Uppsala University, Mr. Cornell has undoubtedly refreshed and enriched the literature over history and legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. What we have caught from this interesting report was dealt with its 7th paragraph. Here we can detect quite unique emblems of official documents which will separately be examined within primary sources of our research. The most influential one which held obviously a strategical struggle for power between conflicting sides was Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act. Unfortunately, today this document remained unexplored within the context of modern warfare types, in particular, by a discourse of "hybrid warfare". When we have underscored simultaneity within Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the idea was chiefly about a contemporaneous deployment of diplomatic and military efforts on each strategical and operational parts, but Section 907 has also propped up the co-existence of fusion and multimodality, whereas Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has encountered with the revelation of war's level and its qualification. According to the author, while the conflict was stretching by mutual strikes on authorities, trans-border political battlespaces of Azeri-Armenian hybrid confrontation reached even American Congress. In mid-1992, the Freedom Support Act that was a long-term programme of economic assistance to the former Soviet Union was enacted. It included a section, the by now infamous section 907(a), which prohibited all US assistance to Azerbaijan due to its 'blockade of Armenia'. The Congress implicitly defined Azerbaijan as the aggressor in the conflict and section 907 must be interpreted as a punishment to Azerbaijan for its policy. The act stipulated that "United States assistance may not be given to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh".^{48,49} In the

⁴⁷ Institute for Security and Development Policy // Biography of Prof. Cornell // URL: <http://isdpeu/people/svante-e-cornell/> // Retrieved at 20.01.2018

⁴⁸ The title of the source - The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Svante E. Cornell, Department of East European Studies // Report no. 46, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, 1999 // p. 99 // https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2012/MVZ208/um/35586974/Cornell_The_Nagorno-Karabakh_Conflict.pdf // Retrieved at 20.01.2018

initial phase, it was apparent Armenian political and diplomatic victory saturated by humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the Armenian organizations in the US took pride in their success but deplored their inability to curtail US assistance to Turkey. In the words of a leaflet from the Armenian Assembly of America, ‘with the help of our friends in Congress, we secured an \$85 million earmark in US assistance for Armenia in 1996...we are currently advocating for an increase to \$95 million in assistance for next year. We achieved our second legislative goal with the passage of the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act...which prohibits American foreign aid to any country that blocks the delivery of US Humanitarian assistance to a third country, is now the law of the land’.⁵⁰⁵¹ Azerbaijani response to this sort of Armenian hybrid method was a bit late but very mind-blowing. Herein, the hybridity of methods was hidden in the meshing up of geographical, geopolitical and economic factors. If Armenia was consuming its lobbyists' reputation in order to break enemy's psychological and legal prevalence, Azerbaijan has mixed one's future energy projects with Nagorno-Karabakh region and bound itself to the Western appetite that still seeks to get rid of energy dependence on Russia and the Middle East. Heydar Aliyev's ingenious plan was absolutely different from other post-Soviet dictatorships. He was very rough and even despotic on domestic issues but parallelly was overarchingly democratic and open-minded in one's foreign policy. Aliyev's strategy was clear: to attract a high level of private American interests in Azerbaijan, confident that this would increase the importance of the country in US foreign policy. In this strategy, Aliyev clearly counted on the influence of ‘Texas Oil’ in the domestic US politics, to counterbalance the Armenian lobby. Texas oil interests had a clear concern in attracting US attention to Azerbaijan for several reasons. First of all, the Caucasus and indeed Azerbaijan remained unstable areas, and there was at all times a risk involved in the multi-million dollar investments the oil companies undertook in the country. The fate of oil companies was increasingly tied to the fate of Aliyev's regime, as certain Azerbaijani opposition figures claimed they would renegotiate the contracts should they come to power. And, in turn, the stability of the Aliyev regime depended partly on eliminating threats to it from abroad — especially from circles in Russia; and secondly on the resolution of the Karabakh

⁴⁹ The title of the primary source - Freedom Support Act, Section 907(a), P.L. 102-511, 24 October 1992, effective January 1993 // URL: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-106/pdf/STATUTE-106-Pg3320.pdf // P.L. 102-511, 24 October 1992 // Retrieved at 20.01.2018

⁵⁰ Quoted in Thomas Goltz, A Montana Perspective on International Aid and Ethnic Politics in Azerbaijan, n.p. // Retrieved at 20.01.2018

⁵¹ The title of the primary source – “Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act”, on the prohibition of United States assistance to countries that prohibit or restrict the transport or delivery of the United States humanitarian assistance // URL: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104s230is/pdf/BILLS-104s230is.pdf> // 104th Congress, 1st Session, January 13, 1995 // Retrieved at 21.01.2018

conflict. The absence of a resolution to the conflict and the predominance of the Armenian position internationally could seriously threaten Aliyev's regime. Hence it was in the interest of the oil multinationals to engage the US government in Azerbaijan, thereby, first of all, increasing the security of the Aliyev's regime by increasing US stakes in the country, which in turn would lead to the US administration expressing its support for Aliyev. Moreover, involving the US in Azerbaijan entailed supporting the Azerbaijani attempts at removing section 907 from US legislation. Removal of section 907 would make the oil companies eligible for government-backed loans and financial assistance; more importantly, however, the US oil companies got clear signals from Baku that European or Middle Eastern oil firms might be favored over American ones if the ban persists.⁵²

Being on a plateau of its academic propaganda, Armenian political scientists did not prefer to compare the past and today of Nagorno-Karabakh War to the newly-emerged and ever-upgrading elements of Hybrid Warfare. As an example, we can call to witness of Sergey Minasyan's recent article ("Hybrid" vs. "Compound" War: Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict) under the auspice of PONARS Eurasia that is an international network of scholars advancing new approaches to research on security, politics, economics, and society in Russia and Eurasia which based at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (hereinafter IERES) at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. Currently, he is Deputy Director and Head of Political Studies Department at Caucasus Institute in Armenia. According to his article, it is futile to look for elements of Hybrid Warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh, explaining it with Azerbaijan's conservative position, especially relative to its modern defense system model. For him, the Azerbaijani leadership has kept in reserve the option of using large-caliber multiple-launch rocket systems and tactical missiles as a remote safeguard in case of any large-scale military hostilities. To this end, we do partially share the same position with him upon the simplification of Azeri leadership, but this idea does not matter for the obscure existence of hybridity from either side. He prefers to estimate a status quo as a "low-intensity conflict", but at the same time argues that within probable open full-scale conflict, especially in the tactical-operational part, here can be emerged bygone elements of hybrid warfare, such as re-deployment of Turkish "volunteers" of Special Military Groups without their own insignia or

⁵² The title of the source – "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict" by Svante E. Cornell, Department of East European Studies // Report no. 46, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, 1999 // pp. 102-103 // URL: https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2012/MVZ208/um/35586974/Cornell_The_Nagorno-Karabakh_Conflict.pdf // Retrieved at 23.01.2018

under Azeri military uniform.⁵³ Subsequently, it is inevitable not to reveal the lack of co-existed comparative analysis upon Russian military “volunteers” without or with the insignia of Armenian military uniforms. Altogether, these contradictions are surging a coexistence of more fresh hybrid warfare’s factors and their international correlation.

The last and technologically freshest source relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s tactical-operational part was written by Prof. Azad Garibov. He is a leading research fellow at the Foreign Policy Analysis Department of the Center for Strategic Studies (hereinafter SAM), (Baku, Azerbaijan) as well as editor-in-chief of the Istanbul based biannual academic journal - Caucasus International. He is also an adjunct faculty member of the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Khazar University (Azerbaijan) where he teaches EU related courses such as the EU in global politics, comparative politics of European countries, and basics of EU law. He received a BA in International Relations from Baku State University and an MSc in International Politics from the University of Glasgow (UK). Azad Garibov is a frequent contributor to various electronic and printed academic journals and newspapers, including Eurasia Daily Monitor, The National Interest, and the Journal of Turkish Weekly. He co-edited and co-authored the book ‘The Caspian Sea Chess-Board: Geopolitical, Geo-economic and Geostrategic Analysis’, published jointly by SAM and the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (Milan, 2014). His areas of interest include politics and security issues in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, trans-Eurasian energy and transport corridors as well as Caspian affairs.⁵⁴

Mr. Garibov should be considered as a new-thinker over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and must be differed from previous researchers. He has written a prolific article explaining the role of innovative military hardware in Nagorno-Karabakh's battlespaces. “Karabakh: A New Theater for Drone Warfare?” held not only the comparative character but also reveals a modern understanding of military confrontation and its role in international relations. The evidence was given on the basis of last and probably the most violent skirmish between Azerbaijan and Armenia in April 2016 after more than two decades of "no war, no peace period". One the distinctive features of the recent escalation, which has come to be known as the “Four Day War,”

⁵³ The title of the article - “Hybrid” vs. “Compound” War: LESSONS FROM THE UKRAINE CONFLICT // PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 401 November 2015 // Sergey Minasyan, Caucasus Institute (Yerevan) // URL: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/PePm401_Minasyan_Nov2015.pdf // Retrieved at 25.01.2018

⁵⁴ Azad Garibov is a leading research fellow at the Foreign Policy Analysis Department of the SAM Center for Strategic Studies (Baku, Azerbaijan) as well as editor-in-chief of the Istanbul based biannual academic journal Caucasus International. // URL: http://www.cife.eu/en/4/azad-garibov_161-1 // Retrieved at 25.01.2018

was the extensive use of sophisticated military hardware, including unmanned aerial vehicles (hereinafter UAV) or "Kamikaze drones", for surveillance and reconnaissance missions, as well as for use in ground attacks. In fact, the Karabakh conflict may be the first-ever inter-state armed conflict in which drones have been deployed on specifically combat missions. While reports of downed enemy drones in and around Karabakh have been fairly commonplace in recent years, the deployment of UAVs to the so-called "Line of Contact" (hereinafter LoC) received ample media coverage only after the recent fighting. According to Azeri local media coverage, Azerbaijan has downed three Armenian drones since the beginning of April, one of which was destroyed during the Four Day War, while two others were shot out of the sky in the following weeks (Azvision.az, April 7, Ann.az, April 19). Armenia claimed it had downed ten Azerbaijani UAVs during the four days of fighting, but only two cases were confirmed to date with video and photos (Ng.ru, April 22). Pursuant to author's standpoint, if the 1991–1994 war was fought with mostly insurgent tactics, a possible new war in Karabakh promises to be a conflict of modern weaponry, in which having a technological edge over the enemy and effectively deploying sophisticated military hardware could be crucial in defining the outcome of operations. Drone deployment is one of those fields where Azerbaijan currently has an ostensible edge over its rival. Although Azerbaijan was the major employer of drones in the recent fighting, the relatively higher "casualty rate" among Armenian UAVs could be explained by their technological inferiority. Azerbaijan's economic capabilities (the country's \$4.8 billion military spending for 2015 dwarfed Armenia's \$447 million military budget—Bloomberg, April 6) have enabled it to create a much larger and technologically superior drone fleet. Azerbaijan also remains to be better at mastering the effective deployment of UAVs in actual combat, as proven by the increasing precision of its strikes on enemy positions and improved operational command in the battlefield.⁵⁵

Review of primary sources: Thematic analysis of the official documents

Initially, it is useful to specify those more engaged primary sources, related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's hybrid aspects, in two different levels: a) international and b) domestic official documents infiltrated as an input to the process of the conflict itself that is still being born by too complicated and highly hybrid outputs. After the collapse of Soviet Union

⁵⁵ The title of the article - "Karabakh: A New Theater for Drone Warfare?" // Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 92 by Azad Garibov // URL: <https://jamestown.org/program/karabakh-a-new-theater-for-drone-warfare/> // Retrieved at 25.01.2018

domestically confirmed official governmental documents⁵⁶⁵⁷ of USSR lost almost all their legal imperatives. Aftermath, they were being altered by internationally recognized and unanimously adopted resolutions, communique, memorandums and etc. The main reason for this sort of changes was the upgrading nature of international relations and the inception of multi-polar world strengthened by a socio-political interconnectedness and an economic interdependence. Since the dissolution of USSR up-today, there had been adopting for more than twenty substantial international documents dedicated to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Hereinafter, our task will be binding on whether international or domestic official documents that hold mere, but simultaneously, concealed factors of threat adorned by the new hybrid warfare concept.

The hybrid fight, which in this case has been interpreted as “gibridnaya voyna” for supremacy between conflicting bureaucracies, has begun even in the strategical part of the full-scale war in 1992 and scattered its products all over battlespaces whether diplomatic or military. In that times, the newly-emerged Republic of Armenia was very strong with its "lobbyists" on the diplomatic field of war. They had quite influential socio-political powerpoints in the heart of such international actors as the United States, France and Russian Federation that was a succeder of USSR in the legal, political, economic and socio-cultural phenomenon of an international community. The fact that strategical part of conflict faced its first mutual hybrid challenges can be affirmed by 907 section of U.S. Freedom Support Act issued in 1992. It was officially called as “Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act” assisted by such pro-Armenian organizations as U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation in the highest consideration with the Armenia School Connectivity Program and adopted by the United States Congress without even one objection on August 6, 1992.⁵⁸ Section 907 was dedicated to the U.S. official governmental restriction on assistance to Azerbaijan. It has been juridically kept under the law as follow:

⁵⁶ The title of the official decree "On establishment of the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast" of the Azerbaijan Central Executive Soviet Committee of July 7th, 1923 // URL: <http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/History/HistDocs/Documents/en/06.pdf> // Retrieved at 29.01.2018

⁵⁷ The status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan SSR was stipulated in the Constitutions of the USSR of 1936 and 1977. In accordance with the Constitutions of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR, the legal status of the NKAO was governed by the Law “On the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast”, which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR on 16 June 1981 following its submission by the Soviet of People’s Deputies of the NKAO. As a national territorial unit, the NKAO enjoyed a form of administrative autonomy, and, accordingly, had a number of rights, which, in practice, ensured that its population’s specific needs were met. Under the Constitution of the former USSR, the NKAO was represented by five deputies in the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was represented by 12 deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR // <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/812> // Retrieved at 30.01.2018

⁵⁸ The title of the primary source – “Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992” // p.1 // URL: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-106/pdf/STATUTE-106-Pg3320.pdf> // Retrieved at 30.01.2018

"United States assistance under this or any other Act (other than assistance under title V of this Act) may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh."⁵⁹

Only in 2002, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Act that would ensure the President of U.S. with the ability to waive Section 907.⁶⁰ As a result, there were in an orderly way adopted four waivers of section 907 (in 2002⁶¹, 2003⁶², 2004⁶³, 2005⁶⁴) of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 under the George W. Bush administration. All these waivers were adopted under the following principles:

- a) the necessity to support U.S. efforts to counter international terrorism;
- b) to promote the operational readiness of U.S. Armed Forces or coalition partners to counter international terrorism;
- c) to ensure Azerbaijan's border security;
- d) not to undermine or to hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia;

Yes, it is too apparent that all efforts made by Armenian lobby to keep in force this section and Azerbaijan's ex-president Heydar Aliyev's strict foreign policy to avert the commitments of it was a pure confirmation of an orthodox "gibridnaya voyna" in the strategical part of the conflict for the primacy between governing authorities of either side. In 1992, Heydar Aliyev was leading the New Azerbaijan Party in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic which

⁵⁹ The title of the primary source – "Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992" // p.38 // URL: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-106/pdf/STATUTE-106-Pg3320.pdf> // Retrieved at 30.01.2018

⁶⁰ The title of the primary source - "Foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations act" // URL: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ115/html/PLAW-107publ115.htm> // Retrieved at 30.01.2018

⁶¹ The title of the primary source - "Memorandum for the Secretary of State", January 25, 2002, // Presidential Determination No. 2002-06 // URL: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2002-02-08/pdf/02-3264.pdf> // Retrieved at 30.01.2018

⁶² The title of the primary source - "Presidential Determination on Extending Waiver of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act With Respect to Assistance to the Government Of Azerbaijan" // Presidential Determination No. 2003-12 // URL: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2003-01-27/pdf/03-1894.pdf> // Retrieved at 02. 02.2018

⁶³ The title of the primary source - "Extension of Waiver of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act with Respect to Assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan" // Presidential Determination: No. 2004-18 // URL: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/2003/27664.htm> // Retrieved at 02.02.2018

⁶⁴ The title of the primary source - "Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Extension of Waiver of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act with respect to Assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan" // Presidential Determination No. 2005-18 // URL: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050113-10.html> // Retrieved at 03.02.2018

was a landlocked exclave of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nakhichevan was in a blockade as well, because Armenian military forces kept separated this exclave in order to attain tactical and operational prevalence over Azerbaijan. Despite all these artificial barricades, Mr. Aliyev was deeply engaged in Baku's internal fight for supremacy over the whole country and finally got what he struggled for. Unfortunately, American double standards could not pass away Nakhichevan's blockade, but again Mr. Aliyev was very strong and in that time-freezing moment he got "impossible humanitarian aid" from the USA and convinced them to look through parallel and more real Armenian blockade of Nakhichevan. Unsurprisingly, when Mr. Aliyev was asked by Ms. Betty Blair about his feelings and personal opinion for newly-elected American President, Bill Clinton, ex-president has responded as follow:

"I'll never forget his reply to my request for help when I was Speaker of Parliament of Nakhchivan. When he became President, I sent a Congratulatory Letter to him explaining the difficult situation that existed for us in the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan because of the Armenian blockade. Immediately, he organized a planeload of aid and sent it to us."⁶⁵

After adoption of 907 Section of U.S. Freedom Support Act, not only Heydar Aliyev with small authority in Nakhichevan but also capital, Baku controlled by Azerbaijan Popular Front immediately reacted and called this document as an unfair policy of American double standards. This fact endorses another internal hybridity of strategies used by Heydar Aliyev to defeat current authorities from Baku and to regain control over the country. There is another crucial document that leads us to the deep insight of time-worn and yet inactive factors of hybrid warfare within a tactical-operational level which was labeled as terrorism and criminal activities for supervising of conflict's economy, illegal trade with natural sources, looting, smuggling and achievement of short-time political goals. They were wielding the same multimodality, simultaneity and catastrophic dimensions of Frank G. Hoffman's hybrid warfare. These factors were caught by myself in a "Letter dated 9 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General" signed personally by Ambassador Permanent Representative, Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev.⁶⁶ In Appendix to this letter, I

⁶⁵ Azerbaijan International Editor, Betty Blair, interviews President Heydar Aliyev in New York, upon his first visit to the United States, September 30, 1994, // URL: https://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24_folder/24_articles/24_aliyevinterview.html // Retrieved at 05.02.2018

⁶⁶ The title of the official document – "Letter dated 9 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", from documents of International Organizations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, pp. 357 – 363 // MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN DEPARTMENT FOR ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES // URL:

was again able to refresh my memory by atrocious evidence of "Armenian terrorism" which time-by-time became conflict's psychological breaking moment and periodically kept conflict's operational level in the highest degree of hybridity. Aftermath, it led even to the involvement of many illegal paramilitaries, such terrorists as Shamil Basayev, Monte Melkonian and other paid soldiers from Lebanon, Iran, Russia, Afganistan, and Turkey. Within thematical analysis of this letter I have encountered with the following paragraph:

“There are more than sufficient facts which expose the methods of nefarious fabrications used by the Armenian propaganda, and these have repeatedly been brought to the attention of the international community. Suffice it to recall the famous interview of 15 December 2000 with President Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia, who in answer to the question as to whether things could have happened differently and whether he had any regrets about the deaths of thousands of people as a result of Armenian attacks against Azerbaijani civilians, frankly said that he “has absolutely no regrets”, since “such upheavals are necessary, even if thousands have to die”.⁶⁷⁶⁸

In lieu of to collect repeating word combinations, the thematical analysis as a very strong method indulges us to entitle even this small paragraph as “Azerbaijani view of Armenian propaganda”. Even this official standpoint on propaganda and its role and capacity within conflict empowers the role of mutual assessments on it as the main guideline to the ever-changing factors of hybrid warfare. This sort of propaganda activities are still being considered and disseminated by Armenian diplomats within Collective Security Treaty Organization Parliament Assembly (hereinafter CSTO PA) inter-parliamentary hearings. For instance, former member of PA (hereinafter MP) Arman Saghatelyan who was also serving as Press Secretary of the President of the Republic of Armenia told the reporters at the hearing of CSTO on “Issues of effectively countering collective security system to hybrid wars in the contemporary circumstances” that he believes during this whole period Armenia has acted successfully and properly pursued its interests. Speaking about the 2016's April war and the work done in that period, he stated that we can state that we are in a better position than Azerbaijan, which is an

<http://mfa.gov.az/files/media/Documents%20of%20international%20organizations%20on%20the%20Armenia-Azerbaijan%20conflict.pdf> // Retrieved at 05.02.2018

⁶⁷ The name of document – “DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT”, “Letter dated 9 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”, pp. 358 – 359 // MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN DEPARTMENT FOR ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES // <http://mfa.gov.az/files/media/Documents%20of%20international%20organizations%20on%20the%20Armenia-Azerbaijan%20conflict.pdf> // Retrieved at 09.04.2018

⁶⁸ See also URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/24/president-interview-andtragic-anniversary/%209vpa> // Retrieved at 05.02.2018

encouraging fact.⁶⁹ It was one of those ever-upgrading facets of propaganda based on an underestimation and humiliation of defensive capacity of the enemy in front of members of the military block that is far away from Azerbaijan's interests and contemporary foreign policy. Mr. Saghatelyan also underscored that there is a necessity for the CSTO member states to possess unified approaches and methods to face the challenges in hybrid wars because for him it is obvious that military component is gradually losing its position to such forms of influence as cyber attacks and information-psychological factors. Additionally, Former Defence Minister of Armenia, Vagharshak Harutyunyan, in attendance of the discussion, highlighted that the hybrid warfare is backed by the military power of a state.⁷⁰

He stated that “If a country lacks military power, it cannot run a hybrid war. As far as Armenia is concerned, we have managed to ensure our security for 25 years in spite of the fact that Azerbaijan poses a military threat to us and has petrodollars. Regardless of its powerful economic potential, that country is unable to solve the problems it is facing. This comes to show that the Armenian side is able to ensure its security with all methods, starting from military to non-military channels.” This sort of statements issued by Armenian officials confirms the fact that propaganda and its new forms usually fastened by “fake news” and “cyber attacks”⁷¹ even today might be a very crucial factor of hybridity within conflict and it can rope other parties as well.⁷²

⁶⁹ From the news issued by Armenian online news agency “Panorama.am” // “Karabakh conflict has always featured hybrid warfare elements” // URL: <https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2017/09/30/Karabakh-conflict-hybrid-warfare/1842846> // Retrieved at 05.02.2018

⁷⁰ From the news issued by Armenian online news agency “Panorama.am” // “Karabakh conflict has always featured hybrid warfare elements” // URL: <https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2017/09/30/Karabakh-conflict-hybrid-warfare/1842846> // Retrieved at 05.02.2018

⁷¹ The mutual cyber attacks were increased after a military helicopter of the Armenian armed forces was shot down by Azerbaijani servicemen in the airspace of Azerbaijan, said Faig Farmanov, Head of the Electronic Security Center under the Communications and Information Technologies Ministry // URL: <https://www.azernews.az/nation/73378.html> // Retrieved at 09.02.2018

⁷² From the news on CSTO’s inter-parliamentary hearings on “Issues of effectively countering collective security system to hybrid wars in the contemporary circumstances” // URL: <https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2017/09/30/Karabakh-conflict-hybrid-warfare/1842846> // Retrieved at 09.02.2018

Research approach: Hypotheses of the study

In modern academic circles of international relations, new concepts, fresh theories, and novel ideas are persistently being encountered with drastic criticism. Therefore, it will not be able to fully get rid of obstacles within one's academic implementation. Undoubtedly, hybrid warfare concept has already been attached to many conflict studies and even oversimplified in its rational juxtaposition. By being cautious about it, we will devote ourselves to use deductive research approach in order to confirm one's hypotheses emerged as a result of critical observation over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The major reason is based on the uniqueness of deductive approach which will explore a known "hybrid warfare concept" and test its validity in given circumstances. It has been admitted that "the deductive approach pursues the path of logic most tightly. The reasoning starts with a concept and leads to new hypotheses. These hypotheses are put to the test by confronting them with observations that lead to their confirmation.

