Санкт-Петербургский Государственный университет

**Екатерина Ивановна ДЕВИЦЫНА**

**Выпускная квалификационная работа**

**GR-СТРАТЕГИИ ТРАНСНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ КОМПАНИЙ (НА ПРИМЕРЕ ПИВОВАРЕННЫХ КОМПАНИЙ В РОССИИ)**

Направление 41.04.04 «Политология»

Основная образовательная программа магистратуры

«Политическое управление и публичная политика (на английском языке)»

Научный руководитель:

Д-р полит.наук, проф.

Александр Васильевич ПАВРОЗ

Рецензент:

д-р филос. наук, проф.

Григорий Львович ТУЛЬЧИНСКИЙ

Санкт-Петербург

2018

St.- Petersburg State University

**Ekaterina Ivanovna DEVITSYNA**

**Final qualification work**

**GR-STRATEGIES OF TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES IN RUSSIA (CASE OF BREWING INDUSTRIES)**

Field 41.04.04 “Political Science”

Main educational MA program

“Political Governance and Public Policy”

Supervisor

Doctor of political sciences,

Professor

Alexander Vasilyevich PAVROZ

Reviewer:

Doctor of philosophical science,

Professor:

Grigory Lvovich TULCHINSKY

St.-Petersburg

2018

**Abstract**

In the work "GR-strategies of transnational companies in Russia (case of brewing industries)", the author examines GR strategies of three international brewing companies. In the modern world the large corporation is a recognized participant of political processes as it conducts activities to influence political decision-making and formulate a policy. The brewing industry in Russia is one of the most transparent. Nevertheless, it is rigidly regulated, new restrictions are constantly introduced: increase in an excise in a geometrical progression, equating of beer with strong alcohol and distributing it to the 171 Federal Law, banning the production of beer in a plastic bottles over 1.5 liters and others. This paper analyzes how brewing companies react to these constraints, what tools to influence the state authorities use, what the GR strategy consists of and what role in the GR of transnational companies is played by the business association. Units of analysis are 3 transnational companies that control more than 80% of the Russian brewing market. It is AbInBev, Heineken, Carlsberg group. The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is pluralism, neo-corporatism and network approach. The key methods of research are the case study and the interview method. Based on the conducted research, the author draws conclusions about how transnational brewing companies build GR activities in Russia, what is their GR-strategy and how successfully it is implemented.

Contents

[Introduction 5](#_Toc514876996)

[1. Theoretical aspects of Government Relations 13](#_Toc514876997)

[1.1. Government relations as a new form of interaction between business and government 13](#_Toc514876998)

[1.2. Theoretical approaches to government relations analysis 17](#_Toc514876999)

[1.3. Lobbyism as technology government relations 21](#_Toc514877000)

[1.4. The role of business associations in government relations 27](#_Toc514877001)

[1.5. Features of the Russian government relations 33](#_Toc514877002)

[2. Analysis of the GR-strategy of the brewing industry in Russia 40](#_Toc514877003)

[2.1. The brewing industry in Russia and its role in Russian politics 40](#_Toc514877004)

[2.2. Lobbying of the brewing industry on excises 48](#_Toc514877005)

[2.3. Government relations of the brewing industry in the context of regulation 51](#_Toc514877006)

[2.4. Opposition to licensing of the brewing industry 57](#_Toc514877007)

[2.5. Government relations of the brewing industry regarding a plastic bottle 59](#_Toc514877008)

[2.6. Government relations of the brewing industry on the issue of advertising 62](#_Toc514877009)

[2.7. The reaction of the brewing industry to the introduction of the state automated information system 64](#_Toc514877010)

[2.8. Features GR strategy of the brewing industry (according to research interviews) 67](#_Toc514877011)

[Conclusion 73](#_Toc514877012)

[Bibliography 77](#_Toc514877013)

[Application 97](#_Toc514877014)

[Application1. Interview with GR-manager AB InBev part of AB InBev Efes Group 97](#_Toc514877015)

[Application 2. Interview with GR-manager Heineken 101](#_Toc514877016)

[Application 3. Interview with GR-manager Baltika Brewery (Carlsberg Group) 103](#_Toc514877017)

# Introduction

*Relevance.* In the modern world, a large corporation is an acknowledged participant in political processes, an influential socio-political institution that in some cases is comparable with the state. We are talking about transnational corporations that pretend to stand on a level with national states, and their influence on the political life of countries and regions becomes the object of research on political science.

At the heart of the relationship between the state and transnational companies lies the principle of interdependence. Companies pay budget-forming taxes, create jobs, engage in social policy. The state provides companies with "rules of the game", creating laws and monitoring their implementation. GR-departments of multinational companies engaged in the alignment of such a relationship, try to influence the political background and political decision-making. In government relations (GR) of transnational companies an important place is occupied by business unions and associations, which open a large field for research. Building the participants of the brewing industry of effective communications with authorities is one of the most complex and ambiguous directions of the modern Russian GR. The brewing industry is represented by 80% foreign capital. In the current geopolitical trend, sanctions and also the program for fight against alcoholism, it is increasingly difficult to lobby the interests of brewers effectively. Western companies very tightly regulate the costs of GR-activities. These companies have internal codes and extensive experience of lobbying practices around the world. In addition, Russian legislation strictly controls the activities of non-residents. Therefore, the brewing industry has exemplary GR, which are transparent and exclude corruption and shadow practices.

Before the economic crisis of 2008-2009, the Russian corporate GR was mostly of an "individual" nature, GR-coalitions and business associations rarely acted as its participants. After 2009, the business associations took on a special niche in GR, became prominent players in GR-strategies of corporations.

The brewing industry faced serious problems in 2011, when amendments to the 171 Federal Law equated beer to strong alcohol. Since then, the industry has become severely regulated, the government has introduced many restrictions that hinder the consistent economic development of brewing companies. The state implements the anti-alcohol program, so it increasingly limits the brewing industry. For example, the state banned the release of products in plastic containers of more than 1.5 liters, in geometric progression increases excises, limited advertising, introduced a unified state automated information system for the production and sale of beer, and much more. In these conditions, large brewing companies began to optimize their business and unite. GR-departments began actively resisting the imposed restrictions.

Research work on GR-strategy of the brewing industry in Russia is not much, although this is one of the most transparent industries in terms of financial costs for lobbying. The author of this work decided to study the case of the brewers, to find out which GR strategy is most effective, to find the agenda, to find out what resources the companies use to successfully interact with state authorities in the conditions of economic instability, sanctions, business combination.

The above indicates that the topic of research is relevant and in demand both in the theoretical sense and in the practical activities of transnational corporations and public authorities. In order to make scientific recommendations for improving the effectiveness of GR mechanisms, it is necessary to analyze the behavior of transnational companies in the context of the Russian political system, analyze the role of non-profit organizations in the interaction of brewing companies and the state, analyze the GR strategy and the factors determining it.

*Analysis of the literature*. From the beginning of the 20th century, political scientists began to study the representation of interests. A. Bentley[[1]](#footnote-1) и D. Truman[[2]](#footnote-2) proposed to view politics as a sphere of rivalry between interest groups. Bentley considered the political process as a bilateral pressure of groups in the struggle for state power.

Throughout the century, many brilliant theoretical and empirical studies were published concerning the formation of interest groups in the US and Europe, the interaction of the state and business. (Bentley A., Parsons T., Truman D., Olson M., Libman A., Schmitter P., Dahl R., Heywood A).[[3]](#footnote-3)

The study of the interaction between business and government is connected with the theory of lobbyism (J. Berry, F. Baumgartner, B. Leech, J. Birnbaum, D. DeKiefer, L. Milbrath, D. Kimball, M. Hojnacki).[[4]](#footnote-4)

A special place is occupied by works studying the theory of functional representation of interests, within which three basic approaches to research are distinguished: pluralism (R. Dahl, C. Lindblom, М. Olsen, D. Truman, E. Fraenkel)[[5]](#footnote-5), corporatism (A.Cawson, Lembruch J., С. Перегудов, Schimitter P.)[[6]](#footnote-6), political networks (Wasserman S., Faust K., Scott J., Borgatti S.)[[7]](#footnote-7).

In Russia, the problems of the relationship between business and government, as well as the influence of business on the political process, began to be actively studied since the 90s of the twentieth century. Russian studies of Government Relations have different orientations. The relationship between business and government is seen in the context of the dynamics of the relationship between the ruling elites (Gelman V., Gaman-Golutvina O.V., Kryshtanovskaya O.).[[8]](#footnote-8) Another direction analyzes the interaction of companies and leaders at the level of public authorities (Libman A., Lyubimov A., Nelson L., Kuzes I., Peregudov S., Lapina N., Semenenko I., Tolstyh P.).[[9]](#footnote-9) Part of the research refers to the concept of "Russian oligarchy" (Frye T., Zudin A., Peregudov S.).[[10]](#footnote-10)

Some authors approach the conceptualization of the system of representation of interests from the theoretical side, they try to identify models of representation reflecting the specifics of Russian reality (Pavroz A., Zolotareva E., Lapina N.).[[11]](#footnote-11)

Despite the fact that there are many works on Russian government relations and lobbying; studies analyzing the behavior of transnational companies in the Russian market and their interaction with authorities do not exist. Small analytical publications make the media or agencies under private orders.

*Research Question* that is posed in this paper: how do transnational brewing companies build GR activities in Russia, what is their main GR-strategy and how well is it implemented?

To answer the research question, we will perform a number of *tasks*:

* Analyze theories and approaches to the study of government relations;
* To consider the peculiarities of the brewing industry in Russia and determine its role in the political process;
* Analyze the lobbying of excises by the brewing industry;
* To consider the government relations of the brewing industry in relation to 171 Federal Laws;
* Analyze the government relations of the brewing industry on licensing issues;
* Consider the government relations of the brewing industry regarding the banning of a plastic bottle of more than 1.5 liters;
* To study the government relations of the brewing industry in relation to advertising;
* Analyze the government relations of the brewing industry in relation to the state information system;
* Analyze the features of GR-strategy based on interviews with representatives of brewing companies.

*Object of study:* relations between the state and business in Russia.

*Subject of study:* GR-activity of transnational brewing companies in Russia.

*Operationalization of the main terms of the study*. The central place is occupied by the concept of government relations (GR). GR is seen as the use of communicative technologies to influence government decisions.[[12]](#footnote-12) GR is an activity for building relations between different social groups and state power. This activity includes the collection and processing of information on the activities of the government, the preparation and dissemination of information on the positions of interest groups, the impact on political decision-making (lobbying)[[13]](#footnote-13).

Another important concept for this research is the GR-strategy. GR strategy is a set of mechanisms and technologies, combined in a strategy for building relations with public authorities.

GR campaign is a system of events united for building relations with public authorities within the framework of a specific GR strategy.

GR mechanisms and tools are various methods used in the activities of companies in interaction with public authorities, with the aim of influencing political decision-making and policy-making.

*Hypothesis* of this study: the brewing industry in Russia is one of the most transparent in interaction with the state; the brewing industry companies carry out open GR-activity.

*Theoretical and methodological basis* for this study is theories of pluralism, neocorporativism and the network approach.

Within the framework of the theory of pluralism, stakeholders are independent, compete with each other and are not controlled by the state. The adoption of political decisions reflects the balance between groups of interests within society.

The neo-corporatist approach puts forward the formalities in the interaction of business and the state. The main actors on the business side are associations and unions.

The network approach connects all participants to the general political and administrative network. The influence of actors increases with the proximity of their location to the nodes of networks.

It seems that these theories are best suited to describe the interaction of transnational brewing companies and state authorities in Russia.

The key method of research is the case-study method. We consider the cases of GR transnational companies of the brewing industry in Russia in six main areas: excise taxes, separate regulation, licensing, state information system, plastic packaging, advertising. Units of analysis are three transnational companies that control more than 80% of the Russian brewing market. This is AB InBev Efes Group, Heineken, the Baltic (Carlsberg group). In addition, to collect information, the author used the method of interview. This allowed to obtain unique information directly from the developers of GR-strategy and to do a deeper analysis.

The author of this research uses primary and secondary empirical material, and on its basis conducts research that identifies the opportunities and problems of studying GR transnational corporations in Russia using the example of the brewing industry.

*The theoretical significance* of the study is due to a systematic study of the concept of government relations in the context of its impact on the adoption of government decisions. The main provisions of the work and conclusions contribute to the study of existing in Russia GR-strategies, mechanisms and prospects for the development of interaction between government and business.

*The practical significance* of the research is the possibility of using the presented materials and the results of the research in further research work. The results of this study can be used in the activities of companies, public authorities, business associations to optimize the existing GR system. On the basis of this study, practical recommendations can be developed on how to build relations between international companies and state authorities.

*Structure of the study*. The goal and objectives of the study determined the structure of the study, which consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion, a list of literature and applications. In the first chapter the main theoretical and methodological approaches to GR are analyzed. The main GR classifications and models, tools and mechanisms were studied. A special attention was paid to the study of the concept of lobbyism. The analysis of relations between government and business in modern Russia concludes the chapter. The second chapter gives a description of the brewing industry, analyzed the problems in GR, which faced the brewing industry and their solutions, namely the increase of excises, the ban on advertising, separate regulation, the prohibition of plastic packaging, the attempt to license and the introduction of the state information system. In addition, an analysis of interviews with leading GR specialists from Russian offices of companies AB InBev Efes Group, Heineken, Carlsberg group is offered. In conclusion, the main conclusions of the research on the current situation in the GR brewing industry are formulated, its most important results are summarized, the topical aspects of the problem posed that require further study are highlighted. In the application three interviews mentioned above are documented.

# Theoretical aspects of Government Relations

# Government relations as a new form of interaction between business and government

The Russian studies of Government Relations have different focuses. Several researchers consider the relationship between business and power in the context of the dynamics of the ruling elites.[[14]](#footnote-14) Other direction of researches analyzes interaction of the companies and the government at the level of public authorities.[[15]](#footnote-15) Part of the research refers to a review of the features of the concept of "Russian oligarchy".[[16]](#footnote-16) These researches of the different directions do not show the full picture GR in the country.

GR is considered as use of communicative technologies for influence on government decisions.[[17]](#footnote-17) GR is an activity to build relationships between various social groups and state power. This activity includes the collection and processing of information on the activities of the government, the preparation and dissemination of information on the positions of interest groups, the impact on political decision-making (lobbying)[[18]](#footnote-18).

GR is an additional tool for traditional representative democracy. It facilitates the involvement of public interest groups in the political decision-making process, which ensures the formation of a balanced state policy.[[19]](#footnote-19)

The main objective of GR is "prevention of probable threats from activity of political stakeholders and realization of potential opportunities of the company by means of its participation in political actions", and the purpose of GR — "forming of long-term, comfortable, predictable system of the relations with political stakeholders".[[20]](#footnote-20) Besides, tasks of GR are an improvement of the relations with the staff of government agencies; observation of work of the government; influence on formation of the legislation; participation of business in work of the government at all levels; explanation to representatives of government agencies of interests and activity of business.

Subjects of GR are the actors who are purposefully establishing the relations with public authorities. The subjects of GR are corporations, GR departments, non-profit organizations, business associations, GR agencies and consultants.[[21]](#footnote-21)

Russian researchers identify two types of subjects: basic and technological subjects. The basic subjects of GR are initiators of GR-activities of the commercial and non-commercial sector. Technological subjects are GR-departments of organizations and professional GR companies.[[22]](#footnote-22)

GR involves activities at several levels - municipal, regional, federal and international, depending on the level of the authorities.

GR in Russia today is implemented in several ways. One of them is when the first persons of the company independently carry out all interactions with the authorities. PR departments perform sometimes GR functions. Special departments of GR exist in large companies. Small companies delegate GR functions to industry associations.[[23]](#footnote-23)

GR carries out a set of function: tracking and analysis of initiatives of executive bodies of the government; monitoring and complex analysis of legal acts; coordination of forming of the relations of the company with public authorities; maintenance of initiatives of the company in the state sphere (questions of licensing, lobbying of bills, participation in the state tenders or target programs); correction of the state initiatives for the benefit of the company, GR campaigns; support of economic activity of the company in foreign markets[[24]](#footnote-24); minimization of financial expenses of the company, due to reduction of taxes, tariffs; receipt of state co-financing.[[25]](#footnote-25)

As for the possibility of conflicts, according to T. Parsons, some individuals take obligations that are not appropriate or contrary to their own interests.[[26]](#footnote-26) However, obligations in collective are considered as binding. Interaction of business and the power is based on mutual expectations and trust. The overestimated expectations and different interests provoke the conflicts.

Bentley believed that the political process consists of the pressure of social groups on each other in order to influence the state power. Bentley claimed that any benefit leads to the creation of interest groups, and the interaction of these groups is the hallmark of democracy.[[27]](#footnote-27)

D. Truman has defined political process as race for power over distribution of resources, and society — as the groups interacting among themselves. He understood "group of interests" as group, which has common interests and making demands to other groups for establishment, maintenance, or strengthening of standards of behavior that are defined by this group. According to Truman, the groups of interests acting through government structures are political. The researcher believed that in process of complication of public processes the number of groups will grow.[[28]](#footnote-28)

M. Olson argued that the basis of the political process is large economic groups that work for their economic interest.[[29]](#footnote-29)

E. Yasin offers a model of interaction between business and the state in three separate zones: white, black and gray.[[30]](#footnote-30) This concept is considered in the framework of the predominance in Russia of the processes of "deforming rules".[[31]](#footnote-31)

Several researchers[[32]](#footnote-32) suggest the existence of competition in the institutional market between formal and informal institutions, when the business community chooses the rules of the game. Other researchers consider direct interaction of business with public authorities less effective than interaction of associations and branch business associations.[[33]](#footnote-33)

# Theoretical approaches to government relations analysis

Different theoretical approaches use for the research of interaction of business and authorities: elitism, new institutionalism, group and network approaches.

The elitism assumes hierarchical access to elite. The distance exists between business groups and the center of decision-making and redistribution of resources. The level of the decision and influences corresponds to each problem. The model of clientelism explains hierarchy of formulation, statement and solution of problems and the principle of distribution of resources. All the leaders of big business are included in one of the groupings close to the elite and have different kinds of "roofs". The decision depends on the patron's ability to cope with the client's problem within the framework of the elite interaction.[[34]](#footnote-34) Such a model characterizes Russia in the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR. Regional business solves its problems with regional authorities; large business interacts with the federal government and solves issues at the level of regulation of the industry as a whole.[[35]](#footnote-35)

Supporters of new institutional approach see the political and economic organizations as participants who have contract relations. Interaction takes place within the institutional environment that leads to decrease in transaction expenses, leveling of opportunistic behavior, increase in transparency of decision-making processes and rationality of subjects of these decisions. [[36]](#footnote-36)

Adherents of network approach describe participants as a part of the general political and administrative network. Access to knots increases the weight of the participant. Supporters of network approach give a special role to personal qualities of participants of political and administrative networks, their ability to an intensification of interaction and forming of alliances.[[37]](#footnote-37)

In modern political system, two models of interaction of business and the state are most popular: pluralistic and neo corporatism where the defining factor is the role of the state.

The pluralistic model is "a system of interest intermediation in which constituent units are organized in a limited number of special categories, obligatory and non-competitive, ordered hierarchically and functionally, each granted a representative monopoly in the category in exchange for control over the selection of leaders and the articulation of support and demands".[[38]](#footnote-38) The individualism is the cornerstone of social and economic behavior of most of the population.[[39]](#footnote-39) The competition is a driving force of economic development, an indicator of its success.[[40]](#footnote-40) The state is not an economic agent. The state distributes limited resources according to the decisions reflecting balance between groups of pressure in society. The pluralistic model is considered effective for formation of policy in democratic regime.[[41]](#footnote-41)

The concept of neo-pluralism was developed by Robert Dahl [[42]](#footnote-42), С. Lindblom [[43]](#footnote-43) and J. Galbraith[[44]](#footnote-44). Its main idea is that modern states are less sensitive to pressure from society than in classical pluralism. The most influential social group is business, so it enjoys privileges from government structures.[[45]](#footnote-45) According to the concept of "pluralistic democracy” R. Dahl, modern pluralistic societies of the West created favorable conditions for free competition of groups of interests.[[46]](#footnote-46) Non-profit organizations and business associations are also full participants of process of adoption of the state decisions.

