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Выпускная квалификационная работа

**THE DOCTRINAL ASPECT OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

**IN XX-XXI CENTURIES**

**ДОКТРИНАЛЬНЫЙ АСПЕКТ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ В ОТНОШЕНИИ СССР И РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

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**Аннотация**

Диссертация посвящена изучению места, занимаемого Россией во внешнеполитических доктринах США на протяжении истории. Цель этой работы – определить характер эволюции восприятия России как актора международных отношений разными президентскими администрациями США. Одной из важнейших задач было сравнение современных внешнеполитических доктрин США с доктринами времен «холодной войны». Большое внимание уделено анализу возможностей американского правительства в проведении политики сдерживания России в настоящее время. Основными источниками исследования выступили речи президентов США, документы Белого дома и Конгресса.

**Ключевые слова**: внешнеполитические доктрины США, американо-российские отношения, холодная война, политика сдерживания, разрядка

**Abstract**

This dissertation is devoted to analysis of what importance “Russian agenda” has for US doctrines of foreign policy throughout history. The aim of this study is to determine a nature of evolution of Russia’s perception as an actor of international relations by different US presidential administrations. One of the most considerable objective of this research was to compare contemporary US foreign policy doctrines with the doctrines of the Cold War. The large attention was paid to the analysis of American capabilities to establish an efficient Russian containment policy presently. The main sources of research were speeches of US presidents, documents of the White House and Congress.

**Keywords**: doctrines of US foreign policy, US-Russian relations, Cold War, containment policy, détente

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# **INTRODUCTION**

**The theme** of Master’s dissertation is evaluation of US foreign policy towards Russian Federation from a perspective of the doctrinal aspect in past and in modernity.

**Relevance of the topic:** US-Russian relations have centuries of history with their ups and downs. There were the times when our countries were close allies in the struggle against British domination, nonetheless world history had moments of American-Russian irreconcilable confrontation for hegemony in world arena. Perhaps, the best characteristic of this relationship can be described by words of Jason Kornwitz that “US-Russia relations have always been on a roller coaster”,[[1]](#footnote-1) thereby ambiguity between Moscow and Washington is not something new or abnormal about it as some experts exaggerate assuming that current US-Russian relations are “in the worst state that have ever been”.[[2]](#footnote-2)

 Nevertheless, there is a clear understanding that bilateral ties between nations are in grave tensions nowadays. Many political scholars from both sides opt for the view of George F. Kennan, who is known as an advocate of a policy of containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War and Mr. Kennan has claimed that “it is the beginning of a new cold war”.[[3]](#footnote-3) Unfortunately, the capacity to rebuild friendly and profitable partnership after collapse of the USSR was wasted by many mistakes of both Governments, therefore world community observes a great recurrence to the rhetoric of “good old times”. Considering this fact, the polemic in US Senate figures out that containment policy towards Russian Federation is a very tempting framework for thinking about the post–Cold War world.

 The “Containment” was a key stone for US foreign policy towards Soviet Union during Cold War and the foundational ground of this policy was formed by US Presidential doctrines. This method of forming world understanding was conducted by President Monroe in XIX century and it took roots in US Government’s practice, becoming very influential tool for American foreign affairs.

 It is fair enough to notice that implementation of US Presidential doctrines has increased in XX-XXI centuries, playing really significant role for American establishment. As system of the world became more complex after World War II, the United Stated had to react in a proper way to these changes and challenges they faced, therefore state machinery needed to be more scrupulous, flexible and adaptive. US presidential administrations of Cold War elaborated an efficient strategy that bested communistic point of view on world outlook: “This single, simple, and continuous priority provided a kind of ballast, a center of gravity for American Cold War strategy: whatever the oscillations between parties or between approaches, this fundamental objective always remained”.[[4]](#footnote-4) Precisely because of this unity of purpose, the United States managed to establish realistic and pragmatic foreign policy towards Soviet Union, which could successfully challenge Soviet ambitions in the world, despite some grave failures such as Vietnam War or Bay of Pigs invasion.

 Regarding past experience, American Government has the ideas how to implement operative containment policy. Many influential political figures in Washington now stand for renewal of Russia’s retaining strategy and it seems administrations of Post-Cold War period are ready to follow this direction. Starting with Ukrainian crisis in 2014, US Government has changed partner’s like rhetoric with Russia to rigid one to make Moscow reconsider its “unfriendly” foreign policy. Notwithstanding, a huge criticism comes up to modern American establishment, proclaiming that their approach “limits strategic flexibility particularly regarding the ability to adapt to changing conditions, and that such generic policies incur high political costs”.[[5]](#footnote-5) It may seem that US Government is only on the early stage of forming “Russian Containment 2.0”, however the fact is evident: they will keep on establishing new foreign policy, which is able to compete in modern conditions.

**The object and subject.** US-Russian relations can be determined as *an object* of this research, in its turn, US presidential doctrines that forms US strategy towards Russia is considered as *a subject* of current dissertation.

**The definition of the principle concepts.** Since we are to comprehend the phenomenon of US presidential doctrines, it is important to provide a definition for this term. According to Oxford dictionary, a doctrine can be defined as a set of instructions, beliefs, principles or positions that forms a branch of knowledge or a belief system.[[6]](#footnote-6) The term has come from Latin and has roots with the word catechism – a learning introduction to the Sacraments traditionally used in the Christian religious teaching of children and adult converts, thus a doctrine is related to religious principles, proclaimed by church. When we speak about the international relations study, a doctrine can be thought of being as a general statement of political leader, which forms a belief system about official foreign policy or military affairs towards a particular country or world/region. It is worth noting that there is distinction between political doctrine and political ideology. As Daniel Șandru claims, “ideology is more general than a doctrine, being a universal way of interpreting reality, from which derives the interpretation of political reality and within the framework of contemporary political reality, ideology stands in the proximity of political philosophy but is not confounded with it”.[[7]](#footnote-7) Thus, we consider a doctrine as not an ideology itself, but as method to form this ideology.

Furthermore, there is another significant concept in this study – Containment policy. It is largely acknowledged George F. Kennan gave recommendations in his “Long Telegram” for US Department, how the United States had to act towards Soviet Union, however he formulated the idea of containment in his another work “The sources of Soviet conduct”: “it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness."… it is a sine qua none of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige”.[[8]](#footnote-8)

 Last but not least term is security dilemma. In the book “Political Realism and Political Idealism” John H. Herz mentioned security dilemma, explaining it: “Groups or individuals living in constellation must be concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups or individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure…, the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on”.[[9]](#footnote-9) In other words, group (state) always feels itself vulnerable, thus, there is always need to strengthen safeness, at the same time, other groups see how it increases its power, so they start to feel insecure and strengthen their security.

 **Research question** of this Master’s thesis is how influential is the impact of US presidential doctrines in forming US foreign policy towards particular country (in our case, towards Russia) or world/region in past and in modernity. **The central objective** of this dissertation is the comparison of contemporary US foreign policy doctrines with the doctrines of the Cold War.

**The aim** is to determine a nature of evolution of Russia’s perception as an actor of international relations by different US presidential administrations.

**Objectives.** To achieve the aim, the following objectives have been set:

1. To make overview of history of US-Russian relations and stress out significant moments that have influenced gravely on development of ties between two nations;
2. To track down the changes of American-Russian relations in Post-Cold War period (from cooperation to tensions);
3. To analyze US Doctrines towards Soviet Union and Russian Federation and find out what tendencies and methods affecting on forming Russian retaining policy in past and in current moment;
4. To reveal the goals of US Government they pursue in world arena nowadays;
5. To determine a legal framework of the United States, which provides modern stage of Containment policy.

**The chronical frameworks** of the study cover the huge period of history, starting the point when first official contacts between Russian Empire and the United States began during American Revolution. However, it must be admitted our interest is related with Cold War period due to this has been “the golden age” for US presidential doctrines, and also with Post-Cold war era as this period is a turning point of relationship between Washington and Moscow.

**Methodology.** This study has strong ties with ***the historical method*** in chapters one and two. Basically, this method was used for defining the tendencies of development of US-Russian relations and for examining the important moments that influence the most on the process of evolution of connections between Washington and Moscow. In chapter three, ***comparative method*** comes in handy to determine the capacities of modern doctrines and doctrines of Cold War era. The speeches and statements held by US presidents of Cold War and Post-Cold War periods undergone ***the content analysis***. Finally, ***the system analysis*** was implemented throughout the study in order to provide better explanations.

**Theoretical approach.** During our research, we have provided the important concept of Neorealism approach – security dilemma, formulated by John H. Herz. The concept of security dilemma was applied to understand the logic of Trump’s current US foreign policy that is directed to military build-up. Furthermore, to comprehend the realities of Containment policy, we are to examine the past experience of such political experts like George F. Kennan, who has been representative of pragmatic political realism. Last but not least, we have implemented ***the discourse analysis*** that gives better understanding of the conditions and factors, which influence the political direction of modern US presidential doctrines.

**Analysis of existing literature.** US Presidential doctrines is not so new phenomenon for international relations, notwithstanding this aspect remains almost uncovered in academic field. There is a very huge monograph of Heiko Meiertöns that makes attempt to provide deep analysis of Cold War doctrines. In his book “The doctrines of US security policy: an evaluation under international law”, Professor Meiertöns examined the capacity of past doctrines, giving the evaluation of their legal framework, position of every US president on the use of the force and acceptability of doctrine’s implementation under international law.[[10]](#footnote-10) An important note is that there is variety of works about US foreign policy during Cold War, however, when we speak about doctrines of Post-Cold War, we have found out a lack of knowledge concerning this field.

 To comprehend how US-Russian relations developed after collapse of the Soviet Union, our study got an inspiration from the work of Angela E. Stent “The limits of partnership: US-Russian relations in the twenty-first century”. Angela E. Stent is a foreign policy expert specializing in US and European relations with Russia and Russian foreign policy. She is Professor of Government at Georgetown University and director of its Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, thus her knowledge in US-Russian ties is inestimable for our analysis. In her research, she examined a big period of US-Russian connections from Clinton administration to Obama’s tenure and estimated possibilities of forming friendly like atmosphere between Washington and Moscow and what insurmountable contradictions they have that can be a grave obstacle to forget “good old times” of Cold War era.[[11]](#footnote-11)

“The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism” is a book by the Canadian author and social activist Naomi Klein. She is well-known for her strong criticism of a corporate globalization and of neoliberal free market, advocated by Milton Friedman. Her analysis of shock therapy implemented in Russian dimension after collapse of USSR is quite useful due to she provides facts that set Russian people against the United States. Naomi Klein believes that Russian nation is sure American Government destroys Russian economy to weaken our country, notwithstanding the problem has been about not taking into account the specifics of Russian reality that are not suitable for Chicago school’s shock therapy.[[12]](#footnote-12) Considering this fact, professor Klein gives us understanding what push Moscow and Russian people into some mistrust and suspicion towards American nation.

In chapter three, we raise a question about Obama’s policy, which relies seriously on *“soft power”*. To get to the idea what is wrong about Obama’s approach, our research has references to the work of Colin S. Gray, British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he is the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. Professor Gray is gravely critical to the possibility of replacing hard power by soft power, though he acknowledges that it becomes more difficult and more expensive to implement a military strength in modern realities. However, according to Colin S. Gray, it does not mean hard power should be diminished to secure some political decisions. What is more, soft power cannot be thought of as an instrument of policy as it really “depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners”, unlike the hard power, which is totally depends upon the decisions of policymakers.[[13]](#footnote-13)

 Our dissertation is strongly related with neorealism, thus we are to use the knowledge and experience of the main founders of this approach like Kenneth Waltz,[[14]](#footnote-14) Robert Jervis and John Mearsheimer.[[15]](#footnote-15) The huge attention was paid to the phenomenon of security dilemma and how these scholars considered this subject. The vast attention was paid on a work by Robert Jervis “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”, where he made attempt to solve a stalemate created by debate of defensive realists (Waltz) vs. offensive realists (Mearsheimer) about inevitability of conflict in case of security dilemma.[[16]](#footnote-16) We also took into account the works made by realists like George F. Kennan and John H. Herz. John H. Herz taught International Relations from a critical, Realist perspective and elaborated the term security dilemma, which neorealists use even now in their researches.[[17]](#footnote-17) The contribution of George Kennan is priceless for realistic approach and for US foreign policy during Cold War; he has inspired many US presidents in forming their doctrines towards Soviet Union, thus it is unavoidable to examine his bibliography to comprehend the logic of containment policy.[[18]](#footnote-18)

**The novelty of the study.** Overview of literature shows that doctrinal aspect is not researched so well, especially considering the modern stage of doctrine’s implementation. This study provides a comprehensive study, by taking into consideration the existing publications on the matter and analyzing current trends, documents, speeches and discourse, using as many open sources on the topic as possible. Furthermore, modern tendencies demonstrate that containment policy towards Russia gains huge support in current American establishment, thus we are to find out what forms and methods US foreign policy will obtain at the moment.

**Primary sources overview.** To conduct the research, the large number of sources were analyzed. ***Official documents.*** Our research contains the analysis of American legal framework and international and bilateral treaties, which have provided a strong impact on international relations. We examined the official statements of US presidents in past and in modernity and their declarations concerning the state of US-Russian relations. Documents like National Security Strategy of Obama and Trump have the huge priority for analysis of current US foreign policy towards Russia.[[19]](#footnote-19) Speeches of US presidents also have great significance for current dissertation, where they have made statements about status of foreign affairs concerning Russia.

 ***Materials of the digital media and online publications*** were also widely used in this Master’s thesis. Especially, it has a serious relevance for modern stage of world due to many analytics and critics use Mass-media coverage for expressing their view about US foreign policy. Such news agencies like RIA Novosti, the Guardian, BBC, Reuters, The New York Times, The Atlantic and so on play a very considerable role in acquaintance of people with trends US Government use now in forming their strategy to the current agenda. What is more, these informational resources provide the full texts of the majority of presidents’ speeches.

 ***Interviews***, conducted by news agencies or personally by author, also became a source of valuable information for this dissertation.

**The structure of the work** corresponds to the set objectives. Thus, the first chapter provides historical overview of American-Russian relations before Cold War, revealing the ambiguity of connection between two nations and analyzes Cold War doctrines as an example of how to form an efficient containment policy towards Soviet Union. In the second chapter, we are to examine US-Russian ties in Post-Cold War period for determining the reasons why a friendly partnership between Washington and Moscow has made a great recurrence to grave tensions. Finally, the third section is very important for our research as we are to give a deep analysis of modern doctrines of Obama and Trump that form a new direction for US foreign policy towards Russia. An attempt to predict how modern “Containment 2.0” will be developed by American establishment and what results they can achieve by these means has also been made.

# **CHAPTER 1. The US practice of applying doctrines during the Cold War**

If there is a need to describe US-Russian relations, there is one right word for it – ambiguous. On the one hand, two states had quite profitable economic partnership; however, the United States always were disappointed with the state of human rights in Russia. They could find compromises on very thorny agenda; nonetheless, different understandings of how to rule often were an obstacle for deeper cooperation between Russia and America. The relationship varied really rapidly: during American Civil War, Russia “was friend when the world was foe”[[20]](#footnote-20) for the Union, but when Russia did not eager to support the policy of open doors in China, America immediately demonized Russia on a par with Germany. We can observe such changes during the whole history of US-Russian ties, and sometimes it has led to serious contradictions between these two states. Nowadays, it is known that people of both nations like to remind only dark times between Moscow and Washington (Cold War, US War on Terror in Iraq, Crimean annexation) without any bright moments in history (Anti-Hitler Coalition during World War II, 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission, 1975 Helsinki Declaration). However, it is wrong way to comprehend this ambiguity of communication between Russia and America; thus, we are to give a brief historical overview for US-Russian relations with all their ups and downs.

## **§1.1 Establishment and development of US-Russian relations before Cold War**

Russian-US relations have eventful history, though they have been established not so long time ago – just 209 years ago. And, it needs to say, these relations have not always been tense and competitive; in fact, before the great October revolution in 1917, Russian Empire and the United States maintained non-hostile contacts with each other. Starting with the moment, when America fought for independence from Great Britain, Russian rulers favorably treated the new state, especially considering the fact, that this potentially possible alliance with United States could be quite handy against British dominance. As Frank A. Golder noticed: “Catherine probably knew none of the Americans personally, but she took an interest in the American Revolution personally because it affected English and European politics… During the years of conflict she never for a moment doubted that complete separation from mother-country was the only solution”,[[21]](#footnote-21) thereby Catherine II predicted appearance of a new actor in world arena which was worth a closer look.

Maintaining neutrality during War for independence in America, nonetheless, Russian empress wanted to establish relations with new country and trade really came in handy for it. Trade between Russia and the colonies began as early as 1763, though such trade was a violation of Britain’s Navigation Acts, which only allowed the colonies to trade with Britain, nevertheless, the colonists and Russia saw each other as excellent trading partners, particularly because both parties had ample resources to offer. Continued trade with Russia during the Revolution provided the colonies with markets for their products as well as funds and supplies necessary to survive.

In 1801, President Jefferson appointed Levett Harris as the first American consul-general to Russia. The establishment of diplomatic relations happened a bit later, in 1807. In October, 1809, the first official diplomatic representative of the United States of America, John Quincy Adams arrived in the capital of Russian Empire. At the same year, Andrei Dashkov formally presented his credentials to President Madison, thus he became the first official Russian representative to the United States. Recognition of the United States could happen earlier during the mission of Francis Dana in 1781-1783, however, Catherine II did not want to hasten with official recognition of new country that could provoke negative reaction of Great Britain; withal this mission broke diplomatic traditions due to Congress did not ask for agreement of Russian Government for appointment of this meeting.

There is a really paradoxical thing in US-Russian relations: trade aided to set up these ties, however official trade treaty between these two states was not ratified yet. In 1824, countries signed the Convention Between the United States of America and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, Relative to Navigating, Fishing, Etc., in the Pacific Ocean which set parallel 54°40′ north as the boundary between Russian America and the Anglo-American Oregon Country and stipulated “With the view of preventing the rights of navigation and of fishing, exercised upon the great ocean by the citizens and subjects of the high contracting powers, from becoming the pretext for au illicit trade, it is agreed, that the citizens of the United States shall not resort to any point where there is a Russian establishment, without the permission of the governor or commander; and that, reciprocally, the subjects of Russia shall not resort, without permission, to any establishment of the United States upon the Northwest Coast”.[[22]](#footnote-22) Later, in December 1832, U.S.-Russian Treaty of Navigation and Commerce with the Russian was signed by Count C. De Nesselrode, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and U.S. Ambassador J. Buchanan provided general bilateral trading rights between two countries and most-favored-nation treatment. In fact, it made no major changes to the status quo, but formalized practices already followed in the growing trade between the two countries. This treaty was in force for eighty years, but in 1911 it was cancelled because “it being under durable heavy pressure of lobbying campaign instigated by a group of bankers who were against of the Russian policy to Jews”.[[23]](#footnote-23) It is worth noting that Jewish issue was always really contradictory and ambiguous for American-Russian relations due to Russian policy was too strict with the representatives of the Jewish community, notwithstanding it never affected the fruitful partnership before until this moment in 1911.

