

The Government of the Russian Federation  
St. Petersburg State University  
School of International Relations

Master's Thesis

Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy of the European Union and of Russian  
Federation Towards The Near Abroad:  
The Role of Identity in Shaping Policies in New Eastern Europe

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Saint Petersburg

2017

## **ABSTRACT**

This paper aims to determine how the European Union and the Russian Federation project their 'national' identity in framing their foreign policy towards the New Eastern Europe. The research focuses on the processes of identity construction and identity operationalization in foreign policy. By comparing both of these processes in the European Union and in Russia, we have been able to differentiate the way they formulate their identity in policy making. After conducting this research, it became clear that the EU institutionalization of identity is effective as it goes through comprehensive mechanisms of integration, while Russian identity construction and operationalization remains weak because of a lack of conceptualization.

## АННОТАЦИЯ

Настоящий документ призван определить, как Европейский Союз и Российская Федерация проектируют свою «национальную» идентичность в формировании своей внешней политики в отношении Новой Восточной Европы. Основное внимание в исследовании уделяется процессам формирования идентичности и операционализации идентичности во внешней политике. Сравнивая оба эти процесса в Европейском Союзе и в России, мы смогли различать, как они формулируют свою идентичность в процессе разработки политики. После проведения этого исследования стало ясно, что институционализация идентичности ЕС эффективна, поскольку она проходит через комплексные механизмы интеграции, а построение и функционирование российской идентичности остаются слабыми из-за отсутствия концептуализации.

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*What is underway in and around the former Soviet Union is a struggle between the soft power of Russia and the soft power of the Western democracies ... for the political orientation of the countries in Europe's East, for economic influence in these regions and for the extension of their respective alliance systems and multilateral institutions.*

*Bruce Jackson*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The aim of this thesis is to determine how the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (RF) project their 'national' identity in framing their foreign policy towards the New Eastern Europe (NEE). After the development of recent crackdowns in Ukraine, it is of scientific importance to wonder how the European Union and Russia play a role of competing influences in the region. Indeed, the observation of fightings involving contrary views of pro-European and pro-Russian movements raise the question of how such views are being developed on account of the EU foreign policy and Russian foreign policy towards the region. Thus, this research aims to identify the processes towards which factors of influence are used in foreign policy of the two blocs. This study will analyze the use of national identity as a factor in framing foreign policy towards the NEE. To achieve a high analytical account of the use of identity in the framing of EU foreign policy and Russian foreign policy, in the NEE, we will use a methodology of comparison of the processes involving the translation of both blocs' identity in foreign policy. To achieve our goal we will compare the processes of identity construction as well as identity operationalization of the EU foreign policy and Russian foreign policy dedicated to the NEE.

In view of the facts that 1) the topic has not been researched well, or isn't worthy to be considered as a serious research area in the study of foreign policy of the EU and RF; and 2) there are indeed strong transpositions of the identity factors in the EUFP and RUFP towards the NEE; I consider that the topic is relevant for research and

could contribute to the better understanding of the modern foreign policy challenges that oppose the EU and the RF.

The aim of this thesis will be achieved by analyzing information from a range of different sources, including scholarly literature as well as governmental documents and reports from both the EU and RF. The chosen literature covers a wide selection of scholarships that I estimated appropriate for a better understanding of the following topic: this contains literature about the history of the EU and RF in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, general theories of national identity and its linkage with foreign policy, national identity conception and construction in Post-Soviet Russia and in the EU, selected relevant literature about current Russian Foreign Policy (RFP) towards the ‘near abroad’<sup>1</sup> as well as Foreign Policy of the European Union (EUFP) towards the states I decided to focus on for this paper. Using the information provided by the sources, the method I will follow in this paper is a comparative analysis of the identity factor in both Russian foreign policy and European Union foreign policy. Therefore the objectives of this thesis are the following :

- (1) To determine the importance of the area for both European Union and the Russian Federation, the incentives for the creation of targeted policies in the area.
- (2) To identify the concept of identity in foreign policy, eventually to conceptualize the linkage between the two.

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<sup>1</sup> Translation from Russian ‘blizhneye zarubezhye’, the term ‘near abroad’ is employed by Moscow in the early 1990’s to designate the 14 non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union. More than a political label, those words imply the existence of a tight relationship between the new Russian state and the former Soviet republics, as well as some sort of strategic engagement of Moscow in those countries. Considered as having a pro-Russian connotation by the West, the term would be replaced by ‘the Community of Independent States’, the ‘Post Soviet Space’, or the ‘Newly Independent States’. An article published in 1994 by the New York Times identifies the early different uses of the term in the academy. [<http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html>] A clearer definition of the term and area studied in this paper is to be given later in this section.

- (3) To provide an analysis of the identity construction in both blocs for the setting of external strategies, by giving an historical review of RFP and EUFP for a better contextualization of the concept.
- (4) To study the translation of identity in the framing of foreign policy towards the defined zone of interest through the process of identity operationalization. .

*Importance of the area: a Zone of Common Interest.*

For the sake of comprehension, it has to be clarified that the choice of the terms employed alongside this introduction and the all paper is not arbitrary. To the contrary the use of each particular term mainly regarding the area has been the object of a thoughtful approach. I do refer to the Post-Soviet Space in some parts of the thesis because a) before the late 2000's the EU and the RF did not significantly formulate specific policies dedicated to the NEE, thus I consider the use of that term - to describe events prior to the two blocs' understanding of the area as the very zone of interest - to be irrelevant; b) there is a will to use the term Post Soviet States rather than 'near abroad' to avoid any criticism of political leaning. The reader should make sure of his understanding regarding the reference to either of those terms to be a reference to a precise concept and a different area. When I do refer to the Post Soviet States in some parts of the paper, it is to be understood as the entire set of former soviet republics including the modern NEE region, even if such understanding was inexistent in the past.

*A loophole in recognition.*

Through several research projects I have accomplished about the Ukrainian conflict, my attention has been brought on interrogations such as what is actually driving instability in the area, and what are the vital stakes for actors in Ukraine. It came to my understanding that Ukraine, as well as Belarus and Moldova, belongs to a specific geographical zone that I used to describe as a buffer zone. Yet if the literature thrives to define the area, there has been difficulties to find a consensus towards a



settled definition. In this case, the most relevant term in scholarship, related to my study, is the following ‘‘New Eastern Europe’’.

However, over the last 20 years there has been contradictory and vague definitions that bring us to question a) Is there a general understanding of the region in the scholarship that will be pertinent for study? b) How the different actors define the region and whether we can observe the use of a definite regionalist approach towards those 3 countries in their external strategies; c) How did a relative consensus appear to study the particular region and; d) Does this region have legitimacy to be studied as a strategic recipient?

This paragraph is going to briefly overview the conception of the major actors with regard to the New Eastern Europe (NEE) which will allow us to develop a comprehensive meaning of the region for the very actors. In the following lines lie the key-definition findings that I could observe doing this research concerning the main actor’s understanding of the region:

- Although the *European Union* has developed targeted strategies to the PSS, namely the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its complement dedicated to the eastern periphery i.e. the Eastern Partnership (EaP); those programs’ perception of the geographical scope is broader and includes in addition to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova the Trans-Caucasus countries - Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Nonetheless we can distinguish in the official EU documents an evolution with regards to the consideration of Ukraine since 2015, that in the NEP 2016 is a clear target.<sup>2</sup>
- The *Russian Federation* has no understanding of different sub-regions among its former Soviet colonies. However, we can identify a trend in the use of the term ‘eurasianism’, especially since the western sanctions have been imposed on Moscow, that drove as a result a shift geographical orientation in economic strategies. That could imply the existence of a western or european sub-regions

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<sup>2</sup> See for exemple ‘Avis du Comité Européen des régions - Réexamen de la politique européenne de voisinage.’ Comité des Régions, 119eme session plénière des 10, 11, et 12 octobre 2016. Web: [<http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/opinions/pages/opinion-factsheet.aspx?OpinionNumber=CDR%20982/2016>]

of its ‘near abroad’. Besides, Moscow clearly refers more to Belarus in the frame of the Union-State, that one could consider as a specific strategy with regards to the region.<sup>3</sup>

Leaving aside the idea of recognition in the primary literature and amongst the study relevant international actors, the following lines are going to present key findings in the academic literature, reviewing concisely the use of the term ‘Eastern Europe’ and its development to achieve a possible understanding as ‘New Eastern Europe’. If we observe the use of the term ‘Eastern Europe’ in history, we can see a conflict in what the term encompasses:

- In the 1990s the term was widely used to describe all the countries further east to Germany, Italy, and Austria, that joined the Union in 1995. In those days the ‘Eastern Europe’ definition includes Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, the actual Balkan region, and the Baltic states. At that time the Former Soviet Union is not strictly speaking considered as Eastern Europe, and is yet not part of external strategies of the then-EU. The EU was afraid that, if it would consider it a ‘its Eastern European Countries’, then it would have to engage in international relations (IR) with Ukraine and Russia.<sup>4</sup> The EU was not ready yet for integrative cooperation with this area.
- After the 2004 EU enlargement and the de facto accession of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary and the three Baltic States, there is an evident development of the term ‘Eastern Europe’ meaning: namely the countries outside the EU. Nowadays this definition remains quite similar, and the EU regularly refers to ‘Eastern Europe’, encompassing not only the countries of the Eastern Partnership but also Russia.

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<sup>3</sup> See for exemple ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)’, December 1st, 2016. Web: [[http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248](http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248)]

<sup>4</sup> Smith, K. (2004) *The making of EU foreign policy: the case of Eastern Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

In view of the fact that a clear definition of the region is quasi inexistent in the scope of the primary actors, as a result there is a lack of political will in the region. It is important to come to a consensus in the understanding of the set of countries that we are going to study as a whole. It is not fallacious to say that in that logic of region definition, interests and geography intermingle. I do believe that there is a relevance to consider this specific area as a Zone of Common Interest, term of my design that would include this distinct feature of interweaving and dependence of interests and geographical position.

*Definition of a Region.*

There has been a significant evolution with regard to the region definition around the 2010's, with the apparition in the scholarship of the term 'New Eastern Europe' (NEE) that refers directly to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. In 2007 notable work concerning the existence of the region is carried out by Gerhard Mangott<sup>5</sup> and Angela Stent<sup>6</sup> in their contribution to the book '*The new eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova*'. The researcher Anastasiia Bakanova in her article '*Definition of « The New Eastern Europe »: The Lands In-Between*' identifies three main school of thoughts over the new region definition. She still emphasizes on the confusion around the term 'Eastern Europe' and hardness that underwent scholar to overcome the need of reinventing the label.<sup>7</sup>

Mangott in his definition uses a constructivist approach and subjective interpretation of reality when it comes to similarities and differences of this group of

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<sup>5</sup> Mangott, G. (2007). Deconstructing a Region. Hamilton, D. Mangott, G. (ed.). *The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova*. Washington, DC., 261-287.

<sup>6</sup> Stent, A. (2007). *The Lands In Between: The New Eastern Europe in the Twenty-First Century*. Hamilton, D. Mangott, G. (ed.). *The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova*. Washington, DC., 1-21.

<sup>7</sup> Bakanova A. (2015). Definition of the « New Eastern Europe »: The lands in-between. Mechnikov National University, Odessa I.I., Ukraine. Web: [<http://eppd13.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/2015-2-5/07.pdf>]

three countries with the rest of the world. He came to the conclusion that New Eastern Europe is what outside players - as the EU or the RF - make of it, in pursuing strategic and geopolitical strategy. I consider that this approach is limited if we take into consideration the fact that official documents of the EU and Russia do not explicitly refer to the region as a conceptualized strategic area.

Stent states that 'the future of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus is important because they are located on key military, transportation and energy corridors that link Eurasia and Europe'.<sup>8</sup> She argues that what defines them as a specific region is the fact that they are a land in between two blocs - an expanding but closed EU and a resurgent Russia. They have a status of grey zone that acts as a link between the two regions. They do share features between them as well as with the rest of Eurasia, nevertheless they do not consider themselves as a region. I consider this manner as being relatively relevant in terms of coincidence with recent events in IR, nevertheless Trent's emphasis on the internal identity construction of the 3 countries neglects the question of the identity construction from external actors, that characterize the region.