When we used to examine key aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has already been underlined that significance of this region is being partially neglected. Despite one fact that, there are a plenty of academic treatises that focused on a revelation of the regional importance of Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflict is still being involved in an interlaced stalemate. By observing old and new factors of "hybrid warfare" in conflict's both strategical and tactical-operational parts, we came to the following hypotheses:

a) Factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are rapidly evolving and it damages domestic & foreign policies of either side;

b) Strategical and operational parts of conflict are differing from each other but come together in their ultimate aims and pave the way for the most complexed belligerency within hybrid warfare norms;

c) The mediation and peace-building efforts of influential actors and international organizations remain weak, dormant and ineffective against future threats of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

d) Without a productive mediation process, for the peaceful resolution of conflict, and internationally recognized, unanimously signed and legally tested peace treaty based on mutual interests, it will almost be impossible to eschew those new factors of hybrid warfare which might rope into itself permanent tactical-operational re-engagement of neighboring countries as well;

Research Questions

As well as in every academic research, arisen hypotheses of our critical observation over appropriate circumstances should also be interrogated. Though there is one common research question related to the exposure of factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we would interrogate our hypotheses by following sub-questions of research:

a) Why is this region so important for the international community and how a new full-scale war might destabilize future regional, and followingly, global integrational processes? Critical response is striving through almost every chapter of research by indicating the following hypotheses which endorse a rapid evolving of factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Being an inseparable part of South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh region intersects with the nearest borders of such internationally very crucial energy projects as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, TANAP (hereinafter Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) etc., and again with such internationally-backed integrational projects as TACIS (hereinafter Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) and TRACECA (hereinafter Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia). It seems an international community is still not aware of a danger of losing the easiest connection between Europa and Asia with a possible full-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh region. Historically, it is not a secret or a novelty how one small region could be a reasonable subject for the new World Wars. It sounds very rigid but the reality is not escapable. The new dangerous factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can easily rope into itself other neighboring countries as well, even by the creation of new military blocks and systems. Consequently, it will not be possible to way back from simmering battlespaces of the possible New Hybrid World War;

b) Do the factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict prevent its peaceful resolution? Almost in every step of peaceful mediation process within Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1994 armistice, we would stumble with artificial or derivative obstacles. Aftermath, these obstacles stood up in the epicenter of hybrid strategies and tactics of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the second empirical chapter of our thesis, we will find out these strategies and tactics by making a comparative flashback to the historical background of conflict's kinetic and apathetic facets within international mediation process, mostly leading by OSCE MG;

c) What is the best choice to eschew these factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: full-scale war or peace treaty? Alternative propositions for the peaceful resolution of the conflict will also be explored within both the theoretical and the empirical

chapters of our research, by modeling the position of these motions for peace and prosperity within a relevant system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and making comparative analysis amidst various alternative conflict models on peaceful resolution;

Methods of the study

Within structural designing of every academic research, it is necessary to point out the methodology used to come to the general hypotheses accompanied by critical interrogation of observing facts. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, our observations came to the aforementioned hypotheses by using following methods:

- a) Thematic analysis of primary sources: Though it is a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns within data⁷³, it will go beyond simply counting phrases or words in the texts of official governmental documents and moves onto identifying implicit and explicit ideas which will hold old&new factors of hybrid warfare within the primary sources. Thematic analysis is a widely used method of analysis in qualitative research and allows for the rich, detailed and complex description of existing data;
- b) System modeling: In order to prove a dichotomy of hybrid warfare factors in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's strategical and tactical-operational parts, it is necessary to dig out its system model which will be analyzing in the 1st Chapter of our thesis. Consequently, we will be able to achieve a hybridity over conflict's nature by rebuilding up its inputs (which are the aspects, basically demands and supports, that go into the system. These are the things that are needed to use, create, or maintain the system), a process (that will be painting what happened, happens and will be able to happen), outputs (which will be focused on what comes out of the system. What is the result of using the system? Which sort of decisions and actions of a system must be proportioned with the factors of hybrid warfare?), and feedback (that will characterize what monitors, controls or might destroy the system by a mixture of arisen drawbacks. How do we know the system is working or not? How do we make changes to the system? How does the system control itself?);
- c) Comparative analysis of alternative conflict models for a peaceful resolution: This method will also be used in the 2nd Chapter of our thesis and will be bound by

⁷³ The name of source – “How to use thematic analysis”, Braun and Clarke (2006), p.79 // Retrieved at 10.02.2018

empirical data of research. The special goal will be to find out full academic response how to get rid of dangerous factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh and how to reach its peaceful resolution by comparing alternative conflict models;

Limitations of the study

Prior to commencing systematic analysis of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in order to reveal old and new factors of hybrid warfare that mostly being infiltrated by inputs into the process itself, it is necessary to delimit the boundaries of our research by academic feedback arisen from outputs of hybrid process within a conflict. This thesis is hugely dedicated to the revelation of the factors of hybrid warfare which has already been defined and academically made crystal-clear in its destination. The main idea will be framed within this academic definition in order to propose the alternative methods for the attaining of finite peace and prosperity between two conflicting nations, Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The achieving of internationally guaranteed, accompanied and recognized peace treaty, at least, will be the best resolution of mutual national hatreds based on obnoxious, thorny, newly-enhanced, hugely-developed and technologically upgraded factors of hybrid warfare.

Chapter 1. The system modeling of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The system modeling of conflicts as a traditional method for understanding of political, military-technological, economic, social, psychological, legal and cyber natures and behavior of interstate struggles was chiefly connected and even arisen from "systems theory" in political sciences firstly conceived by David Easton. In his most sensational academic work "The political system: An inquiry into to the state of the political science", Dr. Easton has academically cleared out that political science has lacked a systematic theoretical scheme which would give meaning, coherence, and direction to research. The main idea was dealt with separation between social and political activities, at least for analytical purposes, and examine it as though for the moment it were a self-contained entity surrounded by, but clearly differentiated from, the environment or setting in which it operates. Easton's system is being alive because of its inputs of various kinds. These inputs will be transformed by process of the system to outputs, and it, in turn, has got results both for the system and for the environs in which there is still an existing system.⁷⁴

Systems theory became popular not only within political science but also has contributed greatly to the development of peace and war-related studies. It has created collateral academic stream within conflict studies and assisted the freshest approach to its distinguished analysis. Originating approximately in the same period, each of these scientific movements has influenced the other to a degree that may seem astonishing to outsiders, and both have been divided by a fierce methodological dispute. The parallel development has yielded several overlaps, among which an interesting coincidence can be observed. Despite David Easton's bravest theoretical inception, a number of the founders of General Systems Theory were also the forerunners of peace and conflict studies. On the basis of universal ethical motivations, the first peace researchers attempted to create holistic methodologies and more detailed models enabling humanity to identify, and eventually to control, the processes leading to the outbreaks of war.⁷⁵ Similar activities, albeit subdued by the political goals, were also carried out in government-sponsored strategic studies centers, where so-called systems analysis was elaborated. Numerous


⁷⁴ "The political system: An inquiry into to the state of the political science" by David Easton // New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953.-xiii, p. 320 // Retrieved at 19.02.2018

⁷⁵ The names and academic works of leading founders of General Systems Theory is available to be viewed in the seminal article called "The History and Status of General Systems Theory" edited by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy // The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, General Systems Theory (Dec. 1972), pp. 407-426 // Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/255139> // Published by Academy of Management, DOI: 10.2307/255139 // Retrieved at 19.02.2018

obfuscations have been made at the introduction of mathematical models in peaceful researches. The relation varied from a naive charm up to absolute denial.⁷⁶

Using D. Easton's combination of political activity within one system which is separated from social life, we would also merge all actions within the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under the same system which also exists because of its inputs, the core process, and the final outputs. In comparison with the system of D. Easton, in our case, it is almost impossible to separate completely the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from social life, because of the high level of hybrid warfare factors, all these actions within the conflict are already bound. Despite all shortcomings, we will be able to model the system of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, trying to find the high degree of hybridity and its excessive negative consequences for the character of the conflict. The alternative system modeling of conflict will be constructed on the basis of David Easton's systems theory as follow:

Figure 1.




In our case, we will put in the center not the political system, but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself. The basic idea will be binding chiefly with methodological benefit from system modeling of political environment that will be replaced with the system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The positive result will be attained with academic clarification, proof of gaps and high

⁷⁶ "Applications of Systems Modelling in Peace Research" by Czesław Mesjasz // Abstract // Retrieved at 19.02.2018

level of hybrid warfare factors which are still wielding potential danger that might lead to whether the full crash of the system or its total replacement with another complicated one:

Figure 2.



For detection of hybrid warfare factors, it is a very energetic method to make up a systematic layout of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Talking more about its inputs, it is very significant to differ them from demands and support derived from initial effects of those inputs that time-by-time became a primary entrance to the system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The freshest and probably the most violating inputs of this conflict should be considered following historical facts:

- A) a civil war between Azeri and Armenian population (within USSR) for the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region that was under the jurisdiction of USSR from the 1920s up to 1991, with the status of the autonomous oblast. It is no secret that Armenians as a populace and even by their high-stand diplomats or representatives in state apparatus of USSR, many years were struggling for the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh region;

- B) a full-fledged interstate war after the collapse of USSR from 1991 to 1994. Even, we have already proven the old and not examined or maybe neglected factors of hybrid warfare within this wartime period by crucial primary sources, it is too obligatory to analyze post-war period and its contribution to the system;
- C) a post-war period, from 1994 to the end of the 1990s, encompassed by diplomatic chivvy that ended up with the crash of peaceful negotiations and with the criminal alteration of the peace-pursuing Armenian government;
- D) No war, no peace period saturated by contagious, new factors of hybrid warfare, from the beginning of the 2000s up to 2016s April war. This period was too passive and ineffective that mostly paved a pathway to the more accelerated enhancement of those hybrid warfare factors and deepened mutual national hatred between Azeris and Armenians;

1.1.The history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

As in every conflict between two or more nations, the basic questions usually derived from the context of territorial embracement of so-called “firstcomers”. Historically, it is very difficult even now to determine the real percentage of national identities perpetuating by local tribes of South Caucasus. Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan had been filling with a plenty of different national minorities for more than thousands years ago. The vast majority of autochthons were Caucasian Albanians that were initially far away from Christianity and Islam and held their own religions that were called as Zoroastrianism and fire worship.⁷⁷ For instance, in modern Azerbaijan, it is still popular to be called as a "land of fire".

Probably the most interesting and objective commencement to the academic analysis of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict history has been done by pro-Armenian anthropologist Nora Dudwick who has specialized on the South Caucasus. She has encountered with several academic impediments which were mentioned in her seminal article "The case of the Caucasian Albanians: Ethnohistory and ethnic politics", where two aspects of the accompanying public discussion were very problematic. First, such discussions frequently began by a recital of the events of almost two millennia ago. Second, they were accompanied by such Armenian accusations as the Azerbaijanis had "falsified history" in order to appropriate Armenian lands,

⁷⁷ Read the essays on the history and culture of Caucasian Albania: IV century. BC - VII century. AD written by K.V. Trever, Kamilla Vasilievna

culture, and history. Pursuant to her ideas, this polemic between Armenian and Azerbaijani scholars suggests something about the role of ethnographers and ethnography in the Soviet Union. The transmutation of political into academic discourse was encouraged by the responsibility of Soviet ethnography to convey a sense of ethnic harmony within the family of Soviet peoples. When interethnic and inter-republic tensions were denied free political expression, conflicts could be projected into the past and fought on the pages of academic journals. Disagreements between the Armenian and Azerbaijani versions of their general history also reflect more shipped project. For each person, this project consists in the definition of the personality for the future by means of concrete interpretation of the past.⁷⁸

According to official Azeri sources, Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the ancient regions of Azerbaijan, that was existing even within the Caucasian Albania. The name of this inseparable part of Azerbaijan consists of two different Azerbaijani words: "gara" (black) and "bag" (garden). The word Karabakh given by the Azerbaijan nation to a part of their native lands was used for the first time 1,300 years ago (in the 7th century).⁷⁹ At first, Karabakh was used as a historical-geographical definition, but it later transformed to cover a larger geographical area. By the way, this aspect is very typical for Azerbaijan: Nakhchivan city - Nakhchivan region, Sheki city - Shaki region, Ganja city - Ganja region, Lenkoran city- Lenkoran region and etc. When Karabakh is a subject of disputes, at first, there is being derived a question of the location of Karabakh. What part of Azerbaijan includes Karabakh? The academic reply to this question is still carrying very huge significance, and it is necessary to understand the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh prepared by Armenians. The academics and researchers of the Institute of History named after A.Bakykhanov of ANAS addressed themselves to the origins in order to answer the question. When Karabakh khanate of Azerbaijan included this territory its regent Mirza Jamal Javanshir in consideration of this question in his work the "History of Karabakh" wrote: "According to the ancient historical books the frontiers of Karabakh are: from the south the river Araz - from Hudapharin Bridge to Sinig Bridge.⁸⁰ At present, the population of Gazah, Shamseddin and Demerchi-Hesently lives near this bridge and Russian Tatars call it using the Russian term "Krasniy Most" that is the Red Bridge. From the east - the Kur River, which flows

⁷⁸ Dudwick Nora. The case of the Caucasian Albanians: Ethnohistory and ethnic politics. In: Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, vol. 31, n°2-3, Avril-Septembre 1990. Regards sur l'anthropologie soviétique. p. 377 // URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/cmr_0008-0160_1990_num_31_2_2237 // Retrieved at 25.02.2018

⁷⁹ From the New Azerbaijan Party's online interpretation on the etymology, territory, and borders of Karabakh // URL: <http://www.yap.org.az/en/view/pagetabs/1> // Retrieved at 25.02.2018

⁸⁰ The title of the article – "KARABAKH: Etymology, territory and borders" // Institute of History named after A.Bakykhanov of ANAS // URL: <http://www.yap.org.az/en/view/pagetabs/1> // Retrieved at 25.02.2018

into the Araz River in Javad village and flows into the Caspian Sea. From the north - the Goran River, which flows from the Yelizavetpol frontier of Karabakh to the Kur River, crosses it in many parts and riches of the Araz River. From the west - the high mountains of Karabakh called Kusbek, Salvarti, Erikli. Such a detailed description of the territory and frontiers of Karabakh at the first stages of Russian occupation and colonization are explained by the following factors: 1) this fact is described by an official person directly connected with the government of Karabakh, in other words, this fact is reflected in an official document composed by an official representative of Russia; 2) on the other hand this fact is not only based at practices and realities, but it also finds reflection in the references. It is not occasional that ancient books are used to prove the position of Mirza Jamal. There was a general definition of Karabakh, which was not used only for Daghlig Garabagh, but for both mountainous and plain parts. In other words, the word combination of "Daglig Garabag"(Mountainous Karabakh) is a product of the subsequent periods, the name given to one of the parts of Karabakh as a result of separatist intentions. According to afore-initiated Azeri standpoint, even an ordinary logic proves this fact: If there is "Daglig Garabag" then there must be flat or low-lying Karabakh too. The reality is that there are both Daghlig Garabagh and Low-lying Karabakh (that is flat Karabakh) in Azerbaijan. And always both low-lying (flat) and Daglig (mountainous) Karabakh during all historical periods were the motherland of one nation - the nation of Azerbaijan, the nation who has in its language the words "gara" and "bag". Hundreds of the most ancient and rarest models of folklore, which are the brilliant musical pearls of the nation of Azerbaijan, were created in Karabakh and are related to Karabakh.⁸¹

On the other hand, Armenian scholars claim that Albania (not to be confused with the modern state of Albania) covered a relatively small territory north of the Kura river. They also argue that Utik (the Armenian name of the territory that covered low-lying Karabakh and territories of modern Gazah-Tovuz-Shamkir regions of Azerbaijan⁸²), Artsakh (the name of Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia⁸³) and Siunik (according to the "geography of the VII century in Armenia", "Sunik" consisted of 12 provinces, but sources of Southern Syunik are also referred to as modern Zangazur city of Azerbaijan⁸⁴) the disputed provinces south of the Kura , were

⁸¹ From the article edited by Institute of History named after A.Bakykhanov of ANAS and published in the official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan // URL: <http://mfa.gov.az/content/801> // Retrieved at 03.03.2018

⁸² The Soviet Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. IX, p.469, article: Uti // Retrieved at 03.03.2018

⁸³ The name of Nagorno-Karabakh region has also been indicated in the article edited by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the "Artsakh" // <http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/> // Retrieved at 03.03.2018

⁸⁴ Zangezour - article from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (3rd edition) // Retrieved at 03.03.2018

ethnically Armenian, and had been part of the Armenian kingdom of the Ervanids since the fourth century BC. They also underline other historical moments as well as the partition of "Greater Armenia" between Byzantium and Iran, in 387 AD. According to them, in 428, the Sassanids reorganized their Transcaucasian territories into the three regions of Iberia, Albania, and Armenia, and Albania was administratively strengthened by the addition of Utik and Artsakh. Only then Albania came to include territory on both sides of Kura river. By not mentioning historical de-ethnicization of Albanian tribes by Armenian clergy, modern Armenian historians mostly pay attention to an alphabet that was allegedly invented by the famous Armenian monk Mesrop Mashtots. But in reality, Albania was the first state in the Transcaucasus to adopt Christianity, and that its Church was initially autocephalous. A lingua franca was also used by the Albanian tribes even before Albania was baptized. An alphabet has already been invented and was existing, to which Mesrop Mashtots only added a few modifications.⁸⁵

Pursuant to Nora Dudwick's research on the historical analysis of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region, the territorial issue was the most symbolically and emotively laden. But her academic reasoning was very contradictory because talking a few about de-ethnicization of Albanians by small Armenian tribes with the active cooperation of Arabs⁸⁶, she has decided that provinces south of the Kura river, were, in fact, Armenian whether Utik or Artsakh. But anyway, we do agree with her just on one moment that the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh region will not be altered on the basis of events some thousand years in the past.⁸⁷

Therefore, it will be academically productive to analyze more close period of conflict between Azeris and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh region. Unsurprisingly, the creation of modern Armenian state was chiefly implemented at the expense of Russian Empire and also resettlement of Armenians on the lands occupied by Russia from Iran and Turkey was not a casual event, but rather was a natural result of Russo-Armenian relations which in the Armenian historical literature were popularized only as trade relations. The Armenian-Russian relations extend with a Russian conquer of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), the Turkish wars (1635-1639, 1711, 1768-1774, 1787-1791, etc.) and become stronger by the next Russian attempts of

⁸⁵ Dudwick Nora. The case of the Caucasian Albanians : Ethnohistory and ethnic politics. In: Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, vol. 31, n°2-3, Avril-Septembre 1990. Regards sur l'anthropologie soviétique. pp. 379-380 // URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/cmr_0008-0160_1990_num_31_2_2237 // Retrieved at 08.03.2018