Relations between two nations became closer in 1850ies-1860ies during two very significant events in the life of countries: Russian-Turkish war, also known as Crimean War 1853-1856 and American Civil War 1861-1865. Speaking of Crimean War, Russian Empire got to the difficult situation due to Great powers of Europe declared on Russia a war, trying to counteract the Russian conquests in Ottoman Empire. In its turn, the United States found opportunity to strengthen economic ties with Russia. America allowed Russian ships to sail under American neutrality in the North Pacific and supplied the Russian merchant ships, whose shipping was frequently disrupted by the British Government. Moreover, American leadership still considered Great Britain as potential threat so that was much convenient for the United States that Russia always was political opponent to British crown, thus “long before the Crimean War, when discussing the possibility of a future conflict between Russia and England, both the Russians and the Americans considered their countries as potential allies”.[[24]](#footnote-24) President of the American Russian Commercial Company, Beverly Sanders agreed to help supply Russian America and Siberian coastal settlements during the war, and arranged for the fictitious sale of Russian ships to his American Russian Commercial Company, thereby allowing them to sail under the American flag; in return, Americans got monopoly over the marketing of the Russian America Company's products throughout the Pacific.

During American Civil War, Russian Empire was the strongest supporter of the Union, governed by Abraham Lincoln, primarily because its main geopolitical enemy at that time was Great Britain, which was sympathetic to the Confederacy. In 1862, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov express diplomatic support to the Union, proclaiming that “Russia desires above all the maintenance of the American Union as one indivisible nation”,[[25]](#footnote-25) thereby Russia declared total support for Abraham Lincoln’s Government, claiming that it was the only legitimate authority on U.S. soil. Meanwhile, Great Britain and France gave the status of belligerent state to Confederate States of America, what did not mean they officially recognized the Confederacy, however European Great powers gave Confederate agents the possibility to contract with private concerns for arms and other supplies. They were even discussing some options to intervene in America aiding the confederates, subsequently taking a decision to stay neutral; howbeit, Russian Tsar Alexander II ordered to send a fleet of twelve warships in New York and San-Francisco, “as an expression of Russian sympathies for the Union cause”.[[26]](#footnote-26) This move of Russian Empire helped the Union to prevent raider attacks by southerners, firstly, and also it secured American waters to avoid their getting trapped if a war broke out with Europe.

One more event influenced on the relations of two countries fruitfully – Alaska purchase. Crimean War affected Russia really badly, not only damaging its status of a great power, but also causing economic crisis in country, meanwhile, Tsar Alexander II set a political course of reforms, realization of which was quite expensive. In addition, Russian Government was still anxious about threat to break out war with Britain again and territories of Russian America were not secured enough to retain during martial law. Also, some Russian politicians believed that it was only a matter of time when the United States picked these territories up: “We must not deceive ourselves and must foresee that the United States, aiming constantly to round out their possessions and desiring to dominate undividedly the whole of North America will take the afore-mentioned colonies from us and we shall not be able to regain them”.[[27]](#footnote-27) On the basis of these facts, Russian Empire proposed the Administration of Andrew Johnson to discuss terms of Alaska sale. In April 1867, US Congress voted for the adoption of this treaty, and according to all facts, they accepted: “The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the consideration of the treaty between the United States of America and the Emperor of all Russias for the cession to the United States of all the territory and dominions now possessed by His Majesty on the continent of America, and in the adjacent islands”.[[28]](#footnote-28) On the strength of the treaty, Washington was to pay US$7.2 million for 1,518,800 km2 of Russian America’s territory. Russian side had to withdraw troops and its Admistration from Alaska under the terms of the contract; nonetheless, parties to the treaty agreed to allow Russian missionaries of Orthodox Church to stay. In the issue, Russia managed to improve its financial positon, as for the United States, a new territory ensured them to promote their dominance into the Pacific region.

Nevertheless, it would be biased and improperly to take notice of only positive sides of American-Russian relations. There were moments of contradictions even before Cold War era, and one of these historical events happened in The end of XIXth – the beginning of XXth centuries – the period of World division when Great powers started competition for zones of influence. Russian Empire was one of the most active players in this agenda, however the Unites States did not stay aside from world processes. In general, American Government expanded its territories in American continent, engaging in wars against Spain, notwithstanding it made attempts to join big game with European countries, in particular Washington developed some projects to increase its influence in Asian region. After Boxer Rebellion in 1899-1901, Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain shared zones of influence in China, leaving USA behind; it made US Secretary of State John Hay to call for *Open Door policy* in China, which meant that Asian market had to be open and equal in trading for merchants of all nationalities. Hay argued that “establishing equal access to commerce would benefit American traders and the U.S. economy, and hoped that the Open Door would also prevent disputes between the powers operating in China”.[[29]](#footnote-29) Apparently enough, Great powers could not agree with this proposal; American economy was one of the stable and strong in the world, thus if it hit the Asian market, it would make a serious competition for European nations. Based on this, they made everything possible to get American business out of China, provoking a negative reaction of American Government.

Despite the fact of the rivalry between all the Great powers in that times, there were instants, when states helped to stop bloody conflicts. This is what the United States did during Russo-Japanese war broke out. Though US President Theodore Roosevelt sympathized more to Japanese side and his Administration “had made efforts to make American public opinion friendlier to Japan”,[[30]](#footnote-30) he also was concerned of how Tokyo’s military power strengthening could affect its impact on long-term United States interests in Asia, if Japan managed to drive Russia out entirely. Therefore, the decision was made to call for conclusion of peace with the help of mediation by America. The negotiations were held in American city, Portsmouth, on August 1905, and situation there was quite stressful as both Russia and Japan went to concessions extremely hard. As it was mentioned in memorandum of this conference, “The chief aims of the Japanese negotiator included first control in Korea and South Manchuria, then the negotiation of an indemnity and control of Sakhalin Island. As for the Russian side, they wanted to maintain Sakhalin Island, refused to pay a war costs indemnity to the Japanese, and hoped to maintain their fleet in the Pacific”,[[31]](#footnote-31) based on these dissimilar claims, it was no surprise why it was difficult to reach an agreement. In the middle of this process, Russian delegation, headed by Prime Minister of Russia Sergei Witte, even threatened to resume hostilities if their demands would not be fulfilled. Such a turn would mean a complete failure of negotiations, therefore, Theodore Roosevelt insisted on easing of Japanese tough conditions. Eventually, sides came to an agreement that Russia recognized Japan as the dominant power in Korea and turned over their leases of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin Island, to Japan, however Russian side was not obliged to pay reparations and both sides agreed to restore Manchuria to China. The treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905 and Theodore Roosevelt got the Noble Peace Prize for his contribution in it.

 Hereafter, Great powers reached a peak of their division campaign – World War I happened. And the most important question for every nations was who was supported by whom. The Unites States did not show apparent sympathies to any alliances and tried to maintain neutrality. There were two warring parties in this conflict: Triple Entente with Russian Empire, France and Great Britain and Triple Alliance with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. It is fair to notice that the United States did not backed fully the policy of both sides, nevertheless German aggressive ambitions were especially unpleasant for American Government. Though there were contradictions between Entente and The United States, in particular concerning Chinese market, however they were not able to make damage for American interests stronger than Germany. When war was unleashed, President Woodrow Wilson formally proclaims the neutrality of the United States on August 4, 1914, but situation began to change when German warships carried out several attacks on US merchant ships, trying to break off trade ties between the United States and Britain. One more event helped Woodrow Wilson to declare war against Triple Alliance – Russian February revolution in 1917. Russian Empire was absolute monarchy and there could be no doubt “there would have been serious opposition to American allying with an absolute monarchy to make war”.[[32]](#footnote-32) Therefore, when Tsar Nicholas II was deposed and power passed into the hands of “liberal” Russian Provisional Government, American Administration hasted to recognize Russia and they made it so very first on March 22, 1917. US President Wilson, reluctant to enter the war with an autocratic Russia, found in a “democratic” Russia a “fit partner for a league of honor”.[[33]](#footnote-33)

 After World War I previous system of international relations collapsed with many great empires, including Tsarist Russia. Great powers, that won in war (Great Britain, France, the United States), began establishing new order, governed by League of Nations. This organization could be considered as brainchild of President Wilson, after he proclaimed his famous “Fourteen Points”. One of these points was concerned of Russian destiny: “The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire”.[[34]](#footnote-34) According to this paragraph, US President made reference to the principle of self-determination, thereby he urged world community not to intervene in Russia’s affairs. Nonetheless, when Britain and France sought to intervene in Russia’s civil war to install a government capable of re-opening the eastern front, Woodrow Wilson, who “believed strongly in democracy and self-determination of peoples, and saw communist ideology as a suppression of these natural rights”,[[35]](#footnote-35) rapidly reconsidered his thoughts about this agenda, supposing The United States had to aid Russia to come back to democracy, thus they joined Allied forces in intervention.

Despite all the attempts of Great powers to strike Russian communism down, Bolsheviks managed not only to survive Civil War, but also to strengthen their positions in world arena in a very short time. Therefore, world community realized that they had to reckon with Soviet opinion. In 1933-1934 the streak of USSR’s diplomatic recognition began; the United States did it on November 16, 1933. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 32nd US President, assumed, that “recognition of the Soviet Union would serve U.S. strategic interests by limiting Japanese expansionism in Asia”,[[36]](#footnote-36) also it would give some economic benefits in trade with Moscow and Soviet Government would end with espionage in Washington. Moreover, Soviet Union was accepted to League of Nations on September 18, 1934, what could be taken as fact of Russia’s full recognition in world arena. Unfortunately, mutual mistrust and rivalry put in appearance very soon between USSR and USA, thereby it could not provide fruitful cooperation, not living up to Roosevelt’s expectations.

Last time when Soviet Union and the United States were able to forget about contrarieties and joined their forces against common enemy was World War II. On June 22, 1941, after Germany began war campaign against USSR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced full support for Moscow, offering Soviet Government Lend-Lease. Such American aid was really important contribution for USSR in its struggle against Germany and Washington delivered supplies for Moscow in total “14,795 aircraft, 7,537 tanks, 375,883 trucks, 345,735 tons of explosives, 2,981 locomotives and 11,155 railroad cars, over a million miles of field telephone cable, $1.312 million worth of food, 2,670,000 tons of gasoline, and 15 million pairs of boots”,[[37]](#footnote-37) for all the period of 1941-1945.

Cooperation of Allied Powers gave some significant achievements for world. During their conferences, partners discussed not only how to triumph over Rome–Berlin–Tokyo Axis, but also they were really concerned of post-war plans. Indeed, allies wanted to cooperate with each other to prevail such conflicts as World War II in the future. President Roosevelt understood necessity to adjust world order together with Moscow, thus they made agreements to establish organization that would be better and more efficient in the maintenance of peace than League of Nations – the United Nations. The decisions on Teheran and Yalta conferences reshaped the system of international relations, known as bilateral. As Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed it could let USSR and USA to coexist peacefully and ensure world order. Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s hopes to rearrange relations with Soviet Union in a friendly way were gone after his death. Harry Truman, who was famous for his opposition to USSR, took up post of US President. Even during the war, he declared: “if we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible”.[[38]](#footnote-38) In this way, bilateral system in hands of Truman became not as the way to coexist peacefully, but to clash American interests and ideas with Soviet ones. Thus, we come to the subject of our research.

## **§1.2 The US Presidential Doctrines before Cold War**

During the Cold War, American Government often used elaborated tactics and strategies against communists. These methods and ways of opposition could be considered in combination as *doctrines.* The practice to implement doctrines for establishing foreign policy is not new for the United States. The richest period for US doctrines was Cold War due to every new American President added something new to state’s agenda or completely redirected US foreign policy. Nonetheless, there are earlier examples of this practice – Monroe and Stimson doctrines.

***Monroe doctrine*** appeared when the fifth President of the United States of America, James Monroe, announced the principles of US foreign policy for Congress on 2 December, 1823. He mentioned in his speech: “With the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States”,[[39]](#footnote-39) and by these words President began to provide “non-colonization” and “non-intervention” principles on American continent; these principles served as contrast to conservative and monarchical concepts of European “Old World”. Monroe doctrine was related with two events: Tsar Alexander’s edict of 16 September 1821, claiming the northwest territory north of 51◦ to be under Russian jurisdiction and interference of Holy Alliance in affairs of Latin America. Thereby, American President drew the line between European hemisphere and American continent, proclaiming policy of isolationism that lasted hundred years in the United States. It makes sense to notice this was the first time when the United States made decision to stand against “The Concert of Europe”, where Russian Empire took one of the dominant roles for decades, thus Monroe Doctrine could be considered as first American strategy, which opposed Russian interests in the world. Meantime, this strategy stopped working after World War II when the USA decided to join battle with Soviet Union for hegemony in the world. Though some US Presidents of Cold War period made attempts to revitalize the principles of Monroe doctrine, time showed the concept became outdated as the United Stated could not isolate themselves from outer world and global problems.

***Stimson doctrine*** is quite significant document for US policy because its principles were used more than once. On 18 September, 1931, Kwantung army occupied Manchuria and America immediately responded for this act of aggression against China. Secretary of State, Henry Lewis Stimson, declared that the United States denied any Japanese military conquests in China. He sent two diplomatic notes to China and Japan, where he stressed out: “American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy”.[[40]](#footnote-40) The principle of non-recognition of acquisition of territory against international law, as mentioned in these notes, has become known as the Stimson Doctrine. This document is very interesting from the position of international practice as it was the first time of raising the question of the legality of annexation, hence, the acquisition of territory as a result of the use of force. In this way, The United States made attempt to determine applicable standard of using force legally.

As it was mentioned earlier, Stimson doctrine was applied several times. When USSR affiliated Baltic states on june, 1940, Sumner Welles, the new US Secretary of State, following the principles of Stimson doctrine, expressed his concerns about Baltic issue in his declaration: “The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak”.[[41]](#footnote-41) Subsequently, this policy was of current interest all the Cold War, allowing to exert pressure on Soviet Union and its violation of international law.

## **§1.3 The US Presidential Doctrines of Cold War era**

The period of Cold War was very important for US foreign policy due to “the political role of the United States changed from that of an actor in a multipolar system to that of a decisive state (one of the two poles) in an international system now considered as bipolar”. ***Truman doctrine*** was the first step for establishing American position about rivalry with Soviet countries. Inspired by concepts of Kennan’s *Long Telegram, The Sources of Soviet Conduct* and Churchill’s *“Iron Curtain Speech”*, President Truman made up his mind to help Greece and Turkey in fighting against communism in place of Britain that couldn’t handle with it. “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”[[42]](#footnote-42) as US President stated for Congress, thereby, he created principle of communism’s containment, providing economic, political military expert aids.

The big important feature of this doctrine, unlike Monroe doctrine, is very idealistic tone of American policy. “One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression and the second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms”.[[43]](#footnote-43) Thence, line was drawn between those who strived for freedom (Western hemisphere) and oppressors of liberty (Soviet Union and other communistic countries), and this division defined all era of Cold War. The Truman Doctrine outlines in basic terms the Cold War conflict and formulates a political duty for the United States to support states, considered by the United States to be free.

It is fair enough to state that ***Eisenhower doctrine*** (also known as *“American Doctrine for the Middle East”*)was continuation of Truman’s principles, in fact, Eisenhower just increased the zone of clash with Soviet power. When Suez Crisis of 1956 happened, USSR showed some interest in spreading influence in Middle East, thence it caused American concern: “It would include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such [Middle Eastern] nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism”. Though it is worth noting Eisenhower demonstrated greater determination in his speech to struggle with communists outright, not by “indirect military aggression” as Truman announced in 1947. US President recollected that Moscow “stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity and all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of anti-Soviet provocateurs”, meanwhile, “Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union”. Furthermore, he stressed out Russia always tried to set out its influence in Middle East region, even before Soviet Union and “The Soviet rulers do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends in this region”. [[44]](#footnote-44) In this connection, it was clear the degree of tension between USA and USSR became much higher and any act of provoking could cause serious problems.

One of the heavy burden for American-Soviet relations was Cuban missile crisis 1962 and in such conditions, US containment of Soviet Union was hardened. “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty”[[45]](#footnote-45) John F. Kennedy said in his inaugural speech. It could seem that new President went on Eisenhower doctrine, preparing country to inevitable direct clash with Soviet Union, nevertheless, Kennedy’s foreign policy showed astonishing possibility to get out of any stalemate. After resolving Cuban crisis, he proved that warring parties could reach an agreement and renewed US security policy, shifting from nuclear massive retaliation to flexible response (the capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms). Thus, ***Kennedy doctrine*** added flexibility and rationalism to US Containment policy, having reduced probability of Nuclear war.

Agreements about withdrawal of missiles between Moscow and Washington caused thaw in relations, notwithstanding it could not last for long. ***Johnson doctrine*** again turned back to the polemic with whom United Stated fought for: “The American Nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere and our goal, in keeping with the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent another communist state in this hemisphere”.[[46]](#footnote-46) Unlike the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines, Lyndon B. Johnson made attempt to express standpoint of countries which were the part of American system, thereby forming the “Western weltanschauung”: “We will defend our Nation against all who seek to destroy not only the United States but every free country of this hemisphere”. It is even suitable to emphasize that Johnson doctrine has been corollary of Monroe Doctrine, that established “American hemisphere”, prohibiting the interference of European “Old World” into deals of “Inter-American system”. During Cold War the United States widened their zone of interest by including some countries in their hemisphere. Nonetheless, some nations were on the edge of revolutions, which were supported by Communists, and "The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system". Speaking of which, Johnson Administration faced domestic turmoil in Dominican Republic, which caused fear of reiteration of the “Cuban plot”, thence US President proclaimed: “The American nations will not permit the establishment of another Communist government, like Cuba, in the Western Hemisphere”.[[47]](#footnote-47) Therefore, we can state the fact that Lyndon B. Johnson turned America back to Monroe’s values, giving the new phase for “Inter-American system”.