This idea is closely followed by Serhii Plokhyy in his work '*The new eastern Europe: What to do with the histories of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova?*'. He corroborates Trent's hypothesis of 'the lands in-between' but further develops the aspect of common features: according to Plokhyy, not only the geographic factor but also history, culture, and ethnicity of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova is critical for the understanding of the region as being different from its neighbors.<sup>9</sup>

Notwithstanding the fact that the term is not widely used in the scholarship, Dmitry Trenin in his article '*Russia and the New Eastern Europe*' expounds the importance of the NEE for both blocs, thus confirming the hypothesis of the mere existence of the region. He describes the emergence of 3 regions in the PSS - Central Asia, South Caucasus and the New Eastern Europe. By doing so he gives credence to

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<sup>8</sup> Stent, A. The Lands In Between.

<sup>9</sup> Plokhyy, S. (2011). The "New Eastern Europe": What to Do with the Histories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova? *East European Politics and Societies*, 25, 4, 763-769.

the existent literature, stating that the NEE is a geopolitical *durable* reality.<sup>10</sup> In his opinion it is a buffer zone, that will continue to find itself between the Russian Federation and the EU, and it has its all set of interesting, specific, defining features. Here lay the interests of Europe and Russia - in the NEE's characteristics.

Interestingly enough, while outlining the different theories of regionalization concerning the NEE, all authors come to the consensus that the concerned countries share common features of struggle for identity. If the countries are strategically important for the rest of the world due to their particular position, they have in common that they are the recipient of different influences, competing foreign policies, and area of identity diffusion.

If those findings give some legitimacy concerning the existence of such terminology in the academy, total legitimacy is needed to give a ground for research, and will be achieved by putting into words in a more precise manner the strategic importance that the NEE represents to the EU and to the Russian Federation. The following section is going to discuss the EU and RF interests in the NEE, and will ought to determine in which ways a particular attention is given to the area. This will help us drawing the relation between interests that lie in the region and the incentives to project identity policies towards the the NEE.

#### *A strategic importance.*

For both the EU and the RF, the question of security is paramount and can be achieved only through pacific and cooperative relations with the immediate neighboring countries. What we can observe in the NEE is the push of different strategies - soft powers - that contradict themselves. One can sure argue that we have seen the importance of the buffer zone over the past 3 years, since the Ukrainian conflict begun. A conclusion that we can depict is that politics of identity have played a strong role in the recent crackdown, and would gain to be studied more deeply. The

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<sup>10</sup> See Trenin, D. (2011). Rusia and the New Eastern Europe. Russian Politics and Law, vol. 49, no.6, November-December 2011. pp. 38-53.

following logic will try to answer to different interrogations: a) whether the EU and RF have strategic interests in the NEE; b) how we link security and the incentives for the use of identity in foreign policy; and c) how the identity plays a paramount role in the relations both bloc sustain with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

The capital security interest of the EU is to preserve a relative stability in its neighborhood, by means of promotion of democratic values, respect for human rights and the rule of law, along with accompanying reforms in the fragile states at its periphery. ‘This neighborhood, in the “wide” sense of the term, represents a priority for Europe due to its geographic proximity and also due to the pressure of events that have turned these regions into the most exposed to the greatest amount of conflict and danger.’<sup>11</sup> Through a strategy of gradual integration, the EU first and foremost spreads a European identity (EU ID), but this very identity is also the instrument of integration. In other words, the mere integration processes are based on the concept of a European identity: a country will only be considered for European integration if it respects a certain number of norms and values, or if it is in the way to have them included in its socio-political culture. Thus the implementation of these processes heavily depend on the diffusion of identity.

However, the concept of European security remains on this very principle of integration: the more a tier country is integrated into European norms, the further is the threat of insecurity — related to undemocratic states and their unpredictable behavior. Brussels has strong incentives to project an identity in the NEE, as a tool to fulfill the EU’s strategic goals on the long term. To cast European values in the immediate neighborhood is a way to cast a latent moral hegemony, and ensures the EU to preserve a status of peace protector in the world. More than a mission for democracy, this strategy also allows it to remain a leader the region.

Besides being a tactical transit zone, significant for economic relations with the EU, the NEE has a growing importance for Russia. Moscow aims to preserve the

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<sup>11</sup> The Strategic Interest of the European Union. Carnegie Europe, April 20, 2016. Web: [<http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/04/20/strategic-interests-of-european-union-pub-63448>]

special relationship resulting from the soviet times and those ties have never been more at stake. It is important for Russia that those states remain a buffer zone that will protect them from the West - namely Europe, the U.S. and NATO.<sup>12</sup> There is indeed an inherent link between the security of the RF and its relations with its near abroad, with respect to its position with or 'against' the West. One can consider that it is in the best interest of the RF to preserve its stance as a friendly neighbor with regard to the PSS, to overcome threats coming from the West, for instance NATO and the expansion of the EU. Hence, all possible aspects that can reconcile Russia and the ex-soviet republics are to be used by the Kremlin in order to secure relatively close ties within the post soviet community: namely economy, historical legacy and cultural similarities, whether the community is consenting or not. Yet, the Russian Federation has faced issues in the reaction of the independent states to its latent influence, characterized by a more aggressive western engagement in some part of the PSS that has challenged the implementation of such rapprochement strategies.<sup>13</sup>

A way for Russia to 1) preserve its status of great power in the region and become a center of gravity and 2) to overcome threats from the West, is to regain influence in the PSS. Indeed, there is an inherent link between the Russian definition of national security and the question of identity in the foreign policy equation. I have been able to identify, what I will develop further in the Chapter 2 of this thesis, the phenomena that we could call the nexus Russian national security/national identity.

Official documents of the Russian Federation comprise strong references to 'the other' and 'the West' as a national threat. This definition of the other will become a central element in Russia's self definition and thus the definition of its own security. The identity factor is crucial in the RF's formulation of goals, and it to be used as an element of recognition with other countries that represent its allies. Russia is using this factor as a vector to direct its strategy towards those specific countries and to strengthen the existing identification links.

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<sup>12</sup> Trenin, D. (2011). Russia and the New Eastern Europe.

<sup>13</sup> Russia makes latest high risk move to keep pieces of its 'near abroad' in check, The Guardian, March 2, 2014. Web: [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/russia-moves-keep-near-abroad-soviet-states-in-check>]

*Contextualization of the research.*

This thesis aims to gather key findings to determine how are set the specific policies of the European Union and the Russian Federation towards the NEE. We have explained in this introduction in what way the NEE is a Zone of Common Interest for both blocs, also we have sought to point out the conflicting strategies that they apply in the studied region. I have some incentives to pretend that conflicting strategies can increase dissensions in unstable areas, bring out differences, lead to human harmful situations. Through the research process I have been able to distinguish a common an important feature in both blocs' strategy towards their external actors: the identity dimension of their foreign policy.

**Research question:** Following this logic the aim of this paper will be to determine 'Through which processes the EU and Russia project their identity in the framing of foreign policy towards the NEE'. The method employed in this paper will be a comparison of both blocs' translation of identity in their foreign policy.

The paper is based on Hemel and Lenz theory of identity/policy nexus. Through a model of identity construction and identity operationalization, the theory intends to reveal the process through which national or regional identity translates to foreign policy, by the formulation of concrete values and goals in the creation of institutions for external action. Identity construction is the process by which accumulation of raw material and constitutive norms are accumulated to formulate an identity. Identity operationalization is the process through which the constructed identity is operationalized in foreign policy, via its concrete formulation in foreign policy institutions.

This thesis is going to compare the European Union and Russian Federation processes of identity construction and operationalization in shaping foreign policy towards the NEE, within the time frame of the Post-Cold War period until 2014. Such time frame is relevant in view of the fact that EU and RU identity construction and operationalization occurred during the 1990s in search for a new world order. The time



frame is limited to the year 2014, because I consider that we do not have enough back-sight to analyze the diffusion of influence in the NEE after the breakdown of conflicts in Ukraine, yet also violent conflicts have brought up the creation of more assertive policies from both blocs in the area that would enshrine the results of our research.

The aim of the thesis will be achieved through the completing of the following:

**Task 1: To identify the concept of identity in foreign policy.** To provide with ground knowledges for the understanding of my research, I will in a first chapter review the existing relevant theories to the topic, in order to verify the hypothesis that states use 'national' identity to frame their foreign policy. At the end of this chapter, the reader should have a clear idea of the conceptualization of identity and foreign politics.

**Task 2: To determine the identity construction of the EU and the RF for external use.** To introduce the reader with the background knowledges necessary to understand the construction of a identity/policy nexus. A review of the historical constitution of EUFP and RUFP must to be made in order to apply broad theories of conceptualization of identity in foreign policy to the EU and the Russian Federation. This task will allow to reveal the processes of identity construction of both European Union and Russian Federation

**Task 3: To demonstrate the identity operationalization in the NEE.** To put into lights the process of translation of EU identity in foreign policy institutions as well as the translation of Russian identity in foreign policy institutions and their programs towards the zone of common interest. We will analyze official governmental documents of external action strategy in order to pick out features of identity translation in the shaping of foreign policy towards the NEE.

The following chart describes the set of criteria implemented during the research to fulfill the tasks description:

SET OF CRITERIA	EU / RUSSIA
<b>Identity construction</b>	Definition of the Self
	Definition of the Other
	Threats perception
<b>Definition of an Identity/Policy Nexus</b>	Normative integration vs. National security
<b>Identity operationalization</b>	Translation of identity in institutions of foreign policy towards the NEE (i.e. official documents)

*Review of literature.*

To complete the above listed tasks I have used scholarly literature that covers a wide selection of scholarships that I estimated appropriate for a better understanding of the topic: articles and books about the history of the EU and RF in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, general theories of national identity and its linkage with foreign policy, national identity conception and construction in Post-Soviet Russia and in the EU, selected relevant literature about current Russian Foreign Policy (RFP) towards the ‘near abroad’ as well as Foreign Policy of the European Union (EUFP).

Some books particularly inspired my work and the development of my thoughts, such as *Misunderstanding Russia* by Maria Leichtova; *National Identity and*

*Foreign Policy: Nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* by Ilya Prizel; and *The Mortal Danger: how misconceptions about Russia imperil America* by Aleksander Solzhenitsyn. Those authors have accomplished a remarkable work of approximating the factor of identity in Russian Self-definition and its repercussions on foreign policy.

Also, Hebel and Lenz article on *The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy* has been the revelation for the direction of this study and allowed me to create a relevant analytical framework to approach Russian and European foreign policy.

In order to complete the interpretation of identity operationalization in RU and EU foreign policy I have use mainly governmental official documents as primary sources. Reports of foreign policy from the European Union as well as strategy informative platforms of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and of the European Commission allowed me to analyze the different programs directed to the NEE. Russian Conception of Foreign Policy approved by the President of the Russian Federation as well as Russian Concepts of National Security allowed me to make analytical analysis on the Russian side.

## 1. Chapter 1 : THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter intends to reveal the link between national identity and foreign policy making. It will provide the reader with existing literature review in order to identify a realistic hypothesis, which will be the foundation of this research. Even though the phenomena has been researched since the 1990s, it appears that there is not a clear consensus concerning the conceptualization of the relationship between identity and FP. For this reason, the panel of literature chosen for the development of the context is literature which is in direct relevance with identity formation and foreign policy of Russia and the European Union. The other readings available on the topic of identity and foreign policy making are rather vague and focus on a psychological approach that, as a matter of fact does not prove an immediate relevance to the study of the identity factor in EUFP and RUFPP in the sense I attempt to prove their influence in this paper. Thus, literature aiming to provide real applied theory to the topic will be used a foundation to address the question of whether identity shapes foreign policies, and those conclusions will help carry out a comprehensive analysis of the phenomena in EUFP and RUFPP.

According to Ilya Prizel, whose work is to date the most significant contribution to a contour appreciation of the concept of national identity and foreign policy in eastern Europe, the concept of national identity in contemporary politics is weak.<sup>14</sup> He points out the difficulties experienced in the study of nationalism and its impact on foreign policy as such that there are a) no single universal source of identification; b) no uniformity on its effect on foreign policy; c) constant redefinition of the terms and concepts of nationalism and identity in the scholarship.<sup>15</sup>

Yet constructivist theories remains the major research body with regards concepts of identity in foreign policy. Constructivist theories have been developed in

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<sup>14</sup> Prizel, I. National identity and foreign policy: nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 2004. Print.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*

the past decades and the principal assumption of constructivism is that reality and knowledges are politically and socially constructed and to some extent contingent.