⁸⁶ For the Azerbaijani interpretation, I. Aliev, "Spravka v sviazi s sobytiiami v NKAO," Materialy samizdata, 43 (1988); I. Aliev, "Sereznyi vklad v albanistiku," Izvestiia Akademii nauk Az. SSR, 4 (1986) // Retrieved at 08.03.2018

⁸⁷ Dudwick Nora. The case of the Caucasian Albanians : Ethnohistory and ethnic politics. In: Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, vol. 31, n°2-3, Avril-Septembre 1990. Regards sur l'anthropologie soviétique. p. 381 // URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/cmr_0008-0160_1990_num_31_2_2237 // Retrieved at 08.03.2018

gaining of Caspian lands. During these events, there has been twisted the process of the resettlement of Armenians to Russia and creation here of the Armenian colonies. In this case, the big role was played by the state Decree of Peter I of October 10, 1724. This Decree provided the agreement on allocation of lands under settling and resettlement of Armenians on the lands occupied by Russia. This political line of Peter I has been continued by his successors during the whole century. For ANAS, some time later, the Armenian nationalists have put forward the false and compelled problem for "self-determination of the Karabakh Armenians" and carry out the open-armed aggression against the peace Azerbaijani population living on their initial ancient lands - Karabakh unfounded allegations of the Armenian geopoliticians and their mercenaries became widespread that Karabakh belongs to Armenia. However historic facts represent incontestable proofs of the return. The earliest of such documents has been signed on May 14, 1805, which was called as Kurekchay Treaty, between the Karabakh khan Ibrahim and Russian Empire about a transfer of this khanate under the power of Russia who was brightly showing that the empire has won only the Azerbaijani lands where Armenians from Turkey and Iran have moved later on. None of these documents contained mentions of the Armenian or Armenian possession in Karabakh as though they pass under the power of Russia. According to conclusive Azeri viewpoint, the publication of this document would become the correct answer to the Armenian falsifiers and their paid lawyers.⁸⁸ The victory of Russia in the Russian-Iranian war of 1804 — 1813 and the "Gyulistansky contract" which has led to the partition of Azerbaijan resolutely have advanced resettlement and association of Armenians. After Erivani's taking during the Russian-Iranian war in 1826-1828 this plan began to be realized and the project of resettlement has already been prepared by the Armenian Catholicos Nerses Ashtareketsi. In preparation and introduction of this plan, the big role was played also by A.S. Griboyedov.⁸⁹

In November, 1827, to Egizar Lazaryan who was in Tabriz and has been invited from St. Petersburg for implementation of the leadership in resettlement of Armenians, Nerses wrote: "Now I have asked the faithful defender of our Armenian nationality mister A.S. Griboyedov about that he did not forget my request for our captured Christians and that wherever he will visit, would promote their acceptance under a powerful Russian flag ... I have also asked his Highness of mister Paskevich and now I write mister Griboyedov A. S. and also I ask your highness to incline mister Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich to that during truce I have not forgotten

⁸⁸ See the Treaty of Kureckchay (1805) // URL: <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/808> // Sources on Azerbaijani history. Baku, 1989, p. 272-276. // Retrieved at 18.03.2018

⁸⁹ The title of the article – "The resettlement of Armenians into the Karabakh" edited by the Institute of History named after A.Bakykhanov of ANAS, 31.05.2017 // URL: <http://1905.az/ru/переселение-армян-в-карабах> // Retrieved at 18.03.2018

to include in the agreement article providing free return of the Armenians living in the cities and the villages of Iran to the homeland under the auspices of Russia."⁹⁰

The XV article of the "Turkmenchaysky contract" signed on February 10, 1828, provided resettlement of Armenians. From the XV article: "His Highness Shah ... grants general forgiveness to all population and officials of the area called Azerbaijan ... Besides, since this day, within one year they have the right together with the family to pass from Iran to Russia without any obstacles from local chiefs and officials and also to sell movable goods, without being levied any duty and taxes. As for real estate, for his sale or some voluntary decision on him, five years are defined".⁹¹

For the organization of resettlement of Armenians in Nakhchivan and Irevan, the committee on resettlement has been created. There have been defined huge privileges for immigrants, in which they were exempted from taxes and a compulsory military service within six years and have been paid by grants of the contribution received from Iran. After some preparatory activities resettlement has begun. The number of the Armenians moved from Iran made 40-50 thousand people. In the course and after the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829 from Turkey 90 thousand Armenians have been moved. Resettlement of Armenians from Turkey and other eastern states has been continued also during the subsequent period. Transcaucasia was the main direction of resettlement. In 1911 N.I. Shavrov wrote: "From 1 million 300 thousand Armenians living now in Transcaucasia over one million are not indigenous people, and is moved by us".⁹² At resettlement of Armenians in Transcaucasia special attention was paid on that, where exactly to place them. A.S. Griboyedov wrote: "From the areas occupied by the Russian army — Tabriz, Hui, Salmaz, Maragi of all Armenians need to be lodged in Nakhchivan, Irevan, and the Karabakh region". This recommendation of Griboyedov has been adequately implemented. Shavrov wrote: "Armenians accommodated, generally on fertile lands of Elizavetpol (Ganja) and Irevansky province where them was insignificant a little. A mountain part of the Elizavetpolsky province (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the coast of the lake Gyoycha have been populated with these Armenians ". Thus, change of ethnic structure of the called territories was a result of settling by their Armenians. According to the historical data of 1823, from 20

⁹⁰ The title of the article – “Resettlement of Armenians to Karabakh” // URL: http://www.azerbaijan.az/ Karabakh/ KarabakhProblem/karabakhProblem_02_e.html? // Retrieved at 18.03.2018

⁹¹ The title of the primary source – “Turkmenchay Treaty”, p.3, Article XV // URL: <http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/History/HistDocs/Documents/en/03.pdf> // Retrieved at 18.03.2018

⁹² See "Karabakh in the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic" // URL: <http://khojaly.vn/en/armenian-aggression-against-azerbaijan/21-history-of-karabakh.html> // Institute of History named after A.Bakikhanov of ANAS Treaties // Retrieved at 20.03.2018

thousand families of the Karabakh region (the territory of the former Karabakh khanate), only 1,5 thousand were the Armenian families. After resettlement, the ethnic proportion of the population is sharply changed. In 1832 64,8% of the population of Karabakh were Azerbaijanians, and 34,8% became Armenians. This policy purposefully proceeded. In the eighties of XIX century in the national structure of the Shusha County there were 41,5% of Azerbaijanians, Armenians there were 58,2%. According to a population census of Russia in 1897, these figures have made 45 and 53%, and in 1917 — 40,2 and 52,3%.⁹³⁹⁴

At the beginning of 20th century, even within Russian Empire, there were being emerged little but very explosive cells of mutual distrust and contempt between Azeris and Armenians. The main reason was dealt with the earnest desire of Azeri population to create a modern democratic state within internationally recognized borders. On May 28, 1918, after 120 years' submission of Russia, the Azerbaijani people have created the independent state in Northern Azerbaijan. In the Declaration of independence, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic declared that it is an heiress-at-law of the lands of Northern Azerbaijan occupied by Russia on the basis of Gyulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) treaties. Again, in the same Declaration of independence it has been noted: "From this day the people of Azerbaijan have sovereign rights, Azerbaijan consisting of East and Southern Transcaucasia and is the full independent state".⁹⁵

The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (hereinafter ADR) which was the first secular democracy in the Muslim world has published legally and politically reasonable map of the territory. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic sought to restore the legal power in all historical territory of Karabakh which was an integral part of Azerbaijan. At the same time just announced Armenian (Ararat) Republic has put forward the unreasonable claims for Karabakh. The government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic has rejected these claims. On January 15, 1919, after the appointment of Khosrov bek Sultanov to the post of Governor-General of Karabakh (along with Zangezur), new democracies of Transcaucasia in Azerbaijan and Armenia sought for the final solution of the dispute that could be found at the Paris Peace Conference. The candidacy of K. Sultanov was also approved by General W. Thomson, Head of the British

⁹³ The title of the article - "Karabakh: Looking into the Past in search of the Truth: Resettlement of Armenians from Neighboring Countries and Demographic Changes in Karabakh" written by Jamil Hasanli, D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan) // URL: http://www.ca-c.org/c-g/2010/journal_eng/c-g-3-4/13.shtml // Retrieved at 20.03.2018

⁹⁴ See also: A Record on Karabakh Province in 1823 collected by a civil servant, Mogilevsky, and a colonel, Ermolov (Tbilisi, 1866), State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan, f.21, 24-1, N.117 // Retrieved at 20.03.2018

⁹⁵ Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918 - 1920), by Agamaliyeva N., Elm. 1998. p. 316. ISBN 5-8066-0897-2 // Retrieved at 20.03.2018

troops quartered in Baku representing the Allied Powers.⁹⁶ In August 1919, the Karabakh Armenians and the ADR Government signed a temporary agreement that “mountainous part of Karabakh, ... inhabited also by Armenians, considers itself in the boundaries of Republic of Azerbaijan.”⁹⁷ The resolution was based on the recognition of “cultural self-determination”⁹⁸ of the Armenian population of Karabakh. Georgian Bolshevik newspaper *Borba* noted that “the agreement between Armenians and Muslims in Karabakh is already a fact...In the present case, we see the first serious attempt at resolution of the Armenian-Muslim conflict not by means of violence but by means of negotiation”.⁹⁹¹⁰⁰ For us, it was the most unforgivable blunder of that-times Azeri leadership, because the negotiations were basically stressed on the willing of Armenians to ensure from the Azeri government the cultural and territorial transformation of Irevan (which was the main administrative center of Irevan khanate on the territory of Azerbaijan) from Azerbaijan into the newly-emerging state of Armenia. In return, Armenians have obliged themselves to stay away from territorial claims over Karabakh, but they again did not implement one's commitments. In those years, the borders of each country were not definitely proven by the international community and if Armenia was struggling to get some territories from Eastern Anatolian region of Ottomans where they have argued an alleged existence of the "Greater Armenia", the Azeri population sought for international support in order to gain independence from centuries-long occupation by Russian Empire.

Despite all obstacles, Azeri movement for independence from Russian Empire was backed by the international community in the same level as it was en route to Armenian one from Ottomans. Therefore, in early 1920, the Paris Peace Conference has recognized Karabakh as an internal part of Azerbaijan in order to empower a new strong state against new Bolshevik threat from Russia.¹⁰¹ The territorial friction over the mountainous part of Karabakh resumed after the Sovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan. On July 5, 1921, the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, consented on the finite

⁹⁶ The title of the source - "The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict A Historical and Legal Appraisal", Chapter III, p.51 // URL:

<http://sam.az/uploads/PDF/The%20Nagorno%20Karabakh%20Conflict%20A%20Historical%20and%20Legal%20Appraisal%20.pdf> // Edited by SAM, Baku-2013 // Retrieved at 20.03.2018

⁹⁷ The temporary agreement of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh with the Azerbaijani government, August 26, 1919, (paragraph 2) // To the history of the formation of the NKAR of the Azerbaijan SSR, Collection of documents and materials, Baku, 1989, p. 25 // Retrieved at 25.03.2018

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Paragraph 12

⁹⁹ “*Borba Proletariata*”, 1919, September 5.

¹⁰⁰ See also "Legal status of quasi-autonomies in USSR: Case of Nagorno-Karabakh's Autonomous Oblast" // the Article published by Farhad Mehdiyev, Irada Bagirova, Gulshan Pashayeva & Kamal Makili Aliyev // URL: https://www.academia.edu/5474212/NK_Legal_Status-CI_Vol_3_no_1-2 // Retrieved at 25.03.2018

¹⁰¹ The title of the book - “The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under Russian rule” edited by A. Altstadt // Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1992, pp.102-103. // Retrieved at 29.03.2018

legal status of this territory. The most significant document in this context was the July 5, 1921 decree of Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, in which Stalin, along with several Armenian members, such as A. Nazaretyan and A. Myasnikyan, agreed on retaining mountainous Karabakh within Azerbaijan, not “transferring” or “ceding” it to anyone and leave it within the borders of Azerbaijan SSR”.¹⁰² Only on July 7, 1923, the Central Executive Committee (hereinafter CEC) of Azerbaijan SSR issued a decree “On the Formation of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh (AONK¹⁰³)”.¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, the 1936 Constitution of Soviet Union brought new provisions on autonomous entities, establishing a list of all autonomous oblasts and republics within the USSR.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, article 24 of the 1936 USSR Constitution reconfirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (hereinafter NKAO) was an integral part of Azerbaijan SSR.¹⁰⁷

In Soviet times, the authorities of the Armenian SSR had repeatedly raised the issue of the transfer of NKAO to Armenia with Moscow. This happened in 1945, 1964 and 1968, but met with resistance from the Azerbaijani side, which to some extent had the support of Moscow.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, Armenian attempts to secure the consent of Moscow on this issue continued.¹⁰⁹ The new 1977 USSR Constitution did not deliver further regulations for the autonomous units of the USSR. In this Constitution, NKAO once again remained constant as an autonomous oblast of Azerbaijan SSR. Pursuant to the Article 110 of the 1977 USSR Constitution, the Council of Nationalities had to be elected on the basis of the following representation: 32 deputies from each member Republic, 11 deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each autonomous region, and one deputy from each autonomous area.¹¹⁰

¹⁰² Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Moscow), f.64, op. 2, d.1, p.118, 121-122. // Retrieved at 04.04.2018

¹⁰³ The name was changed to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast' (NKAO) only in 1937

¹⁰⁴ Collection of Legislation and Orders of the Workers 'and Peasants' Government of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic for 1923, Baku, 1923, p. 384-385 // // Retrieved at 04.04.2018

¹⁰⁵ See also the Constitution of USSR of 1936; // URL:

<http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons02.html#chap03> // Retrieved at 14.04.2018

¹⁰⁶ The 1936 Constitution of USSR of 1936; // URL:

<http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons02.html#chap03> // Articles 22-27 // Retrieved at 14.04.2018

¹⁰⁷ USSR Constitution 1936, Article 24 // <https://constitutii.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/1936-en.pdf> // Retrieved at 14.04.2018

¹⁰⁸ АИД VII АР (Archive of Political Movements of the Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan), Ф.1, оп.169, д.249, л.12; See the relevant document on the official website of the Archive of Political Documents of the Office of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic // URL: <http://arxiv.gov.az/> // Retrieved at 16.04.2018

¹⁰⁹ Mammadov N.R. Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province of the Azerbaijan SSR (1923-1991). Baku, 2008, p.117; Hajiyev N. Mountainous documents from Karabakh history. Baku, 2005, p.80 // From SAM references on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict // Retrieved at 16.04.2018

¹¹⁰ The 1977 USSR Constitution. Article 110 // URL:

www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons05.html#chap15 // Retrieved at 17.04.2018

Unfortunately, Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of "perestroika" and "glasnost" has not been continued with the advent of positive results. The tensions amidst other different nationalities of USSR were getting rapidly enlarged as well. However, one thing was certain: Armenians and Azerbaijanis were able to live and develop peacefully for several decades of Soviet rule, without many of the domestic problems that affected the whole of the Soviet Union. In all three periods of the development of autonomy, we can see that it was managed by the same system of governmental bodies; their names were changed but the essence of their function was not. From the Congress of Soviets up until the NKAO Soviet of People's Deputies, the legislative power was mostly illusory, and decisions and legislation were adopted on the basis of the party arrangements, as in the rest of the USSR. Thus, it can be concluded that the reasons for the failure of autonomy were not discrimination on the part of the central Azerbaijani government, nor the lack of access to minority rights, but rather the Soviet system of administration and Armenia's separatist goals.¹¹¹

1.2. Basic reasons for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's systematic hybridity

The seepage of systematic hybridity is connected to the demands and support emerged from the fastest dissemination of inputs' negative and too small positive effects. The short period of civil war was memorized by such internal demands within Soviet bureaucracy as how urgently cope with different local conflicts between national minorities that were mostly based on territorial claims and mutual ethnic cleansing. So-called Armenian "irredentism policy" was too organized and did not hesitate to use all methods to annex Nagorno-Karabakh region from its historical roots that were dilated into the heartland of Azerbaijan. Within civil war period of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the greatest demand was documented in All-union referendum¹¹² undertaken by that times President of USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev to keep together Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an individual of any nationality will be completely guaranteed. This referendum was

¹¹¹ The title of the source - "The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict A Historical and Legal Appraisal", Chapter III, p.77-79
URL:<http://sam.az/uploads/PDF/The%20Nagorno%20Karabakh%20Conflict%20A%20Historical%20and%20Legal%20Appraisal%20.pdf> // Retrieved at 18.04.2018

¹¹² The official title of the referendum was - "A referendum on the future of the Soviet Union." It was held on 17 March 1991, and the question put to voters was:
"Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?" from the book "Elections in Asia: A data handbook", Volume I written by Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz & Christof Hartmann in 2001, p.492 // ISBN 0-19-924958-X // Retrieved at 19.04.2018

held on March 17, 1991, and revealed major intentions of conflicting national minorities. In the case of conflict between Azeris and Armenians for Nagorno-Karabakh region, everything was overwhelmingly complicated, but one thing was quite crystal-clear that Armenians had seized the great historical moment for the next betrayal behind the back of the Soviet Union, how quickly to declare its independence and to demonstrate, in advance, the artificial, allegedly historical borders of ones new state, where they through the unilateral referendum, planned to include the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (hereinafter ASSR). One of the basic reasons for systematic hybridity within conflict had emerged from this initial stage of the civil war period. There were appeared two opposite supports that infected the newly-forthcoming system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with irregular methods fulfilled by a high level of hybridity. Mikhail Gorbachev, who, previously, even at the beginning of his rule, was encircled by such Armenian advisers as Abel Geyzovich Agambegyan, Karen Nerserovich Brutenz, Georgy Khosroevich Shakhnazarov, Elena Georgiyevna Bonner and etc., unfortunately, became dependent on their chiefly pro-American assumptions. Unsurprisingly, on February 26, 1988, he had met in Kremlin such aggressive and sentimental Armenian nationalists as Zori Balayan and Silva Kaputikyan, and then, as an unexpected result, he had decided to freeze their demands for annexation but sent Deputy Head of the CPSU¹¹³ Department Karen Brutenz to the Nagorno-Karabakh region for the support to other local Armenians.¹¹⁴¹¹⁵ Despite all contradicting steps, Mr. Gorbachev had backed Azerbaijan that was not against the keeping up of USSR as a unified country and confirmed it by votes of its population in All-Union referendum.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile, in the strategical part, it was the next sample for staying in a power, but operational stage became complicated after the decision to commence the "Operation Ring".¹¹⁷ It was a joint operation leading by Soviet Internal Security Forces that were getting directives from

¹¹³ CPSU – The Communist Party of the Soviet Union

¹¹⁴ The title of the source – “Azerbaijan: The Political history” written by Suha Bolukbasi // pp. 84-85 //Retrieved at 20.04.2018

¹¹⁵ The title of the article - "Gorbachev met with Silva Kaputikyan and Zori Balayan – Washington Post, February 28, 1988, // URL: <http://www.aniarc.am/2017/07/01/washington-post-nk-gorbachev-zoei-and-silva-meet/> // The Karabagh File, Documents, and Facts, 1918-1988, First Edition, Cambridge Toronto 1988, by the ZORYAN INSTITUTE, edited by Gerard J. LIBARIDIAN, pp. 94-95. // Retrieved at 20.04.2018

¹¹⁶ The title of the book - "The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict" written by Michael P. Croissant // p. 40 // Retrieved at 20.04.2018

¹¹⁷ The comparative and objective analysis on “Operation Ring” might be researched in “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War” written by Thomas De Waal // New York: New York University Press, 2003, p. 114. ISBN 0-8147-1945-7. // Retrieved at 21.04.2018

newly-established Security Council of USSR and by OMON¹¹⁸ from Azerbaijan SSR. The basic goal was to disarm and prosecute illegal Armenian guerrilla fighters who called themselves as "fedayeen" and to supplement passport checking. The false concept of the Armenians about the displacement and isolation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians lost its former euphoric popularity even in the eyes of Mikhail Gorbachev and he realized that everything was and will be done for the sake of seceding from the USSR, with the joint occupation of foreign territories in the name of expanding its borders. Armenians had lost Gorbachev's support on their quite opposite demands on annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh region to the Armenian SSR. But it was late, the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh region had already been raped by real signs of the upcoming full-scale war. According to such pro-Armenian academics as Erik Melander, the Operation Ring was done for ethnic cleansing and total expulsion of Armenians from north-western part of Nagorno-Karabakh region. But indeed, it was a result of a filthy policy of Armenian lobby in the USA and has found its collateral endorsement by the report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives and The Committee on Foreign Relations of U.S. Senate introduced by The Department of State. They were not hesitating to condemn even without one real evidence the USSR Interior Ministry forces and Azeri OMON detachments on attacking some Armenian settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh and forcible deportation of over 1,000 residents to Armenia, causing death, injuries, and loss of property. Armenians had exchanged support on their illegal activities from Soviet to American one and then after the dissolution of Soviet Union, there had ignited a full-scale war, mostly, by remnants of the Soviet army.