There is really significant detail that should be noted. When President Johnson drew a line where Western hemisphere was located, Soviet leadership did the same for its zone of interests. August, 1968, Moscow deployed the troops in Czechoslovakia when this country faced uprisings against communist’s regime. Surely, it caused strong negative reaction in Western world, howbeit USSR managed to keep its positions in Eastern Europe; moreover, Soviet Government made attempt to justify its decisions. The leader of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, proclaimed his intentions to the Congress of the Polish Communist Party in Eastern bloc on November 12, 1968: “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries”.[[48]](#footnote-48) It is not difficult to notice the parallels of *Brezhnev doctrine* with Johnson doctrine, and relatively with Monroe Doctrine, meaning that Soviet Union, as The Unites States, drew a line where Eastern bloc was located and it was unacceptable for Western hemisphere to intervene into Soviet affairs. This perhaps is best exemplified by a connection between American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets in 1968. Both events are extremely similar in the fact that they used a set of doctrines to justify their actions to prevent a certain type of government in countries which were the part of their interest. In this regard, it can be stated Washington and Moscow defined their influential borders doctrinally.

As time went, the influence of American hemisphere skyrocketed in the world, but, at the same time, many third world countries sympathized Communism, for example in Vietnam. *Vietnam war*demonstrated the US Government that they had to fight with communism not only in Inter-American system, but in the whole world. Richard Nixon, succeeded Johnson, set the task for his Administration to counter the spread of “Red scare” efficiently, wherever it appeared.

Undoubtedly, the formation of ***Nixon doctrine*** has clear link to Vietnam war, to which the United Stated have been gravely mired already (by 1969 almost 550,000 US soldiers had been deployed to Vietnam).[[49]](#footnote-49) In his speech during press conference in Guam, Nixon made clear that “In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression”.[[50]](#footnote-50)

The doctrine itself was established in November 3, 1969. The US President declared three principles of how America would provide its policy toward Asia: “First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments”, meaning all the agreements with NATO and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in particular with South Vietnam, which the United States supported in Vietnam war; “second, provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with the United States or of a nation whose survival considered vital to American security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, the United States shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with treaty commitments, but shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense”. Concerning the last two principles, it is important to stress out that President Nixon understood how gravely America needed to withdraw its forces from Vietnam, thence, there was one more principle in his doctrine: “U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them”. [[51]](#footnote-51) This point caused two things: first of all, Nixon considered this principle a gradual turning away from the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, “just as the Marshall Plan had been in 1948”, thus he made attempt to provide methods avoiding the use of force like “Peace through Partnership”. Secondly, it gave huge possibility for United States to to aid allies without interference directly into conflict.

In 1973, Darrel L. Gooler analyzed actions of US President in Asia and concluded that Richard Nixon was planning to “establish a Pacific community in the form and manner of the Atlantic community, where the Atlantic community was organized to counter the pressures of the Soviet Union, and Pacific community would be created to counter the pressures of the People's Republic of China”.[[52]](#footnote-52) Thus, Guam was to become a starting point for setting up an alliance of nations which had desire to fight with “Red scare” in Asian region, guided by the United States. Notwithstanding, Nixon could not realize his plans about Pacific region as he was forced to resign the presidency on August 9, 1974 after Watergate scandal. Gerald Ford, next US President, continued his legacy.

December 7, 1975, Ford announced his project at the University of Hawaii in Honolulu. Later his statement became known as *“New Pacific Doctrine”.* The essence of his plan was to ensure stability in this area of the Pacific for the security of the United States as “the fall of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to the forces of communism in the spring of 1975 heralded a distinct shift in the balance of power in the West Pacific”.[[53]](#footnote-53) Based on this, balance of power was broken for Western hemisphere in Pacific, and this was considered as the threat for US security. Therefore, Gerald Ford outlined several goals for his Government, including reestablishment of relations with China, maintaining the regimes of Asian countries, like Japan, allied to the Unites States, and economic cooperation in Pacific region. Noteworthy, that President did not mention any particular things about the use of force, thus, ***Ford doctrine*** cannot be constituted as a doctrine in traditional way like any previous ones. Furthermore, Gerald ford rather supplemented pre-existing Johnson doctrine, than created something new, thence, it is suitable to consider these two doctrines as a one full-fledged strategy of US security policy in Pacific region.

Nixon doctrine permitted for the United States to consider some regions as the part of their security policy. When Soviet Union started its campaign in Afghanistan, in December, 1980, President of the United States Jimmy Carter declared American will to confront Soviet aggression in Gulf region, as it contradicted the US national interests. It should be noted that before Soviet intervention, the countries of Gulf region were considered as allies of the United States. After revolution in Iran in 1978-1979, where US embassy in Tehran was under attack and insurgents took hostages of US personnel, status-quo started to change in the region, thence American Government could not stay aside due to this alteration did not come in handy for them.

In 1980, Jimmy Carter announced his doctrine in front of the US Congress: “An attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”.[[54]](#footnote-54) Claiming that détente of 1970ies disastrous that gave possibility for Moscow to show its aggressive ambitions. As it can be seen, US President turned back to the polemic about the use of the force, and we have courage to propose that it was merit of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser. As the fierce opponent of Soviet regime, Brzezinski drew up ***Carter doctrine*** in the spirit of full readiness to fight against USSR by any means. In domestic policy, President Carter stressed out that America had to be prepared for war, thus all American people needed to sacrifice some benefits. He announced he would reduce the federal deficit, a move which would most likely come from cutting social programs since he has already committed a 5% increase in military spending. Furthermore, the Carter administration began to build up the Rapid Deployment Force. In the interim, the administration asked Congress to restart Selective Service registration (plans to require all men and possibly women aged 18-26 to register) and expanded the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Carter’s legacy continued working even after he left his office in 1981. Ronald Reagan did not change strategy in Persian Gulf, thus he declared the United States would oppose internal subversion of states in the Gulf region (this continuation of Carter Doctrine was called *"Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine"*). As the illustration of such policy, American Government intervened to events of Iran-Iraqi war, aiding Saudi Arabia since the United States appraised it as threat to security of the Gulf region. However, this policy was not the constituent of his Reagan’s own doctrine.

There was huge outbreak of revolutions against communist’s regimes in 1980ies around all the world: Ethiopia, Angola, Laos, South Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Cambodia, Iran and Libya. February 6, 1985, Reagan gave his speech in the State of the Union: “Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy, and to communicate these ideals everywhere we can on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua---to defy Soviet-supported aggression and to secure rights which have been ours from birth”.[[55]](#footnote-55) He called for struggle with “Red scare” in all the world, which made ***Reagan doctrine*** of a global scale as other doctrines had no courage to do: “Unlike other doctrines, the declaration of the Reagan Doctrine is generally not considered to be a reaction to a single political event. Instead, it is considered to serve the purpose of countering a perceived general loss of power in relation to the Soviet Union which was expressed in a series of single events”.[[56]](#footnote-56) Making references to events in Nicaragua, where people raised against the Sandinista government, President expressed American will to aid those fighters, who pursued democratic values and freedom.

Speaking of Nicaragua case, there are even now many controversies in academic discussions, as it was not clear whom America upheld. Some scholars assumed that Reagan Administration, zealously desired to overthrow communism in some regions, by that they even supported armed groups like “Contras”, which used terrorist tactics in their war against the Nicaraguan government: “Nicaragua, where the United States backed not a counter insurgent state but anti-communist mercenaries, likewise represented a disjuncture between the idealism used to justify U.S. policy and its support for political terrorism”.[[57]](#footnote-57) According to these facts, political experts doubted that freedom and democratic values have to be achieved by any means, even terrorism. Furthermore, they accused the United States for justifying their actions, that did not follow to the international law, if they aided those who pursued democratic values. So was in Chile (Pinochet regime 1974-1990), so was in Nicaragua.

At the same time, no matter if it was breach of the prohibition of force and some international laws, US Administration methods demonstrated better efficiency and flexibility in spreading its influence in the world, thereby American coherent policy bested Soviet Union, giving the possibility to become the only one superpower state in the world. Undoubtedly, there were many mistakes made by American Government like in South Vietnam or in Iran, notwithstanding, precisely the flexibility and the ability to adapt to specific situations helped the Unites States came in handy for USA; in its turn, Soviet Union was too obdurate and conservative to acknowledge its errors and change the approach, thence Moscow’s policy was too one-sided and stiff, only relying on strength and disregarding other methods.

# **CHAPTER 2. Post-Cold War period: from amicable cooperation to recurrence of tension**

The end of Cold War era generated the idea of “the end of History”, provided by Francis Fukuyama, which meant that world community finally could live in peace without huge conflicts. Such euphoria was supported by the events like Collapse of the Soviet Union and adoption of democratic way in post-soviet countries, including Russia, improvement of Chinese economy with the help of capitalistic model of market, the beginning of disarmament, including nuclear capacity limitation (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and etc. – all these facts made people believe world would change for the better. Nevertheless, even Professor Fukuyama acknowledged the point in his book, that “Those who remain dissatisfied, will always be able to restore the course of history”[[58]](#footnote-58) and ranks of dissatisfied countries are replenished. Russian side is concerned about changing status-quo of current situation too.

It is fair enough to notice that first years of American-Russian relations have developed in the positive key after disappearance of the Soviet Union from a geopolitical map. It is also fair enough to notice that suspicions and mistrust between two countries unfortunately have turned back very soon. The new chapter of relations between two nations began with the speech of Mikhail Gorbachev, on December 25, 1991: “I hereby discontinue my activities at the post of President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I am making this decision on considerations of principle. I firmly came out in favor of the independence of nations and sovereignty for the republics”.[[59]](#footnote-59) A new period for Russian nation began from now on. Angela E. Stent raised very important questions in her research: “What did it mean that the United States and Russia no longer would face each other as antagonists whose large stockpiles of nuclear weapons targeted each other? What kind of political system would the new Russia have?” and this agenda was really urgent. It is possible to comprehend American and Russian Governments positions and policies toward each other in current stage, but it has not been so clear enough for them twenty-seven years ago. Thus, we are to observe their development of relationship from the moment when “the red hammer-and-sickle Soviet flag was lowered over the Kremlin and the new red, white, and blue Russian tricolor flag was raised” [[60]](#footnote-60) to the modern stage, when some Russian and American experts and politicians make attempts to turn back the polemic about “Cold War era version 2.0”.

As the majority of relations between countries, US-Russian relations began with recognition. On December 25, 1991 President George H.W. Bush, just after Gorbachev’s speech, addressed to new Government of Russia: “the United States recognizes and welcomes the emergence of a free, independent and democratic Russia, led by its courageous President Boris Yeltsin. Our Embassy in Moscow will remain there as our Embassy to Russia. We will support Russia's assumption of the U.S.S.R.'s seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. I look forward to working closely with President Yeltsin in support of his efforts to bring democratic and market reform in Russia”.[[61]](#footnote-61) Thus, it is obvious to proclaim he has fully recognized Russia as the legal successor of the USSR, retaining all political, social and economic ties with country. Nonetheless, though President Bush supported “the historic choice for freedom by the new states of the Commonwealth”, there still was paranoia for years that Soviet Union could be reborn. Only after 3 years when Russian Government, headed by Boris Yeltsin, set democratic reforms in economy and policy, accepted the Constitution (that replicate US Constitution in many points), established quite friendly relations with Bush administration, America was thinking the unthinkable – “the USSR might actually disappear”.[[62]](#footnote-62)

The United States was not exactly for sure that Yeltsin could lead new Russia for the “better democratic way”, thus American Government started to examine him and more meetings they had with first Russian President, more they convinced themselves Yeltsin did not want to be a new Soviet dictator. American political experts began providing the idea – “The only alternative to Yeltsin is Stalin—and authoritarian regimes”.[[63]](#footnote-63) Based on this concept, US Government decided to support changes in Post-soviet Russia, aiding with economic reforms of market, continuing to follow the agreements of disarmament Treaties and endorsing Russian Federation to join all international organizations because if they did not make, the communists would return, and that would be a catastrophe. This fear in Washington was doubled in fall of 1993, when political opponents of Yeltsin’s reforms and his option of Constitution (the majority of them were communists and those who supported socialistic views) made attempt to depose his Government. Undoubtedly, The United States advocated for Yeltsin’s regime and, henceforth, American administration, governed by newly-elected US President William Jefferson Clinton, made “Russian agenda” as one of the primary target, trying to adjust it for the benefit of US national interests.

## **§2.1 Clinton administration: from friendly ties with Russia to NATO bombing of Yugoslavia**

The 42nd US President, Bill Clinton, set a task to nurture democratic tradition on the foundation of post-communistic Russia, so Yeltsin’s Government could join *the principle of democratic peace* – “the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other”.[[64]](#footnote-64) Warm relations with Moscow could give Washington really important stakeholder, which would not prevent the United States in gaining a status of hegemon in the world. To achieve this possibility, Clinton understood that his administration ought to push Russia to change its domestic policy with the help of reforms.

US President made a bigger bet on economic reform due to he believed that faster Russian society accepted an American market-oriented economic model, closer it would be to Western-style world. Thus, *“Shock Therapy”* in Russia was launched, which Russian leadership greeted positively. Liberalization of trade, massive privatization, openness of economy for foreign investments – all these measures were imposed, thereby it was supposed to help Russia to adapt to Capitalism and liberal values. Notwithstanding, the plan was too far from reality; Russian economy had to overcome a deep decline accompanied by a huge surge of inflation, a decrease of investment, an increase of the external debt, bartering of the economy, a reduction of the population’s incomes. As Naomi Klein emphasized: “Many people in Communistic countries want to live like in the West, by easily wearing blue jeans and eating “big macs”, but none of them want to be suffered from the impudence of oligarchs”.[[65]](#footnote-65) Indeed, only small percentage of population won the big piece of pie from “Disaster and savage capitalism” that Russian leadership welcomed so nicely. As for ordinary people, they suffered the most from poverty, inflation, fraudulent schemes and unavailability (and maybe even reluctance) of Government to help them. This was the first time after Soviet collapse when some experts took a thought that Russia, might be, would not evolve as a Western-style democracy.

Furthermore, America was concerned of the very thorny subject – the presence of nuclear missiles in former soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan). Clinton began to focus on enhancing the Bush administration’s nuclear nonproliferation programs and encouraged new initiatives in this field. On December 1994, representatives of Russian Federation, The United States, United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus signed The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, that provided some guarantees of independence and sovereignty for new states. Nonetheless, the most important point about this treaty was the process to “eliminate all nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan within a specified period of time”[[66]](#footnote-66) and made these countries as the part of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The problem with nuclear arms was solved, however the problem with guarantees of independence and sovereignty appeared. Curiously enough to notice that the current crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations is really connected with this memorandum due to, after annexation of Crimea, Kiev has accused Moscow in breaking off the principles of Budapest memorandum. In this way, it is fair to affirm that Clinton’s legacy has cracked in the area.

The next step of Clinton administration was to give Russian Federation a feeling that it was still Great power, by offering association with the G7, the Council of Europe and, later partnership with NATO. It was given for Moscow as a “consolation prize” for diminished international role, at the same time, Russia was not insignificant nation in the world. West offered some of the trappings of a major power for Russian state, thus it could accept a loss of superpower status and forgot about moving toward a post-imperial foreign policy. Having achieved these goals, the United States believed they could implement their plans in world arena, counting on Russia as their stakeholder. Nonetheless, Russian side comprehended they wanted to get something more than just tacitly support all American actions. Yeltsin’s first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, considered “the West is rich and we need to be friends with it — It’s the club of first-rate states Russia must rightfully belong to”,[[67]](#footnote-67) thus, he assumed Moscow could become as equal partner with Western civilization, but everything had a price and price for Russia was sacrifice of its national interests. Fairly enough, Moscow could not let it happen.

The first contradictions in Russian-US ties arose about Iranian nuclear program. During Soviet times, Russia was the biggest exporter of nuclear technologies and military equipment for Teheran and Yeltsin’s Government continued to supply Iran, though Clinton administration asked Russia to stop this cooperation. Moscow committed to limit ties with Iran in this sector, however nuclear projects were not frozen as Russia referred that Iran could have nuclear energy as Teheran did not violate any agreements it had signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency and it only desired to acquire a civilian nuclear power capability. There was one more reason for Russia to keep on deal with Iran: Moscow understood if they left Iranian market, Washington would occupy this niche very quickly. In 1995, Russian leadership agreed to freeze supplies of military technologies for Iran, howbeit it aided to develop nuclear technology for Tehran anyway.

US-Russian relations began to crack root and branch at the end of Clinton administration. It happened when situation in Balkans escalated too much. It is notable that during NATO campaign in Bosnia, 1995, Russia stood aside of this conflict and approved all Resolutions in UN Security Council, made by the United States. Perhaps, such Russian tacit neutrality was related with The First Chechen War, the escalation peak of which broke out in 1994-1995, thus President Yeltsin preferred to leave this agenda for the UN and NATO; at the same time, Clinton decided not to exert pressure on Russia, thereby it would not embolden anti-Yeltsin forces, who sympathized Serbs. Nevertheless, in 1999, Moscow changed its position completely, when new conflict over Kosovo emerged and NATO made decision to bomb Belgrade. Russian cabinet altered drastically and West-oriented prime-minister, Andrei Kozyrev, was replaced by Yevgeny Primakov, who was quite nationalistic in his views. The mood in Russian society could be described as: “Wasn’t it obvious that each missile directed against Yugoslavia was an indirect strike against Russia… Today Yugoslavia, tomorrow Russia!”.[[68]](#footnote-68) The liberal wing in Russia still recommended to adhere to neutrality in Kosovo in order not to contradict the West, however security forces and military officers wanted to intervene in course of conflict. So it happened on June 12, 1999, when Russian troops took under their control the airport in Pristina, Kosovo, thus Moscow decided to stop NATO campaign against Serbia. It could cause direct physical blow between Russia and NATO, but, fortunately for both sides, they came to an agreement that Russian peacekeepers would deploy exclusive safe-zones throughout Kosovo, but independently of NATO. The crisis was resolved peacefully, but Russian suspicion about NATO activity and, especially its enlargement, left a mark on American-Russian relations, that even reflected on current agenda.

 The end of XX – the beginning of XXI centuries were significant for two common events in Russian Federation and the United States – the resignation of Presidents. Yeltsin declared his decision on 31 December 1999: “I have taken a different decision. I am standing down earlier than scheduled. I have realized that I have to do this. Russia must enter the new millennium with new politicians, new faces, new intelligent, strong and energetic people. As for those of us who have been in power for many years, we must go”.[[69]](#footnote-69) Announcing this solution, he entrusted the duties of the president of Russia to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The impeachment of Bill Clinton occurred on January 20, 2001. As a result of political sex scandal (known as The Clinton–Lewinsky scandal), House of Representatives adjudicated that President Clinton had to resign: “My fellow citizens, tonight is my last opportunity to speak to you from the Oval Office as your President. I am profoundly grateful to you for twice giving me the honor to serve, to work for you and with you to prepare our Nation for the 21st century”.[[70]](#footnote-70) Right after this farewell speech, George W. Bush took office, becoming 43rd US President. The US-Russian relations were strongly connected with personal friendly ties between Clinton and Yeltsin. When these circumstances of resignations occurred, “the Bill and Boris show” was over and it marked the new phase of Russian-American relations, affected not only on lives of these countries, but also on all world agenda.