### **1.1. Key analytical framework : Identity/Policy Nexus**

For this paper, I chose to focus on the work (among others) of Kai Hebel and Tobias Lenz, ‘The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy’ which sets the base for the framework of the research. Hebel and Lenz identify a lack of clear conceptualization of the relationship between identity and policy and propose a study-relevant model of *identity construction* and *identity operationalization*. They oppose other authors’ existent rhetoric of naturalization of foreign policy, denying the fact that foreign policy is constructed on the internal character of the actor.<sup>16</sup> They believe that identity is constructed through the formulation of norms and definitional features of the actor, and then applied to external sphere of policy through the operationalization process.

In other words, through empirical examination of the linkage between identity and foreign policy they thrive to examine the process by which identity is constructed and translated into foreign policy, in the context of the European Union.<sup>17</sup> They establish a linkage that they term ‘*the identity-policy nexus*’.

They argue that the constitutive process of identity consists of two phases the *identity construction* and the *identity operationalization*:

- (1) *identity construction* defines the core process of identity creation for external purposes. It includes the accumulation of an identity, which can be collective, based on a raw material (language, cultural or geographical features, religion, ...) and constitutive norms (such as democracy or respect for human rights). The collection of identity involves comparison and differentiation from outsiders, based on cultural, geographical, temporal features. Identity

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<sup>16</sup> See Aggestam, Duchêne or Manners, cited in Hebel K and Lenz. The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy. Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 23 , Issue 4. 2016

<sup>17</sup> Hebel K and Lenz. The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy. Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 23 , Issue 4. 2016

construction can be operated in the context of weak actors and defense of stronger actors (for example the European identity construction is the result of a pursuit for a stronger foreign policy towards countries exterior to the community and that constituted a threat to the community). Therefore *identity construction* involves a high degree of contingency because it relies mainly on external circumstances: actors and historical events.<sup>18</sup>

(2) *identity operationalization* is the process in which those constitutive norms resulting from identity construction is operationalized into the process of making foreign policy. They can appear on the form of institutions with regulative norms which define foreign policy goals and instruments, that apply in a unique political space.<sup>19</sup> *Identity operationalization* defines the translation of the identity on foreign policy.

Those two phases of identity construction and operationalization create the *identity/policy nexus in foreign policy* which validates the systematic influence of the identity factor and give empirical proofs concerning the political processes that link its translation on foreign policy.<sup>20</sup> Those conclusions allow us to study the processes of identity influences in EUFP and RUFP and in this frame to legitimate the content of our research.

This chapter is going to provide an overview of key theoretical features in the Identity/foreign policy concept to give more debt to Hebel and Lenz theory. We will give more details about definitions of *the Self vs. the Other conceptions, degrees of contingency* in the formation of a Self-identity, as well as the role of identity in the definition of *interests and national security*. Finally we will see how a nexus identity/policy legitimates *normative foreign policies* and *power status dynamics*.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

## 1.2. Core processes of Identity Construction

### 1.2.1. The Self vs. the Other

One of the best contributors to the social constructivist movement in this field of research is Ted Hopf, with his notable and frequently cited work '*Social construction of International politics: identities and foreign policies, Moscow 1955-1999*'. Through his reflexion he thrived to understand the dynamics of identities and their influence on Moscow's foreign policy through the following questioning: what are the interests of Russia in central Asia and how the Russian diasporas present in Russia's neighborhood constitute an ethnonational bound between Russia and those countries.<sup>21</sup> In accordance with those arguments, he seeks to determine the process of a state's collection of identity — how it understand itself — and thus how states understand other actors in world affairs through their own identity definition.

Hopf considers identity as being a cognitive framework. In other words, he argues that *what* an individual understands to be, will help determine what information he apprehends and how to use it so that it matches with its conception of self identity.<sup>22</sup> Identity thus acts like 'an axis of interpretation', a social cognitive structure that establishes the basis of how individuals think of themselves and the other.<sup>23</sup>

Hopf uses the logic of mutual constitution to put into words the construction of the self and the other. While the different constructivists movements refer to the

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<sup>21</sup> Hopf T. *Social construction of International politics: identities and foreign policies, Moscow 1955-1999*. Cornell University Press, 2002. Print.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Markus, Hazel and Moreland. Role of the Self-Concept in the Perception of Others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 49(6):1494. December 1985.

identities as being relational<sup>24</sup>, Hopf asserts that those relations are in fact oppositional: identities can only be understood by the mean of comparison, because we can not know what an identity is without relating it to another.<sup>25</sup>

« [...] the Self requires an Other to generate its own identity, but often treats that Other as a threat for the Self. This assumption makes conflict and subordination inevitable in the identity relationship. »

Hopf, 2002

Comparison and competition are thus essential to the creation of the Self. Hebel and Lenz argue that ‘collective identity involves comparison and differentiation from outsiders’.<sup>26</sup> The definition of the Self is as a consequence the basis of ‘the Self vs. the Other’ discourse. The definition of the Self depends on the particular attributes than it can oppose to the Other’s: ‘nations may derivate their sense of identity from a common language, religion, geographic location, collective memory, cultural practices, myth and common ancestry. In this regard, interaction with the outside world and the other allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness.’<sup>27</sup>

### **1.2.2. Degree of Contingency**

‘A polity’s national identity is very much a result on how it interprets its history’<sup>28</sup> thus, the definition of the Self and the Other can be dependent of one’s perception of history, events, and existing political dynamics. However, if self-

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<sup>24</sup> The author discusses the divergences between the scholarships with regards to the role of the Self in the difference it discovers in the Other. While critical social theorists state that the difference endangers the unity of self and must be suppressed, cognitive theorists expect the self to assimilate the other, and symbolic interactionists understand the self and the other as being complementary.

<sup>25</sup> Hopf T. Social construction of International politics. 2002

<sup>26</sup> Hebel K and Lenz. The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy. 2016

<sup>27</sup> Prizel, I. National identity and foreign policy. 2004

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.



perception is determined partly by the particular features that a society presents, those features might as well be a product of the perception of the environment. Psychological theories of IR introduce concepts as cognitive consistency, the fact 'to perceive information and behaviors with with-held pre-existing beliefs and images'.<sup>29</sup>

Pre-existing conceptions act as a 'belief system' that constrain the actor's apprehending of an information. However we stated earlier that the perception of the Self and the Other depends on the axis of interpretation of the actor, axis of interpretation which itself relies on belief systems. In other words, the belief system determines the way an actor is perceiving a coming information, and how this information is going to on the perception of the Self. However, if the way the information is perceived influences the Self definition, we can state that this process is the result of a high contingency.

Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz assume that anarchy is essentially caused by the unpredictable character of the human kind and thus makes unpredictable the actions of the states in the latter. In fact, *Figure 1* intends to illustrates that the external world is made of unpredictable factors, such as events and reactions of the other international actors to those events. The unpredictable character of the external world makes the process of information reception extremely, as the nature of the event defines the information.

In that regard, the perception of the Other, remains highly based on the external world, e.i. current events. The nature of the event constrains the actor's perception of the information ensued by the outcome of the event. This was certainly true during the Cold War, when the USA and the USSR would pursue arm races: neighboring states would perceive the information ensuing the events as a threat for their security and would form their understanding of the events according to this threat, that fit their belief's system.

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<sup>29</sup> Mintz, A. and DeRouen. Understanding foreign policy decision making. Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 2014. Print.

Identity definition is relying on the belief system, thus the process of Othering operates through a *high degree of contingency*, because depending heavily on external actors and events.<sup>30</sup>

### 1.2.3. Identity and national security interests

According to Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein in their chapter '*Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security*' the security environment in which states evolve comprises not only material but cultural aspects.<sup>31</sup> 'Identity functions as a link between this environmental structure and interests and is a mutually constructed and evolving image of the Self and the Other.'<sup>32</sup> Thus 'Interests are derivable of identities in the sense that an individual identity implies its interest,<sup>33</sup> and the changes in state identity affects the states national security interests.<sup>34</sup>

« Some interests, such as mere survival and minimal physical well-being, exist outside of specific social identities; they are relatively generic. But many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. This was certainly true during the Cold War. Actors often cannot decide what their interest are until they know what they are representing — 'who they are' — which in turn depends on their social relationships. »

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein. 1996

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<sup>30</sup> Hebel K and Lenz. The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy.


<sup>31</sup> Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security' in Katzenstein, P. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1996. Print.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Hopf T. *Social construction of International politics*. 2002

<sup>34</sup> Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 1996.

1.2.(a) *Figure 1: Degree of contingency in the definition of the Self.*



### **1.3. Identity translation to institutions : operationalization**

Following Hebel and Lenz's framework, identity passes by a phase of institutionalization, in other words the process of which it translates into institutions for external purposes, such as foreign policy institutions. 'Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities: that is, states might seek to institutionalize their identity in international structures.'<sup>35</sup> In the EU we can observe several levels of institutionalization, in the different corps of the CFSP, that is to say the EEAS, the NEP and its spin-off policy the EaP.

Identity is operationalized by the means of institutionalization, in this way it permits to legitimate foreign policy approaches. Identity is used in the formulation of foreign policy goals and instruments, i.e. treaties and official strategies. As an example, the Hague Summit is the first moment in the history of the European Union where the question of identity is raised to appear officially 4 years later on the Copenhagen declaration, in the way it created an explicit understanding of shared values as a condition to community accession.<sup>36</sup>

In this paper the institutionalization of identity, in the way of how it translates into official documents and strategies of the states, will be the central axis used for research in the picture of EUFP and RUF. I seek to provide a policy-relevant interpretation of the way identity is formulated in EUFP and RUF external institutions, and how the identity discourse affects the foreign policy goals of both blocs towards the NEE.

### **1.4. Applied Methodology**

The two following chapters intend to define the identity/policy nexus in EUFP and RUF. To overcome difficulties in conceptualization of the nexus, there is a need to review the historical aspects of foreign policies of both blocs.

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<sup>35</sup> Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 1996.

<sup>36</sup> Hebel K and Lenz. The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy.

By this mean, we will be able to set out the implementation of identity policies and come to a pertinent definition of the Self and the Other. The literature analyzed for this part is literature concerning the definition of EUFP and RUFP in the 1990s. The literature reviews historical events, thus provides the reader with an understanding of the then incentives of creating - what I call - a self identity dedicated to external purposes.

As explained earlier in the theoretical part, for the following two chapters we will base our analysis on the theoretical framework introduced by Hebel and Lenz in their paper '*The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy*'. They propose the framework of two core process that constitute the nexus: (collective) identity construction and operationalization. The nexus proposition is aimed to demonstrate a linkage between identity construction and the translation of this identity in the making decision process concerning foreign policy — what is called by the authors the operationalization of identity.

## **2. Chapter 2: A EUROPEAN IDENTITY/FOREIGN POLICY NEXUS**

This part aims to demonstrate the viability of the argument identity/policy nexus when coming to the European Union foreign policy. To present a clear conceptualization of the nexus, it appears necessary to give an historical overview of the conditions in which the European identity for external purposes was created. To neglect the context in which the creation of an identity for an external application dedicated to Eastern Europe renders the concept obsolete. Indeed the creation and polishing of the European integration strategy occurred in the special historical context of the demise of the Soviet Union, and this mere strategy is the essence of the use of identity in NEE.

This chapter thus describes briefly the historical context of a European identity formation in the immediate post-Cold-War era and aspires to give an account of how that identity translated in the implementation of the European integration scheme dating from the 1990s. A description of the European integration concentric circles of Aid, Association, Accession will provide the reader with evidences on how identity is institutionalized in EUFP. Finally the issue of EU being a normative power is going to be raised and evaluated in modern documents of foreign policy dedicated to the Eastern Neighborhood, in order to find evidences of identity operationalization in the research area.

### **2.1. Evolution of the institution's Self-Understanding**

Hebel and Lenz stress that many studies neglected the identity factor in EUFP and bypass the phenomena: while some scholars claim that EU identity doesn't influence foreign policy but is rather a product of foreign policy outcomes, others opt for a 'naturalization of linkage' that gives a wrong analysis about the utilization of identity in the EU foreign policy making. Indeed, the naturalization of linkage is an error in statement since it implies that the way foreign policy is conducted by the EU is a reflexion of the way the internal structure EU is constituted.

However, Hebel and Lenz deny that the inner and the outer are connected and argue rather in favor of a ‘collective identity’ specified by the self understanding of a group of actors, that share a set of constitutive norms.<sup>37</sup> In other words, ‘the EU identity is not formed by the individual identities of each member states bound together to form a broader sense of common values, yet it is rather the product of a constitutive norms, such as democracy or human rights, that have been chosen by the community in order to define the nature of their assembly and to follow external purposes’.<sup>38</sup>

Therefore we are going to analyze the process of European normative and political community constitution, to prove its inherent link with the diffusion of a European identity and its operationalization.