1.2.1. Possible rebirth of old hybrid warfare's factors: Intermediate development

The second phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had brought the next new demands and supports into the system, that was, again and again, proving the co-existence of irregular, hybrid and operationally complicated methods for the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh region. We have already analyzed local strategical confrontations for superiority within one's governments from either side which creates basic demands that might be overviewed or understood just within one system. In comparison with new Azeri movement for independence

¹¹⁸ OMON (Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya) -The Special Purpose Police Unit or OPON (Otryad Politsii Osobogo Naznacheniya) was a special forces detachment unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan SSR in the early 1990s formed in the initial stage of Nagorno-Karabakh War. The first body of the unit consisted of 3,000 policemen.

from USSR led by activists of Popular Front, Armenians were not fighting just for the security within an independent state and its territorial integrity. If for Azerbaijani leadership the basic demand was to defend its borders from invasion and further occupation, the Armenians were demanding special safety for their allegedly isolated and forcefully deported comrades in Nagorno-Karabakh region. The same demand could be introduced and obtrusively inundated by the Azeri government as well, to defend its fellow citizens that had really and already been deported from Yerevan and its surrounding districts. Unsurprisingly, this process has not begun after "Perestroika" or from a finite collapse of Soviet Union but had quite deep and unbearable history of injustice from the beginning of the 1900s. Unlike the vindictive Armenians, the leaders of Popular Front of Azerbaijan had not rationally appreciated this fact and did not make reciprocal steps to demand the rights for life and property of deported Azeris who, even prior to the Revolution, had made up 43 percent of the population of Erevan.¹¹⁹

The deportation process was bureaucratically replaced by the term of "resettlement" of the Azerbaijani population from Armenia to Azerbaijan. It was closely connected with the attempts of the Soviet leadership after World War II to expand their borders at the expense of Turkey. This shameful process has mostly begun from Erevan which was wielding such destructed historical Azeri monuments as the Palace of Irevan khans, Azerbaijani tombstones in Urus village, the Fortress Agtala near Lori mahal of the Irevan khanate (nowadays - the Tumanyan area Republic of Armenia) and etc., that were irrefutable historical evidence. In conjunction with the resolution of this problem, active work was carried out among Armenian national groups in the United States, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East in order to repatriate them to their "historical homeland". In turn, the possibility of mass repatriation gave the leadership of the Armenian SSR a convenient excuse to hope to expand the boundaries of the republic not only at the expense of the territory of Turkey but also of neighboring Azerbaijan.¹²⁰ Thus, in a letter to Stalin in November 1945, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia, G. Arutinov, made a proposal to separate Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and incorporate it into Soviet Armenia.¹²¹ In response, the first secretary of the Communist Party of

¹¹⁹ Dragadze 1990:166–7, From the references of "Great Tragedy Deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia" edited by Karim Shukurov // URL: <http://www.visions.az/en/news/233/19b4cf06/> // Retrieved at 22.04.2018

¹²⁰ The title of the article – "Deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia (1948-1953)" written by Ph.D. in History, Ilgar Niftaliyev // p.42 // URL: <http://irs-az.com/new/pdf/201403/1395241540579776076.pdf> // P.S – The "Resolution on the deportation of the Azerbaijani population from Armenia" and other relevant official documents might also be overviewed in this article // Retrieved at 22.04.2018

¹²¹ Deportation of Azerbaijanis from the Armenian SSR (1948-1953 gg.). Collection of documents. // Baku, 2013, doc. № 2, p.75-76 // Retrieved from aforementioned article at 23.04.2018

Azerbaijan SSR, M. J. Bagirov, made counterclaims, and after that, the issue was withdrawn.¹²² In comparison with such national minorities in Armenia as Kurds, Russians, Greeks, after the last census of 1979 within the Soviet Union, Azeris were the largest minority in Armenia making up 5,3% (approximately 160,800 people) of Armenia's population.¹²³ During history, it still was the smallest amount of Azeri population, because of well-organized deportation and alleged repatriation policy of Russian Empire against Ottoman and Persian Empires. The possible creation of Armenian state would be served as a geopolitical fore-post and strategical buffer zone in order to cut deep Turkic links from the Caucasus and further Central Asian countries. The treaties of Gulistan¹²⁴ and Turkmenchay¹²⁵ are still serving as a basic historical evidence to this sort of academic disposition. The next and final stage of mass expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia has commenced in 1987 from the district of Kafan. (Thomas De Waal, 1996, p.19) Pursuant to Azeri statistics, about 40,897 Azerbaijani families were totally deported and 216 people died. The vast majority of the victims were from northern areas, where refugees came from former Kirovoabad (today: Ganja) district, especially to district Gugark, where 11 people were killed.¹²⁶

If first civil war period of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ended up with quite negative decisions to make a war for an outbreak of occupation within the internationally recognized territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the second wartime phase can be considered as the most violent action arisen from previous demands and supports that poured out of conflict itself. Unfortunately, it has ostensibly finished with 1994 armistice which for us cannot be academically examined and overviewed as a systematic output that will be capable to bear with future positive feedback from the international community and local population from either conflicting side. It was just a transformation to another, new system which will be controlled by distinguished demands and supports and will again be perplexed by the ever-upgrading factors of hybrid warfare. The full-scale military operations for the occupation and further annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia has taken place between 1991 and 1994, which was also labeled as a Nagorno-Karabakh war. The significance of strategical confrontations for the holding of superiority within one's government and its role in negotiations were altered by

¹²² Ibid, doc. No. 3, p.77-79 // Retrieved at 25.04.2018

¹²³ The title of the source – "Population of Armenia: National Structure of the Population in Armenia" // URL: <http://www.iatp.am/economics/migr/demo-1e.htm> // Retrieved at 25.04.2018

¹²⁴ The treaty of Gulistan (1813) // URL: <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/809> // Retrieved at 25.04.2018

¹²⁵ The treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) // URL: <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/810> // Retrieved at 25.04.2018

¹²⁶ "Pogroms in Armenia: Judgments, Ideas and Facts." The newspaper "Express Chronicle", No.16, 16.04.1991. // Retrieved at 25.04.2018

heavyweight of operational craftsmanship and insidious, tricky and irregular tactics that had mostly breached all pillars of international humanitarian law, its proper conventions and other relevant laws of war. The use of guerrilla fighters without military insignia from both sides, a gathering of ex-terrorists within such special divisions as already mentioned "ARABO", the terroristic acts far away from a battlespace saturated by such intimidations as the bombing of metro stations in Baku, subversive acts for cutting the ties amidst strategically close districts were major proof of first hybrid warfare factors that faced not only simultaneity, but also criminality of actions. After an achieving a decision to sign a so-called "Bishkek Protocole" on 5 May 1994, there was emerged the next doubtful actions en route "mediation of negotiations for a peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict", but was no systematic output that must be labeled as a positive result and end of a conflict. It has just frozen hot military operations, paved a quite intertwined road for a peaceful resolution and threatened with a possible rebirth of old hybrid warfare factors. Meanwhile, in the third phase of the conflict, we have been encountered with the transformation of not only decisions and supports, but also the replacement of old hybrid warfare factors with the new ones those mostly differed with multi-modality, criminality, high probability of implementation, and huge damage to the real peaceful resolution of conflict.

The third phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can also be analyzed as an input of its ever-changing system that also attested to the new demands and supports arisen from the post-war actions which engaged foreign actors as well. The main discernible goal was to attain a peaceful resolution of conflict but in reality there was appeared another system filled with various decisions and actions. Even in 1992 within a wartime period, there has been achieved a decision to form a special Minsk Group by the CSCE, now Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE) to bear and promote a negotiated resolution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council on 24 March 1992, proposed the Chairman-in-Office to meet as soon as possible in a new conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the aegis of the CSCE to ensure an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE.¹²⁷ The Conference would have to take place in Minsk. The Ministers agreed that the CSCE must play a major role in promoting a peace process relating to the conflict. They agreed that the situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh requires further CSCE action. Although the planned conference was overrated and not

¹²⁷ See also - "Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mg/70125?download=true> // ("Minsk Conference") // Retrieved at 26.04.2018

taken place, Minsk Group of OSCE was lasting to act as a new actor for peaceful resolution of conflict.¹²⁸

Only on 6 December 1994, the OSCE Budapest Summit of Heads of State or Government agreed to set a co-chairmanship for the process. Deploring the continuation of the conflict and the human tragedy involved, the participating states welcomed the confirmation by the parties to the conflict of the cease-fire agreed on 12 May 19, 1994, with the mediation of the Russian Federation in the teamwork with the Minsk group of CSCE. They confirmed their commitment to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and welcomed the political support given by the Security Council to the CSCE's efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. For this purpose, they have urged parties of the conflict to enter intensive negotiations on an including direct contacts. In this context, they pledged to redouble the efforts and assistance by the CSCE. They have resolutely supported intermediary efforts of the Minsk group of CSCE and have expressed a satisfaction with the most important contribution of the Russian Federation and efforts of other certain members. They agreed to harmonize these into a single coordinated effort within the framework of the CSCE. Based on this objective, they have sent the acting Chairman-in-Office to consultations with the state parties and have as soon as possible acted as Co-chairmen of the Minsk conference to provide the general and coordinated basis for negotiations and to carry out full coordination in all intermediary and negotiation actions. The co-chairmen, guided in all of their negotiating efforts by CSCE principles and an agreed mandate, was joint to chair meetings of the Minsk Group and jointly reported to the Chairman-in-Office. They would regularly brief the Permanent Council on the progress of their work. As the first step in these efforts they have urged Co-chairmen of the Minsk conference to take immediate measures for assistance, with support and cooperation of the Russian Federation and other certain members of the Minsk group, to presumption of ongoing ceasefire and, relying on the progress which is already reached during the previous intermediary actions to hold the fastest negotiations on the conclusion of the political agreement on the termination of armed conflict which realization would allow to eliminate the main consequences of the conflict for all parties and to allow convocation of the Minsk conference. They also asked the Co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference to proceed a cooperation with the parties for further implementation of confidence-building measures, especially in the humanitarian sphere. They have emphasized the need of that the participating states undertook as individually, and within the relevant

¹²⁸ CSCE First Additional Meeting of the Council, Helsinki 1992 // Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council, 24 March 1992 // Summary of Conclusions // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mc/29121?download=true> // Retrieved at 07.05.2018

international organizations of a measure for humanitarian assistance to the population of the region with paying of special attention to simplification of a difficult situation of refugees. They have agreed that according to reasons of the parties in the conflict the conclusion of the agreement mentioned above would also allow developing multinational peacekeeping forces as an important element for the implementation of the agreement. They have declared the political will with the appropriate resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of multinational forces on peacekeeping of CSCE after the agreement between the parties on the termination of armed conflict. They asked the acting chairman to develop as soon as possible the plan of creation, drawing up and functioning of such forces organized on the basis of chapter III of the Helsinki document of 1992 and in full accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. For this purpose Co-chairmen of the Minsk conference and the Minsk group would be assisted the acting chairman and with assistance of the Secretary general; after the corresponding consultations he would also create in Vienna group of high level of planning for pronouncement of recommendations, in particular, of the size and characteristics of force, command, and control, material support, distribution of units and resources, rules of interaction and arrangements from the involved states. He would try to obtain support from the United Nations on the basis of the stated readiness of the United Nations to provide technical consultations and expert knowledge. He would also try to obtain a continuation of political support from the Security Council of the United Nations for possible expansion of peacekeeping forces of CSCE. On the basis of such preparatory work and the relevant provisions of chapter III of the Helsinki document of 1992 and after consent and official request of the parties of the acting chairman through Co-chairmen of the Minsk conference the Permanent Council would adopt the final decision on creation of peacekeeping operation of CSCE.¹²⁹ For the implementation of the Budapest decisions, that times Hungarian Chairman-in-Office Marton Krasznai issued on 23 March 1995, the mandate for the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Process.¹³⁰

Only in 1997 two options of settlement — package and stage-by-stage have been offered conflicting parties. The first of them has been rejected by Azerbaijan, the second — self-declared Nagorno Karabakh Republic (hereinafter NKR). Moreover, the consent of Armenia to this option of settlement became the reason of criminal change of the power in Armenia. This change was

¹²⁹ CSCE BUDAPEST DOCUMENT 1994, TOWARDS A GENUINE PARTNERSHIP IN A NEW ERA // Corrected version 21 December 1994 // REGIONAL ISSUES: Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict // pp.16-17 // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true> // Retrieved at 07.05.2018

¹³⁰ The mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE ("Minsk Conference") // pp.1-2 // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mg/70125?download=true> // Retrieved at 07.05.2018

other evidence to the surpassing of operational hybridity by the bloody and partially terroristic struggle for supremacy in the strategical part of a conflict. In this phase, additional game to look innocent in front of the international community has paralyzed the effectiveness of mediation process and opened new doors for the fastest spreading of such new hybrid warfare factors as fake news, the promotion of false patriotism, propaganda, and disorientation of popular attention from internal economic and social problems. Intermediaries have hurried to submit the new offer on settlement and when it has been rejected by Azerbaijan, negotiation process has come to a standstill. The Minsk group of OSCE for all this time managed to execute only one of the functions, namely providing the permanent forum for negotiations on the peaceful resolution of a crisis. As a result, the demands for a peaceful negotiation could not find its real supporters to the resolution of conflict and dormant decisions on the convening of permanent summits had not ended up with an evolutionary action of the international community.

1.3. New factors of hybrid warfare as a destroyer of an unstable system

Initially, for this chapter, it will be a quite cunning step to refresh the readers' memory by those emerging new factors of hybrid warfare which were arisen chiefly from the result of our distinguished academic definition over the nature of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its close ties with this new hybrid warfare concept. One of the most exciting new factors within dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh region is occurring between current Armenian and Azeri governments, which we do agree to call as an image-making game. This game has got two arenas, first one is an international, and the second is a local one. Diplomats from either side, almost in every diplomatic meeting, under the roofs of international communities do not hesitate to condemn one another by using internal social, economic and political problems, lack of democracy and mutual digital propagandas as the main impediment en route to success within negotiations for the peaceful resolution of conflict. That is why each leadership is still using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself as a trigger of emergent mobilization and an alternative escape from domestic uprisings based on internal economic and social disorders.

Concerning Azerbaijan, in this sense, there must be mentioned 2015s devaluation of Azerbaijani National Currency - manat. According to economist Shirin Mirzeyev from the Center for Economic and Social Development (hereinafter CESD), starting from February 21st, 2015 the official exchange rate of the dollar to the manat has been set at 1.05 manat, which was 33.86 percent more than the exchange rate set before the beginning of the weakening process of

the rate. Central Bank of Azerbaijan has had face a dilemma to depreciate manat since the sharp dropping of a crude oil price in the world market in fall of 2014; either going sharp depreciation or having gradual devaluation. In fact, Central Bank has announced that sharp depreciation would not be in the government's agenda in the near future. Just 2 days after the Central Bank's governor's official declaration on not going to sharp depreciation, the national currency of Azerbaijan has lost its value against to major foreign currencies by 33.86 %. Manat's rate dropped to 1.05 from 0.78 against to US dollar.¹³¹

Azerbaijan's currency has dramatically plummeted after moving to a floating exchange rate, causing a rush on dollars and shops as customers try to buy goods before prices increase. Close to the end of 2015, the manat lost 32% to the dollar following the central bank's decision to stop protecting its value in the face of falling oil prices. The bank said it had lost more than half its foreign reserves trying to defend the national currency. Contemporaneously, opposition leaders criticised authorities for allowing the manat to fall so dramatically. "Azerbaijan has moved to a floating exchange rate but someone forgot to teach it how to swim," said Natiq Cafarli, an economist, and member of the opposition Republican Alternative.¹³² Residents of Baku were angry at the sudden announcement and scrambled to convert their manats into foreign currency or durable goods. "This is such a miserable situation for the whole nation," one said. "Everyone wants to buy dollars and only a few (banks and exchange offices will) sell ... There are almost no dollars left at exchange points." An employee at Baku's Bina shopping market said the shop had had to close to avoid losing money. Others wanting to buy dollars and euros found many exchange offices shut or not selling hard currencies, while several banks put a \$500 limit on exchanges.¹³³ Consequently, it has entailed massive uprisings of the unemployed population and there had been emerging domestic economic, social and political chaos.

Beginning from 12th January 2016, people launched massive protests in some regions of Azerbaijan. Protests took place across Azerbaijan in the latest sign of mounting frustration over unemployment, price hikes and other economic woes in Azerbaijan. Demonstrators showed their grievances, basically, including anger over price rises on essential items as flour and bread. The protesters' rallies took part in the districts of Fuzuli, Aghsu, Aghjabadi, Siyazan, and Lankaran

¹³¹ The title of the article – "Devaluation of Azerbaijani National Currency; Causes and Consequences" written by Shirin Mirzeyev, Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD) // p.1 // URL: http://cesd.az/new/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Azerbaijan_National_Currency_Devaluation2.pdf // Retrieved at 08.05.2018

¹³² The title of the source - "Azerbaijanis Reel As Currency Tanks" edited by Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty // URL: <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijanis-reel-as-currency-tanks/27441071.html> // Retrieved at 08.05.2018

¹³³ The news from "The Guardian" - "Azerbaijan in crisis as currency plummets" // URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/azerbaijan-currency-plummets-oil-price> // Retrieved at 08.05.2018

on the 13th of January. The forces of internal security services were deployed to suppress the rallies by demonstrators, using rubber bullets and tear gas. Reports say there were detentions in several districts. As per witnesses, at least two protesters were detained in Siyazan and in Lankaran district. The police detained several more demonstrators, some of them were reportedly found guilty of taking part in an unsanctioned rallies protesting high unemployment and were sentenced to one month in jail. Several demonstrators have been fined and released. Currency devaluation always comes with the double whammy of reduction in spending power and rising of prices. As a result, the cost of many items, such as tomatoes and grapes, has shot up, in some cases by as much as 100 percent. Flour and bread prices increased by 25 percent. And these were the main reasons for the people to walk the streets and join the rallies. A man from Fuzuli, south of Azerbaijan said while protesting: “We are here because of we are hungry.” Three demonstrators were attempting to commit suicide because of bank loans, they could no longer make payments on. These demonstrations were the sparks for the reforms, that had to be done by the government immediately. People still protested against price hikes and demanded employment and the protest was getting bigger, including other regions of the country.¹³⁴ The opposition leaders have proposed a package of proposals to the government, that unhesitatingly will assist to re-pave more stable economic circumstances that based not only on such natural resources as gas and oil but on the non-oil sector as well. Unfortunately, Azeri government has chosen another irregular strategy to get rid of these domestic problems. The arrows were directed onto neighboring enemy, in particular, to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. The process has been commenced under the intensive support of Azeri media, and there has been dug out another parallel information war that made those new factors of hybrid warfare more visible. The preliminary media performance was getting enhanced even from the end of 2014.

In comparison with Azeri authorities, the Armenian leadership was powerless in front of unsatisfied Armenian population who had successfully got a victory on 2015's protests against hikes in electricity rates, concomitant with extra demands on immediate alteration of ruling government and adoption of the new Constitution. According to the interesting Armenian view of these situations, penned by Nona Shahnazarian, Research Fellow, Institute for Archaeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia, the following acts exposed the Armenian public's pent-up frustration on series of problems, including the government's alacrity to admit Russian control over the economy. While the rallies soon moved away, there has been

¹³⁴ The title of the article - "Azerbaijan: Uprising unemployment vs Government" edited by Vahid Ali // Cooperation and development network, Eastern Europe // URL: <https://www.cdnee.org/azerbaijan-uprising-unemployment-vs-government/> // Retrieved at 09.05.2018

emerged various consequences and positive impacts. First of all, the government almost was obliged to respond to the people's requirements by showing its consent to subsidize the hike from the state budget. Nevertheless, the fact that the government was weak to remain stable at lower unsubsidized prices intensified the poor condition of the country's energy sector, as well as Armenia's overall economic servility to Russian geopolitical interests.¹³⁵ Though the internal economic crisis was temporarily humiliated, the beginning of 2016, has aspired to the development and further enhancement of previous demands on the alteration of leading authorities and even current Constitution, the border clashes with Azerbaijan were already being perceived to be used for transitory distraction of population from ever-uprising economic stagnation. But anyway, the conclusions were quite different from one another, if the Azeri leadership has gained its perspectives en route distraction, the Armenian one was filled just with two-year stamina to keep within the government. As a result, 2018 Armenian Velvet Revolution have totally crashed the durable resistance of this sort of hybrid warfare factors.¹³⁶

According to Armenian scholar Samvel Martirosyan, at the beginning of 2015, the information war has also been escalated. Information flow from both sides intensified, which assisted both Armenia and Azerbaijan to strengthen their domestic campaigns and attempt to influence the international community.¹³⁷ But this type of confrontation was mostly a product of tactical-operational struggle and led to the emergence of such utmost hybrid warfare factors as a simulation of patriotism (which is usually called as false patriotism) by dissemination of fake news from either side's media outlets and from other international information agencies.