## **§2.2 Bush administration: from close partnership of the post-9/11 reset to the Russo-Georgian War**

A new stage of relations began during the period of “Age of terror”. On September 11, 2001 American society faced ordeal that altered their points of view about personal safety and country’s security: “Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror… These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation”[[71]](#footnote-71) Bush proclaimed on the same day when the War on Terror was launched. Vladimir Putin made a telephone call to US President after the appalling terrorist attack and expressed his solidarity with the American people, offering any help as a strategic partner of the United States in the Global War on Terror: «Good will triumph over evil. I want you to know that in this struggle, we will stand together”.[[72]](#footnote-72) Russian President really believed that it could mend relations between two countries, which began deteriorating from the end of Yeltsin’s years of ruling. However, as time went, too many disagreements between Russia and America appeared over the most ambiguous problems like Iranian nuclear program, NATO enlargement process, arms control, human rights and future of post-Soviet countries, thus it made very difficult for two Governments to make compromises, choosing selective partnership characterized by some improvements on some issues and fundamentally disagreeing in the rest.

Starting with the beginning of Bush presidential campaign, he criticized Russian leadership for violations of human rights in Chechnya and for unleashing the second Chechen campaign by Putin. Thus, to make pressure on Russian affairs, Bush called for reducing International Monetary Fund’s funding for Russia. Though, advisor of Bush, Condoleezza Rice, was adherent of the idea to normalize relations with Russia and many politicians in President’s circle of trust felt the same, Bush continued his debates in a different key than Clinton did. George Bush attacked heavily Clinton administration for their carefree support of Russian elite, corrupted and favored, that “failed the Russian people”, blaming American Department for pursuing reckless policies that led to 1998 economic crash in Russia, turned Russians against America. Also, he mentioned about nuclear arms control treaties, that had to vanish as the relics of the finished Cold War era, however, Russian leadership did not want to lose the arsenal that retained a great-power status for country and gave them voting right on world arena. According to this, Bush accused Russian Establishment of unwillingness to conduct productive negotiations in this field.

Two states could not agree on whether to focus on intentions, rundown or capabilities. Each side had different view about missile defense: US Department considered this system as a protection from a possible nuclear attack from North Korea or Iran; on the other hand, Russia, which was really concerned of US missile’s potential capabilities to reach the Russian lands. State of affairs worsened when Washington made agreements about missile defense with Poland and Czech Republic, the former members of Warsaw Pact. The United States did not view Russian Federation as a threat, but these Polish and Czech states still did not trust in transformation of Russian Government, thus they wanted to be secured from the potential Russian aggression. Suchwise, Moscow did not understand the position of American side and judged it as a threat of national security. The Kremlin's chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, stressed out: “We were extremely concerned and disappointed. We were never informed in advance about these plans. It brings tremendous change to the strategic balance in Europe, and to the world's strategic stability”.[[73]](#footnote-73) In other words, Russian officials felt betrayed by the Pentagon's move and they were sure this deployment was against Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, not against potential threats from Iran or North Korea. As a result, Russia began to elaborate countermeasures against missile defense system in Europe, European Union was tended to strengthen protection against Russia and the United States lost any hopes to establish European missile security together with Russia.

The disagreements went further over the Iraq War. American administration considered Hussein’s regime was an ally of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, therefore The United States-led coalition had to organize an invasion in Iraq. Russian leadership, in its turn, did not take American evidences into consideration, developing contacts with *“Rogue states”* (North Korea, Iran and Iraq also known as *Axis of evil*). This position irritated Bush administration, so they accused Russia for opposing *“Freedom Agenda”*, that was stated by Clinton and Yeltsin endorsed it. Meanwhile, Putin did not believe that spreading of democracy in Middle East ought to be an option; Moscow insisted on the principle of sovereignty and nonintervention in other countries’ internal affairs, so status-quo would be preserved. Bush sharpened polemic: “NATO expansion as a powerful tool to advance the freedom agenda and Russia stands out as a disappointment in the freedom agenda”.[[74]](#footnote-74) US President held to the point that the use of military force could be justified if it got rid of a threat for world security and peace. “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world”[[75]](#footnote-75) Bush proclaimed in his second inaugural address in 2005, giving the proves that NATO and their allies served for peace and freedom. Russia saw American revisionism as an obstacle for its interests, therefore, it could not help becoming the leitmotif of disagreements between Moscow and Washington.

The position of Russian side became stricter as economic situation in country got better with the help of oil price rising, so Vladimir Putin wanted to make ties with America not as its stakeholder in any actions the United Stated undertook, but as equal partners who would respect each other and took into account of each other’s interests. Moreover, Russian President considered seriously the possibility for Russia to join NATO and, again, many people in US President’s circle were set really positively about this “big idea”, nevertheless Bush administration was less enthusiastic about it than Clinton was. In addition, NATO began its enlargement, including in organization the former Soviet states like Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland – the countries that are really close to Russian borders. Yevgeny Primakov expressed his concerns in this way: “Russia remains staunchly opposed to NATO expansion, since it brings a military alliance right up to our borders for no real purpose”.[[76]](#footnote-76) Indeed, Russian Government did not comprehend why NATO expanded near Russian borders, whereas the real threat came from terrorist organizations, treating with suspicion of this enlargement. In February, 2007, Putin decisively formulated Russian standpoint about NATO and the United States in Munich during G-8 Summit, which became as a keystone of US-Russian relations: “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?”.[[77]](#footnote-77) The ideas about alliance of Russia with NATO were buried and tensions between countries got harder. It can be stated by famous words of Czech minister of foreign affairs, Karel Schwarzenberg: “We must thank President Putin—who has not only shown concern about the publicity for this conference, but has clearly and convincingly demonstrated why NATO had to enlarge”.[[78]](#footnote-78)

The reason why Putin stopped really trusting his Western partners was deeply related with revolutions in former-soviet republics as became known as *Color Revolutions*. The first case occurred in Georgia after the parliamentary elections on November 2, 2003, when opposition, leaded by Mikheil Saakashvili, proclaimed that these elections fell short of internationally accepted democratic practices. As a result, President Shevardnadze was forced to resign and Saakashvili took President’s post after presidential elections in 2004. Russian leadership was anxious about *Rose Revolution*, that would make Georgia west-oriented, however Putin reacted cautious without censure, withal Saakashvili came into office vowing to improve relations with Russia at first. But criticism of Russian Government got stricter when the next case happened.

The revolution that gravely affected on Russian President was *Orange Revolution.* Ukraine is very strategically, economically, politically and historically significant for Moscow and Russian leadership has considered the loss of Kiev as inadmissible, therefore Russia made attempt to prepare a candidate for Presidency in Ukraine who would be directed favorably to Russian side – Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych won in the second round of elections, however the supporters of Yushchenko stepped up street demonstrations, seeking for the annulment of the result of these elections. With support of the United States and their allies, the protesters managed to declare the elections null and void and made rerun of the elections: Yushchenko won this time. When Russia lost Ukraine as the part of its interest, Vladimir Putin, who was deeply involved into Ukraine processes, could not hide his disappointment: “The result is that different political groups and groups within the population in Ukraine itself have lost trust in each other. Through this action you have begun to destroy Ukraine, undermining its territorial integrity and sovereignty. That is what the United States has accomplished in Ukraine, and the same thing is happening in Georgia”.[[79]](#footnote-79) As Ukraine and Georgia became pro-western, thus it could make potential for them to join NATO, Russian Government saw in these cases “the West’s hand”, thence US-Russian relations continued aggravating.

 The polemic continued to develop about Iran either. Though Tehran was quite active in cooperation with the United States against Hussein’s regime in Baghdad and Taliban in Afghanistan, American mistrust about Iranian nuclear program did not disappear completely, thus new President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, assumed to strengthen ties with Russia. Moscow did not want Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, at the same time, it could not let Washington to increase its role in the region, so Russia considered that if it deepened cooperation with Ahmadinejad, it would be able to control Iranian nuclear program in the way how Russian Government would decide. In addition, it could open really considerable market in Middle East for Russia which would meet Russian nuclear technologies, weapon and natural resources with a great pleasure. Last but not least factor was the fact that improvement of Iranian-Russian relations could be good element in a dialogue with Islamic fundamentalism, thus, by engaging Iran, Moscow made attempts to combat domestic extremism. Earlier, Russia supported all the sanctions of the United Nations against Tehran, however, from the period between 2005 and 2008, Moscow started new strategy of softening United Nations resolutions condemning Iran. Despite the fact, Russia did not take a veto on UN Resolutions, it continued the project of the Bushehr plant’s construction that became as a significant aspect of Iranian-Russian cooperation and as serious argument for the United States to criticize Moscow.

 Meanwhile, one more conflict occurred in Balkans between Serbs and Kosovars. The Contact Group was intended to resolve this controversial issue and determine future status of Kosovo. Russian side was extremely negative to all the decisions as it believed European delegation did not take into account the interests of Serbian people who lost their country. On the other hand, the United States and their allies accused Moscow for being indifferent to the plight of Kosovars and for support of those, who implemented ethnic cleansings. Such situation led to a stalemate in talks, which was got worse after the unilateral decision of Assembly of Kosovo to become independent from Serbia in 2008. The United States and 22 EU States immediately recognized Republic of Kosovo, however Russia managed to organize a bloc of non-content countries due to they all faced their own separatist challenges. Vladimir Putin was really disappointed with this agenda: “The precedent of Kosovo is a terrible precedent, which will de facto blow apart the whole system of international relations, developed not over decades, but over centuries. They have not thought through the results of what they are doing. At the end of the day it is a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and hit them in the face”.[[80]](#footnote-80) Russian President assumed that Kosovo precedent could become as a boost for many separatist movements across the entire Europe, thus Moscow started blocking all the decisions concerning Kosovo, hindering Washington’s plans in Europe.

On may 7, 2008 Dmitry Medvedev became 3rd Russian President and Vladimir Putin took the post of Prime Minister. Such change occurred in quite a difficult period for the country: national economy was in disaster because of *the Great Recession* and a war with Georgia about South Ossetia and Abkhazia was coming. The second event led to the lowest point of Russian relations with Europe and the United States. Though NATO did not intervene in conflict, they provided whole support for Georgia, accusing Russia in aggression and not recognizing independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; meanwhile, Moscow condemned Georgia for the use of military force against its own regions: “The Georgian leadership, in violation of the U.N. Charter and their obligations under international agreements and contrary to the voice of reason, unleashed an armed conflict victimizing innocent civilians. The same fate lay in store for Abkhazia”.[[81]](#footnote-81) Russian leadership blamed the West for double standards: if Kosovo could declare unilaterally its independence and it was not the violation of international law, why Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not do the same.

US-Russian relations deteriorated drastically: The Bush administration’s Russia policy had got down from the friendly partnership of the post-9/11 reset to the wreckage of the Georgia War. Two administrations of American Presidents did not know how to communicate with Russia: Clinton could not make Russia as a part of Western world, Bush did not manage to establish connections with Russia as equal partners. As for Russian side, Moscow altered its standpoint about relations with the United States, diving deeper into the abyss of suspicion and mistrust. Both countries sank into a reverie about “overload” of relationship.

## **§2.3 Obama administration: from “fresh start” of US-Russian relations to Ukrainian crisis**

On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama took office, becoming 44th US President. During his first Presidential campaign, he stated his program, pledging that American troops would end the Iraq War, US Government would reform the health care system and relationship with Russia would be changed in a better way. Obama suggested that it could be possible to begin “a fresh start” with Moscow as both Kremlin and White House had new “fresh” faces and Dmitry Medvedev was more liberal than his predecessor. Obama’s opponent, John McCain, was extremely skeptical about Russia, considering candidate from Democratic Party as inexperienced and naïve politician who had a lack of knowledge in foreign policy. Indeed, new US President did not often take part in world agenda before, showing greater activity in domestic policy, thus some politicians with great authority, like Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, wanted to give advice to the incoming President: “This drift toward confrontation must be ended. However appropriate as a temporary device for showing our concern, isolating Russia is not a sustainable long-range policy”. Never forgetting about American interests, these specialists, however, advised new administration to comprehend “how the world looked from Moscow”[[82]](#footnote-82) and establish a dialogue, engaging Russia on issues of world, pressing “the reset button and to revisit the many areas where America can and should be working together with Russia”.[[83]](#footnote-83)

First success in easing tensions was the signing of the new nuclear arms reduction treaty (The New START) on April 8, 2010, committing themselves to significant reductions in both delivery vehicles and warheads (limit to no more than 1550 deployed strategic warheads, no more than 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and no more than 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers). Also, Medvedev proposed Obama to give a pass for NATO through Russian territory to Afghanistan. Two Presidents agreed on transit of flights of US troops and lethal military equipment and non-lethal goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan every year. Having achieved these agreements so easily, Obama administration believed that they could go further to get Russia involved into global denuclearization. Nonetheless, American leadership was too hasty with it as Russia was concerned about its weakness in conventional forces, so nuclear arsenal was only the way to remain great-power attributes of a country; moreover, Moscow did not trust Washington completely, and Beijing’s longer-term intentions were part of Russian anxiety, thus it was unlikely to make Russia reduce in tactical nuclear weapons.

A new approach was applied to Iran: instead of isolating in the way Bush did, Obama made attempts to find the way how to reestablish a dialogue with Tehran: “I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world”.[[84]](#footnote-84) Unfortunately, any hopes for renewal of relationship was gone after election results were violently crushed in Iran, thus American leadership had to concentrate on more urgent problem – Iranian nuclear program. The goal remained the same – to avoid possibility for Iran to obtain nuclear weapon and, for achieving it, Obama needed strong support of Russian side. During Medvedev’s tenure, the Kremlin took important measures to deepen cooperation with the United States in reining in Iran’s nuclear program. Washington managed to convict Russian Government to support US Sanctions against Iran; though Medvedev was not backer of sanctions, but he comprehended the fact that it was the only chance to limit Iranian ambitions. Without doubt, gaining Russia’s support was a great achievement of Obama administration, which once again confirmed the fact that Russia and the United States still were able to reach a consensus. Unfortunately, new changes came in agenda and they redirected US-Russian relations anew, reminding of the old times of tensions and rivalry.

In March, 2012, Putin won elections and got his third term in Kremlin for 6 years. It was quite controversial decision as some experts doubted that it was within the framework of the Constitution to become a President more than for 2 terms. What was not controversial at all that “Ruling tandem” of Putin and Medvedev was over. So was over the “reset” of Obama. When Putin was a Prime Minister, his position about Obama administration was already quite tough and skeptical, therefore, it was no surprise, when he took the post of President for the third time, that policy and attitude of Russia toward the United States was reconsidered in the negative direction.

The demonization of the West began with mass protests in Russia (also known as *Snow revolution*). Discontent of people was connected with results of 2011 legislative elections, intention of Putin to run again for President’s post in 2012 and the lack of real opposition in the Government, but Russian political elite discerned in it “the hand of the West”. Putin accused the United States for sponsoring unrest on the streets and supporting questionable representatives of unofficial opposition, who had connections with radical nationalists and anarchists. Furthermore, he turned back to polemic of “the Munich speech”, complaining about NATO enlargement in Europe, Middle East and Africa that threatened national security and Russian interests. The principle of democratic peace was also criticized heavily by Russian President, stressing out that Washington was trying to build unilateral world where only American voice would have a weight and even the orders of UN Security Council would not have power over the United States’ actions. All these facts together formed the “Putin’s formula” of defamation of the West and toughening of domestic policy.

On November 6, 2012, Obama got his second term and he had to reconsider policy toward Russia again. In Obama’s previous term, he set up relationship with Russia in the way where America worked only with Dmitry Medvedev as the head of a country, not taking into account the interests of second part of “Ruling tandem”, Putin. American Government hoped until the last that Vladimir Putin would not go for reelection, leaving the post of President for Medvedev with whom they knew how to communicate, but on September 24, 2011, Medvedev announced the decision of “the United Russia” party: “I think it's right that the party congress support the candidacy of head of the government, Vladimir Putin, in the role of the country's president”.[[85]](#footnote-85) The hopes of Obama administration about Medvedev’s more liberal governance were gone.

Starting with the beginning, US-Russian relations got to the stalemate because of the difference of opinions about revolts in the Arab world. The thorniest subject was Syria. Unlike Libya, Moscow did not want to lose Syria so easily as Damask was one of the last Russian allies in Arab world, withal Syrian Government was quite active in buying Russian defense equipment and Russia had really huge contracts with Syria, primarily in natural gas extraction. Thus, Russian side continued supplying Assad’s Government and blocking all the decisions of the UNSC, concerning Syrian issue. In July, 2011, uprisings escalated into an armed conflict between opposition and supporters of authorities. The United States advocated for oppositional Democratic Forces in Syria; on the other hand, Russia patronized Bashar Al’Assad, making reference on absolute sovereignty and noninterference in the affairs of other states. During the first stages of Civil War, Great powers stood aside and did not interfere directly in conflict, but situation completely changed in March 2013, when chemical weapon was used by one of the warring parties in Aleppo. Then, in August 2013 second incident in Ghouta, suburb of Damascus, happened. Immediately, American side accused Assad’s Government in it: “This tragedy underscores the dangers of trying to do deals with dictators”[[86]](#footnote-86) Obama stated after incident, warning Syrian leader that he crossed “red line”. Understanding what it led to, Putin gave a warning for Washington not to attack Bashar Al’Assad or grave aftermaths would occur. Both sides comprehended the fact they needed to arrange talks to prevent worst scenario.

The negotiations started in September, 2013. High-level talks were held between John Kerry and Sergey Lavrov, with large teams of experts simultaneously working on technical details. As a result, parties agreed that Syrian Government, with the help of Russia, had to destroy all chemical weapons material and equipment in the country until June 30, 2014 as a deadline. In general, these negotiations in Geneva could be considered as a sign that Russia and the United States still were able to make compromise. However, as if a curse was imposed, when Moscow and Washington made a deal, something went wrong and spoiled all the agenda.

While Great powers vehemently argued about Assad’s regime, they even could not notice what a great threat was coming. Nurtured by anger to all “foreign invaders”, *Islamic State* declared a war against all those who oppose a worldwide caliphate: “blessed flag…covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of state of ignorance, even if American and its coalition despise such”.[[87]](#footnote-87) The main attacks of ISIS were conducted in Syrian territory, wherein the targets of attacks were both government forces and opposition factions. In addition, “Daesh” launched a vast terror campaign, first in Syria and Iraq, then in Europe. World community identified ISIS as terrorist organization pretty quickly: “ISIL is not “Islamic”. And ISIL is certainly not a state… ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple”,[[88]](#footnote-88) now they had to find out how to eliminate new threat that was growing right in front of them all the time.