European identity was constructed between 1962 and 1968, yet it was first operationalized from 1969 to 1975. If at that time the European Union strictly speaking did not exist, its predecessors the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European economic Community (EEC) gave birth to what evolved later in the modern EU, the European Community (EC) with the ratification of the Rome treaty in 1957. The EC was only an *apolitical* economic union with no democratic or human rights centered explicit claims.

However political concerns about an eventual undemocratic turn within the Community arose when Spain and Greece expressed the will to join the community in 1962. Also, concerns expressed about the respect of human rights would participate to some kind of alienation of the ‘East’, that is to say the Soviet union, and confirm a position of Ally of the West. We can assess that the EU ID was born from a high contingency, which disconfirms the natural linkage claim, since it was introduced in the first place to counter a potential illiberal turn as well as external threats.

Until the late 1960s the EC identity was uniquely addressed internally with regard to concerns for the questions of association and admission to the Community. In

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<sup>37</sup> Hebel K and Lenz. The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

1962 the Birkelbach Report becomes the identity pillar of the current EU, as being the first document to mention a European identity. It establishes guidelines for accession and association conditions with the EC: ‘democracy, in the form respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms should be considered an essential requirement for Community membership’.<sup>39</sup> It has, then, no relevance to a particular external policy, and it going to be of use at a later time only.

In a willingness of a ‘relaunch of Europe’, new leaders such as Pompidou, Brandt or Heath introduce an explicit nexus identity/foreign policy as it established an correlation between the EC collective identity and the EC’s role in the world.<sup>40</sup> Later in, at the Copenhagen European Summit of December 1973, the member states of the enlarged European Community have proclaimed their determination to introduce the concept of European identity into their common foreign relations: <sup>41</sup>

« The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity. »<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Report by Willi Birkelbach on the political and institutional aspects of accession to or association with the Community (19 December 1961). Web: [[http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/report\\_by\\_willi\\_birkelbach\\_on\\_the\\_political\\_and\\_institutional\\_aspects\\_of\\_accession\\_to\\_or\\_a\\_ssoociation\\_with\\_the\\_community\\_19\\_december\\_1961-en-2d53201e-09db-43ee-9f80-552812d39c03.html](http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/report_by_willi_birkelbach_on_the_political_and_institutional_aspects_of_accession_to_or_a_ssoociation_with_the_community_19_december_1961-en-2d53201e-09db-43ee-9f80-552812d39c03.html)]

<sup>40</sup> Mockli D. European Foreign Policy During the Cold War - Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity. I.B. TAURIS & CO. Ltd., 2008. Print.

<sup>41</sup> Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No 12. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. "Declaration on European Identity", p. 118-122. Web: [[http://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration\\_on\\_european\\_identity\\_copenhagen\\_14\\_december\\_1973-en-02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration_on_european_identity_copenhagen_14_december_1973-en-02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html)]

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.



Thus, ‘principles of democracy, the rule of law, justice, and respect for human rights’ are to this date the core constitutive norms to the fundamental elements of the European identity. The Declaration sets the ‘defense of european identity by integrating and framing a genuine European foreign policy’ as the new external strategy of the community.<sup>43</sup>

However, facing the tremendous change in the world order at the disappearance of the Iron curtain, the European integration strategy needs to be revised to address the new challenges that the definition of new borders in the East of Europe brought.

## **2.2. Collapse of the USSR, the need for a new strategy**

This section is aimed to explain the dynamics of post cold war security in Europe, in the wide sense of the term. At the end of the cold war, we assist to the emergence of a ‘shady east-west security complex in the way that there is a notion of different and overlapping Europe’.<sup>44</sup> The cold war denouement brought a new geopolitical environment and a system of new emerging states that is unlike anything in the then European Union.<sup>45</sup> The termination of the soviet bloc challenges the mere definition of Europe, in the sense that new independent states suddenly appeared in Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and so forth. Soon ‘Europe’ becomes a problematic term since we are not able to assess with certainty anymore the question of where Europe ends ?

On the other hand, a notion of new threats for european security is present: how to deal with disarmament and the soviet nuclear legacy in those new states, the new borders, their individual strategies, the creation of the CIS ? The patterns of the EU strategy with the USSR are no longer into force, thus there is an important source of uncertainty vis-a-vis Eastern Europe.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Griffiths, S. I. Nationalism and ethnic conflict: threats to European security. Oxford: Oxford U Press, 1998. Print.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

## 2.3. The Identity nexus of European integration

### 2.3.1. Towards the design of a new Ost-Politik

I deemed pertinent to use Karen Smith's volume '*The making of EU foreign policy, the Case of Eastern Europe*' to illustrate my view of European identity diffusion through foreign policy. Smith in her analysis describes the European multi-level integration in the form of *concentric circles*. According to her, EU integration passes by three different levels of integration : aid, association and integration, the least representing the deeper level of integration that the first.<sup>46</sup> Here are the premises of a new 'Ost-Politik': there was incentives to get the Eastern Neighbors closer, for security concerns, without integrating them fully to not overload the EC. There is a need to re-design strategies vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, in order to:

- 1) Address the demands of new created eastern states for closer ties with the Union;
- 2) Ensure the success of the reforms;
- 3) To secure a relative security at the immediate borders of the community.

My point is that to highlight foreign policy changes towards the East, we need to observe the first attempt to the design of these policies and to extract the identity signification of those policies. This analysis will allow us to extract the mere essence of the identity factor in shaping 'Ost-politiks', thus give a solid foundation to our hypothesis of identity influence on the current NEE directed foreign policy. I have summarized this approach in *Figure 2*. The following paragraphs will intend to explain those EU mechanisms and put them in relation with our topic for more relevance.

### 2.3.2. The widening vs. deepening debate.

The debate over enlargement began after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. At that time the idea was to 'tighten links with countries whose democracy is

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<sup>46</sup> Smith, *The Making of EU Foreign Policy, the Case of Eastern Europe*, 1999.

uncertain, yet such decisions prove to depend on the success of the reforms'.<sup>47</sup> However the question created dissensions within the Community: although the principal aim of enlargement was to seek the strengthening of peace in Europe, regain unity as well as promote the right to free self determination; some members states raised their voice advocating problems of enlargement: too much expansion is risking the result of an ineffective Union.<sup>48</sup> In this regard, the concentric circles responded to everyone's exigencies: 'concentric circles are a compromise in the sense that it includes Eastern Europe in Europe, but it retains major differences between the EC as a core actor and those who are led and helped by it'.<sup>49</sup>

Therefore a new kind of association is to be created, following the logic of the concentric circles. The modalities of participation in any of the circles could be considered in two ways: either a stepping stone for EC membership on the mid-term, or a long-term solution for the future participation in Europe architecture.<sup>50</sup> This way, there is a will to avoid the question and critics of the membership.

There is an idea of center, where the core of the European values is gathered and where the integration is the deeper. The more we move away from the center, the mildest the integration degree is. The logic of the European integration in concentric circles demonstrates the willingness of the European Union to integrate Eastern States, with features of different levels of integration: *aid*, *association*, and *integration* or *accession*. The following sections aim to depict the logic of the new Ost-Politik of European integration, with the help of *Figure 2*.

### **2.3.3. Aid and Association**

In what Smith calls the 'pre-revolution' of EU foreign policy, the main policy instruments for the East in the immediate post-Soviet period were trade and cooperation agreements: as an example the programs PHARE, EBRD, that are

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

international efforts to provide economic support to the emerging democracies. They are the EU's main financial instrument for accession of the Central and Eastern European countries.<sup>51</sup> However, those programs were destined at first to the 'Eastern countries', as we stated in the introduction, after the collapse of the USSR (Mainly the Balkans, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic and so forth...later the program will be enlarged to 14 countries).

The creation of 'Stabilization and Association Agreements' or the *European Agreements* in 1990 constitutes the framework of relations between the European Union and eastern Europe for more substantial relations. According to the Union 'the goal of association will contribute to political stability, encourage the development of new instruments for cooperation, and strengthen confidence on the part of economic operators'.<sup>52</sup> At the moment of the new reformation of the European integration system, a deeper association with the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia is envisaged on the condition that they submit memoranda setting out their reform plans and requesting that coordinated assistance.

In the case of cooperation, the commission states that it will be expressly looking into improvements towards:

« [...] commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, the establishment of multiparty systems, the holding of free and fair elections in the course of 1990 and economic liberalization with a view to introducing market economies »<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Briefing No 33: The PHARE Program and the enlargement of the European Union. Enlargement: 4 December 1998. Web: [[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm)]

<sup>52</sup> Press release 'La commission repond positivement a la demande d'assistance g-24 et d'association eventuelle avec la communaute, formulee par les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale' 01/02/1990. Web: [[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_P-90-4\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_P-90-4_en.htm)]

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

The commission states that relations can move forward from cooperation to association when ‘our partners are looking beyond normalization of relations with the Community towards a type of relationship reflecting geographic proximity, shared political, economic, and cultural values and increased inter-dependence.’<sup>54</sup>

#### **2.3.4. Integration/Accession**

In spite of the fact that the *European Agreements* provide ground for deep cooperation, they do not resolve the question of whether the states should or shouldn't join the Community. In 1993 the EC fears a shift from the East as the ex-soviet republics are subject to a more assertive policy from Russia, that would try to re-establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. It began to be an issue that Eastern European countries are not deeply enough integrated and that they might fall in a state existence of buffer zone. In that logic the only way to reduce uncertainty: the EC needed a collective response with regard to the pre-accession strategies. We assist to the rebirth of the *widening vs. depending* debate, however ‘enlargement was agreed because it would help spread stability, security and prosperity to Eastern Europe, to increase EC’s security’.<sup>55</sup> In that view, widening and deepening would have to occur simultaneously.

From now on the EC is equipped with a ‘remarkable structure’: from the one hand the Europe agreements, from the other hand the pre-accession strategies. Under the high external pressure, the EC have been able to answer and create a *shift from politics of exclusion to politics of inclusion*, and to use it as an instrument of the EC power politics towards the East. However, the logic undermining EU enlargement is a legitimization of foreign policy, as enlargement is considered as an instrument of identity diffusion.<sup>56</sup> The way of achieving legitimacy falls within a logic of moral justification.

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<sup>54</sup> Press release, European Commission 01/02/1990

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Sjørnsen H. and Smith K. ‘Justifying EU foreign policy: the logics underpinning EU enlargement’ in Tonra, Ben, and Thomas Christiansen. *Rethinking European Union foreign policy*. Manchester: Manchester U Press, 2004. Print.

To resume, the diffusion of an european identity operates through the different levels of european integration: *aid, association and accession* dimensions of the integration strategy is based on the promotion of Europe as the ‘good’ and a model of peace building. The means to achieve those different degrees of integration are financial aid to eastern european countries so that they can build in new democratic regimes, with the promise of further integration into the nexus at the condition that they respect the *core european values*.

### **2.3.5. Logic of Inclusion/Exclusion and Russia**

Even though the european integration nexus presents a remarkable structure, it puts a tremendous difference on the inside vs. the outside. The different level of integration such as the association agreements and pre-accession strategies share the same features in the way they encourage a dynamic of exclusion based on the difference.

Following a high external pressure of accessions demands and security issues, the Union had to re-design the integration nexus to achieve a shift from a polity of exclusion towards a polity of inclusion. The admission and association criteria attached to the integration nexus not only affect the former identity of the neighbors but affects the essence of the European self, as the way it positions itself with regard to its eastern neighborhood.<sup>57</sup> Cederman in his book ‘*Constructing Europe’s Identity*’ emphasizes on the nexus inclusion/exclusion via the structural feature of the applicant rhetoric:

- (1) States that wish a rapprochement who the EU may emphasize on their belonging to the geographical and historical european scope as a pre-requisite condition for inclusion.

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<sup>57</sup> Cederman, L. E. *Constructing Europe’s identity: the external dimension*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 2001. Print.


- (2) There are existing patterns of excluding neighboring states to the East, example of Russia that is an historic antagonist to Europe and will be long time excluded from any pattern of integration.
- (3) The way in which applicant states or states that aspire to a rapprochement within the EU structures try to integrate their regime into the pre-requisite conditions by excluding internal factors of the regime to fit to a pre-conceived European identity.