According to the re-edited article of Alexander Murinson who is an independent researcher holding a Ph.D. from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London that was titled as "Forbes buys into the fake news: promotes Russia-vassal Armenia" from prominent Azeri online news agency, News.az, which commenced one's activity since October 2009, the importance of fake news within Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was scrutinized as well. Pursuant to this article, Forbes plainly published "fake news," on October 30, 2017, in the

¹³⁵ The title of the article - "Here Is Not Maidan, Here is Marshal Baghramian" edited by Nona Shahnazarian // The "ELECTRIC YEREVAN" // Protest movement and its consequences// URL: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/PePm413_Shahnazarian_Jan2016_0.pdf // PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 413 // National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, January 2016 // Retrieved at 09.05.2018

¹³⁶ News from "The Guardian" on protests grip Armenian capital after opposition leader's PM bid blocked // URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/01/armenian-opposition-leader-nikol-pashinyan-falls-short-in-pm-bid> // Retrieved at 09.08.2018

¹³⁷ The title of the article - "Armenia, Azerbaijan and the War on Information" edited by Samvel Martirosyan // URL: <https://www.evnreport.com/raw-unfiltered/armenia-azerbaijan-and-the-war-on-information> // Retrieved at 09.05.2018

piece, “Azerbaijani Aggression Should not Be Rewarded With U.S. Aid,” written by such virtual unknowns as Movses Ter-Oganessian and Suren Sargsyan.¹³⁸ Identified as “Caucasus experts,” the writers weaved demonstrable digital propaganda, evocative of the Soviet Union and its Russian successor. They would have the reader believe that Armenia is an independent and prosperous wonderland while Azerbaijan is some regional Muslim boogeyman, undeserving of U.S. foreign aid. Mildly, the reality was far from how Forbes portrayed. Dr. Murinson has also underlined that Azerbaijan, with its own well-allocated foreign aid budget, receives a relatively small amount of foreign aid from the U.S., predominantly in the form of naval materiel and training. Peruse a map and one easily discerns the national interest of the U.S. to defend Azerbaijani offshore oil and gas fields from Russian and Iranian invasion — commodities that contribute crucially to the energy security of Europe and to Western markets. U.S. support of Azerbaijan, in general, sought to safeguard it from Russian and Iranian intrusions and to promote its efforts to integrate this geopolitically and geostrategically important region with the West. The writers also try to sell a skewed and dishonest account of the wars and bilateral issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The News.az also re-asserted that the reality is that Nagorno-Karabakh is a region of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia. It is not an independent region. No nation with internationally recognized territory de-jure adopts the "independence of Nagorno-Karabakh region" — not even Armenia. Fake news cannot stand up to the light of facts, even at the hands of the Kremlin and when the venerated Forbes delves into it. In an environment where astute readers must pay such close attention to where their information emanates, Forbes makes it that much more difficult.¹³⁹

To this end, the forthcoming new factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict take part in the last no war, no peace period of dispute that became the last input into the system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These new factors had brought more recent and earnest demand for a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would be based chiefly on the obligatory provisions of international law and resolutions on the conflict itself. The systematic analysis of conflict gave us otherwise concealed opportunity to reveal another new factor of hybrid warfare that must be called as "a lack of internationally recognized peace treaty". But,

¹³⁸ The “news” from Forbes - "Azerbaijani Aggression Should not Be Rewarded With U.S. Aid" edited by Movses Ter-Oganessian and Suren Sargsyan who claimed to be Caucasus policy experts// URL: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/10/30/azerbaijani-aggression-shouldnt-be-rewarded-with-u-s-aid/#5847162533f5> // Retrieved at 10.05.2018

¹³⁹ The news from News.az - "Forbes buys into the fake news: promotes Russia-vassal Armenia" written by Dr. Alexander Murinson, and re-edited by Azeri online news agency News.az // URL: <https://news.az/articles/politics/126869> // Retrieved at 10.05.2018

there were no real decisions to sign this sort of treaty that probably might be encouraged by such international actors as UN, EU, OSCE MG etc. The lack of an international peace treaty alongside with absence of critical decisions on peaceful resolution of conflict has been noiselessly destroying the already unstable system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for more than three years. Additionally, it has amplified quite extraordinary and technologically-evaluated battlespaces filled with drones and other unmanned aerial military vehicles, which would be separately and in a more detailed way analyzed in the second chapter of our thesis.

Chapter 2. Imperfect principles for peaceful resolution: The role of new factors of hybrid warfare

Prior to pass to the post-war principles of ineffective international mediation for peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it would be a very pragmatic decision to make a flashback on such peculiar documents as Zheleznovodsk Declaration signed on 23 September 1991, within the civil war period that was a joint communiqué on the results of the mediating mission of President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Tehran Communique within full-scale war period which was a joint statement of the heads of conflicting parts under the auspice of Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

According to the Zheleznovodsk Declaration, it was a civil war and the central authorities of the USSR had been unable to work out and implement effective measures to normalize the situation in the region. Huge mistakes have been made that has led to the aggravation of confrontation between the parties and to increase in mistrust in federal bodies. In the circumstances, there was a need of mediation for the efforts directed to the creation of conditions to start the negotiation process capable gradually to lay the foundation for normalization of a situation in the region. Upon agreement with the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides, the leaders of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan took upon themselves the role of mediators. On September 20-23, 1991, the mediating mission, led by President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, visited Baku, Gyandzha, Khankendi (Stepanakert), and Yerevan. The sides were seeking the peaceful settlement of the conflict that must be guided by the principles of noninterference in internal affairs of sovereign states and the undeviating observance of civil rights of citizens, irrespective of their nationality and in accordance with international legal norms. Through mediation, some problems of the gradual settlement of the conflict were discussed. The main results of discussion were as follows:¹⁴⁰

a) the sides believed that the necessary and binding conditions for the settlement of the conflict were a ceasefire;

¹⁴⁰ The title of the primary source - "Zheleznovodsk Declaration", Zheleznovodsk, 23 September 1991 // Unofficial translation, Moscow TASS, 24 Sep 1991 // URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Azerbaijan_ZheleznovodskDeclaration1991.pdf // p.1
Published by Accord – Conciliation Resources // Retrieved at 11.05.2018

b) the repeal, before January 1, 1992, of all unconstitutional Azerbaijani and Armenian enactments concerning Nagorno Karabakh;

c) the recognition of the authority of legitimate bodies of power;

d) the withdrawal from the conflict zone of all armed forces, except units of Soviet Interior Ministry and Soviet Defence Ministry troops;¹⁴¹

When this term has expired, the presence of all armed forces and their activity would be considered as illegal for all parties and would be suppressed by troops of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, and members of armed forces would bear responsibility. It was entrusted to a working group of observers to develop measures for ensuring ceasefire, to neutralize all armed forces, certain as illegal, to create security guarantees for all citizens living in a conflict zone. For acceptance of the coordinated measures and for normalization of a situation in a zone of the conflict the temporary working group, including authorized representatives of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, has been created. The working group has begun activities from October, 1. The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia ensured the eventual return of deported people to their homes, beginning with the fully vacated villages. The sides guaranteed safety in places of permanent residence. Talks on this problem had to begin from October 1991. The sides involved in the conflict has begun an immediate release of hostages. This process had to be completed within a period of two weeks, upon the expiry of which persons involved in holding hostages may be prosecuted under the law. Control over compliance with this provision was exercised by authorized representatives of the mediating sides. Together with federal bodies, the sides guaranteed to normalize all railway, air traffic and communications systems within two weeks. All sides, with the cooperation of mediators, would start negotiations to ensure the free and mutually beneficial functioning of all highways. During the talks, the sides arrived at a unanimous decision to guarantee the flow of impartial information into the conflict zone. It was decided to set up an information group, consisting of representatives of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan authorized to prepare official information about developments in the conflict zone. The supreme bodies of the government of Azerbaijan and Armenia would approve authorized delegations which immediately would begin bilateral negotiations on a constant basis. The sides believed the negotiation process would begin once bilateral treaties have been prepared and signed between the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijan Republic, the Russian Federation

¹⁴¹ The title of the primary source - "Zheleznovodsk Declaration", Zheleznovodsk, 23 September 1991 // Unofficial translation, Moscow TASS, 24 Sep 1991 // URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Azerbaijan_ZheleznovodskDeclaration1991.pdf // p.2
Published by Accord – Conciliation Resources // Retrieved at 11.05.2018

and the Republic of Armenia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan and the Republic of Armenia. The working group of observers was entrusted with preparing, within a month, proposals for the subsequent stages of settling the conflict. The working group of observers would regularly inform the top leaders of the four republics on progress and on realizing the measures envisaged by this communiqué. The provisions contained in this communiqué cannot be viewed as the right of the mediators to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states - the Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia.¹⁴²

Nonetheless, everything has seemed to be normal, Armenians were envisaging the great consent to this sort of mediation and ostensibly run away from their illegal territorial claims. But unfortunately, the reality has got absolutely miscellaneous faces. Just two months later, there has been used another irregular tactical-operational method in order to cut aforementioned peaceful negotiations and unimpeded receipt of reliable and independent information. On November 20, 1991, Azerbaijani Mi-8 Helicopter was shot down near the Karakend village of Khojavend district in Nagorno-Karabakh region, which was carrying a team of 19 peacekeepers alongside with 3 crew members. All 22 on board were killed in the crash. The observers for Russia and Kazakhstan, statesmen of Azerbaijan and TV reporters - have died. The causes of the accident were found out by the investigation. On the eve of an accident, the Armenian side has refused to continue negotiations unless Azerbaijan would stop to overlap natural gas supply to Armenia. For the first time, the energy dimension of the conflict was deeply infiltrated into the hotspot of hybrid warfare factors, that after became the most appetizing holder of its ongoing shares. Subsequently, the Azerbaijani parliament would also consider a question of suspension of negotiations with Armenia at an extraordinary session on November 26. The observers for Russia and Kazakhstan working in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (hereinafter NKAO) according to the Zheleznovodsk communique flew accompanied by representatives of the leadership of Azerbaijan from Agdam to Khojavend for acquaintance with the situation which has become complicated in this area. The first version of the causes of the accident has been transferred to TASS (one of the largest Russian News Agencies) with reference to commandant's office of the special area of NKAO: the helicopter has exploded, having flown in fog on the rock. The chairman of the commission on investigation of the causes of accident Adil Agayev has said in the TV-inform program on November 21 that the helicopter has been shot from the earth with

¹⁴² The title of primary source - "Zheleznovodsk Declaration", Zheleznovodsk, 23 September 1991 // Unofficial translation, Moscow TASS, 24 Sep 1991 // URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Azerbaijan_ZheleznovodskDeclaration1991.pdf // p.3
Published by Accord – Conciliation Resources // Retrieved at 11.05.2018

a large-caliber weapon, the video equipment and weapon from the accident site were stolen.¹⁴³ In response to Agayev's statement People's Deputies of the USSR from Armenia and such NKAO activists as Zory Balayan, Victor Ambartsumyan, Heinrich Igityan, Sos Sargsyan have accused the Central Television of the USSR of tendentiousness and have hinted at non-participation of national liberation army of Artsakh (Armenians called the Nagorno-Karabakh as Artsakh). According to them, "not accidentally immediately after accident on the place of the tragedy there was the former second secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, the former adviser of Najibullah Victor Polyanichko who was engaged two years in "seditious activity" in Karabakh" (he headed the Organizing committee founded by Azerbaijan on management of NKAO). On November 21 at 18:30 the commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR headed by the first deputy commander-in-chief of Interior Ministry Troops of the USSR major general Vyacheslav Ponomarev has taken off for Agdam. Amongst killed officials were also such important Soviet governmental representatives as the head of department of internal affairs of NKAO Vladimir Kovalyov, the military commandant of NKAO major general Nikolay Zhinkin, the prosecutor of NKAO Igor Plavsky, the deputy minister of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan Seylau Serikov, group of the Russian observers — the colonel of Interior Ministry Troops of the USSR, and such representatives of RSFSR colonel Kocherov and Mikhail Lukashev. In Baku, a funeral of the dead has taken place on November 22. Among the killed statesmen there was an Attorney-General of Azerbaijan Ismet Gaibov, the state adviser of Azerbaijan Mamed Asadov (before the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic), the Head of Department on press relations Osman Mirzoyev, TV reporters — Ali Mustafayev and Fakhraddin Shakhbazov. After messages about the tragedy apprehended by Azerbaijanians as "the next intrigues of the Armenian terrorists" in Baku spontaneous meetings have begun. Except for the ordinary contingent of protesters students and workers of Academy of Science of Azerbaijan have taken to the streets. Requirements of protesters — to the Supreme Council and the president Ayaz Mutalibov to bring order to Karabakh or to retire. The leaders of the republic have made the decision to convene on November 26 an extraordinary session of Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. In the agenda were **a)** the announcement of martial law in the territory of the republic; **b)** about a recall from Soviet Army of the military personnel and officers — Azerbaijanians; **c)** about the suspension of negotiations with Armenia. Even earlier the deputy chairman of Armed Forces of Armenia Babken Arartskyan has said to representatives of Azerbaijan that the Armenian side

¹⁴³ The title of the source - "1991 Azerbaijani Mil Mi-8 shootdown" // URL: <https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=1991+Azerbaijani+Mil+Mi-8+shootdown> // Retrieved at 11.05.2018

refuses continuation of the negotiations planned for November 22. Negotiations would be resumed only after the termination by Azerbaijan of a blockade of the gas pipeline supplying gas to Armenia. The deputy chief of staff of Interior Ministry Troops of the USSR general Starikov has reported that the issue of withdrawal of Interior Ministry Troops of the USSR from the area of state of emergency would not be resolved in the nearest future as "there was no such a leading power that could put the end to the Karabakh problem". According to Starikov, and from now on Soviet Internal Armed Forces would be on the party of those to whom the danger threatens (that is between the devil and the deep sea), but "would be able to answer force with force". It was the next official endorsement of weakness in front of upcoming irregular methods that sought to maximally gain the economy and psychological predominance of war. Being in a heartland of irregular casualties, the warfare type bedraggled with nefarious factors of hybridity, again, has absolutely gained the highest level of criminality, multimodality, and simultaneity.¹⁴⁴

In comparison with weightless and incendiary Russian-made mediation, on May 7, 1992, there were held a meeting of the heads of the Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia by an official invitation of Iranian President A.H. Rafsanjani to Tehran. The parties began by expressing gratitude to the Islamic Republic of Iran, international and regional organizations and other countries for their efforts at peace settlement and stability. To develop bilateral relations and to ensure security in the region, the parties agreed to organize meetings of representatives of both countries at the highest level and periodically the leaders of the regions and responsible military representatives. The parties expressed their desire to resolve all problems related to the normalization of the bilateral relations at various levels by means of peaceful means based on the principles of CSCE and international law. Taking international legal standards and the UN Charter as the basis, the parties stressed the need to ensure peace and stability on the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, pointing out that this is beneficial for both countries. Observing the human rights and the rights of minorities, the parties drew the attention of each other to the issues of solving the problems of Armenian and Azerbaijani refugees. The parties also agreed that within a week after the arrival of the special representative of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. M. Vaezi in the region (Baku, Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh), after the negotiations with the interested parties and with the support of the heads of the states of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the truce would be established and at the same time, all communication roads would be opened in order to meet all economic needs. In case of consent for the implementation of the reached

¹⁴⁴ The title of the source – from the “Report of an independent journalist Roman Glebov to Коммерсант.ру” // URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1595> // Retrieved at 12.05.2018

agreement, besides the observers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, observers of the CSCE and others would be engaged. Positively assessing the work of the summit in Tehran, the sides agreed that all questions connected with bilateral relations should be solved by means of meetings and consultations of responsible persons at different levels and through negotiations. The leaders of the two countries, while appreciating the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran, expressed the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue its efforts until the peace and stability are established in the region.¹⁴⁵

For the sake of completeness of our study, it is quite obvious to come to the next academic inference that even pre-war negotiations were partly stuffed with old factors of hybrid warfare that even in that times were hindering the normalization of a situation over Nagorno-Karabakh region and finite peaceful resolution of conflict. Now, it is time to scrutinize some substantial norms and principles which were being emerged within an international mediation process. Although we have already mentioned the creation process of OSCE MG and its debuted meetings on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it will be more broadened approach to make a comparative analysis of different principles of an international mediation and to direct our sharpest and academically the most critical arrows to the role of ongoing new factors of hybrid warfare within these principles. Today, OSCE MG is being co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and France. All these countries have got their own benefits from being involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's mediation process. But, prior to their co-chairmanship, alongside with Russia, the basic role was being played by Sweden, Finland, Italy, Hungary and other pro-European countries. Unfortunately, the principles of this sort of international mediation were overwhelmingly contradictory. These contradictions became pregnant from those new factors which were getting deepened after full engagement of such geopolitical enemies as USA and Russia. France is still playing a role of European Union representative and shown an alleged face of an independent mediator. The first timid step has been undertaken within Lisbon Summit of OSCE held in 1996. There were signed a Lisbon document that shaped the inner scheme of Lisbon principles for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's resolution.

According to the statement of the acting chairman of OSCE, three principles maintained by all member states of the MG have to become a part of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:

¹⁴⁵ The title of the book - "The Karabakh conflict - Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" third times edited by Ali Abasov and Haroutiun Khachatrian, APPENDIX #3 // JOINT STATEMENT OF THE HEADS OF STATE IN TEHRAN, p.90 // URL: http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatrian.pdf // Retrieved at 12.05.2018

- a) territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic;
- b) the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in the agreement based on self-determination which gives to Nagorno-Karabakh the most advanced stage of self-governance within Azerbaijan;
- c) the guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and all its population, including mutual obligations for ensuring compliance with provisions of settlement by all Parties;¹⁴⁶

Meanwhile, the Armenian side has not forgotten to give its doubtful consent to this statement by underlying the following conclusions on self-determination principle:

a) The statement does not reflect either spirit or the letter of the mandate of the OSCE MG established by the Budapest summit of 1994 in which negotiations with the purpose of achievement of the political agreement were offered. The problem of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was a subject of discussion in direct negotiations which still should be finished;

b) The statement predetermines the status of Nagorno-Karabakh that contradicts the decision of Council of ministers of CSCE of 1992 according to which this question is within the competence of OSCE MG which would be called after the conclusion of the political agreement;

c) The Armenian side is convinced that the solution can be found on the basis of the international law and the principles stated in the Helsinki Final Act, first of all on the basis of the principle of self-determination;

d) For the benefit of achievement of a compromise solution the Armenian side is ready to continue the most intensive negotiations both within the Minsk Group and on the basis of the direct contacts coordinated by Co-chairmen of this group;¹⁴⁷

In the interim, the post-Lisbon period of negotiations was firstly encountered with an unexpected attempt to make an accelerated political shock therapy on the principles of sovereign governance within one's territorial integrity. Between 20-24 September 1997, the international mediators of the Minsk Group, mostly encouraged by Russian Federation, has presented a new plan for a peaceful settlement, according to which "Nagorno-Karabakh would become an associate state within the territorial formation of Azerbaijani Republic". It was a first rejected heavyweight document of international mediation and major reasons for this sort of destination were high-level of inconsistency with the previous Lisbon principles. Additionally,

¹⁴⁶ The title of the primary source - "The Lisbon document" from Lisbon Summit of OSCE held on 2 December 1996 // ANNEX 1, STATEMENT OF THE OSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE, p.15 // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true> // Retrieved at 12.05.2018

¹⁴⁷ The title of the primary source - "The Lisbon document" from Lisbon Summit of OSCE held on 2 December 1996 // ANNEX 2, STATEMENT OF THE OSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE, p.16 // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true> // Retrieved at 12.05.2018

Azerbaijan was beware to lose its internationally recognized sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, that has already been recognized as a region within national borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹⁴⁸

Despite the fact that Lisbon principles seemed to be doubtful from Armenian perspective, after the preparation of an aforementioned document upon “Associate state”, Levon Ter Petrosian's administration has given its consent to commence the process of peaceful settlement. In the same time, the process of mediation has again stumbled with one of the old factors of hybrid warfare, which was terrorism, that has already been explored in our thesis by the facts on the assassination of such L.Ter-Petrosian's supporters as Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchyan.¹⁴⁹ Aftermath, Levon Ter-Petrosian had been forced to retire and there had been emerged the next, quite opposite to Lisbon Principles, the scenario of Armenian foreign policy on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When in 1998, under the aegis of Minsk Group mediation process, the principle of "Common State" had been declared, the next highest contradiction has appeared.