In the corporatist model, the state is an important economic agent ensuring the development and observance of the rules of the game, and also has social obligations to society. Interest groups are organized in a hierarchical system with a dominant organization, and the ways of aggregating interests are reduced to "bargaining" of groups with the state bureaucracy.[[47]](#footnote-47) This model emerged in the 90s in Russia, when specific interest groups had a great influence on the adoption of political decisions in exchange for loyalty to the current government.[[48]](#footnote-48)

The neo-corporatist approach that developed in the 60-70s of the 20th century suggests a formalized organization of access to decision-making centers, stability and successful development of the national economy. The actors of interaction are professional and social organizations, for example, associations, unions. They agree and formulate a general request for political decision-making or state policy making. The state reveals the position of all interested parties and, in case of rejection, negotiates with a specially authorized organization of coordinated interest.[[49]](#footnote-49) The interaction of corporate associations with the state is voluntary, although they are "embedded" in state structures. Neo-corporatism reflects the model of interaction between business structures and public authorities in the subjects of the Russian Federation.[[50]](#footnote-50)

Interaction of transnational corporations with state authorities of a particular country is a separate field for studying. Transnational corporations face a number of difficulties in interacting with authorities. Grosse explores it using institutional theory in three ways. The behavior of the company in a foreign market is a reflection of social norms and traditions. The pressure and interaction of participants in the international market are studied in detail in the framework of behavioral theory. Transnational companies in the institutional economy face transactional costs. There are three problems - information vulnerability, limited rationality and opportunistic behavior. The third line of the institutional theory emphasizes hierarchy of the relations from the government to the companies.[[51]](#footnote-51) This direction helps to investigate negotiations of the governments of the different countries and the companies, the company's compliance with labor requirements and environmental protection in a particular country.[[52]](#footnote-52)

In capitalist economies, institutions and relationships between firms and government bodies are different. Countries are divided into two categories according to the US-UK model (liberal), or the German-Scandinavian (coordinated) model. The countries of the first category use the markets (contracts) for the solution of social problems. Weak cooperation takes place between companies and the government. The countries of the second category (coordinated) use intergroup cooperation between firms and the companies for the solution of these problems. These countries have stronger forms of cooperation between the companies and the government.[[53]](#footnote-53)

Between the national governments and multinational firms nobody takes the leading position in modern concepts of relationship. These concepts help to study a context of the relations between the states and international firms.[[54]](#footnote-54)

The system of interaction of business structures and public authorities in the different countries functions differently. These distinctions are defined by historically developed character of the relations between society and the state, traditions of permission of the business conflicts, the prevailing types of economic behavior of the population, level of political culture, distribution of resources between various institutes.[[55]](#footnote-55)

# Lobbyism as technology government relations

GR and lobbyism are concepts with similar meanings; however, they are conceptually different. GR is an integral part of general management, and the tasks facing it are much broader than the challenges facing lobbying. Lobbyism is a technology for promoting the interests of the company in government.[[56]](#footnote-56)

Lobbying is part of democracy. Expression of views on politics and influence on it is a derivative of freedom of speech. Lobbying influences the quality of decision-making by providing channels for involvement experts.[[57]](#footnote-57) According to a poll of 600 European parliamentarians and officials in 2013, 89 percent believe that “ethical and transparent lobbying helps the development of politics”.[[58]](#footnote-58)

Lobbying is an interaction with the state officials for influence on adoption of political decisions. Lobbying is information channel for state policy. It also influences political climate that is the cornerstone of state policy and the legislation.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Lobby activities depend on what type of representation of interests, pluralism or corporatism prevails in society. In pluralism, groups that have not received representation in decision-making bodies are carrying out their political activities through lobbying. In corporatism, lobbying fades into the background, since almost every sphere of public life has its own legitimate monopoly representative, which interacts with the state through official channels.[[60]](#footnote-60)

American political scientists G. Almond and G. Powell identify anemic and institutional interest groups. Anemic are spontaneous and short-lived associations for the solution of a specific task, disintegrating after the achievement of the goals. Institutional groups are long-term, have clearly formulated interests and act based on certain rules. Based on the nature of intra-group relations, interest groups are divided into associative and non-associative. Associative groups are voluntary organizations that specialize in articulating interests, for example, trade unions and ethnic associations. Non-associative interest groups are informal, with no clear organized structure.[[61]](#footnote-61)

In Russia the level of organization of the group is not an indicator of its influence. Russian political scientists distinguish groups of subjects of lobbyism: branch, regional and client.[[62]](#footnote-62) The most widespread and effective in Russia is the lobbying of the executive authorities. Since the government and the president play a more prominent role in shaping the agenda than the Federal Assembly.[[63]](#footnote-63)

Specialists distinguish three forms of lobbyism: "direct", "indirect" and "internal". "Direct" lobbyism implies direct contacts between representatives of the company and representatives of state authorities. These are personal meetings with legislators, the establishment of client-client and corruption ties. "Indirect" lobbying involves influencing the decision-making process by mobilizing public opinion in favor of the lobbied problem. "Internal" lobbyism assumes that those who have access to public authorities are engaged in relations with the state. Current or former politicians influence peddling. In Russia, this type of lobbyism is very common.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Lobbyism implies a variety of technologies:[[65]](#footnote-65)

* Participation in discussion of bills with parliamentary bodies;
* Personal meetings with politicians, officials;
* Participation in expert or advisory groups established by government bodies;
* Participation in round tables, special partnerships, which regularly discuss laws and policies with government officials;
* The organization of "grassroots" campaigns, when people are encouraged to turn to civil servants;
* Research projects aimed at influencing the views of public officials.

Researchers have identified three categories of lobbyists. These lobbyists are independent experts who are hired by clients to lobby on their behalf. The second type is internal lobbyists. These people lobby to support the organization of their employer, for example, a non-profit organization. The third type is “casual” lobbyists.[[66]](#footnote-66)

The negative side of lobbyism is its abuse. "Trade in influence" or bribery is payments to government officials or their employees to influence government decisions. Another way is to try to challenge scientific or expert data that undermines the lobbyist's position. The astroturfing technology means confidential financing of groups of citizens and campaigns for lobbying of decisions that bring benefit to private interests. The set of scandals is connected with the offer to politicians in the future of work in the organization that depends on their decisions today. Another way is that the company's personnel are arranged for temporary work in state bodies (“revolving doors”).[[67]](#footnote-67)

In Europe and America, large companies try to be open and ethical when interacting with the state. Responsible lobbying means responsibility, respect by professional lobbyists of ethical standards and laws.[[68]](#footnote-68)

The universal principles of lobbying are stated in Universal Declaration of Human Rights [[69]](#footnote-69), The United Nations Global Compact[[70]](#footnote-70), United Nations Convention against Corruption[[71]](#footnote-71). OECD member countries adopted Recommendation with Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, where has registered the basic principles of effective lobbying.[[72]](#footnote-72) Various organizations associated with lobbying have their own code and norms of political behavior.[[73]](#footnote-73) Special organizations, for instance, AccountAbility[[74]](#footnote-74), SustainAbility [[75]](#footnote-75) and Transparency International [[76]](#footnote-76) develop recommendations and guidelines for responsible lobbying. The Russian GR-League has developed its own GR code, taking into account national circumstances.[[77]](#footnote-77)

Transparency International identified three basic principles for responsible lobbying: transparency, equity of access and integrity. The most common principles are legitimacy, transparency, consistency, accountability, opportunity.[[78]](#footnote-78)

European researchers identify three factors in the effectiveness of lobbying regulation: transparency of interaction; clear and enforced rules of ethical conduct; equality of access.[[79]](#footnote-79)

We consider the situation in the field of lobbying in the European Union. The work of the government and lobbyists to create open and ethical lobbying was fragmented and ineffective. Only seven countries have regulatory acts that regulate lobbying. At the national level, there is a system of sectoral representation and institutionalized partnerships with the government. Two years ago the new trend when large corporate actors depart from services of business associations has arisen, and lobbying is taken in hand.[[80]](#footnote-80)

The financial scale of lobbyist activity is unknown due to the lack of obligatory mechanisms of the reporting in Europe. According to the Register of transparency of the EU since 2012 in Europe 40 million euros only in the pharmaceutical sector are annually spent for lobbying. [[81]](#footnote-81)

According to Burson Marsteller poll in 2013, 79% of professional lobbyists consider that the transparency of lobbying will help to reduce influence problems.[[82]](#footnote-82)

Formally, there is no lobbying in Russia. This concept is not fixed in laws, and activity is not regulated in any way. Separate lobbying technologies are round tables, expert advice. It is fixed in the normative documents. For a long time, personal lobbying is considered the most effective in Russia. Often the CEO or his deputy carries out GR and lobbyist activity.[[83]](#footnote-83) On the second place on efficiency there are known large business associations.

Customers of GR-services are large business, foreign companies or industry associations. This is especially true for industries where import substitution is actively pursued. Most experts in GR are in the staff of large companies. Companies use the services of professional lobbyists in outsourcing.[[84]](#footnote-84)

According to Oleg Rumyantsev, in Russia there is a trend for lobbying in the government and the presidential administration, rather than in parliament. The State Duma was a prominent player in the sphere of lobbyism until the middle of the 2000s. M. Bashirov believes that most laws are frameworks, and their filling takes place in the government. One of the most successful ways to conduct a bill is to make it through the presidential administration.[[85]](#footnote-85)

# The role of business associations in government relations

The impact on the authorities of Russian companies is not carried out alone, but by creating coalitions with other interested companies. Multiplication of participants' resources drives competing companies to unite. Such coalitions are most often represented by business associations, leagues, industry associations, unions.

The influence of coalitions is determined by the personality of the leader, his "political weight," ties and regional representation.[[86]](#footnote-86)

Schmitter and Streeck outline the principles of the formation of business associations: territory (national, regional and local), industry or products, the scale of business, the form of ownership, the purpose of the activity, religion, political loyalty, age.[[87]](#footnote-87)

The relevant principles of combination of business structures are the size, branch, existence of common goals, self-realization of the head, the territory. The incentive for membership are: the productive and effective activity of the business association, the presence in the association of experienced professionals who can lead; the level of overall development of company management; the ability of the association to enter power, as well as the ability to uphold the systemic interests of the business community as a whole or a particular industry; the availability of access to the draft documents discussed; the protection of the interests of the company in the event of problems; belonging to the "club of entrepreneurs"; assistance in acquiring new contacts; access to various useful information. Associations can act as a business platform for information exchange, industrial intelligence, industrial safety.[[88]](#footnote-88)

The Russian reality shows that many companies try to lobby their interests, covering it with an association, giving out their corporate interest for industry or public interest. Officials are easier to act in response to the appeal of the association, because it is not a corporate business.

Most of the business associations in Russia are experiencing significant difficulties. For example, imperfection of the current legislation, which regulates their activity and the order of creation. Employees of associations do not always understand the decision-making process, how to make an association influential. There is a problem with the staff. It is difficult to find a leader who could effectively work, effectively represent the interests of the association in government bodies. Often, business associations are created for a specific person, so it does not always represent the interests of its members. The advancement of the leader becomes his goal. In addition, there is an insufficient funding problem.[[89]](#footnote-89)

The problem is that the government is preoccupied with the tasks of building a state and most often does not hear business, whereas it is possible to speak about the effectiveness of interaction between government and business only on the condition that constructive dialogue between them takes place.

The structure of the mechanism of GR activity in Russia is made by the organizations of two types. First, it is non-profit organizations which initial purpose was no political representation of interests. These organizations include various business associations, unions, associations, business support funds. At the moment, the most active corporate business associations are the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation. The branch organizations of businessmen, for example the Union of petroleum producers and the Russian gas society are active. Such associations of businessmen declare protection of interests of small and medium business, but in practice the interests of the small enterprises often aren't taken into account.

Practice of the leading foreign and Russian companies shows that any successful company relies in the activity on the corporate social responsibility (CSR). The CSR programs are strategic investments into development of the long-term successful relations of the company with key groups of influence.

There are three strategies for interaction between business and government within the framework of the CSR:

- Shareholder theory;

- Stake holder theory;

- Enlightened self-interest theory.

Shareholder theory is relevant for the USA, but not for Russia. The founder of the theory M. Friedman assumed that for acquisition of loyalty of consumers and maintaining reputation business will cooperate with society. Social activity is the right of the management of the company and isn't regulated by the national legislation.[[90]](#footnote-90)

In stake holder theory each organization possesses the circle of interested parties which exert impact on activity of the company. The concept is popular in Western Europe and Japan.[[91]](#footnote-91)

The communication aspect of CSR concerns public responsibility and public relations. Tulchinsky structured CSR technologies and divided them into traditional (funding of funds, scholarship programs) and communication-public relations and public responsibility, social audit, international CSR standards, etc.[[92]](#footnote-92)

The regional authorities interact with business associations as it allows to simplify process of coordination of interests, obtaining information on problems, and controlling the interaction space. Attention to federal level associations is more than regional ones, which opens an additional communication channel with the federal center of both regional authorities and business.

Factors of interest of public authorities in business associations are formed proceeding from influence of association, existence of formal cooperation agreements, and the interest of the head of authority.

The most important form of participation of business associations in GR is the creation of public-state advisory, consultative, coordinating and expert bodies. The tendency to form an advisory system comes from above, but its actual content and the role of business in the decision-making process depend on the interest of the agency and the activity of business associations. Authorities are afraid to apply for expertise, because it can fail if business associations do not have relevant experts, clear criteria for selection to the expert council. In addition, there is no procedure by which the authority should clearly substantiate the reason for the deviation of the business position on the issues under consideration. In addition, there is no procedure by which the authority should clearly substantiate the reason for the deviation of the business position on the issues under consideration.

The lobbying firm has more motivation than the association. The lobbying firm will receive a bonus on the outcome of the company, and the association lives on membership fees.

Business associations try to participate in discussion of the normative legal acts infringing on the interests of businessmen. In case of adoption of the documents worsening conditions of development of business, associations use the efforts for their delay or cancellation. The success of these processes substantially depends on the functional level, influence of business association and professionalism of their leaders.

Business associations are an effective form of self-organization of the business community and can successfully represent the interests of their members, acting as intermediaries in the dialogue between business and government. It is especially relevant for the Russian Federation where the economy is transitional in which traditions of active participation of citizens in formation of the civilized market relations are in a formation stage. Business associations are one of the most real ways of influence on decision-making for the purpose of creation favorable conditions for business development. Business associations are mechanisms of formation of the corresponding institutional bases of government relations.[[93]](#footnote-93)

The real model of interaction of business and the state which has developed in Russia was offered by Yasin. It includes rather isolated zones: white, black and gray. "Gray" zone refers to relations that have been withdrawn from the control of official bodies. The "Grey" zone covers informal practicing of requisitions from business and the informal bargaining with the authority concerning the conditions of the operation of a particular business.

"White" zone covers formal practices of relations between government and business, for example, administrative and economic regulation of business. "White" zone is based on the creation of uniform rules of the game for all entrepreneurs and on their compulsion by the state to implement these rules.

"Black" zone covers criminal practices, corruption. "Black" and "gray" zones are based on business investments in "good relations" with the authorities. The fundamental difference between the "black" and "gray" zones is the purpose and set of tools for creating preferential regimes.[[94]](#footnote-94)

This model is considered within the framework of prevalence in Russia of the processes of "deforming rules". According to V. Radaev, “deforming rules” is understood as “the transformation of institutions, where formal rules are replaced by informal ones”.[[95]](#footnote-95)

The determining factors in the formation of interaction between business structures and government are the existence of the objectives of interaction, free dialogue and readiness of business structures and public authorities to implement the declared goals, legislatively designed rules of the game, as well as public benefits and economic expediency.

Researchers distinguish several types of models of interaction between business and the state:

* on the role of the state: order state, punish state, rescue state;[[96]](#footnote-96)
* on the role of business: suppression and coercion, patronage, non-interference of power, partnerships, domination, ignoring, competition, confrontation, privatization of power;[[97]](#footnote-97)
* by the degree of conflict of interest: functional, partner, model of state patronage, symbiotic and conflict;[[98]](#footnote-98)
* by combination of parameters “strong/weak power” and “strong/weak business”: the state “predator”, the policy of non-interference, mutual hostages, the search for rent and “occupation of the state”.[[99]](#footnote-99)

The above models can be present both at the federal and regional levels. At the federal level more centralized issues are resolved, the federal authority is more inclined to interact with business associations. At the regional level, the interaction between government and business is exacerbated by the uneven development of regions and the heterogeneity of entrepreneurship and its weak institutionalization.

Business and power can be communicated through a public open discussion at forums and conferences. Successful examples are the Russian Business Week, the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, the International Investment Forum in Sochi. An alternative to business associations, forums, business clubs, can be a political party that expresses the interests of business. In the early 1990s, "business parties" were created, where commercial structures were the core of the party. They combined the functions of the party and the pressure group.[[100]](#footnote-100) Nevertheless, political struggle can turn into fight of the capitals, but it has to be based on some ideology to attract the population and to enter into Parliament.

# Features of the Russian government relations

In Russia, the interaction of power and business elites in the regions occurs according to several models: patronage model, partnerships, suppression (“the struggle of all against all”) and “privatization of power”. Business is the subject of social policy.[[101]](#footnote-101)

Gaman-Golutvina describes a personal factor in GR and business elite. Zudin by means of approach of path dependence investigated process of evolution of interaction of business and the power.[[102]](#footnote-102)

There are several models of interaction of business and the state. The ideal GR model assumes that subjects of business pay taxes and agree about rules of the game which are controlled by the state. The state guarantees to business creation of the favorable environment and production of public benefits.

I. Iwasaki allocates three types of models of interaction of the state and business. In the “order state” business structures are under strict centralized control, privatization has never been carried out. Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can be examples. The “punish state” supports market institutions and does not interfere with corporate governance mechanisms, nor does it take measures to prevent bankruptcy, which is typical for the Baltic countries. The “rescue state” gives economic entities the opportunity to make their own decisions, but in certain situations can interfere and prevent bankruptcy of the enterprises. Intervention of the state is not limited to clear norms and institutions; therefore there is a risk for corruption and lobbyism.[[103]](#footnote-103)

Russian researchers proposed a typology of GR models based on an understanding of the role of business as a subject of social policy in modern Russia. Models of "suppression" and "coercion" provide for administrative pressure. Power requires business investments in the implementation of social programs and projects, using an administrative resource. The model of "patronage" presupposes compensation of business expenses for the implementation of social programs in the form of access to power-controlled resources. In this model there is a place for bargaining on the terms of business support for social power programs. In the model of "non-interference of power" the authorities are not interested in social policies conducted by the business. In the “partnership model”, the state authorities realize the importance of business in the development of social and economic relations and builds a constructive dialogue with business, while taking decisions the state is oriented towards the interests of business structures. Under Russian conditions, this model is the most acceptable, since it works on the principle of "profitable for everyone - beneficial to everyone". In the model of "domination", relations between the parties are built on the domination of the state. This model is based on paternalism in the relations that is expressed in ensuring a certain support (financial, administrative, etc.) activity of business structures, delivery of preferences in exchange for loyalty to the government. The ignoring model assumes lack of interaction and is transitional. It is supposed that the state ignores business. . It happens when the power is concentrated on various political and economic problems. In the model of "competition" one subject tries to foresee actions of the competitor. The lack of dialogue and the solution of tasks by efforts of one actor aren’t effective. The “confrontation model” assumes active and dynamic interaction of business. The authorities consider the business that does not want to "build in" into the paternalistic model, is dangerous and tries to complicate its activities.[[104]](#footnote-104)

Turovsky studied the factors defining the interest of business groups in entry into regional and local government and influencing on it. Models of management of economy in regions differ that exerts impact on model of interaction of the power and business. The researcher has defined five main models of interaction between business and government elites in the regions of Russia, determined by the extent of their merging and level of conflict:[[105]](#footnote-105)

* The functional model assumes mutual distancing of the power and business. According to the author, the model hampers the development of corruption and preferentialism in relations between government and business.
* The partnership model is characterized by the development of common interests of the state and business related to the development of the region and attraction of investments.
* The model of state patronage - is when the government seeks to control the activities of business entities, preventing reverse effect. The division of business into a "loyal" and "disloyal" and the corresponding system of benefits and privileges arises as a result. Regional authorities of Russia are trying to establish such a model.
* The symbiotic model assumes merging of the power and business. The interests of approximate business become priority for the regional power, high degree of dependence of the power on business is noted.
* The conflict model is characterized by the absence of stable relations between business and power elites. In the region, there are many "twin" relationships between officials and businessmen, and there is no coordinating center for organizing conflict-free interaction, for example, the governor.[[106]](#footnote-106)

Russian business in its development faces barriers in the form of dishonesty of representatives of public authorities that distort the business environment. In many regions, business is held hostage to the personal interests of regulators, representatives of regional and local authorities. Large business, lobbying interests in power, tries to protect itself from prosecutions of security officers, instead of to grow up a new generation of businessmen which can be led. Public authorities have created high degree of uncertainty, business "is in fear", can't carry out long-term planning as there is no concrete framework, condition and laws. For example, in the brewing industry, key laws affecting the distribution of beer products are adopted quickly and without preliminary discussions in society and business. This is the law prohibiting the sale of alcohol at night, the prohibition of drinking alcohol in public places, the ban on advertising beer on television, and so on.