Inasmuch as major encroachments of IS were aimed at Syrian lands (and by December 2015 it got large areas in western Iraq and eastern Syria), there were no doubts that Great powers would organize intervention. Russian military intervention was requested by Syrian Government, as for American-led coalition, they stood for oppositional forces in Northern Syria. Without a peep, the parties began to blame each other; Russia accused American-led coalition for intervention without approval of Assad’s Government: “This step, in the absence of a UN Security Council decision, would be an act of aggression, a gross violation of international law”[[89]](#footnote-89) Russian foreign ministry spokesman, Alexander Lukashevich, proclaimed Russian and Syrian mutual position. In its turn, US-led Coalition condemned Russia for propping up dictatorship of Bashar Al’Assad and air-strikes that they conducted on targets, whether they were oppositional forces or ISIS: “From Russia's perspective, they're all terrorists. And that's a recipe for disaster”.[[90]](#footnote-90) Eventually, such disagreements led to two antiterrorist campaigns, uncoordinated between each other, against the same enemy – ISIS, but with different goals: Russia eager to strengthen the power of official Syrian Government and The United States and their allies pursue a desire to achieve the resignation of Bashar Al’Assad and set up democratic regime in Syria. As a result, Obama’s words “They will be there for a while if they don't take a different course”[[91]](#footnote-91) became prophetic and Russia and US-led Coalition are stuck now in the thick of Syrian crisis for undefined time.

Despite the fact that Syrian crisis demonstrated severe contradictions between America and Russian Federation, the greatest challenge was yet to come. In November, 2013 a new wave of revolts began in Ukraine; this time Ukrainians made a stand against Yanukovych’s tenure, who reconsidered Ukraine’s policy by taking a pro-Russian stance. The last straw was a suspending the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union – people started to take to the streets for a protest. The political movement known as *Euromaidan* was formed very quickly whose goals were ousting of pro-Russian Yanukovych and rapprochement with Europe. When these demands were not implemented mass protests grew into February revolution in 2014, causing the overthrow of Yanukovych and rise to power of West-oriented opposition. After revolution happened, Obama gave an interview for CNN, where he encouraged Ukraine’s eager for democracy and freedom: “Over the last several days, the United States has been responding to events as they unfold in Ukraine. Now, throughout this crisis, we have been very clear about one fundamental principle: The Ukrainian people deserve the opportunity to determine their own future”.[[92]](#footnote-92) In addition, US President confirmed that White House would provide any aid Kiev needed and Washington would keep an eye on openness and transparency in the upcoming elections in Ukraine.

An entirely different reaction came from Moscow. Declaring that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych was Ukraine’s legitimate leader, Putin did not recognize aftermaths of Ukrainian revolt: “We see what tragic consequences the wave of so-called color revolutions led to. For us this is a lesson and a warning. We should do everything necessary so that nothing similar ever happens in Russia”.[[93]](#footnote-93) Based on what happened in Ukraine, Putin’s Government took one more step to toughen its foreign policy.

The first step was returning Crimea to Russia. 3 days after revolution in Kiev, unknown people in masks occupied the most important buildings in Crimea, including Crimean parliament. The next day, Crimean leadership, headed by pro-Russian party “Russian Unity”, called for independence from Ukraine and an accession to Russia. Ukrainian new Government immediately proclaimed it as “the provisional occupation” by Russian military forces and asked international community not to recognize this “rude violation of the international law and national law of Ukraine”. Obama administration expressed support for Kiev, warning Russia that, if it kept on doing this way, there would be serious consequences: “if the Russian leadership stays on its current course, together we will ensure that this isolation deepens”.[[94]](#footnote-94) However, negative reaction could not thwart Russian ambitions to annex Crimea. On March 16, Aksyonov government conducted the Crimean status referendum, where 95% of people voted for becoming the part of Russian Federation. The process of accession occurred on March 18, 2014. As Putin told later, this operation was to protect Russian people in Crimea, who could be in danger as there was the presence of strong faction of radical nationalists in new Ukrainian Government. Nonetheless, it would be mistake to consider this reason as the only one. There was still an old paranoiac polemic of Russian leadership about NATO enlargement and potential possibility for US-led coalition to take advantageous geopolitical position in the Black Sea. One way or another, the fact of annexation happened and world community had to work with this agenda.

Fast enough, US Department began to react. President Obama prepared to take decisive actions, but he denied any military responses for Russian imperialistic attitudes: “This is not another cold war that we're entering into. The United States and NATO do not seek any conflict with Russia. There are no easy answers, no military solution".[[95]](#footnote-95) Instead of shooting war, Obama administration launched a massive sanction’s campaign against Russia. The first round of extensive sanctions started right after Crimean status referendum the results of which majority of international community did not recognize. These targeted sanctions imposed travel bans and the freezing of US assets of certain persons, who “have asserted governmental authority in the Crimean region without the authorization of the Government of Ukraine -- that undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine”.[[96]](#footnote-96) Besides, Obama limited trade of US corporations with Crimean republic, recommending other European governments to follow his example. The second round, signed on April 28, imposed a ban on business transactions within its territory on 7 Russian prominent figures, including Igor Sechin, executive chairman of Rosneft, Oleg Belavncev, the Russian presidential envoy to the Crimean District and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak. In its turn, Russian Government hurried to response, introducing the retaliatory sanctions against certain American citizens, including Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner, Senator John McCain, and two advisers to Barack Obama. The head of the Russian ministry Dmitry Medvedev, who never supported the idea of sanctions, stated afterwards: “There is nothing good in sanctions and it was not an easy decision to take, but we had to do it”.[[97]](#footnote-97)

Ukrainian crisis got escalated as tensions rose in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, where there was strong support of friendly relationship with Russia. Surely, when revolution was ended in favor of Europe-oriented people, pro-Russian Donbass turned against new Government. Anti-governmental movement began to claim independence from Ukraine, what really irritated interim government, especially after the act of Crimean separatism, therefore, in March 2014, it caused armed conflict in Donbass. Kiev immediately spread accusations towards Moscow, that fomented Civil war in Ukraine for its selfish and violent purposes. The United States saw Russian Federation as guilty too in fueling of this war: “these events did not appear to be spontaneous” US Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed, “Russia has to publicly disavow the activities of separatists, saboteurs and provocateurs”.[[98]](#footnote-98) Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, in response, declared that the US-led coalition was guilty in whole Ukrainian crisis, not Russia: “We supported Kiev's wish for urgent consultations between Ukraine, Russia and the EU to discuss harmonizing the integration process. Brussels flatly rejected it. This stand reflected the unproductive and dangerous line the EU and US have been taking for a long time. They have been trying to compel Ukraine to make a painful choice between east and west, further aggravating internal differences”.[[99]](#footnote-99)

Not having achieved Russia’s confession or the end of the war in Donbass, The United States started new round of Sanctions against Moscow in July. This time they banned two Russian banks, Gazprombank and Vnesheconombank, and two major Russian energy firms, Rosneft and Novatek. In September, Obama imposed much tougher sanctions sanctions on Russia's financial, energy and Defence sectors, which had a very negative impact on the Russian market, bringing down the value of Russian ruble. Notwithstanding, Russian position did not change one iota, moreover, Putin tighten countersanctions against Europe and the United States, signing a decree "On the use of specific economic measures", the essence of which was an embargo of products and equipment for those countries which imposed “wrecking sanctions” against Russian economy.

Meanwhile, conflict in Lugansk and Donetsk continued to be escalated, but the resolution of the war was not foreseen by Russia or the United States with Europe. President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko proposed his services as mediator in talks with Ukraine, Russia, the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic. On September 2014, diplomats met in Minsk. The agreement was drawn up by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which consisted of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE. This treaty called for an immediate ceasefire on the borders of the warring parties, passing of the Ukrainian law “On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts”, an exchange of prisoners of war, taking measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbass and etc. The document was signed on September 5, 2014 and almost immediately the regime of ceasefire began to be violated mutually by both Ukrainian and anti-governmental forces. Unfortunately, the *first* *Minsk protocol* showed its complete inefficiency and collapsed too quick in January 2015. The same fate awaited *Minsk-II* as neither the Government of new Ukrainian President Poroshenko, nor separatists of DPR and LPR did not want to end with this crisis.

Due to the situation concerning Ukraine, Russian-US relations were in 2014 said to be at their worst since the end of the Cold War and it only got much worse. At the end of Obama’s tenure, the new scandal, where Russia supposed to be involved, came around. In 2016, the US presidential campaign started and Barack Obama had plans to give his legacy for Hillary Clinton. The problem here was that Clinton was notoriously unpopular among American people because of her involvement into many scandals in the past. The candidate of Republican party, Donald Trump also was quite eccentric and scandalous, thus all the campaign was set in tone of choice of lesser evil.

Except two unfavorably seen by the general public candidates, America saw the problem in strange Russian activity over US elections. What was really strange for US Department that Russian side advocated strongly for Trump’s candidacy as Hillary Clinton’s position towards relationship with Russia was seen by Moscow as unfavorable; as for Donald Trump, Russian leadership considered they could agree with him. According to this, US Government began to suspect that Moscow was able to interfere in 2016 US Presidential campaign. The first charges came from the Department of Homeland Security on October 7, 2016; The US Intelligence Community got hacked e-mails where there was written about intentions of Russian Government to interfere in US elections by influencing American public opinion and providing with any needs for candidates who would be useful for Moscow: “The US Intelligence Community is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations. The recent disclosures of alleged hacked e-mails on sites like DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks and by the Guccifer 2.0 online persona are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. These thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process”.[[100]](#footnote-100) All these accusations were connected with leaking of Democratic party’s e-mails, including those relating to Clinton’s “dark past”. Next day, Obama brought charges to Putin during their “red phone” call, warning about serious consequences in case if Russian involvement would be proved. The same serious consequences would be undertaken with President-elect Donald Trump if his ties with Putin turned out to be true.

## **§2.4 Trump administration: from plans to improve US-Russian relations to the Salisbury poisoning incident**

 Right after Trump was elected on November 8, 2016 condemnations were made in his address and situation did not change in a better way when he officially took office as 45th US President on January 20, 2017. The protests against him started the next day after inauguration speech; millions of people took to the streets during the Women's March for demonstration of their discontent with outcome of the elections, making this outcry the largest single-day protest in the history of the United States. The reasons of such public unrest were related not only with a bunch of scandals concerning Trump, but also his positions about American foreign policy, including his ideas to improve relationship with Russia. After Obama’s speech in the 69th UN General Assembly in 2014, American society looked at Russia from a different angle: “an outbreak of Ebola overwhelms public health systems in West Africa and threatens to move rapidly across borders. Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition. The brutality of terrorists in Syria and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness”.[[101]](#footnote-101) In other words, ex-President of the United States ranked Russian Federation as the second threat for international peace and stability. It could be named a *“symmetric demonization”*: Putin started demolishing the image of America in 2012, and Obama let Russian President to have a taste of his own medicine in 2014. Therefore, it was strange and untimely for Americans to hear from Trump that he was to reestablish a friendly dialogue with Moscow; moreover, it made some people think that the candidate from Republican party might be also the candidate from Putin.

An appointment of personnel in White House became cause of discussion too. In particular, people were surprised with the candidacy of Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State, who had strong connections with Russia and personally with Vladimir Putin and Igor Sechin. First of all, Tillerson was chief executive officer of ExxonMobil, the oil corporation, which had profitable partnership with Rosneft (as it was mentioned earlier, Russian oil company was under American sanctions). Some political experts argued that Tillerson’s appointment was able to form lobbying of Exxon’s interests, that could give a “green light” for lifting Russian sanctions. Though during confirmation of his candidacy in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he claimed that did not support Russia for annexation of Crimea, nevertheless people were not assured Rex Tillerson would keep his words: “Rex Tillerson, President-elect Donald Trump’s apparent choice to be the next foreign minister in his government, has ample experience in dealing with Russia and many other nations, but strictly as a businessman, not a diplomat”.[[102]](#footnote-102) Thus, as some experts assumed, if Tillerson considered that ties with Moscow could be profitable, he would neglect the disagreements between two countries in foreign policies in favor of business. After all, it was not accidental that Putin awarded him the Order of Friendship for improving economic US-Russian partnership in 2013.

First official meeting of Trump and Putin happened in July 2017 during G20 summit in Hamburg. They discussed a huge agenda: Syria, Ukraine, North Korea and possible interference of Russia in US elections. They agreed that Ukrainian crisis had to be resolved, the regime of ceasefire in Southern Syria was to establish, new sanctions against North Korea needed to be imposed. Concerning the facts about interference, Russian President denied any connections with it and Trump believed in it: “We look forward to a lot of very positive things happening for Russia, for the United States and for everyone concerned. It’s an honor to be with you, Vladimir Putin”.[[103]](#footnote-103) Later, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told journalists, that “There was a very clear positive chemistry between the two”.[[104]](#footnote-104) confirming that President Trump had heard the clear statements from President Putin about this being untrue, that the Russian leadership did not interfere in the election, and that he accepted these statements. In whole, there was a feeling Trump administration was looking for “reset” with Russia.

Nonetheless, in August 2017, the new sanctions were imposed on Russia for its interference in the 2016 United States elections and its involvement in Ukraine and Syria, though Trump claimed he did not believe in “the fake news” about this US elections scandal. Dmitry Medvedev expressed deep disappointment of Russia in connection with new sanctions: “The hope for improving our relations with the new U.S. administration is now over. Trump's administration has demonstrated total impotence by surrendering its executive authority to Congress in the most humiliating way”. In its turn, Trump justified himself that it was not his will to make these sanctions, stressing out that this bill would hinder his administration’s ability to negotiate with foreign adversaries and he hoped “there will be cooperation between our two countries on major global issues so that these sanctions will no longer be necessary”. [[105]](#footnote-105)

Soon enough it became clear there would not be any improvement in US-Russian relations and Trump’s viewpoint started changing really rapidly. First of all, towards the end of 2017, Washington took a series of steps to further denounce Russia, branding the country a "rival power" and "revisionist power" along with China, while imposing new sanctions on several individuals linked to the Kremlin such as Ramzan Kadyrov, who is a one of the closest Putin allies. Then, US Department decided to provide Kiev with lethal antitank weapons that would help them to struggle against Eastern Ukraine. As Senator John McCain stated: “President Trump's reported decision to provide Javelin Anti-tank munitions to Ukraine marks another significant step in the right direction and sends a strong signal that the United States will stand by its allies and partners as they fight to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity”.[[106]](#footnote-106) Surely, Russian Government reacted in the negative way, concluding that the United States was pushing Ukraine to new bloodshed against Donbass, destroying all the efforts European countries made to establish ceasefire in Ukraine, at least somehow. Thus, Trump’s rhetoric towards Russia altered completely just for 5 months. It was likely that he tried his best to keep his post of president as accusations against Trump became much tougher and it could ensure impeachment for him.

 A new round of tensions between the United States and Russia came on March 4, 2018. Former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, who became a defector in favor of the Great Britain, and his daughter Yulia Skripal were poisoned in Salisbury. British intelligence assumed that this was “Novichok” nerve gas, which produced only in Russia. Thus The United Kingdom’s conclusion was very simple: Russia might be involved into this incident with Skripal’s family: “Our knowledge that Russia has previously produced this agent and would still be capable of doing so, Russia’s record of conducting state-sponsored assassinations, and our assessment that Russia views some defectors as legitimate targets for assassinations, the government has concluded that it is highly likely that Russia was responsible for the act against Sergei and Yulia Skripal”[[107]](#footnote-107) UK Prime Minister Theresa May claimed. In response, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused London for a provocation and dropped a hint that it could be a benefit for Britain to poison Skripal: “This could be in the interests of the British government which found itself in an uncomfortable situation having failed to fulfil promises to its electorate about the conditions for Brexit”.[[108]](#footnote-108) One way or another, UK have started investigation without Russia's admission to this case, and if Moscow’s involvement in this scandal is proved, there will be grave consequences.

 Moreover, London made decision to expel 23 Russian diplomats. A number of countries and organizations followed the British example in a show of solidarity with the UK including the United States. Trump administration expelled the biggest number of Russian diplomats – 48. In addition, representatives of Moscow lost 7 places in NATO and 12 in Russian mission to the UN. By these means, Trump still attempted to prove American people that he “had been much tougher on Russia than Obama”,[[109]](#footnote-109) nevertheless, this did not stop him to organize an unofficial meeting of the directors of Russia's three main intelligence and security agencies with top US security officials. The controversy about this event was fueled due to, firstly, these three Russian official were in the list of the US sanctions, secondly, Trump administration decided to delay with the imposition of a new package of sanctions against Russian Federation. Political experts began to hesitate: “If Donald Trump wants to be tough towards Russia, why do his deeds and words diverge from the reality? Why does he change his minds too quickly?” It seems that Trump’s toughness is not so constant such as his ideas to improvement of relationship with Russia. Surely, he dismissed his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who stood for normalization of US-Russian relations, and proposed Mike Pompeo as a candidate for the Secretary of State, the positions of whom towards Moscow could be described as “radically unpleasant”.

 Syrian crisis also fueled tensions in world as the United States accused Assad regime for new chemical attack in Douma on April 7, 2018. Trump proclaimed he would launch missile strikes on multiple government targets in Syria, which likely contained chemical weapon. Russian Government opposed to US-led coalition, rejecting evidences of Trump administration. The Russian envoy in the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, stressed out the United States and NATO had to reconsider their policy towards Syria because Moscow did not let to destabilize situation in Syria as they already tried before in December 2017: “If you take the decision to carry out an illegal military adventure – and we do hope that you will come to your senses – then you will have to bear responsibility for it yourselves”.[[110]](#footnote-110) US President was disappointed because of Russian stubbornness and he warned Moscow to be ready for American response to Assad’s “atrocity”. However, it is not so obvious for everyone how Trump actually wanted to make Russia pay “a big price” as he denied new round of sanctions on Moscow for a while. To all other, American leader still hoped to forge friendly relations with Putin’s Government and finally stop arms race: “the president has been clear that he’s going to be tough on Russia, but at the same time he’d still like to have a good relationship with them”[[111]](#footnote-111) Ms. Sanders stated, emphasizing about really controversial behavior of US President. Based on this, no one can say for sure that Trump is so tough to Russia as he pretends to be, which implies that his foreign policy cannot be reliable and predictable.

 Suchwise, we passed the way from the friendly partnership of Yeltsin and Clinton, Putin and Bush Jr., Medvedev and Obama to a complete setback of relations between Putin and Obama, Putin and Trump. Many scholars, politicians and journalists from both sides may conclude that the recurrence of tensions between Russia and the United States has been unavoidable as the gap in views, interests and concepts is too huge between these two countries. However, it is fair enough to notice that, despite all the contradictions and disagreements, Moscow and Washington have managed to compromise, making very significant treaties and deals for all the world community. It is hard to say how long this period of suspicion and mistrust will be turning on, but considering the potential of fruitful US-Russian cooperation and the ability to negotiate in friendly-like manner, we presume that “ottepel” (“thaw”) in US-Russian relations will come again someday.