The ex-Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, met on 8 October 1998 in Warsaw with the French, Russian and United States Co-Chairs of the OSCE MG. The Co-Chairs informed the Chairman-in-Office about a new approach to resolving Nagorno-Karabakh's status under their consideration that sought to apply creatively the concept of a common state.¹⁵⁰ In accordance with this new "Common State" principle of the OSCE Minsk Group, the parties would conclude an agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which would include the following provisions:

- a) Nagorno-Karabakh would be a state and territorial formation in a form of a common state with Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders. Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would sign an agreement on the delimitation of the subjects of jurisdiction and mutual delegation of powers between state bodies, which would have the force of the constitutional law. Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would form a Joint committee into which representatives of presidents, prime ministers, chairmen of parliaments, for the definition of policy and activity relating to the sphere of joint maintaining would enter;

¹⁴⁸ The title of the primary source - "Comprehensive agreement on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" edited under the aegis of CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE OSCE MINSK GROUP // Document #16 // URL: <http://vn.kazimirov.ru/doc16.htm> // Retrieved at 13.05.2018

¹⁴⁹ The journal “Коммерсантъ Власть”, No. 43 (344), 02.11.1999 // Retrieved at 13.05.2018

¹⁵⁰ The title of the primary source - "OSCE Chairman-in-Office meets with OSCE Minsk Group", Warsaw 8 October 1998 // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mg/52635> // Retrieved at 13.05.2018

- b) Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right for implementation of direct external relations in economic, trade, scientific, cultural, sports and humanitarian areas with the foreign states, with the regional and international organizations connected with these problems at the relevant representation abroad. Political parties and public organizations in Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right to establish a connection with political parties and public organizations of the foreign states. Nagorno-Karabakh would take part in the implementation of a foreign policy of Azerbaijan on the questions infringing on its interests. Decisions on such questions could not be adopted without the consent of two parties;
- c) The government of Nagorno-Karabakh could have the representatives in embassies or consular establishments of Azerbaijan in the foreign states in which it would have special interests and also to send the experts to the structure of the Azerbaijani delegations for participation in the international negotiations if they concern the interests of Nagorno-Karabakh. Borders of Nagorno-Karabakh will correspond to borders of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Their possible specifications or changes could be a subject of special mutual arrangements between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Borders between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would be mutually open for free movement of unaided citizens of each other. At implementation of trips and maintaining business contacts, they would not be assessed with customs or other duties. Granting the right to the full-time residence would be referred to the competence of the relevant governments;
- d) Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would not use force or threat of use of force for settlement of disputes. In case of the disputes or disagreements insuperable within Joint Committee, the party could request an advisory opinion of the Acting chairman of OSCE which would be considered as an acceptance of the final decision. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh would include also the rights and privileges which were listed below as they would be issued in the Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh approved by the Minsk conference;¹⁵¹

Following the Paragraph V of the concomitant document upon Agreement on the cessation of armed conflict issued by OSCE MG alongside with an Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflicting parties would promote the safe and voluntary return of

¹⁵¹ The title of the document No. 18 - "About the principles of a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict" adopted by OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIR // Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Paragraph I // URL: <http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/doc18.htm> // Retrieved at 13.05.2018

refugees and internally displaced persons to their former places of residence in the separation zone, as were widely set out in Annex 2 to the same document. The Parties would negotiate the safe and voluntary return of all other persons, other than those covered by this Agreement, who were refugees or displaced as a result of the conflict and tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan after 1987. Correspondingly, there had been given a diplomatic response to the problem with definition of "People of Nagorno-Karabakh", which would have own Constitution adopted by those people of Nagorno-Karabakh on a referendum. This Constitution would incorporate provisions of the Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, respectively, would make changes to the Constitution for incorporation of this agreement. The provision of this agreement or those parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani Constitution which incorporate it could not be changed without the consent of all three parties. In the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, just the Constitution and laws of Nagorno-Karabakh would be valid. Laws, rules and executive decisions of Azerbaijan would be valid for territories of Nagorno-Karabakh if they would not contradict the Constitution and laws of the last. Nagorno-Karabakh would have own flag, the coat of arms and the anthem. According to the Constitution of Nagorno-Karabakh, it would form the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. Citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh would have as the identity card of the passport of Azerbaijan with a special overprint Nagorno-Karabakh. Only the government of Nagorno-Karabakh or authorized by him for this establishment would have the right to issue such passports. Citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh of the Armenian origin would be able to emigrate to Armenia and in case of moving there on permanent residence to obtain the Armenian citizenship according to laws of this country. The population of Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right to elect representatives in parliament of Azerbaijan and to participate in an election of the president of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh would be the free economic zone, to have the right for issue of own bank notes which would be in use along with the Azerbaijani bank notes and also to release own brands. Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right for free and free transport connections and communication with Armenia and Azerbaijan. It would also have national guard (security forces) and constabulary forces formed on a voluntary basis. These forces could not work out of Nagorno-Karabakh without the consent of the government of Azerbaijan. The army, security forces and police of Azerbaijan would not have the right to enter on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh without the consent of the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian would be the main official language in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the second official language - Azerbaijani. The citizens of this region could also use other native languages in all official and informal

cases. The budget of Nagorno-Karabakh would consist of the means received from own sources, where the government of Nagorno-Karabakh would encourage and guarantee capital investments of the Azerbaijani and foreign companies and persons.¹⁵²

Unsurprisingly, the "Common State" principle of OSCE Minsk Group was undoubtedly criticised by Azerbaijani government and was rejected, on the basis of non-compliance with previous Lisbon principles that assured the territorial integrity of either side. Almost 80 percent of "Common State" principle was to damage the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh region, by alleged remaining of territorial integrity. The problem was also dealt with seven districts adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh region which were occupied as well and undergone collateral damage from the previous war. Although initially, Armenia has willingly demonstrated its consent to the "Common State" principle, furthermore it has also denied signing aforementioned agreements, being in a high apprehension to lose those extra-occupied, contiguous districts as well. The ridiculous moment might also be observed in the special auxiliary agreements on the status of Lachin corridor, Shusha and Shaumyan (which was a separate district within AzSSR and was liquidated on February 12, 1991, by the decision of the Supreme Council of the AzSSR, and included into the Goranboy region) districts.¹⁵³

Pursuant to these agreements of "Common State" principle, the question of the use of the Lachin corridor by Nagorno-Karabakh for providing free information between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia would be a subject of the separate arrangement if with the consent of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh other decisions concerning a specific mode of Lachin district were not made. Otherwise, Lachin district would have to remain constant as a completely demilitarized zone. The parties would have also agreed that all Azerbaijani refugees would be able to return to places of the accommodation in Shusha. Their safety would be guaranteed by the relevant authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh. They would have the equal rights with all citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh, including the right for the creation of political parties, for participation in elections of all levels, to be elected to the state legislature and to local governments, to be accepted on public service, including in law enforcement bodies. The same rights would be acquired also by the Armenian refugees at their return in Shaumyan. Residents of Shusha and the

¹⁵² The title of the official document No. 18 - "About the principles of a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict" adopted by OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIR // The comparative analysis between Paragraph I, Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Paragraph V, Agreement on the cessation of armed conflict // URL: <http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/doc18.htm> // Retrieved at 14.05.2018

¹⁵³ The title of the article - "Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict: Demographic and migration aspects" written by Arif Yunusov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of Department of Conflictology and Migration of the Institute of Peace and Democracy of Azerbaijan // URL: http://www.ca-c.org/journal/16-1998/st_10_junusov.shtml // Retrieved at 14.05.2018

city of Shaumyan would have the guaranteed access on roads, communication and other relations with other Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. The authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan would render assistance to placement and activity respectively in the city of Shusha and the city of Shaumyan of representative offices of Bureau on democratic institutes and human rights of OSCE.¹⁵⁴ The main reason of ineffectiveness of the "Common State" principles was a deterioration of the pillars of initial Lisbon principles on territorial integrity and inseparable state sovereignty over the internationally recognized territories. Azerbaijani state administration led by President Heydar Aliyev was aware of a coming danger and momentarily refused to sit around the negotiation table covered with this sort of jug-handled documents.

The latest and most peculiar negotiations were held on 29 November 2007, in Madrid, the capital of Spain, at the OSCE ministerial conference. Right there, the famous "Madrid Principles" had first been introduced to the foreign ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia. According to the famous Armenian online news agency "ARAVOT", these principles was a code name of the basic proposals that have been offered to Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹⁵⁵

On July 10, 2009, within the Group of Eight Summit in L'Aquila presidents of the countries co-chairmen of OSCE Minsk Group, for the first time have officially made some changes and partially published the updated version of "Madrid principles" that were for half a year kept under secrecy.¹⁵⁶

According to the "ARAVOT", the document was firstly published in the Armenian press, in particular, in the newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak in June 2011, and was strongly secured the "Madrid Principles" in the following clauses:

a) The final status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region (hereinafter NK) would be defined by a plebiscite which means free and fair (genuine) will of the population of NK. Terms and details (modality) of a plebiscite would be coordinated by parties during further negotiations. The population of NK was understood as inhabitants of all nationalities living in NKAO in national

¹⁵⁴ The title of the official document No. 18 - "About the principles of a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict" adopted by OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIR // The Chapter II on the concerning the Lachin Corridor and the Chapter III on the concerning the City of Shushi and the City of Shaumyan // URL: <http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/doc18.htm> // Retrieved at 14.05.2018

¹⁵⁵ The title of the source - "Madrid principles, the Kazan document, or Lavrov's proposals?" edited by Emma Gabrielyan // Generalization - in the "Aravot" on April 20. Emma Gabrielyan The newspaper "Aravot" 04/19/2016 // URL: <http://www.aravot-ru.am/2016/04/21/207437/> // Retrieved at 14.05.2018

¹⁵⁶ The title of the primary source - "Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries" // URL: <https://www.osce.org/mg/51152> // Retrieved at 14.05.2018

proportions of 1988. During the plebiscite, there would not be a restriction in a formulation of a question;

b) During the intermediate period before defining the final legal status of the NK, its residents would have appropriate rights and advantages which would be determined in accordance with the stated principles in the Peace agreement. According to international law, the inhabitants of NK must have a right to social and economic activity in democratic society, protection and monitoring of one's security. The population of NK would have a right to elect officials for governance during the intermediate period. These officials would carry out legislative and executive power and also would create courts. Also they would have the right to organize elections in the areas provided under the Peace agreement. The intermediate authorities of NK would have the status of the observer at those sessions of OSCE where the issues concerning the NK would be discussed. They could enter those organizations in which internationally recognized status is not obligatory. The NK could also receive financial aid from foreign countries and the international organizations;

c) The Armenian forces would be withdrawn from all territories, adjacent to the former NKAO. The Armenian forces would also be withdrawn from Kelbadzhar district. Limited military connection would be deployed in that territory which would be defined by the International Transitional Commission, before signing of the Peace agreement. Control over Kelbadzhar district would be exercised by the International Transitional Commission where representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan would enter. The commission would carry out continuous international monitoring of Kelbadzhar district. The departure of the population from Kelbadzhar district would be encouraged. The expelled Azerbaijanians would return to Kelbadzhar district after signing of the Peace Agreement;

d) The corridor of the coordinated width would have to connect Armenia and Karabakh. Until the solution of the final status of NK, this corridor would keep that status which existed at the time of the signing of the document. After determination of the final legal status of NK, the status of a corridor would be settled, considering the final status of NK;

e) On the basis of provisions of the Peace Agreement, all internally displaced persons and refugees would have the right for return on a voluntary basis since that moment when the Commissioner of the UN for refugees declares that safety of former residences is ensured. All persons which would have come back to the settlements without discrimination would have human rights and fundamental freedoms. Their coexistence would have to be promoted by all

parties, pursuing the aim to weaken tension and also to settle an economic, political and social status of Armenians and Azerbaijanians;

f) Before entry into force of the Peace Agreement, the International peacekeeping operation for monitoring of demilitarization and safety of areas would be carried out. Peacekeeping units would be created from troops. Granting troops for peacekeeping activity would be carried out on a voluntary basis. Each party would have the veto on the choice of other party. In the document, there was also a conclusion where, besides the generalizing estimates, it was noted that the Basic principles provided creation of 4 commissions. The first would develop "Details of the implementation of a plebiscite", the second must specify "Future status of a corridor", the third has to develop "Full transfer of Kelbadzhar district to the Azerbaijan" and the fourth would discuss "The additional issues concerning the realization of the Basic principles";¹⁵⁷

This time, the main reason for the failure of the mediation policy of the OSCE Minsk Group, which was set out in the so-called Lisbon, Madrid and other principles, was basically dealt with parallel co-existence of the factors of hybrid warfare which even led to the underestimation and misinterpretation of such political term as the referendum and incompatibility of its usual form within Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's character. The derivative reasons were also the incomprehension and bias with the concept of the plebiscite, the similarity upon the old principles of the "Common State" and the protracted nature of the negotiations. The parties even were not ready for a full-fledged peace scheme of negotiations, which would be based on a real mutual trust and reciprocal respect of the decisions taken by both sides. That is why the talks in Kazan, held on June 25, 2011, did not yield any results in the way of signing an agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis of the agreed Madrid principles.

2.1. The core activities of other international organizations within conflict

In recent years, the political role and value of various international organizations with European identity has increased in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and, first of all, such as the European Union (hereinafter EU) and the Council of Europe (hereinafter CE). Recognizing the priority of such organizations as UN, CIS, NATO, Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, Collective Security Treaty Organization, OSCE and its Minsk group (hereinafter

¹⁵⁷ The title of the primary source - "Madrid principles, the Kazan document, or Lavrov's proposals?" edited by Emma Gabrielyan // Generalization - in the "Aravot" on April 20. Emma Gabrielyan The newspaper "Aravot" 04/19/2016 // URL: <http://www.aravot-ru.am/2016/04/21/207437/> // Retrieved at 14.05.2018

OSCE MG), European ones, nevertheless, is still trying to make the most feasible contribution to the peaceful settlement, proceeding from own purposes, functions and priorities.

Nowadays, the policy of the EU and CE in the South Caucasus, and in particular in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is covered by the principles of the new European Neighbourhood Policy and based on the premise that the South Caucasus is a unique region in which the value approaches and humanitarian ideals of the new European foreign policy are interwoven in a peculiar way with both pragmatic considerations of geopolitics and geo-economics, and with stereotypes of relations between Europe and Russia and the Islamic world. The current EU leadership as the milestone of its existence is still possessing a solution to the problem of ensuring energy security close to its geopolitical zone of influence. The main value of the new independent states of the South Caucasus lies in the ability of the European Union (after the collapse of the USSR) to directly develop, without Russia's participation, energy deposits that belong to them, and also to lay through the territories of these countries ways of supplying energy carriers from the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia to the states - members of the EU, bypassing the territory of Russia.¹⁵⁸

According to the independent Azeri standpoint, France is still the unofficial EU representative within the Minsk Group, because the European Union Special Representative (hereinafter EUSR) has never worked visibly with Paris to establish a strong EU position on the resolution process. Therefore, in order to promote the functionality of the Minsk Group, it is not necessary to find a new format, but rather to re-work the current options. On the one hand, the EUSR and the French Co-Chair, with the participation of the heads of the EU delegations in Azerbaijan and Armenia, could find a working framework to improve the EU's role in Nagorno-Karabakh resolution. The delegation heads, member-state ambassadors, and the EUSR could meet every month, and then present the results to the EU institutions. Secondly, the EUSR could informally attend, or attend with 'observer status', the meetings of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. This would mean slightly changing the format: 3 Co-Chairs + 1 EUSR. Unfortunately, discussions over the EUSR's engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ended with criticism of Azerbaijan following the 2007 incident, when the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister recalled the then-EUSR from his unauthorized visit to Nagorno-Karabakh. This incident has since been cited

¹⁵⁸ The title of the source - "The European Union and the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory", Report prepared for the Committee on Member States' Obligations // Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Berlin 4-5 November 2007 // Stefan Wolff, Centre for International Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution, University of Nottingham // URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224476/evidence-stefan-wolff-nagorno-karabakh-territory.pdf // Retrieved at 15.05.2018

by EU officials as evidence that Azerbaijan opposes increased EUSR mandate within international mediation of OSCE MG. Azerbaijan's demand is that the EUSR promotes inter-community dialogue in Nagorno-Karabakh; otherwise, the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities will cite these visits as a sign of recognition or international support.¹⁵⁹ At this moment, we have again observed an intermediate development of the concomitant image-making game within international community proven as a co-existing new hybrid warfare factor. Nevertheless, the realization of these inter-community negotiations was characteristic of an end-stage peace process, but they are crucial at this current stage given the decreasing tensions and trust-building. However, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are monopolizing the right to speak on behalf of the territory by the coloring of their alleged innocent image, and are refusing to accept the Azerbaijani community as part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore if EUSR wants to make the contribution to settlement process, it has to begin with further assistance to contacts between Azerbaijanians and Armenians. In addition, other alternatives include: that the EU stimulates dialogue through Parliamentary Assembly of Euronest (further EURONEST), to intensify bilateral contacts between Azerbaijanians and Armenians in parliamentary measurement. The European Commission (hereinafter EC), through the Eastern Partnership (hereinafter EaP) and other mechanisms, can increase its role. The European Parliament (hereinafter EP) has adopted resolutions on the conflict, suggesting increased engagement. Its resolution 'On the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus' (20 May 2010) said "frozen conflicts are an impediment to the economic and social development and hinder the improvement of the standard of living of the South Caucasus region, as well as the full development of the EaP of the European Neighbourhood Policy (hereinafter ENP); whereas a peaceful resolution of the conflict is essential for stability in the EU Neighbourhood". The same resolution called for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁶⁰ Also of importance is how the EU uses its influence in conflict resolution, either directly or indirectly. A direct impact stems from deliberate EU actions as a foreign policy actor, i.e. diplomatic activism. Indirectly, for the prospective member countries affected by secessionist conflicts, the EU offers a single currency and visa-free regimes, making territorial disputes less relevant to the daily life of the affected population. Until now, the EU has acted indirectly in conflict resolution;

¹⁵⁹ The title of the source - "Azerbaijan is disappointed with EU's role in Nagorno-Karabakh" edited by Gulshan Pashayeva // URL: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/opinion/azerbaijan-is-disappointed-with-eus-role-in-nagorno-karabakh/> // Retrieved at 16.05.2018

¹⁶⁰ The title of the primary source - European Parliament resolution of 20 May 2010 on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus // URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0193+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> // Retrieved at 16.05.2018

in this regard, despite the fact that both Azerbaijan and Armenia may sign Association Agreements and thereby get more benefits from the EU until the conflict is resolved, neither country will really benefit in concrete terms. Negotiations on the Association Agreements with both Azerbaijan and Armenia were launched in July 2010, and so far 24 of the 28 negotiations have been successfully completed with Armenia, and 13 with Azerbaijan. For the Association Agreements to come into force, they must be ratified by the EP as well as by EU countries' national parliaments. EP resolutions adopted at the end of March 2013, has also contained recommendations for the Council, the EC and European External Action Service (hereinafter EEAS) regarding the negotiation of Association Agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The text includes links to confidence-building measures, taking into account the recommendation that EUSRs can and must engineer inter-community meetings.¹⁶¹ The language echoed the 'Madrid Principles' in calling to end the occupation and all activity in the occupied territories, urging Armenia to put an end to any kind of settlement-building initiative designed to increase the Armenian population in the occupied territories, to provide accurate data on ethnic representation in Nagorno-Karabakh's population, and to take immediate steps toward peaceful resolution. Unfortunately, only 6 of this 14 principles have been agreed and made public. These were: the return of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; granting interim status to Nagorno-Karabakh and guaranteeing security and self-governance; the right of all internally displaced persons (hereinafter IDPs) and refugees to return to their places of origin; opening a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; defining the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally-binding expression of will; and international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation. It has also been noted by Azeri vision that the EU missed an earlier opportunity for similar progress. For no what, in 2006, both countries signed ENP Action Plans, which focused primarily on political and economic transformation rather than resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. While Azerbaijan's Action Plan includes "the respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally-recognised borders of each other," representing the first priority area, in Armenia's Action Plan conflict resolution is only seventh in the priority list, and entails the competing principle of 'self-determination of peoples'. In terms of EU leverage, the ENP Action Plans did not include clear statements or demands from the conflict parties. The signing of the Association Agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia should be conditional on a serious commitment by both parties to

¹⁶¹ The title of the source - "European Neighbourhood Policy, working towards a stronger partnership: EP's position on the 2012 progress reports" // URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0446+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#def_1_18 // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

resolve the conflict. The principle of territorial integrity should be included in the texts of both agreements, as well as the Madrid Principles, tied to expectations of results. Azeri vision has also been kept under this sort of diplomatic disposition in order to make its own image of diplomatic cheerleader more liable, to get rid of EU criticism arisen whether from itself or other EU institutions and to ensure the EU guarantees on international mediation and more secure circumstances for a presumption of peaceful negotiations. Howbeit, for Armenians the guarantees will also be helpful, especially regarding the security of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population, which Armenia has repeatedly questioned.¹⁶²

The main activities of another weighty European Organization of the Council of Europe had been incepted from the Resolution № 1047 of its Parliamentary Assembly (hereinafter PACE) in 1994 on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. PACE has welcomed an armistice signed on 12 May 1994 and hoped that it would be followed up as soon as possible by a peace agreement between the warring parties. The conflict, which broke out in 1988, has already resulted in almost 20 000 deaths and more than one million refugees. It has also welcomed the agreement signed on 26 July 1994 by the Ministers of Defence of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which they affirmed their commitment to observe the ceasefire and their eagerness to accelerate the signing of a political agreement, and calls urgently on all the warring parties to refrain from any hostile act which might jeopardize the fragile ceasefire that has been in force since 12 May 1994. Finally, it calls on the warring parties to organize the return home of refugees on an urgent basis and to respect minority rights as advocated in its Recommendation 1201¹⁶³ and urgently calls on Azerbaijan and Turkey to immediately end the blockade of their means of communication with Armenia.¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² The title of the article - "Challenges for the EU in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: An Azerbaijani perspective" written by Zaur Shiryev // pp.3-4 // URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/166082/pub_3587_an_azerbaijani_perspective.pdf // Retrieved at 17.05.2018

¹⁶³ "Additional protocol on the rights of minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights", Recommendation 1201 (1993) // Assembly debate on 1 February 1993 (22nd Sitting) (see Doc. 6742, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Rapporteur : Mr Worms ; and Doc. 6749, opinion of the Political Affairs Committee, Rapporteur : Mr. de Puig). Text adopted by the Assembly on 1 February 1993 (22nd Sitting) // URL: <http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbmQvbnceG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNTIzNSZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NibWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9OZGYvWFJiZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xslparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE1MjM1> // Retrieved at 17.05.2018

¹⁶⁴ Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh", Resolution 1047 (1994) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe // URL: <http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbmQvbnceG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNjQ1OCZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NibWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9OZGYvWFJiZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xslparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE2NDU4> // Retrieved at 17.05.2018

Aftermath of this resolution and recommendations, were kept by the next official documents adopted by PASE of the Council of Europe. Amidst them, there were such documents: as the next PASE Recommendation №1251¹⁶⁶ (1994), that, particularly, was directed to the deployment of international observers in the war zone, a renovation of political dialogue with the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan and starting of co-operation programmes to Armenia and Azerbaijan by placing experts at their disposal who could help draw up a political status for Nagorno-Karabakh based on a mutual goodwill of either side; the Recommendation №1263¹⁶⁷ (1995) on "Humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan" that was encouraged by the further PASE Resolution №1059¹⁶⁸ (1995) on it; a comparative PASE report wherein the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with the OSCE Minsk Conference¹⁶⁹, fastened by further PASE Recommendation №1690¹⁷⁰ (2005) and

¹⁶⁵ See also Doc. 7182, report of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, Rapporteurs: Mr. Pfuhl and Mr. Solé Tura. Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 10 November 1994 // URL: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=8185&lang=EN> // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

¹⁶⁶ Recommendation 1251 (1994) // Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh // URL: <http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbnceG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHluYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNTI4NSZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJiZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE1Mjk3> // Retrieved at 17.05.2018

¹⁶⁷ Recommendation 1263 (1995) // Humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan // URL: <http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbnceG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHluYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNTI5NyZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJiZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE1Mjk3> // See also Doc. 7250, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, rapporteur: Mr. Atkinson; and Doc. 7266, an opinion of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, rapporteur: Mr. Jeszenszky. Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 15 March 1995 // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

¹⁶⁸ Resolution 1059 (1995) // Humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia and Azerbaijan // URL: <http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbnceG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHluYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNjQ3MCZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJiZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE2NDcw> // Retrieved at 17.05.2018

¹⁶⁹ The title of the source - "The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference" // Doc. 10364, 29 November 2004 // Report Political Affairs Committee Rapporteur: Mr. David Atkinson, United Kingdom, European Democrat Group // URL: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10733&lang=EN> // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

¹⁷⁰ Recommendation 1690 (2005) // The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference // URL: <http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbnceG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHluYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNzI5MCZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJiZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE3Mjk3> // Assembly debate on 25 January 2005 (2nd Sitting) (see also Doc.10364, report of the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Mr. Atkinson). Text adopted by the Assembly on 25 January 2005 (2nd Sitting) // Retrieved at 17.05.2018

the Resolution №1416¹⁷¹ (2005) on it; and the freshest reply from the Committee of Ministers enricshed in PASE Doc. 10685 on 26 September 2005.¹⁷²

Comparatively analyzing, we have found out that the farthest engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still being held by such geopolitically opposite and geostrategically conflicting military organizations as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO) versus Collective Security Treaty Organization (hereinafter CSTO). Talking more about NATO's role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it has to be taken into academic consideration that each of the conflicting sides participated within such NATO-sponsored programs as the Partnership for Peace (hereinafter PfP) from 1994 that is a program targeted at an establishment of credibility between NATO and other European states and the post-Soviet countries and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (hereinafter EAPC), which is another post-Cold War entity of NATO, playing a role of multilateral forum constructed to enhance relations between NATO and non-NATO European countries and those parts of Asia on the European rimland.