At that time there is a specific exclusionary discourse depicting Russia as Europe's other, making of the exclusion/inclusion logic one of the essence of the mere Self european external identity.<sup>58</sup> As a matter of fact the construction of the European identity is tied with the 'Russian Other', which makes of Russia inherently a competitor with regards to any steps the EU will undertake in its neighborhood. Therefore Russian exclusion operates as the necessary ingredient to focus on inclusion dynamics. The EU do stress the particular exclusion of Russia as a foundation for the integration of Eastern European states to Western institutions.

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<sup>58</sup> Cederman, L. E. Constructing Europe's identity: the external dimension.

2.3.(a) Figure 2: The exclusion/integration Nexus of EUID operationalization:  
The concentric circles





## 2.4. Contemporary discourse of integration : a global normative actor ?

In light of the precedent findings, we can assess of the EU's ambition to play a key role in its immediate neighborhood. However the absence of a collective foreign policy was remarkable.<sup>59</sup> As per Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, the EU nowadays remains a 'hybrid entity, which is neither an intergovernmental organization nor a state but operates globally across a range of policy areas.'<sup>60</sup> It is thus appropriate to qualify the EU as a 'state actor', especially is has gifted itself with state attributes concerning foreign policy. The signature of the Lisbon Treaty created state foreign policy structures as a 'foreign minister of the union', i.e. the High Representative of the Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) as well as an external diplomatic service - the EEAS. Those changes have participated in the reinforcing of the CFSP, and it is genuine to address the question of how the identity factor could have been transmitted through the process of change ? Which internal or external actors have permitted, constrained or promoted the development of the EU's role in global politics as a normative power ?<sup>61</sup>

Hemel and Lenz's argument is based on the dynamics of contestation 'by which member states formed a collective identity based on constitutive norms such as democracy and human rights'<sup>62</sup> and how they used this created identity in order to formulate regulative norms. If in the first place they were dedicated to 'internal european community policy', they are yet later employed for foreign policy purposes. The operationalization of European identity then is the translation of those regulative norms for definition of policy goals and instruments, in the aspiration to become a normative power. The integration model that have been implemented through the decades is the most speaking element of the implementation of this normative 'role in

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<sup>59</sup> Bachmann, V. Perceptions of the EU in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. 2015

<sup>60</sup> Bretherton, C., Vogler, J. The European Union as a Global Actor. London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 1996.

the world'. The EU has indeed 'a long history of positioning itself through civilian and normative narratives [...] and the success of regional integration process is considered as a legitimation for the peace model that it oughts to spread.'<sup>63</sup>

We will not step in the debate 'Normative Power Europe', to evaluate the the degree through which, Europe, by the diffusion of its identity, achieves to secure a position of hegemony in its neighborhood. The EU is a 'principled actor' which, beyond material goals (economic, well being) puts forward the existence of certain values as preconditions for extended cooperation.<sup>64</sup> The reason is that it genuinely believes that the liberal values around which the EU project has been articulated and proved successful are the best practices and should have 'wider applicability in the world and especially in EU's neighborhood'.<sup>65</sup>

The way of achieving the legitimacy being the integration model of European foreign policy falls within a logic of moral justification. The EU seeks to promote its own model that encompasses a particular idea of the 'good life' that is grounded in the identity of a specific community.<sup>66</sup> The conditions for membership evolved from simple economic considerations (Cf. Rome Treaty of 1958) to the insistence on topical issues of morality.

#### **2.4.1. The role of Commission in identity creation**

According to Bachmann, the EU institutions regulate but also produce political space beyond Europe. This process is made through the integration principles of course. In the second chapter of his book *'Perception of the EU in Eastern Europe and*

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<sup>63</sup> Bachmann, V. *Perceptions of the EU in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa: looking in from the outside*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Print.

<sup>64</sup> Haukkala, H. *The EU's regional Normative Hegemony Encounters Hard Realities: the Revised European Neighborhood Policy and the Ring of Fire in 'The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy'*. Bouris D. and Schumacher T. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 77-94. 2017.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Sjursten H. and Smith K. 'Justifying EU foreign policy: the logics underpinning EU enlargement'

*Sub Saharan Africa*', he raises the question of how are the *concepts of Europe* nowadays framing policies and the work of the EEAS in the specific Eastern dimension of the ENP?

However, according to Bachmann, inside the Commission there are ambiguities that might hinder the mere concept of European Identity. In the second chapter of the book, '*Crafting Europe for Its Neighborhood practical geopolitics in European institutions*', he dresses the issue of how the commission translates this idea of identity in the decision making process. He led a simple study constituted of unnamed interviews with a range of high level commission officials in order to pinpoint their meaning of Europe while in the conception of foreign policy. The most speaking answer is 'it rather depends who holds the pen'. EUFP decisions and leanings would then be highly motivated by the HR. There is a strong debate over borders inside the Commission: the issue is not to determine where they are but rather how officials use the meaning of Europe to define those borders and create the policies around those definitions.<sup>67</sup> Some officials argue that 'Europe is not territorial free, it is rather a common cultural space, based on values and common culture. Europe is way broader and at the same time narrower than a simple geographical definition'<sup>68</sup>

## **2.5. European Identity Operationalization in the NEE**

The precedent sections aimed to reveal a subsistent link between identity formation in Europe and the way it translates into foreign policy goals. Following the logic of this paper, this section will intend to analyze how the processes of identity operationalization operate in the region of interest : the NEE. To attain this goal, we will review the different programs and instruments through which the European union is achieving its foreign policy goals in the NEE.

The methodology used for this section consists in looking at primary documents of the European Union foreign policy, in order to reveal features of identity in the core formulation of programs dedicated to the NEE, as different countries or as a region.

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<sup>67</sup> Bachmann, V. Perceptions of the EU in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. 2015

<sup>68</sup> Interview with an official, unnamed, Bachmann.

For the sake of clarity, but also to follow Hebel and Lenz's framework of identity operationalization, we are going to look narrowly into the European primary documents and treaties that set foreign policy especially in the NEE region, in order to estimate to what extent identity is part of the external strategy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

### **2.5.1. CFSP and the Foreign & Security Policy**

Towards the CFSP the EU aims to begin a key player in its neighboring region. Its joint foreign and security policy, designed to resolve conflicts and foster international understanding, is based on diplomacy; trade, humanitarian aid, security and defense often play a complementary role.<sup>69</sup> The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union was established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1993 with the aim of:

« preserving peace, strengthening international security, promoting international cooperation and developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.»<sup>70</sup>

The EU emphasizes on its role of security provider, and cooperation with developing countries.<sup>71</sup>

Before the creation of the ENP in 2003, there are no consensus with regards to an institutionalized policy towards the particular countries of the NEE. However, under the first premises of the CFSP there have been some developments with regards to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The common CFSP strategy towards Eastern European countries evolved in view of the Eastern Europe, as the common border after the enlargement means new accompanying challenges: 1) to sustain peace and stability in

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<sup>69</sup> Fact Sheets on the European Union. Web: [[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU\\_6.1.1.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.1.1.html)]

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Foreign & Security Policy. Web: [[https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy_en)]

Europe by fostering a presence in the East, as being a first regional actor in the region; 2) to participate to the regional stabilization and consolidation of democracy, and the diffusion of pro-european choice, the TACIS programs as well as bilateral programs were implemented to encourage transition and reforms; 3) to reinforce the economic dynamics and and cooperation possibilities in this area.<sup>72</sup>

However I do not consider to be relevant considering pre-ENP developments to be representative of a clear conceptualization of the european identity operationalization to the region of the NEE in particular, for the reasons of an unclear conceptualization of the region, that thus imply a non clear formulation of goals towards the NEE.

### **2.5.2. The European Neighborhood Policy**

As the EU gives accession to Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, there is a need for a new policy to engage in the neighborhood. The European Neighborhood Partnership is designed to strengthen the EU's relations with its neighbors, the policy offers political association; economic integration; and increased mobility for people. However a certain sense of threats and new concerns for security emerges:

« The Union expresses a certain notion of threat and security around the change of the borders and the new challenges that it implies. the European Union has taken a big step forward in promoting security and prosperity on the European continent. EU enlargement also means that the external borders of the Union have changed. We have acquired new neighbors and have come closer to old ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and

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<sup>72</sup> De Saint- Malo a Lisbonne- textes choisis de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune en Europe 1998-2008. (PESD) Web: [<http://europavarietas.org/sites/default/files/DeSaintMaloaLisbonnev1.3.pdf>]

challenges. The European Neighborhood Policy is a response to this new situation.»<sup>73</sup>

The EU expresses clear interests into participating into the Eastern countries in the way to foster their inclusion towards a more western path. By doing so, it hopes to blur the ethnic borders between the new neighboring countries and the Union, by ‘including them in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation.’<sup>74</sup> This goals are to be achieved by the mean of inclusive proposition plans which are a forming part of the inclusion/integration nexus of the EUFP based on the identity diffusion. In particular, the fulfillment of defined priorities set the *conditionality to bring neighbors closer to the EU*.<sup>75</sup> Priorities reincorporated in *Actions Plans* covering a number of specific key areas for action that will reinforce common values. They take form in ‘political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's Internal Market; justice and home affairs; [...] and social policy and people-to-people contacts.’<sup>76</sup>

« The privileged relationship with neighbors will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighborly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.»<sup>77</sup>

Actions Plans remain the key for ‘a privileged relationship’, conditioned by the willingness of the state to abide by common values that are the forming part of the core

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<sup>73</sup> Communication from the Commission - European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy paper {SEC(2004) 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570}/\* COM/2004/0373 final \*/. Web: [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52004DC0373>]

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

European identity, bringing us to the centrality of European values as a fundamental element for integration or any involvement in a regional relationship with the EU.

As the EU has grown, the countries of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus have become the closest neighbors. Increasingly, their security, stability and prosperity affect the EU's security.<sup>78</sup> A joint policy initiative – the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – was launched in 2009 to deepen relations between the EU and its 6 Eastern neighbors. Closer cooperation between the EU and its Eastern European partners – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine – is a key element in EU foreign relations. The EaP provides a framework for solid multilateral and deeper bilateral cooperation with the EU.

### **2.5.3. The Eastern Partnership, AAs and DCFTAs.**

Through the EaP the EU is committed to have ‘strong, differentiated and mutually beneficial cooperation with all six EaP partners, whatever the individual level of ambition in their relations with the EU.’<sup>79</sup> According to the European Council information sheets, The EaP offers (1) new contractual relations; (2) deep and comprehensive free trade agreements; (3) steps towards visa liberalization and (4) a multilateral framework in which to discuss these issues; at the condition for the contracting countries to *undertake political and economic reforms*.

The EaP, as the little sister and Eastern dimension of the ENP is, as a matter of fact included in the scheme of identity operationalization in the region of the NEE as it is setting more debt for cooperation with the Eastern Neighborhood on the basis of the NEP conditions of respect for European core values. From the years 2009 to 2011 an effort for integration of Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine has been made on the basis of bilateral relations towards the common goal — but especially economic cooperation in the first place, via the AAs and DCFTAs. By working on to implement Association Agreements (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)

<sup>78</sup> De Saint- Malo a Lisbonne- textes choisis de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune en Europe 1998-2008.

<sup>79</sup> Eastern Partnership, Consilium Europa. Web: [<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/>]

with all of the 6 partners, the EaP aims to bring even further the normative integration scheme in the NEE region. The EU seeks to nurture good relations with and towards Russia, with a peaceful and constructive dialogue, if both are ready to ‘engage on international issues at the top of CFSP agenda including protracted conflicts in common neighborhood, recognizing the share interests on these issues’.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Annual reports from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basis choices of the CFSP 2009-2014. Web: [[https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8427/cfsp-annual-reports\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8427/cfsp-annual-reports_en)]



### **3. Chapter 3: A RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY/IDENTITY NEXUS**

This chapter aims to provide evidences on the formation of a Russian identity for external purposes. If Russian foreign policy presents some characteristics of identity, it is more correct to say that foreign policy influences Russian identity construction as a whole. The lack of a clear incentives towards a new Russian identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union to 'replace' communism and the Cold-War render the apprehension of the identity factor quite difficult for its use in Foreign policy in a general way but also towards the Russian near abroad.

However, the study of the Russian state creation in the immediate post-soviet period will give us more insights on the conception of a Russian identity dedicated to external action. This chapter is going to review historic developments relative to the creation of a supposed Russian identity in the 1990s and its transposition to external politics. To sustain the hypothesis of the influence of identity on foreign policy towards the NEE, this is mandatory to understand the formation of such identity and the concepts that surround Russian Self- positioning in the world affairs regarding the question of the Near Abroad. Therefore, this chapter intends to give accounts of the different Russian identities as well as explain the dissensions around the creation of a Russian Self.