Business in Russia has the extensive nature of development today, new rules and procedures of business are constantly adopted, the internal and external environment of business is unstable, the majority of relationship with the state is based on a personal contact. Nevertheless, attempts of creation of rational business exist.

The main problem in Russia is the lack of the correct laws in the sphere of lobbyism and their observance. The researcher A. Pavroz considers that legally mature lobbyism helps the state to pursue the balanced policy. The need to create a competent law on lobbying exists in Russia, and not only to legalize the actions of big business, but also to allow other economic actors to effectively promote their interests. However, in order to create a really good law, it is necessary to have a base of developed social and economic relations and mechanisms for a dialogue between business and government.[[107]](#footnote-107)

We can identify a number of specific features that are characteristic GR in modern Russia. The first feature is a high role of top managers in GR. This is due to the importance of the work and the lack of qualified top managers in the field of GR.

The second feature of modern Russian GR is a presence at the large companies of the "core" deputy (or groups of deputies) in the State Duma. As a rule, it is the former employee of the company, or the independent deputy to whom the company has helped to be elected.

The third feature that capital offices of the companies carry out GR at the federal level. The solution of tasks of GR of regional level is shifted to affiliated structures in regions, or not carried out at all.

The fourth feature is the lack of transparent budgets. The official budgets of GR companies cover only direct costs. Informal budgets of GR surpass official many times over. The most part of GR activity is hidden and is conducted on informal channels.[[108]](#footnote-108)

The interaction of business structures and public authorities in the regions depends on relationships and changeable sentiments. For example, if the governor and his team are changing in the region, all the rules are changing, building a business for the future becomes difficult.

E. Yasin considers that two resisting forces – the government and a money power - exist in Russia. Rules of the game need to be created to solve the conflicts between them.[[109]](#footnote-109)

Several effective GR tools developed in Russia. The first is an establishment and maintenance of direct personal contacts. For example, the business actors participate or organize a public action (a forum, a conference).

The direct forms of GR communications meaning existence of direct contact of group of pressure with "an access point" have various forms: influence through providing expert information to institutes of the power, participation of businessmen in meetings of committees and the commissions at parliament and executive departments, development of ready bills and their further advance. The most effective GR in the organization is carried out by its head. In the Russian ratings of GR-managers, the lobbying resource of top people is almost always higher than that of professional lobbyists.[[110]](#footnote-110)

The researchers began to study the interaction of state and business in the beginning of the 20th century. In accordance with research trends and approaches at different times, the view on GR was from different directions. In this chapter, we collected the most famous studies of GR.

Analysis of literature has shown that the typologies of current GR models are based on theories of elitism, new institutionalism, networks. The theory of elites presupposes a distance between power elites and business and hierarchical access to elites. In the new institutional approach, the interaction of business and government takes place within an institutional framework. As part of the network approach, all participants are in the political and management network, and the weight of each participant depends on its access to the "nodes".

We considered a pluralistic and neo-corporatist model of interaction between the state and business. In a pluralistic model, business groups operate on the basis of individualism.[[111]](#footnote-111) Neocorporatism assumes that the main actors in interaction with the state are professional and social organizations. In practice, pure models do not occur in the relationship between business and the state, but there is always a predominance of features of a single model.

The study of liberal and coordinated models of interaction between business and the state is relevant. In a liberal model, social issues are resolved within the framework of market relations, but in a coordinated way thanks to the cooperation of stakeholders.[[112]](#footnote-112)

Throughout a theoretical research the concept of lobbyism, its difference from GR and its place in Russia has been considered. We consider lobbying as one of GR technologies, features of lobbying follow from type of representation of interests - pluralism or corporatism.

Besides, we have analyzed researches of the Russian GR. In Russia effective GR in many respects depends on influence of the person who is carrying out interaction with the state. Large companies try to have "their" person in government. Until recently, there was a tendency to lobby the State Duma. However, with the increase in the real influence of the president and government on the economy and production sectors, the trend has changed. As a rule, companies are oriented to interaction with federal authorities, so most of them have their offices in Moscow.

Not all companies allocate expenses on GR in separate article, most often expenses are hidden.[[113]](#footnote-113) As for regions, personal interaction with the head of the region or the cities is built on the place. It isn't long-term.

Tendencies in the relations of the Russian business and the state for long years changed, included personal protection of authorities, attempts to build equal "rules of the game" for all. Within GR a huge number of tools is used: participation in expert communities; presence at meetings at the Ministries; organization and holding of conferences and seminars; use of the public capital of the head of the organization; working visits of the managements; work with the commissions, audits, reports.

Thus, further we analyze the creation of GR strategies of transnational brewing companies in Russia.

# 2. Analysis of the GR-strategy of the brewing industry in Russia

# 2.1. The brewing industry in Russia and its role in Russian politics

Historians believe that the first mention of the regulation of brewing was in 1290 in Nuremberg when it was forbidden to use oats, wheat and rye in the preparation of beer products. The first regulatory "Law on the cleanliness of beer" (Reinheitsgebot) was adopted in 1516 by William IV.[[114]](#footnote-114)

In Russia, S. Witte in 1894 for the first time tried to regulate alcohol production. With the outbreak of the First World War, the Russian government introduced a complete ban on the sale of alcohol, but a year later the ban on beer was lifted. The Bolsheviks allowed the sale of beer to 12 degrees. Later, in order to combat the alcoholization of the population, the plan for the Fourth Five-Year Plan included the production of only beer, wine and champagne.[[115]](#footnote-115)

In December 1958, with the adoption of the resolution "On Strengthening the Struggle Against Drunkenness and on Establishing Order in the Trade in Strong Liquor," the production of beer and grape wine was increased instead of vodka. The trend continued with the 1972 resolution. As part of the Gorbachev campaign against alcoholism, they fought with all alcohol.[[116]](#footnote-116)

In the post-Soviet period, large world beer producers came to Russia, which significantly increased production and expanded the assortment.[[117]](#footnote-117)

In 2009, the "Concept of State Policy on Alcohol Abuse and Alcohol Abuse Prevention among the Population of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020" was approved. The main purpose of the concept is to change the structure of consumption of strong alcohol in favor of the weak. However, a number of legislative barriers in the brewing industry hamper the achievement of this goal.[[118]](#footnote-118)

Today, the world brewing market is represented by two types of beer producers - traditional and craft breweries. Craft breweries produce small volumes and sell goods in the production region, paying more attention to experiments with flavors. It is believed that crafted beer is built in between wine and traditional beer.[[119]](#footnote-119)

Traditional breweries are large factories producing beer under famous brands for mass demand. This is the type of transnational breweries.

Transnational brewing companies occupy a leading place in the world market. In 2014, Anheuser-Busch InBev, SABMiller, Heineken and Carlsberg produced 47% of the world's beer. This market share giants sought for almost 15 years, conducting "universal consolidation".[[120]](#footnote-120) In 2016, in continuation of the merger strategy, AB InBev bought SABMiller.[[121]](#footnote-121)

Regional brewing markets vary considerably. This is due to the type of state's economy, with legislation, excise taxes, demand, religion. In Europe[[122]](#footnote-122) and America[[123]](#footnote-123) brewing is regulated by special laws. 171 There is a single Federal Law for the entire alcohol industry.

An important player in the international brewing market are brewing associations. The American Brewers Association includes more than 4,380 U.S. brewery members and 46,000 members of the American Homebrewers Association.[[124]](#footnote-124) This is more than 70% of the brewing industry.[[125]](#footnote-125) "The Brewers of Europe" unites 29 national associations from European countries, includes 8500 breweries and promotes their unified position in Brussels.[[126]](#footnote-126) In addition, there are organizations that promote the development of brewing, for example, the Siebel Technology Institute in the United States[[127]](#footnote-127) and the Institute of Brewing and Distillation in the UK.[[128]](#footnote-128)

 Over the years, the brewing industry in Russia has fulfilled 100% of the tax liabilities to budgets of all levels. The brewing industry is characterized by the absence of a shadow market, as brewing is time-consuming and complex. In addition, breweries create jobs in different regions of Russia, including in related areas.

The Russian beer market is one of the largest in the world. Within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEMA), Russia and the participating countries are actively working to integrate the brewing market. The adoption of the Technical Regulations of the Customs Union "On the Safety of Alcohol Products" is actively discussed. It is supposed to consolidate international norms of brewing and composition of brewing products.[[129]](#footnote-129) For the development of communications in 2012, the Union of Russian Brewers signed an agreement on cooperation with the Guild of Brewers of Belarus and the Union of Brewers of Kazakhstan.[[130]](#footnote-130)

The active development of the Russian market began in the 90s. Brewing production contributed to the development of related industries: agriculture, machine building, glass and packing production, etc. After the crisis in 1998, foreign companies began to actively enter the brewing market.

With the beginning of the international economic crisis of 2008, there is a regression in the brewing industry. In 2010, the excise tax on beer grew by 200%. The rate of excise tax has become higher than in Germany and the Czech Republic.[[131]](#footnote-131) From 2010 to 2014, beer production fell by a quarter. In 2011, the amendment to 171 Federal Law equated beer to strong alcohol, strict restrictions on advertising spread to the brewing industry, a ban was imposed on the sale and consumption of beer in public places, for sale in non-stationary retail (kiosks). Since 2012, the number of breweries in Russia has begun to decline. To date, the excise tax rate on beer and spirits is approximately equal. In 2017 beer sales decreased by 4-5%. Brewers consider one of the reasons there is excessive regulation of the market. Its role was played by the fall in real incomes of the population, an increase in excise tax, the prohibition of production and sale in plastic containers of more than 1.5 liters, the introduction of the EGAIS system. In 2018 the brewers count on the World Cup.[[132]](#footnote-132)

The Russian brewing market is an oligopoly. Until 2012, 5 large foreign companies were represented on the market: SABMiller RUS, Moscow-Efes Brewery, Carlsberg group, SUN InBev, and United Heineken Breweries. Since 2012, the company "SABMiller RUS" was joined to the "Moscow-Efes Brewery". In 2014, 84% of the market was controlled by 4 foreign companies - Efes, Baltika (Carlsberg), SUN InBev, Heineken. In the spring of 2018, AbInVev and Anadolu Efes merged business in Russia.[[133]](#footnote-133)

Today, 3 transnational players are represented on the Russian brewing market: AB InBev Efes Group, Heineken, Carlsberg group. In 2017, the first place in terms of revenue goes to Baltika, the second to SUN InBev, the third to United Heineken Breweries and the fourth Moscow-Efes Brewery.

Baltika has been producing beer since 1990, it belongs to the Danish company Carlsberg and is the largest Russian exporter.[[134]](#footnote-134) "SUN InBev" exists in the Russian market since 1999 and is a division of the international brewing concern "Anheuser-Busch InBev".[[135]](#footnote-135) "United Breweries Heineken" is the Russian subdivision of the international concern "HEINEKEN N.V." since 2002.[[136]](#footnote-136) "Moscow-Efes Brewery is a division of the international brewing company Anadolu Efes in Russia since 1997.[[137]](#footnote-137)

The brewing industry fully fulfills its tax obligations to the budgets of the Russian regions. Nevertheless, it was subjected to more than 40 legislative restrictions at the federal and regional levels. The production of beer has greatly decreased. Brewers appeal that the production of beer in addition to income creates jobs, promotes the development of innovation, agriculture, and reduces the use of strong drinks in society. [[138]](#footnote-138)

In the current geopolitical trend, sanctions, as well as a program to combat alcoholism, it is increasingly difficult to lobby the interests of brewers effectively. Western companies very tightly regulate the costs of GR-activities, have internal codes and extensive experience of lobbying practices around the world. In addition, Russian legislation strictly controls the activities of non-residents. Therefore, the brewing industry has exemplary GR, which differ in transparency and exclude corruption and shadow practices.

In addition to transnational brewing corporations, business associations play a significant role in GR. Influential associations are authorized by producers to represent a single industry position, to which the state listens.

In Russia, the most influential branch organization is the Union of Russian Brewers. Its members produce more than 90% of beer in Russia, it is a member of the World Brewing Alliance. Since 1999, the Union has initiated legislation regulating the industry, creates self-regulatory documents, represents the industry in GR, interacts with legislators, monitors information on the industry as a whole.[[139]](#footnote-139) All transnational brewing companies operating in Russia are part of the Union. This gives the Union the right to express an industry-wide position.

In 2012, small and medium-sized breweries merged into the National Union of Producers of Beer and Beverages.[[140]](#footnote-140) The noncommercial branch organization "Association of participants of the beer and nonalcoholic market" unites not only the product producers, but also distributors and service organizations.[[141]](#footnote-141) Craft breweries are part of the Craft Depot union, created in 2015.[[142]](#footnote-142)

Brewing companies in tandem with the Union of Russian Brewers began to develop relations with public authorities since the formation of the Union. Large companies submit proposals regarding lobbying and GR for consideration. The Union agrees proposals with all participants, and in communication with the authorities expresses a single industry position. This allows brewers to be heard.

In the beginning of 2000 the Union successfully lobbied the reduction of customs duties on foreign equipment for brewing. By 2005, the rate was reduced by 50%.[[143]](#footnote-143)

In 2003, the Union of Russian Brewers adopted the Code of Honor for Russian brewers. He describes the principles of competition, advertising, responsibility to the consumer. In 2014, a new edition of the code was introduced. The Union did not stop there, and in 2009 adopted the Commercial Communications Code, which ordered beer producers to restrict the stricture of the federal law "On Advertising".[[144]](#footnote-144)

In support of the ban on the sale and consumption of beer by minors, the Union of Russian Brewers in 2004 proposed to fix this at the legislative level. The main instrument GR was an open letter to VV Putin with a proposal. The Union implemented a number of programs in support of the ban[[145]](#footnote-145), organized information and advertising campaigns.[[146]](#footnote-146) The result was the legislative enactment of the ban.[[147]](#footnote-147)

To strengthen the interaction of the brewers and the Russian agrarian sector with the prospect of import substitution, the Union of Russian Brewers has concluded several agreements with the State Commission for Testing and Preservation of Selection Achievements.[[148]](#footnote-148)

In order to develop legislation in the field of technical regulation taking into account the interests of beer producers, the Union has communicated with the National Institute of Technical Regulation.[[149]](#footnote-149)

The mechanism of interaction between brewers and authorities that is popular in Russia is meetings at forums, conferences, format of round tables. In 2013 at the forum "Beer-2013" the current GR of the Union of Russian Brewers was discussed. The Union initiated the testing of means for measuring the volume of brewing products produced and invited representatives of the Rosalkogolregulirovanie. The results showed errors in the operation of the measuring instruments, the expert working groups decided to send an appeal to the Government of the Russian Federation with the justification of the need to postpone the introduction of the declaration from July 1, 2013 to January 1, 2015. The Union also made an exception to the Technical Regulation "On the Safety of Alcohol Products" plastic containers for brewing products and the cancellation of the notification of the start of production of alcoholic beverages.[[150]](#footnote-150)

Another popular platform for interaction between state and business representatives is the Eurasian Brewery Forum. In 2014, representatives from Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus discussed the problem of excise taxes, regulation of the turnover of brewing products, plastic packaging and technical regulation.[[151]](#footnote-151)

This is an example of the fact that in Russia the authorities are open to dialogue. The well-coordinated and clear work of the Union shows the state of shortcomings in innovations that can have serious consequences not only for the brewers, but also for the government itself.

Next, we will consider 6 topics on the agenda of the GR brewing industry for several years. These 6 directions (excise, 171 federal law, advertising, ban of plastic packaging, state information system, licensing) are case studies.

# 2.2. Lobbying of the brewing industry on excises

We consider how the brewers managed to stop the critical growth of excise tax on brewing products.

In 2010, the excise rate on beer was unexpectedly increased by 3 times for brewers compared to 2009. While the excise tax on strong alcohol was increased by only 10%. The tax burden on beer and vodka has roughly equaled, which runs counter to the world practice, where the fight against alcoholism implies a high difference in the tax performance of strong and weak alcohol. The government explained such an act by the desire to raise the excise tax on beer before the Central European.[[152]](#footnote-152)

This decision was made by the authorities during the economic crisis, thereby aggravating it for the brewing industry. Whereas in world practice, governments support budget-forming industries and make allowances for their early restoration. Nevertheless, the regulatory decision significantly supplemented the state budget. In 2010, excise receipts to the budget amounted to 81.98 billion rubles, with 66 billion in 2009.[[153]](#footnote-153)

The government commission, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister A. Khloponin in 2015, approved a government card, which set the task to increase budget revenues from excise taxes and reduce alcohol consumption. The map explained the annual increase in excise taxes from the brewing industry. Manufacturers of the industry understood that the increase in excise tax meant a decline in production indicators and a reduction in revenues to the budget. As for strong alcohol, its taxes remained frozen. The main task for strong alcohol was to fight against the shadow market.[[154]](#footnote-154)

In 2015, the Eurasian Brewery Forum was held, the agenda of which was an increase in excise taxes. Brewers offered to make tax break for low-alcohol beer. Following the discussion, the government did not support the reduction in the excise tax on low-alcohol beer.[[155]](#footnote-155) Then the Union of Russian Brewers announced its intention to achieve a two-three-year moratorium on state regulation of the brewing industry. This would help the brewers develop a plan for further development of the industry. The Union in an open letter to V. Putin expressed a single industry position on the freezing of excises and separate regulation.[[156]](#footnote-156)

The position of the industry was heard and in 2016 and 2017 rates of excise on beer with a share of alcohol 0.5 - 8.6% practically did not increase and amounted to 20 and 21 rubles, respectively. This had a positive impact on the industry, letting it grow stronger.[[157]](#footnote-157)

In 2016, State Duma deputy V. Zvagelsky and business representatives met in the framework of the AlcoCongress meeting. According to him, the Ministry of Finance approved proposals to reduce excise taxes on alcohol.[[158]](#footnote-158)

When in 2016 the Ministry of Finance proposed to introduce an excise on non-alcoholic beer, explaining this by a fashion for such beer among people with above-average prosperity, the Union of Russian Brewers convinced the ministry to abandon the idea. The State Duma retained zero rate for non-alcoholic beer for 2017-2019. Nevertheless, the government can introduce such excise at any time. Now, non-alcoholic beer is on the list of excisable goods, but it has zero excise tax. This is an unprecedented case in the world practice.[[159]](#footnote-159)

Producers of beer believe that raising excise taxes is not an effective tool for replenishing the state budget. This can exacerbate the crisis of the brewing industry and worsen the investment climate. In addition, a predictable increase in the price of the final product will lead to an increase in the share of consumption of strong alcohol.[[160]](#footnote-160)

As practice shows, an increase in excise taxes on the brewing industry does not help to reduce the alcoholization of the population. World practice shows that the consumption of alcohol can be reduced by shifting demand for strong alcohol in the direction of the weak. Because of high excise taxes on beer, the situation is that pure alcohol in beer costs more than in vodka. Therefore, socially unprotected and low-income groups choose strong alcohol.[[161]](#footnote-161)

# 2.3. Government relations of the brewing industry in the context of regulation

Another important agenda for brewers is the 171 Federal Law regulating the brewing industry, which was established in 1995 for strong alcohol. Over time, it was introduced more than 300 amendments, from 2011 the law began to spread its effect to the brewing industry. To date, the law seems to be a snowball, has many contradictions and does not always accurately determine the types of products. Reforming the law and creating separate regulation is the main task for the brewing industry.[[162]](#footnote-162)

The regulation of a strong and low-alcohol industry by unified norms runs counter to the concept of reducing alcohol consumption of the population, where the main task is to reduce the consumption of strong alcohol in favor of the weak.