# **CHAPTER 3. Obama and Trump Doctrines: the way to Cold War 2.0?**

 It is not a secret that Moscow and Washington have really tense relations, having achieved the lowest point since Collapse of the Soviet Union. Starting with the moment of Ukrainian crisis, tensions got tougher and only aggravated under pressure of other agendas like Syrian Civil War, Scandal around 2016 US Elections, Poisoning of Skripal’s family. According to these facts, the contradictions with Russia have brought a heavy reaction of the United States, related with reconsideration of US foreign policy towards Putin’s Government and if earlier Bush and Obama administrations viewed Russia as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, later, Obama and Trump administrations started criticizing Russian “aggressive” attempts to increase its influence on world arena. Thus, tensions in world agenda caused relevance of Doctrines focused on Russian deterrence. What is the basis of ***Obama*** and ***Trump*** ***Doctrines***? What methods and ways do they eager to use towards Russia in XXI century? What differences do they have? Do they correlate with each other? Do modern doctrines are better in efficiency than doctrines of Cold War era?

## **§3.1 Obama Doctrine**

 From the beginning of 2008 Obama’s Presidential campaign, he stood against possibility to form any doctrine. During 2008 Democratic primary presidential debate on National Public Radio, Obama stated that “One of the things about the Obama doctrine is it’s not going to be as doctrinaire as the Bush doctrine, because the world is complicated and the part of the problem America has had is that ideology has overridden facts and reality”.[[112]](#footnote-112) In other words, he did not want to limit his foreign policy by doctrinal framework, assuming that world could achieve prosperity only with joint efforts of all nations. Nevertheless, mass media did not let the moment pass to outline their understanding of ***Obama Doctrine*** as something passive, appeasing the adversaries, including Russian Federation.

Concerning Russia, Obama’s rhetoric altered very drastically; in 2010, National Obama’s strategy did not consider Russia as rival; on the contrary, US President thought Russia was a partner of the United States: “We seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms. As the two nations possessing the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, we are working together to advance nonproliferation, both by reducing our nuclear arsenals and by cooperating to ensure that other countries meet their international commitments to reducing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. We will seek greater partnership with Russia in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan. We also will seek new trade and investment arrangements for increasing the prosperity of our peoples. We support efforts within Russia to promote the rule of law, accountable government, and universal values. While actively seeking Russia’s cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors”.[[113]](#footnote-113) Based on these words, Obama saw Russia as a trustworthy partner, with whom there was possibility to make agreements concerning a range of issues, from new START treaty to involvement into antiterrorist campaigns in Middle East. However, that was the period of Medvedev’s tenure, when “fresh start” of US-Russian relations was announced. The moment of truth came when Putin returned in post of president in 2012 and when he arranged operation on turning Crimea back to Russia in 2014. Obama changed his mind about trustworthiness to Moscow, which reflected heavily on his new National Security Strategy of 2015 that became a significant part of Obama Doctrine: “Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. In response, we have led an international effort to support the Ukrainian people as they choose their own future and develop their democracy and economy. We are reassuring our allies by backing our security commitments and increasing responsiveness through training and exercises, as well as a dynamic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression. This will include working with Europe to improve its energy security in both the short and long term”.[[114]](#footnote-114) Washington recognized joining of Crimea as an annexation, accused Russia on involvement in Ukrainian Civil War and condemned Putin for propping up Assad’s regime in Syria. Following to this logic, the United States decided to make pressure on Moscow with the help of sanctions: “We will continue to impose significant costs on Russia through sanctions and other means while countering Moscow’s deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth. We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary”.[[115]](#footnote-115)

 Imposition of sanctions could be described as “an effective tool for imposing costs on irresponsible actors” during Obama’s tenure. The idea was to shut off the market access of rival’s banks, companies and state bodies, thus, it would cause severe damage for state’s economy, pushing government to reconsider its foreign policy. “Obama had an overwhelming desire to substitute soft power for hard power”, James Carafano stressed out, “The problem is that soft power – like diplomacy – is not a substitute for hard power”.[[116]](#footnote-116) Colin S. Gray, British Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies, evaluated soft power as a method of strategy and concluded that American Establishment, which, in general, invented this tool, overestimated the capabilities of it to influence an opponent. “The concept of American soft power is true gold in theory, in practice it is not so valuable” Professor emphasized in his research, “An important inherent weakness of soft power as an instrument of policy is that it utterly depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners. Sometimes their preferences will be compatible with ours, but scarcely less often they will not be. Interests and cultures do differ”.[[117]](#footnote-117) Indeed, cultural diplomacy can work only with those who accept the values of influencing country; if nation denies the culture and traditions of influencing country, there are no ways to shape the preferences of them through appeal and attraction or pressure and censure. Obama’s case proves Gray’s hypothesis, as his aspirations to make Russia pay a high cost for its perceived aggression almost have not affected on Russian foreign policy.

 Concerning the hard power itself, Obama held to the position that the use of the force ought to be reasonable and rational: “We will be principled and selective in the use of force. The use of force should not be our first choice, but it will sometimes be the necessary choice. The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our enduring interests demand it: when our people are threatened; when our livelihoods are at stake; and when the security of our allies is in danger”[[118]](#footnote-118) Acknowledging the fact that America had one of the strongest army in the world, however, Obama denied the use of force as the only tool at the disposal, choosing rather diplomacy, negotiations and economic power as the instruments of his power: “The Obama Doctrine is a form of realism unafraid to deploy American power but mindful that its use must be tempered by practical limits and a dose of self-awareness. Those are the limits that defenders of the recent past have trouble accepting”.[[119]](#footnote-119) That standpoint of Obama strangely made him opposing liberal interventionists of Bush administration period.

Such criticism of Bush tenure became an occasion for criticizing Obama in naivety and superfluous idealism. Former President of France Nicolas Sarkozy mentioned: “We live in the real world, not in a virtual one…. President Obama himself has said that he dreams of a world without nuclear weapons…. I support America’s “extended hand”. But what have these proposals for dialogue produced for the international community? Nothing but more enriched uranium and more centrifuges”.[[120]](#footnote-120) Some critics emphasized that Obama’s strategy was too inactive and impassive as US President adhered to the point of his program to withdraw US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan: “There's no doubt there are risks of increased bloodshed in Iraq without a continuing U.S. presence there. It is my assessment that those risks are even greater if we continue to occupy Iraq and serve as a magnet for not only terrorist activity but also irresponsible behavior by Iraqi factions”[[121]](#footnote-121) he said in his interview for Associated Press.

The polemic went further when some of the US allies expected that America would help Poroshenko’s Government in Ukraine by sending American troops against pro-Russian separatist groups, however Obama acted as George Bush during Georgia War – he avoided any possibility for armed conflict with Russia. Why did he do in this way? The logic of former US President was simple: “Ukraine is a core Russian interest but not an American one, so Russia will always be able to maintain escalatory dominance there. The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what America do”.[[122]](#footnote-122) Thereby, Poroshenko got into situation with Obama, which was similar with Saakashvili-Bush relations: The United States assured they would help their allies by any means, but if their countries got involved into conflict with Russia, they would have to handle it without American military support.

 There is another point in Doctrine that is worth to be mentioned0: “Energy security concerns have been exacerbated by European dependence on Russian natural gas and the willingness of Russia to use energy for political ends”.[[123]](#footnote-123) It is suitable to notice that issue of Europe’s dependence on Russian energy resources have been discussed in West even before Ukrainian Crisis, but there were no reasons to crash Russian market. When unrest in Ukraine began, this topic acquired special importance in agenda. Firstly, American concern was related with Russia’s possibility to influence European policy with the help of its natural resources, thus US allies would not be able to support US “sanctions policy” towards Russia as their energy policies were really bound by obligation to Russia. Secondly, the United States got interest to promote their energy market in Europe. Europe was considered by America as a significant market for US technologies and investment, however Russia took up very powerful and stable positions in energy supply, with which was difficult to compete for the United States. “Sanctions policy” opened new possibilities for Obama administration in building new markets for US energy policy: “We must promote diversification of energy fuels, sources, and routes, as well as encourage indigenous sources of energy supply… We will also stay engaged with global suppliers and our partners to reduce the potential for energy-related conflict in places like the Arctic and Asia… We will continue to develop American fossil resource while becoming a more efficient country that develops cleaner, alternative fuels and vehicles. We are demonstrating that America can and will lead the global economy while reducing our emissions”.[[124]](#footnote-124) According to Obama’s plans, US Department was looking for dominant position in world energy sector and imposition of sanctions on Russia came in handy for promoting this goal.

 As a part of the interest to become dominant in world energy policy, Obama highlighted the importance of renewable energy, praising for the increased efficiency of some resources and for becoming cheaper than conventional energy. He also hailed criticism on fossil fuel lobby, represented by such people like Koch brothers, who made attempts to diminish the significance of alternative energy resources: “I’m getting resistance from some fossil fuel interests who want to protect the outdated status quo. When you start seeing massive lobbying efforts backed by fossil fuel interests or conservative think-tanks or the Koch brothers, pushing for new laws to roll back renewable energy standards or prevent new clean energy businesses from succeeding, that’s a problem”.[[125]](#footnote-125) Thus, he “unleashed the war” against conventional energy by imposing restrictions for conventional energy suppliers and it could not remain without a response from the republicans who were the main supporters of fossil fuel lobby; first of all, they commenced legal proceedings that frozen some Obama’s energy projects, backing it with proves that fossil fuel was much cheaper, than Obama’s utopian plans: “means of Obama administration with higher electric bills are forcing many more people into energy poverty”. Furthermore, the part of republican anti-renewable campaign was to accuse US President for transferring of large powers for the state in the market, what really spoiled the spirit of liberal market: “Government policies are forcing people to close perfectly good power plants and building new plants. The Obama administration has changed the entire electricity industry from one run by private markets to one run by government”[[126]](#footnote-126) Dan Kish, senior vice president for policy at the American Energy Alliance, proclaimed against Obama’s commitments to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

 Thus, President Obama formed his strategy of foreign policy on the basis of sanctions policy, diplomacy, development of renewable energy and disarmament. The use of force was taken into account only if it was extremely necessary, making hard power as a secondary tool that became the main argument for more bellicose politicians who believed Obama could not see the whole world picture because of his naivety and over-idealism. Furthermore, US President was criticized heavily for really passive policy towards Russia as his sanctions policy did not change Moscow’s positions about the world agenda, what some experts compare with appeasement policy towards Hitler’s Germany, headed by Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Neville Chamberlain. Eco-oriented energy policy did not fine a proper support as fossil fuel lobby, which had huge ambitions in European market, encountered aggressively against Obama’s campaign against conventional resources. Based on all these points, American leader made attempt to change doctrines of previous Presidents who stood for liberal interventionism by reconsidering the use of hard power and strengthening soft power as a policymaking tool. Unfortunately, many influential figures in the United Stated regarded Obama’s progressivist policy as a weakness and passivity that could not advance American interests and could not put pressure on oppressive regimes and terrorist organizations efficiently.

## **§3.2 Trump Doctrine**

At the beginning of Trump’s tenure, it was hard to say what strategy he would like to provide, and it took one year for his administration to shape US foreign strategy that got a name *“America First” policy*: “An America First National Security Strategy is based on American principles, a clear-eyed assessment of U.S. interests, and a determination to tackle the challenges that we face”. US President has claimed that his doctrine is formed by ideas of principled realism, which is “guided by outcomes, not ideology”,[[127]](#footnote-127) as Trump administration acknowledges significance of power in world arena and provides American principles that lead international community to peace and prosperity.

Concerning Russia, Trump’s foreign policy took “severe” position, declaring it as a “revisionist” power due to Moscow along with China make attempts to contest American principles and leading power in the world by reconsidering status-quo of current system of international relations: “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence”.[[128]](#footnote-128) Therefore, US Department has to reconsider their views on how to deal with rivals in international institutions and global commerce. Despite the rigidity of rhetoric, Trump emphasizes that competitions do not always mean conflict; instead, American competiveness helps to avoid hostility.

In order to achieve the leading position for America, US President marks four points that need to be secure: first, is homeland security that includes protection of borders and cybersecurity. The issue of cyberattacks is really urgent agenda: “Today, cyberspace offers state and non-state actors the ability to wage campaigns against American political, economic, and security interests without ever physically crossing our borders. Cyberattacks offer adversaries low-cost and deniable opportunities to seriously damage or disrupt critical infrastructure, cripple American businesses, weaken our Federal networks, and attack the tools and devices that Americans use every day to communicate and conduct business”.[[129]](#footnote-129) This is also important because American Establishment feels vulnerable to Russian hacker attacks, thus Trump insists on improvement of capabilities to prevent attacks before they affect or hold at risk U.S. critical infrastructure. For example, US Government is strongly convinced Russian hackers are able to destroy American energy grid: “Russians were placing the tools that they would have to place in order to turn off the power. That's a serious vulnerability for us, and we're not anywhere near ready to deal with it”.[[130]](#footnote-130) Joel Brenner, head of counterintelligence under the Director of National Intelligence in the Obama administration, held on position that Moscow has huge experience in hacking infrastructure of other states, including in Ukraine. Considering this fact, critics call Trump for assessment of Russian cyberattacks against the electric grid as the United States do not have efficient countermeasures against Russian cyber-incursions.

Second, it is economic prosperity of the United States. Here, American leader proposes to boost economy for the benefit of American workers and companies by guaranteeing protection from “unfair” competitors and providing dominant place in world energy market. The goal of Trump administration is to take “a central position in the global energy system as a leading producer, consumer, and innovator”[[131]](#footnote-131) and conventional resources will be important basis for it. Trump continues the direction of republican lobby, who have stood against Obama’s war on conventional resources. Current US President withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, revoked several Obama executive orders including the Presidential Climate Action Plan, and also removed guidance for federal agencies on taking climate change into account during National Environmental Policy Act action reviews and propounded to increase fossil fuel use, thus Trump helped “fossil fuel” lobby to destroy all Obama’s efforts in environmental policy.

As conventional resources have gained a key position for American energy policy, it is evidently The United States opposes Russian interests in this sphere. During Trump’s visit in Poland, he pledged to wean Warsaw off Russian energy imports, providing US fuel as alternative. Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, accepted proposed deal and assured American leader not to renew a gas supply deal with Russia’s state-owned Gazprom when it expires in 2022. Surely enough, Moscow got nervous from such American interference in European market. the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov mentioned: “We know about absolutely, let’s say, unfair attempts by the United States to try to undermine Gazprom’s various energy projects, which is an unfair competition”.[[132]](#footnote-132) President’s spokesman emphasized Russia would compete against it, providing any measures. Moreover, the concern of Russian Government is related with project of pipeline under the Baltic Sea to Germany - the Nord Stream 2. Donald Trump administration considers this pipeline as a threat to Europe’s energy security, thus confrontation in energy sector is unavoidable. Confrontation is also inevitable in Arctic as US President has huge ambitions in this region: “We want to grow our nation’s offshore energy industry, instead of slowly surrendering it to foreign shores. This is a clear difference between energy weakness and energy dominance. Under President Trump we’re going to have the strongest energy policies and be the strongest energy superpower”[[133]](#footnote-133) Ryan Zinke, the secretary of the interior, stated a new oil and gas leasing program. According to these facts, it is worth noting “war” on energy sector between Russia and the United States will be conducted in European market and Arctic due to both countries see these regions as part of economic profit and geopolitical influence.

It is not difficult to see who supports Trump’s “dominance energy” policy: a think-tank of current US Government consists from oil and gas producers who will achieve really strong advantages from getting Russia off the European energy market. Nonetheless, not everyone agrees with Trump’s ambitions, including alliance of environmental groups. Kristen Monsell, ocean program legal director at the Center for Biological Diversity, claimed Trump administration will push world to the edge of ecological catastrophe: “Trump’s trying to turn our oceans into oilfields. His reckless plan would expose more wildlife and coastal communities to devastating oil spills. Offshore drilling is dirty and dangerous and many coastal communities want no part of it. Letting the oil industry loose in our oceans will mean more deadly disasters like the Deepwater Horizon. And when those big oil spills happen in the Arctic, they’ll be impossible to clean up” French President Emmanuel Macron as well did not prop up American plans to destroy Arctic environment by drillings: “By polluting the oceans, not mitigating to the emissions and destroying our biodiversity we are killing our planet. Let’s face it, there is no Planet B”.[[134]](#footnote-134) The another problem for American energy policy is uneven distribution of governmental subsidies for different sectors of energy department. Again, Fossil-fuel firms clearly have more influence on policy under Trump and easier access to decision makers, but by the same token other producers were left behind without US Department’s preferences. Michael Steel, a spokesman for the Affordable Energy Coalition blamed Trump administration for unfair subsidy, what will totally ruin energy policy: “The Department of Energy is trying to pick winners and losers in a way that will raise costs for consumers by billions of dollars”.[[135]](#footnote-135)

Third is to preserve peace through strength. With reference to a military’s modernization of rogue states and “competitors” – “revisionist powers”, US President is confident the United States needs to build up army too. In other words, Trump turns polemic about arms race back: “To retain military overmatch the United States must restore our ability to produce innovative capabilities, restore the readiness of our forces for major war, and grow the size of the force so that it is capable of operating at sufficient scale and for ample duration to win across a range of scenarios”. Trump blames previous administrations, which cut the size of our military to the lowest levels since 1940, instead of building military capacity, “as threats to American national security increase”.[[136]](#footnote-136) Russia, from the point of this National security strategy, is attempting to weaken US military capabilities and American ties with partners and allies because of Moscow’s “paranoia” about NATO and desire to restore former influence in the world, especially in post-soviet space. The main existential threats for the United States, coming from Russia, are a vast nuclear arsenal that continues to upgrade and grow, despite all the nuclear disarmament treaties and Russian cyber-attacks, which destabilize American networks. On the strength of these menaces, American Government is to restructure military capabilities to “deter and if necessary, defeat aggression against US interests”,[[137]](#footnote-137) strengthen efforts and capabilities with US allies and partners, especially in regions, which adversaries and competitors are claiming and modernize diplomatic capabilities to compete in the current environment and to embrace a competitive mindset.

Better coverage of Trump’s military policy is presented in his National Defense Strategy signed in January 2018, where US president insists on strong military build-up capabilities: “The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one. Doing so requires a competitive approach to force development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness and field a lethal force. The size of our force matters“,[[138]](#footnote-138) Trump administration continues to expand the issue of arms race in this document and prepare the United States to the worst scenario. For upholding of the championship in world, US Department proposes to build a more lethal force as American competitors develop their own capabilities very hard and to mobilize allies for their preparedness to deterrence of adversaries and even war with them. All this situation really reminds about outdated Cold War rhetoric that is unlikely to fit for facing modern world challenges.