Finally the chapter is going to analyze the scope of the Russian self identity conception in the shaping of policies towards the NEE, by reviewing official documents of the Russian Federation foreign policy making in order to look for features of identity operationalization. Those findings will allow us to assess that the Russian identity operationalization still remains really weak in policy making, partly because in reason of a unclear conceptualization of identity in the Russian political sphere, thus enshrining the implementation of effective policies towards the NEE region.

### 3.1. Context of a post soviet construction

The remarkable book *'The Mortal Danger'*, written by Alexander Solzhenitsyn is a major element of a specific school of thought whom the arguments are that Russia wasn't the 'ruling nation' of the Soviet Union and that Russians suffered as much, if not even more, than non-Russian nations during the soviet rule.<sup>81</sup> 'Russian national consciousness today has been suppressed and humiliated to an extraordinary degree by all that it has endured and continues to endure'.<sup>82</sup> The Soviet Union kept all the ethnic and nationalities together in a form of cultural pluralism, that also collapsed with the system in 1991, bringing weaknesses and raising awareness around self identity questions.<sup>83</sup> At the twilight of the USSR, tremendous changes operate for the new Russian state, that has to figure its own Russian self identity in the world.

The Post-Soviet Space is an umbrella of common historical roots, with a similar economical and political culture and specific groups of society, which is nowadays fragmented between different geopolitical entities, but still shares special features of unity and uniformity.<sup>84</sup> In order to overcome the consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Common Wealth of Independent States is created in 1991. It aims to provide a sort of supranational power and addresses issues as security, deep trade cooperation.

The states that compose the CIS surely suffer from dissensions which each other, but still share more ties with one and the other playing a role in an intensified interconnected commonwealth, than they share ties with the rest of the world. 'The foundation of the CIS was in fact viewed not as an act of establishing a regional union

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<sup>81</sup> 'Russia's new empire', *The Spectator*, January 3rd, 1981. *The Spectator Archives*. Web: [<http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/3rd-january-1981/10/russias-new-empire>]

<sup>82</sup> Solzhenitsyn, A. (1980) *The mortal danger: how misconceptions about Russia imperil America*. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Print.

<sup>83</sup> Prizel, I. *National identity and foreign policy*. 2004

<sup>84</sup> Nikitin, A. *Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space*. *International Journal on World Peace* Vol. 25, No. 2 (JUNE 2008), pp. 7-31. Web: [<http://proxy.library.spbu.ru:2087/stable/pdf/20752831.pdf>]

supporting the closer cooperation of its members, but, on the contrary, as a tool of the dissolution of a previously existing single political entity of the Soviet Union'.<sup>85</sup>

### **3.1.1. Westernization dreams: design of a new foreign policy**

Nonetheless newly formed Russia nourishes normative aspirations. Controversial Eltsin foreign policy remains low key in order not to offend neighboring countries and frustrate the West. The period 1992-1993 marked the existence of a shady era, where inside the country elites have a hard time constructing a coherent domestic and foreign policy.<sup>86</sup> If newly formed Russia expressed normative aspirations, the definition of a national interest and therefore of a foreign policy remains extremely complex.

For a foreign policy to be implemented, there are needs to reflect a certain national interest. Unfortunately, the central leadership of Russian foreign policy as so far avoided the central question of the country's main interest. Moreover, some challenges appear: quarrels oppose different internal political movements when it comes to the design of a Russian stance in international affairs. Atlanticists oppose Eurasianists, the eternal debate of the liberal school vs. the centric school, when the firsts want a fundamental break from history and imperialism for a deeper integration into the western world, the later support a more aggressive Russian FP focused on national interests with further integration with the ex-USSR.<sup>87</sup> Unfortunately, The multiple and occasionally competing "national self-images" impacted the framings of

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<sup>85</sup> The democratization of international organizations: Commonwealth of Independent States and Eurasian Economic Community. Libman, A. Report. International Democracy Watch, Centre for Studies on Federalism. Web: [[http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/460\\_CIS-libman.pdf](http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/460_CIS-libman.pdf)]

<sup>86</sup> Prizel, I. National identity and foreign policy. 2004

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., see also Proceedings of the meetings of the Foreign Policy Council of the RFM in November and December 1992. *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 1993, No. 2, pp. 5-22.

Russia's great power-hood and thus the realm of possible Russian foreign policy action.<sup>88</sup>

The attempt to formulate the first Concept of Russian Foreign Policy demonstrates this uncertainty in the very core of the government, yet demonstrates Russia's will for westernization : 'Russia agrees with the meaning of the concept of «new political thinking» which became a trial to overcome total-dead end confrontation'.<sup>89</sup>

At that time, the focus is already existing on the countries of the CIS, in a way to form bridges with the West. Russia seeks to foster West-CIS cooperation, encourages accession of CIS countries in Western organizations; in an attempt to stop latent paranoia and break the existing rhetoric of Russian imperialism, in one word to prove good faith to the world. Eltsine's aim is to break the history, to fulfill Russia's paramount goals :

- (1) full integration in the international system;
- (2) extended cooperation with the west and notably the U.S. on a range of topics concerning security, as well as with the European Union in the aim of being recipient of European development aid and put reforms in place;<sup>90</sup>
- (3) foster inclusion and integration within the CIS, by just 'participating' , to not undermine prospects of Russian westernization with «pragmatic and balanced policy» mostly concerning border making, security, economy, ethnical unity and taking more time with the dealing of strategic military positions in the area.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Clunan, A. L. The social construction of Russia's resurgence: Aspirations, identity, and security interests. 2009. Print.

<sup>89</sup> 'Conception of Russian Foreign Policy' 1993. Web, in Russian: [[http://www.ng.ru/world/2000-07-11/1\\_concept.html](http://www.ng.ru/world/2000-07-11/1_concept.html)]

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

### 3.1.2. Policy of indifference: the denial from the West

However, western strategies of confinement such as NATO or the denial to include Russia in international organizations whereas Moscow was ready to operate foreign policy changes without ever questioning the West created a climate of indifference or even mockery.<sup>92</sup> The West by keeping to ignore the need to replace military agreements formed under the period of the Cold war, that do not suit anymore the existing reality, install a state of Cold Peace.<sup>93</sup> I argue that the unresolved issues between the U.S. and Post-Soviet Russia are in fact at the origin of the dissensions between modern Russia and Europe, since Russia had to find other strategies for its own development and come up with newly oriented national interest.

« Being normal naturally means having a normal foreign policy. This is now emerging; and it is emerging in direct reaction to the recent past, the period immediately after the failed coup of 1991 and the emergence of Russia as an independent state. During that period, Russia was too inclined to say 'yes' to our new friends in the West - even before being asked to. We suffered a temporary loss of our vision and of our ability both to understand, and act in, our own interests. This created a backlash. »<sup>94</sup>

Sergei Karaganov, Financial Times, 1993

The need to build a new, self-owned foreign policy slowly emerges. Kozirev's vision is too normative pro-western, and 'represented a sort of "soft unipolarity" where American superiority was implicitly accepted. Reproaches from 'Russians abroad' asking for more assertive policies to protect their ethnicity against the new threats of new formed states with nationalists views achieved to convince for a shift in policy. The protection of compatriots 'abroad' has thus become a crucial point in what Russians consider their national honor and duty.

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<sup>92</sup> Personal View: Russia finds independent foreign policy, Sergei Karaganov. Financial Times, March 21, 1994. Archives. Web: [<http://proxy.library.spbu.ru:2059/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi=AC00NBGenSrch&csi=293847>]

<sup>93</sup> Prizel, I. National identity and foreign policy. 2004

<sup>94</sup> Personal View: Russia finds independent foreign policy, Sergei Karaganov.

A shift in view in what Russians considered the neighborhood operated. In a way of enhancing a more centrist view, a policy of rapprochement acknowledging the importance of the West but putting forward Russia's national interest is undertaken by Yevgeny Primakov. From there several strategies with regard to the near abroad appear. Russia needs to consolidate its security interests by becoming an hegemon in the region, therefore the use of latent conflicts to position itself as the 'Russian World's savior' allows it a position of mediator and ascendent power on the neighboring area.

### **3.2. Threats perceptions: a new oriented policy**

The unresolved issue of the West-Russia relations and the obstacle that the west represents in Russia's development are the origins of the issues between the blocs in the current system, since Russia had to find new strategies for its development and its national security. Russia was actually willing to deepen its relations with the West based on an *equal relation*: to this date, the principle of equality is the most important when it comes to Russian conception of security and its external actions and image reverberation.

The accumulation of the threats, mainly disarmament and 'out of region' influence, added to the ambient western politics of indifference is going to operate as a motivation for a shift in policy towards a concrete definition of Russia's other in the West. The definition of Russia Self-perception through the eyes of its relations with the West is the instigator of a new policy in the sense that Moscow will orient its national security rhetoric towards the research of allies. There is thus a strong relation between national security and Russian external identity since this identity will be the vector of policies destined to its allies in view of securing political leverage. The closer the allies are, the more leverage Russia has against its Other.

First, there are concerns about disarmament in the ex-soviet republics, notably in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as Russia is alarmed by a spillover from conflicts and crime in the CIS. The control of non conventional weapons in the Near Abroad

remains of high priority.<sup>95</sup> The first conception of Russian foreign policy sets the post soviet area as a main priority, as it highlights the need to negotiate the demilitarization, as well as emphasize a certain help for Russian help in the sense of enhancing their national security and preserving their national security. One of the task of the first doctrine is also to find a way to overcome ex-colonies resistance to cooperation. As a matter of fact, ‘peace and demilitarization in neighboring region is the doctrine to Russia’s own survival.’<sup>96</sup>

On the other hand, Russia mainly conceives its foreign policy on the basis of reaction to an external stimuli.<sup>97</sup> Russia naturally perceives the Post Soviet Space as a sphere of influence and sovereign interests. ‘*Out of region influence*’ is the term employed by the Kremlin and the CSTO to qualify external influence in the CIS, which is also considered as mostly dangerous, unfriendly or interfering with Russian national security.<sup>98</sup> A more assertive foreign policy towards Eastern Europe represents a threat for the security of the Federation: the expansion of NATO to Central Europe as well as the design of effective policies targeting Russia’s neighbors installed a climate of defiance, especially when those policy aim to provoke a ‘Western’ slide in Russia’s close countries, at the risk of underestimate the will of Russian diasporas present in those countries.

« It deems the contemporary international system as discriminatory towards the majority of cultures and cultural identities, [...] which is manifested in the ongoing psychological “containment” of Russia, including attempts to reinterpret postwar history.»<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Yakovlec-Golani H. Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in the Slavis Triangle. Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes. Vol.53, No2/4 (June-Spet-Dec. 2011), pp. 379-400.

<sup>96</sup> Leichtova, M. Misunderstanding Russia, edited by Magda Leichtova, Taylor and Francis, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central.

<sup>97</sup> Leichtova, M. Misunderstanding Russia, 2014.

<sup>98</sup> Nikitin, A. Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space, 2008.

<sup>99</sup> Leichtova, M. Misunderstanding Russia, 2014.

### 3.3. Russia and its Others

According to Hopf, the Russian Self in the 1990s could be constituted of three kinds of Others: the Historical Self, the External Self and the Internal Self.<sup>100</sup> It is not erroneous to consider that Russian construction of the Self is a complex phenomena, encompassing elements of past perception, threat perception and internal perception, as approached in *Figure 3 : 'A map of Russian Identity: Moscow 1999'* attached below from Hopf's book *Social Construction of International Politics, Identities and Foreign Policy Moscow 1955-1999*. As for our attempt to draw the contour of a Russian external identity, we will not aboard the internal Self in this paper as being not especially relevant to the research. However, I will try to produce a valuable explanation of the Russian Self definition by developing in the following sub-sections the conceptions of historical others, relative to the past and the empire perception, as well as the external others embodied by the threats perceptions and the West.

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<sup>100</sup> Hopf T. *Social construction of International politics: identities and foreign policies, Moscow 1955-1999*.



3.3.(a) Figure 3: Hopf's scheme of Russian Self identity perception, 1999.<sup>101</sup>



<sup>101</sup> Hopf T. Social construction of International politics: identities and foreign policies, Moscow 1955-1999.

### 3.3.2. Perception of the past

There are strong features of past perception in the definition of the Russian self. Indeed there is a conviction of special relationship with the countries of the former USSR with regards to the common soviet legacy. *First*, the notion of slavic neighbors with shared history, culture and language. Russia has a tendency to recognize its allies in the former USSR republics as they were bound to the same state for decades. Secondly, there is an emphasize on ‘compatriots’. The notion of ‘Compatriots’ — the ethnic Russians leaving abroad — has been introduced in 1992 by President Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev.