Brewers offer to create separate regulation for beer, wine and strong alcohol. In their opinion, this will reduce the regulatory burden on the industry, make beer more affordable for consumption in comparison with strong alcohol, stimulate the development of brewing and related industries, increase the competitiveness of Russian beer in the international market.[[163]](#footnote-163)

In the State Duma, the Chairman of the Committee on Economic Policy, V. Zvagelsky, promotes the proposal for creating separate legislation for the brewing industry. The deputy talked with beer producers at the annual forum "AlcoCongress 2016". In the same year, legislators and representatives of the executive branch made various proposals aimed at weakening the regulation of the brewing industry. An expert area for regulating the industry was created: the Subgroup on Regulation of the Brewing Industry under the Governmental Commission for Enhancing Competitiveness and Alcohol Market Regulation, chaired by Deputy Minister of Economic Development O. Fomichev. The subgroup developed separate regulations for the brewing industry based on 171 Federal Law.[[164]](#footnote-164)

Already at the end of the year, experts commissioned by the Working Group on Improving the Effectiveness of State Regulation and Competition in the Alcohol Market under the Governmental Commission for Enhancing Competitiveness and Alcohol Market Regulation sent a proposal to the Ministry of Economic Development for separate regulation for brewing products. Experts suggested developing a special federal law to improve the regulation of the brewing industry. In their view, this will avoid excessive stress on the brewing and related industries, as well as ensure competitiveness in the international market.[[165]](#footnote-165)

The topic of creating a separate law was also touched upon in the framework of AlcoCongress-2017. 171 The Federal Law is rather complicated for users without special legal training. Constant amendments and contradictions made it confusing and not relevant for the tasks facing it. This determines the urgency of creating a new, ultimately understandable document, where a separate regulation will be prescribed for different types of alcohol products - beer, champagne, wine. This proposal is supported not only by brewers, but also by wine and champagne producers. The Union of Russian Brewers is actively engaged in preparing the law.[[166]](#footnote-166)

In 2016 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Khloponin noted that the government is ready to listen to the brewers at a meeting of the government commission to increase the competitiveness of the alcohol market and discuss separate regulation of the industry and excises in the long run.[[167]](#footnote-167)

 In 2017, separate regulation was discussed by A. Khloponin and the Union of Russian Brewers at the Russian Investment Forum in Sochi, attended by representatives of key ministries, the Federation Council, regional authorities and leading economic institutions. A. Khloponin supported the idea and passed it to the working group on improving the efficiency of state regulation and competition on the alcohol market for consideration and transfer to the Governmental Commission for Enhancing Competitiveness and Alcohol Market Regulation.[[168]](#footnote-168)

Within the framework of the forum "Beer-2017" a round table "Separate regulation of the alcohol market: the formation of unified national approaches to the production and turnover of brewing products" was held, which brought together representatives of the brewing business, associations and the state. The Union presented the concept, as well as the drafted bill of separate regulation.[[169]](#footnote-169)

Discussion of the creation of a separate law was continued at the Gaidar forum in the framework of the panel discussion "Variants of regulation of the alcohol market and their social and economic effects." Anna Dupan, director of the Institute for Problems of Legal Regulation of the School of Law at the Higher School of Economics, believes that the separate regulation of alcohol will increase the transparency of the market.[[170]](#footnote-170)

Representatives of the Higher School of Economics and the Union of Russian Brewers joined forces and prepared a concept of separate regulation for the production and turnover of beer for the Ministry of Economic Development. The main arguments for creating a separate regulation were the following:[[171]](#footnote-171)

* According to the "Concept of Implementing the State Policy on Reducing the Scale of Alcohol Abuse and Prevention of Alcohol Abuse among the Population of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2020," the emphasis on strong alcohol consumption should be shifted towards beer, which should be more accessible.
* The brewing industry is a budget-forming industry for many regions. For several years, beer excise receipts exceeded the preliminary calculations of the Federal Treasury.
* Brewing requires expensive raw materials and qualified personnel. The industry does not have a shadow market.

The proposals for the concept were as follows [[172]](#footnote-172):

* All prohibitions and restrictions related to the production, turnover and advertising of brewing products should be established only at the federal level. Granting such powers to subjects of the Russian Federation can negatively affect the transparency of the market and competition.
* Remove restrictions on the place and time of sale of brewing products.
* To change the excise tax ratio for weak and strong alcohol in favor of a significant increase in strong.
* Revise the system for measuring the volume of production and take into account a variety of technological nuances.
* It is proposed to review the limitations of advertising for beer.
* Develop a motivation system for producers and sellers to target soft and non-alcoholic beer.

The Brewers registered the expected result of the innovations:[[173]](#footnote-173)

* Legal regulation will become relevant, systemic and useful for the development of the industry.
* The culture of alcohol consumption will shift from strong drinks to weaker ones, alcoholization of the population will decrease.
* The law will promote the development of related industries.

In parallel with the concept of separate regulation, the Union of Russian Brewers and representatives of the Higher School of Economics prepared a draft of amendments 171 of the Federal Law. According to A. Dupan, the project is created on the model of the Tax Code and has 5 chapters. The first chapter contains the general norms of production, turnover, sales of products, the powers of regulatory bodies. The second chapter prescribes control and responsibility. Separate regulation of spirits, wine and beer is given in a separate chapter. Also, the licensing norms for each type of alcohol products are separately spelled out. The new law should become structured and understandable.[[174]](#footnote-174)

The proposals were preceded by numerous discussions. The choice was between creating three separate laws for strong alcohol, wine and beer, or creating one law that enshrines separate regulation. As a result, experts dwelled on the creation of a single law, in which all aspects of the alcohol market. According to A. Dupkan, making amendments and making references within one legal act is more logical and easier for both business and state.[[175]](#footnote-175)

 In many European countries (Germany, Belgium, England) for beer, separate legislation is provided. In these countries, the distribution of alcohol consumption outweighs the use of low-alcohol beverages, and the brewing industry is a budget-based.

If we compare the regulation of the brewing industry in Russia and the EEA countries, we see that in Belarus beer is used as a food requirement[[176]](#footnote-176), Kazakhstan is allowed to sell beer in kiosks.[[177]](#footnote-177)

At the time of writing, no legal acts have been adopted regarding separate regulation. Discussions and consideration of the concept are continuing.

# 2.4. Opposition to licensing of the brewing industry

Another important issue for brewers is licensing. With the addition in the 171 Federal Law of the names "beer" for a drink containing at least 50% of the ingredients combined and a "beer drink" for the rest of the species, many manufacturers began to produce beverages with the addition of alcohol, which have nothing to do with beer, and call them " beer beverage ". The Brewers appealed to the Rosalkogolregulirovanie (RAR) to abandon the term "beer drink" and solve the problem. In return, Rosalkogolregulirovanie proposed to introduce licensing of drinks made on the basis of beer. Rosalkogolregulirovanie explained the need to introduce licensing a large number of counterfeit products found during inspections. One of the listed violators, the president of the company "RUDO" wrote a letter to the Union of Brewers, in which he denied the allegations of the Rosalkogolregulirovaniye and proposed a number of measures to improve the situation in the alcohol industry. Brewers believe that the problem can be solved by canceling the term "beer beverage" or clarifying it to exclude non-malted products from it.[[178]](#footnote-178)

The bill on the licensing of beer and beer production was submitted to the State Duma on March 3, 2014. It was proposed to oblige to receive a license of brewers, whose volume exceeds 100 thousand deciliters per year. The official response of the Government to the bill states that its provisions do not correlate with the concept of the Federal Law, and there has not been a sufficient law enforcement practice of state regulation of the production and turnover of beer and beer beverages. In the end, the Government of the Russian Federation did not support the bill.[[179]](#footnote-179)

The Union of Russian Brewers opposed licensing. Its individual participants sent appeals to government agencies and the curator of the alcohol industry A. Khloponin. Appeals indicated that existing tools allow the state to fully control the brewing industry. Rospotrebnadzor controls production and turnover of products, there are no real reasons for introducing licensing of beer beverages. Analyzing the arguments of the brewers, Rosalkogolregulirovanie in the letter of reply to the Union agreed that licensing is unnecessary.[[180]](#footnote-180) In addition, the brewers appealed to the Ministry of Finance with a proposal to develop a simplified procedure for access to online sales, which does not require the receipt of licenses.[[181]](#footnote-181)

The issue of licensing is not yet closed. In 2018, the Ministry of Finance drafted bills on licensing and labeling beer.[[182]](#footnote-182) Nevertheless, beer and beer drinks are not included in the final list of goods subject to obligatory marking from 2019.[[183]](#footnote-183) At the April meeting of the government and brewing unions on licensing the brewing industry, the parties came to the conclusion that instead of licensing a register of producers.[[184]](#footnote-184) The format of the register has not yet been developed, but the participants in the brewing industry themselves actively participate in its creation. The National Union of Producers of Beer and Beverages proposed a number of criteria for inclusion in the register and created a vote.[[185]](#footnote-185) The Ministry of Finance and the RAR approved these criteria.[[186]](#footnote-186) The timing of the introduction of the registry has not yet been determined.

In general, the brewing industry defended its position: licensing was not introduced. The active work of the Union of Russian Brewers helped convince the government of the uselessness of this idea. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the topic with licensing is closed. Most likely, after some time the government will again try to introduce it, and then the brewers will look for new arguments in support of their position.

# 2.5. Government relations of the brewing industry regarding a plastic bottle

For five years, brewers were concerned about the restriction of plastic containers. The brewing industry has made quite a few steps to self-restraint in the hope of avoiding legislative prohibitions.

In 2014, the State Duma adopted in the first reading a law prohibiting the bottling of beer into plastic over 0.5 liters and containing more than 4% alcohol. Restriction of plastic containers would lead to a significant increase in the price of beer, a reduction in production and a decrease in the receipt of excise taxes to the budget. This would have an impact on adjacent to the brewing industry, the production of plastic containers.[[187]](#footnote-187) The bill was adopted swiftly, there were no discussions with the profile ministries and business associations. The explanatory note to the bill informs that plastic packaging reduces the price of beer and gives an opportunity to buy immediately a large amount, which leads to alcoholization of the population. This identity goes against the antialcohol program, which aims to shift consumption of strong alcohol in favor of a weak.[[188]](#footnote-188)

The brewers reacted to the bill with letters to the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation DA Medvedev and the heads of the relevant ministries, where they reported that it would hit the production indicators of the brewing and related industries, would lead to a sharp increase in the price of beer, but would not yield results in combating alcoholism. The letter to D.Medvedev was signed by the leaders of six associations. The letter described the advantages and safety of plastic containers for beer production, and also requested to stop the adoption of the law.[[189]](#footnote-189) The result was a delay in the consideration of the bill in the State Duma.

Russian colleagues were supported by foreign brewers. The Union "Brewers of Europe" and the International Brewing Union sent a letter to the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Igor Shuvalov, where they declared the safety of plastic bottles and a negative impact on international investment. Director of the company "Bouquet of Chuvashia" wrote to the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation A. Khloponin. The director of the Syktyvkarsky Brewery sent an appeal to I. Artemyev, head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation.[[190]](#footnote-190)

This prompted the Union of Russian Brewers to voluntarily abandon the production of beer in a plastic bottle of over 2.5 liters for low-alcohol beer, and more than 2 liters for strong beer. The Brewers assumed that this was a reasonable compromise and would help legislators to abandon the ban. The result was the prevention of a complete ban on plastic bottles for bottling beer.[[191]](#footnote-191)

n the fall of 2015, brewers agreed to a voluntary limit of up to 1.5 liters of beer production in plastic. There was a lot of discussion with different moods around the limitation of a plastic bottle. Participants of the Union of Russian Brewers and the Association of Plastic Producers and Processors signed a memorandum "On Supporting Fair Competition and Preventing Discrimination of Certain Types of Packaging for the Production of Brewing Products." The producers agreed to conduct fair competition and not lobby for limiting the output of other producers. Aluminum and glass producers were invited to sign, but they saw a pressure on their industry and power, and informed Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Khloponin and the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) about it. Manufacturers of aluminum and glass have already received a warning from the FAS for the desire to "lobby for measures to increase the volumes and markets for the sale of glass products, including limiting the use of a plastic bottle".[[192]](#footnote-192)

In the same year, representatives of the industry met with the leadership of the Rosalkogolregulirovanie (RAR). In support of the norm of 1.5 liters for plastic containers for beer, the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Economic Policy and Entrepreneurship of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Viktor Zvagelsky. According to him, such a norm is supported by the State Duma's profile committee, the government and vice-premier A. Khloponin.[[193]](#footnote-193)

In 2016, the law on limiting the production and turnover of alcoholic beverages in plastic more than 1.5 liters was signed. On January 1, 2017, the law came into force. Thus, the brewers were persuaded to increase the minimum volume for the production of beer in a plastic bottle from 0.5 liters to 1.5.[[194]](#footnote-194) For a long time, brewers have tried to make an amendment to permit the production of beer in plastic more than 1.5 liters for export. Russian beer is represented on the markets of Mongolia, Belarus, Uzbekistan. The Union of Russian Brewers achieved the inclusion of an export amendment to the bill, but was later rejected, arguing that it would be difficult to track which market produces products in large plastic bottles. In the summer of 2017 the export amendment was again introduced for consideration by the State Duma deputy I. Gilmutdinov.[[195]](#footnote-195) The amendment was adopted at the end of 2017, it allows from August 1, 2017 production and turnover of beer and beer beverages in plastic containers of more than 1.5 liters for export purposes.[[196]](#footnote-196)

The Union of Russian Brewers and its participants believe that the state is ready to consider the industry's position in various areas of regulation. The St. Petersburg Brewers' Forum showed a good dynamic of constructive dialogue between the industry and the authorities.[[197]](#footnote-197)

# 2.6. Government relations of the brewing industry on the issue of advertising

Since we equate beer with strong alcohol, strong restrictions on advertising of brewing products have come into force. According to the authorities, this contributes to the goals of the anti-alcohol campaign.

Since 2004, advertising of beer on television in the morning and afternoon, as well as in stadiums.[[198]](#footnote-198) Since 2005 beer advertising has been toughened and banned from using images of people and animals.[[199]](#footnote-199) In 2009, the bill on the complete ban on beer advertising was under consideration.[[200]](#footnote-200) Everything was limited to a ban on dialogue behind the scenes of advertising.[[201]](#footnote-201)

With the equating of beer to strong alcohol, the same advertising restrictions began to apply to him. Thus, from September 1, 2012, beer advertising was completely banned.[[202]](#footnote-202)

In 2014, the State Duma amended the Law on Advertising, allowing advertising of brewing products until the end of 2018, in accordance with the requirements of FIFA for the World Cup, which will be held in Russia in 2018.[[203]](#footnote-203)

The Union of Russian Brewers in 2016 adopted the Code of Commercial Communications on non-alcoholic beverages based on beer, which establishes voluntary restrictions on beer advertising in accordance with moral principles. In particular, advertising with religious or national overtones that offends the feelings of certain groups of people is prohibited. To advertise non-alcoholic beer, a special pictogram was introduced.[[204]](#footnote-204)

It should be noted that the brewers took a responsible approach to advertising beer. After the World Cup, the Union of Russian Brewers will continue to work on maintaining current advertising permits. Now brewing companies can place advertising in stadiums during competitions, in print media, in sports broadcasts and on sports channels.[[205]](#footnote-205) Manufacturers of beer actively promote the advertising of non-alcoholic beer.

Advertising of beer in the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union: Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan is regulated milder, there is prohibited outdoor advertising and in social institutions, but it is allowed in print media and radio, as well as at night on television. In Kazakhstan beer advertising is completely banned. In the US and some European countries, beer advertising is restricted by domestic codes of manufacturers.[[206]](#footnote-206)

# 2.7. The reaction of the brewing industry to the introduction of the state automated information system

In 2015, the Unified State Automated Information System (USAIS) was introduced, to which all breweries with an annual turnover of more than 300 thousand deciliters were to be connected. The system already worked in the hard alcohol industry, but had a lot of mistakes and shortcomings, which created difficulties for producers. The Brewers held conferences, roundtables to share their experience in the system and discuss how to influence the state to improve it and make it easier to use. In 2015, in Novosibirsk, a round table "Issues of introducing USAIS for brewing products in wholesale and retail trade organizations" was held with the participation of breweries, regional authorities and Rosalkogolregulirovaniye. Producers proposed to postpone the introduction of the system for retail. According to the brewers, additional time contributed to understanding the implementation of the new system.[[207]](#footnote-207)

The introduction of USAIS required financial and time costs from enterprises and from outlets. The slightest mistake could cost a license and a fine. In addition, manufacturers could not ship products to retail outlets that were not connected to the system. Against the introduction of such a system were the Head of the “OPORA RUSSIA” Commission for Small Format Commerce and the Chairman of the Board of the National Union of Beer and Beverage Producers.[[208]](#footnote-208)

Branch associations actively interacted with authorities. Union of Russian Brewers November 20, 2015 wrote a letter to the Rosalkogolregulirovanie (RAR) with a request to postpone the introduction of the system and explain some of the points. In the response, the RAR considered that there were no problems with the system and it was senseless to introduce a delay.[[209]](#footnote-209)

In 2016 State Duma deputy Viktor Zvagelsky proposed to release from USAIS beer producers that produce less than 300 thousand deciliters per year.[[210]](#footnote-210)

According to the Union of Russian Brewers, the system will work effectively for both business and the state, if the USAIS. The Union of Russian Brewers throughout the whole period of the system's work discusses its work with government agencies and makes current proposals. For example, the council proposed the introduction of a system for promptly informing users of failures and ensure the smooth operation of USAIS during the elimination of failures. The Union proposed to reduce the time of fixing the application in USAIS to 30 minutes (there were 12 hours) and the Rosalkogolregulirovanie introduced this proposal.[[211]](#footnote-211)

Since the USAIS work, the government has repeatedly proposed to introduce additional measures to control the production of beer, to identify and destroy the "gray zones". The union of Russian brewers and multinational companies appeal to state bodies in that additional measures are financially expensive and unnecessary. To date, no additional measure proposed by the state has been legislated.[[212]](#footnote-212)

We made an analysis of cases in six areas of GR transnational brewing companies. Information we took from open analytical and news sources.

Summarizing the analyzed cases, it is possible to single out the most popular formats of interaction between brewers and representatives of state authorities. For the most part, these are meetings, negotiations and round tables in the framework of conferences and forums. A fairly large number of industry brewing forums are held in Russia, attended by representatives of the federal and regional authorities. This is the Eurasian Brewery Forum, "AlcoCongress", "Beer- (year)", St. Petersburg Forum of Brewers. In addition, round-table discussions and meetings in different regions of Russia are held especially on topical issues. For example, on the introduction of USAIS, the restriction of plastic packaging, the round table "Separate regulation of the alcohol market: the formation of unified national approaches to the production and turnover of brewing products", a round table "Issues of introducing USAIS for brewing products in wholesale and retail trade organizations". In addition, representatives of the brewing industry frequent visitors to major inter-industry forums, such as the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, the Russian Investment Forum in Sochi, the Gaidar Forum. Brewing and related industries interact with each other, holding various meetings and accepting road maps and agreements. For example, manufacturers of plastic containers and the brewing industry signed an agreement on free competition.

In addition, the Union of Russian Brewers and manufacturers are responding promptly to spontaneous adoption of regulatory procedures by open letters to the president, prime minister and profile ministries. The analysis of the cases showed that the brewing industry is solidary, and, if necessary, foreign colleagues and representatives of related industries, as well as representatives of state power themselves, stand up for its protection.