Being in the highest proportion to Neil Silviter's seminal article on NATO's role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we might approve that NATO has built very good relations with either side within aforementioned peacekeeping programs. Despite maintaining steady relations with both nations, NATO's 2008 Bucharest Declaration whipped up some controversy by noting its support for the "territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova."¹⁷³ The statement has backed Nagorno-Karabakh's existence within Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and therefore prompted Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian to boycott NATO's 2010 Lisbon Summit, which ultimately reiterated the controversial clause in the summit's declaration.¹⁷⁴ Controversy aside, NATO has largely played

¹⁷¹ Resolution 1416 (2005) // The conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference // URL: <http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbmQvbnveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHluYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNzI4OSZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdc9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE3Mjg5> // Retrieved at 18.05.2018

¹⁷² The title of the official document - "The conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference Recommendation 1690 (2005)" // Reply from the Committee of Ministers, adopted at the 938th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies (21 September 2005) // URL: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=11024&lang=EN> // Retrieved at 18.05.2018

¹⁷³ The title of the primary source - "Bucharest Summit Declaration", issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 // URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm?mode=pressrelease // Retrieved at 18.05.2018

¹⁷⁴ The title of the primary source - "Lisbon Summit Declaration", issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon // URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm // Retrieved at 18.05.2018

a neutral role throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and has continually adjourned to the leadership of the OSCE Minsk Group to resolve the conflict. Today, the pivotal formulas of the Minsk Group mandate have not come to accomplishment, most notably, with the establishment of a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force. In lieu of a proper peacekeeping force, the Line of Contact (hereinafter LoC) between Armenia and Azerbaijan was kept uncrippled by military deterrence, which has paved a tremulous ground for peace, with its subsequent constant ceasefire violations that have varyingly evolved into the military hassle. The necessity for an internationally-mediated peacekeeping force was also one of the Madrid Principles launched by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group in November 2007. In a recent Chatham House report on the conflict, Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme, Laurence Broers notes that “The inability to install a credible ceasefire support infrastructure is the single most debilitating weakness of the international mediation effort today.”¹⁷⁵ Confirmed with recent collisions in Nagorno-Karabakh, the territory is not the frozen conflict and is capable to turn into full-scale war quickly. As the Transatlantic region is already intense in connection with the continuing crisis of refugees and also a set of the conflicts along its periphery, the NATO is not able to afford one more regional conflict. Considering that this conflict can have wider consequences for the relations between NATO and Russia, the NATO has to continue to support efforts on the achievement of the resolution. For this purpose, NATO can use the reliable platform for interaction both with Armenia and with Azerbaijan. Within the special programs of the Individual Partnership Action Plans¹⁷⁶ (hereinafter IPAP), the NATO can focus obligations of IPAP on coincidence to tasks of the Minsk mandate, therefore, applying the diplomatic pressure promoting the implementation of the mandate of OSCE better. As it concerns the crucial multinational presence of peacekeepers, members of NATO should continue to respect a primacy of OSCE. Nevertheless, the Alliance can offer expanded support for the implementation of this project. Having wealth of experience in the field of peacekeeping, NATO can provide experts and the advanced practice to the formation of supervising peacekeeping presence and also lobby expanded presence of group which will be headed by the Minsk group of OSCE. Thanks to an active position concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, NATO can not only support a neutrality but also

¹⁷⁵ The title of the research paper - "The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Defaulting to War " edited by Laurence Broers // Russia and Eurasia Programme, July 2016 // pp.24 // URL:

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/NK%20paper%2024082016%20WEB.pdf> // Retrieved at 19.05.2018

¹⁷⁶ The title of the primary source - "Individual Partnership Action Plans" // URL:

https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49290.htm // Retrieved at 19.05.2018

work on the creation of more effective mechanisms of stabilization in a conflict zone - measures which can also help long-term prospects for peace.¹⁷⁷

In contrast, CSTO has got a very well-designed relationship just with Armenia which became its full member from 1994, almost together with Azerbaijan. On 2 April 1999, only six members of the CSTO signed a protocol that was updating the treaty for another five-year period. To the opposite, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan has denied to sign and withdrew from the treaty instead. The main reason was a parallel co-existence of GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development created in 1997 by the highest American assistance within the international community. Notwithstanding a geographical proximity of CSTO to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its policy was destined far away from this region, even to compare to its geopolitical enemy, NATO. Unsurprisingly, in his last press conference, the Chief of the CSTO Joint Staff, Anatoly Sidorov has underpinned that Nagorno-Karabakh is not a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member, and therefore the organization will not provide military assistance to Khankendi. He has also noted that a CSTO agreement was signed and updated with Armenia, and, correspondingly, the CSTO has certain commitments to Yerevan. In addition, Anatoly Sidorov stressed that the CSTO does not have the authority to intervene in a conflict without a respective request by the organization's member country which a party to this conflict.¹⁷⁸ The main geopolitical challenge arose from CSTO's non-remembrance and a reluctance on its solidarity with OSCE MG principles on territorial integrity and UN principles on non-intervention of other state's internal affairs.

As a last one-sided actor, with the face of a weighty international organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later became the Organization for Islamic Cooperation) (hereinafter OIC) has played a role of diplomatic custodian of the Republic of Azerbaijan around the tables of an international community. In comparison with Azerbaijan, Armenia has lacked this sort of spiritual support, if Armenian lobby abroad has not been considered as a prototype of OIC. According to the last reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic, the OIC was the first organization which has admitted the fact of aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan. Summits of the organization always held a problem of Nagorno-Karabakh in the center of attention and adopted quite accurate statements demanding respect for rules of

¹⁷⁷ The title of the article - "Can NATO Make a Difference in Nagorno-Karabakh?" edited by Neil Siviter, who is a writer for the NATO Association of Canada's Arc of Crisis Program, and also, an intern with the Corporate Engagement team of the Ontario Chamber of Commerce // URL: <http://natoassociation.ca/can-nato-make-a-difference-in-nagorno-karabakh/> // Retrieved at 19.05.2018

¹⁷⁸ The title of the source - "CSTO Joint Staff chief says they will not help Karabakh in case of war" // URL: <https://news.am/eng/news/439726.html> // Retrieved at 19.05.2018

international law. The first resolution on Armenian-Azerbaijani, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been adopted at the 21st conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the organization which has taken place in Karachi (Pakistan) in 25 - 29 April 1993. It has resolutely announced attacks of Armenia on Azerbaijan and occupations of its territories. In the document scales and gravity of the humanitarian problems caused by the aggression of Armenia against the Azerbaijani Republic which created the threat to the international peace and safety have been stated and demanded an immediate withdrawal of armed forces of Armenia from all occupied Azerbaijani territories. Moreover, the resolution urged Armenia to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Azerbaijani Republic. This document also contained an appeal to that forcibly displaced persons could return to the houses for safety, respect, an advantage and also asked member states, the Islamic Development Bank and other Islamic institutions to render urgent financial and humanitarian aid to the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹⁷⁹ The organization also asked the UN Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council to use all efforts for the adoption of the resolution condemning aggression of Armenia and demanding an immediate withdrawal of the Armenian military formations from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In addition to this, two more OIC resolutions condemning the Armenian aggression were adopted in turn, wherein the first was adopted in December 1994 at the next, the Seventh Islamic Summit held in Casablanca, the Kingdom of Morocco¹⁸⁰, and the second in 1997 in Jakarta (Indonesia) at the next conference OIC Foreign Ministers.¹⁸¹ If the first two resolutions were similar in their endogenous and exogenous interpretations, then the political outcome of the latter was more significant and had a rather specific character. Firstly, the name of the resolution was correctly chosen: "On the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan". This time, the document expressed concern about the seriousness of humanitarian problems regarding the existence of one million people who were forcibly deported and refugees in the territory of Azerbaijan and asked the international community to give urgent financial assistance

¹⁷⁹ The title of the primary source - "FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF 21ST CONFERENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS", Karachi, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 4 - 8 Zul Qa'dah 1413H, 25 - 29 April 1993 // URL: http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/21/21cfm_fc_en.htm // Retrieved at 20.05.2018

¹⁸⁰ The title of the primary source - "FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS CASABLANCA", KINGDOM OF MOROCCO, 8-10 RAJAB, 1415H, 10-12 DECEMBER, 1994 // URL: <http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/22/final%2022.htm> // Retrieved at 20.05.2018

¹⁸¹ The title of the primary source - "FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS", SESSION OF FRATERNITY AND COOPERATION, JAKARTA, REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, 28 RAJAB TO 3 SHA'ABAN, 1417H // 9-13 DECEMBER, 1996 // URL: <http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/24/final24.htm> // Retrieved at 20.05.2018

to resolve this problem.¹⁸² Also, the latest resolutions were wielding more spiritual character especially such as Resolution № 3/43-C¹⁸³ on Protection of Islamic Holy Places Destruction and Desecration of Islamic Historical and Cultural Relics and Shrines in the occupied Azerbaijani territories. It must be underscored that a spiritual support would not be effective without economic and political ones, and despite one fact that there has also been adopted such resolutions as Resolution № 6/37-E¹⁸⁴ and № Resolution 10/37-POL¹⁸⁵ which reaffirmed the position of the OIC members states stated also in the previous Resolution 10/11¹⁸⁶ for Economic and Political Assistance to the Republic of Azerbaijan, in reality, there was no plausible material support and its positive results.

To conclude, it must be understood that all of these external actors from the international arena have still been bringing one's logic, goals, and competitive policies to the Nagorno-Karabakh region and to a bleeding local conflict on it. The role of these organizations in the collateral emergence of the new hybrid warfare factors still seems to be untraceable, and possible revelation is not excluded from our thesis.

2.2. The 2016 "April war" as an igniter of the new factors of hybrid warfare

To propel our analysis of no war, no peace period, it is inevitable to reveal the most violent post-war actions taken within 2016 four-day "April War". The severe skirmish has begun on the night of April 2, then turned into protracted fighting and has officially ended on April 5, with the achievement of the arrangement on truce during the meeting of chiefs of the General Staff of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow. Despite it, collisions and shelling continued on an

¹⁸² The title of the source - "The Organization of Islamic Cooperation" edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan //URL: <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/841> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

¹⁸³ The title of the primary source - "Resolution NO. 3/44-C on Protection of Islamic Holy Places", p. 14 // URL: https://www.oic-oci.org/subweb/cfm/44/en/docs/final/44cfm_res_cs_r2_en.pdf // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

¹⁸⁴ The title of the primary source - "Resolution No. 6/37-E on Economic Assistance to the Member States and Muslim Communities in Non-OIC Countries" adopted by the thirty-seven session of the Council of the Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), pp.21-27 // URL: <http://ww1.oic-oci.org/37cfm/en/documents/res/37-CFM-ECO-RES-ENGLISH-FINAL.pdf> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

¹⁸⁵ The title of the primary source - "Resolution NO.10/37-POL on the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan" adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers (Session of Shared Vision of a more secure and Prosperous Islamic World) Dushanbe, Republic of Tajikistan, 4-6 Jamadul Thani 1431H, 18-20 MAY 2010 // p.29 // URL: <http://ww1.oic-oci.org/37cfm/en/documents/res/37-CFM-POL-RES-ENGLISH-FINAL.pdf> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

¹⁸⁶ The title of the primary source - "Resolution No.10/11-P(IS) on the Aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan" adopted by the Eleventh Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, (SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC UMMAH IN THE 21ST CENTURY), Dakar, Republic of Senegal, 6 – 7 Rabiul Awwal 1429H 7, 13-14 March 2008 // p.23 // URL: <https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=35&refID=9> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

extent of almost all April 2016, therefore, another name of the conflict — "April war" is a little more proper.¹⁸⁷ We once again will sum up the results of this escalation of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict which was the most bloody from coming into force of the agreement on termless armistice on May 12, 1994. Initially, both sides were condemning one another on inception of shelling with heavy artillery, but reality was being interpreted by western, local and Russian news agencies and think-tanks in various and opposing trajectories. According to the Azerbaijani news agencies and the statements of the official representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the blitzkrieg war was ended up with the liberation of strategically and tactically significant highes and surrounding villages of the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹⁸⁸

The Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan Zakir Gasanov has stated that the army of Azerbaijan did not set as the purpose to wage full-scale war, and just had to respond to a problem of suppression of weapon emplacements of the Armenians shooting the peaceful Azerbaijani population. Further, the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan has declared the liberation of several strategic heights in Karabakh, including the villages of Seysulan, heights around the village Talysh and also the height of Leletepa on the direction to the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan. According to the statement of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, heights around the village Talysh could create a danger to Geranboy district of the country and city of Naftalan, and the bar to Leletepa has been cleared for the safety of the city of Goradiz.¹⁸⁹ Immediately, the Armenian news agencies has initiated a process of fake and partly-true news dissemination over the digital space of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in order to keep emerging fear of Armenian population far away from closer districts and to control full propagandistic engagement of Armenian lobby abroad. For instance, the notorious Armenian news agency ARMENPRESS was differing with its highest presence on Armenian digital propaganda and dissemination of fake news. Pursuant to its operations-related news on the situation around Seysulan village, the official representatives of Azeri Ministry of Defence are permanently issuing fake news on liberation of Seysulan, but in Armenian reality it still remained Armenian land, "as it used to be before". The ARMENPRESS has represented a statement of the Defense Army of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh

¹⁸⁷ The title of the article - "Global Powers Scramble to Contain Neglected Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict" edited by Laurence Broers, Chatham House Associate Fellow on Russia and Eurasia Programme, 4 April 2016 // URL: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/global-powers-scramble-contain-neglected-armenian-azerbaijani-conflict> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

¹⁸⁸ Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic: "Armenians did not beat off the height of Talish village" edited by Haqqin.az on April 3, 2016 // URL: <https://haqqin.az/news/67245> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

¹⁸⁹ The title of the source - "The Azerbaijani army has liberated several settlements from the occupants" edited by Vesti.az // URL: <http://vesti.az/news/287869> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

Republic, with peculiar footage that has allegedly shown the killed Azerbaijanis in red circles who have allegedly occupied Seysulan.¹⁹⁰ Later the reporters of pro-Armenian France Presse agency who have visited a front zone have confirmed the fact of the liberation of Leletepe Hill but ill-treated it as Azeri occupation. Nonetheless, there have been issued such contradicting news as the German Reuters agency reported the seizure of the village of Talish by the Azerbaijani armed forces, and subsequent retaliation by the soldiers of the self-declared Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁹¹

Generally speaking, the "April war" has played very crucial role as a projectile of the new hybrid warfare factors, because of upsurging strategical and tactical-operational levels of hybridity. As a result of the mixed co-existence of the new factors of hybrid warfare, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has roped with certain templates. Not productive activity of international mediators and diplomatic stagnation slowly, but it was expected, have flowed in the beginning of war. The present Azerbaijani government has been called upon to accept a new strategic step for discharge attention of its population from internal political-economic and social crisis which main cause was the lack of democracies, secured space for building of the new peaceful relations with Armenia that could be a quite innovative approach in solutions of an economic crisis of both countries and a failure of the international mediation which was fraught with a lack of international peace treaty. These negative components of April war became a face of constantly upgrading new factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh. Also after the "April War", the level of participation and the number of conflicting parties were summed up. It was completely clarified that the war is between Armenia, not the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan. Since the agreements on armistice between Azerbaijan (represented by N. Sadikhov) and Armenia (represented by Y. Khachaturov) in Moscow April 5, 2016, have a very strong diplomatic background, because there was no third party represented by the representatives of the "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic". It is also worth emphasizing still the importance of the new hybrid tactics realized in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as it played a role of new factors of hybrid warfare in an operational phase of the conflict. The Azerbaijani army has been equipped much better than it was possible to imagine. It was also clear that

¹⁹⁰ The title of the source - "NKR Defense Army: Seysulan remains Armenian land, as it used to be before" represented and edited by ARMENPRESS news agency of Armenia // URL: <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/842027/nkr-defense-army-seysulan-remains-armenian-land-as-it-used-to-be-before.html> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

¹⁹¹ The title of the source - "Nagorno-Karabakh truce holds, but residents fear renewed violence" edited by Reuters Staff, on APRIL 6, 2016 // URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nagorno-karabakh-ceasfire-idUSKCN0X30DV> // Retrieved at 21.05.2018

Azerbaijan actively purchases the latest military equipment. But the last operations during the “April war”, have proved that a lot of things have been hidden from the public. The anti-tank complexes “Spike” and the reconnaissance-percussion Israeli-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (hereinafter UAV) “Harop” in an arsenal of the Azerbaijani army became a surprise for all.¹⁹²

According to the last report of an outstanding Russian news agency “RIA NOVOSTI”, during fights on the northern direction of the line of contact of forces of Azerbaijan and self-declared NKR an unusual incident has occurred. The UAV of the Azerbaijani army has struck a blow to the bus in which the Armenian volunteers commuted. After this RIA Novosti have said that the head of the press service of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan Vagif Dyargakhly, has expressed that the Azerbaijani side would not comment on the message of the Armenian media. "It is information of the Armenian media. It does not concern us. The armed forces of Azerbaijan monitor a situation along the line of contact in Karabakh. We control the territories freed the day before".¹⁹³ According to this information, the possibility of tactical use of warring drones, for the first time in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not disproved and became an obvious new factor of an operational phase of hybrid war in Nagorno-Karabakh. But it was not everything as the Armenian side has begun to counter-act by quite new tactical and operational methods for undermining psychological advantage of the opponent which were rather unsuccessful.

Pursuant to the "Statement on the use of white phosphorus bomb by the armed forces of Armenia against civilians and civilian objects of Azerbaijan" issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia has also wanted to show its ability to use irregular tactics filled with a high level of hybridity. In recent escalations and offensive actions starting from April 2, 2016, armed forces of Armenia among numerous instances of deliberate shelling on civilians and civilian objects of Azerbaijan with artillery and large-caliber weapons have also used shells containing chemicals such as white phosphorus. One of such projectiles was shelled on Askipara village of the Tartar region of Azerbaijan, coincidentally it missed its prime target and landed on the cultivated cotton field and was found as an unexploded ordinance by Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) on May 10. If landed on the densely populated part of Askipara village, the projectile would have inflicted serious casualties and

¹⁹² The title of the article: ""Four-day war" in Nagorno-Karabakh" edited by Ahmed Alili, Researcher in International Management for the socio-political newspaper "ЭХО" // URL: <http://www.echo.az/article.php?aid=99015> // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

¹⁹³ The title of the source - "Yerevan announces the death of seven people in Karabakh with the impact of a drone" edited by the "RIA NOVOSTI", April 4, 2016 // URL: <https://ria.ru/world/20160404/1402441265.html> // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

injuries among the civilians.¹⁹⁴ In response, Spokesman of the Defense Ministry of Armenia Artsrun Hovhannisyán said that the Azerbaijani allegations of white phosphorus usage by Armenian Forces are “ill-mannered delusions”. “A few words regarding the white phosphorus: Azerbaijan is in an ill-mannered delusion. But we understand this type of behavior. The saying is correct: “Fear has big eyes. They see even what is not present” (У страха глаза велики: чего нет, и то видят)”, Hovhannisyán wrote via Facebook.¹⁹⁵

To end up, we might argue that main reasons of burning new hybrid warfare factors within conflict could be shaky economic situations in, both, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and also the emergence of a possibility of Azerbaijan to deal with Russia in order to get green light to the commencement of full-scale war en route liberation of occupied territories. But, this kind of academic prognosis still needs to be reaffirmed by periodic repetition of aforementioned casualties which are not far away from conflict's contemporary battlespaces.