A huge emphasis in “peace through strength” relies on nuclear weaponry. As “revisionist” powers and rogue states are developing their nuclear capabilities and there is potential threat that terrorist organizations can possess nukes, Trump administration considers nuclear weapon as vital for America’s National Security Strategy for the past 70 years: “Nuclear arms are the foundation of our strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States, our allies, and our partner”.[[139]](#footnote-139) Notwithstanding, US President pointed out American Government reduced investments in nuclear enterprise after Cold War, thereby it gave credit for US adversaries to develop their lethal and nuclear armaments. Based on this, Washington is determined to “maintain the credible deterrence and assurance capabilities provided by our nuclear Triad and by U.S. theater nuclear capabilities deployed abroad”[[140]](#footnote-140) and defense budget needs a boost of investments to maintain a U.S. nuclear arsenal and required infrastructure.

Surely enough, critics notice Trump changed direction of Obama’s policy, who attempted to stop nuclear arms race by extensive disarmament; current President is not so interested in continuations of Obama’s achievements such as prolongation of START treaty in 2021, when agreement will expire. “We’re simply mirroring the reckless Russian doctrine. We can already deter any strike. We have plenty of low-yield weapons. The new plan is a fiction created to justify the making of new nuclear arms. They’ll just increase the potential for their use and for miscalculation. The administration’s logic is Kafkaesque”[[141]](#footnote-141) an assistant defense secretary during the Obama administration Andrew C. Weber blamed Trump team for being led by interests of warlike establishment Republican defense experts.

It is important to notice that Trump’s moves form situation of *security dilemma*. Every country has necessity to be secure as part of national interest because, when state feels itself safe, it can focus on other affairs not concerned with threats. Therefore, Great powers spend the bigger part of budget on military and defense systems, especially this applies to countries which have not so friendly relations with their neighbors. In this case, it is impossible to avoid any potential threats coming from the other nations. The problem here is countries can go too far with their anxieties about existing and nonexistent dangers. Once Joseph Stalin claimed: “Capitalist encirclement – it is not an empty phrase, it is a very real and unpleasant phenomenon. Capitalist encirclement – it means that there is one country, the Soviet Union, which has established at home a Socialist order, and that there are, besides, many countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to carry on the capitalist form of life and which encircle the Soviet Union, waiting for the opportunity to attack it, to crush it, or, in any case-to undermine its might and to weaken it.”[[142]](#footnote-142) Subsequently, in 1946, George Kennan named this paranoiac condition by “instinctive Russian sense of insecurity” and called US government to be prepared to any Soviet acts of aggression. This was the beginning of the Cold War, the conflict that got involved into arms race many countries because of their “sense of insecurity”. And presently, Trump eagers to get America engaged into the new arms race that can provoke the situation of security dilemma that aggravate an already strained relationship between Washington and Moscow. The problem about this situation that such “vicious circle” doesn’t help to maintain safety, it creates more threats for it.

Criticism also fell on Trump administration for his unorthodox approach to foreign policy. Many experts noticed that current US President attempted to turn back interventionism policy – policy Obama fought for so gravely. This directly contradicts what Trump has claimed before going to presidency, blaming previous administrations for useless and expensive intervention campaigns in Iraq, Libya and Syria: “We went from mistakes in Iraq to Egypt to Libya, to president Obama’s line in the sand in Syria. Each of these actions have helped to throw the region into chaos and gave ISIS the space it needs to grow and prosper”.[[143]](#footnote-143) However, bellicose rhetoric came too fast, getting involved the United States deeper into Syrian crisis and providing military equipment for Ukrainian Government against pro-Russian separatist groups in Donbas. As Trump emphasizes in his Defense Strategy: “We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted”.[[144]](#footnote-144) It needs to say new direction of Trump is welcomed by many supporters of Bush’s liberal interventionism and those who have not prop up Obama’s idealistic views about disarmament: “Obama’s theory was that we will lead the way in reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons and everyone else will do the same. It didn’t work out that way. The Russians have been fielding systems while we haven’t”[[145]](#footnote-145) Franklin C. Miller, a nuclear expert who served in the George W. Bush administration, welcomed Trump team’s rhetoric, which reconsidered Obama’s “policy of adversary’s appeasement”.

Russian President has not evaluated Trump’s ambitions positively, declaring that new National Security Strategy is trying to get Moscow angry about military build-ups and new NATO enlargements near Russian borders: “The U.S. has recently unveiled its new defense strategy. Speaking the diplomatic language, it is obviously offensive, and, if we switch to the military language, it is certainly aggressive. We must take this into account in our practical work”.[[146]](#footnote-146) By last phrase, Vladimir Putin called for strengthening Russian military capabilities, thus Russian President decided to requite like for like to American Government. Sergei Lavrov kept on Putin’s position, stressing out that Trump administration worsened US-Russian relations without good reason: “It is regrettable that instead of having a normal dialogue, instead of using the basis of international law, the US is striving to prove their leadership through such confrontational strategies and concepts”.[[147]](#footnote-147) Nevertheless, Russian Foreign Minister does not lose hope for normalizing the dialogue between two countries due to Russia is ready for friendly and open discussion of agenda, if only American demonstrates its determination to do so either.

Last, but not least in Trump’s strategy is to advance American interests in the entire globe. As Trump supposes, “a world that supports American interests and reflects our values makes America more secure and prosperous”.[[148]](#footnote-148) He stated that Soviet Union made “free world” to create coalition for defense of liberty against tyranny and totalitarian regimes and, in modern period, a threat for liberty still exists, becoming more diverse: repressive leaders keep on collaborating to subvert free societies and corrupt multilateral organizations, states and non-state actors can use information of democratic media sources to make harm for freedom. It can be fair to stress out that Trump’s concept of peace is very similar to Bill Clinton’s idea of Democratic peace: if world accepts values of American system, there will not be any reasons for conflicts, thus the United States will be secure and prosper. With this all, Trump contradicts himself in this point: he declares that America will champion its values on world arena because the United States is good example of alternative to tyranny; at the same time, US President states: “We are not going to impose our values on others”.[[149]](#footnote-149) Therefore, it is not clear for world what Trump administration is going to do and critics emphasize: “This administration has no body of thought; merely a crazy-quilt of ideas and assertions, as is evident from the frequency with which its members contradict each other”.[[150]](#footnote-150)

Political experts assume Trump is clear and present danger for the United States and the world. *Clear and present danger* is the doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States that identifies what can restrict freedoms of speech, press, or assembly. September 15, 2017, Hillary Clinton, candidate from Democratic party for 2016 Elections, gave interview MSNBC, where she stressed out why Trump administration is dangerous: “I think this president and some of the people around him pose a clear and present danger to our country. Domestically to our institutions of democracy, our self-governance, our rule of law internationally in so many ways because of the unpredictability then the fact that there is no strategic plan, there is a reactive, emotional, visceral kind of behavior”.[[151]](#footnote-151) Therefore, democrats and even some republicans are very skeptical about effectiveness of Trump’s plans to advance American interests and what kind of interests he is to provide: “It feels like Trump’s on a reality show of some kind, when he’s talking about these big foreign policy issues. And he doesn’t realize that the United States could be heading towards World War III with the kinds of comments that he’s making”.[[152]](#footnote-152) claimed Republican Senator Bob Corker for the New York Times, what showed that not all of the representatives of Grand old party share discrepant views of current US President. It makes even more sense George Bush, former US President, also opposed against his colleague from republican party and propped up Clinton’s positions: “I don't like him. I don't know much about him, but I know he's a blowhard. And I'm not too excited about him being a leader” [[[153]](#footnote-153)]. This needs to be admitted: if George Bush, who has been very contradictory US President in the period of Post 9/11 reset, believes Trump is clear and present danger for his own country and world itself, thus something is going wrong with American establishment.

Overall, Trump administration managed to establish very contradictory doctrine, which split American political powers much graver than Obama did during his tenure. Such “achievement” was related with Trump’s furious struggle against Obama’s legacy in energy and military policies. Two influential powers have impact on current American leader – fossil fuel lobby and liberal interventionists from Republican party; their impacts impose on US President to put strong emphasis on hard power by launching military build-up and developing nuclear capabilities. Such warlike tendencies create a situation of security dilemma, which sharpen the issues of world community. Speaking of methods like sanctions policy and diplomacy, they have started to serve in the benefit of a bellicose party, downplaying the role of soft power as a tool to settle a conflict. Trump’s rhetoric has made a great turn back to outdated Cold War “climate” and such subjects like American exceptionalism and Clinton’s democratic peace theory have got more relevance for nowadays debates in the United States. Surely enough, Russian Government has got anxious from toughening of American policy that Russian President describes it as “certainly aggressive”. Moscow has accepted the rules entered by Washington and has taken direction for further military build-up, which will definitely provoke new phase of arms race. Unfortunately, it will lead both countries to contribute huge sums of budget for defense sector and nuclear shield, instead of investing other perspective fields and tensions in the world will be aggravated very seriously that potentially can lead us to huge conflicts.

### **§3.2.1 Case-study: Security dilemma between Russia and the United States and potential threat of armed conflict**

 Considering the US foreign policy of Trump, there is a great concern that his determination to provide military build-up in the United Stated can provoke the situation of security dilemma. We have concluded that such conditions in world arena forms “vicious circle” that doesn’t help to maintain safety, it creates more threats for agenda. Thus, we are to understand how dangerous are tensions between Russia and the United States.

 The security dilemma is often related with structural realism and it is not by chance. In 1970ies neorealistic approach got two variants of development; first one headed by *Kenneth Waltz* called defensive realism, and another one formed by *John Mearsheimer* – offensive realism. Both have come from the same “anarchic” roots, nevertheless, there is one significant difference between them. According to Mearsheimer, “This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other—that are merely concerned with their own survival—nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system”.[[154]](#footnote-154) Best defense is offense – this phrase describes position of “offensivists” like nothing else. All states are always aggressive and they can be regarded as power maximizers. In contrast to what have been said by Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, who is seen as establisher of defensive realism, emphasized, that “States cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power may or may not serve that end”.[[155]](#footnote-155) Many followers of neorealism adhere to the standpoint of Waltz, that states may be aggressive as Mearsheimer has claimed, however, they are more security maximizers. “States are distrustful of other states' intentions and as a consequence always try to maximize their own security, which results in the situation of the security dilemma”[[156]](#footnote-156) as Professor Baylis stressed out.

This difference in positions about aggressiveness of countries set out difference in views about security dilemma. If we speak about offensive realism, they see the only one way for countries to feel safe and this way involves strengthening the power to become dominant in system. Surely, since states want to maximize their power in this anarchic system and since states cannot trust one another, the security dilemma is inescapable. “No state can ever be absolutely sure of each other’s intentions. In anarchy no state can be absolutely certain that other states will not use their military capabilities to attack the first state” [[157]](#footnote-157). That means countries will be always on the edge of armed conflict.

Considering from the offensive paradigm, security dilemma can be seen as something inevitable and predefined that will end up with bloodshed. Surely, defensive realists disagreed, notwithstanding, they had no arguments to beat Mearsheimer’s concept, thence, it set out stalemate in dispute. Robert Jervis made attempt to solve this issue and created puzzle: “Anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. Why would states cooperate anyway?”. [[158]](#footnote-158) This question led him to assumption that there are some mechanisms and logic to respond appropriately in different events. Trying to find out, Jervis used “Prisoner’s dilemma” and drugged in two conditions; first is *whether the defense or offense has the advantage* (is it easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own?), second – *whether defensive and offensive weapons are distinguishable from one another* (do defensive weapons also provide attack capabilities?). Taking into account these conditions, we can come to “four possible worlds”:

1. If offense has advantage (it is faster to conquer, then to maintain defense) and offensive/defensive postures are indistinguishable (no matter, that weaponry is for defense or for offense), thus it means situation is on the edge of conflict and there is no way to avoid the security dilemma;
2. If defense has advantage (it is better to preserve status-quo and strengthen security system), nevertheless, offensive/defensive postures are still indistinguishable, thus it leads to situation that security dilemma exists, but status quo states can clearly indicate their intentions;
3. If offense has advantage, but offensive/defensive postures are distinguishable (there is possibility to define this weaponry is for aggression or for security means), so the security dilemma does not exist, but aggression is possible, since offense has the advantage;
4. If defense has advantage and offensive/defensive postures are distinguishable, so status quo states have no incentive to acquire offensive weapons and aggressors always signal their intentions by the posture they adopt.

Offense/defense theory aids to simplify analysis of threats that are able to cause security dilemma, even arms conflict. It draws the line between existing dangers and ones that potentially can happen, however the possibility of it is quite small (therefore, it is not agenda for state’s concern).

Using Jervis’s Offense-Defense theory and all his parameters (Offense/Defense is profitable and Offensive/Defensive weapons are indistinguishable or distinguishable), we can come to such table:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Countries** | **Offense/Defense is profitable** | **Offensive/Defensive weapons are indistinguishable** |
| **The United States** | Offense is advantage | Indistinguishable |
| **Russian Federation** | Offense is advantage | Indistinguishable |

Now, we essay to explain data received and how we have achieved it. From this spreadsheet, it is seen that offense is profitable for both sides due to Moscow eagers to restore its influence in Post-Soviet sphere, as for Washington, US Government is interested to advance American interests in the world arena to feel safe. The ambitions of both nations have very offensive roots. Speaking of weapons, both countries have very extensive military arsenal, especially when it is concerned of nuclear capabilities. The claims of Presidents of Russia and the United States make attempts to assure all the world community that military build-ups are only for strengthening the defense; meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin has used a concept video of unlimited range nuclear warheads apparently raining down on Florida, which can be considered as offense against America.[[159]](#footnote-159) In American turn, Donald Trump states that military build-up will provide better sense of security for American borders; together with this, current American leader does not avoid any chance to use missiles against Syrian Government and make it easier to put American-made weapons into the hands of US allies and partners, like it occurred to deal with Ukrainian Government.[[160]](#footnote-160) Considering this, it is not possible to identify whether Moscow and Washington need their military capabilities for defense or offense. Relying on Jervis’s theory and his apprehension of “four possible worlds”, we have got to the point that Russia and the United States belong to “first possible world”, thus, we observe security dilemma exists, what is more, the situation is on the edge of conflict. It must be admitted that even Robert Jervis acknowledges the fact it is not always clear does state have offensive weaponry or defensive one. He stressed out: “Tanks could be offensive OR defensive depending on whether you were France or Germany in 1940; aircraft can provide cover for tanks or intercept attacking fighters”.[[161]](#footnote-161) It is very hard to examine some arms cases due to it is not possible to say exactly that ends of use will be unequivocally defensive or offensive. Nevertheless, it is unavoidable not to stress out that Moscow and Washington have very strained relationship by now and their ambitions to ensure military capabilities fuel more anxiety in the world situation.

## **§3.3 Obama Doctrine vs. Trump Doctrine**

 Modern stage of American Presidential Doctrines includes three declarations and strategies of Post-Cold War US President – Bush Doctrine, Obama Doctrine and Trump Doctrine. As Bush administration had no interest in confrontation with Russia, it is possible to divide modern doctrines on two periods: before Ukrainian crisis (Bush’s war on Terror, Obama’s proclamation for disarmament) and after Ukrainian crisis (Obama’s unrecognition of Russian Crimea and Trump’s position about “revisionist” powers). Second stage is really tied up with containment policy of Russia, but, surprisingly, these two strategies of foreign policy do not correlate with each other; moreover, they contradict to each other, providing different rhetoric, methods and ways. Indeed, Obama’s approach is more focused on resolving issues and conflicts in conformity with international norms and diplomacy, relying on hard power only in extra-emergency situation; speaking of Trump’s rhetoric, current US leader has chosen a kind of “gunboat diplomacy”, making a great emphasis on military capabilities (and his will to hold a military parade in honor of the Independence Day this year demonstrates his belligerent intentions).

 In many respects, approaches of two presidents are diverse and their entourages have quite a significant role in forming direction of US foreign policy. Obama hired officials with very progressive, eco-oriented and futuristic views about development of country and whole world, thereby efforts of his administration and financing were concentrated on projects like renewable energy, disarmament, space exploration programs. However, Obama ignored bellicose faction and huge group of conventional energy producers; moreover, he made attempts to cut the budget for defense and imposed limitations for coal, gas and oil production. Obviously, these decisions formed a group of discontent, which propped up a candidate in elections 2016 with views loyal to them. In order to strengthen his position as president, Donald Trump enlisted support of “militarists” and fossil fuel lobby, providing them preferences from US Government. Undoubtedly, the impact of “discontent” faction formed uncompromisingly militant rhetoric of current American president, who swore to get rid of Obama’s legacy completely.

 It is worth noting Obama did try to change conception of American establishment on foreign policy by assuming alternatives to the use of the force and alternatives to conventional resources, nonetheless, he faced misunderstanding and outdated attitudes about structure of the world. Trump takes position of those who have power and the power is in hands of bellicose faction at the moment, thus he adopted their views on his foreign policy. The big difference between these two – Trump is populist who is able to neglect his own principles and concepts for benefit; in Obama’s turn, he is idealist, whose concepts and principles can be described as unshakable: “Obama always has a firm belief that if something is right and if you think you are on the right track then you can influence others too and get your message across. This will take some time but eventually you’ll succeed”.[[162]](#footnote-162) He strongly believed in long-term perspectives that would provide efficient results eventually. Obama’s sanctions policy was one of those long-term perspectives.

 Sanctions policy was a main tool of foreign policy during Obama’s tenure due to it helped to put pressure on Russian Government without escalating situation to the armed conflict. Obama believed sanctions would make Moscow reconsider its policy sooner or later, nevertheless, some influential politicians called into question his approach and blamed US President for inaction. Interesting enough, current US President does not abolish Obama’s sanctions, though he has criticized them during his presidential campaign; moreover, Senate continues to impose sanctions on Russia, thus it can be stated that Obama’s legacy has not completely extinguished. At the same time, Trump not infrequently delays an imposition of sanctions for one reason or another. It is suitable to notice, sanctions policy is not even mentioned in National security strategy 2017, unlike Obama’s strategy where it has got really important role. Strong economic pressure was replaced by powerful military capabilities. Considering this fact, Trump administration does not avoid aggravation of tensions and the United States should be ready to “deter adversaries, and if necessary, to be able to fight and win”.[[163]](#footnote-163) Caution and consistency of Obama about the use of force has been changed to irrationality and hasty decision-making of Trump about North Korea, Iran and Syria: “In a democracy, there will always be changes in policies and priorities from one Administration to the next, but the consistent flouting of agreements that our country is a party to risks eroding America's credibility, and puts us at odds with the world's major powers”[[164]](#footnote-164) Obama criticized Trump for his decision to exit the Iran deal, a pillar of Obama's legacy on foreign policy.