Since 1994, the concept has developed into a concrete state policy, manifesting itself in a series of laws and state programs, as well as through some foreign policy decisions.<sup>102</sup> It has been later mentioned in the Russian Conceptions of Foreign Policy of 2000 and 2008, and a special consideration is given to those Russians abroad in ensuring their rights and maintaining ties with them.<sup>103</sup> ‘Within Russia, there is a consensus that Moscow has some responsibility to those people who identify themselves as Russians or Russian speakers and who live in the successor states of the former Soviet Union.’<sup>104</sup>

Second, Russia’s nostalgia of being a great power plays a significant role in the Russian Self definition. Russia is having a fight between being a regional power and a superpower.<sup>105</sup> Surprisingly enough, both of those concepts intermingle, in the view that Moscow seeks to *assert its status of great power in the international sphere through the consolidation of its status of regional power*. Indeed this latent regionalism plays a critical role in the sense of status claim in Russian policy making. From the 1990s and at several occasions, Russian elites have seek to manage *Russia’s self-esteem* by pursuing both assimilating and social competition strategies in most issues

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<sup>102</sup> The Russian World in Moscow’s Strategy. Igor Zevelev. CSIS, August 22, 2016. Web: [<https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-world-moscows-strategy>]

<sup>103</sup> Leichtova, M. Misunderstanding Russia, 2014.

<sup>104</sup> The Russian World in Moscow’s Strategy, CSIS, 2016.

<sup>105</sup> Nikitin, A. Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space, 2008; Trenin, D. (2011). Rusia and the New Eastern Europe;

areas.<sup>106</sup> Russia tries to achieve a strategic independence and this requires a regional prominence.<sup>107</sup>

« The concept of Russia as a regional power is an important element of the national identity of a large state protecting and defending nations living within its territories or in its surroundings. Such a concept of personal identity allows Russia to preserve its influence in foreign countries close to its borders, which is for Russia emotionally important (nostalgia and feelings of solidarity), rationally necessary (for security and economic reasons) and serves as a significant domestic policy topic and a gauge for a successful government.»<sup>108</sup>

Therefore, in order to achieve regional prominence, Russia has to consolidate its links with its Near Abroad. For that reason there is an intermingling conception of national security, which is part of a broader aspiration of power status achievement. The definition of national interests are crucial to fit in the plan of creating an effective identity policy towards the CIS, and the way this identity operates on the region affects the shaping the national interest. Russia's position in the world is the critical factor of identity definition for the Russian elites:

« The search for Russian identity is closely connected with perceptions of Russia and other world regions. The way in which Russian elites perceive Russia and what its place is in the world defines its priorities and its manner of behavior in the international system.»<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Morozov, V. *Russia's postcolonial identity: A subaltern empire in a Eurocentric world*. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2015.

<sup>107</sup> Trenin, D. (2011). *Russia and the New Eastern Europe*;

<sup>108</sup> Leichtova, Magda. *Misunderstanding Russia*, 2014.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

### 3.3.3. Russia's external Other: the West

The West constitutes the most significant Russia's other and in this way is the most important point in Russia's Self definition. Russia defines its position in 'the modern world' in accordance with its relation with the West. However, there has been a shift in the West conception and therefore Russia's Self conception during the time between the Russian conception of foreign policy in 1993 and 2008 under Vladimir Putin.<sup>110</sup> It ranges from the 'efforts to become an integral part of one civilization to the aspirations of balancing Western "unilateralism" and the assertive condemnation of Western states for their attempts at keeping Russia in a weak position.'<sup>111</sup> The West to Russia is the pillar stone of the foundation of an external identity and thus an external policy, in the way it 'formulates Russian self-confidence and self-awareness, and is the cornerstone for defining its role and goals in the system.'<sup>112</sup>

## 3.4. The nexus National Security/Identity

### 3.4.1. Unipolarity and policy of Selective approach

In his article '*Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space*', Alexander Nikitin gives a comprehensive overview of the changes that characterize the transition to a post-soviet foreign policy to a *Post post-soviet strategy*. He notably comments what we can call the policy of 'selective approach': the features in Russia's shift from a neutral foreign policy towards its near abroad to an emphasis on its relations with the Caucasus, central Asia and Eurasia.

The first National Security Strategy of 1997 defines clearly the out of influence threat and is the first official national document to draw the relation between the threats of 'out of influence region' and the need for a rapprochement with the CIS:

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<sup>110</sup> 'Conception of Russian Foreign Policy' 1993 and 2008.

<sup>111</sup> Leichtova, Magda. *Misunderstanding Russia*, 2014.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

« Threats to the Russian Federation's national security in the international sphere are manifested via the attempts of other states to counter Russia's consolidation as an influential center of the multi-polar world that is taking shape. [...] By their policy these states are seeking to reduce the Russian Federation's importance in the solution of key problems of the world community and in the activity of international organizations. As a whole this could lead to the limitation of Russia's influence, the infringement of its most important national interests, and the weakening of its positions in Europe, the Near East, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia.

The threat of the emergence or aggravation in the CIS states of political, ethnic, and economic crises capable of delaying or destroying the integration process is acquiring special importance for our state.

These countries' establishment as friendly, independent, stable, and democratic countries is extremely important to the Russian Federation. »<sup>113</sup>

However the National Security from 2000 proves to a more assertive document, which states the creation of regional security blocks and lists the threats for Russian regionalism: 'NATO's expansion to the east; efforts to position military facilities close to Russia's borders; the weakening of the CIS's integration; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; conflicts on Russia's borders or borders of the CIS; claims to Russian territory; efforts of other countries to weaken Russia.'<sup>114</sup>


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<sup>113</sup> Russian National Security Concept 1997, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 Dec 1997 pp 4-5 \ FBIS-SOV-97-364, 30 Dec 1997. Translated, web: [<https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html>]

<sup>114</sup> Leichtova, Magda. Misunderstanding Russia, 2014.

3.4.(a)

Figure 4: Russian Identity/National Security nexus



In lights of those documents, we have been able to identify a nexus of Identity/ National Security in Russian foreign policy shaping during the 1990s. The operationalization of Russian identity on RUFPP takes place within the framework of *Othering*: the perception of threats and the relationship with the West are the main factors of the creation of national interests and pose a threat to Russian self conceived security. The operationalization of identity takes place in the recognition of Allies, — ‘friends of Russia’ by the Russian elites. Special attention will be given to this allies, in particular deeper engagements with regard to cooperation and cultural ties.

### 3.5. Operationalization of Russian Security/Identity nexus in the NEE

The precedent sections aimed to reveal a subsistent link between identity formation in Russia in the immediate Post- Cold War era and the way it translates into national security goals, and vice versa. Analogically with the precedent chapter on the European Union, this part is going to analyze the processes of *operationalization of the Russian security/identity nexus* towards the region of the NEE. To fulfill this task we will review the official Foreign Policy documents of the Russian federation, in order to reveal features of identity translation to the Russian foreign policy institutions dedicated the near abroad. Because this paper focuses on the operationalization of identity in the NEE region, only the following institutions are going to be inspected as comprising at least one state of the the concerned area of interest — the CIS; the former Eurasian Economic Community (EEC)/EuraSec; the Union State of Russia-Belarus; the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Yet at the difference of the European Identity/Foreign Policy nexus, there are no clear conceptualization of identity operationalization in RUFP, in the sense no explicit Russian identity is mentioned nor the mechanisms of its utilization though multilateral organizations. Russian institutionalization of identity for external purposes is an *implicit and ongoing process* that takes place in the formulation of goals by the government elites in the fundamental documents of foreign policy.

The choice to focus on the CIS for the following section is motivated by the fact that this paper is focusing on the construction and operationalization nexus of identity in foreign policy making, thus the framework of our study concerns uniquely the process by which identity is institutionalized in the actors' foreign policy. The results and the implementation of those mechanisms are not the objects of this research paper.

As a matter of fact, the Russian Foreign Policy Conception does present in a relative explicit way features of identity operationalization with regards to the commitment to the CIS, but those features of operationalization are simply not present in other integrative institutions such as the ancient Eurasian Economic Community

(EuraSec)<sup>115</sup>; nor in the Union State of Russia-Belarus.<sup>116</sup> However in the recent Eurasian Economic Union there are notions of relative identity translation in the guiding lines regarding ‘the principle of the sovereign equality of states, the need for unconditional respect for the rule of constitutional rights and freedoms of man and national’ as well as ‘solidarity and cooperation between their peoples while respecting their history, culture and traditions.’<sup>117</sup>

### 3.5.1. The Commonwealth of Independent States

While some features of enhanced cooperation are to be noticed in the Concept of Russian Foreign Policy 2000;

« The emphasis will be made on the development of good neighborly relations and strategic partnership with all CIS member states.»<sup>118</sup>

a more assertive conceptualization of the Russian Security/Identity nexus is to be observed only in the FP Concepts of 2008 and 2013:

« Russia forges friendly relations with all the CIS Member States on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, respect and regard for the interests of each other. Strategic partnerships and alliances are developed with States that demonstrate their readiness to engage in them.»<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> See the Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community, Astana, October 2000. Web, translated in English: [[http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other\\_treaties/text.jsp?file\\_id=234738](http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=234738)]

<sup>116</sup> See Treaty of Union State between Russia and Belarus [Договор о создании Союзного государства] December 1999. Web: [<https://rg.ru/2008/05/26/dogovor-dok.html>]

<sup>117</sup> Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, November, 2011. Web: [[http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/docs/treaty\\_on\\_eeu.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/docs/treaty_on_eeu.pdf)]

<sup>118</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000. Web: [<https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>]

<sup>119</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, January 12, 2008. Web: [<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>]



Nonetheless, there is a shift in the Russian security agenda in 2012 when a ‘more violent use of identity’ can be noticed in Russian national elites’ discourse.<sup>120</sup> Vladimir Putin notably did introduce the concept of Russian identity in the world during his speech at the Valdai Conference in 2013:

« They [geopolitical influences] depend on whether the citizens of a given country consider themselves a nation, to what extent they identify with their own history, values and traditions, and whether they are united by common goals and responsibilities. In this sense, the question of finding and strengthening national identity really is fundamental for Russia. »<sup>121</sup>

The regional priorities section of the Foreign Policy Concept of the RF in 2013 do state relatively clearly the identity relation with deep cooperation in the CIS:

« [...] preserving and increasing common cultural and civilizational heritage which is an essential resource for the CIS as a whole and for each of the Commonwealth's Member States in the context of globalization. Particular attention will be paid to providing support to compatriots living in the CIS Member States, as well as to negotiating agreements on the protection of their educational, linguistic, social, labor, humanitarian and other rights and freedoms. »<sup>122</sup>

The document emphasizes on the Russian conceptualization of the world order, with a certain amalgamation of national identity narratives, international security discourse and domestic goals. Indeed, it denounces processes of globalization that

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<sup>120</sup> Russian national identity and foreign policy. CSIS. December 2016. Web: [[https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161208\\_Zevelev\\_RussianNationalIdentity\\_Web.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161208_Zevelev_RussianNationalIdentity_Web.pdf)]

<sup>121</sup> Vladimir Putin meets with members the Valdai international discussion club. Transcript of the speech and the meeting, Valdai Club, 2013. Web: [[http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/vladimir\\_putin\\_meets\\_with\\_members\\_the\\_valdai\\_international\\_discussion\\_club\\_transcript\\_of\\_the\\_speech\\_/](http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/vladimir_putin_meets_with_members_the_valdai_international_discussion_club_transcript_of_the_speech_/)]

<sup>122</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 February 2013. Web: [[http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186](http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186)]

thrive to impose (western) values upon other civilizations, that drive intolerance and tensions in international relations. The document states that priority in world politics is to ‘prevent civilizational fault line clashes and to intensify efforts to forge partnership of cultures, religions and civilizations in order to ensure a harmonious development of mankind.’<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to answer the question on how the European Union and Russia project their identity in framing their foreign policy towards the New Eastern Europe. This paper tried to compare the processes of identity construction and identity operationalization of Russia and the EU in the NEE. I argue that European identity operationalization is more effective than Russian identity operationalization, in the way that the EU has been able to translate successfully identity patterns in its core institutions and to create foreign policy mechanisms dedicated to the diffusion of this identity as a mandatory condition for international cooperation. At the contrary, Russian identity/policy nexus remains weak because of a lack in conceptualization and as a matter of fact an ineffective operationalization. The following paragraphs will provide the reader with the main findings of the research as well as recommendations.