To date, the main strategic task of transnational brewing companies is to maintain constructive interaction with the Union of Russian Brewers and public authorities. The companies react promptly and carefully to all regulatory innovations, act as experts when interacting with representatives of public authorities and express their position to decision-makers.

# 2.8. Features GR strategy of the brewing industry (according to research interviews)

For a more detailed study of the GR strategy of the brewing industry, we conducted a series of interviews with specialists working in the field of GR. Interviewers were made by 3 representatives of multinational brewing companies: "United Breweries Heineken", "Baltika" and "SUN InBev". These are the largest companies in the industry, producing more than 80% of all brewing products.

 Respondents were asked the following questions:

1. Does your brewery belong to an association / nonprofit organization of the brewing industry?

2. How does your brewing company implement the GR strategy, independently or assign it to the association / non-profit organization that it includes?

3. What is the type of interaction between the brewing company and the state: separate or unified for the whole industry?

4. How do you assess the success of GR-relationship of your company and the industry as a whole? What is more in the percentage, wins or losses of GR-campaigns?

5. What is the main strategy of GR? What is this participation, passive (analysis of government actions, bills) or active (participation in the discussion of laws, expert activity)?

6. Who performs the main tasks of the GR, company employees or third-party organizations and consultants?

7. In your opinion, do associations / non-profit organizations effectively implement the GR-strategy (= positive result)?

8. Does your company's GR use the experience of the West or have to find its own way?

From the side of SUN InBev (AB InBev part of AB InBev Efes Group), Alexander Mazanov, the head of the department for interaction with federal authorities, responded. The detailed interview allowed to draw the following conclusions.

Sun Inbev is a member of 3 non-commercial organizations of the brewing industry - the Union of Russian Brewers, the RusBrand Commonwealth, the Industry for Ecology Association RusPEC.

GR-strategy of the company is developed on the basis of national and local strategies for Western Europe. The Russian GR strategy is a reflection of the global strategy, but taking into account the specific features of the country's economic and social policy. The company AB InBev implements GR forces of its employees, pointing to consultants.

Before the implementation of GR-strategy or projects, AB InBev analyzes the world practice, specific cases. This helps to avoid mistakes, as well as to argue the chosen position. In addition, the use of international experience helps to develop a balanced approach to the development of GR-strategy.

The GR-strategy of AB InBev includes both passive and active participation: government actions, bills are analyzed to react quickly and effectively, and interact with authorities through expert activities, round tables. The government constantly introduces new restrictions to regulate the brewing industry, so the work of GR departments of transnational companies is always there.

The state authorities are ready for a dialogue with brewing manufacturers, are ready to listen and consider proposals, but in the event that the proposals reflect the industry position. Therefore, before expressing a position to the federal authorities, large companies agree on their proposals, achieve a unified vision of the position and express it to the state. Most often, the position of the industry on the sidelines of power is expressed by the Union of Russian Brewers. The Union of Russian Brewers acts in some way a filter of proposals. If there is disagreement among the participants, then the proposal will not be presented to the state. The interaction of a non-profit organization and the state is more credible than lobbying a particular company for their interests. In addition, it is assumed that the state only hears to those proposals that express the common opinion of the industry and are supported by all companies and the Union in particular. Therefore, 99% GR of AB InBev is supported by a non-profit organization. All projects pass through the Union of Russian Brewers. This is done to ensure that the state correctly perceives the message of the project, without contact with the brand. Such interaction is more effective.

As for the regional level, the branches have the opportunity to interact with local authorities on specific issues.

 The success of GR of AB InBev is expressed in subsidies, benefits. GR with legislative and executive power in the sphere of regulation is consistent with the Union of Russian Brewers and is implemented by him. According to A. Mazanov, FIFA 2018 promotes the implementation of GR, as the partner company is positively perceived by the state authorities. Nevertheless, GR of AB InBev is associated with risks that have financial effects.

As for lobbying, it is difficult to name successful. At the end of 2017, the industry had a significant victory: an amendment was approved to permit the production of beer in plastic containers over 1.5 liters for export.

The actual direction of the brewing industry is the creation of a bill providing for separate regulation for strong alcohol, beer, wine and champagne. In Chapter 2, in a separate section, this topic is discussed in more detail. The Brewers believe that the state will consider the concept of regulating the industry, but it will not develop it, as this is not its direct task. Producers of brewing products intend to propose to consolidate to the state at the legislative level such regulation, in which it is comfortable for them to conduct their activity and develop themselves.

Respondent from the company "United Breweries Heineken" made a manager for work with government bodies Arina Flugova.

The company "United Breweries Heineken" is in the Union of Russian Brewers and is actively involved in the work of the Union. Thus, the company implements the GR strategy both independently and jointly with the business association. In the Union there are commissions on the main issues, members of which are representatives of companies. Thus, decisions within the Union are accepted only with the approval of the members.

The interlocutor believes that interaction with state authorities is a single task for the entire industry. Active work of the Union opens prospects for further implementation of the unified GR strategy of the brewing industry.

Heineken conducts active GR activities: participates in the discussion of laws, expert activities. The main tasks are performed by company employees and associations. To settle certain issues, experts are involved. GR-activity takes into account the experience of different countries. As for the percentage of victories and the loss of GR-campaigns, Arina finds it difficult to answer. In general, the government listens to the opinion of the industry, which helps to reach compromise solutions.

The next respondent was Irina Fedorova, Senior GR director of the East Europe Baltika.

Baltika is a member of the Union of Russian Brewers. The implementation of the GR strategy depends on its objectives. The strategy for GR work is entrusted to the directorate, and tasks within the strategy are implemented by various instruments within the framework of Russian legislation. The main task of the GR department of the Baltika is to protect the right to conduct business. Those changes in legislation that have the same influence on the industry, and do not cause conflicts of interest between companies, are worked out by the Union. The main tasks of the GR strategy are carried out by the employees and are their KPIs.

As for the evaluation of the success of GR-campaigns, Irina noted that in 2017 no risks were realized. Baltika is part of the Carlsberg group, so the GR-activity uses the experience of colleagues. At the same time, the specifics of the Russian GR dictate the need to seek own way.

The interview provided some important conclusions. We found out that all transnational companies of the brewing industry are members of the Union of Russian Brewers. In addition, they coordinate their positions on key issues, and the Union of Russian Brewers represents a unified position of the industry. In the opinion of the respondents, the authorities see the true message of the position, without being distracted by brands, when the position is presented by a non-profit organization. In addition, government agencies take into account a single industry position when it expresses a consolidated business position.

Despite a large number of restrictive regulations, brewers believe that they manage to successfully implement GR and lobbying campaigns. In 2017, not one specific regulatory bill was adopted. In many respects it is the merit of the Union of Russian Brewers, which acts as an industry expert and constructively opposes the state in an attempt to further regulate the industry. In addition, in 2017 the brewers succeeded in lobbying permission for the export of beer in plastic bottles over 1.5 liters.

Large companies implement GR-strategies by their employees, pointing to experts. At the same time, employees of companies are included in a standing commission in the Union of Russian Brewers. Active work on GR is in cooperation with the Union. The Union is the coordinating link between large companies, within which a consolidated position is developed. The Union does not voice the uncoordinated position in cooperation with the authorities. This approach allows you to achieve maximum efficiency from the GR-company.

Representatives of the companies share their interaction with the state to solve current problems, respond to bills, and work for the future. One such long-run is the development of separate regulation for the brewing industry. Not only representatives of the brewing industry are involved, but also interested lawyers, a specially created group. Respondent Alexander Mazanov believes that the industry itself must develop a comfortable regulatory concept, and then submit it to the authorities for discussion. The authorities are ready to consider offers of business.

In addition, interviews were conducted with craft breweries. The analysis of the interview showed that the craft breweries do not deal with GR-activities independently and do not have GR-departments, in rare cases entrusting it to business associations.

Regulatory activity of the state creates both prospects and threats for business of brewing companies. In states with a strong state presence in the economy, like Russia, interaction with authorities is the determining factor in the successful functioning and development of the company. Building positive relations with the authorities is one of the main tasks for large international companies. The advantage of brewers in the dialogue with the authorities is the long-term experience of GR-activities of companies in various local markets around the world, as well as understanding the nature of the influence on the power structures and technologies of civilized GR.

# Conclusion

Globalization and accelerated economic growth have led to a large number of multinational companies. These companies have huge financial and material resources that allow companies to transform them into power resources. Thus, transnational companies have become notable players not only in the social and economic life of the country, but also in the political. Gradually, large companies became part of the political decision-making process, as they have the ability to influence state actors. In addition, companies have the necessary tools to transform social reality.

In the 1990s, transnational companies came to Russia. Among them there were also large foreign brewing companies. Transnational brewing companies in Russia are more than 80% of the entire industry. The state recognizes their position for the position of the whole industry.

The interaction of companies in the brewing industry and public authorities in Russia is carried out in accordance with the model of neo-corporatism. The brewing industry is an oligopoly, based on three international companies - AB InBev Efes Group, Heineken, Baltika (part of the Carlsberg group). These companies form the GR strategy of the industry together with the Union of Russian Brewers. The Union of Russian Brewers interacts with the state on behalf of the entire industry. It coordinates and formulates a single industry position on politics and offers it to the state.

In Russia, there are two trends in the implementation of GR. One is based on the personal influence of the CEO; the second assumes influence on the state through business associations. The predominance of the type of representation of interests largely depends on the specifics of the industry. This study showed that in the brewing industry large companies operate through the Union of Russian Brewers.

An important feature of the Russian GR is the fact that interest groups have a loyal politician in government. This determines the effectiveness of GR and lobbying. In the past few years, the lobbying of members of the State Duma has been replaced by the government and the president. GR of most companies is aimed at counteracting the rigid regulation of the industry that is carried out by the government. The brewing industry is a good example. Important is the fact that the main GR-strategies are aimed at the federal government. Business in Russia pays less attention to building long-term GR with regional authorities. This is due to the instability of political relations in regions where all processes are tied to the personalities of the head or governor.

Despite the fact that the brewing industry fulfills its tax obligations to the budgets of Russian regions, the government constantly introduces new regulatory acts. This reduces not only the production of beer, but also workplace and incomes of related industries. It is supposed, that thus the government realizes the program on struggle against an alcoholization of the population. The experience of other countries shows that people should be transferred from strong alcoholic beverages to weak ones. In Russia pure alcohol in beer costs more than pure alcohol in vodka.

From an interview with representatives of three international brewing companies - Baltika (Carlsberg), Heineken, AB InBev Efes Group - we learned in more detail about the current GR strategy of the industry and its tools, the direction of development and problems. The most relevant issue for today is the issue of separate regulation. The Union of Russian Brewers, brewing companies and representatives of the Higher School of Economics have already developed a bill that includes separate regulation for different alcoholic beverages - beer, strong alcohol, wine.

Thus, the main conclusions of the work are as follows:

* Transnational breweries implement a fairly open GR. Media publishes news about GR technologies in the brewing industry; company employees are open for interview.
* Brewing companies give the state only a single industry position. Large companies - Baltika (Carlsberg), Heineken, AB InBev Efes Group - are 80% of breweries in Russia. The state only considers the general industry position.
* The interests of transnational breweries at the federal level are realized by the Union of Russian Brewers.
* Representatives of the brewing industry develop separate regulation. This will help solve a lot of problems that arose after joining beer to strong alcohol in 2011.
* The main tools of GR brewing industry are round tables and meetings within the framework of industry and interbranch forums, as well as written appeals to the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and the authorities.
* In 2017 transnational brewing companies successfully conducted GR: excises remained almost at the level of 2016, regulatory acts were not adopted. The success of the GR brewing industry is the adoption of an amendment that permits the export of beer in plastic bottles over 1,5 liters.

The hypothesis of the work was confirmed. Transnational brewing companies conduct open GR-activity. We collected a lot of information about GR companies from the media, analytical publications. Representatives of the companies were open for interviews. While a representative of the Union of Russian Brewers refused to comment on the GR branch.

Transnational brewing companies build GR activities, using the accumulated world experience. GR-strategy of multinational companies is developed on the basis of a global strategy taking into account the Russian characteristics and it is aimed at neutralizing the rigid regulation of the industry. In addition, industry representatives are trying to participate in politics, making various proposals, which are then voiced by the Union on the sidelines of the government. Representatives of multinational companies believe that the GR strategy of the industry is being implemented quite successfully and it is achieving its goals. In 2016-2017 the brewers managed to stop the spontaneous growth of excises, to delay the introduction of licensing and to build a successful dialogue with the authorities

The work has scientific and practical relevance and novelty, and the problems have broad perspectives for continuing the study. Practical relevance lies in the fact that other industries can use the experience of brewing to build GR. As for representatives of the brewing industry, they can use this work to look at their activities "from the outside."

The work opens the field for further study. For example, researches can make a comparative analysis of GR of two or three industries in Russia. Another variant of the study is a comparison of the GR brewing industries in Russia and other countries, due to which the characteristic features of GR for specific political systems will be determined.

# Bibliography

**Literature**

Assembly U.N.G. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. : United Nations Publications, 2008. 48 с.

Baumgartner F., Berry J., Hojnacki M., Kimball D., Leech B. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago, 2009.

Bauer T. Responsible Lobbying: Conceptual Foundations // Responsible Lobbying. : Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden, 2017. С. 85–122.

Bentley A. F. The process of government: A study of social pressures. – Routledge, 2017.

Birnbaum J. The Lobbyists. New York, 1993; DeKiefer D. The Citizen's Guide to Lobbying Congress. Chicago, 2007.

Borgatti S. P. et al. Network analysis in the social sciences //science. 2009. Т. 323. №. 5916. P. 892-895.

Cawson A. Corporatism and political theory. – Blackwell, 1986.

Campos N.F., Giovannoni F. Lobbying, corruption and political influence // Public Choice. 2007. Т. 131. № 1–2. С. 1–21.

Dahl R. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Dahl R. Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven, 1961.

Dahl R., Lindblom Ch. Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York: Harper, 1976. P. 34.

Denisov D. Business lobbying and government relations in Russia: The need for new principles //Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Fellowship paper. 2010. Т. 27. P.2-3, 12-17.

Fraenkel E. Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien. Frankf. / M., 1991.

Freeman R. E., Wicks A. C., Parmar B. Stakeholder theory and “the corporate objective revisited” //Organization science. – 2004. – Т. 15. – №. 3. – С. 364-369.

Frye T. Capture or exchange? Business lobbying in Russia //Europe-Asia Studies. 2002. Т. 54. №. 7. P. 1017-1036.

Grosse R. International Business and Government Relations in the 21st Century. Cambridge 2005

Galbraith J. K. The new industrial society. New York: Signet., 1967.

Gel'man V., Tarusina I. Studies of political elites in Russia: issues and alternatives //Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2000. Т. 33. №. 3. P. 311-329.

Grant Thomas. Lobbying, Government Relations, and Campaign Finance Worldwide. Oxford., 2006.

Georgiou G. Corporate lobbying on accounting standards: Methods, timing and perceived effectiveness //Abacus. – 2004. – Т. 40. – №. 2. – С.219-237.

Govorun A., Marques I., Pyle W. The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian enterprises and business associations //Business and Politics. – 2016. – Т. 18. – №. 4. – С. 395-433.

Hall P. A. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001.

Heywood A. Politics. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Vol.2. .Р. 453.

Hillman A. J., Keim G. D. Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social issues: What's the bottom line? //Strategic management journal. – 2001. – С. 125-139.

Hojnacki M., Kimball D. Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress // American Political Science Review. Vol. 92. 1998. № 4. P. 775–790;

Iwasaki I. Evolution of the government–business relationship and economic performance in the former soviet states–order state, rescue state, punish state //Economics of Planning. – 2003. – Т. 36. – №. 3. – С. 223-257.

Korbonski A. The decline and rise of pluralism in East Central Europe, 1949–1989, or how not to see the forest for the trees //Communist and Post-Communist Studies. – 1993. – Т. 26. – №. 4. – С. 432-

Klein W. Business Associations: Agency, Partnerships, Llcs, and Corporations, 2017 Statutes and Rules. : West Academic, 2017. 426 с.

Lane J. E., Ersson S. O. The new institutional politics: Performance and outcomes. – Psychology Press, 2000. С.247-273.

Lembruch J. Neo-Corporatism in comparative perspective //Pattterns of Corporatist Policy-making. London: Sage. 1982.

Libman A. Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS //The European Journal of Comparative Economics. 2006. Т. 3. №. 2. P. 263-288.

Lindblom C. E. Politics and markets. 1982.

Lobbying.ru | Слово из словаря [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.lobbying.ru/dictionary\_word.php?id=42 (дата обращения: 21.05.2018).

Mack С. S. Business, Politics, and the Practice of Government Relations. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997.

March J. G., Olsen J. P. The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life //American political science review. – 1983. – Т. 78. – №. 3. – С. 734-749.

Milbrath L. The Washington Lobbyists. Chicago, 1976.

Mulcahy S., Transparency International. Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, privileged access., 2015.

Olson M. The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, 2009. Т. 124.

Olsen M. E. Participatory pluralism //Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 1982.

Parsons T. On the concept of political power //Proceedings of the American philosophical society.1963. Т.107. №. 3. P. 262.

Peregudov S. The Oligarchical Model of Russian Corporatism //Contemporary Russian Politics. 2001. P. 259-268.

Schmitter P. C., Streeck W. The organization of business interests: Studying the associative action of business in advanced industrial societies. MPIfG discussion paper, 1999. №. 99/1. Р. 58-65.

Schimitter P., Lembruch G. Trends towards corporatist intermediation //Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. 1979.

Scott J. Social network analysis. Sage, 2017.

Truman D. B. The governmental process: political interests and public opinion. – A. Knopf, 1951.

Yakovlev A. The evolution of business – state interaction in Russia: From state capture to business capture? // Europe-Asia Studies. 2006. Т. 58. № 7. С. 1038-1041. (весь 1033–1056)

Wasserman S., Faust K. Social network analysis: Methods and applications. – Cambridge university press, 1994. Т. 8.

Ашин Г. К. Элитизм и демократия //Общественные науки и современность. – 1996. – №. 5. – С. 59-70.

Гайнутдинов Р. И. Модели взаимодействия бизнеса и государства в глобализирующемся мире: сравнительный анализ (Россия, Санкт-Петербург) //Проблемы современной экономики. – 2006. – №. 1-2. – С.121-124.

Гаман-Голутвина О. В. Политические элиты России: Вехи исторической эволюции. М., 2006.

Гельман В., Бычкова О. Экономические акторы и локальные режимы в крупных городах России //Неприкосновенный запас. – 2010. – №. 2. – С. 70.

GR и лоббизм: взаимодействие бизнеса и органов власти / под ред. В.А. Ачкасовой, И.Е. Минтусова, О.Г. Филатовой. М.: Издательство Юрайт, 2015.

Золотарева Е. В. Группы интересов в политике //Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Cерия: Политология. 1999. №. 1. С. 63-75.

Зудин А.Ю., Неокорпоративизм в России? (Государство и бизнес при Владимире Путине) // Pro et Contra.\_2001. T. 6. № 4

Зудин А. Ю. Олигархия как политическая проблема российского посткоммунизма //Общественные науки и современность. 1999. №. 1. С. 45-65.

Игошин И.Н. Институциональные системы и их искажения // Вестник Московского Университета. – Сер. 12, Политические науки. – 2003. – № 5. – С. 39-51.

Кинякин А. А., Матвеенков Д. О. Government relations как форма общественно-политической и бизнес коммуникации: к определению понятий // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Политология. — № 1. — 2009.

Коробейникова Н.Ю. GR-коммуникации в условиях развития современного российского бизнеса (на примере компаний «Вымпелком» и «Связьинвест») // Бизнес.Общество.Власть. 2010. № 3. С. 52–69.

Крыштановская О. В. Анатомия российской элиты. М., 2005.

Лапина Н.Ю. Модели взаимодействия бизнеса и власти в российских регионах и типы предпринимательского делового поведения // Российское предпринимательство: Стратегия, власть, менеджмент. М.: Институт социологии РАН, 2000. С. 45-55.

Лапина Н. Ю., Чирикова А. Е. Региональные элиты в РФ: модели поведения и политические ориентации. – ИНИОН РАН, 1999.