2.3. Convoluted hybrid warfare factors within alternative conflict models for peaceful resolution

In addition to the aforementioned principles of peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the international community has put forward completely innovative methods for resolving intercommunal and ethnic strife based on a comparative analysis of appropriate regional conflicts. Some of them were put into the heart of very prolific, comparative research completed by Ali Abasov and Haroutiún Khachatrián on various variants of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that within this sort of comparative analysis there were detected a systematic merge amidst old and new factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The main outcome was dealt with prolonged Armenian policy on de jure non-recognition of self-declared NKR. The main reason was tied with unremitting Armenian appetite to keep itself in a closest geopolitical position to this region and uprising fear to leave NKR alone within international mediation that would cut it from Armenia and to lose its reputation in the eyes of local Armenians who might be enticed by

¹⁹⁴ The title of the primary source - "Statement on the use of white phosphorus bomb by the armed forces of Armenia against civilians and civilian objects of Azerbaijan", by Elmar Mammadyarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, at the International Conference on the Victims of Ethnic and Religious Violence in the Middle East // URL: <http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/909/4104> // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

¹⁹⁵ The title of the primary source - "Defense Ministry spokesman responds to Azerbaijani allegations of white phosphorus usage: Azerbaijan is in an ill-mannered delusion" edited by Armenian news agency ARMENPRESS, 11 May, 2016 // <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/846805/defense-ministry-spokesman-responds-to-azerbaijani-allegations-of-white-phosphorus-usage-azerbaijan.html> // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

growing economy of Azerbaijan, who are not living inside economic prosperity and have encountered with many social and financial aid problems from the government.¹⁹⁶ Currently, this fear was ballooned by the decision of Trump's administration to cut financial aid to Armenia from the state budget. The US budget issued on May 2018 would show a decisive 70 percent cut in aid to Armenia over the fiscal year 2017 budget, which allocated \$22.4 million in assistance to Armenia. Trump's budget would be calling for a \$6.8 million aid package to Armenia.¹⁹⁷

“We are troubled by President Trump's ill-advised and misguided proposal to sharply cut aid to Armenia. His budget recommendation underscores the need to work with Congressional appropriators to reverse these reductions while redoubling our efforts to empower Armenia's aid-to-trade transition,” said Aram Hamparian, Executive Director of the Armenian National Committee of America.¹⁹⁸

Despite these facts, the historical background of alternative peaceful resolutions arisen from comparative analysis of similar conflict models was serving as a main pillar of this sort of Armenian ambivalent foreign policy toward self-declared NKR. For the first blush, there could be mentioned the idea of the so-called Cyprus variant that was emerged in discussions even within the 1990s how to settle the Karabakh conflict and its future status. Point of "the Cyprus model" consisted that this formation (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) is officially recognized by Turkey only and exists and functions de facto. The Cyprian model in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh meant: not to recognize it de jure, but to agree with its existence de facto. It was meant that Nagorno-Karabakh would not be an integral part of the Azerbaijan Republic or the Republic of Armenia, would not be officially recognized as an independent state, would not be a member of the international community, but would exist and function as an independent state formation. In the beginning of negotiations based on this model, the opinion of the Armenian side, the Cyprus model was a compromise one. It could allow the sides to reconcile themselves to the existing state of affairs without the humiliation of the national dignity of all sides involved in the conflict. It would facilitate tension, would provide a respite and would promote the future broader approach to a solution. On the other hand, it would contribute to the normalization of the relations between neighbors - Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a quite opposite response expressed

¹⁹⁶ See "The Draft State Budget of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic for 2016 submitted to the Parliament" // URL: <http://www.nankr.am/en/1487> // December 2, 2015 // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

¹⁹⁷ See also "Losing the moral compass over Nagorno-Karabakh" // By Jacob Kamaras // URL: <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/21/granting-aid-to-armenia-sends-a-roguish-message/> // November 21, 2017 // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

¹⁹⁸ See also "Trump's Budget Cuts Armenia Assistance by Almost 70 Percent" // URL: <https://anca.org/trumps-budget-cuts-armenia-assistance-by-almost-70-percent/> // Issued by Armenian National Committee of America // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

by the Azerbaijani side, such model violated its territorial integrity and sovereign management over it and nearly ten years work but hasn't met expectations.¹⁹⁹

The secondly proposed model was the “Chechen Variant”. In one and a half years of bloodshed in 1996, the Russian Federation and Chechnya have come to the agreement on the war termination, peace-making and a delay of determination of the status of Chechnya within five years. Such is there was an essence of the Chechen option, some kind of "mechanism of the delayed determination of the political status". Beyond the Russian-Chechen agreement, various state advisers in the Russian Federation, Armenia and the administration of the self-declared NKR have started to speak about a probability of application of this model relating to the Karabakh problem. It was thought that if the question of status would be delayed, for instance for a five year period, within this timeframe a new generation of politicians could emerge, there would be more clarity in the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus as well as in the economy. Perhaps, parties to the conflict would refuse too categorical accent in negotiations. Thus, there could be an opportunity to move a problem from the deadlock. At least, "the Chechen model" was based on three basic principles which have resulted from the Russian-Chechen war:

a) ensuring the maximum safety for Karabakh and inhabitants of adjacent territories of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic;

b) establishment of a transition period at least for five years during which the delay of determination of the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be postponed. Therefore, it would create a reprieve and more favorable political, geopolitical and economic conditions for the settlement of the Karabakh problem;

c) during this period there would be a new generation of politicians, free from a burden of the previous period and mutual hostility, and this generation would act in the new atmosphere and in new conditions;

In fact, one variation of the “Chechen variant” was the Dayton Peace Accord (1996) according to which the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted “a delayed right” of self-determination after nine years. The leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh (hereinafter NK) immediately gave a positive estimation to the possibilities of the “Chechen variant”. Aftermath, that-times president of unrecognized NKR, Robert Kocharian, stated on February 27, 1997, in Stepanakert that the “variant of the resolution of the Karabakh problem in analogy with

¹⁹⁹ The title of the book - "Karabakh Conflict, Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" written by Ali Abbasov and Haroutiun Khachatryan // Third edition, 2006 // p. 43 // URL: https://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatryan.pdf // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

the Chechen problem is quite acceptable for Karabakh". He said that as far back as two years ago, the NK leadership suggested departing from the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, but that suggestion was rejected by the leadership of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, in turn, thought that the "Chechen variant" was incompatible with the situation in NK. There is no one for Chechnya to integrate with, while NK has already widely integrated with the Republic of Armenia and, in another five years, would simply complete this process. Meanwhile, the development of the political situation in Chechnya led to the oblivion of the Khasavyurt agreements, which, however, did not rule out the importance of studying the "Chechen variant" as it is.²⁰⁰ The de facto recognition of NKR by the state of Armenia was another hybrid strategy to maneuver amidst further de jure recognition and non-recognition, for paving the chiseled ground of image-making game within offered peaceful principles and alternative conflict resolutions.

The third, probably the most idealistic model was called as the "Andorra variant" laid on the principle of a condominium. After the Key West meeting, Armenian and Azeri mass media wrote about an allegedly proposed variant of "Andorra status" (condominium) envisaging the participation of "plenipotentiary representatives" of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the government structures of NK and other "attributes" (including the establishment of some kind of international control over the "corridors").²⁰¹ The matter was likely to have concerned a mere touchstone to gauge the political opinions in Azerbaijan, NK, and Armenia. In reality, the OSCE MG co-chairmen could hardly have intended to consider the plan themselves, let alone propose it to the conflicting sides. The thing was that any "Andorried" variant of a settlement, logically, had to be based on the denial of the right of "new Andorrans" to maintain their own armed forces. As it became clear from the public statements of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen in Khankendi (Stepanakert) and Yerevan, and especially by N. Gribkov and P. de Suremain, the international community was inclined to understand that NK long ago turned into a "big independent factor" of Transcaucasian politics. It was likely to mean that the OSCE MG Co-chairmen were inclined to distinguish the separate role of NK's armed forces in this factor. And in the case of "Andorristation" of NK or even one single similar attempt, the U.S., Russia, and France would

²⁰⁰ The title of the book - "Karabakh Conflict, Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" written by Ali Abbasov and Haroutiun Khachatryan // Third edition, 2006 // p. 44 // URL: https://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatryan.pdf // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

²⁰¹ See also "The Key West Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh: Preparing Peace In the South Caucasus?" // URL: By Robert M. Cutler // Regions: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Europe & Central Asia // April 1, 2001 // URL: https://fpif.org/the_key_west_conference_on_nagorno-karabakh_preparing_peace_in_the_south_caucasus/ // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

face the task beyond their strength of fully and unconditionally disarming the NK defense army and demilitarizing the territories of not only NK but also of the lands adjacent to it both in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Meanwhile, in Azerbaijan, the co-chairmen pronounced quite different statements, acknowledging that negotiations were conducted exclusively between the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia and that their framework could be broadened after first successes were achieved.²⁰²

Despite already proposed, but ineffective comparative models of peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there were some not popularized, but quite interesting variants of settlement as the “Dayton schemes” and "The Dartmouth initiative". The first one was purely based on the inability of Azerbaijan and Armenia to find an acceptable solution to the territorial dispute which created an urgent need to find an internationally accepted system of coercive measures that would be directed at the elimination of conflicts which threaten the existence of whole regions and were capable of causing full-scale international crises. The deep roots of a pending coercive international response were dealt with such an already revealed and newly-popularized hybrid warfare's factor as image-making games playing in front of international community and leading global powers. According to the basic principles of the "Dayton schemes", one possible way to settle the conflict could be achieved with the aid of external coercion by the world superpowers, which can be conventionally called the “Dayton Principle”.²⁰³ In comparison with previous ones, the Dartmouth initiative was moreover far away from the threat arisen from those contagious factors of hybrid warfare and dated back to 1960 as a place of a meeting of citizens of the USSR and the USA on the improvement of mutual understanding between the two countries. In 1982, this forum created a working group of the Dartmouth conference on regional conflicts. In October 2001, the working group of the Dartmouth conference on regional conflicts organized a dialogue on Nagorno Karabakh led by the co-chairmen of the Dartmouth conference - Harold Saunders (the USA, ex-Undersecretary of State) and Vitali Naumkin (Russia). On June 24-26, 2005, the eighth round of dialogue of representatives of the public of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno Karabakh took place in Moscow within the framework of this dialogue. During this round, a draft framework agreement on the peace process in the region of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, proposed by

²⁰² The title of the book - "Karabakh Conflict, Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" written by Ali Abbasov and Haroutiun Khachatryan // Third edition, 2006 // p. 51 // URL: https://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatryan.pdf // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

²⁰³ The title of the book - "Karabakh Conflict, Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" written by Ali Abbasov and Haroutiun Khachatryan // Third edition, 2006 // p. 57 // URL: https://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatryan.pdf // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

the co-chairmen of the Dartmouth conference, as well as a joint press release, were discussed and coordinated. The basic idea of “the Dartmouth variant” was the initiation of an all-around peace process, as a process of “continuous interaction at all public levels and in many spheres of social, political and economic life which would be accompanied by the general provisions of the draft framework agreement. Another important feature of the offered scheme was that it was proposed to negotiate in two stages:

a) the first phase of negotiations should be concluded by intermediate steps which were confidence-building measures implying equivalent concessions of the parties in coordinated spheres;

b) the second, these measures should demonstrate the achievement of progress on the way to peace and create prerequisites for the resolution of final questions. At this stage of intermediate steps, it would be necessary to exclude questions concerning the final agreement,²⁰⁴

Today, there are too many variants of settlement emerged in the result of comparative analysis and researches by local think-tanks suiting to Armenian interests, and, probably, the most interesting one from all of them is "Land for peace" variant that sought to be compared with the Arab-Israeli conflict, introduced then harshly criticized by Lynette Hacopian, who is a Resident Fellow of prominent Armenian think-tank "Regional Studies Center" in the South Caucasus. In the seventh article of “RSC Guest Analysis” publication series, entitled “Land for Peace: A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of Israel and Nagorno-Karabakh,” she has offered an innovative comparative assessment of the concept of “land for peace” in the cases of Israel and Nagorno-Karabakh. Hacopian argued that “of the many aspects of the complex Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the core issues of self-determination and territorial integrity have presented a challenging clash or even contradiction of key principles of international law. Within the framework of diplomacy and mediation, there is also a related issue of the need for concession and compromise, largely defined by the surrender of Armenian-held, or ‘occupied,’ territories of Azerbaijan proper beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, in exchange for the self-determination of Karabakh through a referendum on final status.” She further stated that “while this issue of ‘land for peace’ continues to be a highly charged and daunting aspect of the Karabakh peace process, there were interesting and pertinent lessons learned from other cases of the concept of land for peace, namely in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or more precisely, regarding the issue of Palestinian statehood in exchange for peace with Israel. She sought to

²⁰⁴ The title of the book - "Karabakh Conflict, Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" written by Ali Abbasov and Haroutiun Khachatryan // Third edition, 2006 // p. 58 // URL: https://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatryan.pdf // Retrieved at 22.05.2018

present specific lessons learned from the Israeli case and to demonstrate the comparative relevance to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” In this point, there has been detected another Armenian fear of losing occupied land for peace, its negative approach and collateral hybrid strategy on absolute and de jure independence of NKR, again has proven the ineludible co-existence of hybridity. She concluded her analysis by contending that “due to Azerbaijan’s behavior and maximalist policy towards Armenia, a giveaway of the occupied territories, comprised of seven districts, to Azerbaijan would prove detrimental to the peace process and will put Armenia at a geographical disadvantage.”²⁰⁵

In comparison with Armenian logic of settlement, Azeri one has mostly relied on the international assistance as it was demonstrated within aforementioned "Dayton Principle". But we do consider that there must be an alternative and comparative Azeri approach as well that would suit its very-well backed principles of territorial integrity and sovereign rule within internationally recognized borders, where it would have no right to be drabble with transmissible and contagious factors of hybrid warfare. Azeri analysts always seek this models far away from its borders, in the insights of different, geographically farthest local conflicts, but the nearest and the most suitable model was right nearby and might be fetched even with passed internal conflicts of Russia with Chechnya (but categorically not previous "Chechen Variant") and the Dagestani Republic. Post-Soviet Russian Federation like the post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan was a multinational state with internationally recognized borders. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia as Azerbaijan also had to face the territorial claims of such national minorities as Chechens, Dags and etc. Passing through different war-time periods, they were successful to be ensured with wide autonomy within the internationally recognized borders of the Russian Federation committing to such basic principles of international law as the inviolability of territorial integrity and the right of national minorities for self-determination. As the Russian Federation or other internationally recognized independent states, the Republic of Azerbaijan has got the same rights for keeping up of its territorial integrity by being ready to defer highest autonomies to national minorities residing within one's national borders. Unfortunately, modern rules of international shade bureaucracy and double-standards chiefly encompassed by the insights of ad hoc interpretations of local conflicts and was getting immediately time-worn.

²⁰⁵ The title of the article - "Land for Peace: A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of Israel and Nagorno-Karabakh" written by Lynette Hacopian on 7 December 2016 // URL: file:///C:/Users/Dns/Downloads/RSC_Guest_Analysis_7_Hacopian_12.16.pdf / <https://regional-studies.org/publications/rsc-analysis/577-021216/> / Retrieved at 23.05.2018

Conclusion

During whole analysis of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, we have got several malfunctions, but nevertheless, we have achieved our major goal within the full implementation of given task. Though the concept of hybrid warfare was fresh, using quite pragmatical methods of the scientific analysis, we managed to reveal old and new factors of hybrid warfare in the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The historical component of the conflict has been subjected to periodic changes and the sharp academic criticism based on the comparative and systematic analysis of the facts. The concept of hybrid warfare has been interpreted in a special academic framework covering the nature and distinctive features of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Through primary academic analysis of factors of hybrid warfare which are the main stumbling block in a way of peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the relevance of our subject has been emphasized.

The last and probably the most viable attention of an international community within the legal documentation of international responses and demands over conflicting sides of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was United Nations General Assembly Resolution № A/RES/62/243, adopted on 14 March 2008. This document has again reaffirmed continued respect and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders. It has, again and again, demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the population expelled from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan to return to their homes, and stresses the necessity of creating appropriate conditions for this return, including the comprehensive rehabilitation of the conflict-affected territories, recognized the necessity of providing normal, secure and equal conditions of life for Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which would allow an effective democratic system of self-governance to be built up in this region within the Republic of Azerbaijan, and reaffirmed that no State shall recognize as lawful the situation resulting from the occupation of the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining this situation. Within the necessary call for the implementation of aforementioned provisions, it has also expressed its support to the international mediation efforts, in particular, those of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, aimed at peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, and

recognizes the necessity of intensifying these efforts with a view to achieving a lasting and durable peace in compliance with the provisions stipulated above, called upon Member States and international and regional organizations and arrangements to effectively contribute, within their competence, to the process of settlement of the conflict, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session a comprehensive report on the implementation of the present resolution. There has also been decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”.²⁰⁶

The resolution has been adopted soon after the happened collisions near the occupied city of Agdere (Mardakert) in the Nagorno-Karabakh region which have turned into a hot skirmish on March 4, 2008, between armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia of the protecting NKR near the village of Levonarkh controlled by the army of the self-proclaimed NKR.²⁰⁷ These actions were considered as the largest collision since the ceasefire in 1994 too, but in the military and operational scale were small and more moderate in comparison with April four-day war of 2016.

For adoption of the resolution have voted 39 countries, among which there were such, geographically and geopolitically close to Nagorno-Karabakh region, countries as Afghanistan, Georgia, Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, etc. Armenia, of course, was against adoption of this resolution, but the United States, Russian Federation and France, the same co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE, and the three of the permanent states of the UN Security Council, in advance adopted, nearly dozen of the resolutions not different from basic requirements of the current resolution were the most shocking countries which have voted against. To the strange backgrounds in this situation, the reason expressed by the representative of the USA who has supported almost other two co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE as well, against adoption of this resolution which, according to him, had unilateral character. However, he has specified

²⁰⁶ URL: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r114.htm> ²⁰⁶ URL:

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/ga10487.doc.htm> // The title of the primary source - "Resolution № 62/243: on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan ", adopted by the General Assembly on 14 March 2008 // 86th plenary meeting of UN General Assembly // URL:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/243 // It was also recalling Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 29 July 1993, 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993 and 884 (1993) of 12 November 1993, as well as General Assembly resolutions 48/114 of 20 December 1993, entitled “Emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan”, and 60/285 of 7 September 2006, entitled “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan” // Retrieved at 23.05.2018

²⁰⁷ The title of the source - "Karabakh casualty toll disputed" edited by BBC news agency on 5 March 2008 // URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278871.stm> // Retrieved at 23.05.2018

that despite the negative vote onto this document, the co-chairmen maintain territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and do not recognize the independence of self-declared NKR.²⁰⁸

According to an interview with the British politician Lord Howell Guildford, his country have refrained from vote as in the resolution, according to him, "the Madrid principles and the process of the Minsk group of OSCE were not considered."²⁰⁹

As we see, the image-making game of conflicting sides entailed with high degree of negligence of international mediation and the use of conflict for the next distraction from internal problems, being two of those hybrid warfare factors, have been turned into diplomatic collision and conceptual contradictions over the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the last Resolution № 62/243 of UN General Assembly in 2008. We do agree that the acceleration process within the sporadic dissemination of hybrid warfare factors, has begun aftermath of these events. It led to another hugest casualty that was occurred within "Four-day war" from the April, 1 to the April, 5.

All these events have afresh endorsed the role of those hybrid warfare factors as a basic hindrance en route achieving of the real peaceful resolution based on mutual trust and respect of nations. Through initial thematic analysis of relevant primary sources and systematic modeling of the conflict itself, we have observed and academically proven that hypotheses of our thesis interrogated by the research questions on the significance of this region and the existence of obstacles in the face of relieved hybrid warfare factors were successfully done and responded.

In the end, it has to be accentuated that for the eschewing from the future speediest dissemination of different sorts of new hybrid warfare factors or possible rebirth of old ones, it is quite mandatory to maximally oblige the conflicting sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to sign an international peace treaty and even put economic sanctions on either side, for non-implementation of already achieved basic principles of territorial integrity and the right for the highest self-governance within internationally recognized borders, relied on insuperable volition of leading international mediation, which even might be reconstructed for the sake of real peace and prosperity. Unfortunately, unless there is a mandatory internationally recognized peace treaty, the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be almost impossible.

²⁰⁸ The title of the source - "General Assembly adopts Resolution reaffirming territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, demanding a withdrawal of all Armenian forces", at the 86th Plenary Meeting, 14 March 2008 // GA/10693 // URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/ga10693.doc.htm> // Retrieved at 23.05.2018

²⁰⁹ The interview with Lord Howell of Guildford who was asked by Mr. Viscount Waverley // URL: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/100705w0001.htm> // Retrieved at 23.05.2018

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