Area definition was a critical part for the understanding of this paper and the repercussions of the research. The introduction tried to cover the issue of the existence of a 'zone of common interest'. Because the premises of this project relied on the interrogation of how Russian foreign policy and European foreign policy competed in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, the issue of influence had to be raised, therefore the measurement of such tendencies have to be completed within a precise geographical termination. The concept of New Eastern Europe has been debated in the scholarship yet successfully describe an area that we could qualify as a buffer zone, a link between two blocs and a zone of competing influence for common interest. However, the EU and Russia surprisingly lack in region definition for the specific area of the NEE, therefore policies directed to this area remain weak in term of pertaining peaceful and sustainable integration.

The first chapter intended to reveal the link between identity and foreign policy and to present the theoretical framework of the paper. Hemel and Lenz theory of identity/policy nexus is therefore the basis of this study. Through a model of identity construction and identity operationalization, the theory intends to reveal the process through which national or regional identity translates to foreign policy, through the formulation of concrete values and goals in the creation of institutions for external action. Identity construction is the process by which accumulation of raw material and constitutive norms are accumulated to formulate an identity. Identity operationalization is the process through which the constructed identity is operationalized in foreign policy, via its concrete formulation in foreign policy institutions. Cognitive theories of the Self and the Other are essential to understand the process of identity construction used in this paper, as the way the actors perceive their Other is a crucial factor in the framing of the definition of Self-identity.

The chapter two analyzed the European identity/foreign policy nexus and intended to demonstrate its institutionalization in the ENP and in the Eastern Partnership. If European identity has been created and institutionalized in the 1960s, it experienced readjustments in the Post-Cold War period. European identity is formed by constitutive norms, such as human rights or democracy that have been the pillar values around which the Union constructed itself. Those values of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, have been institutionalized in the constitutive treaties and set as goals for foreign policy. However the international system underwent changes that constrained the European Union to adjust to a new world reality. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of insecurity coming from unstable new created states in Eastern Europe raises the need for comprehensive strategies.

The reformed European integrative mechanism consists in concentric circles that places the identity as a central and non negotiable condition for deeper integration with the Union. Aid, Association, and Accession are the different degree of integration with the EU and act as mechanisms to fulfill goals such as achieve political stability in the East Neighborhood, encourage the development of new instruments for coordination, and strengthen confidence for further economic cooperation. Through these mechanisms the EU is diffusing its own identity as they impose from

the cooperating states a mandatory commitment to the European core values of democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights. Nonetheless the EU integrative structure puts a tremendous pressure on neighboring states in the way that they present no alternative other than alienation if the European values are not the priority of the states. There is a logic of inclusion/exclusion whom has been the victim has not putting with the norms in the way Europe represents it.

Those findings lead us to conclude that the EU as aspiration of being a normative power and it achieve its goal by the diffusion of its identity. We thus sought to analyze how this diffusion takes place in the NEE, by operationalization in institutions. We discovered that if the CFSP is part of external strategy with normative goals, a clear operationalization of identity in the NEE region is not to happen before 2003 et the creation of the ENP and its Eastern dimension a couple of years later. The NEE strategic documents explicitly provide proof for operationalization of identity in the region as they stipule in their constitution the commitment to European values to be a paramount condition for the setting of a ‘privileged relationship’ with the EU. The EaP gives even more debt to these commitments by expressly focusing on the 6 neighboring, post soviet, Eastern countries of the EU, with the promise of bringing them better living standards by a deeper association with the EU.

The chapter three intended to analyze the Russian foreign policy/Identity nexus and put in evidence rather the existence of a National Security/Identity nexus. Russian conception of Self identity has to be put in the context of the Post Cold war period and state reconstruction. New formed Russia has been and still have troubles when it comes to the definition of he Self and its relation with the Ex-Soviet satellites, in view of the fact that they constitute a hole, sharing historical roots, language, religion , as well as socio-economical and political culture. However, Russia has made tremendous adjusting efforts to integrate into the West, as well as trying no to undermine its neighborhood ‘westernization’ by the implementation of the CIS. Under Eltsine, a policy of encouragement is lead towards the CIS so that it engages with the West, in order to prevent dissension between the states themselves and to fix eventual claims of Russian imperialism.

However, several circumstances drove the crucial need for Russia to come up with a new strategy. Indeed, the West old strategies of confinement constrained Russia to find an other Allie to achieve its position in the international sphere. As a matter of fact, Western policy of indifference is the origin of the shift in Russian Self perception as it awoke a certain notion of national security along with threats and interests for the nation. Russia's Self-perception is intrinsically linked with threat perception as Russian's Other is defined by those threats. Russia's Self and Other's understanding are shaped by strong features of past perception: perception of historical relationship with the CIS as well as nostalgia of being a regional power play in Russian definition of the Self. Put together those notions of threats and perceptions of the past form a complex of national security and interests that forge Russian identity.

Operationalization of the nexus Russian national Security/Identity occurs via a policy of selective approach towards the Post-Soviet space. Founding documents of Russian Foreign policy such as the national Security Strategy of 1997 and the Conceptions of Foreign Policy of 2000 evoke such notion of threats and selective approach but a clear translation of the nexus is not to be noticed in governmental strategies. If along the time the National Security Concepts and the Concepts of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation become more assertive, there is a lack in clear formulation of the identity purpose in the shaping of a policy of selective approach. Yet, if some features of identity operationalization are present in the formulation of foreign policy towards the area of the Post-Soviet Space, they remain really weak with regards to enhanced cooperation with the area as a whole, and there are no explicit conceptualization of a zone of common interest such as the NEE. As a matter of fact, the absence of a clear conceptualization of either the zone and the nexus in policy enshrines the creation of mechanism comparable to the Europeans one with regards to identity diffusion.

For the sake of clarity, the following table is going to provide a summary of the research findings, and is going to put them in perspective for the reader's understanding. The findings of the research show that the European Union is way more effective with regards to the diffusion of its identity in the NEE region. It created

integration mechanisms that place European values and identity at the core conditions for enhanced cooperation with states, and coupled those mechanisms with programs focusing on the region such as the ENP and the EaP. Diffusion of identity is thus very successful in the way it is mandatory for external states to comply in order to achieve deeper cooperation with the EU, and secure better living standards.

At the contrary, Russia is suffering from an absence of clear conceptualization of a national identity and thus the impossibility to translate it effectively in its foreign policy institutions. Russia lacks incentives for the creation of proper mechanisms of identity diffusion and integration, at the EU's image. Russia strategy of participation in existing organizations should be revised for the creation of its own. Thus Russia's operationalization of identity is ineffective in a general way, furthermore in the NEE.

<b>CRITERIAS</b>	<b>European identity</b>	<b>Russian identity</b>
<b>PROCESS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION</b>	Simple	Complex
<b>Formation of the Self</b>	Agreement on constitutive norms	Internal dissensions "Who is Russia?" Atlanticists vs. Eurasianists
		Perception of the past
		Emphasize on relation with the Other
<b>Formation of the Other</b>	Dynamic of inclusion/exclusion	Based on threat perception
	Identity/Foreign Policy nexus	National Security/Identity nexus
	explicit nexus	implicit nexus
<b>NEXUS OF IDENTITY/ FOREIGN POLICY</b>	<u>Integrative:</u> Internal to external, Constitutive norms translate into external goals, logic of diffusion of norms and integration	<u>Defensive:</u> External to internal Perception of external threats translate into national security priorities and interests, logic of threat containment, research of Allie

<b>CRITERIAS</b>	<b>European identity</b>	<b>Russian identity</b>
<b>Identity</b>	Constitutive norms Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Rule of Law	historical ties, language, religion , as well as socio- economical and political culture
	Clear formulation and conceptualization of identity for external purpose. 1973, Copenhagen Declaration	Unclear, lack of official formulation and conceptualization of Russian identity
<b>PROCESS OF IDENTITY OPERATIONALIZATION</b>	Mecanisms of integration	No mecanisms
	Clear formulation in governmental strategies	Unclear formulation in governmental strategies
	Identity diffusion through European integration scheme concentric circles. Wide scope, ‘moralizing mission’	Policy of selective approach, ‘Friends of Russia’. Emotionalism, Nostalgia.  Narrow scope.
	Normative power, achievement of goals by diffusion of norms. Identity becomes conditionality for cooperation.	Accession to status of great power if confirmation of Regional power. Identity becomes a power instrument
<b>SHAPING NEE POLICIES</b>	Relative region definition	Inexistant region definition
	Creation of specific multilateral programs towards the region. ENP, EaP	Enhanced participation in existing multilateral programs. CIS


**Recommendations:** After enlighten of the research results, I allow myself to make some recommendations in order to conclude this paper. If progress have been made towards the definition of a national identity and put it in context during the last years by President Vladimir Putin, Russia should put incentive on promoting its identity in its sphere of influence.



Russia basically suffers from the nostalgia of the past and even though it ceased to be an empire, it can see itself prosper only by positioning itself as a world great power. The diffusion of a supposed self-Russian shared identity in the CIS is Moscow big strategy to secure a place of regional leader and Moscow legitimates strategic geopolitical views. However, a center of power needs a cultural aura. Sure Russia has a Russian-world to base its grip on the ex-Soviet republics, yet Russian cultural diplomacy is practically nonexistent. Moscow is still able to exert a strong geopolitical influence through the NEE and Eurasia region for the only reason that those countries are economically strong emerging markets with regards to energy. Yet when it comes to the NEE I am afraid to assess that Russia has no strategy, besides a policy based on emotions. Russia's cultural diplomacy can be one of the means to assert a stronger identity power in the NEE, but this sphere of diplomacy remains extremely weak. Russia would gain to enhance its identity in the NEE through a real soft power strategy based on strengthening existing links, not only economically.


## Annex 1. Maps

*Map: Eastern Europe after the Collapse of USSR, in French*




Source: <http://lhgcostebelle.canalblog.com/archives/2017/week1/index.html>

Map: EU integration and new accession of 2004



Source: [http://www.dadalos-europe.org/int/grundkurs5neu/grundkurs\\_5.htm](http://www.dadalos-europe.org/int/grundkurs5neu/grundkurs_5.htm)

Map: European Neighborhood Policy



Source : <https://epthinktank.eu/2016/10/25/the-european-neighbourhood-policy/>

## **Annex 2. Overview: Structure of the EU foreign policy**

For the sake of comprehension and additional information, this annex is presenting a brief overview of the different structures and institutions of the European Union Foreign Policy, using a chronological approach. The following descriptions can help to set the frame for further analysis of the European Union (EU) towards the Near abroad, taking into account the shift in policy resulting from the creation of new institutions as well as the rise of new challenges, that necessitated such improvements in the structure.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU was established as a part of the three pillars-system, in the treaty of the European Union ratified in 1993.<sup>124</sup> The initial aim of the CFSP is to preserve peace, strengthen international security, promote international cooperation. It seeks to develop and consolidate democracy, by the strict abidance to the rule of law, the respect of human rights and of fundamental freedoms.

Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 that reformed EU foreign policy and created a new structure and a new strategy regarding the external action, the concerns towards the near abroad remained rather weak. There is no particular strategy dedicated to the post soviet space, nevertheless some discussions on bilateral rapprochement and deepening of relations with some countries of the CIS are already undertaken.<sup>125</sup> They will be the foundation of further cooperation under the Lisbon Treaty.

The Lisbon Treaty represents a benchmark in EUFP. It defines the new interests and priorities of the EU external action, the modalities of implementation of a new

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<sup>124</sup> Fact Sheets on the European Union. Web: [[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU\\_6.1.1.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.1.1.html)]

<sup>125</sup> De Saint- Malo a Lisbonne- textes choisis de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune en Europe 1998-2008. (PESD) Web: [<http://europavarietas.org/sites/default/files/DeSaintMaloaLisbonnev1.3.pdf>]

common policy and the goals to achieve. It provides the frame for a change in structure : from now on the a Common Security and Defense Policy is implemented, as a part of the CFSP, and will be under the jurisdiction of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Equally will be created the European External Action Service, acting like the ‘national diplomatic network’ of the EU abroad.

This is under these new structures that the most significant change in policies towards eastern Europe will be operated. Those developments can be observed in the CFSP annual reports from the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) to the European Parliament (EP) from the years 2009 to 2014. They provide with the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP. They account and evaluate the measures and activities carried out during during these 6 years. They also justify the creation of specific programs related to the post soviet space.

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