Любимов А. П. Лоббизм как конституционно-правовой институт. М., 1998.

Любимов А. П. История лоббизма в России. – Фонд “Либеральная миссия”, 2005.

Нельсон Л., Кузес И. Группы интересов и политический срез российских экономических реформ // Полис. 1995. № 6. С. 81–86.

Николаев А. В. Антиалкогольные кампании XX века в России //Вопросы истории. 2008. №. 11. С. 67-79.

Павроз А. В. Законодательное утверждение лоббизма в России в контексте глобальной конкуренции юрисдикций //Государственная служба. – 2011. – №. 3. – С. 15-1.

Павроз А. В. Эффективность плюралистической модели формирования политики: классическое обоснование и современные интерпретации //Вестник Московского университета. Серия 12: Политические науки. 2015. №. 4. С. 8.

Павроз А. В. Этические принципы лоббизма в условиях современной демократии //Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭКС. – 2015. – Т. 11. – №. 2. – С. 87-98.

Павроз А. В. Government Relations как институт социально-политического взаимодействия //Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭКС. – 2005. – №. 2. – С. 242-244.

Перегудов С. П. Ренессанс корпоративизма? //Куда идет Россия. 1998. P. 130-139.

Перегудов С. П. Политическое представительство интересов: опыт Запада и проблемы России //Полис. Политические исследования. – 1993. – №. 4. – С. 115-124.

Перегудов С. П., Лапина Н. Ю. Семененко И. С. Группы интересов и российское государство. М., 1999.

Перегудов С. П. Организованные интересы и государство: смена парадигм // Полис. 1994. №2. С. 76–87.

Радаев В.В. Социология рынков: к формированию нового направления. – М.: ГУ ВШЭ, 2003. – С. 135.

Радаев В. В., Котельникова З. В. Изменение структуры потребления алкоголя в контексте государственной алкогольной политики в России //Экономическая политика. 2016. Т. 11. №. 5. С. 2.

Рейтинг лучших GR-специалистов России. Выпуск 3 / 2011 [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.gr.ru/content/56 (дата обращения: 22.03.2018)

Рыбаков А.В. Трансформация политических институтов // Власть. – 2003. – № 5. – С. 49-54.

Рыбаков А.В. Общественные эффекты институционализации политико-властных отношений // Социально- гуманитарные знания: научно-образовательное издание. – 03/2004 - № 2. – С.146-156.

Сморгунов Л. В., Шерстобитов А. С. Политические сети: Теория и методы анализа //М.: Аспект Пресс. – 2014.320 с.

Стратегии региональных элит: экономика, модели власти, политический выбор / Н. Лапина, А. Чирикова; Рос. акад. наук. Ин-т науч. информации по обществ. наукам. - М., 2000. - 198 с.

Такала И. Веселие Руси: история алкогольной проблемы в России. Журнал Нева, 2002. С.32-84.

Толстых П. А. Практика лоббизма в Государственной Думе Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации. М., 2006.

Толстых П. А. Субъектный статус лоббизма и Government Relations //Исторические, философские, политические и юридические науки, культурология и искусствоведение. Вопросы теории и практики. 2012. №. 4-2. С. 195-200.

Тульчинский Г. Л. Корпоративная социальная ответственность: технологии и оценка эффективности //М.: Юрайт. – 2014. – Т. 338

Туровский Р.Ф. Власть и бизнес в регионах России: современные процессы обновления региональной элиты // Региональная элита в современной России. М., 2005. С. 143-178.

Урбан М. Социальные отношения и политические практики в посткоммунистической России // Полис. Политические исследования. 2002. № 4. С. 66–85.

Формирование системы цивилизованного лоббизма в России: GR и проблемы эффективности взаимодействия общества и власти / Под ред. В.И. Быкова, Л.Н. Галенской, Л.В. Сморгунова. СПб., 2006.

Шмиттер Ф. Неокорпоратизм //Полис. Политические исследования. – 1997. – №. 2. – С. 14-22.

Яковлев А.А., Бизнес-ассоциации в России: внутренняя структура, эволюция отношений с государством, роль в модернизации экономики / Под ред/ А.А. Яковлева. Сер. «Научные доклады: независимый экономический анализ»/ № 2.; М.:: МОНФ; Автономная некоммерческая организация «Проекты для будущего: научные и образовательные технологии», 2010, 190 с.

Яковлев А.А. Власть, бизнес и движущие силы экономического развития России: до и после «дела Юкоса» // Общественные науки и современность. – 2005. - № 1 .

А.Яковлев, А.Зудин, В.Голикова, А.Говорун, Е.Астафьева, Г.Гарифуллина. Бизнес-ассоциации в России: внутренняя структура, эволюция отношений с государством, роль в модернизации экономики. // Москва, МОНФ, 2010, 190 с.

Ясин Е. Бремя государства и экономическая политика //Вопросы экономики. – 2002. – №. 11. – С.30.

**Electronic resources**

Brewers Association Purpose [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.brewersassociation.org/brewers-association/purpose/ (date of the application: 26.04.2018).

Brewers Association [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.craftbeer.com/brewers-association (date of the application: 26.04.2018).

Code of Conduct // Epaca. <https://epaca.org/code-of-conduct/>

Corporate Social Responsibility Practices and Environmentally Responsible Behavior: The Case of The United Nations Global Compact | SpringerLink [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-006-9265-4 (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Convention against Corruption [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

EFES [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.efesrussia.ru/company/history.html (дата обращения: 23.03.2018).

Gerlach J. Text - H.R.494 - 113th Congress (2013-2014): Small BREW Act [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/494/text (date of the application: 19.05.2018); Excise duty rates - Taxation and Customs Union - European Commission [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\_customs/business/excise-duties-alcohol-tobacco-energy/excise-duties-alcohol/excise-duty-rates\_en (date of the application: 19.05.2018).

It’s Final: AB InBev Closes On Deal To Buy SABMiller [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/taranurin/2016/10/10/its-final-ab-inbev-closes-on-deal-to-buy-sabmiller/#733ed61e432c (date of the application: 26.04.2018).

1. IBD Information Brochure 2018 [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.ibd.org.uk/documents/ibd-information-brochure/ (date of the application: 26.04.2018).

Lobbying: influencing decision making with transparency and integrity. OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/50101671.pdf>

Lobbying Survey | [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://lobbyingsurvey.burson-marsteller.com (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Mulcahy S., Transparency International. Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, privileged access. , 2015. <http://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Lobbying_web.pdf>

RESPONSIBLE LOBBYING / Transparency International. 2015. <https://transparency.ie/sites/default/files/15.12_responsible_lobbying_guide.pdf>

Research - Corruption Q&As - Code of ethics for companies: Good practices and resources [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/code\_of\_ethics\_for\_companies\_good\_practices\_and\_resources (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

SABMiller AB InBev would dominate the beer market - Business Insider [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.businessinsider.com/sabmiller-ab-inbev-would-dominate-the-beer-market-2015-9 (date of the application: 19.05.2018).

Siebel Institute: Home [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.siebelinstitute.com/ (date of the application: 26.04.2018).

Standards - AccountAbility [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.accountability.org/standards/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Stakeholder Engagement » SustainAbility [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://sustainability.com/our-work/reports/stakeholder-engagement/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Traditional beer companies are copying craft brewers, but the wine industry isn’t interested - Business Insider [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.businessinsider.com/traditional-beer-companies-are-copying-craft-brewers-but-the-wine-industry-isnt-interested-2015-8 (дата обращения: 19.05.2018).

26 U.S. Code Chapter 51 - DISTILLED SPIRITS, WINES, AND BEER | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/subtitle-E/chapter-51 (date of the application: 20.05.2018).

Welcome to The Brewers of Europe [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.brewersofeurope.org/site/about-us/index.php (date of the application: 26.04.2018).

Александр Хлопонин провел рабочую встречу с представителями Союза российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/15690/ (дата обращения: 16.11.2017).

Анна Дупан: «Закон получается более разумным, когда учитываются и социальные, и экономические эффекты» [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №22, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9622_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018).

AB InBev и Efes завершили объединение бизнеса в РФ и на Украине [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.interfax.ru/business/606116 (дата обращения: 23.04.2018).

Безалкогольное будущее [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 20, 2016. С.6-7. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9620_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 18.03.2018).

Ведомости. Чистая прибыль Anheuser-Busch InBev выросла на 23% [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2013/02/27/chistaya\_pribyl\_anheuserbusch\_inbev\_vyrosla\_na\_23 (дата обращения: 15.05.2018).

Ведомости. Российскому рынку пива поможет чемпионат мира по футболу [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/01/11/747421-rinku-piva-pomozhet-futbolu (дата обращения: 26.04.2018).

Вехи пути [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. С.2-3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Власти выступили с несколькими инициативами по либерализации регулирования [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 18, 2016. С.5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/beerunion-18-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 13.02.2018).

Государство отказывается обучать специалистов индустрии [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 20.05.2018). Власть и олигархи — Российская газета [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://rg.ru/2003/11/27/politologi.html (дата обращения: 01.04.2018).

Главная - CraftDepot [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://craftdepot.ru/ (дата обращения: 23.05.2018).

Госсорткомиссия и Союз российских пивоваров подписали Соглашение о взаимодействии - САН ИнБев - публикация [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://publishernews.ru/PressRelease/PressReleaseShow.asp?id=524138 (дата обращения: 12.03.2018).

«Деловой журнал» Ретроспектива законодательных инициатив в алкогольной отрасли за 2016-2017 гг.: изменения и последствия [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://blog.dp.ru/post/10843/ (дата обращения: 12.02.2018).

Дифференцированный подход к регулированию пивоварения отвечает стратегическим целям алкогольной политики [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 20, 2016. С.8. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9620_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 19.01.2018).

Евразийский пивоваренный форум: итоги [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/6950/ (дата обращения: 12.11.2017).

Их не видно, но они решают вопросы: Как работают российские лоббисты, джиарщики и «решалы» — посредники между бизнесом и государством. Репортаж Таисии Бекбулатовой [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://meduza.io/feature/2017/12/21/ih-ne-vidno-no-oni-reshayut-voprosy (дата обращения: 18.03.2018).

История пивоваренной компании «Балтика» [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://corporate.baltika.ru/m/41/the\_history\_of\_baltika\_breweries.html (дата обращения: 20.04.2018).

Личный сайт О.Г. Румянцева [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://rumiantsev.ru/a877/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Лучшие лоббисты России – третий квартал 2017 года / Экономика / Независимая газета [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.ng.ru/economics/2017-11-09/5\_7111\_lobby.html?id\_user=Y (дата обращения: 01.04.2018).

Международный форум «ПИВО» в Сочи — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/22318/ (дата обращения: 03.10.2017).

На Гайдаровском форуме обсудили регулирование рынка алкогольной продукции [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://gaidarforum.ru/news/na-gaydarovskom-forume-obsudili-regulirovanie-rynka-alkogolnoy-produktsii/ (дата обращения: 14.01.2018).

Национальный Союз Производителей Пива и Напитков [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.unionbeer.ru/ (дата обращения: 20.05.2018).

Несмотря на жаркое лето, производство пива в России падает [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://expert.ru/2012/08/9/menshe-piva-bolshe-vodki/ (дата обращения: 03.11.2017).

Особенности национального пивоварения [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест Союза Российских пивоваров №11, 2014. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/Vestnik/vestnik-1-5-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Объединение Участников Пиво-безалкогольного Рынка | OUPR.RU [Электронный ресурс]. URL: /obedinenie-uchastnikov-pivo-bezalkogolnogo-rynka (дата обращения: 11.05.2018).

Отрасли нужна законодательная передышка [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №17, 2015. С.9. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/beerunion-17-2015.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Перезагрузка крепкого алкоголя » www.alcoexpert.ru - Ваш личный аналитик! Информационно-аналитический портал алкогольного рынка [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.alcoexpert.ru/itnews/26868-perezagruzka-krepkogo-alkogolya.html (дата обращения: 14.10.2017).

Пиво — это продукт в упаковке [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/900424 (дата обращения: 2.02.2018).

Последствия чрезмерного регулирования [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №17, 2015. С.3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/beerunion-17-2015.pdf (дата обращения: 20.04.2018).

Противоборье [Электронный ресурс]: Коммерсантъ business guide №24, 2011. С.4. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1642998> (дата обращения: 27.10.2017)

ПМЭФ-2016: президент «САН ИнБев» и А.Г. Хлопонин обсудили вопросы пивоваренной отрасли — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/21568/ (дата обращения: 16.11.2017).

Раздельное регулирование поможет бизнесу, государству и обществу [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №21, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9621_%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018).

Региональные модели взаимодействия между деловыми и властными элитами | Политком.РУ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://politcom.ru/8474.html (дата обращения: 03.04.2018).

Рискованные ставки [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 20, 2016. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9620_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 18.03.2018).

Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/ (дата обращения: 26.04.2018).

Союз российских пивоваров подписал соглашение о сотрудничестве с Национальным институтом технического регулирования — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/18090/ (дата обращения: 12.04.2018).

Совфед одобрил повышение акцизов на алкоголь, табак и топливо [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://russian.rt.com/business/news/336950-sovfed-akciz-alkogol-tabak (дата обращения: 14.09.2017).

Свет и тени выставки «Пиво-2013» [Электронный ресурс]: Мир пива 2013. С.118. URL: <http://www.brauweltinternational.com/pdf/BRAUWELT_Russian/BRAUWELT_MirPiva_03_2013.pdf> (дата обращения: 07.04.2018).

ТР ЕАЭС О безопасности алкогольной продукции [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <http://www.novotest.ru/information/tech_reglament/doc21486.php> (дата обращения: 21.04.2018).

Участники АлкоКонгресса-2017 сошлись во мнении о необходимости модернизации ФЗ-171 — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/22206/ (дата обращения: 11.04.2018).

Федеральная служба по регулированию алкогольного рынка : Концепция государственной политики [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.fsrar.ru/policy\_of\_sobriety/koncepcia (дата обращения: 21.05.2018).

Федеральный закон «О государственном регулировании производства и оборота этилового спирта, алкогольной и спиртосодержащей продукции и об ограничении потребления (распития) алкогольной продукции» от 22.11.1995 N 171-ФЗ (последняя редакция) / КонсультантПлюс [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_8368/ (дата обращения: 16.01.2018).

Heineken объединит российские пивоваренные заводы к 2010г. и вложит в их развитие в 2008г. 115 млн евро. :: Общество :: РБК [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20080403175459.shtml> (дата обращения: 10.05.2018).

Раздельное регулирование поможет бизнесу, государству и обществу [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №21, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9621_%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018)

Пиво может перестать считаться алкоголем по требованию Белоруссии ( БЕЛАРУСЬ » / События / ) [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.customsunion.ru/infoprint/4951.html (дата обращения: 21.05.2018).

О государственном регулировании производства и оборота этилового спирта и алкогольной продукции - ИПС «Әділет» [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z990000429_> (дата обращения: 19.05.2018).

Тень на отрасль [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №14,2014. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/%E2%84%9614-2014.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.03.2018).

Законопроект о лицензировании производства пива и пивных напитков Госдума может рассмотреть в апреле [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/3418/ (дата обращения: 18.05.2018).

Союз российских пивоваров сообщил свою позицию по лицензированию [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/31802/ (дата обращения: 14.05.2018).

1. Правительство и пивовары до мая обсудят лицензирование в отрасли – Бизнес – Коммерсантъ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3554788> (дата обращения: 18.05.2018).

Минфин должен до 26 апреля дать предложения по лицензии и маркировке пива [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/31625/ (дата обращения: 12.05.2018).

Пиво не будет маркироваться [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/32203/ (дата обращения: 12.03.2018).

НСПП предложил критерии включения в реестр производителей [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/32030/ (дата обращения: 23.01.2018).

Правительство подтвердило появление реестра пивоварен [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/32160/ (дата обращения: 23.02.2018).

Пивовары обвинили Дерипаску в попытке «убийства» отрасли [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.rbc.ru/business/13/04/2016/570e50459a79479c16984f7a (дата обращения: 10.01.2018).

Размер имеет значение [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13, 2014. С.8-9. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.04.2018).

Достучаться до небес [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №12, 2014. С.3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/Vestnik/vestnik-12-06-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.04.2018).

Ведомости. Запрет на использование пластиковой тары в производстве пива может стоить отрасли 1,5 млрд рублей [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/09/03/607306-zapret-ispolzovanie-plastikovoi-tari-proizvodstve-piva-mozhet-stoit-otrasli-15-mlrd-rublei (дата обращения: 10.05.2018).

ФАС считает полезным внедрение принципов антимонопольного комплаенса [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/economy/1976107.html (дата обращения: 24.02.2018).

 Пивовары начали отказываться от пластиковых бутылок [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://top.rbc.ru/business/19/08/2015/55d46ae89a79472bced59c9d (дата обращения: 12.03.2018).

Вступает в силу запрет на продажу пива в ПЭТ-таре объемом более 1,5 литра [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://ria.ru/society/20170701/1497642194.html (дата обращения: 12.05.2018).

В Госдуму внесли законопроект о разрешении производства на экспорт пива в ПЭТ свыше 1,5 л [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/27182/ (дата обращения: 10.05.2018).

Госдума разрешила производство пива на экспорт в пластиковой таре объемом более 1,5 л [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://tass.ru/ekonomika/4834380 (дата обращения: 27.02.2018).

«Балтика» призвала пивоваров к активному взаимодействию с органами власти — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/22718/ (дата обращения: 27.02.2018).

В России вступил в силу закон об ограничении рекламы пива [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.newsru.com/russia/05sep2004/pivo.html (дата обращения: 23.02.2018).

ФАС объяснила пивоварам, как использовать образы людей и животных в рекламе пива [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.newsru.com/finance/19nov2004/beer.html (дата обращения: 23.02.2018).

Госдума может полностью запретить рекламу пива на телевидении и радио [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://rg.ru/2009/05/12/reklama.html (дата обращения: 23.01.2018).

Пивоваров вывели из образа – Газета Коммерсантъ № 185 (4240) от 06.10.2009 [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1250777 (дата обращения: 02.11.2017).

Пиво стало алкоголем [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.spb.kp.ru/daily/25722/2714327/ (дата обращения: 13.05.2018).

Госдума в первом чтении отменила запрет рекламы пива на спортивных мероприятиях [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.interfax.ru/business/383592 (дата обращения: 13.05.2018).

Социальная ответственность — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/social\_responsibility/kodeks-kommercheskikh-kommunikatsiy-o-bezalkogolnoy-produktsii-na-osnove-piva/ (дата обращения: 10.05.2018).

После футбола [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №22, 2017. С.8-9. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9622_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018).

Практика добросовестности [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №22, 2017. С.8. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F\_%E2%84%9622\_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C\_2017.pdf (дата обращения: 17.05.2018).

Участники пивного рынка заявили о необходимости перенести сроки внедрения ЕГАИС в торговых организациях [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/7446/ (дата обращения: 05.05.2018).

Пивной форум прошел на площадке ОПОРЫ РОССИИ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/2302/ (дата обращения: 02.05.2018).

Трудности интерфейса [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №18, 2016. С.4. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F\_%E2%84%9622\_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C\_2017.pdf (дата обращения: 17.05.2018).

Титов предложил освободить крафтовых производителей пива от ЕГАИС | ROSNG.ru [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://rosng.ru/news/titov-predlozhil-osvobodit-kraftovyh-proizvoditeley-piva-ot-egais (дата обращения: 22.05.2018).

Трудности интерфейса [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №18, 2016. С.2-5. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F\_%E2%84%9622\_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C\_2017.pdf (дата обращения: 17.05.2018).

Ораз Дурдыев: «ЕГАИС полностью решает вопрос прослеживаемости пива» [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/30151/ (дата обращения: 13.05.2018). <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/news/22723/?sphrase_id=21749>

# Application

# Application1. Interview with GR-manager AB InBev part of AB InBev Efes Group

Respondent is Mazanov Alexander, Head of the Department for Interaction with Federal Authorities, AB InBev part of AB InBev Efes Group.

1. Does your brewery belong to an association / nonprofit organization of the brewing industry?

*Yes, it is a member of three associations: the Union of Russian Brewers, the RusBrand Commonwealth, the Industry for the Environment Association RusPEC.*

2. How does your brewing company implement the GR strategy, independently or assign it to the association / non-profit organization that it includes?