Both US presidents were interested in reconsidering world energy market and reducing Russian influence on Europe with the help of conventional resources, but their approaches were obviously diverse. It was mentioned before, Obama gave dominant role for renewable energy, limiting the production of oil, gas and coal, therefore he tried to reconsider energy policy in the United States and in the world either; in Trump’s turn, he made emphasis on conventional resources by lifting limitations from their production and giving them preferences, thereby current US leader stroke at one more part of Obama’s legacy as his commitment to “reversing” policy. Trump’s counter-reform policy affected negatively on the Climate pact made by Obama and financing of clean renewable energy because US President saw environmental rules “as overly burdensome to the fossil fuel industry, including major Obama-era policies aimed at fighting climate change”.[[165]](#footnote-165) All his efforts were made for increasing the use of fossil fuel in Europe and conducting “drilling” campaign in Arctic. It can be said Trump’s ambitions really bother not only environmentalists, but also irritate Russian Government and it is able to provoke even more tensions in regions that have been protected by international norms earlier.

Obama and Trump doctrines have many distinctions, but they are quite similar in one point – both strategies strive to get rid of the legacy of previous US President. Obama dedicated to of his presidential terms to reconsider Bush’s policy of “Post 9/11 period” that allowed US Government to use the force in cases when national security of the United States was at stake, thus liberal interventionists could exercise military strength for any purposes under the guise of a potential security threat. An important point is that Trump also has decided to rethink the policy of previous President; as a result, he has abolished the majority of treaties and these Obama’s arrangements can be considered as his diplomatic success for the benefit of reducing tensions in the world. It is fair to stress out that there is nothing new about contradictions between two US presidents. Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower did not get along with each other, Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter battled over who caused the 1982 recession – a dispute that made President Carter to publicly blame his successor for not accepting the full duties of the job: “When he is ready to accept those responsibilities, I'll be there to help him”[[166]](#footnote-166) Jimmy Carter claimed. Considering George Bush’s policy, he became famous for being so intent on doing the opposite of whatever Bill Clinton had done. This phenomenon got the name *“Anything but Clinton”*. Notwithstanding, Trump’s *“Anything but Obama”* has got too personal and too malicious for American establishment. “Reverse” policy of Trump is erasing all Obama’s useful efforts that have provided reduction of tensions in Iran and Syria and draw the United States and the world into the new harsh conflicts.

In total, modern doctrines of Post-Cold War period show inefficiency and fragility. As Obama wrote in his inauguration letter for Donald Trump: “We are just temporary occupants of this office. That makes us guardians of those democratic institutions and traditions – like rule of law, separation of powers, equal protection and civil liberties -- that our forebears fought and bled for. Regardless of the push and pull of daily politics, it's up to us to leave those instruments of our democracy at least as strong as we found them”.[[167]](#footnote-167) By this phrase, former US leader pointed out Trump had to admit the fact that his presidency post would belong to him not for whole his life, but there are elements of American establishment, democratic institutes and tools, which serve US Government for decades and even for centuries, regardless of the fact what president takes Oval office. If every US president is obsessed with ruining legacy, there will be no operative political mechanism for US leadership already. Unfortunately, Donald Trump has started his tenure with activity Obama has warned him not to do – he is trying to erase efforts of previous administration and to alter political environment in the United States. Obama himself devoted a significant part of his term to reconsider policy of Bush administration what gave birth to “discontent” faction of republicans and businessmen, who immediately dealt with Obama’s legacy after his tenure. The fact is presidents and their administrations are interested in opposing with each other more than opposing to Russian ambitions. Therefore, “Anything but previous president” policy causes too much troubles for US Department by making disorder in political establishment, what hinders to form clear and stable strategy for foreign policy.

## **§3.4 Modern doctrines vs. doctrines of Cold War era**

Previous paragraph determines why modern doctrines are not able to operate at full capacity and this last but not least paragraph will provide the best to explain why doctrines of Cold War period have achieved the goal Obama and Trump administrations could not realize – to establish an efficient containment policy towards Russia. In first chapter, our research led us to the conclusion about “old” strategies that, despite many mistakes and prohibition of international law, administrations of Cold War times provided flexible and adaptive policy, which were aware of what to contrapose communistic influence in the world.

Here must to be admitted this effect would not work if there was no correlation between all doctrines of US presidents. It is fair enough to notice that every following American leader in Cold War period supplemented US foreign policy that was based on Truman Doctrine and the Long Telegram, which were ideological inspiration of the Soviet containment policy. In substance, American establishment did not change the main concept of restraining strategy, it only reacted to the actions of the USSR in different regions, providing “action-reaction” principle. Containment was formed by *realpolitik* thinking that combined *rollback* (strategy focused on preventing undesirable political changes for the United States in a particular country) and *détente* (policy focused on decreasing tensions between USA and USSR); in this way, American Government balanced in relationship with Soviet Union and by that confrontation did not lead to a boiling point. Perhaps the only exception was Cuban Missile Crisis when tensions got too grave, but in other cases, the United States and Soviet Union managed to keep balance in the bilateral world.

Considering the modern stage, it is fair to mention Obama attempted to implement a resembling formula for his foreign policy towards Russia like presidents of Cold War. After all, it was not by chance that some experts called Barack Obama foreign policy realist. As an illustration of this point, his “fresh start” with Moscow could be considered as some kind of détente; in its turn, sanctions during the Ukrainian crisis was his rollback, precluding undesirable processes for the United States in Kiev. Notwithstanding, former US President faced serious obstacles with his political rivals who tried to prevent an adoption of Obama’s decisions. The entirely different situation is about Trump administration, current US President has chosen the direction complete rollback with Russia and all countries, which compete American dominant position in the world. All his recent efforts cause only tensions without making any balance. Trump’s “flirt” with force and warlike rhetoric is forming a grave confrontation in world community that cannot be solved so easily due to both sides (Moscow and Washington) do not eager to compromise with each other. Unlike Obama administration, which has considered the possibilities to reestablish a peaceful cooperation as “the door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of common interests, should it choose a different path”, Trump even does not see the way to agree with Moscow and Beijing. Such exacerbation can be observed as undesirable because Syrian crisis is more and more seen as Cuban missile crisis. It took huge efforts from both Soviet and American diplomats to decrease “nuclear” tension; concerning Trump’s political capabilities, many experts evaluate as unskillful and irrational.

Furthermore, Cold War doctrines were possessed of strong basis of ideology, which promoted American standpoint about democracy and human rights as a bright alternative to repressive and authoritative regimes of Communistic camp. American establishment of Cold War era promulgated the idea that people’s desire to achieve liberty and prosperity in all world, including in Soviet republics, would dominate on communist’s utopia, which covered oppression and persecution of people disliked by the dictatorial regime. Subsequently, “American dream” and huge support of freedom fighters in regions of the Soviet interests coupled with serious internal problems in USSR led to American dominant role in the system of international relations. In connection with this fact, it must be admitted that ideology contributes a very important part in forming an efficient foreign policy because people need to be aware of what they fight for.

Modern doctrines do not use an experience of Cold War times administrations; in fact, current US President has attempts to contest influence of ideology itself, claiming his approach is not guided by ideology, but by outcomes, thus people consider Trump’s strategy as unorthodox, misunderstanding what means he proposes to implement. The problem of his doctrine is in lack of strong foundation that is based on obscure outcomes that potentially can or cannon appear. Returning to the point about Cold War period, presidents provided the idea for country they would have bright and peaceful future if they protected the interests of democracy and freedom; together with that, US Government demonstrated for people “a dark experience” of communistic implementation as a threat for “free world”. It is suitable to state Cold War approach was related with reality, in which people existed; they knew exactly what was at stake. Considering Trump’s method, his arguments about outcomes sound a bit unconvincingly and it is quite ironic that doctrines, formed by Cold War ideology, actually have showed what outcomes world community would get from American hegemony.

Lastly, a very burning issue is about turning back to Cold War 2.0 polemic. The new strategy of national defense of the USA officially puts the Pentagon in confrontation with Russia and China, reminding the times of Cold War. In some sense, it is quite convenient for both sides as everything has been understandable and logical in those times and both Moscow and Washington have known how to behave in world arena. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that such vision on the world system is too outmoded and not working with nowadays agenda. Surely, American-Russian relations remind now to the Cold War model in some sense: there are military rivalry, a potential arms race and deterrence. But the situation is completely different in reality. Firstly, confrontation between Moscow and Washington is not the main agenda for modern international system, which is polycentric, chaotic and diverse than bilateral system. A general conceptual worldview about balance of power, national interests, and so on is not able to revive the mechanisms for ensuring global stability that operated 40 years ago. Methods of Cold War are already ineffective nowadays due to there are many new actors and countries on world stage, which do not take into account the interests of neither America, nor Russia. Secondly, all borders are porous and passable in the global world, and no one is aware of how to regulate external influence on states. Because of this, Russia usually blames the United States for interference in its internal affairs like openly supporting anti-government protests, financing oppositional parties and their media and criticizing domestic decisions, including legal ones. In American turn, Washington accuses Russia of a large-scale interference in the elections 2016 and of a hostile propaganda. The two countries cannot agree on mutual non-interference, because they understand it in different ways. What one side calls "soft power", the other perceives it as an attempt to weaken its state, and vice versa.

Trump tries to be like US presidents of Cold War times, but he uses a wrong experience of past administrations. When Cold War actually happened, the world was experiencing a transitional period of the emergence of a new system of international relations and US Government had to form an efficient foreign policy to face new challenges, including the growing influence of the Soviet Union in many regions and countries. Today is the same transition period for world as a current model of international relations is defective and unproductive. Donald Trump has become US President in these crisis times and America needs to adapt to the new situation in the world and adjusts its positions towards modern agenda. Unfortunately, a key element of such a transition is the emphasis on strength as a method to advance not America's global leadership, but the global superiority of the United States and their ability to defend American interests in every possible way. It needs to be emphasized that though US leadership relied on military capabilities during Cold War, it also implemented other means like diplomacy and soft power, thus US foreign policy was not bounded and one-sided.

To everything summarize up, Obama and Trump provided very controversial doctrines, which were destined to form new position about US foreign policy. Obama made attempts to reconsider American establishment by some modern and developed approach; nevertheless, traditionalists, who still felt some tendencies characteristic of Cold War period, did not accept Obama’s futuristic naïve methodology. Trump undertook a means that bellicose faction could consider as favorable, however such approach could not measure up the claims of present-day world. Furthermore, these doctrines do not correlate with each other, contradicting and disordering political environment in the United States. Cold War doctrines supplemented each other as US presidents were interested in elaborating effective containment policy, which would ensure American strength and prosperity by any available ways (not only by military build-up). Based on this, the United States passes through a transition period that demonstrates a grave need to reconsider their positions without taking world back to the “good old times” of US-USSR confrontation.

# **CONCLUSION**

Considering the results of our research, we have come up to following inferences: first of all, relationship between Russia and the United States always were ambiguous, reminding the changeable waves – from friendly partnership to irreconcilable confrontation. Such tendency was peculiar to period of Russian Empire, when two nations were content with fruitful economic ties, nevertheless, there were issues of current interest about human rights, political regime and contradictory reforms that hindered from time to time to organize a much closer American-Russian alliance.

It is important to note that US-USSR relations also were not so univocal as political experts of both countries claimed to be. From the time of “Long Telegram”, a huge range of studies stood for the point Soviet Union and the United States could not exist in conditions of peaceful coexistence, thereafter there could be only one possible direction of relationship between two countries – confrontation. Unfortunately, “the shadow of Cold War” influences the minds of world community even in modern times, thus view about Cold War 2.0 has a very strong support in Russian and American environments. Nonetheless, people forget how American and Soviet diplomats and leaders have managed to make an alliance against fascist’s regime, sign agreements on measures to reduce military confrontation and strengthen security in Europe and decrease nuclear standoff between Moscow and Washington. Eventually, if there was no any balance of power in bilateral system, tensions between American and Soviet Governments certainly led to a direct collision and Cuban missile crisis was a clear example of this closeness to a war.

After Collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed the new stage of US-Russian connections began. At the beginning of democratic path of Russia’s development, Bush Sr. administration chose not to interfere into Moscow’s affairs, giving the possibility for Russian people to determine their destiny by themselves; nevertheless, situation altered completely after putsch of 1993, when potential danger of the return of the communist regime in Russia appeared. President Clinton declared that Russian agenda had to become one of the primary goals for US Department and the United States needed to be engaged more actively in development of Russian economic market, society and democratic regime. At a later date, Bush Jr. criticized this approach, emphasizing America made crucial mistake by this interference and it alienated the Russian people from rapprochement with America. Furthermore, tensions got much heavier when NATO enlargement started to “threaten” Russian borders and color revolutions were organized in countries of Post-Soviet space with the support of US Department, thus Russian leadership lost any trust to Western hemisphere forever, considering every statement of the United States about a strong and friendly partnership with Moscow as hypocrisy and manipulation to achieve their interests. From time to time, there were moments of “enlightenment” in relationships like Russian full support of Bush’s anti-terroristic campaign in Middle East, Obama’s “fresh start” in American-Russian ties, new START treaty, an agreement of 2013 with Russia and the Syrian government to destroy all chemical weapons in Syria and etc. These events actually demonstrate potential capabilities of American-Russian cooperation that can provide really useful and profitable outcomes for both countries and whole world community and it proves the fact the “thaw” in US-Russian relations is able to occur under specific efforts.

At the same time, an entirely different framework of US foreign policy towards Russia was formed because of the strong divergences in views about Ukrainian crisis and Syrian Civil War. Moreover, Sanctions on Russian Government, Russian potential interference in US elections 2016 and Salisbury incident fueled more mistrust and hostility between two nations, what made a prospect for reconciliation ever less possible. Therefore, Obama and Trump administrations turned back Russian containment policy that could ease Moscow’s powerful ambitions about changing a status-quo in the world. And here, it is fair to notice that one of the most significant method of US foreign policy to make another country reconsider its approach to policy is US Presidential doctrine.

An important point is that American establishment has a huge experience in implementing doctrines, which played really huge role in forming efficient US foreign policy, which could emphasize an importance of American standpoint in world arena. Presidential doctrine is a statement of the head of a state, which provides a set of instructions, beliefs, principles and positions that form a belief system about official US foreign policy towards particular country or world/region. The first time this approach was realized in XIX century after Napoleonic wars, when new system of international relations was set up – “European concert”. Countries of “Old World” agreed to organize an alliance that would protect monarchical regimes by suppressing uprisings of freedom fighters; this union got the name “Holy Alliance”. Quite soon, the ambitions of Europe started to interfere into American continent, what provoked strong opposition of the United States. President Monroe declared his statement, which prohibited “European concert” to expand their interests in American hemisphere, thereby Monroe Doctrine isolated “New World” from European aggressive ambitions. Interesting enough, Russian Empire was one of the dominant countries in Vienna system of international relations, which actually formed this Holy Alliance, thus first US Presidential doctrine was implemented to contain imperial claims of Russia and other European Great Powers.

“A golden age” for US doctrines occurred in Cold War. Having received “the Long Telegram”, US Department got to the point there could not be any partnership with USSR, therefore the United States had to form effective realisticContainment policy towards Soviet Union, which would keep the balance of power in bilateral system. President Truman formed his statement inspired by Kennan and Churchill and his doctrine became the basis of all restraining policy. Subsequently, next US leaders supplemented “Containment” by reacting on Soviet actions in the world. It is worth noting American foreign policy was efficient because the United States could adapt quickly their capabilities to any challenges they faced. What is more important US presidential doctrines of Cold War did not contradict to each other, they correlated as an integrated structure, forming a unified policy of Soviet deterrence. Considering these facts, Washington managed to survive and to achieve dominant place in the world arena; in its turn, Soviet Union collapsed due to grave malfunctioning of the entire political system that could not meet the requirements of reality.

As US-Russian relations have made a recurrence to the confrontation, talks about new “Russian Containment” become very urgent agenda for American establishment. Obama and Trump needed to provide a strategy that would give capabilities for US foreign policy to cope with all challenges the United Stated got. Notwithstanding, their doctrines turned out to be ambiguous and contradictory as they did not focus on framing a correlating strategy and took different directions. Obama made attempts to diminish the role of the use of the force with all his might due to Bush administration gave a carte blanche for militarists; in contrast, he proposed to use economic influence and soft power as modern methods of influence, which were able to affect adversaries without military clash. In addition, former US President eager to change energy market by increasing the role of renewable and save resources, what could provide dominant place in world energy trade for the United States and it also could decrease Russian influence in European market. But, as a result, Obama’s policy irritated bellicose faction, which considered the United Stated had to act more rigidly on world arena, and fossil fuel lobby guided by very influential figures, who saw Obama’s limitations on the use of conventional resources as an obstacle. Speaking of Trump, he opted for support of those who were “oppressed” by Obama’s policy, thereby militarists again got a carte blanche for the use of the force and military build-up and producers of conventional resources were not burdened by Obama’s limitations no more. Current US President got too much involved into rigid rhetoric, not noticing how grave he harmed American political environment and how dangerous tensions became in the world arena.

It is fair to notice Trump’s desires to strengthen military build-up forms the situation of security dilemma, which can provoke new arms race between Moscow and Washington. By applying Jervis’s Offense-Defense theory, we have come up to outcome that US-Russian tensions are setting up potentially dangerous world environment, which is on the edge of conflict. Surely enough, this result is unlikely to be one hundred percent, nonetheless, both nations are to be careful in providing their foreign policy if they want to avoid aggravation of the agenda.

Last but not least, it must to admit US-Russian relations pass through really uneasy period that can be seem as new Cold War; however, it is not the way as it is. Perhaps, leaderships of both states would like to turn back “good old times” of US-USSR confrontation due to it is more understandable for them how to react on challenges of bilateral world, notwithstanding such understanding of the world is outdated and has nothing common with modern times, where structure of the world is not so simple with many actors, which do not follow the guidelines of both countries, neither Washington, nor Moscow. The system of international relations is now on process of transformation like it has been after World War II and nation’s leaders should reconsider their policies to meet requirements of XXI century. According to this, Donald Trump, as US President of a transitional period, has got a very serious burden of finding the place for the United States in modern world because era of American hegemony comes to an end. Current US leader needs to learn a lesson from Cold War administrations guided by presidents who comprehended the fact that US Government ought to be reasonable in reacting on Russian actions in the world, avoiding the escalation. Such balance of power cannot be achieved by only military build-up as a primary tool of providing the US foreign policy, therefore modern American establishment needs to remember that “Containment” of Cold War has two sides – détente and rollback, not only rollback.

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