*GR-strategy is developed by our company independently. Our company has a national strategy, as well as a local one. As a rule, a local strategy for any international company is a reflection of the strategy at the global level. In Russia, we are implementing our strategy for Western Europe. It includes certain projects specific to this geographic area*.

3. What is the type of interaction between the brewing company and the state: separate or unified for the whole industry?

*The brewing industry is scrupulous enough. We have a double responsibility, because we work with alcohol, we have a certain influence on society. The brewing industry in Russia pays 50% of excises. This is about 150 billion rubles a year. For comparison, producers of strong alcohol give the budget 190 billion rubles a year.*

*Breweries are large taxpayers. All large companies (Carlsberg, Heineken, AbInbev, Anadolu Efes) are 80% of the brewing industry in Russia. Only the general position of these companies can be heard by public authorities. Companies communicate with state authorities at the regional level on narrowly focused issues.*

*Large companies agree on their positions in a single and only after that the companies turn to the state. If companies have contradictions on some problem, the Union does not have a single strategy, such position is not voiced for the authorities. Representatives of state bodies want to hear the common opinion of the industry.*

*Many believe that the Union of Russian Brewers is friendly, since it always acts with an agreed position. This is because the non-agreed position is not sectoral. All disagreements are resolved and discussed within the Union.*

4. How do you assess the success of GR-relationship of your company and the industry as a whole? What is more in the percentage, wins or losses of GR-campaigns?

*In this moment it is difficult to separate our company from the Union of Russian Brewers. In general, our company is quite successful in the region. This is expressed in subsidies, benefits.*

*Now the big project of FIFA (we are its partners) is very helpful in GR. As a partner company, we are perceived positively by state authorities*.

*In general, the industry has a difficult situation in GR since 2008. Since 2011, the decline in the sale of beer began, beer was equated to strong alcohol. Since 2011, we are trying to remedy this. We are trying to divide the legislation of the brewing and strong alcohol industry.*

*Last year the branch had a considerable victory: we have achieved permission to export beer in a container 1,5l.*

*Every year in the GR of our company and the industry as a whole there are many risks with serious financial effects.*

5. What is the main strategy of GR? What is this participation, passive (analysis of government actions, bills) or active (participation in the discussion of laws, expert activity)?

*Our GR strategy implies both passive and active participation. We monitor the legislation in order to respond as quickly and efficiently as possible. What is important: new restrictions are constantly being introduced, so we are loaded with reactive work.*

*Nevertheless, the brewing industry is the initiator of separate regulation. Now we are preparing the first text of the bill. Today there are 171 federal laws that regulate the turnover of all ethyl alcohol. This law is complex; it is understood only by professional lawyers and confident market players. We want the law to be understandable for all market participants, including those who want to enter it. This is an important area of our activity. We believe that the state will not object if the industry offers him a project in which it will be described how to regulate the industry. We are developing a law that would make us comfortable to exist, and that would satisfy the interests of the state.*

6. Who performs the main tasks of the GR, company employees or third-party organizations and consultants?

*All tasks within the company are performed by employees. We have external consultants, but we address them point-by-point.*

7. In your opinion, do associations / non-profit organizations effectively implement the GR-strategy (= positive result)?

*All that the company does is in 99% happens with the support of the association. All projects pass through the Union of Russian Brewers. This is done to ensure that the state correctly perceives the message of the project, without contact with the brand. If we express the state some position from the company, the state can perceive it in connection with the brand.*

*If you interact with the state through an association, the state will hear the direct message of the position. Such interaction will be more effective.*

8. Does your company's GR use the experience of the West or have to find its own way?

*All together. Before implementing any GR strategy or project, we always look at how it happened in the world. We gather experience, learn some lessons, turn to international regulation. We are looking at what has already been done. We have a strong division in New York, it collects information, draws conclusions.*

*If the state looks to the west and takes as a base the experience of one country, fragmentarily, then we have something to appeal to. We show the experience of different countries, where it happened, and where not. It is important for us to have a balanced approach, it is important to assess everything and not to harm the business.*

*GR in Russia is different from the US, Europe or Britain. We have different rules, our own way. In Russia, the political system is very mobile, there is a frequent change of politicians, there are certain factors (sanctions, counter-sanctions) that are not available in other countries of the world. We apply the experience of the West, but taking into account the Russian features.*

# Application 2. Interview with GR-manager Heineken

Respondent is Arina Flyugova, Public and Governement Relations Manager, Heineken.

1. Does your brewery belong to an association / nonprofit organization of the brewing industry?

*Yes (Union of Russian Brewers).*

2. How does your brewing company implement the GR strategy, independently or assign it to the association / non-profit organization that it includes?

*Both ways, while we are actively involved in the work of the Union of Russian Brewers.*

1. What is the type of interaction between the brewing company and the state: separate or unified for the whole industry?

*Unified for the industry as a whole.*

1. How do you assess the success of GR-relationship of your company and the industry as a whole? What is more in the percentage, wins or losses of GR-campaigns?

*It is difficult to estimate as a percentage. A positive factor is that the state listens to the opinion of the industry, in GR it turns out to reach compromise solutions.*

1. What is the main strategy of GR? What is this participation, passive (analysis of government actions, bills) or active (participation in the discussion of laws, expert activity)?

*Undoubtedly active involvement.*

6. Who performs the main tasks of the GR, company employees or third-party organizations and consultants?

*Mainly employees of the company and associations, with the involvement of experts.*

7. In your opinion, do associations / non-profit organizations effectively implement the GR-strategy (= positive result)?

*We must understand that associations are not some sort of alienated organization. In the Union, for example, there are commissions on major issues, of which members are representatives of companies. Consequently decisions are taken only with the approval of members.*

8. Does your company's GR use the experience of the West or have to find its own way?

*Any experience is applied in the context of where the business is located. GR-processes are similar.*

# Application 3. Interview with GR-manager Baltika Brewery (Carlsberg Group)

Respondent is Irina Fedorova, Senior GR director ЕЕ Baltika Brewery (part of Carlsberg Group).

1. Does your brewery belong to an association / nonprofit organization of the brewing industry?

*Included in the Union of Russian Brewers.*

2. How does your brewing company implement the GR strategy, independently or assign it to the association / non-profit organization that it includes?

*It depends on the tasks. GR strategy is entrusted to the management, tasks within the strategy are implemented by various instruments within the framework of Russian legislation.*

3. What is the type of interaction between the brewing company and the state: separate or unified for the whole industry?

*The task of the service within the company is to protect the right to conduct business. Those changes in legislation that have the same effect on the industry and do not cause conflicts of interest are worked out by the Union.*

1. How do you assess the success of GR-relationship of your company and the industry as a whole? What is more in the percentage, wins or losses of GR-campaigns?

*No risk (federal) in 2017 was realized.*

1. What is the main strategy of GR? What is this participation, passive (analysis of government actions, bills) or active (participation in the discussion of laws, expert activity)?

*No answer.*

6. Who performs the main tasks of the GR, company employees or third-party organizations and consultants?

*The main tasks are assigned to the employees and are their KPIs.*

7. In your opinion, do associations / non-profit organizations effectively implement the GR-strategy (= positive result)?

*Depends on industry.*

8. Does your company's GR use the experience of the West or have to find its own way?

*We are a Western company and we use the experience of our colleagues, but at the same time the specifics dictate the need for us to "reinvent the wheel".*

1. Bentley A. F. The process of government: A study of social pressures. – Routledge, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Truman D. B. The governmental process: political interests and public opinion. – A. Knopf, 1951. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Bentley A. The Process of Government. A. Study of Social Pressures. New Brunswick, 1994; Truman D. The Governmental Process. Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York, 1951; Parsons T. On the concept of political power //Proceedings of the American philosophical society.1963. Т.107. №. 3. P. 262; Olson M. The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, 2009. Т. 124.; Libman A. Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS //The European Journal of Comparative Economics. 2006. Т. 3. №. 2. P. 263-288.; Schmitter P. C., Streeck W. The organization of business interests: Studying the associative action of business in advanced industrial societies. MPIfG discussion paper, 1999. №. 99/1. Р. 58-65. Dahl R. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971; Heywood A. Politics. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Vol.2. .Р. 453. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Baumgartner F., Berry J., Hojnacki M., Kimball D., Leech B. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses,

and Why. Chicago, 2009; Birnbaum J. The Lobbyists. New York, 1993; DeKiefer D. The Citizen's Guide to Lobbying

Congress. Chicago, 2007; Hojnacki M., Kimball D. Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress // American Political Science Review. Vol. 92. 1998. № 4. P. 775–790; Milbrath L. The Washington Lobbyists. Chicago, 1976. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Truman D. The Governmental Process. Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York, 1951; Dahl R. A. Polyarchy, pluralism, and scale //Scandinavian Political Studies. 1984. Т. 7. №. 4. P. 225-240.; Dahl R. Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven, 1961; Lindblom C. E. Politics and markets. 1982; Fraenkel E. Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien. Frankf. / M., 1991.; Olsen M. E. Participatory pluralism //Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 1982.). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Cawson A. Corporatism and political theory. – Blackwell, 1986. ; Lembruch J. Neo-Corporatism in comparative perspective //Pattterns of Corporatist Policy-making. London: Sage. 1982. ; Schimitter P., Lembruch G. Trends towards corporatist intermediation //Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. 1979. ; Перегудов С. П. Ренессанс корпоративизма? //Куда идет Россия. 1998. P. 130-139. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Wasserman S., Faust K. Social network analysis: Methods and applications. – Cambridge university press, 1994. Т. 8.; Scott J. Social network analysis. Sage, 2017.; Borgatti S. P. et al. Network analysis in the social sciences //science. 2009. Т. 323. №. 5916. P. 892-895. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Gel'man V., Tarusina I. Studies of political elites in Russia: issues and alternatives //Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2000. Т. 33. №. 3. P. 311-329. Крыштановская О. В. Анатомия российской элиты. М., 2005; Гаман-Голутвина О. В. Политические элиты России: Вехи исторической эволюции. М., 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Libman A. Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS //The European Journal of Comparative Economics. 2006. Т. 3. №. 2. P. 263-288; Любимов А. П. Лоббизм как конституционно-правовой институт. М., 1998; Любимов А. П. История лоббизма в России. М., 2005; Нельсон Л., Кузес И. Группы интересов и политический срез российских экономических реформ // Полис. 1995. № 6. С. 81–86; Перегудов С. П., Лапина Н. Ю. Семененко И. С. Группы интересов и российское государство. М., 1999; Перегудов С. П. Организованные интересы и государство: смена парадигм // Полис. 1994. №2. С. 76–87; Толстых П. А. Практика лоббизма в Государственной Думе Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации. М., 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Frye T. Capture or exchange? Business lobbying in Russia //Europe-Asia Studies. 2002. Т. 54. №. 7. P. 1017-1036.; Зудин А. Ю. Олигархия как политическая проблема российского посткоммунизма //Общественные науки и современность. 1999. №. 1. С. 45-65.; Peregudov S. The Oligarchical Model of Russian Corporatism //Contemporary Russian Politics. 2001. P. 259-268. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Лапина Н.Ю. Модели взаимодействия бизнеса и власти в российских регионах и типы предпринимательского делового поведения // Российское предпринимательство: Стратегия, власть, менеджмент. М.: Институт социологии РАН, 2000. С. 45-55.; Павроз А. В. Эффективность плюралистической модели формирования политики: классическое обоснование и современные интерпретации //Вестник Московского университета. Серия 12: Политические науки. 2015. №. 4. С. 8.; Золотарева Е. В. Группы интересов в политике //Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Cерия: Политология. 1999. №. 1. С. 63-75. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Mack С. S. Business, Politics, and the Practice of Government Relations. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Формирование системы цивилизованного лоббизма в России: GR и проблемы эффективности взаимодействия общества и власти / Под ред. В.И. Быкова, Л.Н. Галенской, Л.В. Сморгунова. СПб., 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Gelman V., Tarusina I. Studies of political elites in Russia: issues and alternatives //Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2000. Т. 33. № 3. P. 311-329. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Libman A. Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS //The European Journal of Comparative Economics. 2006. Т. 3. №. 2. P. 263-288. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Frye T. Capture or exchange? Business lobbying in Russia //Europe-Asia Studies. 2002. Т. 54. №. 7. P. 1017-1036. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Mack С. S. Business, Politics, and the Practice of Government Relations. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. 1997. P. 20-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Формирование системы цивилизованного лоббизма в России: GR и проблемы эффективности взаимодействия общества и власти. Под ред. В.И. Быкова, Л.Н. Галенской, Л.В. Сморгунова. СПб., 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Коробейникова Н.Ю. GR-коммуникации в условиях развития современного российского бизнеса (на примере компаний «Вымпелком» и «Связьинвест») // Бизнес.Общество.Власть. 2010. № 3. С. 52–69. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Lobbying.ru | Слово из словаря [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.lobbying.ru/dictionary\_word.php?id=42 (дата обращения: 21.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Grant Thomas. Lobbying, Government Relations, and Campaign Finance Worldwide. Oxford., 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. GR и лоббизм: взаимодействие бизнеса и органов власти / под ред. В.А. Ачкасовой, И.Е. Минтусова, О.Г. Филатовой. М.: Издательство Юрайт, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Denisov D. Business lobbying and government relations in Russia: The need for new principles //Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Fellowship paper. 2010. Т. 27. P.2-3, 12-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Рейтинг лучших GR-специалистов России. Выпуск 3 / 2011 [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.gr.ru/content/56 (дата обращения: 22.03.2018) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Толстых П. А. Субъектный статус лоббизма и Government Relations //Исторические, философские, политические и юридические науки, культурология и искусствоведение. Вопросы теории и практики. 2012. №. 4-2. С. 195-200. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Parsons T. On the concept of political power //Proceedings of the American philosophical society. – 1963. – Т. 107. – №. 3. – с. 243. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Bentley A. F. The process of government: A study of social pressures. – Routledge, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Truman D. B. The governmental process: political interests and public opinion. – A. Knopf, 1951. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Olson M. The logic of collective action. – Harvard University Press, 2009. – Т. 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ясин Е. Бремя государства и экономическая политика //Вопросы экономики. – 2002. – №. 11. – С.7. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Радаев В.В. Социология рынков: к формированию нового направления. – М.: ГУ ВШЭ, 2003. – С. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Игошин И.Н. Институциональные системы и их искажения // Вестник Московского Университета. – Сер. 12, Политические науки. – 2003. – № 5. – С. 39-51.; Рыбаков А.В. Трансформация политических институтов // Власть. – 2003. – № 5. – С. 49-54; Рыбаков А.В. Общественные эффекты институционализации политико-властных отношений // Социально- гуманитарные знания: научно-образовательное издание. – 03/2004 - № 2. – С.146-156. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Яковлев А.А., Бизнес-ассоциации в России: внутренняя структура, эволюция отношений с государством, роль в модернизации экономики / Под ред/ А.А. Яковлева. Сер. «Научные доклады: независимый экономический анализ»/ № 2.; М.:: МОНФ; Автономная некоммерческая организация «Проекты для будущего: научные и образовательные технологии», 2010, 190 с.; Яковлев А.А. Власть, бизнес и движущие силы экономического развития России: до и после «дела Юкоса» // Общественные науки и современность. – 2005. - № 1 . [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ашин Г. К. Элитизм и демократия //Общественные науки и современность. – 1996. – №. 5. – С. 59-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Туровский Р.Ф. Власть и бизнес в регионах России: современные процессы обновления региональной элиты // Региональная элита в современной России. М., 2005. С. 143-178. 2,3 п.л. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Lane J. E., Ersson S. O. The new institutional politics: Performance and outcomes. – Psychology Press, 2000. С.247-273. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Сморгунов Л. В., Шерстобитов А. С. Политические сети: Теория и методы анализа //М.: Аспект Пресс. – 2014.320 с. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Schmitter P. C., Lehmbruch G. (ed.). Trends towards corporatist intermediation. – London; Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979. – Т. 1.-Р.96. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Bentley A. The Process of Government. A Study of Social Pressures. New Brunswick:

Transaction Publishers, 1994. Р.268-272. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Dahl R., Lindblom Ch. Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York: Harper, 1976. P. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Павроз А. В. Эффективность плюралистической модели формирования политики: классическое обоснование и современные интерпретации //Вестник Московского университета. Серия 12: Политические науки. – 2015. – №. 4. – С. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Dahl R. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Dahl R., Lindblom Ch. Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York: Harper, 1976. P. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Galbraith J. K. The new industrial society. New York: Signet., 1967. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Heywood A. Politics. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Вып. 2nd ed.Р. 95-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Dahl R. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Schmitter, P.C. and Lehmbruch, G. (eds.). Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation. London, 1979. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Любимов А. П. История лоббизма в России. – Фонд “Либеральная миссия”, 2005. С.26-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Шмиттер Ф. Неокорпоратизм //Полис. Политические исследования. – 1997. – №. 2. – С. 14-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Урбан М. Социальные отношения и политические практики в посткоммунистической России // Полис. Политические исследования. 2002. № 4. С. 66–85. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. March J. G., Olsen J. P. The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life //American political science review. – 1983. – Т. 78. – №. 3. – С. 734-749. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Grosse R. International Business and Government Relations in the 21st Century. Cambridge 2005 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Hall P. A. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Grosse R. International Business and Government Relations in the 21st Century. Cambridge 2005 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Гайнутдинов Р. И. Модели взаимодействия бизнеса и государства в глобализирующемся мире: сравнительный анализ (Россия, Санкт-Петербург) //Проблемы современной экономики. – 2006. – №. 1-2. – С. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Кинякин А. А., Матвеенков Д. О. Government relations как форма общественно-политической и бизнес коммуникации: к определению понятий // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Политология. — № 1. — 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Павроз А. В. Этические принципы лоббизма в условиях современной демократии //Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭКС. – 2015. – Т. 11. – №. 2. – С. 87-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Mulcahy S., Transparency International. Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, privileged access. , 2015. <http://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Lobbying_web.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Павроз А. В. Этические принципы лоббизма в условиях современной демократии //Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭКС. – 2015. – Т. 11. – №. 2. – С. 87-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Павроз А. В. Government Relations как институт социально-политического взаимодействия //Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭКС. – 2005. – №. 2. – С. 242-244. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Korbonski A. The decline and rise of pluralism in East Central Europe, 1949–1989, or how not to see the forest for the trees //Communist and Post-Communist Studies. – 1993. – Т. 26. – №. 4. – С. 432-445. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Libman A. Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS //The European Journal of Comparative Economics. – 2006. – Т. 3. – №. 2. – С. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Libman A. Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS //The European Journal of Comparative Economics. – 2006. – Т. 3. – №. 2. – С. 264-266. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Georgiou G. Corporate lobbying on accounting standards: Methods, timing and perceived effectiveness //Abacus. – 2004. – Т. 40. – №. 2. – С. 222-223. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. RESPONSIBLE LOBBYING / Transparency International. 2015. <https://transparency.ie/sites/default/files/15.12_responsible_lobbying_guide.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. RESPONSIBLE LOBBYING / Transparency International. 2015. <https://transparency.ie/sites/default/files/15.12_responsible_lobbying_guide.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Campos N.F., Giovannoni F. Lobbying, corruption and political influence // Public Choice. 2007. Т. 131. № 1–2. С. 1–21. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Bauer T. Responsible Lobbying: Conceptual Foundations // Responsible Lobbying. : Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden, 2017. С. 85–122. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Assembly U.N.G. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. : United Nations Publications, 2008. 48 с. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Corporate Social Responsibility Practices and Environmentally Responsible Behavior: The Case of The United Nations Global Compact | SpringerLink [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-006-9265-4 (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Convention against Corruption [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Lobbying: influencing decision making with transparency and integrity. OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/50101671.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Code of Conduct // Epaca. <https://epaca.org/code-of-conduct/> [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Standards - AccountAbility [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.accountability.org/standards/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Stakeholder Engagement » SustainAbility [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://sustainability.com/our-work/reports/stakeholder-engagement/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Research - Corruption Q&As - Code of ethics for companies: Good practices and resources [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/code\_of\_ethics\_for\_companies\_good\_practices\_and\_resources (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Личный сайт О.Г. Румянцева [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://rumiantsev.ru/a877/ (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. RESPONSIBLE LOBBYING / Transparency International. 2015. https://transparency.ie/sites/default/files/15.12\_responsible\_lobbying\_guide.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Mulcahy S., Transparency International. Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, privileged access. , 2015. <http://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Lobbying_web.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Mulcahy S., Transparency International. Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, privileged access. , 2015. <http://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Lobbying_web.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Mulcahy S., Transparency International. Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, privileged access. , 2015. <http://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Lobbying_web.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Lobbying Survey | [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://lobbyingsurvey.burson-marsteller.com (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Yakovlev A. The evolution of business – state interaction in Russia: From state capture to business capture? // Europe-Asia Studies. 2006. Т. 58. № 7. С. 1038-1041. (весь 1033–1056) [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Govorun A., Marques I., Pyle W. The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian enterprises and business associations //Business and Politics. – 2016. – Т. 18. – №. 4. – С. 395-433. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Их не видно, но они решают вопросы: Как работают российские лоббисты, джиарщики и «решалы» — посредники между бизнесом и государством. Репортаж Таисии Бекбулатовой [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://meduza.io/feature/2017/12/21/ih-ne-vidno-no-oni-reshayut-voprosy (дата обращения: 18.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. А.Яковлев, А.Зудин, В.Голикова, А.Говорун, Е.Астафьева, Г.Гарифуллина. Бизнес-ассоциации в России: внутренняя структура, эволюция отношений с государством, роль в модернизации экономики. // Москва, МОНФ, 2010, 190 с. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Schmitter P. C., Streeck W. The organization of business interests: Studying the associative action of business in advanced industrial societies. – MPIfG discussion paper, 1999. – №. 99/1. Р. 58-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Klein W. Business Associations: Agency, Partnerships, Llcs, and Corporations, 2017 Statutes and Rules. : West Academic, 2017. 426 с. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Яковлев А. А. и др. Бизнес-ассоциации в России: внутренняя структура, эволюция отношений с государством, роль в модернизации экономики //М.: Московский общественный научный фонд. – 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Hillman A. J., Keim G. D. Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social issues: What's the bottom line? //Strategic management journal. – 2001. – С. 125-139. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Freeman R. E., Wicks A. C., Parmar B. Stakeholder theory and “the corporate objective revisited” //Organization science. – 2004. – Т. 15. – №. 3. – С. 364-369. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Тульчинский Г. Л. Корпоративная социальная ответственность: технологии и оценка эффективности //М.: Юрайт. – 2014. – Т. 338. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Яковлев А. А. и др. Бизнес-ассоциации в России: внутренняя структура, эволюция отношений с государством, роль в модернизации экономики //М.: Московский общественный научный фонд. – 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Ясин Е. Бремя государства и экономическая политика //Вопросы экономики. – 2002. – №. 11. – С. 5-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Радаев В.В. Социология рынков: к формированию нового направления. – М.: ГУ ВШЭ, 2003. – С. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Iwasaki I. Evolution of the government–business relationship and economic performance in the former soviet states–order state, rescue state, punish state //Economics of Planning. – 2003. – Т. 36. – №. 3. – С. 223-257. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Лапина Н. Ю., Чирикова А. Е. Региональные элиты в РФ: модели поведения и политические ориентации. – ИНИОН РАН, 1999. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Региональные модели взаимодействия между деловыми и властными элитами | Политком.РУ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://politcom.ru/8474.html (дата обращения: 03.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Гельман В., Бычкова О. Экономические акторы и локальные режимы в крупных городах России //Неприкосновенный запас. – 2010. – №. 2. – С. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Перегудов С. П. Политическое представительство интересов: опыт Запада и проблемы России //Полис. Политические исследования. – 1993. – №. 4. – С. 115-124. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Лапина Н.Ю. Модели взаимодействия бизнеса и власти в российских регионах и типы предпринимательского делового поведения // Российское предпринимательство: Стратегия, власть, менеджмент. М.: Институт социологии РАН, 2000. С. 45-55.; Чирикова А.Е. Бизнес как субъект социальной политики в современной России // Общество и экономика. - 2006. - № 9. - С. 116-117. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Зудин А.Ю., Неокорпоративизм в России? (Государство и бизнес при Владимире Путине) // Pro et Contra.\_2001. T. 6. № 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Iwasaki I. Evolution of the government–business relationship and economic performance in the former soviet states–order state, rescue state, punish state //Economics of Planning. – 2003. – Т. 36. – №. 3. – С. 223-257. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Стратегии региональных элит: экономика, модели власти, политический выбор / Н. Лапина, А. Чирикова; Рос. акад. наук. Ин-т науч. информации по обществ. наукам. - М., 2000. - 198 с. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Региональные модели взаимодействия между деловыми и властными элитами | Политком.РУ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://politcom.ru/8474.html (дата обращения: 22.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Региональные модели взаимодействия между деловыми и властными элитами | Политком.РУ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://politcom.ru/8474.html (дата обращения: 22.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Павроз А. В. Законодательное утверждение лоббизма в России в контексте глобальной конкуренции юрисдикций //Государственная служба. – 2011. – №. 3. – С. 15-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Их не видно, но они решают вопросы: Как работают российские лоббисты, джиарщики и «решалы» — посредники между бизнесом и государством. Репортаж Таисии Бекбулатовой [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://meduza.io/feature/2017/12/21/ih-ne-vidno-no-oni-reshayut-voprosy (дата обращения: 01.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Власть и олигархи — Российская газета [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://rg.ru/2003/11/27/politologi.html (дата обращения: 01.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Лучшие лоббисты России – третий квартал 2017 года / Экономика / Независимая газета [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.ng.ru/economics/2017-11-09/5\_7111\_lobby.html?id\_user=Y (дата обращения: 01.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Schmitter P. C., Lehmbruch G. (ed.). Trends towards corporatist intermediation. – London; Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979. – Т. 1.-Р.96. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Hall P. A. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Их не видно, но они решают вопросы: Как работают российские лоббисты, джиарщики и «решалы» — посредники между бизнесом и государством. Репортаж Таисии Бекбулатовой [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://meduza.io/feature/2017/12/21/ih-ne-vidno-no-oni-reshayut-voprosy (дата обращения: 01.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Особенности национального пивоварения [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест Союза Российских пивоваров №11, 2014. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/Vestnik/vestnik-1-5-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Такала И. Веселие Руси: история алкогольной проблемы в России. Журнал Нева, 2002. С.32-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Николаев А. В. Антиалкогольные кампании XX века в России //Вопросы истории. 2008. №. 11. С. 67-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Радаев В. В., Котельникова З. В. Изменение структуры потребления алкоголя в контексте государственной алкогольной политики в России //Экономическая политика. 2016. Т. 11. №. 5. С. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Федеральная служба по регулированию алкогольного рынка : Концепция государственной политики [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.fsrar.ru/policy\_of\_sobriety/koncepcia (дата обращения: 21.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Traditional beer companies are copying craft brewers, but the wine industry isn’t interested - Business Insider [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.businessinsider.com/traditional-beer-companies-are-copying-craft-brewers-but-the-wine-industry-isnt-interested-2015-8 (дата обращения: 19.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. SABMiller AB InBev would dominate the beer market - Business Insider [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.businessinsider.com/sabmiller-ab-inbev-would-dominate-the-beer-market-2015-9 (date of the application: 19.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. It’s Final: AB InBev Closes On Deal To Buy SABMiller [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/taranurin/2016/10/10/its-final-ab-inbev-closes-on-deal-to-buy-sabmiller/#733ed61e432c (date of the application: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Gerlach J. Text - H.R.494 - 113th Congress (2013-2014): Small BREW Act [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/494/text (date of the application: 19.05.2018); Excise duty rates - Taxation and Customs Union - European Commission [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\_customs/business/excise-duties-alcohol-tobacco-energy/excise-duties-alcohol/excise-duty-rates\_en (date of the application: 19.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. 26 U.S. Code Chapter 51 - DISTILLED SPIRITS, WINES, AND BEER | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/subtitle-E/chapter-51 (date of the application: 20.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Brewers Association Purpose [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.brewersassociation.org/brewers-association/purpose/ (date of the application: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Brewers Association [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.craftbeer.com/brewers-association (date of the application: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Welcome to The Brewers of Europe [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.brewersofeurope.org/site/about-us/index.php (date of the application: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Siebel Institute: Home [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.siebelinstitute.com/ (date of the application: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. IBD Information Brochure 2018 [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.ibd.org.uk/documents/ibd-information-brochure/ (date of the application: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. ТР ЕАЭС О безопасности алкогольной продукции [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <http://www.novotest.ru/information/tech_reglament/doc21486.php> (дата обращения: 21.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Государство отказывается обучать специалистов индустрии [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 20.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Государство отказывается обучать специалистов индустрии [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. С.6. = URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Ведомости. Российскому рынку пива поможет чемпионат мира по футболу [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/01/11/747421-rinku-piva-pomozhet-futbolu (дата обращения: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. AB InBev и Efes завершили объединение бизнеса в РФ и на Украине [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.interfax.ru/business/606116 (дата обращения: 23.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. История пивоваренной компании «Балтика» [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://corporate.baltika.ru/m/41/the\_history\_of\_baltika\_breweries.html (дата обращения: 20.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Ведомости. Чистая прибыль Anheuser-Busch InBev выросла на 23% [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2013/02/27/chistaya\_pribyl\_anheuserbusch\_inbev\_vyrosla\_na\_23 (дата обращения: 15.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Heineken объединит российские пивоваренные заводы к 2010г. и вложит в их развитие в 2008г. 115 млн евро. :: Общество :: РБК [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20080403175459.shtml> (дата обращения: 10.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. EFES [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.efesrussia.ru/company/history.html (дата обращения: 23.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Последствия чрезмерного регулирования [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №17, 2015. С.3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/beerunion-17-2015.pdf (дата обращения: 20.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/ (дата обращения: 26.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Национальный Союз Производителей Пива и Напитков [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.unionbeer.ru/ (дата обращения: 20.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Объединение Участников Пиво-безалкогольного Рынка | OUPR.RU [Электронный ресурс]. URL: /obedinenie-uchastnikov-pivo-bezalkogolnogo-rynka (дата обращения: 11.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Главная - CraftDepot [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://craftdepot.ru/ (дата обращения: 23.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Вехи пути [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. С.2-3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Вехи пути [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. С.2-3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Вехи пути [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. С.2-3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Коммерсант 24 мая 2011 Тематическое приложение к газете «Коммерсантъ» №24 «пивоваренная промышленность» [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Пиво — это продукт в упаковке [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/900424 (дата обращения: 2.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Госсорткомиссия и Союз российских пивоваров подписали Соглашение о взаимодействии - САН ИнБев - публикация [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://publishernews.ru/PressRelease/PressReleaseShow.asp?id=524138 (дата обращения: 12.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Союз российских пивоваров подписал соглашение о сотрудничестве с Национальным институтом технического регулирования — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/18090/ (дата обращения: 12.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Свет и тени выставки «Пиво-2013» [Электронный ресурс]: Мир пива 2013. С.118. URL: <http://www.brauweltinternational.com/pdf/BRAUWELT_Russian/BRAUWELT_MirPiva_03_2013.pdf> (дата обращения: 07.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Евразийский пивоваренный форум: итоги [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/6950/ (дата обращения: 12.11.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Несмотря на жаркое лето, производство пива в России падает [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://expert.ru/2012/08/9/menshe-piva-bolshe-vodki/ (дата обращения: 03.11.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Противоборье [Электронный ресурс]: Коммерсантъ business guide №24, 2011. С.4. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1642998> (дата обращения: 27.10.2017) [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Перезагрузка крепкого алкоголя » www.alcoexpert.ru - Ваш личный аналитик! Информационно-аналитический портал алкогольного рынка [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.alcoexpert.ru/itnews/26868-perezagruzka-krepkogo-alkogolya.html (дата обращения: 14.10.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Евразийский пивоваренный форум [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://events.vedomosti.ru/events/brewers (дата обращения: 14.10.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. Отрасли нужна законодательная передышка [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №17, 2015. С.9. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/beerunion-17-2015.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. Совфед одобрил повышение акцизов на алкоголь, табак и топливо [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://russian.rt.com/business/news/336950-sovfed-akciz-alkogol-tabak (дата обращения: 14.09.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Ветер перемен [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №18, 2016. С.5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/1678/21365/> (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Безалкогольное будущее [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 20, 2016. С.6-7. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9620_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 18.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Отрасли нужна законодательная передышка [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №17, 2015. С.9. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/bulletin\_of\_the\_brewer/beerunion-17-2015.pdf (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Рискованные ставки [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 20, 2016. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9620_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 18.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Федеральный закон «О государственном регулировании производства и оборота этилового спирта, алкогольной и спиртосодержащей продукции и об ограничении потребления (распития) алкогольной продукции» от 22.11.1995 N 171-ФЗ (последняя редакция) / КонсультантПлюс [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_8368/ (дата обращения: 16.01.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Дифференцированный подход к регулированию пивоварения отвечает стратегическим целям алкогольной политики [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 20, 2016. С.8. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9620_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8C-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 19.01.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Власти выступили с несколькими инициативами по либерализации регулирования [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров № 18, 2016. С.5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/beerunion-18-2016.pdf> (дата обращения: 13.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. «Деловой журнал» Ретроспектива законодательных инициатив в алкогольной отрасли за 2016-2017 гг.: изменения и последствия [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://blog.dp.ru/post/10843/ (дата обращения: 12.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Участники АлкоКонгресса-2017 сошлись во мнении о необходимости модернизации ФЗ-171 — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/22206/ (дата обращения: 11.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. ПМЭФ-2016: президент «САН ИнБев» и А.Г. Хлопонин обсудили вопросы пивоваренной отрасли — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/21568/ (дата обращения: 16.11.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Александр Хлопонин провел рабочую встречу с представителями Союза российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/15690/ (дата обращения: 16.11.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Международный форум «ПИВО» в Сочи — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/22318/ (дата обращения: 03.10.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. На Гайдаровском форуме обсудили регулирование рынка алкогольной продукции [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://gaidarforum.ru/news/na-gaydarovskom-forume-obsudili-regulirovanie-rynka-alkogolnoy-produktsii/ (дата обращения: 14.01.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Раздельное регулирование поможет бизнесу, государству и обществу [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №21, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9621_%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Раздельное регулирование поможет бизнесу, государству и обществу [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №21, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9621_%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Раздельное регулирование поможет бизнесу, государству и обществу [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №21, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9621_%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. Анна Дупан: «Закон получается более разумным, когда учитываются и социальные, и экономические эффекты» [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №22, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9622_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Анна Дупан: «Закон получается более разумным, когда учитываются и социальные, и экономические эффекты» [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №22, 2017. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9622_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Пиво может перестать считаться алкоголем по требованию Белоруссии ( БЕЛАРУСЬ » / События / ) [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.customsunion.ru/infoprint/4951.html (дата обращения: 21.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. О государственном регулировании производства и оборота этилового спирта и алкогольной продукции - ИПС «Әділет» [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z990000429_> (дата обращения: 19.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. Тень на отрасль [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №14,2014. С.4-5. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/%E2%84%9614-2014.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. Законопроект о лицензировании производства пива и пивных напитков Госдума может рассмотреть в апреле [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/3418/ (дата обращения: 18.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Союз российских пивоваров сообщил свою позицию по лицензированию [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/31802/ (дата обращения: 14.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Правительство и пивовары до мая обсудят лицензирование в отрасли – Бизнес – Коммерсантъ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3554788> (дата обращения: 18.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. Минфин должен до 26 апреля дать предложения по лицензии и маркировке пива [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/31625/ (дата обращения: 12.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. Пиво не будет маркироваться [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/32203/ (дата обращения: 12.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. Правительство подтвердило появление реестра пивоварен [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/32160/ (дата обращения: 23.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. НСПП предложил критерии включения в реестр производителей [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/32030/ (дата обращения: 23.01.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. Правительство подтвердило появление реестра пивоварен [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/32160/ (дата обращения: 23.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. Размер имеет значение [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13,2014. С.8-9. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. Пивовары обвинили Дерипаску в попытке «убийства» отрасли [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.rbc.ru/business/13/04/2016/570e50459a79479c16984f7a (дата обращения: 10.01.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. Размер имеет значение [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №13, 2014. С.8-9. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/bulletin_of_the_brewer/%E2%84%9613-2014.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. Достучаться до небес [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №12, 2014. С.3. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/Vestnik/vestnik-12-06-2014.pdf (дата обращения: 17.04.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. Ведомости. Запрет на использование пластиковой тары в производстве пива может стоить отрасли 1,5 млрд рублей [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/09/03/607306-zapret-ispolzovanie-plastikovoi-tari-proizvodstve-piva-mozhet-stoit-otrasli-15-mlrd-rublei (дата обращения: 10.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. ФАС считает полезным внедрение принципов антимонопольного комплаенса [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/economy/1976107.html (дата обращения: 24.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. Пивовары начали отказываться от пластиковых бутылок [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://top.rbc.ru/business/19/08/2015/55d46ae89a79472bced59c9d (дата обращения: 12.03.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. Вступает в силу запрет на продажу пива в ПЭТ-таре объемом более 1,5 литра [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://ria.ru/society/20170701/1497642194.html (дата обращения: 12.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. В Госдуму внесли законопроект о разрешении производства на экспорт пива в ПЭТ свыше 1,5 л [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/27182/ (дата обращения: 10.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Госдума разрешила производство пива на экспорт в пластиковой таре объемом более 1,5 л [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://tass.ru/ekonomika/4834380 (дата обращения: 27.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. «Балтика» призвала пивоваров к активному взаимодействию с органами власти — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/press\_office/news/22718/ (дата обращения: 27.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. В России вступил в силу закон об ограничении рекламы пива [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.newsru.com/russia/05sep2004/pivo.html (дата обращения: 23.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. ФАС объяснила пивоварам, как использовать образы людей и животных в рекламе пива [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.newsru.com/finance/19nov2004/beer.html (дата обращения: 23.02.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. Госдума может полностью запретить рекламу пива на телевидении и радио [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://rg.ru/2009/05/12/reklama.html (дата обращения: 23.01.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. Пивоваров вывели из образа – Газета Коммерсантъ № 185 (4240) от 06.10.2009 [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1250777 (дата обращения: 02.11.2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. Пиво стало алкоголем [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://www.spb.kp.ru/daily/25722/2714327/ (дата обращения: 13.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. Госдума в первом чтении отменила запрет рекламы пива на спортивных мероприятиях [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.interfax.ru/business/383592 (дата обращения: 13.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Социальная ответственность — Союз российских пивоваров [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/social\_responsibility/kodeks-kommercheskikh-kommunikatsiy-o-bezalkogolnoy-produktsii-na-osnove-piva/ (дата обращения: 10.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. После футбола [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №22, 2017. С.8-9. URL: <http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F_%E2%84%9622_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C_2017.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Практика добросовестности [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №22, 2017. С.8. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F\_%E2%84%9622\_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C\_2017.pdf (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Участники пивного рынка заявили о необходимости перенести сроки внедрения ЕГАИС в торговых организациях [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/7446/ (дата обращения: 05.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. Пивной форум прошел на площадке ОПОРЫ РОССИИ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/beer/2302/ (дата обращения: 02.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. Трудности интерфейса [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №18, 2016. С.4. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F\_%E2%84%9622\_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C\_2017.pdf (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. Титов предложил освободить крафтовых производителей пива от ЕГАИС | ROSNG.ru [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://rosng.ru/news/titov-predlozhil-osvobodit-kraftovyh-proizvoditeley-piva-ot-egais (дата обращения: 22.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Трудности интерфейса [Электронный ресурс]: Дайджест союза российских пивоваров №18, 2016. С.2-5. URL: http://www.beerunion.ru/doc/%D0%A1%D0%A0%D0%9F\_%E2%84%9622\_%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8C\_2017.pdf (дата обращения: 17.05.2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. Ораз Дурдыев: «ЕГАИС полностью решает вопрос прослеживаемости пива» [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://profibeer.ru/law/30151/ (дата обращения: 13.05.2018). <http://www.beerunion.ru/press_office/news/22723/?sphrase_id=21749> [↑](#footnote-ref-212)